AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO: A CASE STUDY

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University

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Promoter/Supervisor: Dr L Snodgrass
Co-Promoter: Prof P Cunningham

2012
DECLARATION

I, Nkosi Makhonya Bukae: 206038275 hereby declare that the thesis for students' qualification to be awarded is my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for assessment or completion of any postgraduate qualification to another University of for another qualification.

Nkosi Makhonya Bukae
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My sincere gratitude goes to my Promoters Dr Lynne Snodgrass and Prof Peter Cunningham for the immeasurably immense contribution they made throughout this study. The successful completion of this thesis would not have been possible without their informed insights, inputs and guidance. They were always readily available to assist.

Many thanks are also due to all my sources of information for having accorded me the opportunity to conduct interviews which formed the core of this thesis. I also want to thank my cousin, Colonel Emang for linking me to some of the retired Botswana Defence Force soldiers who participated during the Lesotho interventions. I am also highly indebted to the University of Botswana for giving me the opportunity and material support to pursue a doctoral programme.

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Last but not least, I convey immense appreciation to my wife Patricia for the unwavering support and encouragements during the programme. Her understanding and resilience during my prolonged absence and engagements were equal to none. My sisters Pedzisani Khani and Thulugang Adam also made immense contributions to the completion of this thesis by taking over different roles in the family during my absence. To them I say thank you very much.
DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my wife Patricia Bukae for the unrelenting support she accorded me throughout my doctoral programme. It is also dedicated to my late parents who provided both the financial and moral support throughout my primary and tertiary education.
ABSTRACT

The focus of this study is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) preventive diplomacy interventions in Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. The core aim of the study was to evaluate the efficacy of the SADC security mechanism (the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in conflict prevention, management and resolution on the basis of the Lesotho experience.

Data for this qualitative case study was collected through interviews and document analysis. The twenty four participants for the study were drawn from the SADC OPDS unit, Lesotho political parties, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Academics from the University of Botswana (UB) and the National University of Lesotho (NUL), retired Botswana Defence officers who participated in the Lesotho missions and office of the post-2007 election dispute dialogue facilitator in Lesotho. Documents on the SADC Treaties, Protocols, Communiqués and interventions in other set ups were used to highlight its operational policies, mandate, structures, successes and challenges. Lesotho was chosen as a case study because SADC employed both non-coercive (SADC Troika and Eminent Person mediation, 1994 and 2007 respectively) and coercive measures (the 1998 military intervention).

The findings of the study revealed that SADC as a regional body had its own successes and challenges. Different perceptions on the SADC interventions in Lesotho emerged mainly between the participants from the ruling party and the opposition parties. While the former commended SADC for successfully mitigating the calamitous effects of 1994, 1998 and 2007 post-electoral violence, the opposition parties viewed the regional organisations as engaged in illegal interference in the domestic affairs of the country to defend the incumbent governing party. It also emerged from the study that the SADC security mechanism has numerous structural and operational flaws. There were several unanswered questions revolving around the legality and mandate of some of the missions. For instance, no concrete evidence emerged as to whether the 1998 military intervention was authorised by the SADC.

The study also revealed that SADC has learnt valuable lessons from the Lesotho missions. Some of the reforms which the SADC has introduced in the OPDS such as the establishment of the SADC Stand by Force, Early Warning structures, the Mediation Unit, and a panel of expert mediators emanated mainly from the Lesotho experiences.

The study recommends that SADC needs to harmonise the efforts of its OPDS structures such as the Mediation Unit; the Troika; the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the Summit of Heads of States and Governments for rapid, coherent and well coordinated interventions in future regional preventive missions.

It is also recommended that SADC should focus on identifying and mitigating underlying causal factors such as underdevelopment; poverty; deprivation of freedoms, marginalisation and other forms of social stratifications and oppression in its preventive diplomacy missions if durable peace is to be achieved in Lesotho and any other future cases.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>All Basotho Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
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<td>AAFC</td>
<td>Allied Armed Forces Council</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Allied Democratic Front</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>BCP</td>
<td>Basotho Congress party</td>
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<td>BCP</td>
<td>Botswana Congress Party</td>
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<td>BDF</td>
<td>Botswana Defence Force</td>
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<td>BDNP</td>
<td>Basotho Democratic National Party</td>
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<td>BNF</td>
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<td>BNP</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<td>CCL</td>
<td>Christian Council of Lesotho</td>
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<td>CMA</td>
<td>Common Monetary Area</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil Military Operation Centre</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>DACOEOCD</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECONOMIC Community of West African States</td>
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<td>FEWER</td>
<td>Forum of Early Warning and Early Response</td>
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<td>FLS</td>
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<td>FPTP</td>
<td>First Past The Post</td>
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<td>Global Political Agreement</td>
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<td>HCNM</td>
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<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IEC</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>Inter-Governmental Authority for</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>Interim Political Authority</td>
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<td>MMP</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organisation of American States</td>
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<td>Organisation of African States</td>
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<td>ODIHR</td>
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<td>OPDS</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PMU</td>
<td>Police Mobile Unit</td>
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<td>PODEMO</td>
<td>Peoples Democratic Movement</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>Proportional Representation</td>
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<td>RRF</td>
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<td>RECAMP</td>
<td>Reinforcement of the African Capabilities for Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>SACU</td>
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<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>Transformation Resource Centre</td>
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<td>UNDPA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>UNOSAA</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa</td>
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<td>UNPREDEP</td>
<td>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force</td>
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<td>UNRF</td>
<td>Ugandan National Rescue Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute for Peace</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WANEP</td>
<td>West African Network for Peace</td>
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<td>WNBF</td>
<td>West Nile Bank Front</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<td>Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
Overview of the Study

1.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the background to the study, the problem statement, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study, theoretical framework, research methodology, scope of the study, limitations and a summary outline of each chapter.

1.2 Background to the Study
This study is an analysis of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervention missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. In order to have a full grasp of the persistent conflicts in Lesotho and the resultant SADC interventions, it is imperative to give a picture of how the world, especially post-Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa, became a centre stage for protracted intra-state conflicts necessitating regional responses and solutions by different regional organisations and solutions. The SADC missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho should be located and understood within this global conflict environment.

Throughout history, the world has grappled with conflicts and wars in their different manifestations, intensity, scope and consequences. All continents of the world have experienced conflicts in one way or the other. Isard (1992: 1) highlights the inevitability of conflicts in human society in his statement that “[t]he history of human kind and the rise and fall of civilisations is unquestionably a story of conflict. Conflict is inherent in human activities. It is omnipresent....” This is evidenced by conflicts in spite of the existence of international, regional and civil society organisations for the maintenance of international peace and security. The sources of conflict in most cases are multidimensional and multifaceted, encompassing historical, external and internal social, economic and political factors such as the colonial legacy of ill-defined borders, ethnic, religious and cultural marginalisation or domination, struggle for limited resources, struggle for power, underdevelopment, crippling indebtedness, globalisation, skewed distribution of resources, corruption, undemocratic governance, administrative failures and collapsed states, military dictatorships, weak systems and institutions of governance, flawed electoral systems and electoral fraud, erosion of the state power and crises of legitimacy in governance.

The post-Cold War era experienced more destructive regionalised intra-state conflicts which threatened global peace and stability when numerous conflicts culminating in immense human casualties and material destruction consumed different parts of the world. In this regard, Joseph (1999: 9) comments, “[t]he anticipation of enhanced possibilities for international peace, security and co-operation at the end of the Cold War has given way to confusion and disillusionment as a result of the intensifying conflicts in parts of Africa, Asia and Europe.” Despite the demise of the Cold War politics which constrained their interventions, the United Nations Security Council, regional organisations
and the international community appear to be paralysed in that they have failed to act decisively in the face of the numerous conflicts, as is evident in the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Burundi, Sudan, Rwanda, Angola, Uganda, The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic to mention a few. Lamenting the plight of this conflict-ridden world Annan (2000a: 173) stated that “[i]f I were a doctor examining the health of the world today, I would be greatly alarmed at the state of my patient The international community, vibrant in its resolve to achieve a strong, stable and a healthy political environment as the post-Cold War began, was drained and weakened by one bout after another of conflict during the last decade... It has had to weather the massive displacement of people, extensive loss of life, and irreparable damage which are conflict’s concomitants.”

1.3 Conflicts in Africa

In the last decade conflicts have been raging in Lesotho, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Somalia; border disputes were looming between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula (the contested territory, has since been handed to Cameroon in 2006), Ethiopia and Eritrea, Botswana and Namibia over Sedudu Islands, (the dispute was resolved by the International Court of Justice at the Hague), secessionist conflicts looming in Nigeria the Niger Delta), Senegal (Casamance), Ethiopia, and Namibia (Caprivi Strip) and latent conflicts due to autocratic regimes in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. North Africa experienced political upheavals in the opening months of 2011 culminating in the collapse of long-time autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Sorbo (1999: 199) highlights the image of Africa as a continent in which many states are “candidates for state collapse or civil war and (in which) there are a host of other countries where present low level ethnic and political conflicts remain unresolved.”

The SADC region did not escape this scourge that bedevilled most regions of Africa. Southern Africa experienced devastating anti-colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. After attaining their independence in 1975, Angola and Mozambique were ravaged by more than two decades of civil war. Both the wars were fuelled by the Cold War ideological rivalry between the East and the West and it was very difficult to find a
lasting solution. Lesotho, which is the case study in this thesis, has also faced incessant post-election conflicts since attaining independence in 1966. The 1970 elections were won by the opposition Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), and the incumbent Basotho National Party (BNP) hijacked the democratic dispensation by launching a coup, banning the opposition parties and forcing their leaders into exile. The dictatorial regime of Leabua Jonathan polluted the political climate in the region until it was halted by a military coup sponsored by apartheid South Africa. This was mainly because the Leabua Jonathan government did not comply with the apartheid regime’s directives such as expelling the liberation activists from Lesotho and signing non-aggression pacts with South Africa (Matlosa, 1993, 1995). The landlocked Kingdom of Losotho went through a process of democratisation with multi-party elections in 1993 and 1998 won by the BCP and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) respectively. The election triggered violent confrontations with the losing parties contesting the elections as fraudulent. The 1993 and 1998 elections were followed by coups launched by the monarchy, the military and opposition parties. The electoral model, the First Past the Post (FPTP) did not help the situation as it promoted winner takes all. In this situation, the opposition, which was voted for by a significant portion, felt marginalised as far as representation in parliament was concerned. Lesotho also went for national elections in 2007 through a new electoral model, the Mixed Member Proportion (MMP), but some political parties defrauded the model by forming alliances with smaller parties. In so doing, they distorted the proportional allocation of seats in parliament, leading to upheavals in which the opposition protested that the ruling LCD government had contravened the MMP regulation. These conflicts in Lesotho attracted the attention of SADC, which intervened in 1994, 1998 and 2007. During 1994 and 2007, SADC intervened through non-coercive means while in 1998; the regional body launched a military operation to restore law and order in the Kingdom.

These wars as will be indicated later in the study had devastating and catastrophic social, economic and political effects on the continent. All the above conflicts have constrained Africa’s development efforts and growth potential. There is an indisputable link between political stability and economic development. Economic prosperity cannot be realised in a conflict-ridden continent like Africa, as the already limited resources are diverted from productive use to sponsoring the war effort, and the obvious disruptions of conflicts on the economic activities. The conflicts also resulted in fragmentation of several African states, for example, Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Another worrying trend of African conflicts is that they have become regionalised and spread to destabilise several countries in the continent, for example the Great Lakes region (the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda), West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast) and the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan). Therefore, they may require regional solutions (Zartman 1989, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, de Waal 2003, International Crisis Group Africa Report No 62, 2003, Ajulu, 2004). This position is justified in view of the ineffective and indecisive interventions by the United Nations and the international community in African conflicts. Joseph (1999: 9) summarises the inaction by the developed world
thus; “[I]n Africa, it appears that the more intense and destructive the conflicts ... the greater the paralysis of international community in acting decisively to bring an end to the violence.” Worse still, according to Rugumamu (2002), while the international community paid less attention to the turbulent security crisis in Africa, the continental institutional and organisational conflict prevention, management and resolution capabilities have not developed at the same rate to counter the pervasive and escalating conflicts. It is in this light that it has become increasingly apparent and necessary that Africa should muster its resources and political will and commitment, to develop its capacity to deal with its growing and destructive security realities. In line with this, regional organisations formed security organs to intervene in their regional conflicts, as evidenced by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the (DRC), Lesotho and Zimbabwe.

In this study, the SADC preventive missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in the Kingdom of Lesotho will be used as case studies to examine the efficacy and capabilities of the SADC’s preventive diplomacy mechanism in preventing, managing and resolving regional conflicts. The SADC is an inter-governmental body comprising mainly Southern African states and a few others outside the geographical region such as Tanzania, the DRC, Mauritius and the Seychelles. The regional block was formed in April 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to coordinate economic development and integration among the independent Southern African states of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Angola. SADCC was later joined by Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa after they had attained their independence. In the 1980’s, the regional body’s political solidarity and support to those countries which were struggling for their independence was championed through its political wing; the Frontline States. Apartheid South African destabilisation incursions in the regional member states drove them to form a solid economic and political bulwark against the pariah state. The post-Cold war era political climate forced the regional body to redefine its objectives and operational institutions. In 1992 at its Windhoek Summit of Head of States and Governments, the SADC Treaty was signed by member states, transforming it from a co-ordination conference to a development community. The realisation that economic development can only be achieved in an atmosphere of peace and stability moved the regional body to form the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in 1996. The Organ and Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) protocols were ratified in 2001 and 2003 respectively. The Organ and MDP were bolstered by the establishment of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) in their cardinal task of promoting, maintaining and sustaining regional peace and security. The regional body pledged to intervene through peaceful diplomatic means in both regional intra and inter-state conflicts. It also emphasised the need for the use of coercive measures as a last resort where peaceful means failed or where gross violation of human rights and genocide was perpetrated.
As will be indicated in detail in chapters five and six, SADC intervened in the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar and Lesotho conflicts through both coercive and non-coercive measures. The SADC interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho in the current study are used as a case study to determine the efficacy of the regional block’s preventive diplomacy mechanism. The Lesotho case has been chosen because it was in Lesotho that SADC intervened through both coercive and non-coercive measures. As such, it was envisaged that Lesotho could be a reasonable case to determine the regional block’s strengths and weaknesses in regional peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building operations.

1.4 Preventive Diplomacy; Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution
Several scholars on conflict concur on the inevitability of conflicts in human society. However, what is of importance is not whether conflict is indispensable but how conflicts can be prevented, managed and resolved, or what institutions can be put in place for the resolution of conflict. As Darby asserts “the real issue is not the existence of conflict but how it is handled” (cited in Stewart 1998: 13). War is a practical problem that requires appropriate theory and mechanisms for understanding, mastering and dealing with it (Sandole 1999, Adedeji 1999). These positions emanate from the fact that conflict seems to be a permanent feature of human society and it cannot be totally eradicated, but measures can be taken to contain their persistence and mitigate their terrible outcomes. The experience of World War One and World War Two have been an eye opener to the international community on the importance of establishing international and regional organisations to maintain international peace and security. The League of Nations (1918-1939) and the United Nations (UN) organisation are the two international organisations that were formed at different historical epochs to shoulder the task of maintaining international peace through preventive diplomacy. The concept of preventive diplomacy was coined by a former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskold during the Cold War in order to deter the escalation of conflict with the danger of involving the heavily armed and polarised East-West blocks. The concept was later broadened by another UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to embrace regional and international efforts to thwart the outbreak of conflict (conflict prevention), escalation or spread of conflict where they occurred (conflict management) and the recurrence of conflict where they were addressed (conflict resolution). Preventive diplomacy may be through coercive measures (military intervention, economic sanctions, cutting of diplomatic relations, isolation, expulsion) and non-military measures (peace envoys, peace and good offices missions, pledges for economic and political assistance, reconstruction and many other reconciliation and rehabilitation measures). However, efficient application of preventive diplomacy has remained elusive as conflicts rage on in spite of the UN’s attempts, in partnership with the regional organisations, at addressing them.

As an international organisation, the UN, through the Security Council, is responsible for the maintenance of global peace and security. From a global perspective, the UN is seen as the only institution with depth, width and a unique
claim on legitimate authority and mandate on international peace and security (Henrikson 1995, Doyle 1998, Annan 1998, Van Nieuwkerk 2000). Since its inception, the UN has been engaged in conflict prevention, management and resolution in different parts of the globe and has roped in the assistance of regional organisations and civil society organisations in its bid to eradicate the misery caused by conflicts in human society.


However, as successive UN Secretary Generals have observed, the task of maintaining international peace is a mammoth and overwhelming challenge. Conflicts have erupted and persisted in spite of the UN's efforts. The multidimensional and complex nature of today's conflicts requires partnership between the UN and different regional organisations (Ghali 1992, 1995, Henrikson 1995, Rothchild 2000, Berman 2000, Annan 1998, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, Adedeji 1999, Berman 2000, International Peace Academy 2001). Thus the United Nations Charter chapter viii (Articles 51-54) accommodated the formation of regional organisations (arrangements) to complement the UN efforts in international peacekeeping as they have a comparative advantage in their respective regions. Subsequently, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, numerous regional organisations emerged in different continents for collective action in economic, political and security challenges within their respective regional zones. Some of the regional organisations which emerged are North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Comecon (the WARSAW PACT), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now the African Union), Organisation of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU), the Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN), the Arab League and many others including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa, (COMESA), and the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). These regional organisations have established security organs in their founding treaties and security protocols to ensure peace and security in their respective regions through preventive diplomacy. For example, the SADC treaty and its protocols for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) and the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) pledge to collectively address regional conflicts through preventive diplomacy measures.

Most of these organisations in the Third World were formed in the 1970s and 1980s mainly with an economic agenda. The operations of these organisations were constrained and even shaped by the Cold War bipolar politics. For example the SADC could not effectively intervene and resolve conflicts in Angola and Mozambique because the different parties in the conflicts were backed by the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United...
States of America (USA) to serve their conflicting ideological interests (Boutrous Ghali, 1992, 1995, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, International Peace Academy 2001, Berman 2000, Levit 2003, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, and Rothchild 2001, Hurrell and Fawcett 1995, Henrikson 1995, Nathan 1995, Field 2004, Ngoma 2005). Boutrous Ghali conceded in his report “An Agenda for Peace” that the ideological tensions between the East and West, coupled with the veto power wielded by the permanent members of the Security Council hampered the UN in its task of maintaining world peace. This has resulted in protracted conflicts especially in Third World countries such as in Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Cambodia, South Africa and Namibia. In this sense, regional countries did not see the necessity and incentives for co-operation or making peace with each other as long as they enjoyed financial and military support from the two ideological blocks. In fact, according to some observers, the US and Europe often acted to undermine regional integration, as they believed it would limit and constrain their roles as power brokers.

The end of the Cold War in the 1990s heralded in a period of new regionalism in which the existing regional organisations reorganised themselves in content, scope, structure and purpose. They became multidimensional in their approach to the social, economic, political and security ills engulfing their regions. The post-Cold War political order demands new approaches to conflict resolution that are a precondition for economic and social development, democratisation and good governance (USIP 1994, Hettne and Soderbaum 1998, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, Terriff, Croft, James and Morgan 2004, Buzan 1990). In Africa, leaders and governments became more committed to reorganising and consolidating regional organisations due to two factors. Of utmost importance was the realisation that the demise of the Cold War politics also marked the loss of Africa’s strategic value to the Western governments, and by extension, the United Nations Security Council. The disengagement of superpowers from the African continent was marked by the eruption of numerous intra-state conflicts. The undemocratic regimes which prevailed during the Cold War era due to the backing of superpowers collapsed under internal resistance and uprisings. Many other conflicts erupted as a result of the vacuum created by the evacuation of the superpowers.

Secondly the end of the Cold War was marked by calculated reluctance by Western powers and the Security Council in committing military resources for intervention in the escalating conflicts in Africa (Rugumamu 2002). This was mainly experienced after the 1991 abortive UN intervention in Somalia and the indifference of the international community and the UN during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Western governments started sponsoring the policy of “African solutions to African problems.” The shift was also reflected by Western powers initiatives to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities by providing military training to African peacekeeping forces to take over the responsibility for peace and security in the continent. This came in the form of training a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), the African Crises Response Initiative (ACRI) by the USA, the Reinforcement of African Capabilities for Peacekeeping (RECAMP) by France, and a variety of other military initiatives by Britain and other European powers. The United

In view of this reluctance and disengagement by the international community and the Security Council, African leaders and governments realised the cardinal responsibility of maintaining peace through re-organisation of regional organisations in the continent. The above stated sentiments were shared by the co-ordinator of the defunct Conflict Prevention and Research Division of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), William Nhara, that “[r]egional organisations should realise that there is a need to take on the primary responsibility for their own problems especially those relating to issues of peace, security and stability. This is necessary as Africa’s partners are increasingly less enthusiastic about sharing its problems” (cited in Herbst 2000: 310).

African regional organisations established security mechanisms for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in their respective regions. For example, in 1993, the OAU which for decades dismally failed to stem conflicts in the continent established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, formation of a more revitalised continental organisation, the African Union and its Peace and Security Council unrestricted by its predecessor’s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. ECOWAS established a peace-keeping force, the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1998, through which the organisation successfully intervened and restored peace and stability in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1993 and 1998 respectively. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) developed a programme on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management in its zone. The organisation was instrumental in mediating conflicts in Sudan and Somalia. While in 1992 at the Windhoek Summit, the SADC Treaty was signed and SADCC transformed to SADC with broadened objectives and operational mandates. It was buttressed by the entrance of South Africa which had attained majority rule in 1994 after decades of apartheid tyranny and regional destabilisation. In 1996 it formed the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security which was tasked with security issues in the region. Through its preventive diplomacy mechanism, the SADC intervened to restore stability in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. All these changes reflect African countries’ commitments to combating conflicts through regional organisations (Joseph 1999, Levit 2003, Berman 2000, Adebayo and Adam 1999, Field 2004, Van Nieuwkerk 2000, Ngoma 2005, International Peace academy 2000, 2001, 2002, Onyango 2002, Nathan 1995, Malan and Cilliers 1997, de Coning 1999, Collier 1999, De Vries 1999). As Joseph correctly noted: “[t]he first responsibility for mitigating conflicts in Africa should be with the Africans themselves and their collective organisations” (1999: 10). In fact, the United States Institute (1994) suggested a division of labour in which regional organisations would focus on conflict
prevention and peacemaking while the UN focuses on peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This scenario would ensure active involvement of regional structures in conflict mediation, resulting in ownership of the outcomes and effects which are necessary ingredients in conflict resolution.

Furthermore, African leaders have always expressed a keen willingness to play a leading role in the prevention, management and resolution of their own problems, as embedded in the Pan Africanist ideology. Herbst (2000: 309) presents this sentiment thus: “within Africa there had always been a desire to have African-led interventions...foreign military interventions by ex-colonial powers and others highlighted the fragility of the newly won political power and served to strengthen the historic memory of colonial domination,” that is, by pooling the continental resources for the resolution of the continent’s problems without relying on external sources. Although it did not achieve the goal, the Organisation of African Unity was founded on the Pan African ideology in 1963 to struggle for social, economic, political and security independence in Africa. Henrikson (1995) mentions how the organisation wanted to Africanise the 1960 Congo crisis through a commission of 10 OAU members led by the first President of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, but failed due to interventions by Britain, USA and Belgium.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century there are many African leaders such as the former Presidents of Nigeria and South Africa, Obassanjo and Mbeki respectively, who championed what Mazrui termed “Pax Africana” a doctrine that Africa should stop depending on the international community to resolve their conflicts, but must marshal the continent’s resources and resolve to shoulder the responsibility of African solutions to African problems. As the former OAU Secretary, General Salim Ahmed Salim, noted in his keynote address to the International Peace Academy at the Vienna Seminar (1995) on Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, the prime role of regional organisations is to “devise regional solutions to regional problems and should take primary ownership of their problems” (cited in Joseph, 1999: 11). In a bid for continental sovereignty in management of its affairs, Mbeki championed the idea of African Renaissance, while Obasanjo proposed a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation through which Africans can dialogue over the problems bedevilling the continent including conflicts. The two leaders were also at the forefront in championing the establishment of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) all of which are geared towards development of the African continent’s political, military and economic capability to address its problems. It was within this framework that the NEPAD Abuja meeting of African Heads of States in October 2001 resolved that “African leaders have learnt from their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development…” and they pledged “to work, both individually and collectively to promote these principles in their countries, sub-regions and the continent” at large (cited in Cilliers 2004: v).
It is therefore argued that a study on the role of regional organisations in conflict prevention, management and resolution (in which the SADC interventions in Lesotho fall) is necessary because most of the African conflicts today are intra-state and regionalised in origin, character and effects as evidenced in West Africa, (Liberia, Guinea–Bissau, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast), the Horn of Africa region, (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea; Sudan), the Great Lakes region, (Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi). Regional organisations would be best suited for timely interventions as they are the most immediately affected by the spill-over effects of the conflicts. It would be in their urgent interest to mitigate conflicts and preserve regional peace, security and stability. One other important advantage is that regional members are in a better position to comprehend the historical, cultural and contextual dynamics of the conflict, which may result in fruitful dialogue and resolution of the conflict based on regional and leaders’ personal trust (Henriksen 1995, Mortimer 1999, Hettne 2001, Rugumamu 2002, International Peace Academy, 2002). Among other things, the end of the Cold War has brought about fundamental shifts in global and regional alignments, definitions and thinking on security. The new security thinking is no longer restricted to military matters. It embraces a wide range of non-military issues such as human security, human rights, environmental protection, democracy and good governance, and economic security, some of which require regional approaches and solutions (Buzan 1991, Nathan 1995, Archaya 1994, Vita 2001, Rugumamu 2002, Munyae 2000, Terriff et al. 2004, Swart and du Plessis 2004, Solomon 2004, Hammestard 2004, Ngoma 2005). In their reports, the UN Secretary Generals Ghali (1992, 1995) and Kofi Annan (1998) lamented the untapped potentials of regional organisations in the maintenance of world peace and security. They pleaded the imperative necessity of partnership between the UN and regional organisations in combating conflicts and building durable global peace. The SADC interventions in Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007 should be viewed within this post-Cold War political climate.

Although there is relative peace in the SADC region, after the demise of apartheid in South Africa, conflicts are looming, threatening regional peace and stability in several countries. The region faces the challenges of the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe and Madagascar, and the latent political crisis against King Mswati’s autocratic regime in Swaziland. The DRC has been enmeshed in conflict since 1997 and the situation has not fully stabilised. Lesotho has experienced post-election violence since independence in 1966, and despite SADC’s past intervention, the political atmosphere remains volatile as the Kingdom prepares for national elections in 2012.

Therefore, this study seeks to examine the efficacy of SADC’s preventive diplomacy machinery in view of the Lesotho interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007. The study analyses SADC, in terms of its structures, strategies, political commitments, successes, challenges encountered, lessons learnt and future prospects for resolving regional conflicts. This investigation emanates from differences among the SADC member states that resulted in uncoordinated and disjointed interventions in the DRC and Lesotho by different camps of the SADC community. It was not clear whether it was SADC or individual countries’ interventions. This left a cloud of suspicion hanging over
the legality of the missions as regional peace operations. The study intends to establish whether SADC has a functioning security mechanism that can deal with the security challenges of the post-Cold War world. This is premised on the fact that the regional organisation seems to lack a clear basis on how and when to effectively apply its preventive diplomacy mechanism. The continued post-electoral conflicts in Lesotho despite the SADC preventive missions raise questions on the efficacy of the regional organisations’ preventive diplomacy mechanism, application modalities and post-conflict peace-building measures. The study therefore seeks to establish why the application of preventive diplomacy has been so elusive in the Lesotho conflict context.

1.5 Research Problem

“If it is not clear what causes and conditions of war are, or how war can be prevented or otherwise dealt with, then war is a research problem” (Sandole 1999: 1). The SADC region was one of the most turbulent regions during the Cold War. The region experienced liberation wars in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Although the post-Cold War period saw relative peace in Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. However, the region has not enjoyed durable peace. In fact, Lesotho, which is the focus of the current research, has never enjoyed peace since attaining independence from Britain in 1966. The country has been beset by numerous post-election conflicts as experienced in 1966, 1970, 1994, 1998 and 2007. The SADC treaty has pledged to employ preventive diplomacy in preventing, managing and resolving regional conflicts. As such, the regional organisation has intervened in the DRC, Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Lesotho. It is in Lesotho that the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism was mainly engaged. In the 1994 and 2007 preventive interventions; the SADC employed non-coercive diplomacy while in the 1998 it employed coercive measures through military intervention. However, in spite of SADC’s preventive missions, peace and stability remain elusive. Lesotho remains volatile as SADC appears to have failed to comprehensively address the structural sources of conflicts prevalent in the country despite its three preventive diplomacy missions.

The current study is based on the assumption that regional organisations should play a leading role in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts and threats to security in their respective regions. This is because most of the African conflicts have become so regionalised that regional institutions would best address them before outside intervention is instituted. It is also believed that regional bodies are well placed for intervention in regional conflicts because they command better knowledge of the historical and cultural context of the conflicts. The experience of SADC in Lesotho, despite the hiccups encountered, provides lessons that regional organisations are capable of restoring peace and stability in their respective zones through preventive diplomacy. Further to that, several African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Botswana, South Africa, and Tanzania have participated in the United Nations Peacekeeping missions and can carry the experiences and lessons acquired to their regional organisations’ peace missions. It is further envisaged that the United Nations should come in at the invitation of, or to complement
the efforts of, regional bodies. As the United States Institute of Peace recommended in its 1994 Symposium, “Africans should determine under what conditions it is helpful to have the international community engage in conflict resolution efforts” (cited in Joseph, 1999: 10-11).

Of utmost significance is to what extent regional organisations, especially in Africa, have resources, institutional capabilities and political will to effectively address the security issues in their regional spheres. The SADC, which is the focus of this study, has displayed numerous implementation and operational flaws in resolving its regional security challenges, as reflected in Zimbabwe, the DRC and Lesotho. The study investigates why peace has eluded Lesotho despite three SADC preventive missions, and also what lessons should be drawn from the Lesotho experience.

1.6 Objectives of the Study
The research aims and objectives of a study denote a “broader, more abstract conception of the end towards which effort or ambition is directed” (de Vos, 2005: 104). This study therefore seeks to analyse SADC’s preventive diplomacy modus operandi in Lesotho to determine its efficacy, successes, and challenges, and determine how it could be transformed into a security mechanism for effective prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the region. The gist is to find out whether SADC has an effective conflict prevention, management, resolution and post-conflict peace-building mechanism, in view of the Lesotho experience.

The study therefore aims to:

- Assess the efficacy of the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism in conflict prevention, management and resolution during the Lesotho interventions.
- Examine the challenges faced by the SADC during its preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho.
- Establish the lessons learnt by the SADC from its Lesotho preventive missions.
- Explore recommendations on how some of the challenges can be resolved.

1.7 Research Questions
Research questions are pivotal to the research process in that apart from providing the research focus, they guide the search and review of literature, the conceptual and theoretical framework, the choice of research methods and data analysis instruments, and the structure and presentation of the research findings (Bryman 2001). As Yin (1994:20-21) indicates, questions such as “who, what, where, how and why” provide an important clue regarding the most relevant research strategy to be used.
The study therefore seeks to answer the following questions:

- To what extent were the SADC interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho justified or necessary?
- Have the SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho been a success or failure?
- What challenges were encountered by the SADC during its preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho?
- What lessons has the SADC learnt (should have learnt) from the Lesotho missions?

1.8 Significance of the Study

Cox (1981: 128) notes that “[k]nowledge is always for someone and for some purpose.” Generally, this study is considered significant as it was conducted during the post-Cold War period when most parts of the Third World, particularly Africa, is afflicted by numerous protracted, devastating and regionalised conflicts. Of paramount importance is the fact that the SADC region is faced with several security threats and challenges, as is evident in the DRC, Zimbabwe, Madagascar and Swaziland. The study is also conducted within the established political reality that the Security Council’s peacekeeping efforts in the continent have drastically dwindled. The international community and the United Nations have shifted the responsibility of maintaining regional peace and security to the different regional organisations. As Archaya (1994: 79) correctly observes, “[t]he end of the Cold War has brought about fundamental shifts in global and regional alignments calling for new approaches to peace and security.” The reluctance by the international community has sharpened African leaders’ resolve to take the responsibility of peacekeeping and security in the continent by strengthening regional organisations’ security mechanisms to conduct preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping missions. The establishment of the SADC, OPDS and Security and subsequently the MDP, took place in response to the above stated dynamics in international politics and governance. Therefore, the study’s findings will be of significance to the following:

- African regional organisations, particularly the SADC, by provision of strategies and mechanisms of conflict prevention, management and resolution (preventive diplomacy).
- Regional organisations, policy makers and planners, peace and conflict resolution practitioners and preventive diplomacy institutional and security administrators through information on strategies and measures for effective prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.
- The SADC security establishments in peacekeeping missions as it will establish where they went wrong and provide recommendations on what they should have done in view of the Lesotho missions.
- Civil society organisations on what role they should play along regional organisations in conflict prevention, management and resolution.
- Academics and peace practitioners as it will provoke further (future) research on the regional organisations' preventive diplomacy engagements in other regions and conflict situations.
- Finally it is hoped the study will augment available research and information bases on regional security issues, particularly in the SADC region. Nathan (2004) and Ngoma (2005) have lamented the existence of a
gap in the academic literature on international security, as it frequently ignores Southern Africa. It is envisaged that this study will contribute some insights and close some of the informational gaps existing in the available literature.

1.9 Theoretical Framework
Theories play a pivotal role in the organisation and conduct of research in different disciplines. In this study, theories on the causes, prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and regional integration and preventive diplomacy were used to provide the framework for comprehension of the causal factors of conflicts and how they can be resolved. Since the causes of conflicts are multifaceted, and conflict is dynamic and dictated by a broad range of contextual factors, the theories on understanding the sources of conflicts and how they can be resolved will also require multidimensional and multi-levelled theories and perspectives. In this study, different theoretical perspectives and positions were employed to explain the multiplicity of conflict causal factors and instruments for their resolution. This was motivated by the fact that there is no single unified theory of conflict which can sufficiently embrace the multi-faceted sources of conflict in their diverse forms and manifestations. The theories employed in this study “do not explain why wars occur by any simple formula because they acknowledge that war is a multi-causal phenomenon. They point to various ways in which background conditions of many kinds, unexpected chance coincidences and war-conducive mechanisms of different sorts combine leading to outbreak of wars” (Suganami 1996: 7-8). Each theoretical framework has its strengths and weaknesses. The different theories therefore complement each other in providing a comprehensive understanding of conflicts and how they can best be prevented, managed and resolved (Azar 1990a, Vasquez 1993, Suganami 1996, Miall et al 2001, du Pisani 2001).

In light of the above, different theoretical perspectives on the origins, causal conditions of conflict and what preventive instruments to employ in resolving each conflict situation, are explored in detail. The theoretical categories are as follows: the individual characteristics (biological/psychological theories) which comprise the frustration-aggression theory; the basic human needs theory and the attribution theory; the social processes theories comprising symbolic interactionalism (interactional theory), the functionalist theory and the social structural theories comprising the Marxist-class and the Realist/Neo-realist theories. Each theory provides a position on the sources of conflict and
suggests strategies on how to resolve conflict. The discussions of conflict in Lesotho and how the SADC intervened to resolve them will be premised within these theoretical perspectives. The theories on regional integration have provided a framework on factors, motivations and conditions necessary for regional integration. They also illustrate the different types and patterns of regional integration. It is within these theoretical frameworks that the evolution of the SADC and its preventive diplomacy mechanism, conflict prevention, management and resolution missions are discussed. The selected theories are Realism/neo-realism theory, the structural interdependence and globalisation theory, functionalism, neo-liberal institutionalism, constructivism, the security complex/regime/community theory and the new regionalism theory. The evolution of the SADC and its operational structures and protocols will be discussed within the above stated theories.

The theories on conflict, preventive diplomacy, regional integration and organisations mapped out the terrain within which the research findings were organised and analysed to find answers to questions on the origins of conflict and how they can be resolved. As Yin (1994) observes, the researcher should be aware of the full range of theories that may be relevant to his or her study.

1.10 Research Methodology
The study employs a descriptive, explanatory and analytic qualitative case study approach in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data on the SADC preventive interventions in Lesotho. The merit of the qualitative-case study research envisioned in this study is that it “seeks to maximise the range of specific information that can be obtained from and about that context, by purposely selecting locations and informants that differ from one another” (Babbie and Mouton: 2003: 277). A qualitative approach is employed to develop an in-depth understanding and meaning of the context (Bryman 2001, Potter 2006, Babbie and Mouton 2006). A qualitative approach was also chosen because it is naturalistic and grounded on the researcher's interpretative faculties of the social world. Researchers “study people in their ordinary settings, analyse what they have heard and seen and then convey to others in rich and realistic detail, the experiences and perspectives of those being studied” (Rubin and Rubin 2005: 30). Therefore, since this is a qualitative study, the aspects of reliability and validity are not central as in quantitative studies. It is the credibility, trustworthiness and authenticity of the data as interpreted and bolstered by "thick" information as provided by the participants which is pivotal in qualitative studies (Guba and Lincoln 1985, Cresswell 1994, Bryman 2001, Ezzy, 2000, Babbie and Mouton 2006). In addition it is based on the belief that “reality is socially constructed and that the goal of the social scientist is to understand what meanings people give to reality, not to determine how reality works apart from these interpretations” (Shutt (2006: 43).

Data for this study was collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews on the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho. Interviews were chosen because they allow open conversations between the interviewee and the
interviewer. The interview also provides insights from the interviewees’ gestures and expressions, an advantage which cannot be obtained through other data collection instruments. Twenty-four participants for the study were purposively selected from the SADC Headquarters (mainly from the SADC, OPDS, from representatives of different political parties in Lesotho, the monarchy, retired BDF officers, academics, Non-Governmental Organisations such as the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (LCNGO), the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) and the office of the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, all of which were involved in the Lesotho conflicts at different levels to find a lasting peace in the Kingdom.

Data was also obtained through the study of document sources such as the SADC policy documents, archival records, records of the conferences and summits, books, journals, academic papers, Internet and the print media on conflicts and preventive diplomacy by different regional organisations with particular focus on the SADC missions in Lesotho. Sources on how the SADC interacted with the Lesotho government; political parties and non-governmental organisations and how they also interacted among themselves in their bid to resolve the conflicts in Lesotho were obtained from the Transformation Resource Centre and representatives of political parties in Lesotho. The merits of documents are that they provide an overview and details of events on the subject under investigation which might not be available from other instruments such as interviews. As such, data from documents may be invaluable in confirming or disputing data from interviews. The interviews and document analysis ensured a complementation of data which in turn enhanced the authenticity, credibility, conformability and trustworthiness of the research findings. These complementary methods broadened the scope of the study and offset any shortcomings. Data from the interviews was collated on the basis of related themes.

1.11 Scope of the Study
The study is confined to the SADC geographical and political region and its regional conflict prevention, management and resolution engagements. Although the study tackled the SADC preventive actions in other setups such as in the DRC and Zimbabwe, its focus is on the SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho. It examines the efficacy of the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism in view of its experiences in the Lesotho interventions. The study is also restricted to intra-and inter-state conflicts.

1.12 Limitations of the Study
Every research study has its limitations, which may affect the original plan and method of data collection, analysis and presentation. The following are some of the limitations (constraints) of this study:

Firstly as a case study through the qualitative paradigm, its findings may not be generalised and/or replicable to all regional organisations in Africa as each region has its own unique peculiarities and complexities regarding issues of
conflicts and their resolution. Neither can the Lesotho case study be regarded as representative of all the SADC conflict interventions as each conflict context has its unique requirements and challenges which dictate preventive strategies and outcomes. As Bradshaw (2007: 23) observes “outside of a laboratory situation and without pre-and post-test opportunities, it is always difficult to know whether outcomes are the results of specific interventions, or whether they are the result of extraneous factors in the broader environment.”

Secondly, the SADC, the envisaged case study, comprises a large number of nations (14) some of which are geographically spread outside the Southern African region. It was impossible due to time and resource constraints to access information on the different nations’ views regarding the efficacy and challenges of the SADC in conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanism in Lesotho. It was also not possible to get the views of the governments of the intervening powers (South Africa and Botswana) on how the SADC fared in Lesotho.

Thirdly, the researcher experienced difficulties in accessing some official documents on the operations of the organisation SADC on security issues, as some of them are still classified. This problem was clearly stated by Nathan (2004: 3) that: “Research on the Organ [OPDS] is constrained by the paucity and uninformative nature of official documents in the public domain. SADC states place a premium on maintaining a posture of unity and solidarity, and they are overly sensitive about the confidentiality of security and defence issues.”

Fourthly, the record of regional interventions in domestic conflicts and regional conflicts resolution in Africa, particularly in the SADC region is a recent one, and therefore the empirical basis for an elaborate assessment may be constrained (Hettne 2001). This limitation is also expressed by Nathan (2004) and Ngoma (2005) on the paucity of literature on security issues in the SADC region.

Finally, data was collected through interviews and document studies, and as such the findings may not be absolutely representative of the SADC preventive diplomacy missions; other data may be obtained from other research methods which did not form part of this study.

1.13 Structure of the Study
The study is divided into nine chapters. Each chapter is organised in terms of relevant topics and sub-headings.

Chapter One has provided the introduction to the study. It outlines the background (context) of the study, the research problem, objectives of the study, the research questions, significance of the study, theoretical framework, research methodology, scope of the study, limitations of the study, and structure of the study.
Chapter Two explores literature on conflict, providing different definitions of conflict, the nature of conflict, causes of conflict in Africa, effects of conflict, conflict dynamics and the theoretical framework on conflict and preventive diplomacy (Conflict prevention, management and resolution).

Chapter Three discusses the theories of conflict and preventive diplomacy from diverse dimensions.

Chapter Four examines the literature and theoretical perspectives on regional integration and organisation.

Chapter Five deals with the origins and membership of the SADC, and the development of its operational structures, aims and objectives. It also provides an overview of the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in the DRC and Zimbabwe and the challenges it faces. This exploration serves to provide a framework to understanding SADC’s preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho.

Chapter Six focuses on the SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho. It provides the historical background to the conflicts in Lesotho since independence in 1966 and how the SADC intervened through both non-coercive and coercive diplomatic instruments. The chapter also examines the successes, failures and challenges of the SADC preventive interventions in Lesotho.

Chapter Seven reflects on the research methodology, research designs, selection of respondents, data collection instruments (interviews and document studies), justification for selection of each, the merits and demerits of each instrument, validation of research tools and ethical consideration.

Chapter Eight provides an analysis, discussion and presentation of the research findings. It brings together data from the literature, interviews and document studies into coherent research findings supported by empirical evidence. Data from the different sources is critically analysed and compiled in relation to the research objectives and research questions.

Chapter Nine provides a summary, conclusion, and recommendations of the study.
CHAPTER TWO
Conflict Definitions, Causes, Dynamics and Consequences

2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a critical review of existing literature and discourse on conflict, conflict prevention, management and resolution (preventive diplomacy) from different contexts and perspectives. The chapter provides an overview of some of the research, debates, perspectives and insights into the definitions, nature, sources, dynamics and effects of conflict. As Rubin and Babbie (1993: 365) note, an important element of research preparation is “to begin with a search of the relevant literature, filling in one’s knowledge of the subject and learning what others have said about it.” In view of this Bryman (2001: 492-493) indicates that the researcher should explore existing literature in order to answer the following questions:

- What is already known about this area?
- What concepts and theories are relevant to this area?
- What research methods and research strategies have been employed in studying this area?
- Are there any significant controversies?
- Are there any inconsistencies in findings related to this area? Are there any unanswered research questions in this area?

It is within the theoretical and literature surveys that some views, perspectives, insights and analytical frameworks on the nature of conflicts and how they can be resolved will emerge, and be explored and discussed. Mitchell (1981: 10) suggests critical key questions that are fundamental in understanding and conceptualisation of social conflict. The questions are as follows:

1. What concepts are needed to analyse conflict?
2. What types of conflict can be discriminated?
3. What causes conflicts, and how do they develop?
4. What are the effects of conflict on the parties and their environment?
5. What outside factors exacerbate, moderate or resolve conflict?
6. Why and how do conflicts end?

These questions, to some extent, guide the exploration and discourse on the literature review. An attempt was made to answer the questions although not in the above sequential order.

2.2 Definitions of Conflict
There is no single all-embracing universally accepted definition of the concept "conflict". Most definitions are determined by the discipline and theoretical perspectives from which the definition emanates, and the causal factors, context, scope, duration, intensity and outcomes of the conflict.
The following definition of conflict has been selected for the purposes of this study. “Conflict refers to purposeful struggles between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power, resources and other scarce values” (Himes 1980: 14). Conflict is a multidimensional and pervasive phenomenon. However, scholars in the field have identified several common features of conflict. Conflict denotes a struggle between two or more contending parties with incompatible goals and interests. The struggle may be over a variety of issues, some of which are: limited or scarce resources, power, incompatible goals, interests, needs, values, aspirations, views, beliefs and ideologies. Contending groups of people or nations get involved in violent conflict either because their interests or values are challenged, frustrated or not met (Coser 1968, Bercovitch 1984, Kelter 1987, Rubin, Pruit and Kim 1994, Adedeji 1999). The Marxists view conflict in the world as a struggle between the different social and economic strata for power and control of the means of production. Hence, in the Communist manifesto, Karl Marx and Fredreich Engels stated: “[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle” (cited in Schellenberg 1996: 81). According to Kriesberg (1982: 18), social conflict refers “to a situation in which the parties believe that they have incompatible goals. The term also refers to the interactional sequence in which the parties contend with each other; it is a war...” In a conflict situation, there is polarisation of behaviour, attitudes, and actions, leading to tensions and sometimes violent confrontations depending on at what stage mitigating measures are applied or generally, how the conflict is managed. A violent conflict situation and its diverse manifestations can be reflected by terms such as war, battle, strife, feud, collision, a fight, combat, incursion, invasion, aggression and dispute, all implying some manifested form and degree of physical violence (Stewart 1998).

Other definitions emphasise conflict as emanating from incompatible values, aspirations, needs and beliefs. A more inclusive definition is offered by Anstey (1991: 4) who envisages conflict as “existing in a relationship when parties believe that their aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously; or perceive a divergence in their values, needs and interests, (latent conflict) and purposefully employ their power in an effort to defeat, neutralise or eliminate each other to protect or further their interests in the interactions (manifest conflict).” Essential to this definition is that it highlights both the latent and manifest aspects of conflict. The struggle over divergent and incompatible values, interests and needs (which may be social, cultural, religious, economic or political) have characterised many a conflict in the world. The Cold War was over conflicting political ideologies- capitalism and communism as pursued by the Western and Eastern blocks respectively.

Basic human needs theorists define conflicts as based on incompatible values, needs and aspirations between the contending parties. According to Burton (1990a: 37), “[v]alues are those ideas, habits, customs and beliefs that are characteristics of particular social groupings. They are linguistic, religious, class, ethnic or other features that lead to separate culture and identity groups.” Conflicts over differences of values are often protracted since values are non-
negotiable and integral to each party; hence uncompromising attitudes are entrenched within the contending parties. Numerous ethnic-based conflicts have caused havoc in many parts of the world, as experienced in the former Yugoslavia and in Africa. Burton and other basic human needs theorists maintain that conflicts emanate from prolonged frustration of people’s basic human needs. They argue that people whose basic human needs and values are frustrated will fight to the end until their needs are satisfactorily addressed.

However, it should be noted that not all conflict is characterised by violence. Some conflict situations may be dormant (latent) for prolonged periods, and accumulation of unresolved frustrations and grievances may reach peak levels, leading to violent confrontations in the long term. Some conflict may remain latent and never manifest any form of violent coercion (Kriesberg 1982).

Other theorists on social conflicts such as Coser (1956), Park and Burgess (1924), Boulding (1960), and Kriesburg (1982) have introduced an important element in defining conflict. They reason that an essential element in the definition of conflict is that the warring parties are aware that they have mutually incompatible goals and are in contention (Kriesberg 1982). According to Kriesberg (1982: 18), “[s]ituations that an observer assesses to be conflicting, but which are not so assessed by partisans are not social conflicts. We refer to such situations as objective, potential or latent conflicts.” Proponents of this defining aspect of conflict may appear, on the surface, to be at odds with Bercovitch’s (1984) assertion that conflict exists whenever there are incompatible interests and goals, irrespective of whether or not the actors are aware of these interests. However, the proponents take note of the fact that an objective conflict situation underlies a dispute, and persists regardless of partisans’ awareness. Kriesberg (1982) further notes that “[a] comprehensive analysis of social conflicts should include the objective conditions underlying a conflict situation and the processes that lead to groups believing that they have incompatible goals…” and “also examine the pursuit of conflicting goals, the termination and outcomes of social conflicts and the consequences of those outcomes” (1982: 18). Hence, Kriesberg (1982) has come out with the phase or cyclical model of conflict processes.

Another important dimension in unpacking the definitional complexities of the conflict phenomena is provided by Galtung (1996). He illustrates a conflict relationship and situation through a Conflict Triangle reflecting conflict or contradiction (C) (underlying conflict situation incompatible goals, actual or perceived), behaviour (B) (threats, coercion, violence, and aggression), attitudes (A) (tensions, hostilities, the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other) in a triangular interactional format (Bercovitch 1984. Miall et al 2001, Galtung 1996). Galtung argues that all three components in the triangle have to be present in a full-scale conflict situation. Explaining the conflict triangle, Galtung (1996) notes that “[a] contradiction (C) may be experienced as a frustration, where a goal is being blocked by something leading to aggressiveness as an attitude (A) and to aggressive behaviour (B)…. Aggressive behaviour
may be incompatible with the other party’s concept of happiness…leading to a new contradiction on top of the old one, possibly stimulating more aggressiveness and aggression in all parties concerned. Violence breeds violence, the triangle becomes the projection of a spiral that may run its course the same way as a fire; stopping when the house is burnt down” (Galtung 1996: 72).

Galtung’s defining elements expand on what other scholars have projected, but introduce the element of hostile attitudes and behaviour as underlying a conflict situation. According to Bercovitch (1984: 6), Galtung’s Conflict Triangle offers the only satisfactory formulation of conflict that gives room for an examination of “a) a specific situation, b) motives and the parties’ cognitive structures and c) the behavioural attitudinal dynamics of a conflict process.”

Bercovitch (1984: 3) indicates that “[t]he range of conflict phenomena is…much wider than that implied by its physical connotations. It is used to describe inconsistencies as well as the process of trying to solve them; it has physical and moral implications; it embraces opinions as well as situations and a wide range of behaviour.”

The critical issue, however, is not whether scholars agree on the definition of conflict but whether they acknowledge their persistence, and devise constructive means of preventing, managing and resolving them for durable peace, security and development. As Rugumamu (2002: 4) aptly notes: “what is at issue... is how to manage and resolve inherent social conflicts before they degenerate into violent expressions and massive destruction.”

2.3 The inevitability of conflict in human society

Conflicts, latent or violent, exist at all levels of society, within and between individuals, communities and nations. Lee portrays this position by stating that “[s]ocial conflict is a likely guest wherever human beings set-up forms of social organisation. It would be difficult to conceive of an ongoing society where social conflict is absent. The society without conflict is a dead society...like it or not, conflict is reality of human existence and therefore a means of understanding social behaviour...” (Mitchell 1981: 8).

The inevitability of social conflicts is also confirmed by theorists from different disciplines and perspectives. The psychological theories and approaches to conflicts expounded by psychologists (for example, Freud), Ethologists (for example Lorenz), and socio-biologists and Anthropologists of the Darwinian tradition, maintain that violence and aggression are natural and innate phenomena inherent in the biological and psychological nature of human beings. Social Processes theories hold that conflict is natural and inevitable because of interaction of people at different levels of society. The interaction of people results in differences, incompatibility and clashes of interests, goals,
values and aspirations, triggering competition, antagonism and sometimes violent conflicts. In line with this, Kriesberg (1982: 18) posits that “[t]he term [conflict] refers to the sequence in which the parties contend with each other; it is a war, fight, struggle ...Once the parties believe they have incompatible goals, each or both may try to attain them. They will try coercive and non-coercive means in seeking to reach their goals.” The Structural Theorists such as the Marxists, on the other hand, argue that conflict is a result of how society is organised and structured, and how people from the different social strata interact and relate in society. These unequal relations create tensions and conflicts over the control of resources, making wars an inevitable feature of all human societies (Starr 1979, Schellenburg 1982, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf 1990).

Realists and Neo-Realists also view conflict as a natural and indispensable feature of international relations and among nations of the world. Hence, they argue that nations reflect the inherent aggressiveness in human beings. For realists such as Morgenthau, Gilpin, Aroon, Carr, Wright and Nerbuhr (Schellenberg 1982, Terriff et al. 2004) the international order is anarchical by nature, and it is dominated by competitive and conflictual interests of nations in their quest for power. Morgenthau et al. (1993) defines international politics as a struggle for power. Their argument is premised on the fact that “at any given period known in history, there were several states locked in deadly conflicts all desiring the augmentation or preservation of their power” (Terriff et al. 2004: 33). They argue that conflicts will remain a permanent feature of human society since nations will always have conflicting national interests and will clash in their perpetual quest for power. Wars and the constant possibility of wars make the anarchical international system a “war of all against all” in the words of Hobbes (Terriff et al. 2004). Further to this, according to Stewart (1998: 12), “[c]onflict is a present reality and no consensus theory about how society should work will wish conflict away.”

The multiplicity of conflicts in the world and mostly in the African continent appears to vindicate perceptions that conflicts are natural, inevitable and pervasive in human society. This is because the continent (Africa) has never enjoyed durable peace and stability. It has been plunged into conflicts of different intensity and scope throughout history. The continent boasts of the most protracted conflicts in the world, such as the conflicts that raged in Angola and Mozambique and those still fermenting in Sudan, Somalia, the DRC and Uganda. In some nations, the recurrence of conflicts seems to confirm the cyclical dynamics of conflicts as propounded by the phase model theorists. Countries like Uganda, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and Burundi have since independence, suffered several vicious cycles of internal strife which seem to be structurally institutionalised, frozen and impossible to resolve.

It is argued in this research study that the fact that conflict is natural and inevitable should not be used as a justification for incessant eruptions; rather, it should be a challenge to world nations, the United Nations, regional organisations, and civil society organisations to combine efforts and resources to develop functional and effective
mechanisms and structures to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. This implies devising means of resolving incompatible goals without necessarily engaging in violent and bloody conflicts. As Darby (1994) correctly suggests, “the real issue is not the existence of conflict but how it is handled” (cited in Stewart 1998: 13). The reality is that conflict is a practical problem “which requires an appropriate theory for understanding and dealing with it” (Sandole, 1999: 1).

2.4 Classification of Conflicts

Conflicts vary in their manifestations of relations between adversaries, the degree of interaction between them, and their relative power within the conflict context (Kriesberg 1982). Miall et al (2001: 29) note that the field of conflict studies is littered with numerous typologies, such that it borders on confusion. They note that “there are as many typologies as analysts and the criteria employed not only vary, but are often mutually incompatible.” Differentiations are in terms of goals, behaviour and attitude of conflict parties, conflict issues, conflict causes, contexts, scope and intensity, conflict trends, dynamics and outcomes (Deustch 1973, Kriesberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Galtung 1996, Miall et al. 2001). According to Singer (1996), it is unlikely that analysts will converge on a single typology which is “logically exhaustive, mutually exclusive, operationally explicit, semantically consistent and substantially comparable (cited in Miall et al. 2001: 30).

However, for the purposes of this study, conflicts are classified under three broad categories, namely latent (dormant), manifest and frozen conflicts.

2.4.1 Latent Conflicts

In latent conflict, conditions for potential manifest conflict exist and the parties involved are aware of this and do perceive incompatible goals between them, but they have not reached the stage of violent confrontations. Latent conflict is characterised by an accumulation of grievances by one party which feels oppressed and marginalised, or that its basic survival needs are frustrated by another. The latent stage of conflict constitutes what Lund (1996) refers to as the stable (cold) peace stage of conflict in which there is hostility between the contending parties but it has not yet boiled to high-intensity armed confrontation. However, latent conflict will not remain so for ever, as the parties will at some stage realise their incompatibilities and engage each other in a manifest violent conflict. Most conflicts start as latent, but as tensions escalate and grievances accumulate, they shift to violent confrontation between the contending parties. The shift to violent encounter may be triggered by a wide range of factors, such as intensified oppression or persecution, the emergence of a powerful organisation to mobilise the oppressed and aggrieved group into a formidable force to engage in violent resistance, or the group getting external or internal financial, military and logistical assistance to launch a conflict to strive for the achievement of its goals. In some cases a spark will emerge providing an opportunity for the long-accumulated grievances to flare up into full-scale armed conflict. The latent
phase of conflict is ideal for effective execution of preventive diplomacy measures, unlike the situation where the conflict has erupted and the parties have inflicted harm on each other. At the latent stage, the levels of hostilities may be low and there is room for cooperative and integrative solutions to be reached by the parties.

### 2.4.2 Manifest Conflicts

“Manifest conflict” is the opposite of latent conflict, in that the warring parties have failed to resolve their incompatible differences through violent means. The definitions of conflict provided by Coser (1956), Himes (1980) and Bercovitch, (1984) reflect the manifest stage of conflict, in which the warring parties are bent on defeating their opponent to realise their goals. The opponent is viewed as an obstacle to attainment of certain goals, and has to be eradicated. At this stage of conflict, attitudes are hardened and enemy perceptions and images are entrenched within the contending parties. The parties are interested in eliminating each other by all means at their disposal. This phase of conflict is more often than not characterised by huge casualties and mass destruction of means of survival. Lund (1996) refers to this stage of conflict as “unstable peace”, “the crisis phase” or “hot war” stage. The stage is characterised by huge military expenditures, accumulation of weapons, and training of combatants to engage in the violent conflict. At this stage, it becomes very difficult to implement effective preventive diplomacy, since the conflict context has been polluted by the bloody confrontations between the contending parties. Preventive diplomacy missions have often failed or become protracted and costly because the UN and regional organisations failed to intervene at the latent stage of conflict when the situation would have been conducive to a negotiated settlement of the parties’ incompatible differences.

### 2.3.3 Frozen Conflicts

“Frozen conflict” refers to protracted, deep-rooted and intractable conflict in which belligerent parties have developed irrevocable and irreconcilable hostilities, rivalry and goals. The parties have hardened their conflict positions to a competitive win-lose situation. In frozen conflict, opportunities for de-escalation and peaceful resolution are remote due to entrenched mutual distrust and negative enemy images (Kriesberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Keltner 1987, Northrup 1989, Miall etal. 1999, Isenhart and spangle 2000). This is characteristic of needs and value-based conflicts which involve non-negotiable issues such as religion, identity, recognition, ethnicity, self-esteem and personal/group development (Coate and Rosati 1988, Burton 1990, Fisher 1990, Azar 1990). Frozen conflict has a tendency to escalate and de-escalate at different times, depending on the might and commitment of the warring parties. To secure an integrative solution to frozen conflict has always proved elusive as none of the warring parties will be willing to compromise on their values. The warring parties are determined to pursue the conflict until they have achieved their goal. In some instances, the conflict is characterised by a series of peace accords which are often violated by one or both parties to the conflict. None of the parties are committed to peace, and peace accords are pretexts for re-organisation and re-strategising by each of the parties. The mediation efforts in such conflicts by the
international community or regional organisations may be ad hoc. Sometimes the international community is indifferent and we have what is referred to as “forgotten wars.”

As stated earlier, the differences in the number or types or semantic connotations of conflict should not be problematic since all contributions complement each other and enhance our comprehension of the conflict phenomenon. For example, the classifications noted above capture most of the embracing grouping of conflicts around the world, and provide a framework in which different types of conflict can be analysed and understood.

2.5 Antecedents of Conflicts

A discussion of the sources of conflicts is essential for mastery and comprehension of conflicts and their subsequent resolution. As Adedeji (1999: 7) observes, “[c]onflicts can only be mastered ... if and when they are fully comprehended. This means that we must accept as axiomatic the proposition that until the root causes of conflicts have been fully comprehended and addressed, they cannot be mastered and that the mastery of conflicts is imperative to achieve lasting peace in any... country.” According to Zartman (1991: 299), although conflicts are an inevitable and inherent aspect of human society, they are “brought on by the presence of several actors and compounded by several choices.” Suganami (1996) distinguishes three critical questions that provide a framework and benchmarks for effective discourse on the causes of conflict. The key questions are: “What are the conditions which must be present for war to occur? Under what sorts of circumstances have wars occurred most frequently?; and How did this particular war come about?” (cited in Miall et al. 2001: 97); “What conditions produce violent fights? What makes groups believe that they have incompatible goals? How [do] aggrieved groups seek justice? Why [do] some groups attain what they seek and others do not?” (Kriesberg, 1982: 1). “The prevalence of intra-state warfare and multifaceted crises in the present period has added new urgency to the need for a better understanding of their root causes” (Dress and Rosenblum: 2002: 232). The discussion which follows will attempt to answer these critical questions.

The sources of conflicts are numerous, multidimensional and reflect the diverse and dynamic socio-economic and political complexities of the contexts in which they occur. The diverse sources of conflicts can be classified under political, economic, social, historical, internal and external, structural and surface factors. It is important that although conflict may have common patterns and trends, it is essential for research on conflict and conflict resolution to take note of the individuality, uniqueness and particularities of each conflict to put it in its appropriate historical, cultural and political context. This helps the conflict-mediating agent(s) to devise appropriate and relevant conflict resolution measures (Annan, 1998, Adebayo and Adam 1999, Adedeji 1999, International Peace Academy, 2002).
Realists and neo-Realists trace the sources of international conflicts to the anarchical and conflictual nature of international relation, in which nations are in perpetual pursuit of power and interests, in turn jeopardising international peace and security (Terriff et al. 2004, Schulz et al. 2001). This was true of conflicts such as those experienced during the colonial era when European nations expanded their imperial powers in other parts of the world through military conquest; the two World Wars; and during the Cold War when the Eastern and Western blocks competed for international hegemony. Expansionist and nation building conflicts also fall within this fold.

2.5.1 Sources of Conflict in Africa

Many scholars argue that the African continent has earned itself a negative reputation as “a continent at war with itself”. The questions to ask are: Why are there so many conflicts in Africa? Why are conflicts so perennial as to have become structural in some countries? What are the root causes of conflict in Africa? Why has there been so much violence in changing governments in Africa? What must be done to prevent or resolve these conflicts? (Buzan 1991, Chabal 1992, Adebayo and Gelin–Adam 1995, Annan 1998, Annan 2000a, Adedeji 1999, Cilliers 2004). It is essential to find answers to these questions if the conflicts are to be understood and resolved. Adedeji observes that attempts to resolve conflicts in Africa have been abortive due to lack of comprehension of the deep underlying causes and dynamics of the conflicts. As he puts it, “unfortunately but not surprisingly, sustained and sustainable peace has proved elusive in many such cases largely because of the failure to comprehend fully the complexity of the forces that have brought about the conflicts” (1999: xvi). In the context of Africa, several scholars have identified numerous themes and perspectives in which to frame the sources of conflicts engulfing the continent. The sources of conflicts in Africa are as diverse as the conflicts themselves, thus making it impossible to reduce them to a single cause (Buzan 1991, Furley 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Rugumamu, 2002, Field 2004, Cilliers 2004, United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA), 2005). Cilliers observes that “[e]xplanations about Africa’s woes have tended to be presented in two analytically distinct ways; one emphasising the domestic factors, the other stressing external considerations” (2004: 31).

The United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UN OSAA) (2005) categorises the sources of conflict in Africa as remote sources (the colonial heritage and legacy), the immediate causes (competition for resources, poor governance, resources misdistribution, external factors to conflicting parties), and factors that exacerbate conflict (availability of arms, arms imports, food insecurity, pressures of refugees and internally displaced people). In the words of Annan (1998: 2), “some sources are purely internal, some reflect the dynamics of a particular region, and some have important international dimensions.” However, “despite these differences the sources of conflict in Africa are linked by a number of common themes and experiences.” In explaining why violent conflicts occur, some theorists distinguish between structural causes of conflict (root causes or imbalance of opportunities, deep underlying problems) and accelerating and triggering factors. The former include political, economic and social factors such as
state repression, lack of political participation, poor governance, and unfair distribution of wealth, the ethnic identity question of society, and the history of inter-group relations. While the latter include the emergence of radical ideologies, repression of opposition groups, sharp economic shocks, new discriminatory policies, external intervention, proliferation of weapons, and the collapse of central authority, all of which bring underlying tensions to the fore and increase the society’s vulnerability to conflict (Azar and Burton 1986, Azar 1990a, Davis and Gurr 1997). These factors form the core of violent conflicts in Africa, as will be indicated in the following sections.

2.5.2 The Colonial Legacy

For a holistic study of African conflicts, it is necessary to reflect on the colonial legacy and its effects on the social, economic and political history of the continent. As Azar (199: 6) correctly notes, “many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are characterised by a blurred demarcation between the internal and external sources and actors.” Miall et al (2001: 29) also note that “…the roots of all major conflicts reach back into the historical past…” There is no doubt that colonialism, Cold War politics, neo-colonialism and globalisation have had, and continue to have, an influence on the social, economic and political life of the Continent. Adebayo and Gelin-Adams (1999: 3) maintain: “the twin curses of colonialism and the Cold War are the defining forces in understanding the nature and causes of Africa’s conflicts.”

However, this does not mean that African leaders do not share the blame for conflict generation. As will be indicated, several factors that resulted in bloody intra-state conflicts emanate from bad governance, dictatorship, corruption, flawed and defective electoral models, and processes and economic mismanagement by African leaders and regimes (Cilliers 2004). Hence, in his 1998 report, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called upon Africa to look beyond its colonial past for the causes of current conflicts in the Continent.

2.5.3 Colonial Boundaries and Conflicts in Africa

The European powers’ partitioning of Africa had devastating effects on the map, as well as the socio-economic and political livelihood of the Continent. The colonial partition of the colonies was arbitrary, and reflected the imperial powers’ selfish agenda to the detriment of the indigenous people. Muller vividly posits that “[t]he African politico-geographical map is thus a permanent liability that resulted from... ignorant, greedy acquisitiveness during a period when Europe’s search for minerals and markets had become insatiable” (in in Boateng 2010: 14). The carving up of the Continent ignored the ethnic, cultural and social differences of the indigenous populace, culminating in the creation of heterogeneous, multi-ethnic nations, which African leaders inherited upon attaining independence in the 1960s (Buzan 1991, Power 2004). As Rosenberg correctly notes: “[w]hat ultimately resulted from the Berlin conference was a hodgepodge of geometric boundaries that divided Africa into... irregular countries. ...The new countries... divided coherent groups of people and merged together groups who really did not get along” (cited in
Boateng 2010: 15). This resulted in numerous ethnic tensions and conflicts, for example in Nigeria, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan. These conflicts were in most cases fuelled by support from similar identity groups in other countries, culminating in regionalised conflicts.

The motive of the imperial powers was to exploit the ethnic diversities for their imperial advantage through the policy of divide and rule, Buzan (1991: 99) notes that the colonial project “for the most part ...neither took much account of existing cultural and ethnic boundaries, nor created new nations to fit within them.” Post-colonial independent African regimes inherited these colonially defined nation-states with their volatile and explosive ethnic questions, tensions and rivalries, thereby exacerbating national tensions, and threatening national cohesion and stability (Thomas 1991, Buzan 1991, Bayart 1993, Chabal (1992), Benjamin 1992, Furley 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, Vita 2001, Power 2004, Cilliers 2004, Ajulu 2004). The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) recommended the wholesale inheritance of the colonially carved nation-states, supposedly in fear of opening a can of worms if the different ethnic groups were granted the opportunity to reclaim their pre-colonial territories’ borders and sovereignty.

However, international law and the OAU Charter established that upon decolonisation, the inherited boundaries would constitute the legitimate boundaries of the newly independent states (Thomas (1991, Furley 1995, Kissangani 2011). According to Aluko (1977), post-colonial leaders were forced to build the new nation-states on the foundations laid down by the colonial states, “...for any attempt to challenge the colonial invention (which in most cases had provided the territory not only with its boundaries but with its name) would have been to challenge the very concept of the nation-state” (cited in Chabal 1992: 122). The situation was aggravated by the fact that not all African states attained independence at the same time. One other reason may have been that the OAU realised that “to open the question of borders would ferment discord and strife when the urgent need was to promote unity...” (Furley 1995: 3). Whether the Continent would have experienced worse conflicts if Africa had redrawn its territorial boundaries, is not clear. The reality is that several post-independence African states were plunged into border disputes, secessionist and bloody ethnic conflicts. It was due to these post-independence crises that Buzan argued that decolonisation in Asia and Africa “left behind an entire international system organised along sovereignty-anarchy lines” (1991: 204-205). This is mainly because Africa is a “continent where in geopolitical terms, the idea of the ‘state’ has remained in perpetual conflict with that of the ethnic identity” (Kisiangani 2011: 10). Thus in Chabal’s (1992) view, some of the bitterest conflicts today in Africa concern cases where there is a contested interpretation of the colonial legacy.

2.5.4 Border Disputes
The unsatisfactory nature of inter-state borders has become a source of recurrent conflicts in Africa. This is because “nearly all these borders were inherited from colonial times and were the products of negotiations and treaties
between colonial powers, decided in Europe with the aid of poor maps and scant attention to African people” (Furley 1995: 2). According to Zartman (1991: 304), “boundaries in Africa have often been described as a Pandora’s box, a source of both real and potential conflict that threatens the emerging interstate order of the continent.” This assertion was vindicated as post-independence Africa experienced numerous border disputes. Boundaries between the independent nation-states were characterised by uncertainties and contestations that brought many of the nations to violent confrontations while others were constantly on the brink of full-scale wars. Mazrui refers to these border crises in Africa emanating from the colonial legacy as “the bondage of African boundaries” while Mamdani (1996) labels it the “inherited impediments of colonial history” (cited in Power (2004: 274). Chabal (1994: 130) rightly notes that “[t]he geographical boundaries of colonial territories almost never took into account the realities of pre-colonial Africa and thus neglected to consider whether these boundaries would make it more or less likely for the peoples of that territory to live together.” In view of this picture, Zartman (1991: 305) further suggests that in Africa “[c]onflict is often a useful way of making artificial boundaries African, since nations have fought and died in the defence of borders formerly regarded as only colonially imposed.” The numerous disputes raise important questions on the legitimacy of Africa’s borders. The supposed sanctity and inviolability of these borders have become a source of conflict or seeds for potential and recurrent conflict in the continent.

2.5.5 Secessionist Conflicts

Another source of conflict in Africa that emanates from the arbitrarily drawn colonial borders is secessionist nationalist tendencies. Post-independence African regimes had to shoulder the challenges of building unitary nation-states by bringing the heterogeneous and sometimes historically hostile groups under one central government. Chabal (1992) notes that colonial powers entrenched seeds for “territorial” consciousness and secessionism through the policy of divide and rule. This was because all colonial states explicitly wished the subjects of their territory to think of themselves as citizens of the particular territory rather than a nation-state including other ethnic groups. This created serious problems for post-independence leaders in building coherent nation-states. As Mazrui and Thomas (1992: 160) vividly state, “…there was nothing national about post-colonial African borders ....” Upon attaining independence, African leaders adopted the colonial borders because they granted them international recognition and power within those borders (Kisangani 2011). In most cases, post-independence African governments failed to balance the ethnic equation and representation, resulting in marginalisation of some groups and domination by other ethnic groups. In other instances political parties and regime, like the colonial government, also exploited the ethnic differences for their selfish political ends resulting either in regionally and ethnically based regimes and political parties. This scenario has culminated in groups who feel marginalised or who feel their territory is the economic vein of the nation but is underdeveloped, engaging in secessionist wars for independence. According to Azar (1990a) and Burton (1988, 1990a, 1990b), the marginalisation, denial and deprivation of a group of its fundamental human needs such as equality, security, recognition of identity, equal opportunity and access to resources and services, are the
root causes of deep and protracted social conflicts. Secessionist threats remain a major threat in many African
nations. This is because, as Chabal (1992: 133) observed: “[i]n Africa, as elsewhere, there are a number of countries
where groups of people do not accept the legitimacy of the existing nation-state and would wish to join or create
another nation-state.”

2.5.6 Ethnicity as a Source of Conflict

The other major source of conflict in Africa resulting from the colonial legacy is the ethnic question. Bayart (1993: 51)
notes that “[a]lthough it would be too much to maintain that all contemporary ethnic groups are the products of the
colonial period; the precipitation of ethnic identities becomes incomprehensible if it is divorced from colonial rule.”

With the exception of a few states such as Lesotho, Swaziland and Cape Verde, which are relatively homogeneous
linguistically and culturally, most of the colonial states in Africa are heterogeneous. With arbitrarily drawn borders,
different groups with dissimilar cultural backgrounds and histories of rivalry were yoked together (Buzan 1991, Gurr
and Harff, 1994, Bayart 1993, Power 2004). This enabled colonial powers to employ their policy of divide and rule,
thereby crushing any collective resistance.

According to Chabal (1992: 121), “[f]ew African countries were ‘natural’ nation-states...geographically, ethnically... or
politically.... Some were hardly plausible candidates for nationhood.” The post-independence leaders battled with the
challenges of building nation-states, a phenomenon which was non-existent in the pre-colonial African political setup
(Chabal 1994, Kisangani 2011). Consequently, some African nations have had “...to spill much blood fighting many
civil and ethnic wars to preserve the monolithic structures, the west created out of naturally dissimilar blocks”
(Kumuyi, 2007: 18).

In many post-independence African nation-states, ethnic tensions have created volatility with a high potential for civil
war. Some undemocratic regimes, politicians and unscrupulous political movements have exploited and galvanised
their power bases by appealing to ethnic and regional divisions and loyalties, hence aggravating ethnic tensions. This
has, in cases of such regimes, resulted in nepotism and corruption, with government and security apparatus
dominated by people from a particular ethnic group or region (in most cases the ethnic group from which the
president originates). Azar, (1990a: 10) posits that in such states power “[t]ends to be monopolised by the dominant
identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups which use the state to maximise their interests at the expense of
others.” According to Bayart (1993), in the context of several autocratic African states, ethnicity has become an agent
of accumulation of wealth and of political power. The “ethnic community is a channel through which distribution is
demanded, as well as being a means of accumulation.” Munyae (2000) refers to this scenario as the “ethnicisation of
politics or politicisation of ethnicity” in his thesis on the conflict in the DRC. He indicates how denial of citizenship and
rights to land to the Banyamulenge (Tutsi ethnic group) in the DRC by the Mobutu regime resulted in the emergence
of a Tutsi-dominated movement that dethroned him in 1997. Mangu (2003: 239) also notes the same problem under the regime of Laurent Kabila in the DRC (Country) when he comments that "[t]he tribalisation or ethnicisation of power was even faster than it was under Mobutu...Under Kabila...the rights curtailed were not only individual rights but also collective rights, including the rights of minorities such as the Banyamulenge who were denied of their Congolese citizenship." Therefore as Bayart (1993: 55 and 54) further observes: "[i]n Africa ethnicity is almost never absent...The candidates saw themselves as trapped by their ethnic perceptions of their supporters and their opponents." The consolidation of political power by a sectarian regime has often led to subjugation and marginalisation of other ethnic and regional groups, threatening the cohesion, legitimacy and stability of the nation at large (Bayart 1993, Bobrow and Chan 1988, Azar and Moon 1988, Jackson 1990, Ayoob 1991, Benjamin 1992, Fisher 1997, Anan 1998, Adedeji 1999).

In response to intolerance and marginalisation by the political elite, opposition groups (the alienated groups) also rally their marginalised ethnic, religious or regional followers to dislodge what they consider autocratic ethnic-based regimes. According to Benjamin (1992: 6), "[p]rejudice against [some] groups or minorities within a state deprives such groups of the basic protections that should ideally be afforded to all its people." In his view, such a scenario, devitalises the productive capacity of the state and weakens its legitimacy, cohesion and foundation (Benjamin 1992). The mobilisation of group interests and identities by the ruling elite, and counter-mobilisation of the excluded groups by the opposition, precipitate a crisis of legitimacy for the government. A security dilemma is fuelled as each group sponsors antagonistic, exclusionist and dehumanising propaganda, culminating in violent ethnic conflicts and genocide, as experienced in Sudan (Darfur) and Rwanda (Azar 1990a, b, Gurr and Harff 1994, Annan 1998, Munyae 2000, Munyae 2000, Miall etal 2001). The conflicts generate a sense of separateness and self-defence. Personal interests and ambitions by political leaders are framed in ethnic terms, in order to rally the solidarity and support of ethnic loyalty and sentiments for the cause (Chabal 1992, Bayart 1993, Fisher 1997, Adedeji 1999, Annan 1998, 2000a, Rugumamu 2002).

Bayart (1993) states unequivocally the reasons for ethnic-based politics in Africa. He notes that ethnicity is “less an actual political force than a ‘shadowy theatre’ through which competition for the acquisition of wealth, power and accumulation is expressed and played out” (paraphrased in Power 2004: 267). The general failure of the state to satisfy political and socio-economic demands distances all the people, apart from those who are close and connected to the centres of power (Benjamin 1992). In the words of Fisher (1997), “[e]thnicity becomes a driving force in the conflict through the colouring of all interactions and attributions to the point where inter-communal hatred is passed on through socialisation from one generation to the next” resulting in intractable conflicts in society. It was on the basis of this view that the Carnegie Commission on Prevention of Deadly Conflicts concluded that “[t]he words ‘ethnic’, ‘religious,’ ‘tribal’ or ‘factional’ – important as they may be in inter-group conflict do not, in most cases,
adequately explain why people use massive violence to achieve their goals. These descriptions do not of themselves, reveal why people would kill each other over their differences. To label a conflict as an ethnic war can lead to misguided policy choices by fostering a wrong impression that ethnic, cultural or religious differences inevitably result in violent conflict and that differences must therefore be suppressed” (1997: 29). Annan illustrates this point that “ethnic differences are not in and of themselves either symptoms or causes of conflict;... Ethnic differences become charged-conflictual when they are used for political ends, when ethnic groups are intentionally placed in opposition to each other.” For Annan, most of the post-Cold War conflicts “…are not ethnic conflicts, but political conflicts in ethnic clothing” (2000a: 175).

In extreme cases, some brutal and criminalised leaders have trained and armed ethnic militias to defend their unpopular regimes through repressive and genocide atrocities of the opposing ethnic groups. Examples include the Hutu-based Interahangwe in Rwanda, the Arab-based Janjaweed in Sudan, and the Fifth Brigade and ZANU militia in Zimbabwe. The politicisation and militarisation of ethnicities and religious cleavages create permanent insecurity and the potential for bloody ethnic conflicts in Africa (Bayart 1993, Anan 1998, Annan 2000a, de Waal 2000, Munyae 2000 Onyango 2000). This is because ethnic and religious conflicts are value-based and have the potential to be intractable and irreconcilable (Azar 1990a, Burton 1990a, Burton1990b, Fisher 1990). In Africa, the problem is exacerbated by the existence of ethnic commonalities in the neighbouring states, which leads to regionalisation and the recurrence of ethnic friction as there will be cross-border sympathies, support and refuge to ethnic-based rebel groups. Lake and Rothchild (1999) observe that conflict spillover occurs through the processes of diffusion when “[a] conflict in one state increases the probability of conflict in a second” and escalation when “ethnic violence sucks in foreign belligerents” (cited in White, Little and Smith, 2005: 142). This scenario has resulted in the regionalised crises, coups and secessionist revolts in many parts of Africa, especially in West Africa, the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa (Benjamin 1992, Munyae 2000, de Waal 2000, International Peace Academy 2001, International Crisis Group Africa Report No 62 April 2003, Onyango 2003, Power 2004, Ajulu 2004).

2.5.7 The Cold War and Conflict in Africa
The Cold War period (1945-1990s) was characterised by intense ideological bipolar conflicts between the Capitalist Western and the Communist Eastern Blocs. Almost all the proxy bipolar-sponsored wars were fought in the Third World and Africa. In this regard, the superpower competition for global influence exacerbated and prolonged regional conflicts in an extensive bipolar rivalry (Ohlon 1993, Rugumamu 2002, Lund 2005). The ideologically hostile superpowers – the USA and the then Union of USSR – backed regimes and rebel opposition movements which championed their respective ideological positions. Adebayo and Gelin-Adams indicate that “[f]rom 1984 to 1988, the former Soviet Union delivered $11.1 billion worth of armaments to Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique while the United States provided $2.7 billion worth of security assistance to its African clients in the same period” (1999: 4).
Logistical and military support was generously provided to any regime which pledged to safeguard the ideological position of the superpowers, however brutal the regime was. For example, the USA backed the brutal Mobuto of Zaire and the apartheid regime in South Africa, while the USSR backed the brutal Mengestu regime in Ethiopia. Understandably, this is one of the major ways in which numerous dictators, mainly in the Third World, were born, bred and sustained (Benjamin 1992, Rugumamu, 2002).

This superpower support triggered, fuelled and prolonged the most devastating conflicts that gripped the Continent during the Cold War period. It is worth noting that the imperialist West and the USA crushed any post-colonial leader such as Nkrumah (Ghana), Lumumba (DRC) and Gamal Nasser (Egypt), who strove for genuine economic and political independence, which they deemed to be at odds with their imperialist interests and agenda (Djanie (2011). Such a political route was deemed a danger to the interests of the West and the USA; hence their governments were violently overthrown. The effects of imperialist-sponsored wars are continuing in the form of unresolved, recurrent deep-rooted conflicts in some parts of the Continent. Rugumamu (2002: 5) summarises the situation thus: “[t]he blind support by Cold War warriors of many unpopular and oppressive African regimes, inevitably led to aggrieved groups to carry out coup' d'états, start secessionist and irredentist movements, and rebellions against the state. So powerful were the Cold War dynamics that they set in motion serious internal conflicts that have long outlasted the Cold War itself.” The post-Cold War period and the changing economic and political rules bred new uncertainties and insecurities among the rulers and the governed alike, leading to clashes of interests (Lund 2005). While there were eruptions in Europe, they were not as numerous and intense as in Africa. In most cases, developed nations still have enormous influence in the economic and political affairs of many African countries through financial and military assistance. France, for example still maintains military bases as well as economic and political influence in her former colonies in West Africa, to safeguard her economic, political and security interests in the Continent in line with the Colonial Pact and the Cooperation Defence Agreement France signed with its former African colonies before granting them independence in the 1960s.

Subsequent to the end of the Cold War, Africa markedly lost her strategic value and significance after the ideological warfare ended with the collapse of the Berlin wall and the USSR in the early 1990s. As Buzan (1991: 435) observes, “Africa’s geo-strategic significance has become marginal to the vital interests of the West. Europe, in particular, seems to be gradually diverting its attention away from Africa in favour of those regions of the world with which it has closer cultural, economic and strategic connections.” Rugumamu (2002) notes that the European Union’s preoccupation with the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the concomitant inattention or feeble attention to the same situation in the DRC, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and Sierra Leone, is indicative of this shift. Necessarily, the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of superpowers did not bring peace to Africa. Instead, it opened a period of incessant internal turbulence that culminated in the fall of most of the despotic regimes that had once been backed
by the superpowers. The break-up of the Cold War alliances, partnerships, and regional support networks, coupled with the Western powers’ policy of disengagement in Africa, exposed the weak African states to manifest systemic instability and vulnerability as experienced by the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, Siad Barre in Somalia, Samuel Doe in Liberia, Mobutu Seseko in the Democratic Republic of Congo (the former Zaire). The unpopular autocratic regimes fell to internal opposition groups because the superpower pillars on which they had rested for more than four decades were uprooted (Buzan 1991, Holsti 1996, Cillers 2004, Reno 1998). Cilliers (2004: 17) summarises the effects of the end of the Cold War on Africa thus: “Africa’s governing elites lost much of their ability to extract capital support from the East or West...With the removal of this external scaffolding, the weaknesses of the African state was ultimately exposed to a world that was in the middle of a new revolution.” The end of the Cold War left many weak state regimes bereft of internal legitimacy and incapacitated in the face of new post-Cold War socio-economic, political and security challenges. As Lund (2005: 70) puts it, most of the corrupt regimes “…came under intense pressure from ‘above’ as support from their Cold War patrons declined and from ‘below’ as democratic expectations from their hitherto suppressed political opposition increased.”

The Western powers started peddling policies of “African solutions to African problems,” and “layered responses” in which regional bodies were called upon to fend for themselves in the maintenance of regional peace and security. Security projects like the USA’s African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and French Reinforcement of African Capabilities for Peacekeeping (RECAMP) are reflective of strategic withdrawal by Western powers from the persistent turmoil in Africa. In 1994, the USA Congress passed a resolution calling for the provision of material and technical assistance to institutionalise African conflict resolution capabilities (Rothchild 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, International Peace Academy 2001). With a few exceptions, most of the states in which the Cold War proxy wars were fought, such as the DRC and Somalia, have never known peace to date. Therefore as Ohlson (1993) observes, while the end of the Cold War has removed the Third World as an arena of superpower competition, it has also to some extent removed it (Third World) from the attention of the North. Instead of ushering in a new world of democracy, peace and security, the post-Cold War world order brought new challenges, tensions, insecurities and violent conflicts. Conflicts raged on with greater frequency, intensity and complexity, as evidenced by the emergence of numerous intra-state conflicts worldwide (Chigas, Evans 1998, Kittani 1998, Lund 2005). Ghali Ghali (1998: 21) observes that “[a] majority of conflicts in the world today are intra-rather than inter-state, involve irregular forces instead of national armies and result in high civilian casualties, sometimes accompanied by the collapse of state institutions.”

The conflicting remnants of the Cold War era are still bedevilling Africa’s unity and development. In some cases those groups which toppled former repressive regimes became dictatorial in turn, leading to further civil strife as experienced in Liberia under Charles Taylor and the DRC under Laurent Kabila. Therefore, although the end of the
Cold War removed some of the causes of conflict, it also created opportunities for a new class of actors lusting after power, loot and plunder, much to the suffering of the Continent (Joseph 1999). Rugumamu (2002: 5) could not have more been accurate when he concluded that “[o]ne of the primary defining features of the post-Cold War era in Africa is the increase in the number, scope, and intensity of domestic conflicts that have spilled, or have the potential to spill over into neighbouring states.”

The evil hand of the former colonisers and Cold War uni-superpower (USA) remains intact in Africa, and is causing havoc by continuing to support particular regimes, which accommodate their interest. The USA backed the brutal dictatorships in Egypt (Mubarak) and Tunisia (Ben Ali). Among other things, the Cold War politics have been replaced by another version of foreign domination and exploitation – globalisation, which, like its predecessor also fuels conflicts in Africa. Through the structural conditionalities of globalisation, the Developed countries still impose their model and forms of democracy, namely good governance and economic management systems in Africa as a condition for acquiring financial assistance from the Breton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This has resulted in economic crisis in the form of crippling debts and the economic collapse of “deviant” nations, creating fertile grounds for conflicts. According to a June 2006 report by the International Crisis Group on Zimbabwe entitled Zimbabwe's continuing self-destruction, Zimbabwe still owes 119 million dollars to the IMF, and new loans are conditional on major political and economic reform (ICG, Africa Report No 38, 6 June 2006: 15).

Although not entirely responsible for conflicts in Africa, the interference of the Western powers in the domestic affairs of African countries is a cause for concern. It is the responsibility of African countries through their continental and regional bodies to establish mechanisms to deter former colonial powers and the Western power’s intrusion in the affairs of the African continent. As Wambu (2011: 90) observes “[o]nce we lose the authority to internally resolve our own conflicts in Africa, opportunities are presented to powerful outside powers, with their own interests and agendas, to intervene and chip away at our hard-fought and hard-won sovereignty.”

2.6 Politics, Power and Governance in Africa

One major source of conflict in Africa is the struggle for acquisition and maintenance of political power. As Annan stated in his 1998 UN Report, “[t]he nature of political power in many African states, together with the real and perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power, is a key source of conflicts across the continent” (1998: 3-4). Most of the post-independence African regimes were characterised by poverty of democratic credentials and structures of social justice, freedom of political expression and choice, democratic representation, transparency, accountability, free and fair elections for smooth transfer of power, and weak institutions of governance. The Continent experienced a large number of highly centralised, militarised and repressive regimes which lacked
democratic legitimacy and survived through brutal repression of the opposition and heavy reliance on the security apparatus and ethnic loyalties and cleavages. Buzan argues that in most of the Third World countries political disorder emanates from “the struggle for control over state’s institutions since) only a minority of the states have developed stable mechanisms for the transfer of political power” (1991: 45). In situations where governments rule more by military power and force than by consensus, their authority and legitimacy will be internally contested, leading to erosion of national democracy, security and ultimate national instability (Azar and Moon, 1988, Buzan 1991, Thomas 1991). Azar, to some extent, locates the origins of these undemocratic institutions of governance to the colonial administration which was characterised by “weak participatory institutions, a hierarchical tradition of imposed bureaucratic rule from the metropolitan centres” (cited in Miall et al, 2001: 74). These repressive state machineries and apparatus were wholly inherited by the post-colonial leaders, some of whom became more brutal (repressive) towards any dissent and challenges to their power.

In most cases post-colonial leaders inherited these repressive institutions and systems of governance to prolong their stay in power. Chabal (1994: 121) summarises it thus: “[t]he colonial state was a coercive state.” Consequently, “the neo-colonial state was born a coercive state.” Decay in governance in most of post-colonial independent Africa was aggravated by the Cold War politics in which the Eastern and Western blocks sponsored regimes that spearheaded their ideological positions and interests, irrespective of the governance records in terms of transparency, accountability, democracy and human rights protection (Buzan 1991, Annan 1998, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, Cilliers 2004). The question of undemocratic governance as a legacy of repressive colonial regimes is better expressed by Williams (2007: 12) “[i]t may also be the time to find out whether we have not been living a lie in post-colonial Africa if we had expected nations founded on anti-national principles of extractive predation and the suppression of indigenous rights to self-actualisation to become democratic exemplars.” This is mainly so “because there was little need to seek political legitimacy, the colonial state did not encourage representation or participation...” As such, “a number of African states have continued to rely on centralised and highly personalised forms of government...” (Annan 1998: 17). However, the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) founding document of October 2001, while acknowledging the impact of the colonial legacy on governance in post-independent Africa also apportions blame to poor leadership, corruption and bad governance as well as a lack of visionary leadership on the post-independence governing elite (cited in Cilliers 2004). For example in some countries “[a]fter independence, the elite took over power, shutting out the vast majority of the population, gathering virtually uncontrolled executive power and limited only the capabilities of the coercive instruments at their disposal” (Cilliers 2004: 40).

Miall et al. (2001) note that despotic regimes successfully manipulated the state apparatus and constitutions in order to cling to power and block political access to all those who do not form their patronage network. Forsyth (1999)
vividly captures this problem when stating that “[i]n Africa as elsewhere political power means success and prosperity, not only for the man who hold it but for his family, his birth place and even his whole region of origin. As a result there are many who will go to any length to get it and having got it will surpass themselves in order to keep it” (cited in Odunuga 1999: 44). Some leaders and regimes resort to “politics of the belly” (Bayart 1993) or what is described in Nigeria as the “democracy of the stomach” (Sheyin 2007). According to Cilliers (2004: 25) the political behaviour and activities of politicians in the majority of African countries is shaped and aggravated by the prevalent material poverty or resource scarcity, to the extent that “the object of political contestation is to secure economic consumption which in turn is best guaranteed by capturing state power”.

Cilliers (2004) also notes a trend in Africa in which some post-colonial leaders exploited their liberation credentials to become dictators who presided over political decay and economic collapse in their nations-states. Museveni of Uganda and President Robert Mugabe are often cited as such leaders who brutalise their people, denying them freedom and free political participation based on their contribution in the liberation of their respective nations.

National elections in most African states have become the source of vicious conflicts between the ruling parties and the opposition, instead of a process to deliver democratic dispensations and good governance. In some cases elections are conducted just as a formality since they are controlled and highly doctored to retain the ruling elite. In the words of Jonathan Moyo (before joining the Mugabe regime) “[t]he assertion that the majority of African governments are now democratic…has no empirical basis. It is true that multiparty elections are now common in Africa but this truth does not describe a fundamental development. The change is strategic, not substantive…” (cited in Nathan 2003: 16-17). In most of the African nation-states electoral fraud, vote rigging, voter trafficking, repression and intimidation of the opposition, abuse of the state media and resources, manipulation of the election results, and other electoral ills are institutionalised. Such flawed electoral processes never deliver legitimate and democratic regimes. The continued electoral contestations are bred by the incumbent regimes’ control of the entire electoral process including the electoral commission, the delimitation of constituencies, the government media machinery, the security forces and the national resources which they often abuse to boost their grip to power to the detriment of the resources-starved opposition. It has become a permanent feature that most of the elections in Africa are followed by vicious contestations of the election results by the opposition, resulting in violence. For example, elections in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Algeria, Angola, DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Togo, Kenya, and Ivory-Coast have been marked by turmoil. Only in a few countries such as Botswana, Tanzania, South Africa and Ghana, are elections relatively fair although not always free. Commenting on the April 14th and 21st 2007 Nigerian state governors and presidential elections which most international observer missions denounced as not credible, Williams posits that: “[i]n Nigeria…we are discovering that an attempt to transit from military rule to full civilian rule may also be accompanied by a democratic regression manifested in deepening despotism and an elite
conspiracy to thwart the democratic aspirations of the people” (2007: 13). In many, if not all African countries, elections are followed by violent protests and rejection of the electoral results by the opposition, mass killings and other forms of political repression. The elections in Kenya (2007), Lesotho (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), Ivory-Coast (2010), and Nigeria (2011) were marred by violent confrontations and huge casualties. In such cases, the electoral playing field always gives an unfair advantage to the ruling party. The ruling party has unfettered access to the state resources such as transport to traverse the entire country to canvass for support, monopolise and abuse the state media and other forums and institutions to sway votes to them. The opposition parties, on the other hand, are severely hampered by paucity of resources to canvass for support, especially in the remote rural constituencies, and are adroitly denied airing their campaign packages through the state-controlled media. The poverty of resources is aggravated by the fact that in many African nations, there is no political party funding. This skewed playing field always give the opposition parties justification to question the credibility of the poll, culminating in conflicts.

Apart from the fact that the electoral playing fields are not plain, the incumbents have devised a sinister strategy of refusing to vacate the seat of power even if they lose the elections, as experienced in Zimbabwe (Mugabe) Kenya (Kibaki) and Ivory Coast (Gbango). Against the democratic and loud voice of the Ivorian electorates and appeals from the regional organisations, the UN and the international community, Gbagbo declared himself the winner, with the backing of the Constitutional Council and the military throwing the country into a constitutional crisis. The editorial in the Telegraph Newspaper (Botswana), April 13, 2011: 8) denounced this undemocratic tendency when it stated that “Africa still has a long way to go before incumbents get to appreciate the true reasons behind holding elections... It is a tragedy that every time an incumbent leader loses elections, they resort to technicalities to disrespect the people’s wish.” As we have seen in many countries, if the election results do not go down well with the ruling elite, they are manipulated to legitimise their continued stay in power. This diabolic tendency has created legitimacy crises for such governments, leading to conflicts.

Worse still, in most cases, the electoral systems are based on the winner-takes-all system, which tends to limit and frustrate mass democratic participation. In the words of Annan, “political victory assumes a ‘winner-takes-all’ form with respect to wealth and resources, patronage and the prestige and prerogative of the office” (1998: 4). Miall etal. (2001) and Odunuga (1999) also observe that civil strife abounds in many African countries because political power has been taken to mean a winner takes all affair. The political history and the bitter conflicts that have besieged Lesotho since independence emanate from the flawed electoral system of the winner-takes-all (the first-past the post electoral system). Since 1966, Lesotho’s national elections have been followed by violent conflicts with the opposition questioning the credibility of the election results. The conflicts of 1994, 1998 and 2007 culminated in the regional body, the SADC, intervening to restore order in the Kingdom. The Human Development Report (2002) and the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser (OSAA) 2005 recommend proportional representation as the most democratic
and inclusive system which can reduce conflicts emanating from electoral contestations. As the OSAA (2005) suggests “[m]ajority votes do not guarantee stability or security...majority rule versus the opposition model of democracy...may be a much less useful focus than seeking to ensure fundamental democratic ideals like free and fair elections, respect for human rights and the separation of legislative, judiciary and executive powers.”

In some SADC countries electoral irregularities are prevalent in stark contravention of the organisations’ established Principles Governing Democratic Elections in the region (Sachikonye 2004, Kibble 2005, and Townsend 2005). Contestations of election results have been experienced in many SADC countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, and have culminated in violent political turmoil in Zimbabwe and Lesotho. Commenting on the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe, the leader of the then pro-senate faction of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Mutambara, noted that “our country is ruled by a corrupt, incompetent, criminal and brutal kleptocracy, which has retained power through fraudulent elections” (Mutambara 2007: 79). The connection between failed states, undemocratic and de-legitimised governance and the emergence of conflicts is an established fact (Buzan 1991, Annan 1998). As Annan (1998: 4) observed, “[w]here there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively important, and the stakes become dangerously high.” Conflicts erupt because the regimes are highly insecure and regard any different political views, no matter how democratic and constructive they seem to be, as a challenge to their authority and legitimacy, hence the repressive counter measures as experienced in many African countries. As long as there is denial of democratic participation in the political dispensation, politically motivated conflicts will remain a permanent feature of the Continent. This is because “[g]overnance issues are closely linked to the empowerment of people and communities. Without effective governance, people are not empowered. And unless people and communities are empowered to let their voices be heard or to participate in decision making, governance is not feasible” (Commission on Human Security 2003: 68).

The Freedom House surveys of civil and political liberties in the SADC region (2002) and Isaksen and Tjonneland (2001) reflected that currently Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa were “free”; Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zambia were “partly free;” and Angola, the DRC, Swaziland and Zimbabwe were “not free” or were less democratic. This scenario tends to vindicate the observation by the SADC Parliamentary Forum that most of the politicians in the region “talk democracy but use undemocratic means to stay in power” (cited in Nathan 2003: 16). In the view of Landsberg and Barengu (2003: 4) “Facade’ or ‘virtual’ democracies, where incumbent regimes manipulate the democratic process while pretending to be highly democratic, are the standard in Southern Africa. In fact, many states are caught between democracy and authoritarianism.”
Subjected to such a hostile political situation, the groups or institutions which felt oppressed by the despotic regimes have no choice but to dislodge it by violent means. In most countries in Africa, “[t]he extraordinary privileges of most African rulers and bureaucrats and their use of state powers for private gain would be regarded as prima facie evidence of the illegitimacy and a potent incentive for…resentment… largely by the disadvantaged and deprived masses” (Gurr, 1991: 154). Firstly, it was the military assuming power through military coups. Buzan argues that “the political conditions of weak states often propel the military into government as the only organisation possessing power and /or the national legitimacy to hold the state together” (1991: 104). However, in most cases this has not ensured democratic governance, but continued repression and dictatorship by those who proclaimed themselves as saviours when they assumed power.

In many African countries, the politicisation of the armed forces through protection of their undemocratic regimes has backfired when the armed forces have turned the military machinery against them. Adedeji (1999: 3) observes that “between the decades 1960s and 1990s… there have been as many as 80 violent changes of government in the continent.” Participants at the Foundation for Global Dialogue (1999) noted that the 1994 and 1998 crisis in Lesotho emanated from decades of politicisation of the army by the Leabua Jonathan government as will be reflected in Chapter Six. The International Peace Academy (2001), Adebayo and Gelin Adams (1999), Adedeji (1999) has noted that among the regions in Africa, West Africa tops the list with the highest number of military coups. This is an appalling reality that more than half of the countries have experienced military rule, which in most cases has proved to be a travesty of democracy. The military rulers who purportedly seized power to remove a dictatorship for democratic rule have in most cases turned to the worse evils. In the DRC, Munyae (2000) notes how Kabila toppled the Mobuto despotic rule, “Mobutuism”, and replaced it with his own form of autocracy, “Kabilaism”, resulting in another protracted and destructive conflict against his regime in 1998.

In some cases, civil wars in Africa were/are launched by power-hungry warlords and rebel groups who wish to topple democratically elected regimes, as was the case in Liberia, Somalia, Uganda, Sierra Leone and Congo Brazzaville. Most of these groups are not guided by any ideological orientation but by the quest to seize power, retain it and further their opportunistic interests (Annan 1998, Joseph 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, de Wall, 2000 and Miall etal. 2001. Mitchell (1996) describes the Somali militia as having “no issues…no ideological differences and nothing to negotiate” (cited in Joseph 1999: 10). Rule by military and warlord dictatorship has robbed the Continent of democracy and opportunities for stable development and peace. Most of these military regimes have been characterised by suspension of the constitution, presidential autocracy, and rule by military decrees, political repression, oppression, corruption, media crackdown and grave human rights abuses (Annan 1998, Barclay 1999, Levit 2003). Todaro (1977) rightly notes that military intervention in politics has proved to be “a notorious vehicle by which one elite replaced another while the welfare of the poor remained unaffected” (cited in Barclay 1999: 302). Put
differently, “Africa’s soldiers have been as unsuccessful as the politicians they replaced in transforming their societies in any fundamental way… and their claims to legitimacy were often as questionable as those of the politicians they displaced” (Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999: 5). In view of the political turmoil and bickering brought by military rule in most African countries, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appealed to political leaders thus: “[w]e Africans must summon the will to resolve our problems by political and not military means. For every day we fail to do so, the innocent people of this continent pay a terrible price.” (Public Eye 13-17 September 1998, cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1998: 39).

In some parts of Africa such as the Great Lakes region and West Africa (the Mano River region) these militarised regimes harboured and sponsored rebel group networks which destabilise and regionalise conflicts. The former warlord president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was responsible for sponsoring rebel movements, which caused disruptive atrocities in Sierra Leone (Sankoh, Revolutionary United Front (RUF), in Guinea and in the Ivory Coast. In retaliation, Ivory Coast and Guinea also sponsored rebel groups such as the Liberian United for Peace, Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), which led to the collapse of the Taylor regime in 2004. Since 2005, Charles Taylor has been on trial at The Hague for a variety of crimes against humanity in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Cilliers maintains that Liberia under Taylor was “a direct source of insecurity-adopting policies that undermined the livelihood of the majority, using state instruments to the benefit of the presidential circle of patronage [and] deploying armed forces in pursuit of commercial gains in neighbouring countries…” (2004: 39). The military regime of Blaise Compaore in Burkina Faso was also accused of harbouring and backing the rebels of the New Forces which controlled the northern part of Ivory Coast during the civil war (Ero 1995, Munyae 2000, International Peace Academy 2001, Soderbaum 2001, ICG Africa Report No 62, April 2003, ICG Africa Report no 72 November 2003).

The same trend is also experienced in the Great Lakes region where militarised regimes in Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi have sponsored rebel groups, for instance, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Kisangani and the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma rebel factions to destabilise the DRC since 1998. Military support for rebel groups has become a major source of continued conflicts in Africa. This concern prompted Annan in his 1998 report to remark that “the role that African governments play in supporting, sometimes even instigating, conflicts in neighbouring countries must be candidly acknowledged” (1998: 4), and “the continent must look beyond its colonial past for the causes of current conflicts” (Annan 1998: 3).

International and regional organisations have come to the realisation that military and other forms of unconstitutional regimes constitute a major source of conflicts; instability and insecurity in the world, and most of them have included clauses in their operational documents to denounce it. For example in 1991, the Commonwealth Heads of States
Meeting in Zimbabwe adopted the Harare Declaration, which called for protection and promotion of political values of democracy, democratic processes and institutions, together with just and honest government (Ngoma 2005). Article 31 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2003: 14) states that “Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the union.” In its 1991 Santiago Declarations, the Organisation of American States (OAS) declared that “violations of basic democratic norms, such as a military coup affected regional stability and would trigger a collective response” (USIP 1994: 3). SADC’s interventions in Lesotho in 1994 through the Troika (Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe and the 1998 military intervention by Botswana and South Africa through Operation Boleas were indicative of the region’s intolerance of unconstitutional means of assuming power (Neethling 2000, Martin 2002, Nathan 2003, 2004, Ngoma 2005). The African Union (AU) and SADC have also indicated their indignation to unconstitutional seizure of power by taking mediation steps and threatening to impose sanctions on the Andre Rajoilina government who, with the backing of the military, seized power from the democratically elected government of Mark Ravalomanana in Madagascar.

However, in spite of pledges for good governance, peace, security and development by African leaders in various forums, most of them are still driven by unbridled greed to cling to power. Examples abound where some African leaders attempted, and sometimes succeeded, to legitimise their continued stay in power by amending the constitution to allow them to stand for a third term despite the dangers posed by such constitutional manipulations. Chiluba of Zambia, Muluzi of Malawi and Obassanjo of Nigeria and Mamadou Tanja of Niger whose government has been toppled by the military in protest against this undemocratic move, made abortive attempts. Nuyoma of Namibia, Museveni of Uganda, Idris Darby of Chad, Paul Biya of Cameroon and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt successfully legitimised their prolonged stay in power by amending the constitution for numerous third terms. In Southern Africa volatile political climates, threatening regional peace and stability and which pose as threats of potential conflicts, exist in Zimbabwe where President Robert Mugabe has prolonged his dictatorial regime through violence and electoral rigging. The regional organisation, SADC, has dismally failed to handle the Zimbabwean question through its fruitless strategy of “Quiet Diplomacy.” The government of national unity that was effected in 2009 between ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions remains dysfunctional as Mugabe still wields immense powers to manipulate its operations to his party’s advantage.

Swaziland also serves as an explosive scene for potential political turmoil as the only monarch regime in Southern Africa which resists both internal and external pressure to institute democratic political reforms in the country. This ugly political scenario prompted Joseph (1999: 19) to conclude that “it is unlikely that a wholly revamped Pax Africana based on respect for democratic governance, the rule of law and human rights would be established” in Africa. Conflicts in Africa can only be prevented or resolved if African governments can commit themselves to democratic systems of governance in which there is tolerance of opposition, transparency, accountability, popular
participation in governance and all levels of decision-making, independence of the judiciary, observance of the rule of law, protection of the fundamental (basic) rights and freedoms of citizens, legitimate, fair and free elections, free press and general socio-economic and political justice. Denial and suppression of popular democracy only create opportunities for military coups, civil wars and armed struggles. As a former President of the USA noted, “those who make peaceful change impossible, make violent change inevitable” (cited in Odunuga 1999: 44).

2.7 The Struggle for Scarce Resources

The struggle for scarce and limited resources has also been identified as lying at the heart of many conflicts not only in Africa but the world over. Ajulu (2004: 268) reasons that “concrete economic interests have underpinned every major war of the past century.” It is within this view that many conflict analysts define conflict as the struggle for scarce resources. Acquisition of external sources of raw material for industrial manufactures and the defence of economic interests were at the centre of European imperial conquest and colonisation of overseas territories in the 15th and 18th century. The Marxists regarded this imperial expansion, conquest and export of capital as the source of international conflicts, domination, oppression and global exploitation. Many scholars and theorists on conflict tend to converge on the fact that the struggle for limited resources to satisfy the ever-growing survival needs has resulted in wars within and between communities, regions and nations of the world. The conflicts are mainly over control, allocation and distribution of the resources among different sections of the population with diverse needs, interests, and aspirations. As Adedeji (1999: 10-12) suggested, “[c]ompetition for resources typically lies at the heart of conflict. This accounts for the intensity of the struggle for political power in many an African country. In these nations, political power is sought in order, inter-alia, to acquire control over the means of production. Those who win in the intense and brutal political power competition no longer need to exert themselves in furthering their economic well-being.”

In Africa, the competition and struggle for resources have resulted in more debilitating conflicts due to two main factors. First, Africa’s abundant resources have been plundered and exported to develop the European nations. Colonial exploitation brutally undermined Africa’s economic development, and is largely responsible for the Continent’s current miserable economic position in the world order. Economic exploitation of the continent has continued after independence through neo-colonialism and the process of globalisation, which have stifled economic growth in the Third World through tied loans, unfair trading relations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes, and their imposed conditionalities. As Cilliers (2004: 20) puts it, “Africa was left to the machinations of the international financial institutions and the vagaries of globalisation…” In the current world order, the economic resources of the African continent mainly benefit the developed nations while the African populace wallow in poverty. For example, the industrialised nations determine the prices of Africa exported raw materials. The manufactured goods made from the raw materials are then exported back to Africa at exorbitant prices. In an interview with New African (April 2007), the former president of Ivory Coast Laurent Gbabgo lamented
the fact that the country was the leading producer of cocoa yet it does not control the cocoa market. In view of this situation, Annan (1998: 3) posits that “the character of commercial relations instituted by colonialism created long term distortions in the political economy of Africa.”

Most African nations are highly indebted to the developed nations and their Bretton Woods institutions through which their economies are controlled by the same developed nations (Cilliers 2004). This negative economic historical legacy and continued economic domination by the developed world nations makes it extremely difficult for post-independence regimes to muster the limited resources for the mammoth task of nation-building, development and service delivery to its deprived masses. Frustrated by these economic hurdles, the former president of Ghana, Jerry Rawlings, is quoted as having once remarked that the independence of African nations is restricted to the flag and the national anthems (Sheyin 2007). It is within this global economic framework that Bedjaoui (2000: 36) describes underdevelopment as “a structural phenomenon linked to a specific type of international economic relations, and to a certain international division of labour … [It] is the product of unequal system of domination and exploitation [which] …thwarts the prospects for prosperity of two thirds of mankind.” On the basis of the above, it is safe to argue that the “externally initiated and funded development strategies such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes, have been a major contributing factor in the emergence of conflicts and /or their exacerbation…” (Adedeji 1999: 10).

Consequently, post-independence African regimes face the wrath of the citizenry for failure to deliver and satisfy their basic needs. As Ajulu (2004: 266) puts it, “[c]onflicts in Africa are invariably sparked off by contestations over resources. This is occurring against a background of economic globalisation that had adverse effects on the peripheral economies of the African type” resulting in incessant conflicts in the Continent. Hettne (2000) also observes that regions in the peripheral zone of the global order are economically stagnant and politically turbulent. There is a consensus by scholars of conflict that underdevelopment is a threat to international peace and security. According to Bedjaoui “[t]he North-South economic gulf represents a profound seismic fissure running through the earth’s sociological crust. It might-it would occasion thunderbolts and violent tremors’ (2000: 36). Mazrui (1995: 26) argues, in view of the fact that most of the conflicts in the Third World emanate from the problem of underdevelopment, that perhaps Nkrumah’s clarion maxim “[s]eek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be added unto it” should now be “[s]eek ye first the economic kingdom and all else will be added unto it.” That is to say, the Third World regions should now organise a struggle for economic independence as one way for sustainable eradication of the perennial conflicts consuming their member nations.

There is also the problem of what Bayart (1993) referred to as “politics of the belly.” The history of Africa is littered with numerous rapacious and corrupt dictators who plundered national resources and amassed wealth for personal benefit to the detriment of national development and service delivery to the impoverished populace. As Duodu (2011:
aptly puts it, “leaders so often renege on their pledge to serve their people. Their luxury mansions and private jets tell the real story.” Such greed and plunder by the political elite has resulted in grave underdevelopment and impoverishment of the masses. It has also given an impression that having political power means having unfettered access to national resources. That is, as Balandier asserts, “[p]articipation in power...provides a hold over the economy...and one’s position in relation to the apparatus of the state also determines one’s social status and one’s material power” (cited in Bayart, 1993: 70). These perceptions gave birth to the emergence of some more brutal and ruthless warlords who would commit heinous crimes against humanity to assume power and access to national resources. Allen (1999: 377) refers to this situation as “spoils political systems” in which access to political power is often the main route to resources and wealth.

Some leaders and regimes have presided over economic policies with skewed and corrupt allocation and distribution of resources and development facilities among the different sections of the population and regions of the country. Some economies benefit a few, mainly the ruling elite, their cronies and the regions from which the president hails, at the expense of marginalisation and exclusion of the masses. Corruption in terms of employment opportunities and access to basic services such as education, clean water, food, shelter and health, is rampant. Labels such as kleptocratic, predatory, extractive and vampire-like regimes have been used by scholars such as Englebert (1997), Frimpong- Ansah (1991), Rodrianja (1996), and Goldsmith (2000) to describe the degree to which some African leaders have drained the nations’ resources to sustain their autocratic regimes. As such, according to Ajulu (2004: 266) most of the conflicts in Africa “have their roots in the scarcity of resources...and the absence of, or failure to craft institutions that could guarantee their equitable distribution.” The resource maldistribution culminates in structural inequalities, which the disadvantaged groups violently resent. Azar and Farah (1981) posit that “[s]tructural inequalities and differential political power lie at the heart of protracted social conflicts. When these inequalities and power differences are expressed through distributional inequalities, such that certain social groups get more or less of society’s rewards, the seeds for a protracted social conflict are sown” (paraphrased in Fisher 1997: 82-83). The Marxists and the Basic Human Needs theorists maintain that the struggle for equal opportunity and access to the basic means of survival remain at the core of conflicts the world over. Azar (1990a: 9) asserts that “[g]rievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for protracted social conflicts.” It was in light of the afore-stated problems that participants at the United States Institute of Peace (1994; 4) concluded that “[c]onflict resolution in Africa will be successful only when the underlying sources of violence are addressed and ameliorated and when citizens of African states perceive that economic resources are distributed fairly to all segments of the population.”

Benjamin (1992) notes how most of the nation-states in the SADC region have fragile economies characterised by low industrial and agricultural output, inability to equitably distribute resources and other essential services, and
general failure in fulfilment of the basic human needs of the masses of their citizens, which is a fertile ground for civil commotions. The incessant conflicts which have rocked Lesotho since independence are traced to the failure by the successive governments to ensure equitable distribution of resources to the different social strata of the population. What aggravates the situation in Lesotho is its hyperdependence on South Africa for its economic livelihood (Matlosa 1993, Santho 2000).

That conflict in Africa results from the struggle for resources is evidenced by the plundering and looting which accompany the conflict process. The exploitation of resources by both the regime and the adversary party to finance the conflict has been a conspicuous trend in the history of wars (Annan 1998, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Naidoo 2000, Maseti 2001, Ajulu 2004, Cilliers 2004). In some of the conflicts in Africa, rebel groups have established parallel or “war zone economies” where they ruthlessly exploit and export resources to sponsor their war effort. This has encouraged rebel groups to continue the protracted conflict and would be opposed to any peaceful settlement, as it would deprive them of their economic base which they also exploit for self-enrichment. Le Billon defines these resource-based wars as “armed conflict[s] in which the control of revenue and natural resources are significantly involved in the economy of the conflict and/ or the motivation of the belligerents” (2000: 22).

It was within this framework that analysts introduced the economic theory of conflicts premised on the belief that the profitability of wars immensely contributes to eruption and escalation of conflicts (resource wars) (Annan 1998, Cilliers 2004, Cilliers and Dietrich 2004). Naidoo (2000) argues that subsequently resource wars culminate in the creation of what he terms war economies, which perpetuate intractable conflicts through the expropriation and exploitation of the nation’s resources by the warring parties. These criminalised war economies establish both internal and external commercial networks and partnerships to facilitate trade in the stolen resources, making the possibility of resolving the conflicts more elusive. The international community and the Security Council embargo on the trade in diamonds suspected of fuelling conflicts were geared towards curbing such conflict trends. Groups such as National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) as well as the different rebel movements in the DRC, survived through war economies during the conflicts in their respective countries. The Ugandan, Rwandan and Zimbabwean forces have also been accused of looting the DRC resources during their 1998 interventions in the country (Zartman 1989, Ero 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, Mortimer 2000, Malaquis 2000, Le Billion 2000, Miall et al. 2001, Schoeman 2001, Martin 2002, de Waal 2003, Cilliers 2004).

It can be concluded that social, economic, political, internal and external factors are intertwined as sources of conflict in Africa (Azar 1990a, Buzan 1991, Ayoob 1995, Alagappa 1998, Du Plessis 1998). This has prompted Azar to refer to contemporary conflicts in Africa as international social conflicts. “That is conflicts that are neither pure international
(inter-state) conflicts, nor pure social (domestic) conflicts but sprawl somewhere between the two” (cited in Miall 2001: 77). Many analysts contend that in the Third World, external involvement is invited by the existence of weak states, legitimacy crises, poor governance and fragmented governance structures, weak economies, corruption, ethnic and religious divisions (Buzan 1991, Rupesinhe 1990, Thomas 1991, Chabal 1992, Benjamin 1992, Munyae 2000). As Buzan (1991: 106) puts it, “in weak states domestic threats to government can almost never be wholly separated from the influence of outside powers. In this sense, the domestic security problems of weak states are often hopelessly entangled with their external relations.”

It is important for regional organisation and the UN to have a full understanding of the sources and dynamics of conflicts in particular contexts in order to devise appropriate resolution strategies and mechanisms. Unless the root causes of conflicts are identified, comprehended and addressed, durable preventive measures and lasting peace will always be elusive. Lack of comprehension of the nature and causes of African conflicts by both African governments, regional organisations and the international community are responsible for failure to devise durable solutions to the conflicts (Burton 1990a, 1990b, Azar 1990a, Prendergast 1997, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Sorbo 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, International Peace Academy 2001, Isenhard and Spangle 2000, de Waal 2003). The following section deals with trends which were identified in many conflicts globally and conflicts which have ravaged several countries in Africa have followed some of the conflict patterns as will be discussed below.

2.8 Conflict Processes, Trends and Dynamics


Literature on conflict converges on the fact that there are different stages in the life cycle of any conflict. Conflicts are not static but dynamic, and do not follow a standard linear path. The intensity level changes over the life history of each conflict depending on the prevailing circumstances. The dynamics of each conflict are determined by the existing contextual factors such as the sources, the goals of the warring parties, the commitment of the disputants, the parties’ perceptions and/or misperceptions about each other, the resource bases of the contending parties, and the efforts at resolving the conflict (Steadman 1991, Miall et al 1999, Lund 1996, 2005, Swanstrom and Weissmann,
Despite the different phases and dynamics of conflicts, scholars in the field have identified common trends in most conflicts. Samarasinghe (1990) notes that typically a conflict evolves through five stages, namely the pre-conflict phase, the conflict emergence phase, the conflict and crisis phase (characterised by chaos and complex emergencies), the conflict settlement phase, and the post-conflict phase. In the same vein, Draman (2003) notes that conflict moves through the pre-violence, escalation, endurance, de-escalation, and post-conflict phase. There are differences in labelling and numbering of stages by different scholars but all enhance the understanding of the nature and patterns of conflicts. It is essential to note that each conflict stage requires particular intervention measures and instruments in accordance with the dictates of the particular conflict. It is therefore, optimally important for an intervening entity to establish the stage at which a particular conflict is, in order to determine when to intervene (timing), how to intervene (the strategies and instruments for intervention) and where (conflict phase and place) to apply each preventive diplomacy instrument (Lund 1996, Carment and Schabel 2003).

2.8.1 The Phase Model of Conflict

The phase model describes conflict development and process as cyclical and moving through a predictable sequence of stages. Although not all conflicts go through the identified stages, they are mutually and symbiotically dependent on each other (Kriesberg 1973, 1982). The full cycle of conflicts according to the phase model, consists of the following stages:

The existence of objective or underlying basis for social conflict: this stage suggests the existence of issues which have the potential to cause conflict but are still latent or dormant. The parties to the conflict have not yet perceived the incompatibility of their goals in relation to the issues. What exists is what Kriesberg (1982) refers to as objective, latent or potential conflict.

Awareness of conflicting and incompatible goals: this stage suggests that the conflict is manifest and the parties to the conflict are aware that they have incompatible goals and are in contention over attainment of their goals. The parties regard each other as an obstacle to the attainment of their intended goals (Coser 1955, Boulding 1962, Kriesberg 1982). At this stage, hostile attitudes and enemy perceptions and images build up as each party meditates on strategies of outdoing each other on the issues in contention.

Initial strategies by the adversaries: the adversaries organise and select strategies of pursuing their contradicting and conflictual goals. In most cases, the party which feels its goals are frustrated will opt for peaceful and non-coercive means such as negotiations and mediations, in which the parties have the opportunity to present, discuss and dialogue on their differing goals and positions on the issues in contention. The next stage is determined by the outcome of the dialogue. If it is satisfactory to both parties, the conflict may be amicably resolved. However, if the
aggrieved party’s objectives are not positively attended to, it may resort to coercive and contentious tactics, for example the use of force.

Escalation of conflict (intensity and scope): Kriesberg (1982: 164) defines conflict escalation as a “movement towards greater magnitude of conflict behaviour.” Deutsch (1973), Wright (1965), Fisher and Keashly (1990) developed a model of conflict escalation comprising four stages of intensity, namely discussion, polarisation, segregation and destruction (cited in Fisher 1997). This stage of conflict is characterised by intense mobilisation of support (internal and external) and resources, enhanced group cohesiveness in preparation for manifest confrontation, communication breakdown, development of dehumanising and distorted enemy perceptions about each other, hardening of positions and conflict behaviour to a win-lose dichotomy, development of irrevocable commitments to the conflict, polarisation, mistrust and suspicions about each others’ intentions, accusations and counter-accusations, intimidations, threats, raids and counter attacks. The contentious tactics, negative attributions and images perpetuate antagonism and solidify conflict commitments and spirals. Conflict escalation also depends on the balance of power between the belligerents that is whether both parties have the resource power to sustain the war and see no possibility for an integrative or mutually beneficial solution. In the words of Azar (1990a: 15) “…the space for compromise and accommodation shrinks as proposals for political solutions become rare and tend to be perceived on all sides as mechanisms for gaining relative power and control.” This stage of conflict is characterised by competitive and destructive episodes. The belligerent parties are entangled in the conflict to the extent that each perceives the solution to be solely the crushing of the other. Fisher (1997: 87) summarises the situation thus: “psychological ossification of perceptions, cognitions, and attitudes results from the vicious cycle of fear and hostility and contributes to a war culture in which meaningful communication among antagonists is nonexistent.” However, it is important to note that not all conflicts escalate. Some conflicts remain frozen in the early stages (Mitchell 1982, Kriesberg 1981, Pruitt and Rubin 1986, Deustch 1987, Sears etal 1991, Fisher 1997, Isenhart and spangle 2000, Anstey 2006).

De-escalation of conflict: According to Kriesberg (1982: 174) “conflict behaviour does not increase in magnitude indefinitely. It must de-escalate or stop.” At some stage “the war fever which characterised the period prior to, and following the outbreak of war… is replaced by war weariness and there is often a growing desire for a negotiated peace” (Dougherty and Pfaltzraff, 1990: 344). However, Mehler (2005) argues, on the contrary, that de-escalation in a lot of contemporary conflicts is often temporary, while the antagonists prepare for the next battle. Experience has shown that in some conflicts, one warring party may call for a ceasefire or sign a peace treaty only to get a breathing space (after some military setbacks) for resource re-mobilisation, re-armament and re-strategising and resume armed conflict thereafter.

Several factors determine conflict de-escalation and ultimate termination. The following are some of the factors.
When a conflict has reached a stalemate, that is the power balance, resource and support bases of the adversaries are such that an absolute victory by one of the parties is not possible: This was experienced during the Cold War when it appeared the parties were prepared to carry on the conflict but there was no sign of an outright victory by any one of the contestants. Zartman (1989, 1991, and 2000) calls this stage of a conflict the "ripe moment" for mediation and peaceful resolution of the conflict, as all the warring parties feel the pains of continuing the war and are compelled to negotiate.

The exhaustion of necessary resources due to the high costs of the war and risks, loss of support or disintegration of the war coalition: This creates a situation where none of the warring parties have the capability to escalate the conflict. Zartman (1989, 1991, 2000, and 2005) refers to this stage as a mutually hurting stalemate in which both parties are cornered in plateaus or deadlocks. Zartman recommends intervention and mediation at this stage of a conflict, as both parties will be ready and willing to be rescued from the conflict entrapment. It may also result when the invading force, for example a rebel group, experiences some operational and logistical setbacks. De-escalation can also occur as the adversaries retreat for resource replenishment, remobilisation of support, re-organisation and re-strategising (what the leader of the Russian Revolution, Lenin, referred to as a strategic retreat in the form of one step backward in order to take two steps forward in the struggle).

When there is a shift in the balance of power and one of the disputants is defeated or incapacitated and forced to surrender and the conflict comes to an end: Examples could be Germany during World War One, Iraq during the First Gulf War, and UNITA after the death of its leader, Jonas Savimbi in 2002.

Domestic, regional or international pressure on the warring parties to find a peaceful solution to the conflict: For example, domestic pressure may be through mass uprisings or protests against the continuation of the conflict as experienced in the USA during the war in Vietnam.

Emergence of new relations between the adversaries: that is a situation where the warring parties reach a common understanding that continuation of the conflict is immaterial and destructive and there are other options of resolving their incompatible goals such as through dialogue and third-party mediation. A change in relations may be reflected by changes in behaviour and attitudes towards each other, the signing of peace treaties, peace accords and the realisation that the parties need each other in resolving their common problem (Bercovitch 1984, Azar 1990a,b, Burton 1990a,b,c, Burton and Dukes 1990, Fisher 1997, Anstey 2006).
Termination and outcome of conflict (Distributive or Integrative): Conflict may be terminated through outright defeat of one party or through a negotiated settlement. Conflict termination can result when one or both parties in a conflict resolve to abandon coercive behaviour and embrace concessions and reconciliation as settlement strategies. The adversaries may adopt a peaceful resolution of the conflict after a realisation that instead of continuation with coercive and costly military operations, they would rather employ peaceful bilateral negotiations on how to reach durable peace (Mitchell 1981, Lund 1996, 2006). The method by which a conflict is terminated will more often than not determine the outcome of the conflict and its impact on the contending parties. In an outright defeat of one party, the victor has the leverage to impose a solution and conditions on the defeated party. This constitutes a distributive outcome, in which the victorious party attains its goals and the defeated party loses. Distributive or unilateral outcomes tend to create fertile grounds for recurrence of conflict when the dissatisfied and humiliated party re-organises and restarts the conflict if the conditions that precipitated the conflict are not satisfactorily addressed. Integrative, mutual or joint outcomes often emanate from conflicts that are terminated through negotiations and problem-solving for a solution in which the parties thresh out their differences through dialogue, in which the parties' needs are addressed for a mutually beneficial settlement and outcomes (Deutsch 1973, Kriesberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Azar 1990, Miall et al. 2001. It is at this stage of conflict that Burton (1990 a, b, c) and other scholars on conflicts such as Azar (1990a, b), Sandole (1990), Mitchell (1982) advocate the engagement of the warring parties through problem-solving workshops chaired by a panel of experts, for a permanent resolution of the conflict. In his works on conflict, Burton (1990a, b, c) distinguishes conflict resolution from conflict settlement. He argues that a conflict is resolved when all the needs of the conflict parties are addressed and an acceptable outcome reached through dialogue. On the other hand, settlement denotes a situation where one of the parties is coerced through compromises, power-based negotiations and bargaining, to accept a particular outcome. In the latter, peace will be brief because the needs of one of the parties which led to conflict will not have been genuinely addressed.

Proponents of the phase or cyclical model of conflict dynamics maintain that the outcomes of every conflict create possible or potential bases for another conflict, culminating in vicious conflict cycles or spirals. Conflicts may recur when a victim of an imposed distributive conflict outcome makes a comeback to pursue its goals, or when one of the parties reneges or violates the peace agreement due to a shift in the goals by the organisation. Mao Zedung (1995) acknowledged the cyclical life of conflict when he remarked that “[w]hen one contradiction has been conquered, another emerges. The process of competition repeats itself…” (cited in Starr 1979: 30). According to de Waal (2003: 37) “if a country has been at war before, it is likely to succumb to war again. The most important reason is that no peace settlement will satisfy all. There is always unfinished business after a settlement.” Using a number of case studies such as Sudan, the DRC, Uganda, Somalia, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Burundi and Liberia, de Waal observes that most of the conflicts in Africa in the 1990s occurred in countries that were engulfed by wars in the 1970s and 1980s. The cyclical mode of conflicts has been proved by concrete examples worldwide.
According to Kriesberg (1982: 323) “[n]o conflict returns to exactly the same conditions that existed before it began.” The differences may be in scope, intensity, number and composition of belligerents, patterns of coalitions, the technology and logistics used, and the political climate in which it occurs, all of which will in one way or another affect the trend and dynamics of the conflict. Rugumamu (2002: 15) succinctly captures the point thus: “[a] combination of factors will generally determine whether a conflict escalates, recedes or retains the same tempo.”

Rugumamu (2002) raises three important issues in his critique of the phase model of conflict cycles. Firstly he argues that clear progressions from one stage to another, though theoretically plausible, are rare and that most conflicts oscillate between two or three of these stages over the years. Secondly, he posits that the determinism inherent in the conflict cycle may draw too much attention to events management and allow little space for searching for structural alternatives that can break the cycle; and finally that the apparent clear-cut phases of the conflict cycle detract attention from the crucial movements from one stage to another.

2.8.2 The Conflict Spiral Model

The conflict spiral model shares numerous characteristics with the cyclical or phase conflict model. Carpenter and Kennedy (1988) identify an eight-phased sequence of events common to conflict spirals as follows:

- Problem emerges.
- Sides form as controversy grows.
- Positions harden as parties become more rigid in their perspectives.
- Communication stops and parties become adversarial.
- Conflict goes outside of the immediate context and parties look for support and power.
- Perceptions become distorted and parties lose objectivity.
- Sense of crisis emerges as the community divides into factions and coalitions.
- Uncertainty arises about outcomes as options for the parties become fewer (cited in Isenhart and Spangle 2000: 18).

The escalation dynamics of the conflict behaviour are dominated by a vicious cycles and spirals of action-reaction, aggressor-defender and retaliatory–defensive spirals between the parties (Pruit and Rubin 1986, Isenhart and Spangle 2000, Zartman 1989, 1991, 2000, Pruit 2005). Just like in the phase model, belligerents may commence with less contentious tactics and move to heavier and more contentious tactics. Deutsch (1973) maintained that if there is no third party mediation, the conflict spiral continues until one of the parties is defeated, or when both parties are exhausted and none have the capability to escalate the conflict.
Isenhart and Spangle (2000) note that to successfully resolve spiralling conflicts it is necessary to recognise the spiral patterns and break the destructive cycle by identifying the antagonistic behaviours and attitudes, depersonalising the issues, and search for an outcome that mutually attends to the underlying needs, interests and goals of the contending parties. Kriesberg (1982: 18) observes that “[a] comprehensive analysis of conflict should focus on the objective conditions underlying a conflict situation and processes that lead to groups believing that they have incompatible goals...” Azar (1990a) and Burton (1990a, b) note that deep-rooted social conflicts emanate from basic human needs and value deprivation, and are not negotiable. That is, since they “centre on threats to fundamental human needs, they are not open to compromise and cannot be bargained away” (Anstey, 2006: 10). The conflict spiral can only be resolved by transforming the existing structural imbalances through analytic problem-solving dialogue which fully satisfies the needs of the aggrieved parties and eliminates or transforms the conditions which precipitated the conflict.

Other research by Stedman (1999), Lund (1996) and Miail etal. (1999) has produced a description of a common life cycle for international conflicts comprising four stages, which are:

- Crisis creation in which tensions deepen and conflict behaviour and attitudes are so hardened that violent confrontation appears inevitable;
- Turning to war; the stage when there are actual manifest confrontations, attacks and counter attacks between the belligerent parties;
- Stopping the fighting; mediation and intervention in the conflict for instance, through peacemaking and peacekeeping deployment of troops by the UN or regional organisations. This takes root especially after the adversaries have experienced what Zartman (1989, 1991, 2000) called a “mutually hurting stalemate” when none of the parties have the steam to continue the war and are all prepared for a peaceful settlement;
- Building a stable peace; the stage when, through a third party mediation the parties are engaged in dialogue over the underlying sources of the conflict with the aim of resolving it (Hauss 2001).

However, it is essential for conflict mediators or peacekeeping agents to have some insights into conflict dynamics, to delineate underlying factors to devise appropriate and comprehensive resolution measures and strategies to apply in the different stages of the conflict. As Northrup (1989) points out, “[c]onflict goes through stages and each of the stages may require different strategies” (cited in Isenhart and Spangle 2000: 9). The question when to intervene and through which method is determined by the nature and degree of the conflict escalation dynamics. Interventions based on poor mapping and analysis of the conflict trends often fail to provide a lasting solution (Zartman 1989, Lund 1996, 2006, Adedeji 1999, Burton 1990a, Azar 1990a, USIP 1994, Fisher 1997, Sorbo, 1999).
2.9 Consequences of Conflicts

There are two perspectives regarding the outcomes of conflicts on human society, depending on the theoretical persuasions of different scholars. On the one hand, there are those who maintain that conflict is an inevitable consequence of social life, is desirable, functionally constructive, innovative, and a transformational catalyst for societal change and development. This position is held by various theorists, among others, the structural theorists who look beyond the destruction caused by conflicts and focus on the long-term positive objectives of war. As Coser states “an overly moralistic negative assessment (of conflict) based on its short term consequences may act to preclude an objective evaluation of its longer-term beneficial functions” (paraphrased in Anstey 2006: 46). For example, the following are some of the views on the positive effects of conflict: conflict is an inevitable by-product of human interaction and serves a positive social purpose (Coser 1956), “social conflicts have long been considered as the premium mobile for social changes and transformations” (in Rugumamu, 2002: 3), “conflict prevents stagnation, stimulate interest and curiosity, is the root of personal and social change” (Deutsch 1973: 9) and “conflict is a beneficial characteristic of the world in that the change it promote is positive and progressive” (Mao Zedung cited in Starr, 1979: 3). Other positive views about conflict are expressed by Robson, namely that “war is the midwife of change” (in Marvick 1978: 7). Bercovitch (1984) summarises the positive effects of conflict into two categories, namely the beneficial consequences to the parties themselves and the beneficial consequences to their environment. The beneficial consequences to the parties include the creation of a sense of identity and solidarity; facilitation of interaction between unequal parties and resultant modifications of their opinions, prevention of rigidity, and facilitation of internal change. Beneficial consequences to the society include prevention of social stagnation; facilitation of growth and change, stimulating innovation, system enhancing, integration of social system, creation of new institutions and value systems (Bercovitch 1984). This position is shared by Barnett (1963) and Worsflod (1919) who assert that “war is a great auditor of institutions” and that “war is a supreme test of existing institutions forcing reorganisation in the interest of greater efficiency” (cited in Marvick 1978: 7). Coser (156) also maintains that conflict may act to maintain a social relationship, freeing feelings of hostility rather than allowing them to accumulate...It provides specific safety valve institutions to drain off hostile and aggressive sentiments” (cited in Anstey, 2006: 7).

Anstey (2006: 46-47) provides an insightful illustration of the functional purposes of conflict based on Coser’s reflections: that it

• May provide groups barred from legitimate access to opportunities in society an alternative means of establishing an identity, and act to symbolise commitment to a given cause;
• Provides the means for a group to acquire a sense of achievement and commitment where more peaceful alternatives are absent;
• Performs the function of a danger signal to a society, its manifestation sensitising more privileged groups of the need for social reconstruction;
- May act as a catalyst, arousing new levels of solidarity in a community as it seeks to campaign against ...government authorities abusing their power.

In view of the above reflections, Zartman (1991: 319) concludes with a call for insightful studies that would alter the prevalent attitudes and views that “consider conflicts as deviant and disruptive behaviour rather than an indication of a problem to be solved.”

Mao Zedung distinguished between what he referred to as “just wars” and “unjust wars” as a way of providing an appropriate determination of the consequences of conflict. He argued that “[h]istory shows that wars are divided into two kinds, just and unjust. All progressive and transformational wars are just and all wars that impede progress are unjust. We Communists oppose all unjust wars that impede progress but we don’t oppose progressive wars” (cited in Starr 1979: 37). Beach lists the principles of a Just War as, a “just cause, comparative justice, legitimate authority, right intention, probability of success, last resort, proportionality, and non-combatant immunity” (cited in du Plessis, 2000: 45-46). The position that progressive conflicts are just, forms the hub of the Marxist theory on conflict. They maintain that transformation of an unjust system and emancipation of the oppressed masses can justifiably be attained through a violent revolution. Himes (1980) echoes Mao’s and Marxist’s sentiments on just wars when he points out that achievement of intended ends is a functional aspect of conflict, citing political liberation through guerrilla warfare as an example. Indeed, conflicts may have positive long-term effects. As Rugumamu (2002: 4) observes “[i]n the ashes of destruction and disintegration caused by the previous system, social revolutions provided societies with unique opportunities to devise more conducive institutional arrangements to meet the challenges of the new times” and the future.

On the other hand, there is the view that conflicts are negative, destructive, pathological, and dysfunctional, and an aberration of humanity and society which therefore should be abolished or eradicated. This position is championed by the Functionalist School of thought, which views conflict as diabolic to societal stability, function and development. They view conflicts as “… the nastiest and most destructive of all human activities” (Marvick 1978: 7). Conflict is also viewed as “disruptive, and a hindrance to development, and are an obstacle that must be surmounted before progress can be made…” (Starr 1979: 43). In an analysis of conflict and violence on society, McKendrick and Hoffmann (1990) posit that “all forms of violence are damaging and disruptive to the quality of life…it injures and destroys, restricts lifestyles, evokes fear, damages relationships, dehumanises, alienates, causes psychological disruption and leads to moral atrophy” (paraphrased in Anstey 2006: 46). This Liberal-Functionalist view of conflict was influenced by the high casualties incurred during the two World Wars. The catastrophic horrors of the wars led to a recommendation by Professor Shotwell in the editorial preface to “The Economic and Social History of the Great War”, that “[a] study be made of the displacement caused by the war in the process of civilisation, in order that its full lesson should be brought home to the world which will be bound to appreciate peace all the more because of the
catastrophic nature of the war…” (cited in Marvick 1978: 8). Contemporary African intra-state conflicts and their concomitant atrocities and destruction can only vindicate the functionalist view of conflict. Most of the post-1990 intra-state conflicts fit well in Himes’ definition of violent conflict as the “intentional struggle between collective actors that involves the application of significant social power for the purpose of injuring, disrupting or destroying human beings, human psyches, material property and /or socio-cultural structure” (cited in Anstey 2006: 46).

Other scholars maintain a more balanced and objective position that conflict has both positive and negative effects. As Terraine (1904) correctly notes “[i]t is largely hypocrisy to discover virtues in war, yet it is hypocrisy too to pretend that there are none” (cited in Marvick 1978: 22). Hence, Deustch (1987) classifies conflicts into those that are constructive because they provide impetus to creativity and innovation, promote positive interparty relations, foster communication, understanding and trust, and those that are destructive, characterised by intense hostilities, escalation of coercive conflict behaviour, and misperceptions about each other, situational entrapment, and contentious tactics. Isenhart and Spangle (2000: 24) maintain that “[c]onflicts can move in either a cooperative and constructive path or a competitive and destructive path depending on the warring parties’ choice of action,” while Bercovirch (1984: 8) posits that “conflicts are neither intrinsically bad nor intrinsically good...”

What is important therefore is not whether conflicts are bad or good, functional or dysfunctional, but how they are constructively managed to avert degeneration into violent and massively destructive crisis (Anstey 1991, Sorbo 1999, Brand-Jacobsen 2002, Rugumamu 2002). The researcher is compelled to concur with the view that the discourse should centre on what mechanisms should be put in place to effectively manage and resolve conflicts from degenerating into destructive phases. This is because it appears that conflicts will continue to erupt in human society and that peace appears to be desirable to both those who view conflicts as constructive and those who view them as destructive.

2.9.1 Social Outcomes
Most civil wars are a crime against humanity. There is no doubt that armed conflict constitutes a major threat and tragedy to human security through direct human costs such as death (massacres and genocides), injury (mutilations, amputations), grave human rights abuses (torture, rape, and denial of survival human needs and freedoms and forced migrations and displacements, (refugee crises and humanitarian emergencies) and their concomitant atrocities (Ghali 1992, 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Newman 2007). The University of British Columbia Human Security Report (2005: 4) points out that “at the turn of the 21st century more people were being killed in wars in this region (Sub-Saharan Africa) than in the rest of the world combined...” The conflicts have resulted in huge casualties, gross human rights abuses, and mass displacement of people, creating refugee and humanitarian crises in different parts of the continent. The catastrophic human tragedy of conflicts in Africa is vividly captured by Martin (2002: 185):
“Over the last 40 years, Africa has been (and continues to be) one of the most conflict-ridden region of the world which has resulted in untold human suffering. ...it has been estimated that... some 10 million people died as a result of the violent conflicts in Africa. In Central Africa and the Great Lakes region alone, the death toll is over 6 million, including two million in Sudan, about one million in the Rwanda genocide of 1994, 3 million in the DRC (1998-2001), and 200,000 in Burundi. Out of the 48-recorded genocides in the world, 20 occurred in Africa. Out of 66 minorities' threat world wide, 27, representing 37 percent of the world population are in Africa. Africa is responsible for about a third of the world’s 22 million refugees. Ongoing conflicts in more than 15 countries on the continent forced at least two million people to seek asylum across the borders in 1999." This chronic and colossal human tragedy is also lamented by Annan (1998: 2) when he said “[i]n 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by conflicts accounting for more than half of all war related deaths world wide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of these conflicts have seriously undermined Africa’s efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples.” Cilliers (2004) equates the numerous conflicts in Africa and the concomitant high casualties, massive displacement of people and human rights atrocities, to acts of terrorism.

2.9.2 Economic Outcomes
The numerous recurring and protracted intra-state conflicts in Africa have damagingly undermined and constrained economic development, growth and prosperity in the Continent. According to Joseph (1999: 9), “Africa is the world’s poorest continent and these conflicts deepen her impoverishment” These sentiments are shared by Chabal, who states that as a result of incessant conflicts, “Africa has virtually been reduced to the television images of the emaciated refugee child in the arms of an almost lifeless mother” (1994: 3). There is no shadow of doubt that the economic development of any country or region is inextricably linked to, and flourishes in, a climate of peace, stability, security and democratic governance. Bedjaoui succinctly notes this umbilical link between peace and development in “there is no peace without development and no development without peace” (2000: 40). These are prerequisites for sustainable development, economic growth and prosperity anywhere in the world. War and insecurity are enemies of development and economic growth. The absence of such an environment in most African countries has seriously hijacked development opportunities in the concerned countries and the continent at large (Annan 1998, 2005, Van Nieuwkerk 2000).

In a conflict situation, corruption by political leaders, business magnates and warlords finds fertile grounds to prosper since the attention is on the war. Foreign military entrepreneurs and governments establish unscrupulous trade partnerships with both the government and rebel forces, intensifying the plundering of Africa’s resources in exchange for military armaments. As Annan notes, “[d]espite the devastation that armed conflicts bring, there are many who profit from chaos and lack of accountability, and who may have little or no interest in stopping a conflict and much
interest in prolonging it” (1998: 4). This was supported in Reno’s interview with one fighter in the National Patriotic Front of Liberia when he said “[t]he Kalashnikov is our business advantage” (Reno 2005: 15). Bayart et al. (1999: 30-31) vividly describe this predatory economic networks thus: “[t]he multiplication of conflicts, the main political logic of which is simply predation, and which tend to be accompanied by a growing insertion in the international economy of illegality,…the spread of a culture of institutional neglect, systematic plunder of the national economy and the uncontrolled privatisation of the state suggests a slide towards criminalisation through [out] the sub-continent.” The “blood diamonds” trade which involved UNITA, RUF and some foreign governments and commercial firms, is a living example of such dirty trading partnerships which fuelled destructive conflicts in Africa (Zartman 1979, Annan 1998, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, Le Billon 2000, Malaquis 2000, de Waal 2003, Power 2004, Cilliers 2004, Cilliers and Dietrich 2004).

In such conflict-ridden situations, it is the development of the country and its citizens that suffer since no development can flourish under conditions of war. Adedeji (1999: 14) notes that “[w]henever violent conflicts exist; human poverty, income poverty and social exclusion are on the rise. There is decline in the Human Development Index value.” The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report of 2005 also observes that “armed conflict naturally has a strong negative correlation to human development. [As] most of the countries with the lowest human development rankings in 2005 were either in the throes of conflict or had just emerged from it” (paraphrased in OSAA 2005: 7).

Cilliers (2004) presents an insightful picture of the gloomy economic trends in most of the African countries as a result of incessant conflicts and bad governance. He posits that the continent’s economy is characterised by decline in agricultural and industrial production, endemic financial and debt crisis, balance of payment difficulties, decline in trade, breakdown of physical infrastructure and public services, poor services delivery, ubiquitous unemployment, abject poverty, low living standards, low income, high mortality rates, brain drain of skilled personnel, disinvestment of private capital and wealth and general underdevelopment. One disturbing feature of contemporary conflicts in Africa is that they have become regionalised, therefore undermining regional integration and development.

It would be logical for collective regional security efforts to nip in the bud these regionalised conflicts and their disruptive effects. Regional organisations, mainly ECOWAS IGAD, SADC and the AU, have acknowledged the umbilical cord–like link between security, peace, stability and development. They have come to the realisation that in order for them to attain regional economic integration and development, there is a need for collaborative regional security efforts to establish a stable environment. Accordingly, they have established regional preventive security structures for prevention and resolution of conflicts, for example ECOWAS’s Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999), IGAD’s Programme on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence
and Security (1996) and the African Union’s Peace and security Council (2003), all of which are geared towards eradicating conflicts and creating peaceful climates for peace, democracy and development. The Constitutive Act of the African Union states that “[m]embers, [are] conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a pre-requisite for implementation of our development and integration” (Constitutive Act of the African Union 2002: 3). Article 2, sub section 2(a) of SADC’s specific objectives on the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security is to “protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict and aggression” (OPDS Protocol, 2001). This reflects the commitment and determination by regional organisations in confronting the security challenges to attain economic progress in their respective regions. At its summit in Windhoek Namibia in 1992, the SADC Heads of State observed and pledged that “war and insecurity are the enemies of progress and social welfare. Good and strengthened political relations among countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for regional cooperation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanism to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security” (Cited in Ngoma 2005: 111).

### 2.9.3 Political Outcomes

Conflicts in Africa have severely impeded the process of nation-building, national and continental cohesion and development of peace, security, democracy and good governance. Conflicts have resulted in the disintegration of several states, which have been consolidated after independence. As Joseph (1999) observes, one of the painful but real consequence of conflicts in Africa is the erosion of the state itself through the contraction of territory under its control and mounting threats to the regimes in power. There are several fragmented, failed and collapsed states in Africa due to prolonged or frequent recurrence of conflicts. Civil wars and situations of state failure contribute to national, regional and international insecurity in the form of displacements and refugee flows, arms proliferations, and spreading of insurgencies, collapsed nation-states (Newman 2007). During the civil war, the DRC was carved into several portions controlled by warlords and militia groups (1998-2004), while Somalia since 1991 is a collapsed state with different religious and clan warlords battling for control of what was once the capital of a unitary state, Mogadishu. With no central government these fragmented nations fall under what Robert Jackson (1990) terms “quasi-states”, a term used to describe “states which enjoy international recognition but lack substantial and credible statehood by criteria of international law” (in Soderbaum, 2001: 65).

Conflicts have also provided fertile grounds for political anarchy in many African countries. Some nations are governed by autocratic military warlords and dictators, whose duty is to safeguard the survival of the regime and state power through repression and violations of the rights and freedoms of citizens. Most of the leaders who came to power through the barrel of the gun establish militarised states in which there is no political freedom, democracy, law
and order, but political repression, enforced loyalty, networks of patronage and patrimony (Chabal and Daloz 1999). Some of the despotic leaders have nefarious agendas for regionalisation of autocracy by sponsoring and harbouring rebel groups to destabilise their neighbours. According to Cilliers (2004: 26), “[s]ome state and sub-state actors may have a vested interest in continued war and disorder since it allows them additional opportunities to extract and conceal rewards and thereby serve the various patrimonial networks that provide their legitimacy.”

Furthermore, conflicts have seriously hijacked development of democracy in Africa. What exists especially in conflict-ridden countries is “low intensity democracy” (Adedeji 1999: 15). In the words of Cawthra (2004: 31), in such countries, “democracy is only a shell within which undemocratic politics prevail.” Landsberg and Barengu (2003) note that most of the states in the SADC region fall within what they termed “formal or procedural” democracy and most of them are in between democracy and authoritarianism. It should also be noted that conflicts in Africa have weakened the Continent’s coherence, status and power in the global political arena. The Continent is in turmoil, with a large number of countries engulfed by internal strife; it is not united in calling for recognition in world affairs such as permanent representation in the Security Council. It is just dismissed as a continent at war with itself, a continent incapable of democratic development and good governance, and a continent that has dismally failed to resolve its problems and is always crying for external assistance.

Reychler summarises the social, economic and political costs of conflicts in Africa under eight categories:

1. humanitarian cost; number of deaths, wounded, refugees, internally displaced persons and famine;
2. political cost; state collapse, anarchy, subversion of the democratic process, political corruption, criminalisation of power;
3. economic cost; loss of revenues from trade and tourism, destruction of economic, transport and educational infrastructure, diversion of resources away from development;
4. ecological cost; loss of arable land, soil erosion, deforestation and desertification;
5. social cost; breakdown of family structures, female victims of sexual violence, war orphans;
6. cultural cost; breakdown of traditional socio-cultural values, institutions and lifestyles;
7. psychological cost, psychological disorders, post-traumatic syndromes, fear and mutual hostility between groups in conflict;
8. spiritual cost; loss of values related to the sanctity of life, development of a culture of violence (cited in Martin 2002: 186).

That conflicts have plagued the continent with little or abortive peacekeeping efforts by the United Nations Security Council, is reason enough for regional organisations to reorganise and shoulder the responsibility of preventing and resolving the conflicts in their respective regions. Numerous political observers are of the opinion that the slow pace
at which the UN Security Council deploys troops, coupled with the reluctance of its most powerful members to mandate new UN peace missions in Africa, has forced the AU and African sub-regional organisations to develop their own conflict management capacity to conduct their peacekeeping, peace-making and peace-building roles (International Peace Academy, 1999, 2001). With coordinated political will and resolve, and the pooling together of the regional sovereignties and resources, the task in not insurmountable.

However, for effective preventive diplomacy and global peace to be attained, it is essential to develop more effective collaborative partnerships between regional organisations, the AU and the UN. These multilateral organisations must strive to develop a common understanding of the connections between preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building that goes beyond peacekeeping. Restoring peace in Africa “is unlikely to succeed unless the root causes of conflicts are properly addressed and means to prevent the rekindling of terminated conflicts through effective post-conflict peace building” (IPA 2000: 2).

2.10 Conclusion
This chapter has provided definitions of conflict from diverse scholars. It has emerged that the definitions converge on the fact that conflicts have been inevitable in human society since time immemorial. It was also established that conflict can be latent or manifest, depending on the prevailing causal and triggering (contextual) factors. The chapter also revealed that although each conflict has its unique particularities, most conflicts in human society (especially in Africa) emanate from poor governance (autocracy, electoral mismanagement, weak institutions of governance), under-development, resource scarcity and maldistribution, and other factors bred by the colonial legacy such as ill-defined nation-state boundaries, the ethnic/identity question (crisis), neo-colonial intrusion by the former colonial powers, and the complexities of globalisation. The chapter emphasised the fact that the issue is not whether conflicts will occur, as indeed they will inevitably occur, but how best to prevent, manage and resolve them. Post-Cold War politics has seen the UN Security Council’s dwindled involvement in African conflicts and has even devolved the responsibility for maintaining peace and stability on to the Africans themselves through what they called “African solutions to African problems.” It also became evident that regional organisation should take the initiative in preventive diplomacy missions in their different regional zones as they are the most affected and would be in a better position to master the history, causal factors and dynamics of the conflicts, hence devising appropriate preventive measures. The chapter also indicated the centrality of partnership between the regional organisations and the UN in striving for global peace and security.
CHAPTER THREE
Theories on Conflict and Preventive Diplomacy

3.1 Introduction
The exploration of theory in this study will provide frameworks, perspectives and insights into the dynamics of conflict, and the underlying factors that trigger fuel and sustain conflicts in their different settings and manifestations. Theoretical frameworks also provide illuminating insights into the strategies and approaches to conflict resolutions (Schellenberg 1982). As Burton (1990a: 25) notes, “[o]ne of the major obstacles in dealing with basic problems such as deep-rooted conflict has been the absence of an adequate theoretical framework and, even more serious, the absence of a realisation that such a framework is necessary for solving a problem.” Thus “[i]t is from theory that conflict resolution processes and prevention policies must be deduced. Evidence from past situations or from present empirical data, must be subjected to tests of theory” (Burton 1990a: 26).

Given the above scenario, there is no single theoretical framework for a comprehensive study of social conflicts. This dovetails with Cohen and Manion’s position that “[a] theory can never be complete in the sense that it encompasses all that can be known or understood about the given phenomena” (1994: 16). This is due to the multidimensional nature, complexities, uniqueness, and particularities of conflicts. For example, the causes, processes and outcomes of a conflict are largely determined by the social, economic and political context in which it occurs (Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Odunuga 1999, Deutsch 2000a, International Peace Academy 2001). Miall, et al (2001: 66) suggest that “it seems unlikely on the face of it that a single, all encompassing explanation will be adequate for conflicts of different types, with different starting points…that have different histories and cultures, and are at different stages of economic and political development.” Adedeji (1999) laments this lack of a clear theoretical framework for comprehension and mastering of the sources and dynamics of conflicts as the main reason for the failure, on many occasions, to find lasting resolutions and durable peace in the African continent.

Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of social conflict requires an integration of both macro and micro theories to unpack both the universal and unique characteristics of the conflict processes. It calls for multi-disciplinary inter-disciplinary and multilevel approaches with inputs and insights from various fields such as sociology, psychology, biology, anthropology, political science, philosophy, theology and economics. Reliance on a single theoretical framework may prevent scholars, researchers and conflict resolution practitioners from uncovering both the latent underlying and covert sources and dynamics of conflicts (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf 1990, Burton 1990a, Adedeji 1999, Jeong 1999, Deustch 2000a, Deutsch 2000b, Miall et al 2001). The call for a fusion of paradigms in the study of conflicts and their resolution is well articulated by Deutsch (2000b: 598) when he states that “[c]ombining traditional disciplinary paradigms and methodologies with multidisciplinary ones is a daunting task, though an essential one if the field of conflict is to offer effective solutions to the complex problems of society.” Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf (1990)
concur that there is no consensus on a single general theory of conflict that is acceptable to social scientists in their respective disciplines.

However, despite the complex and multidimensional nature of social conflict, scholars from different disciplines have produced comprehensive theoretical frameworks and approaches to conflict causal factors, dynamics and the outcomes of conflicts in human society. Several theoretical frameworks reflect the disciplinary inclinations of the proponents that complement each other in understanding the nature of social conflict. As du Pisani asserts, none of the theories should be viewed as superior since “[e]ach theory has its peculiar strengths and weaknesses in selecting, organising, explaining and relating what we study and observe in the real world” (2001: 199). Schellenberg (1982) classifies theories of conflict into three broad categories:

A) Individual Characteristics theories (biological/psychological theories)
B) Social Processes theories (sociological/interactional theories)
C) Social Structural theories (sociological/structural theories).

Schellenberg’s broad classification and the related sub-theories will be used in the discussion that follows.

3.1.1 Biological and Psychological Theories

The Individual Characteristics theories view conflicts in terms of the biological nature of human beings in general and the psychological and personality traits of individuals involved in the conflict (Schellenberg 1982, Sandole 1990, Suganami 1996, Steger 2004). The theories emanate from diverse disciplines such as Biology, Psychology and Ethnology and are premised on the argument that human beings naturally have innate traits and instincts of violence and aggression (destructive instincts). There is scientific evidence dating from the Darwinian scientists that violence and aggression are genetically ingrained in the biological nature of human beings. Lorenz noted that the innate human violent instincts do not necessarily have to be triggered by certain situations such as the defence of territory, as some people have observed, but “...could also spontaneously discharge without any external stimulation” (in Seger 2004: 122). If so, social conflict is an expression of innate forces of aggression deeply inbuilt within human nature and can be genetically transmitted and inherited. As Wilson (1980) notes, “[h]uman beings have a marked hereditary predisposition to aggressive behaviour” (cited in Sandole 1990: 68). Human beings are naturally, “endowed with an instinct of aggression, it is this innate drive that in the last instance accounts for individual and group violence in society” (Steger 2004: 122). According to Ury (2002: 11) “[t]his attribution of violence and war to human nature has a rich intellectual heritage.”

The Evolution scientists of the Darwin tradition such as Lorenz and Ardrey, maintain that the inborn aggression mechanism of human beings is also shaped by the survival needs and challenges of each species. The Ethnologists,
Anthropologists and Socio-biologists of the Darwinian tradition argue that “[h]umans have an inborn tendency towards aggression as part of the universal struggle for survival” (Schellenberg 1982: 43). It is also proposed that the main sources of human violence and aggression are found in their culture and social environment, from which the two vices are learned. Scientific evidence abounds with the notion that human beings have the potential to learn different behavioural patterns from the dictates of the existential environment. Social learning theory also postulates that the social environment in which they live shapes the aggressive nature of human beings (refer Bandura 1973 in Bradshaw 2007: 50). Critics of the innate aggression theory argue that in as much as violence might be innate in humans, similarly they are also predisposed to peaceful existence as an innate feature (Suganami 1996: 4). Stoessinger notes that “[w]hereas aggression may be inherent in human nature, war is a learned behaviour and as such can be unlearned, ultimately selected out entirely (cited in Terriff et al. 2004: 23-24).

Classical Realists also sponsored the view that human nature is inherently imperfect, fixed and aggressive and “ought to be accepted for what it is rather than what it might be” (Burchill 2001; 80). Thomas Hobbes (1651) equated the state of nature with the state of “war of every man, against every man” (in Suganami 1996: 54). They maintained that aggressiveness is evidenced by the anarchical world order in which we live. The aggression is driven by the human innate competitive quest for power and domination that results in conflicts. Hence Hobbes noted that “… in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel; first competition, secondly diffidence, thirdly glory…” (cited in Terriff et al. 2004: 20). Classical Realists further contended that war is caused by “man’s selfishness, aggressiveness [and] stupidity… there is no denying the fact that war would be impossible in an imaginary world in which all human beings are entirely unselfish” (Suganami 1996: 4). According to the Classical Realists, “[h]uman nature is constant or cannot be easily altered, the propensity to engage in conflict cannot be changed and the task of statesmen is to fashion a political framework within which it can be contained” (Terriff et al. 2004: 32). That is, human beings unconstrained by the rule of law display motives and behaviour that lead to conflict. Realists interpreted inter-state wars as reflective of the inherent human quest for power that is projected through the state. Realists maintained that international conflicts would continue to exist since states’ quest and pursuit of power and national interest are perennial biological features rooted in the nature of the statesmen who lead the institutions (Burchill 2001, Terriff et al. 2004).

Numerous scholars dispute the Realists’ position that the anarchic international system is responsible for global conflicts: this is because there is no clear explanation as to why, if the international system is anarchical and reflective of the conflictual nature of human beings, “…the frequency of wars varies in different periods and systems” such that “there are cases where political actors do not exhibit the kind of power politics behaviour involved in the steps to war” (Vasquez 1993: 169).
3.1.2 The Frustration-Aggression Theory

The Frustration-Aggression theory to conflict was propounded by John Dollard, Doob, Miller and Sears (1937) and is premised on the view that an individual or group may direct its anger and frustration towards others they consider a barrier to attainment of their goals or they perceive to be the source of their intended but frustrated goals in life. The theory is based on “the hypothesis that violent behaviour results from frustration. In other words when people are blocked from meeting their basic needs or reaching their desired goals, they become irritable and aggressive” (Steger 2004: 124). According to Dollard and colleagues, frustration is both a necessary and sufficient condition for violent aggression. The logical base of the paradigm is that “the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration.” Although considered a natural instinct, the frustration-aggression posture is largely shaped by socialisation and the existential environment of individuals (Marvick 1978, Schellenberg 1982).

Basic Human Needs theorists observe that frustration of substantive basic human needs such as security, recognition, identity, equality, and access to economic and political participation results in the deprived and frustrated groups embarking on violence against those viewed to be the source of the frustration and non-fulfilment of their basic needs.

The Marxists’ class struggle can also be located within this paradigm, where conflicts are traced to the frustrated survival socio-economic and political needs of the mass proletariat by the capitalist elites. Psychologists of different epochs tend to converge on the fact that the behaviour of a person is shaped by the environment in which one is brought up. “The state of mind that is most associated with war is extreme hostility, frustration and insecurity” (Vasquez 1993: 77). For example, someone who grew up and socialised in the racially antagonistic and polarised societies of the then segregatory USA and apartheid South Africa tended to imbibe the racist traits, resulting in intolerance and direction of frustration to the other on the basis of race, regarding each other as alien and responsible for each racial group’s predicaments. Du Pisani (1988; 23) is of the view that “[t]he frustration-aggression approach to conflict constitutes a major and useful perspective on conflict: especially because it has influenced other approaches such as learning theory” and the basic human needs theory.

The conflicts emanating from the frustration-aggression sources are best resolved by addressing the structural causal factors such as promotion of inclusive and democratic governance, justice, equality, human rights, human security, economic development and equitable distribution of resources and basic human needs in their diverse forms.

3.1.3 Human Needs Theory

The Human Needs theory is based on the belief that all human beings have universal basic human needs fundamental for their survival. The proponents of the basic human needs theory argue that human beings,
irrespective of race, colour, gender and religion, have ontological, biological and innate needs which are pivotal for their growth and survival in society (Burton 1990a, 1990b, Azar 1990a, Sites 1990, Sandole 1990, Roy 1990, Mitchell 1990, Bay 1990). The exponents of the paradigm maintain that for harmony to be attained in society, these basic human needs have to be fulfilled, for if they are frustrated they become a source of perennial conflict and social strife. It is in this light that Burton (1987: 255), the guru of the basic human needs theory notes that “[a]ll people, in all cultures, at all times and in all circumstances have certain needs that have to be, that will be fulfilled; not should, or ought, but will be fulfilled, regardless of consequences to the self or system”. Bay (1988: 3) defines these ontological needs as “[a]ny requirement for a person’s survival, health, or basic liberties; basically meaning that, to the extent that they are inadequately met, mental or physical health is impaired.” Needs are “necessities for not only biological survival but also for the health and development (physical and mental growth) of persons as human beings.”

Similar definitions reflecting the imperative necessity of basic human needs satisfaction for peaceful growth of human society, individuals and groups, are provided by Masini (1980) and Burton (1988). Masini (1980: 227) asserts that “[n]eeds can be understood abstractly to refer to those human requirements calling for a response that makes human survival and development possible in a given society. Needs are mediated by desires that express concrete ways in which humans wish to satisfy their needs at a given moment and place.” Burton maintains that “needs describe those conditions or opportunities that are essential to the individual if he is to be a functioning member of society, conditions that are essential to this development and which, through him, are essential to the organisation and survival of society” (1988: 38). These basic needs as classified by different proponents include: security, access to economic and political participation, representation, equity, identity, need for freedom, human rights and the need to be perceived as rational, needs of love, recognition, belongingness and self-esteem (Bay 1988, Burton 1988, 1990a, 1990b, Sandole 1990, Mitchell 1990, Galtung 1990). Sandole (1990) refers to these innate human traits as ‘biological imperatives which underlie human behaviour in general” (Sandole 1990: 81).

Rugumamu (2002: 4) notes that “[w]hether contending groups in a particular society are defined by ethnicity, religion, ideology, gender or class identities, they have, by definition, different needs, interests, values and access to power and resources. Understandably, such differences necessarily generate social conflicts and competition.” Proponents of the Basic Needs theory, therefore, trace the source of high intensity or protracted social conflicts to the denial, deprivation or frustration of the ontological basic human needs (Sites 1990, Burton 1990a, 1990b, Fisher 1990, Azar 1990a, Sandole 1990). According to Burton (1990a, 1990b), conflicts occur mainly over material (for example, resources and power distribution) and non-material issues (values, interests, needs). He associates material conflicts with disputes over interests which can be settled by traditional forms of conflict management strategies such as direct negotiation, mediation and arbitration, and non-material conflicts with values and innate needs conflicts which cannot be repressed, negotiated, bargained over or adjudicated by the courts, but have to be resolved by removing the root

Burton (1993: 55) therefore concludes that most of the deep-rooted “conflicts are concerned with issues that are not negotiable, issues that relate to ontological human needs that cannot be compromised.” History has proved that denial, deprivation or frustration of these ontological and often non-negotiable needs, sometimes by the state, inevitably lead to conflict. According to Burton (1990a: 61), “[i]t is these non-material needs that are discovered to be fundamental when parties to a conflict are brought into an analytical framework; their fight is not over material resources that are in short supply, but over identity and related issues that do not involve scarce energy resources. Material resources however may provide the means by which to pursue security, or some other goal, in circumstances in which it is denied or threatened.” Denial of such needs culminates in the excluded and deprived developing irrevocable value-based group solidarity commitments to struggle for fulfilment of their rights, resulting in deep-rooted intractable conflicts (Burton 1988, Burton1990a, 1990b, Azar 1990a, Sites 1990, Sandole 1990, Anstey 1990, Fisher 1997). Azar (1990a: 9). As Fisher 1997: 84) notes, “[i]t follows that protracted social conflicts arise when attempts by a disadvantaged group are taken to combat conditions of perceived discrimination that come from the denial of identity, an absence of security of culture and valued relationships and absence of political participation to remedy this victimisation.”

A state will unleash its repressive military apparatus to crush the resistance in the process, inviting “a militant response from the marginalised group” (Fisher 1997: 86). Conflict perceptions and images are hardened when “both groups perceive that their inexorable needs for identity, recognition, security and self-determination are being threatened or thwarted by the other” (Fisher 1990: 107-108). In the words of Burton (1990a: 14), “[t]here are reasons for predicting that no form of coercion or control is likely to suppress conflict and its violence in the family, the street, the community, or within national or international society, while there exists an environment promoting conflict.” The courage, determination and spirit of resistance displayed by the oppressed masses in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, in spite of the brutal crackdown by the autocratic regimes, give credit to this theory.

The Basic Needs theorists trace the root cause of conflict to undemocratic systems and institutions of governance, which are in most cases not representative and responsive to the needs of the ruled, but the interests and preservation of the status quo. It is the position of this paradigm that governance and societal institutions should cater for the ontological needs of the people and not the conversel where the people are expected to adjust to the norms of the institutions (Burton, 1990a, 1990b, Burton and Dukes 1990. The traditional power politics view is that conflict emanates from the innate aggressive instincts of human beings which must be repressed through law and order and other coercive instruments.
The Basic Needs theorists refute the realist power paradigm as ineffective and counterproductive in analysing the sources and resolution of conflicts in society. Burton (1988, 1990a) contends that the assumptions that conflicts are due to innate human aggressiveness justify the preservation of authoritative political structures and processes of punishment and containment as the means by which to control conflict. Basic Human Needs theorists hold that there are inherent human needs, which if not fully satisfied, lead to conflictual behaviour. Consequently, societies in which the citizens are deprived of their fundamental human needs are more often than not characterised by protracted conflicts.

Many conflicts that plagued and continue to plague the African continent are struggles against social, economic and political marginalisation, exclusion and oppression, all of which coalesce in deprivation of basic human needs through poor governance, corruption and plundering of wealth by a minority elite at the expense of the deprived majority of the citizens. Protracted and deep-rooted conflicts arise when the deprived groups organise themselves to fight against the sources of their need deprivation, which in most cases are autocratic regimes and their oppressive institutions (Buzan 1991, Azar, 1990a, Burton 1990a, 1990b, Burton and Dukes 1990, Fisher 1990, Deng1991, Tessendorf 1993, Fisher 1997, Annan 1998).

In their discussions of the SADC security mechanism, Barengu and Landsberg note that there are two forms of democracies: formal or procedural democracy characterised by regular elections, the protection of civil liberties, separation of powers and the role of opposition parties, and substantive democracy, which entails the ability of the state to be responsive to the needs of the citizenry, to eradicate poverty, and ensure effective participation in decision-making and addressing issues of social and economic justice. The authors conclude that in most African nation-states it is the formal or procedural democracy which exists, as most regimes fail to attend to the needs of the populace, resulting in numerous conflicts. Mutambara, the then leader of one of the factions of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, recently described Mugabe as “a dictator who brutalises Africans and denies them basic human needs and economic opportunities” (2007: 78). Mutambara argue that at the core of the Zimbabwean crisis are issues of governance and legitimacy because Zimbabwe is ruled by a brutal kleptocracy which has retained power through fraudulent elections (2007). Azar (1986: 33-34) observes that in most cases highly centralised political structures and states are the sources because they reduce the opportunity for a sense of community among groups, tend to deny groups the means to accomplish their needs, and constrain the state’s responsibility to respond to the needs of the citizenry. He recommends the establishment of appropriate decentralised political systems designed to “serve the psychological, economic and relational needs of groups and individuals within the nation-states” (cited in Miall etal. 2001: 85).
Resolution of such conflicts can only be attained by concerted reforms or destruction of the institutions that hinder the fulfilment of other people’s basic needs. Fisher (1997), Azar (1978, 1990a, 1990b), and Burton (1990a, 1990) persistently maintain that conflicts emanating from denial of basic human needs can only be resolved by structural transformations which address the existing needs deprivations. In Burton’s view “[t]he task which is defined by a consideration of conflict, its resolution and prevention, is not to create some ideal political system, but to discover the processes that are required within any type of system by which relationships can be handled to resolve or prevent conflict, in other words to satisfy basic needs” (1990a: 267). Other than that, conflict would escalate into deep-rooted, protracted and intractable wars characterised by “hostile interactions which extend over a long period of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity” (Azar, 1978: 50).

Burton (1990a) and Azar (1990a) note that the Basic Needs theory should form the basis of analysing and resolving conflicts instead of the classical power politics (state-centric) theories that have failed to resolve conflicts in society. The core of their argument is that the orthodox state-centric theories such as realism, advocate containment, deterrence, coercion, negotiation, power-based mediation and bargaining, as methods of conflict resolution. To the needs theorists, these classical methods can only achieve conflict settlement, which is temporary peace. Burton argues that “deterrence and coercive approaches do not lead to the discovering or removal of the causes of conflict in the particular case and do nothing to stop others occurring” (1990a: 14). Basic human needs theorists distinguish between conflict settlement and conflict resolution. The theorists hold that conflict settlement emanates from orthodox methods of dealing with conflict, in which the conflict outcome is coerced or imposed by one of the adversaries or by powerful outsiders over the weaker party. Burton posits that “[i]t is possible for a settlement to be arrived at in a power bargaining situation just as a court has the power to settle a dispute. A mediator can arrive at a settlement by offering a compromise which the less powerful party must accept” (1990b: 7). Conflict settlement materialises in material and interest-based conflicts that are negotiable and are often characterised by win-lose outcomes, which result in recurrence of future conflicts (Burton 1990a, 1990b, Burton and Dukes 1990).

In the SADC region, the crisis in Zimbabwe, which threatens to destabilise the whole region, resulted from the regime’s failure to address the socio-economic and political needs of the suffering masses of citizens. The crises in Lesotho in 1970, 1986, 1993, 1998 and 2007 also emanated from the government’s failure to address the economic and political frustrations of the people regarding the undemocratic electoral process. Most countries in the SADC region, with the exception of South Africa, are underdeveloped, and the prospects for failed service delivery, exacerbated by corruption, are high, thus creating fertile grounds for violent conflicts. In Swaziland, the only absolute constitutional monarch in the SADC region has brutally crushed any demands for political reforms and allowing multiparty democracy and elections by the Peoples Democratic Movement (PODEMO). This has created a climate of
political insecurity and conflict as the oppressed masses of Swaziland relentlessly push forward for a democratic political dispensation in the country.

The proponents of the Basic Needs theory recommend an analytical need-based problem-solving discussion of the conflict in which the warring parties are given equal opportunity to dialogue over their grievances, needs, interests, goals and perceptions of the problem, for an acceptable and mutually beneficial resolution of the conflict; that is a win-win outcome. As Azar (1990a: 21) points out, “[t]he term problem-solving is intended to convey a view that conflict is not something which is to be ‘won’ but rather something which must be ‘solved’.‘ Burton (1990a: 13) states that “for a long lasting prevention and resolution of conflicts, therefore, there is need to provide a climate of peaceful discussions of the causal factors through analytical problem solving fora, in which there are no coercive and power based tactics.” The aim of such facilitated discussions is “to pinpoint sources of conflict, to direct attention to them, and to find means of resolving and preventing them.” Burton coins the concept “provention” to stress the need to engage in holistic analytical problem-solving discourse geared towards structural reforms as well as “the removal of causal conditions and the positive promotion of environments conducive to collaborative relationships (which extend to the scope of our concerns beyond the narrow area of conflict resolution)” (Burton, 19990a: 18).

To Burton (1988, 1990a, 1990b, Burton and Dukes (1990) a win-win outcome can be attained in conflicts over human needs since the basic human needs such as identity, security, recognition, justice and political participation are not scarce in supply and should be achieved without necessarily depriving each other. “There is no problem of scarcity in needs satisfaction; the more identity or security one party has, the more and not the less the other party will experience identity and security” (Burton and Dukes 1990: 143-144). Burton (1988: 199) recommends “facilitated conflict resolution or the problem-solving approach because through these forums the conflicting parties are brought together to identify their frustrated interests and goals, to find an amicable solution which addresses the underlying basic motivations and values that cannot be bargained away”.

The Basic Needs theory and its concomitant analytical problem-solving conflict resolution mechanisms have made an invaluable contribution to the study of conflicts, their causes, dynamics, resolution strategies and mechanisms. According to Burton and Dukes, “[t]hese processes have not developed out of any one discipline, but have taken much from many disciplines. They are processes that rest on generic theories of behaviour, and seek to incorporate any insights that can be gained from all other processes …Problem solving conflict resolution can reasonably be regarded as the synthesis and culmination of past and present thinking in the fields of management, dispute settlement and conflict resolution” (1990: 122). The introduction of the human dimension in the study of conflicts is pivotal in understanding the behaviour of parties in a conflict, their perceptions, frustrations and goals in relation to conflicts and their resolutions and how human behaviour and perceptions generally shape society. Burton points out
that “[t]he emphasis on human needs as the basis of analysis and problem solving is oriented toward the stability and progress of societies; the human needs of the individual that enables him to operate as an efficient unit within a social system and without which no social organisation can be harmonious” (Burton 1988: 55). Burton commends the Basic Needs theory because it uses the human needs dimension in the study of conflicts and ensures efficiency in preventive diplomacy missions. He posits that the theory is "a step towards the prevention, rather than merely avoidance or prevention of conflict, we are involved in discovering the causal factors that must be dealt with. The knowledge we look for, the discovery of what conditions provoke the behaviours, to be prevented, requires an adequate theory of human and societal behaviour, including a reliable theory of conflict and conflictual behaviours" (Burton, 1999a: 235).

It can be argued that the Basic Needs theory provides the framework for the development of the post-Cold War new security thinking and the centrality of human security in society. The theory has instituted the necessity of studying conflict prevention, management and resolution, which take the survival needs of human beings as pivotal for lasting stability and peace to be realised. Post-Cold War War security thinking calls for world nations to expand the definition of security from the traditional militaristic restrictions to include human security issues such as democracy, good governance, human rights, freedoms, liberty, political participation and representation, social and economic justice (Buzan 1990, Swart and du Plessis 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Barengu and Landsberg 2003, Zacarias 2003). The clarion call is triggered by the realities that most of the post-Cold War intra-state conflicts emanated from unfulfilled and frustrated human needs. As Waltz notes, “[m]ilitary power does not guarantee the well-being of society and non-military phenomena can threaten states and individuals" (cited in Zacarias 2003: 33).

However, the Basic Needs theory, like all other paradigms, has been subjected to a wide range of criticism. These arise from the fact that different societies have different cultures, values and perceptions of the world, and the needs of different people should also be shaped by each society’s traditions and political systems. The criticism is also levelled against the supposed universality of the hierarchy of basic needs. The question is whether basic human needs are static or are dynamic and able to be influenced by the environment. Galtung (1990: 59) contends that the proponents should consider the impact of the different contexts and cultures on people’s needs, priorities and conceptions. He doubts whether “a list of needs can be established, complete with minima and maxima, for everybody at all given social times and social spaces as the universal list of basic needs.” Mitchell (1990: 165) argues that there is evidence that some needs theorists are party to the view that “needs and needs hierarchies change over time according to circumstances and that different people can have different need hierarchies and conceptions of needs.”
The other point of criticism against the needs theory is that the non-material ontological human needs which form the hub of the paradigm’s analysis of conflict and conflict resolution are “theoretical constructs” which “can only be inferred, not observed directly” and be measured (Bay 1988: 88). This therefore, according to Lederer (1980: 3), means that “the existence of an individual’s needs or ...the ‘truth’ of those needs cannot be proven in a direct, physical way”. That is, “needs cannot be measured directly, they can be measured only on the basis of their manifestations” (Gilward 1990: 116). This, to the critics, raises questions on the validity and reliability of the basic needs as theoretical instruments for the study of society and conflict. Furthermore, Fitzgerald (1977: xv) poses the question “How can the genuine internally rooted needs of persons and groups be established empirically?”

Burton confesses to this confusion that “there is no agreed term that covers the basic needs of the individual as a social unit and which are, therefore, basic to social organisation” (1988: 38). Fitzgerald (1977: xv and 61) captures the problem thus: “[t]here are enormous difficulties involved in conceptualising needs. The very expression ‘human needs’ is problematic and emotionally loaded...[and] Built into the word ‘need’ is a notion of necessity and one is unsure whether what is meant is an empirical and factual necessity, a logical or analytic necessity, or a normative necessity.” The seemingly prevalent difficulty in establishing specifically what needs are and what they entail, may have provoked Rist's dismissal that “[i]f everything is a need, then need means nothing” (1980: 241). It was in view of this problem that Sites (1990: 24), cautions that “[i]f we are to establish a listing of needs as a viable basis for theory and subsequent social policy, we must be very careful in the use of language. Otherwise, we revert back to what might be called the MacDougall problem: positing a need for everything people do or ‘want.”

The way the basic needs theorists suggest conflicts should be resolved outside the power politics framework would be difficult if not impossible to successfully implement. In reality, conflict occurs within the framework of politics, and the dynamics of power politics will always be at play in resolving them. The classical strategies of conflict resolution such as negotiation, mediation, adjudication, compromises and trade-offs, which the needs theorists dismiss as ineffectual, are the ones used in both regional and international conflict resolution forums. This raises questions on whether the theory has failed the test in the international relations arena, or if the world’s political establishments are just stuck with the orthodox power politics and their conflict resolution mechanisms.

Further criticisms of the needs theory have emanated from Strange (1989: 433) who states that she cannot not accept Burton’s “unrealistic notions that all conflicts could be resolved with better analysis and rational discussion…” Dunn (2004: 6) also argues that Burton was “detached and incapable...of explaining what is going on in the realm of contemporary international relations.”
However, in spite of the criticism, there is no doubt that the Basic Needs theory of conflicts and their resolution has provided invaluable information, insights and theoretical perspectives. As Banks (1984: xii) notes, Burton’s works “have gone further than any other single body of work towards the creation of a genuine synthesis of the fragmented islands of theory that have so teased the discipline.” According to Dunn (2004: 15), Burton’s contribution is outstanding in its critique of the conventional philosophy on the sources of conflict. Instead “he is more concerned with processes than structures… stresses change rather than order, legitimate social relationships rather than coercive relations…explanations of social behaviour, causes rather than symptoms, the fundamental rather than superficial, needs rather than wants or desires, and needs rather than nationalisms.” The theory is also pivotal in that it provides an alternative dimension to the study of conflicts and how best they can be prevented and resolved.

The present study intends to investigate the SADC conflict prevention, management and resolution within the basic human needs theory, using the organisation’s preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho. This is because most of the conflicts or threats to peace and security are not inter-state but intra-state. This therefore calls for conflict mitigation strategies which will scrutinise the sources from the premises of basic human needs satisfaction or deprivation. In its founding treaty and security protocols, the SADC has items purporting to cater for the basic needs of the region’s populace. For example, Article 5 (a) of the SADC objectives pledges to “achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration” (SADC Treaty 1992). Objective (h) of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security, aims to “promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states, and to encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and conventions of the OAU [AU] and the United Nations” (OPDS Protocol 2001). The critical questions to be addressed are:

Is SADC more concerned with state security or human security?
Does SADC have mechanisms for defining sources of conflict from the basic human needs level?

Experience seems to indicate that the SADC security architecture is state-centric, and that little practical attention is directed to the full satisfaction of human needs and security; hence the unrelenting conflicts and threats to regional security as experienced in Zimbabwe, the DRC and Swaziland. Benjamin (1992) suggests that one of the major challenges facing the Southern Southern Africa states and leaders in the 1990’s will be how to meet the rising expectations of the masses for social upliftment and the satisfaction of their basic human needs. This challenge as framed in Benjamin’s view, is that “[a] shared characteristic of the states of Southern Africa is their level of economic underdevelopment and the structural weaknesses of their economies” (1992: 9). The link between development, satisfaction of human needs and peace is vividly captured by Azar (1990): 155). He writes; “[r]educing overt conflict requires reduction in the levels of underdevelopment. Groups which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of their society. Conflict resolution can truly occur and
last if satisfactory amelioration of underdevelopment occurs as well. Studying protracted conflict leads one to conclude that peace is development in the broadest sense of the term” (also cited in Miall et al. 2001: 73). In light of this, Benjamin (1992) recommends that the SADC region should address the structural deficiencies in its economies and cater for the ever-expanding needs, demands and expectations, through diversification of the regional economies, more realistic long-term economic and strategic planning, and greater regional cooperation and integration, which will ensure a stable political climate for development and foreign investment.

3.1.4 Attribution Theory

The Attribution theory is grounded in the works of such scholars as Heider, (1958), Jones and Nesbit (1971), Ross (1971), and Sillars (1980). It proposes that naturally, people often view and explain events around them in terms of assigning negative and positive qualities and perception to each other (Isenhart 2000). For example, Bradley (1978) finds in his study that people frequently have an inherent tendency to attribute positive consequences to their own actions and negative consequences to the actions of others. Pandy (1977) also observes that people or groups in a conflict situation frequently characterise their own tactics as co-operative and the tactics of their adversaries as unco-operative (cited in Isenhart and Spangle 2000). In the words of Sears et al. (1991: 304-305) “[e]ach side projects negative qualities onto their opponents while reserving positive precepts for their own side.” The theorists trace origins and escalation of conflict from this situation because it is characterised by communication breakdown, polarisation, mistrust, misperceptions, negative stereotypes, mirror imaging and dehumanisation of each other’s goals and actions, consolidated enemy perceptions, win-lose antagonistic postures and irrevocable commitments to the conflict cause by each side (Mitchell 1981, Kriesberg 1982, Holsti 1983, Pruitt and Rubin 1986, Jones 1988, Azar 1990a, Burton 1990a, Sears et al. 1991, Fisher 1997, Anstey 2006, Swart 2008). Psychologists such as Ralph White (1984) and Herbert Kelman (1996) have demonstrated that “attitudes that put blame for our problems on ‘the other guy’ and that portray ourselves as wholly virtuous are a major reason why so many conflicts escalate into violence” (in Hauss 2001: 45). Mitchell (1981) observes that belligerent parties are susceptible to subjective cognitions and evaluations about themselves, the opposing party and the conflict context. Jones (1988) reflects “how facts are a peculiar ordering of reality according to one’s own personal bias which in turn, is determined by certain psychological drivers” (paraphrased in Swart 2008: 64). Thus according to Holst (1983: 405) these “attitudes and psychological predispositions typically surround any serious conflict or crisis.” These psychological variables have also been linked to failure of negotiations and peaceful resolution of many conflicts between warring parties. This is due to entrenched hostile relations, solidified enduring rivalries, mutual distrust and suspicions of each other’s actions. These factors and the extent to which they are attributed to the other often trigger and aggravate conflicts and hamper effective prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in societies (Mitchell 1981, Azar 1990a, Ramsbotham et al. 2005, Swart 2008).
In Lesotho, the political parties attribute the turmoil that has erupted after every election since 1966 to each other. The governing party has often blamed the opposition for failure to accept defeat, while the opposition parties always accuse the governing party of rigging the elections. Preventive diplomacy would require measures to do away with the enemy perceptions and other psychological factors that lead the adversaries to demonise and dehumanise each other, to build confidence and trust between the adversaries, and transform the hostile relationship to a co-operative one in which mutually beneficial win-win outcomes are possible (Kriesberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Pruitt and Rubin 1986, Burton 1990, Mitchell 1990, Sears et al. 1991, Fisher 1997, Isenhart and Spangle 2000, Hauss 2001, Miall et al. 2001, Swart 2008).

Swart (2008) laments the lack of in-depth research on how the psychological variables such as negative images, enemy perceptions conflict behaviour, misperceptions, distrust, fear and suspicion, have triggered and fuelled conflicts, especially in Africa. Swart further notes that the failure of preventive diplomacy (conflict prevention, management and resolution) is mainly due to failure by the preventive diplomacy practitioners to pay attention to the psychological traits of the warring parties and their perception of the conflict, its causes and how best it could be resolved.

Preventive diplomacy within this conflict framework can be successfully implemented when conflict mediators fully comprehend the sources of the conflict at hand, as well as the warring parties’ attitude, behaviour and perceptions of the conflict, how the parties perceive each other, and what each believe is the best way to resolve the conflict. The peace mediators should aim at altering the established and emerging conflict attitudes and behaviours of the warring parties, their misperceptions about each other, and their perceptions about how the conflict could be ended and lasting peace achieved. Well-coordinated and open communication and dialogue between the warring parties may reduce the perceived cognitive rigidities and embedded enemy images, and move the warring parties to a realisation of the necessity to shift from war to peace (Deutsch and Schiman 1986, Lederach 1999). With such a base, the conflicting parties may be swayed into viewing each other not as an enemy but partners in resolving the conflict. Entrenched conflict behaviour may be altered into a desire for peace. In view of this, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Constitution notes that “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.”

3.2 Social Process Theories
The Social Processes theories view conflict as a process of social interaction between individuals or groups. The theories seek to make generalisations about the nature of human interactions and how they result in conflict. The basis of the social process theories is that people’s behaviour, actions, goals, interests, aspirations and expectations are determined or influenced by their interactions with others, and the social, economic and political forces of the
context in which they interact (Kriesberg 1982, Schellenberg 1984, Isenhart and Spangle 2000). This paradigm falls within the constructionist position in that “[s]ocial meaning is constructed and reconstructed by social interactions which create certain mechanisms of norms, identities and interests that guide human action” (Adler and Barnett, 1997, paraphrased in Hwang 2005: 55).

Proponents of this sociological/interactional approach to conflict include Adam Smith, Park and Burgess, George Simmel, and Lewis Coser (Schellenberg, 1984). The theories are premised on the fact that where there is interaction of people, there are bound to be differences and clashes of interests, values, aspirations, expectations and goals, culminating in competition, tensions, friction and conflicts. Hence, Simmel, a 20th century German philosopher and sociologist, observes that all social organisations rest on an intertwining of co-operation and conflict. He asserts: “[a] certain amount of discord, inner divergence and outer controversy is organically tied up with the very elements that ultimately hold the group together” and that “antagonism is an element almost never absent in human association” (cited in Schellenberg 1984: 65). Park and Burgess (1921) identify four main types and results of human interaction: competition, conflict, accommodation and assimilation. Park and Burgess view competition as the most elementary, universal and fundamental process in human interaction. They regard competition as an underlying struggle which, when more conscious and direct, is seen as conflict.

The basic resolution from the social process of competition and conflict is accommodation, which entails contestants adjusting situations of competition and conflict without necessarily resolving the underlying conflict issues. The resultant interaction is referred to as “antagonistic interaction” since the underlying conflict issues remain intact, creating a volatile context for future conflicts. The stage of assimilation occurs when a conflict is resolved and the adversaries have reconciled their incompatible goals in a mutually beneficial mode (Schellenberg 1982, Kriesberg 1982). Proponents of this group of theories also focus on how human interaction promotes co-operation and harmony. However, the proponents differ on the effects of conflict in human society. For example, the functionalists (Talcott) view conflict as destructive and dysfunctional, while some like Coser and Deutsch consider conflict to be functional and even desirable in society. The social process theories are an umbrella for a variety of theoretical perspectives and dimensions, some of which are as follows.

### 3.2.1 Interactional Theory (Symbolic Internationalism)

The Interactional perspective is influenced by the writings of William James, John Dewey, George Mead, Auslem Strauss; Herbert Himes, Herbert Blumer Corning Oberschall, Hugles, Becker and Goffman (Schellenberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Cohen and Manion 1994, Isenhart and Spangle 2000). Mead is regarded as the leader of Symbolic Internationalism. In a collection of his lectures entitled “Mind, self and society” Mead posits that the individual and society are intrinsically woven together, and people are defined and moulded by the prevailing existential conditions
and societal activities (Babbie and Mouton 2006). The theory posits that social forces which act upon them do not only shape human beings' world but are actively involved in construction and reconstructions of their world, actions, behaviour and goals through interactions in different contexts. In their interaction with others, human beings define and interpret situations, actions and events, and develop meanings which determine their behaviour. The notion of the self is a social construction established, maintained and altered in the process of interaction with others. According to the theorists human experience is mediated by interpretation, and the attribution of meaning to societal objects and events through symbols is a product of the dynamic process of social interaction in which human beings are actively engaged, rather than external forces. That is "[t]he individual constructs, modifies, pieces together, weighs up the pros and cons and bargains" in a social context (Cohen and Manion 1994: 33).

It is in the process of interaction that different competing and conflicting meanings, interpretations and perceptions of the world emerge, leading to incompatible goals and conflict. Thus, interactionist theorists view conflict as an ongoing negotiation of what is valued, how behaviours and situations are interpreted, and the meanings attached. As Lederach (1995: 8) points out, "[s]ocial conflict emerges and develops on the basis of meaning and the interpretation individuals involved attached to action and events". Conflict is thus a "...socially constructed cultural event...people are active participants in creating situations and interactions they interpret as conflict." The definition of conflict as resulting from incompatibility of goals fits well into this theory. Conflicts in society are mainly hinged on different goals, interpretation of values and principles, the search for shared meanings, and what is best for society. For example, there are diverse interpretations of what democracy is and what it entails or should entail, depending on which part of the world it is viewed. This prompted Zartman (1991: 316) to comment that "[a]ll positions are justifications in principles (or conflicting applications of principles). Sometimes such principles are fixed; in other cases, conflicts take place within the context of evolving or changing principles." Park and Burgess's four types of human interaction -- competition, conflict, accommodation and assimilation -- fit into this interactional negotiation. Interactionist theorists view negotiation as the best strategy for diffusing conflicts. Strauss notes that negotiation is a fundamental process, through which society is formed, refined and remade (Schellenberg, 1982, Isenhart and Spangle 2000). Resolution of conflicts in the Interactionist paradigm therefore would require comprehension of the indigenous definition and interpretation of the conflict as well as the culturally rooted methods of resolving them (Lederach 1995, Avruch 1998, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999).

3.2.2 Systems Theory -- Functionalist Perspective
Proponents of this perspective include Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton. The theory views society as a social system composed of different but interrelated and interdependent parts or institutions which function together for stability, peace, and harmony to prevail. They view "social institutions as parts of some larger whole and specific social practices constantly showing the signs of their integration into the larger
societal framework” (Schellenberg 1982: 72). The different social institutions have essential functions necessary for survival of society in its healthy composite whole. Parsons, Merton and Durkheim describe “a stable, functional system as one where each of the members fits harmoniously into the larger whole” (Isenhart and Spangle 2000: 9). This approach uses the analogy of a living or biological organism whose body has to be healthy for it to live well or survive. If one part of the body is dysfunctional, it affects the whole body. However, the theory takes cognisance of the existence of conflicts within the different constituent parts of society. They state that “within an organisation, there are always points of conflict, for the parts are never perfectly unified” (Schellenberg 1982: 72-73). The systems theory regards conflict as an indication of the systems breakdown where one or more parts of the composite system become ineffective or dysfunctional, incapacitating the whole system.

Generally, the theory considers conflicts as undesirable, pathological, dysfunctional and disruptive to the composite and harmonious society (Starr 1979, Schellenberg 1982). The theory appears to advocate maintenance of the status quo. It is primarily concerned with stability rather than transformation, and would shun any move which they perceive would disturb the existing harmony and peace. There are many undemocratic regimes in Africa which have used the assumed “peace” within a repressive system to resist any reforms to democracy and inclusiveness in governance. Autocratic regimes in North Africa and the Middle East are good examples. The opening months of 2011 were characterised by uprisings and conflicts to dislodge the despotic regimes for democratic dispensations. Swaziland, the only absolute monarchy in the SADC region, resists any calls for democratic reform. This fear of change has created fertile grounds for conflict in the country.

3.2.3 Social Exchange/ Equity Theory

Proponents of the Social Exchange theory include Homans (1958), Thibaut and Kelley (1959), Blau (1964), Walster, Walster and Beisbeid (1978) and Rolof (1981). It is based on Adam Smith’s contribution to economics. The theory is “essentially an attempt to apply the framework of market analysis to the phenomena of informal interaction and emergence of group patterns” (Shellenberg 1982: 73). In an essay entitled “Social Behaviour as Exchange”, Homans (1958) treats social interaction as an exchange of “goods” or social benefits that people provide for each other. Interaction of people is viewed in terms of rewards gained and costs incurred by the participants in the interaction. The proponents maintain that people tend to change their behaviour when rewards or benefits (profits) from the interaction are low, and maintain behaviour when it proves profitable. Conflict is viewed as arising from a situation or condition in which people fail to achieve the outcomes they consider to be equitable, just, or fair (relative gain). Conflict becomes intense when people see themselves committed to a social relationship that is inequitable (Schellenberg 1982). In the words of Rolof (1981) “conflict emerges when people perceive that their rewards are too low, their costs are too high, or they anticipate resistance if they attempt to reach their goal” (cited in Isenhart and Spangle 2000: 8). Social Exchange theorists analyse conflict from a perspective of distributive justice. They maintain
that people become distressed and frustrated when they perceive that they are not receiving a fair share or
distribution of something they value.

This theory captures most of the issues discussed in the previous section as sources of conflict, for example the
struggle for limited resources, equitable allocation, and the distribution of resources (social, economic and political).
As Schellenberg (1982: 74) notes, “those conditions in which people fail to achieve outcomes they consider to be
equitable are conditions apt to be marked by social conflicts.” Many wars are raging in Africa where some groups feel
marginalised or deprived of what they consider central to their survival. For example, 2011 experienced revolts by the
oppressed masses in the Middle East and Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, for equitable distribution of resources, access to
economic and political resources and opportunities against the repressive and oppressive regimes.

Proponents of the theory maintain that conflicts emanating from unjust distribution of resources can be resolved by
identifying the needs and values of each party, to create a set of trade-offs where all parties achieve their goals
(Isenhart and Spangle 2000). It is important to note that this is contrary to the position of the Basic Needs theorists,
who maintain that needs and values, unlike interests, cannot be negotiated, compromised and bargained over, but
have to be fully addressed for conflict resolution and long-lasting peace to be attained (Coate and Rosati 1988,
Political settlements such as governments of national unity, inclusive political representation, equitable allocation of
resources, constitutional inclusivity, and reforms in institutions of governance to promote democracy and justice, are
solutions to conflicts within the realms of the Exchange paradigm.

3.2.4 Transformational Theory

The Transformational theory is the opposite of the Functionalist-Systems theory that views conflict as dysfunctional.
Proponents of the transformational theory argue that conflicts are a permanent, necessary, desirable, constructive
and innovative aspect of human interaction and society. Transformational scholars tend to focus more on the positive
outcomes of conflict than on explanations about why conflicts occur, and the destructive effects of conflict (Isenhart
and Spangle 2000). They argue that conflicts are functional, constructive, and developmental to the parties
themselves and the context or system in which they occur (Starr 1979, Brercovitch 1984), Anstey 2006). As Coser
(1957) explains, “conflicts not only generate new norms, new institutions…it may also be said to be stimulating
directly in the economic and technological realm” (cited in Isenhart and Spangle 2000: 9). From the transformational
perspective “conflict is the tension between what is, and what people believe ought to be” (Isenhart and spangle
2000: 9). This position is in line with the basic human needs perspective.
Therefore, conflict is a struggle against the prevailing situation of economic deprivation or autocracy by the discontented masses for a better dispensation. The following are some of the constructive outcomes of conflict, according to the proponents. Conflict:

- Forces parties to focus and deal with real problems and deeper issues;
- Prevents rigidity, social stagnation and facilitates internal change and stimulate growth and innovation;
- Facilitates interactions between unequal parties and forces them to modify their opinions;
- Solidifies and creates a sense of identity and solidarity (mobilisation of energies of group members; increasing group cohesion);
- Serves to establish and maintain identity and boundary lines between societies and groups;

Structural theorists such as the Marxists and the Maoists share the same view that conflict is constructive and transformational to an unjust system. For example, Mao Zedung considered conflict to be beneficial, positive and progressive (Starr 1979) The Marxists also consider conflict as necessary and transformational if, through conflict, the proletariat or the oppressed masses successfully uproot a capitalist bourgeoisie system and institute an egalitarian political and economic order. There are numerous conflicts in Africa in which the oppressed masses struggle for a just and democratic system. Conflicts raging in North Africa and the Middle East emanate from popular revolutions against despotic and parasitic regimes.

3.3 Social Structural Theories

Proponents of the Social Structural theories include Karl Marx, Engels, Weber, Dahrendorf and Madison. They view conflict as a product of the way society is formed, organised and structured. Gordon (1964) defines a social structure of a society as “[t]he set of crystallised social relationships which its members have with each other which places them in groups, large or small, permanent or temporary, formally organised or unorganised, and which relates them to the major institutional activities of the society such as economic and occupational life, religion, marriage and family, education, government and recreation” (cited in Schellenberg, 1982: 93). Structural theorists argue that the social stratifications of these different and often unequal classes are the root cause of conflict. The conflict emanates from the fact that the different social groups have different and conflicting interests, goals, aspirations, and expectations, be they economic or political. Conflict also arises from the fact that the economic and political structures and institutions in society are always manipulated to serve the interests of the dominant socio-economic strata at the expense of the marginalised majority. Proponents of this group of theories maintain that conflict will remain inevitable as long as society is stratified into unequal antagonistic segments and the structural institutions
continue serving the interests of the few. However, like the transformational theorists, the structural theorists maintain that conflict is necessary, constructive and transformational to society and its systems. In fact, most of them, especially the Marxists, agitate for violent conflicts to dismantle unjust social, economic and political systems and structures. The following are some of the Social Structural theories.

3.3.1 Marxist–Class Theory

Karl Marx and Fredriech Engels are credited with providing the most comprehensive scientific analysis of societies, social classes, their relations to the material world and their competing and contradictory interests and goals as a source of conflicts and social transformation. Dahrendorf, a German sociologist, calls Karl Marx “the greatest theorist of social change for laying bare the importance of conflict in shaping society” (Schellenberg 1982: 86). Karl Marx believed that a truly scientific analysis and understanding of human life has to begin with real material conditions and the social relations, because these provide the basis on which ideas, consciousness and institutions rest (Linklater 2001). Contrary to the Realists, who hold that the international order is anarchical, the Marxists locate social conflicts within the structure of society, mainly the forces and relations of production. According to the Marxists, throughout history, human society has been stratified into diametrically opposed economic classes, and class struggle has been the dominant form of conflict in human history (Linklater 2001). The capitalist society is composed of the capitalist bourgeoisie who privately own the means of production (land, factories, and capital) and constitute the ruling elite, who make laws and control political institutions to protect their wealth and power. Capitalist wealth, according to the Marxists, is accumulated by unbridled exploitation of the labour of the poor working class masses. As such, “capitalism was a system of largely unchecked exploitation in which the bourgeoisie controlled the labour power of the proletariat and profited from their work” (Linklater 2001: 131).

The relations of the two classes are characterised by domination, subordination and exploitation of the powerless class by the dominant propertied class. According to the Marxists, the capitalist system has “…frustrated solidarity by pitting members of the bourgeoisie against each other as well as against the proletariat, and by forcing members of the working class to compete with each other for employment” (Linklater 2001: 133). These contradictions in the forces and relations of production provide fertile ground for social conflicts through industrial or political action by the exploited proletariat masses against the capitalist bourgeoisie regime and political order. In view of this, existential reality, according to Marx in the Communist Manifesto, is “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle” (cited in Schellenberg 1982: 81). In the Marxist (Critical theory) perspective, “the study of international relations should be guided by an emancipator politic [and] the removal of various forms of domination and the promotion of global freedom, justice and equality [as] the driving forces..” (Devetak, 2001: 155-156).
The Marxists blame capitalism for exploitation and perpetuation of conflicts in the entire world. They maintain that the capitalist exploitation of its capital accumulated through multinational corporations and skewed trade relations, was responsible for the imperialist expansion, conquest, occupation and exploitation of resources in the colonies for the benefit of the developed capitalist world. This expansionist posture of capitalism as the main source of international conflicts was developed by Vladimir Lenin in his work entitled *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*. Lenin viewed World War One as the product of the aggressive capitalist states’ expansionist conquests in need of outlets for exploitation of surplus capital, and the search for new sources of raw materials for industrial manufacture (Linklater 2001). For Marxists, the current economic world order of the developed world of Europe and North America and underdeveloped nations in the Third World is a result of the capitalist system.

Neo-Marxists and Dependency theorists argue that exploitative alliances between the dominant capitalist core countries through their multinational corporations and financial institutions are responsible for the failed development in the Third World. Viewed in this light, in the Marxist tradition, globalisation and the resultant unequal development remain the source of international conflicts, especially in the underdeveloped world. Robert McNamara (1973) posited that “[t]he North-South economic gulf represented a profound seismic fissure running through the earth’s crust… which would occasion thunderbolts and violent tremors” (cited in Bedjaoui 2000: 36). The internationalisation of the capitalist relations of production and forms of governance perpetuate power and wealth inequalities and a hegemonic world order (Cox1993, Linklater 2001). This is because capitalist globalisation and global structures compel all states to bow to the power and dictates of the global markets and political institutions, to facilitate the continuing expansion of capitalism (Linklater 2001). However, according to the Marxists, in spite of its violent expansion, capitalism will ultimately collapse due to its internal contradictions and revolutionary resistance from the internationalist proletariat.

The Marxists maintain that the solution to the class conflict lies in the mobilisation and conscientisation of the proletariat and peasants of the world into a strong revolutionary force (alliance) to forcibly remove the capitalist bourgeoisie regimes from power, to establish communist egalitarian societies under workers’ governments. It is envisaged that “[t]hrough revolutionary action, the international proletariat would embed the Enlightenment ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity in an entirely new world order which would free all human beings from exploitation and domination” (Linklater (2001: 129). In the Marxist tradition, a proletariat revolutionary war against the exploitative capitalist system is justified as the instrument for transformation, emancipation and freedom of humanity. The persistent call by the Marxists for violent revolutions against capitalism and its exploitative and oppressive structures formed the core of the ideological bipolar Cold War conflicts from the 1940s to the 1990s.
This theory still has some relevance when studying contemporary conflicts, considering the perpetual strife resulting from the struggle for limited resources and how they are allocated and distributed among the different sections of the population. Continuous conflict is experienced at the international level between the structurally unequal Third World and the Developed World, vindicating the Marxist prediction that conflict will remain as long as structural inequality, be it at the national or international level. The contribution of Marxism to the study of international relations, organisation of societies and the structural sources of global conflicts has been immense, and remains influential in the increasing global inequalities of the post-Cold War world.

Furthermore it should be noted that the Marxist paradigm was pivotal and essential in guiding liberation movements' struggles against colonial and imperialist conquest and domination in many Third World nations. Its emancipatory intent was reflected by the socialist world’s international support for liberation movements fighting to free the mass of humanity from capitalist colonial domination and exploitation, and the evils of oppression in all its manifestations. In this light the Marxist paradigm should be viewed as problem-solving and transformational in purpose and vision. As Marx himself once commented, “philosophers have only interpreted the world whereas the real point was to change it” (1977: 158).

However, the Marxist paradigm and its interpretation of the international order have not escaped criticism. Realists argue that the Marxist vision of the eradication of conflict under a socialist politico-economic order is utopian since the international community is anarchical, and different states will continue to compete for power irrespective of the system of governance in place (Waltz 1959 and Wright 1966 in Linklater 2001). In view of this, the paradigm has “underestimated the impact of nationalism, the state and war, the balance of power, international law and diplomacy on the structure of world politics” (Linklater 2001: 129). Waltz (1959) also observes that the “Marxists failed to appreciate that if the nation-state was to be the arena in which socialism would first be established then socialist governments would have to ensure its national survival before they could promote its global dissemination” (cited in Linklater 2001: 142).

The Marxists are also criticised for being preoccupied with the economic sphere and class struggles of the human society as the main perspectives for understanding societal order and relations. Critics argue that the Marxists’ prescription of the universal model and stages through which all human societies should pass enroute to communism, is flawed in that it fails to pay attention to the socio-economic and political values and development status of many non-Western societies. However, Linklater (2001) urges scholars of international relations to tap into the solid foundations laid by the paradigm while simultaneously addressing its identified flaws. Lesotho is umbilically dependent on South Africa for its economic survival. Many analysts argue that, though it appears to be political, the conflict which has rocked the Kingdom since independence emanates from the underdeveloped economic status of
the country. Economic hardships like unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, disease, and other social ills, are the underlying sources of the incessant conflict.

3.3.2 Social stratification as a Source of Conflict

Some structural theorists view racial, ethnic, religious or cultural differences and divisions in nations as sources of conflict. Although these are natural differences, they have been a source of conflict in different parts of the globe. Ludwig Gumplowitzc acknowledges that racial and ethnic-based conflict is fundamental to all forms of human society, and there is little anyone can do about such conflicts other than accept them (Schellenberg 1982). Where people of different races, ethnicity and religions interact or live in one place, there are bound to be differences in goals, aspirations, interests and expectations. In most cases, conflict arises when one group plays a hegemonic role and seeks to impose its racial, ethnic or religious supremacy or ideology on other groups. In such countries, power is wielded by one particular group, which imposes institutionalisation, discrimination and marginalisation on the other groups in governance, access to survival needs, and means of production. This position is in line with the conclusions of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, that what matters are not the racial, ethnic or religious differences, but how the differences are manipulated and manoeuvred to benefit others at the expense of the dehumanised groups. These divisions have resulted in intractable conflicts in many parts of the world. Onyango (2002) vividly illustrates how the protracted Sudanese civil war was triggered and fuelled by the “islamisation” of the country and institutionalised economic deprivation of the Black Sudanese population by the Arab-dominated regime. On the other hand, the destructive conflict raging in Darfur (Sudan) is a concerted struggle by the Darfurian Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) for equitable allocation of resources and development. Other examples of conflicts which were triggered by oppression on ethnic, racial and/or religious differences are the wars against apartheid in South Africa, racial segregation in the USA (1960s), ethnic-based conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and Nigeria, and religious-based conflicts in Northern Island, Yugoslavia and the Middle East. In Africa, ethnic-based conflicts were exacerbated by colonialism and the arbitrary boundaries which the colonial powers drew between nations, without due cognisance of the ethnic composition and histories of the different groups the colonial nations were bringing together to form one nation-state (Zartman 1989, Adebayo etal. 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, de Waal 2003).

Resolution of such conflicts can be attained through education, seminars and conferences on democratic, participatory and representative governance, transparency, accountability, tolerance, peaceful co-existence, unity in diversity, reconciliation, peaceful means of resolving differences, equitable allocation, distribution and accessibility of means of production and services, human rights, justice and freedom of all, irrespective of ethnicity, religion, gender and race. Such initiatives on the promotion of ethnic, racial and religious tolerance would go a long way in fighting ethnic, racial and religious-based rivalries and conflicts, culminating in the creation of coherent, democratic nation-
states in which all are equal citizens with equal opportunities. The prevalence of this undesirable mode of politics and governance is a challenge to African leaders to democratise their national politics and governance, and desist from hiding behind the stereotypical and facile exercise of dumping everything, (including their own home-made autocratic deeds) at the door of colonialism, neo-colonialism, globalisation, ethnicity and tribalism (Adedeji 1999).

3.3.3 Realism and Neo-Realism

Realism (Classical realism and Neo-realism) was the dominant school of thought on international relations in the first and second half of the 20th century to counter the Liberal Internationalists’ version of international politics and peace, which realists dismissed as utopian. The theory was championed by such scholars as Carr, Herz, Aron, Kenan, Wright, Morgenthau, Neibuhr, Waltz, and Mearsheimer (Terriff et al. 2004, Schellenberg 1982). According to Krasner (1992:39), Realism “[is] a theory about international politics. It is an effort to explain both the behaviour of individual states and the characteristics of the system as a whole. The ontological given for realism is that sovereign states are constitutive components of the international system. Sovereignty is a political order based on territorial control. The international system is anarchical. It is a self-help system, in that there is no higher authority that can constrain or channel the behaviour of states. Sovereign states are rational self-seeking actors resolutely, if not exclusively, concerned with relative gains because they must function in an anarchical environment in which their security and well-being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilise their own resources against external threats.” Realists therefore view conflict as resulting from the anarchic international order in which different states with conflicting goals and national interests are in perpetual struggle and competition against each other for power, domination and essential resources such as territory and wealth.

For Neo-Realists, the nation-state is the supreme political authority, whose suspicions, mistrusts, competition and struggle for military and political power in the anarchical international political realm render the world perpetually violent and conflictual (Waltz 2000, Burchill 2001, Terriff et al. 2004, Morgenthau 2004). Inter-state conflicts emanate from different nations’ quest for the power to dominate others. Hence Morgenthau, one of the leaders of modern realism defines international relations as a struggle for power and the pursuit of national interests, which are permanent, desirable and unavoidable activities which determine the survival behaviour and foreign policy of states in an anarchical international order. In his opinion, “[a]ll history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organised violence in the form of war” (cited in Kegley and Raymond 1999: 3).

Given this anarchical international order, Realists regard international politics as dominated by suspicions and mistrust between nations, as well as a clash of national interests in their struggle for strategic power and domination. Each state must always be militarily prepared to defend itself from threats and attacks from others, because “violent
conflict is always possible under anarchy” (Buzan 1991: 22). It is this mistrust and suspicion of each other, creation of alliances, arms races and balance of power politics that breeds intense power politics among states and creates fertile grounds for conflicts. An arms race increases the severity of war and makes it more probable that a crisis will emerge that escalates to war. Among equals, the use of coercion leads to more coercion, escalation, stalemate and hostility. Where power politics is a way of life, war is more likely to occur. The anarchy is also exacerbated by the fact that there is no overriding authority to regulate and restrain the nations’ behaviour in pursuit of their divergent goals, or to reconcile their conflicting interests (Groom 1990, Ohlson and Groom 1991, Weber 2001, Terriff et al. 2004, Morgenthalau 2004). Given this scenario, Realists argue that nation-states exist in a self-help environment where the quest for survival requires them to seek security through the accretion of military power. This security dilemma is common to all states, regardless of their domestic, cultural or political complexions. The key question which guides every nation state’s interaction behaviour and relation, therefore is: How does a particular policy affects the power and security of the nation? (Burchill 2001, Terriff et al. 2004).

Realists further posit that although nation-states perform functionally similar tasks in pursuit of national power and interests, they differ greatly in their capabilities to carry out the task. According to Burchill (2001: 92), “[t]he capacity of each state to pursue and achieve these common objectives varies according to their placement in the international system, and specifically their relative power.” This Realist position is no doubt a reality, considering the categorisation of the world into unequal classifications such as great and small powers, the First and Third World, the Developed and the Underdeveloped World, the Core and the Periphery, based on their political, economic and military power and influence in the global order. Realists also maintain that there is no established and practically proved way through which the national interests of the different nation-states can be harmonised, save through war and the pursuit of asymmetrical power relations (Burchill 2001).

In addition, Realists trace conflict to the economic and political power disparities between the nations and regions of the world. This unequal structural world order is the source of tension, insecurity and conflict in the world. The problem is that there is an uneven distribution of capabilities within the system. The powerful nations use their power to dominate the international arena and the weak nations (Wallerstein 1974, Groom 1990, Burchill 2001, Weber 2001). Galtung (1980) points out that the international system is characterised by tremendous disparities in terms of wealth and power, culminating in the prevailing relations of exploitation and domination by the core comprising the developed nations over the periphery-underdeveloped nations mainly in the Third World (Cited in Schellenberg 1982). In the words of Gilpin (1992) and the Marxists, the uneven growth and economic inequality is the root cause of international insecurity, as it makes some states more secure and powerful while it increases the insecurity of some others. The current world order, championed by policies such as globalisation, are an extension of colonialism and neo-colonialism in which the developed world dominates and exploits the Third World through unequal trading
relations, imposed tied loans, and structural adjustment conditionalities. The economic and political might of the
developed world will always be flexed by gains, to the disadvantage of the developing world. The gap between the
rich and poor regions remains a threat to global peace and security. Therefore, “until the unequal distribution of
power in the international system became the central focus of a dispassionate analysis, the root causes of conflict
and war would not be properly understood” (Carr cited in Burchill 2001: 73).

However, it is useful to remember that Realists regard conflict as necessary, constructive and functional. For
example, Waltz, Bull, and Gilpin posit that war plays a useful function as it enhances systemic stability and is the
engine of change in the international system (Terriff et al 2004). Consequently, Realists have a pessimistic view of
conflict resolution and prevention, international harmony and peace, and international or regional organisations’ input
in resolving international conflicts. They further argue that once a conflict has erupted, the possibilities for a win-win
conflict resolution do not exist, because once states are in a conflict they do not easily seek solution as long as one
of them is convinced it can win the war or at least avoid losing (Groom 1990, Burton 1990, Olson and Groom 1991,
Hauss 2001, Terriff et al. 2004). In the Realist view, there is no overriding regulatory body with enforcement powers to
prevent or resolve international conflicts or regulate the behaviour of states in their bid to pursue their national
interests (Burchill 2001, Terriff et al. 2004).

The above Realist position to some extent carries weight in the current world order. For example, the UN Security
Council is a sacred domain of the dominant powers (USA, Britain, France, China and Russia) to the exclusion of
other regions of the world, such as Africa, Asia and Latin America. The former powers have veto powers, and this is
maintained to protect and preserve their national interests from any challenges and threats. For example, when
Britain and France invaded Iraq in 2003 without the mandate of the UN Security Council, it was an outright violation
of the sovereignty of Iraq and international law. However, because they are the world hegemons, no action was taken
against them. When African civil wars result in massacres, the USA and Britain cry aloud against crimes against
humanity and violation of human rights, and advocate the arrest of such leaders to account for their heinous deeds at
the International Criminal Court (ICC). Conversely, when the USA commits the same brutal massacres against
innocent civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, the world remains actively passive.

Realists denounce any measures which could transform the anarchical nature of the international order, as the
Liberal Internationalists and the Marxists envisaged. The Realist tradition holds that the historical reality is that
conflicts in the international relations arena are cyclical and recurrent. As such, “international politics is a world of
recurrence and repetition, not reform or radical change.” In view of this, for the Neo-Realists, “the specific internal
structure of states is largely irrelevant to their international behaviour. What is crucial in this systemic approach is the
state’s location in the global power configuration” (Burchill 2001: 86).
According to the Realist tradition, conflicts can only be regulated by means of: a balance of power; adjustments to new relations of power; the establishment of militarily and politically strategic alliances; negotiation and compromise; recognition of the status quo; shrewd diplomacy; deterrence, and other coercive mechanisms (Waltz 1979, 2000, Burton 1990a, Groom 1990, Weber 2001, Burchill 2001, Terriff et al 2004, Morgenthau 2004). Neo-realists and Realists give high credit to the balance of power as a strategy to prevent international conflict. This was the political context which prevailed during the Cold War era when the then USSR and the USA were the World power rivalries, representing the conflicting ideological postures and alliance blocks. It can be argued that the Realists’ view is in line with Flavius Vegetius Renatus’s assertion that “[i]f you want peace, prepare for war” (cited in Hauss, 2001: 30). For Realists, “peace is never a permanent feature of the international system. It is merely a temporary truce based on a rough equilibrium of state power, between inevitable periods of tension and conflict. The balance of power system is an essential stabilising factor in international relations, and the best way of managing the tendency for states to accumulate strategic power” (Burchill 2001: 81).

In this light, Neo-realists such as Waltz (2000) and Mearsheimer (1990) argue that the balance of power during the Cold War era was responsible for the consequent peace and stability which prevailed, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the bipolar world order was a recipe for disorder. Waltz (2000: 6) posits that “[i]n a system of balanced states, the domination by one or some of them [the powers] has in the past been prevented by the reactions of others acting as a counterweight.” It is envisaged by Realists that through an adroit and shrewd use of the balance of power, “states can regulate their propensity for violence by maintaining strategic equilibrium between the major powers” (Burchill 2001: 86). Waltz (1991:670) further argues that “in international politics, unbalanced power constitutes a danger even when it is American power that is out of balance.” In terms of Waltz’s prediction the unipolarity of the post-Cold War order will be short-lived since “in international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads others to try to balance against it” (1991: 669). However, Hwang (2005: 51) contends that “the mechanism of balance of power politics in the Southern African region played a role in endangering regional security instead of guaranteeing it.” The basic human needs theorists such as Burton also dismiss the realists' power-based coercive theory as a non-starter in conflict resolution and peace, but as only relevant in conflict settlement and management, rather than in resolution.

The relevance of Realism in conflicts has been experienced in many inter-state wars. For example, World War One and Two, the conflict fought during colonialism, and the Cold War era, all have the hallmarks of nations at war to preserve and defend national power and national interests, and to establish strategic influences the world over. The conflicts were characterised by competition for victory and dominance of the world economic and political scene. The intervention of the developed nations in Third world conflicts in the name of humanitarian missions, defence of
democracy and international security, has been motivated by Realist national interests. There are many who argue that the intervention of France, Britain, Italy and the USA in Libya was mainly driven by the need for control of oil resources in the country which are vital for the economies of the West and the USA. Some African countries have also intervened in their neighbours’ situations in the name of defending regional peace and stability, while in reality they were prompted by the defence of their regional power and national interests. For example, when Nigeria intervened militarily in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1997 and 1998, it was mainly to defend its regional influence and revitalise its tainted international image following Sani Abacha’s military coup and the ugly undemocratic antics of his military regime. Similarly, the SADC military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho in 1998 have been interpreted by many as falling within the realists’ theoretical fold. Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola were accused of plundering the vast resources of the DRC while they claimed to have intervened to safeguard the Laurent Kabila government against external aggression by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. These latter looted the DRC while claiming to be assisting the rebel movements. The South African-led SADC intervention in Lesotho was also viewed as a move to defend South African national interests at the Katse Dam, which supplied South African manufacturing industries with water and hydro-power. As such, to a large extent, Realists’ view that a nation will always intervene in another nation only if its interests are in jeopardy, holds water, and history abounds in evidence of such scenarios.

However, Realism has been subjected to numerous criticisms by scholars from a variety of other theoretical traditions. The following are some of the areas in which the Realists’ paradigm has been found wanting in its analysis of world politics, conflicts and international relations. Firstly, many critics maintain that the theory fails to provide insights and perspectives on the intra-state conflicts, which plagued post-independence and post-1990s Africa, for example. It is flawed in that it only interprets international security in terms of military power, therefore devoid of analytical tools and insights into the numerous post-Cold War era new security challenges. According to Hwang (2005: 25), one of the flaws of neo-realism is that it is “Euro- and Cold War–centric.” and mainly focuses on the Great power high politics and conflicts while “the peripheries are simply unimportant” and “invisible” (Hosti 1998: 108). The realist concern with the national power interests of the major powers is reflected by their indifference to how the ideological and military interventions caused conflicts and insecurity in the Third World during the Cold War East-West bipolar ideological contestations and fermentations. It can be argued that in the realist tradition, as long as there was no direct military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, the balance-of-power formula was the best in guaranteeing global peace.

Secondly, realists have been criticised for being reductionist in their analysis of world politics, as they focus on the significance of military power as the determining factor in international relations disregarding other factors such as economic gains, which have also played tremendous roles in shaping states’ behaviour and foreign policies. For example, Liberal critics maintain that globalisation, interdependence and moves towards a “borderless world” which
dominate the post-Cold War international order, are economic-driven rather than motivated by the nation-states’ military power (Burchill 2001, Terriff et al. 2001). For example, Rosecrance (1986) notes that the “trading state” is displacing the “military state” in the contemporary world because competition for global market shares has become more important than territorial conquests (cited in Burchill 2001). Realists have countered that “there is no evidence that globalisation has systematically undermined state control or led to homogenisation of of policies and structures. In fact, globalisation and state activity have moved in tandem” (Krasner 1999: 223). According to Waltz (1988, 2000) the uneven distribution of power capabilities in world nations remains the key factor in understanding international politics. Realists and Marxists would argue that globalisation remains predominantly a Western experience, driven by the powerful Western nation-states for their benefit, and the periphery regions continue to be disadvantaged and exploited.

In the view of Cox (1989), realism should be criticised for its failure to recognise how its suggested model for international stability preserves and protects social and economic inequalities in the world. In fact, realism “...is concerned with the reproduction of the international system of states. It uses notions of order, stability, deterrence and especially the balance of power to convey its message of constraints and to reify the structure of the international system. At the same time it marginalises those theories offering alternative or contradictory accounts of the reality of world politics” (Burchill 2001: 87).

Thirdly, realism has been labelled by several critics as a conservative theoretical paradigm, which is anti-change and pro-status quo. The realists project the international system as anarchical, recurrently conflictual, insecure and static, thereby implying that the nation-states are powerless to institute transformations to the world order. Critical theorists contend that in view of the latter position, realism “naturalises or reifies the international system by treating structures which have a specific and transitory history as if they were permanent, normal or given political fixtures” (Burchill 2001: 93). The moves by several world nation-states to embark on liberal democratic political order with transformations and commitments to resolve their differences peacefully through collective security co-operation, are clear challenges to the realist view that states have no power to alter the international system. Regional organisations world over, including in the Third World, have established security organs with the aim of collectively resolving regional security challenges. In spite of the hurdles encountered, regional organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD and Organisation of American States (OAS), have to some extent co-operated in addressing conflicts, contrary to the Realists’ denunciation of the practicability of collective security and peace.

The UN has managed to bring together world nations under one collective body in spite of their different and sometimes conflictual ideological orientations, development status, and national interests, contrary to the Realists’
position that no world authority can modify or regulate the national interests of nation-states. Although dominated by the developed nations, the UN has provided forums, through its various organs such as the World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the General Assembly and the Security Council, where world nations can air their views on global socio-economic, political and security issues. The UN has also provided laws, rules and principles on how nations should conduct their political and governance affairs according to international law, without endangering other nations. The UN Security Council has played a prominent role in peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement and post-conflict peace building missions in the world since its birth. Africa has benefitted tremendously from such collective peace missions by the UN. For example, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ivory Coast are some of the countries in which the UN peace efforts have borne fruit. All these counter the Realists’ postulations that no world body can collectively resolve conflicts in an anarchical international order.

3.4 Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
Despite the multidimensional theories and perspectives on conflict, its sources, dynamics and outcomes, there appears to be a consensus on the need to devise means and measures for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts for a peaceful, secure and stable world order. The chronic effects of the First and Second Wars (1914-1918 and 1938-1945) conscientised the world of the need to establish international and regional organisations with the aim of conflict prevention, management, resolution and general maintenance of international peace and security. The League of Nations, the United Nations Organisation and several regional organisations such as the OAU, presently the AU, ASEAN (ASEAN), (OAS), the EU, NATO (NATO), ECOWAS), SADC and IGAD are all tasked with creating the agenda for development, promotion and maintenance of international and regional peace and security (preventive diplomacy).

The formation of these economic-cum security blocks with the goal of ensuring economic development, security, peace and stability, was in line with the calls by the former USA President, Franklin Roosevelt (October 1935) for global collaboration against the evils of war and preservation of world peace. Reports by the UN successive Secretary Generals Ghali: ‘An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peacekeeping’ (January 1992), ‘Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa’ (November 1995) and Kofi Annan: ‘The causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa’, raised concerns about conflicts, especially in Africa. The documents all called upon the world to search for more effective strategies for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. The Secretary Generals proposed preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace building as techniques which could be used to prevent, contain and resolve conflicts in the world, and for durable and sustainable peace to be realised. In his report
to the UN Security on Africa in April 1998, the former Secretary General Annan expressed the hope that conflict could be prevented and resolved through concerted collective efforts by the international community.

At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to define the concepts *conflict prevention, management* and *resolution* and what each entails. It is important to note that the concepts are interdependent components of a continuum of activities undertaken at different stages in the lifecycle of a conflict (Ghali 1992, Miall et al. 2001, Levit 2003). Ghali, (1992: 4) notes the link thus: “preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out, peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.” Miall et al. (2001), present the interlink between conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution in a cyclical model from conflict formation (prevention), violent conflict (peace-keeping), conflict transformation (peacemaking), social change (peace-building), conflict formation (prevention). In the final analysis, conflict prevention, management and resolution strategies should be coherent, comprehensive and integrated, and geared towards mastering and addressing the root causes of the conflict.

**3.4.1 Preventive Diplomacy**

Scholars on conflict, in spite of their different theoretical orientations and approaches, are unanimous about the need to devise measures for prevention and resolution of conflicts through preventive diplomacy, for a stable world order. The UN and regional organisations, in their diverse formations, recommend preventive diplomacy as the most effective preventive toolkit for conflict mitigation and peace building, although they fail to efficiently implement it in the face of the numerous conflicts dissecting the world (Van Walraven 2005, Carment and Schnabel 2003).

The term *preventive diplomacy* was coined by the former United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in the Cold War world order, to contain escalation of conflicts which might directly involve the heavily armed superpowers and the East-West military blocs and ignite another calamitous World War. The concept was expanded and gained momentum when Boutros Ghali as the Secretary General launched his UN *Agenda for Peace* campaign to prevent, diffuse and resolve the numerous intra-state conflicts which afflicted the post-Cold War world order (Peck 1993, Chigas et al. 1996, Lund 1997, 2005, Fourie and Solomon 2002, Hampson 2002, Vayrynen 2003, Lund 2005).

Preventive diplomacy as a concept experienced definitional ambiguities. It has, in some instances, been used interchangeably with such concepts as preventive action, preventive deployment, preventive engagement, preventive measures and crisis diplomacy (Lund 1996, Chigas et al. 1996, Swart 2008). Chigas et al. (1996) note that international discourse on preventive diplomacy has been conceived largely in politico-military terms, such as international intervention, settlement and enforcement. There are also many others whose understanding of the
concept is limited to peaceful intervention in conflicts, as opposed to coercive measures. In view of this problem, Lund (2005: xii) posits that “[t]he operational meaning of the term has not been easy to specify. While some advocates contend that preventive action should come into play only in cases of eminent or even hot war, others insist that it is no less relevant to humanitarian disasters or instances of political repression. Still others believe that it should address such issues as over population and poverty. Likewise issues of who should act preventively and how and when they should do so, have also been subjects of disagreements. Reflecting this diversity of opinion the very name given to the idea varies widely with terms such as preventive diplomacy, preventive action and crisis prevention vying for acceptance.”

In spite of the definitional complexities, in this study Ghali’s (1992) and Lund’s (2006) definitions embracing conflict prevention, management, resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding measures will be adopted. Currently, preventive diplomacy has come to denote “[a] response generated by a state, a coalition of states, or a multilateral organization intended to address the rapid escalation of emergent crises, disputes, and interstate [intra-state] hostilities…” (Carment and Schnabel 2003: 12-13). The preventive strategies are determined by the conflict context dynamics, the belligerents involved, their goals and interests, military and political strength and availability of resources for sustenance of the mission, and the concomitant post-conflict peace-building efforts.

Ghali (1992:4) defines preventive diplomacy as “[a]ction to prevent disputes from arising between the parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” He further notes that the pivotal goal of preventive diplomacy “...is to ease tensions before they result in conflict or if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes” (1992:4-5). Ghali provides a broadened definition which embraces preventive measures at different phases of conflict, such as early intervention when preventive diplomacy focuses on the basic sources of disputes to prevent eruption (conflict prevention); later, when it prevents vertical and horizontal escalation of conflict through peace enforcement, peacemaking; peacekeeping (conflict management); and much later, when it seeks to prevent the recurrence of conflict (post-conflict peace-building. It embraces both direct and structural preventive measures which are geared towards preventing the eruption of violent conflict (conflict prevention), minimise, diffuse or halt the horizontal and vertical escalation of an on-going conflict (conflict management), and the eradication of a the recurrence of conflict or relapse to conflict by a country emerging from war (conflict resolution or post-conflict peace building) (Ghali 1992, 1995, Annan 1998, 2000a, Bedjaoui 2000, Miall etal 2001, Hampson, Wermester and Malone 2002, Hampson 2002, Levit 2003, Jentleson 2003, Carment and Schnabel 2003, Van Walraven 2005).

There is interdependence between conflict prevention, management and resolution within the continuum lifecycle of preventive diplomacy. According to Ghali (1992), the main goal of preventive diplomacy is to resolve disputes before
violence erupts, while peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace and facilitate post-conflict peace building initiatives to prevent recurrence of violence. Lund (2002:161) defines preventive diplomacy as “[a]ny structural or intercessory means to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and use of armed force, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties to violent conflicts for resolving such disputes peacefully, and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce those issues and disputes.” As such, the major aims of preventive diplomacy are to prevent latent disputes from developing into violent confrontations, devising measures to manage and resolve conflicts when they have erupted before escalation and to avert a relapse to violent engagement during the post-conflict peace-building phase (Ghali 1992, 1995, Lund 1996, 2006, Annan 1998, 2000a, Swart 2008).

3.4.2 Developmentalist, Preventive and War Diplomacy
Jentleson (2000) distinguishes between three forms of preventive diplomacy missions, namely: developmentalist diplomacy, preventive diplomacy, and war diplomacy, as determined by their durability and goals. Developmentalist diplomacy involves “efforts to address long-term societal and international problems that, if allowed to worsen, have the potential to lead to violent conflict.” On the other hand, preventive diplomacy involves situations with shorter timeframes “where the likelihood of violent mass conflict is imminent and the objectives are to take the necessary diplomatic action within the limited time frame to prevent those crises or wars which seem imminent,” while war diplomacy entails “situations where conflict or war has already broken out” (Cited in Hampson 2002: 141). War diplomacy is reminiscent of what Lund referred to as “crisis diplomacy”. However, it is important to note that a comprehensive preventive diplomacy strategy would embrace both the short-term and long-term operational goals. For many, preventive diplomacy also reflects short-term problem-solving initiatives complemented by long-term structural approaches that tackle the underlying sources of conflict, such as poverty, underdevelopment, inequitable distribution of wealth, poor governance, and denial of human rights and freedoms (Lund 1996, Hampson 2002). It is from this premise that Hampson (2002) argues that preventive diplomacy should not exist independently from a broader strategy of conflict prevention, which addresses the deep-rooted causes of conflict. This has also led to growing appreciation that preventive diplomacy can work only if there is a co-ordinated system-wide approach in the United Nations that brings together the resources from diverse bodies such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) into preventive diplomacy initiatives.

3.4.3 Timing of Preventive Diplomacy Interventions
Of significant importance in the application of preventive diplomacy at any stage of conflict are the timing, the nature of the intervention, and the factors prevailing within the conflict context. The core issues are where to intervene (conflict situation/context), when to intervene, (conflict stage) and how to intervene (mode of intervention). Lund
(2005: 108) argues that to implement a more informed and coherent approach, five key issues have to be addressed, whatever the particular circumstances facing specific preventive interventions. The issues are as follows:

- Where and when are tensions and disputes likely to escalate into violent conflict (early warning)?
- Which of these potential conflicts warrant responses (deciding priorities)?
- What preventive responses are the most timely and cost effective for a given conflict situation (devising effective interventions)?
- How can political, bureaucratic and material support be obtained (mobilising political will and resources)?
- What is needed to organise an on-going, co-ordinated system for preventive diplomacy (linking international actors in a coherent system).

Jentleson (2000: 338) posits that seven elements determine the success or failure of preventive diplomacy; they are as follows.

- Negotiators who gain and keep the trust of the major parties;
- Terms of the negotiations that allow all sides to be able to show their domestic constituencies that there are real gains to be had from co-operation;
- Special envoys and lead diplomats who enjoy credibility with the parties;
- Actions that have to be taken early… because one of the strongest, least conditional conclusions we can draw is that the longer you wait, the more there will be to do and the more difficult it will be to do well;
- Sanctions that are an important part of a mixed strategy (comprehensive, decisive and tightly enforced sanctions work better than partially or incrementally enforced sanctions);
- Inducements such as the lure of membership in major international and regional organizations or the threat of expulsion;
- Political, especially executive leadership, which is a key ingredient for effective preventive diplomacy.

The Carnegie Commission (1997: xix-xx) suggests four elements that can ensure the operational efficacy of preventive diplomacy, namely: (1) “the lead players (international organizations, states, or individuals” (2) “coherent military-political approaches to engagement that addresses the humanitarian and political aspects of the problem” (3) “adequate resources” and (4) “advance plans for the restoration of host country authority.”

There are diverse views about the appropriate timing of preventive interventions. However, several scholars on preventive diplomacy advocate early preventive interventions as more likely to achieve positive results (Peck, 1995, Jentleson 2000a 2000b, 2000c, Fourie and Solomon 2002). Peck (1995) questions preventive interventions at the stage when a dispute is on the verge of erupting or has already erupted, “on the ground that in an escalating conflict it may be too late to really influence the parties because the pressures to escalate are too intense” (paraphrased in
Hampson 2002: 144). Peck advocates early intervention in a dispute, when opportunities for dispute resolution are most “ripe” Carment and James (1995) also note that third parties are more likely to achieve positive results if they launch early preventive interventions rather than during an escalating conflict. These positions contrast with Lund’s (1996) view that preventive diplomacy missions should only be instituted when the conflict has erupted and the warring parties have reached a mutually hurting stalemate, which he views as the ripe moment for successful preventive diplomacy. Experience has shown that most preventive diplomacy interventions have failed because of late preventive actions, when conflict has erupted and the warring parties have entrenched and solidified their commitments to war and victory. Preventive interventions in conflicts in Rwanda (1994), Somalia (1992), Yugoslavia (1995), and DRC 1998) came late when the conflict had caused so much damage (Wallensten 2002, Carment and Schnabel, 2003, Jentlesson, 2003, Vayrynen 2003, Talentino 2003, Engel 2005). Jentleson refers to these late preventive diplomacy interventions as “missed opportunities” because early intervention would have prevented the eruption of conflict and/or limited its vertical and horizontal escalation and the concomitant costs.

However, it is important to note that preventive diplomacy instruments can successfully be applied at any phase and level of the conflict lifecycle, provided that the appropriate measures are devised and appropriately implemented. The crucial question to ask before instituting preventive intervention is “What is the problem on the ground?” The answer to this question begs for need assessment by the intervening entity, to determine the conflict context, the underlying causes of the conflict, as well as the parties involved and their perception of the conflict, in order to devise appropriate responses. What is pivotal is whether the envisaged action is aligned with the context and phase of the conflict at hand. The preventive measures need to embrace the entire spectrum of the conflict and contextualise it, to attain its basic objectives of forestalling and reducing violent escalation and recurrence of conflict (Leatherman et al 1998, Cockell 2002). This is crucial because conflict is dynamic, and the intensity levels vary over a conflict’s lifecycle as dictated by the conflict context, belligerent parties’ perceptions of the conflict, the parties’ commitments to their conflictual goals, the weapons used, and other causal factors. As such “an understanding of the conflict cycle is essential for an understanding of how, where and when to apply different strategies and measures” of preventive diplomacy (Swanstrom and Weissmann (2005: 9). The dynamic nature of conflict poses mammoth challenges to preventive diplomacy.

Lund (1996) maintains that preventive diplomacy should be instituted when tensions between the belligerent parties are in danger of shifting from stable peace to unstable peace. It should also be applied in situations where conflict has been terminated but there are signals of relapse due to insufficient post-conflict peace-building measures, or to one party reneging on the negotiations and peace accords. Lund projects a stage in the full lifecycle of a typical conflict, where preventive diplomacy may be successfully applied, namely the stage of unstable peace. He notes that
application of any preventive measures when violent confrontation has manifested will no longer be preventive diplomacy, but crisis diplomacy.

Swart notes that although Lund’s (1996) preventive diplomacy approach has positive benefits in defining the phases of conflict and when effective preventive measures can be applied, it is flawed in that it envisages a theoretical framework that could be applicable to all conflict situations irrespective of their location, irrespective of the fact that each conflict situation, while characterised by similar patterns of violence, has different trigger factors, circumstances and complexities that require contextualised preventive diplomacy initiatives (Swart 2008).

Zartman (1978, 1996, and 2006) has devised what he terms the “theory of ripe moment” and sees mutually hurting stalemate as the determinant of when and how to apply preventive diplomacy within the lifecycle of a conflict. According to this theory, a ripe moment in a conflict is experienced when the warring parties are trapped in a condition of mutually hurting stalemate, an uncomfortable and costly predicament. Each party is compelled by the prevailing circumstances to realise that neither can achieve its objectives through armed conflict, and as such they are forced to seek a way out through a negotiated settlement. This suggests that when both parties are uncomfortable with the calamitous stage of the conflict and in fear of further catastrophe if the conflict is continued in the same way, the parties will opt for a change of action in ending the conflict (Wallensteen 2007, Zartman 1996, 2006). The theory is also premised on the assumption that before preventive diplomacy can be applied, the warring parties should have engaged in violent confrontation to the extent that they have tested each other’s might, have experienced dreadful and hurting moments of violent confrontation, and are now ready for a way out of the conflict deadlock and stalemate. According to the theory, it is on the basis of this enticing opportunity presented by the mutually hurting stalemate that preventive diplomacy can be successfully implemented, as the parties tend to be more willing to come to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The theory raises the issue that for successful preventive diplomacy to be instituted there must be a perception by all the warring parties that the present course of the conflict is unsustainable, and there exists a suitable and less destructive way out of the conflict deadlock.

The gist of the theory therefore is to provide guidance on why and when parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own or others’ efforts to transform the conflict from a violent phase to a negotiated settlement. The main objective is the termination of both warring parties’ conflictual behaviour and the development of a compromise solution based on the abandonment of the coercive strategies to attain their different goals (Mitchell 1981, Lund, 1996, 2006, Swart 2008, Wallensteen 2007). Lund (1996: 135) advises that preventive diplomacy “…is best launched at points where there already exists sufficient interest and motivation on the part of the disputants to seek a peaceful resolution, yet not so early that the disputants are incited to intensify their confrontation. Early action is vital if violence is to be preempted and the disputants are not to entrench themselves in rigid positions from which it is difficult to withdraw.” The
central argument here is that there are focal points in the lifecycle of conflicts at which it is more useful for mediators to successfully intervene and resolve the conflict. That is “[w]hen a situation is not ‘ripe’ as determined in large part by the extent to which the parties to the conflict are disposed even to seriously consider an agreement, international strategies have much less chance of succeeding” (Jentleson 2003: 32).

Critiques of the ripe moment and mutually hurting stalemate maintain that it is seriously flawed as an instrument of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Firstly, if preventive diplomacy entails prevention of conflict from erupting (conflict prevention) as well as managing to curb both vertical and horizontal escalation (conflict management) and preventing the recurrence of conflict (conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building), then awaiting the ripe moment and hurting stalemate before preventive action will be flawed as a conflict prevention instrument at the pre-violence stage of conflict. While the ripeness theory is central in guiding the assessment of when and where to engage, it is sometimes applied in ways that underestimate the risks and costs of waiting. That is, “[t]he conflict may be intervened in too early, but it also can deteriorate over time and grow worse, become too far gone” as conflict trends are not unidirectional (Jentleson 2003: 32).

Secondly, conflict is a highly dynamic phenomenon with different intensities; trends and processes. There are conflicts where the belligerent parties may pursue goals of continuing the conflict and simultaneously make overtures for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. As such, it becomes very difficult at any particular moment in the lifecycle of a conflict to determine with some certainty that the ripe moment has set in. In the same vein, most conflicts are intense and destructive at the onset, and would call for urgent (swift) intervention. Therefore, in practice it would appear irrational for any entity with the intention of mitigating the conflict to wait for a stage where the parties would have done untold damage to each other as the ripe moment for preventive diplomacy (Wallensteen 2007). This is because the longer a conflict rages on, the more difficult and costly it is to resolve it. In fact, the hardened rivalries, mistrusts and hurting moments which the parties inflict on each other during the conflict may become obstacles for effective preventive diplomacy. There are conflicts which never show signs of ripeness for resolution, but are protracted and may even be frozen. For example, conflicts which are centred on frustrated basic human needs are difficult to mitigate, as each party is strongly entrenched in achieving its goals, and neither party may submit to defeat. The parties’ develop solid and reciprocal enemy images and mutually exclusive belief systems about each other, which perpetuate antagonisms and solidify the conflict spirit of the warring parties as well as legitimising atrocious means of winning the war (Burton 1996a, b, c, Azar 1990, a, b, Swart 2008). Such entrenched enemy labelling becomes an obstacle in resolving the conflict even when the intervention is launched at the phase of the ripe moment.

Thirdly, Swart (2008) argues that the ripe moment is a perceptual event and not something to objectively ascertain with certainty, as it exists in the minds of the warring parties. If the ripe moment and hurting stalemate is to be
determined by an entity which wants to intervene, there is also a possibility that the determining entity may misjudge the warring parties’ perceptions of the conflict as being ripe for intervention, resulting in a suicidal intervention mission. On this score, Swart (2008) criticises Lund’s framework for failing to address the impact of psychological variables such as entrenched mistrust, rivalries, enemy attitudes, images, histories and experiences, on the application of preventive diplomacy. However, in spite of the criticisms, Lund (1996) provides an invaluable theoretical perspective on the marked phases of a typical conflict, and an analysis of what and when preventive diplomacy measures should be applied at some particular stages in the lifecycle of a conflict. He also raises the pertinent issue of what conditions are needed in the relationship of the warring parties and their circumstances vis-à-vis the conflict, before preventive diplomacy can be meaningfully implemented.

According to Carment and Schnabel (2003: 20), “[s]tructural factors create several problems that contribute to conflict, such as reconciling multicultural reality with the principle of national self determination; the pursuit of stable, democratic society in a tumultuous regional system; uneven economic development; and coping with fundamental changes brought about by the outbreak of violent conflict.” As such greater understanding of this deeper problems are necessary if structural preventive diplomatic measures such as developmental assistance can be comprehensively and successfully implemented (Wallensteen 2002, Carment and Schnabel 2003; Engel 2005). Other scholars advocate a combination of both track one (official sanctioned diplomacy) and track two (informal diplomacy) ventured through private institutions and non-governmental organisations in addressing conflicts and the post-conflict initiatives. Some regional organisations have realised the significance of track two diplomacy in the prevention, management and resolution of complex protracted conflicts. Carment and Schnabel (2003: 13) argue that “[o]fficial diplomacy can be greatly strengthened by private sector activity…Track Two diplomacy is increasingly the strategy of choice for dealing with problems beyond the reach of official efforts.” Track one and track two diplomatic initiatives should be operationalised on a complementary basis. Basic human rights theorists such as Burton and Azar recommend the centrality of track two diplomacy measures such as conflict resolution workshops conducted by expert conflict mediators in brokering political agreements and supplementing the official mediation efforts. As Fourie and Solomon (2002: 3) correctly notes, “[i]n this way track two does not seek to compete with track one but rather seeks to complement and reinforce it” However Fourie and Solomon warn against solely relying on track two diplomacy without the official track one mode. In their view “track two should be seen as an extension of, rather than a replacement to the official diplomacy.” This is because no settlement can reach its full potential without the official support and authority of the official entity (Fourie and Solomon 2003).

Several commentators also note that there are many conflict situations in which the regional and/or international bodies could have applied preventive diplomacy measures in their diverse forms for peace and stability. Many scholars indicate that most of the factors which lead to failed preventive diplomacy missions are paucity of resources,
lack of political will, and the question of national interests. Jentleson states that leaders have been reluctant to take on comprehensive conflict prevention because they weigh the costs of intervention and the rewards of such intervention to the nation. In most cases the “[t]he costs to be borne and risks to be run are too high, and the interests at stake are too low” (paraphrased in Carment and Schnabel 2003: 18). Lund (2005: 107) notes that preventive diplomacy has been tried and is sometimes effective. However, to reap its full potential, preventive diplomacy should focus on addressing structural problems in societies to avert outbreak of armed conflict and attain long-term peace. Attention to structural problems through well-coordinated, well-timed and executed preventive diplomacy policies and actions would ensure structural stability, signified by sustainable economic development, democracy, and respect for human rights, as well as viable political structures, capable of managing change without resorting to violent conflict (Commission of the European Communities (1996) cited in Mehler 2005). Structural preventive diplomacy should be integral to any preventive diplomacy mission, because it facilitates identification of the root causes of conflicts and application of appropriate preventive and post-conflict peacebuilding measures. Swart (2008) observes that in Africa preventive diplomacy has always failed because of insufficient diagnosis of the conflicts, to ascertain their deeper underlying sources.

3.4.4 Preventive Diplomacy Instruments

In the toolkit of preventive diplomacy there are several instruments which the intervening entity can select to mitigate a conflict situation. The techniques can be classified into diplomatic non-coercive and coercive diplomatic measures. Non-coercive measures include peaceful, non-violent and conciliatory actions such as fact-finding, peace envoys, eminent persons’ mediation and Good offices missions, shuttle diplomacy, third-party arbitration, adjudication and mediation, deployment of observer teams, international appeals problem-solving intervention, peacemaking, positive rewards and inducements, confidence-building measures, establishment of risks reduction centres, (“carrots”), humanitarian intervention, moral persuasion for accommodation by the adversaries, and post-conflict peace-building programmes (positive inducements) such as revival and reconstruction of the socio-economic and political institutions, targeted economic assistance programmes, access to advanced technology, promotion of democracy and good governance, election monitoring, government of national unity, power sharing and reconciliation, exchange of military missions, information exchanges and monitoring of regional arms control as well as signing of non-aggression pacts, commissions of inquiry and human rights observers. Post-conflict peace building measures also entail creating institutions and procedures through which the warring parties can be engaged in dialogue on the conflict issues and how they can be amicably settled. It also requires measures to modify the perceptions and attitudes of mistrust, misperceptions, suspicion, positional rigidity and enemy images between, the warring parties for lasting peace to be attained.
On the other hand, coercive measures entail the use of force or threat of force and sanctions to obtain co-operation from the belligerent parties. For example, military intervention, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, economic, moral, political and military sanctions and embargoes, establishment of deterrence security policies, de-militarised zones and disarming the belligerents, arms control regimes, establishing local and/or regional balances of power, non-offensive display of force, isolation by the international and regional organisations and war crimes tribunals (Boutros Ghali 1992, 1995, Annan 1998, 2000, Adebayo and Gelin-Adam 1999, Miall et al 2001, Hampson 2002, Hampson, Wermester and Malone 2002, Hampson 2002, Cockell 2002, Wallesteen 2002, Jentleson 2000, Surhke and Jones 2000, 2003, Vayrynen 2003, Carment and Schnabel 2003, Talentino 2003). According to Hampson (2002), there are wide debates over a range of techniques and instruments that are relevant to preventive diplomacy. Some people view preventive diplomacy as referring to non-coercive diplomatic measures and peaceful means described in Article 33 of the UN Charter, while others take a broader view that both coercive and non-coercive methods should be applied to complement each other.

Of utmost important is how the intervening body plans and applies the techniques on the basis of the early warning signals and information available on the sources of the conflict, its dynamics, the goals and perceptions of the belligerent parties, the phase and context of the conflict, and the timing of the execution. Due to the complexity of the conflict causal factors and the dynamics of the conflict cycle, the preventive diplomacy toolbox should be flexible and open to alterations on the dictates of the conflict situation. Each response technique and option should be assessed to determine its situational advantages and disadvantages within the context of the conflict at hand (Cockell 2002). For preventive measures to be effective, they should be appropriately timed and executed such that they optimally engage the underlying causal factors, conflict dynamics, interests and attitudes of the actors. Effective preventive diplomacy entails a substantial understanding of the history and dynamics of conflicts, their structural causes and the processes by which they become violent, to avoid treating only the conflict symptoms rather than the underlying causes. An in-depth analysis of the conflict situation, its structural causes, the parties involved and their perceptions about the conflict and the conflict phase, will help the intervening body to determine how to intervene, the appropriate preventive instruments and when to intervene to transform or mitigate the conflict circumstances (Cockell 2002, Wallensteen 2002, Carment and Schnabel 2003, Lund 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005). It is vital that preventive diplomacy strategies should be multi-faceted and long-term in their set operational goals. The proponents of developmental diplomacy prefer interventions through economic assistance, programmes on promotion of good governance, democratisation, rule of law, and political reconstruction, electoral reform assistance, targeted anti-poverty projects, humanitarian assistance reintegartion, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes to prevent the recurrence of conflicts (Annan 1998, Swart 2008).
In line with the above, the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) preventive diplomacy approach cherishes cooperative, consultative and peaceful mediation as the core framework of its preventive diplomacy machinery for intervention in potential, imminent and ongoing conflicts (Chigas et al. 1996). However, in most cases the government, if it is one of the belligerent parties, may exploit the appeasement overtures as signs of weakness by the powers or body providing the “carrots”. The autocratic Mugabe regime adroitly interpreted the SADC non-coercive policy of quiet diplomacy against its despotic rule as a sign of weakness by the regional organisation. The regime therefore resisted implementation of any meaningful democratic reforms in the country.

Others argue that most preventive diplomacy interventions by third parties have relied on some form of coercive diplomacy. For example, Jentleson’s (2003) case studies reveal that sufficiently credible threats and/or earlier and more decisive uses of military force would make a crucial difference in preventive diplomacy missions. The deployment of the United Nations forces in collaboration with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Macedonia has been cited as indicative of the success of coercive diplomacy in restoring order (Hampson 20002). However, it has also been noted that coercive diplomacy techniques such as economic sanctions frequently backfire and buttress the will to resist, or misfire and cause misery to civilians than on the government as in the cases of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and the apartheid regime in South Africa (Hampson 2002). There are many conflict situations in which dictatorial governments have been hardened to tighten their despotic leadership in spite of the sanctions imposed. This has led to criticisms from some quarters that sanctions are not an effective preventive diplomacy technique as the perpetrators of the evil are often cushioned from its adverse effects. More often than not, its victims are the innocent masses who will already be suffering under the autocratic regime.

Several scholars on preventive diplomacy recommend that optimal efficacy can be attained by a combination of both coercive and non-coercive preventive measures (carrots and sticks). This is mainly because the reasons for conflicts are multidimensional and therefore would require cross-sectoral and multi-pronged strategies to mitigate them (George 1994, Adedeji 1999, Hampson 2002, Lund 2002, Wallensteen 2002, Dress and Rosenblum-Kumar 2002, Cockell 2002, Carment and Schnabel 2003, Jentleson 2003, Cawthra 2004, Swart 2008). The diplomatic components must be backed by a credible threat of coercive strategies. The parties to the conflict must know that both cooperation and non-cooperation have their consequences. “In this regard fairness and firmness go together quite symmetrically (Jentleson 2003: 39)”

Some conflicts, once erupted, can be so intense and deadly that only military intervention through preventive deployments, preventive enforcements, peacekeeping and peacemaking deployments can provide opportunities for dialogue and mediation for peaceful resolution. On this score, Jentleson argues that “[f]orce rarely if ever should be a
first resort, but it often needs to be more of an early resort” Chigas et al. (1996: 386) argue that “military forces may serve as an adjunct to diplomacy, a form of ‘muscular diplomacy in which the threat of force hovers in the background and is used in conjunction with diplomatic efforts and in coordination with a wide variety of civilian tasks. They may prove particularly effective in the very early stages of a conflict when it has not hardened and compromise and resolution remain possible.” This strategy of engaging in non-coercive diplomatic measures backed by threats of force is credited with the success of SADC preventive diplomacy in the 1994 Lesotho intervention.

However, there are instances where coercive interventions have exacerbated the conflict situation, as was experienced by the UN in Somalia, ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the SADC in the DRC and Lesotho. In some instances, when an organisation employs coercive diplomacy strategies, it might make cooperation of the warring parties less attractive. That is to say, the swift resort to the use of force may undermine the receptivity of the force, and result in escalation of violence in the area of operation (Chigas et al. 1996) One of the former SADC Executive Secretaries, Kaire Mbuede (2001: 48), lamented the existence of “…a disturbing tendency to militarise the process of peacemaking.…” This is because “while the role of preventive diplomacy is generally recognized, in practice, the first thing that comes to most peoples’ minds is military intervention.” What is important is to note that “[i]n the short term war and conflict situations often require immediate military action to restore normality, in the long-term, however, this should take place within a broader context of demilitarizing peace making…Peace can also be made without military intervention.”

Many coercive preventive diplomacy missions by the UN and regional organisations have failed due to ill-defined operational mandates, flawed rules of engagement, lack of political will by the intervening member states, and paucity of resources to finance the operations to their logical conclusions. Hampson (2002: 146) posits that “[a]bsent from much of the literature about different preventive techniques and the relationship between preventive diplomacy and coercive diplomacy is any kind of sustained analysis on whether some techniques are better suited to certain kinds of conflict situations than others, what the real tradeoffs are in adopting different preventive diplomacy strategies, and whether choosing one/some option(s) forecloses the use of others.”

In practice, several conflicts have been resolved by employment of the “carrots and sticks” preventive diplomacy measures. Hence, Lund (1999) notes that preventive diplomacy “can involve the use of a variety of diplomatic and other instruments that should be effectively and collectively implemented by governments, multilateral organizations, Non-Governmental Organisations, individuals or the disputants themselves.” What is significant is that each conflict situation has its unique existential peculiarities and will require preventive instruments which are appropriate to the conflict context. This suggests that there is no fixed and definite preventive toolkit and formula for success since each conflict situation has its own requirements. For example, causal factors such as ethnic persecution, regime failure,
massive human rights violations, inequitable distribution of resources, underdevelopment and refugee flows, are results of different combinations of factors, hence “...require somewhat different models, explanations, strategies, and responses.” (Lund 2005: xiii). Among other things, the efficacy of a preventive operation is determined by the stage at which it is implemented in the lifecycle of a conflict. That is whether they are deployed before hostilities occur (such as some form of preventive deployment), during low-intensity conflict, during full-scale war, or after armed conflict (Swart 2008). As such it is not advisable to “...generalize too quickly on the basis of individual cases; nor should [one] transplant an approach that has worked under specific cultural, political and economic conditions to a different setting. Regional variations can be of great significance” in determining the success and/or failure of preventive diplomacy (Mehler 2005: 116). Therefore, the central issue is not so much whether preventive diplomacy works, but rather under what conditions it can be effective. For example, in the case of SADC’s interventions in Lesotho, both coercive and non-coercive measures were employed with different success. In the 1994 intervention, the SADC employed non-coercive diplomatic measures and it has been hailed as a success. In the 1998 intervention SADC launched a military intervention and although they managed to bring order in the Kingdom, it has been criticised from many quarters as an abortive mission; it raised questions on the efficacy of the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism.

The success of preventive diplomacy depends on the extent to which measures are geared towards addressing the deeper, structural underlying sources of conflict (Galtung 2000, Hampson 2002, Wallensteen 2002, Carment and Schnabel 2002, Engel 2005, Mehler 2005, Talentiono 2005). Hampson (2002: 148) maintains that “preventive diplomacy initiatives when taken alone and independently of a broader strategy of conflict prevention are likely to fail unless they are linked to measures and actions that tackle the deeper, or ‘root’ causes of conflict.” In view of this factor, any intervening body should embark on an in-depth analysis of the conflict in question to determine the deep, underlying structural sources of the conflict. This is essential in determining appropriate intervention strategies and post-conflict peace-building initiatives to address the real issues and avoid attending to the symptoms of the conflict.

3.4.5 Preventive Diplomacy and Early Warning Systems

The efficacy of preventive diplomacy is determined by availability of comprehensive and coherent early warning system structures for collection and analysis of data on potential, imminent and ongoing conflicts. As Levit (2003:4) notes, “[n]o conflict prevention mechanism can be sustained...in the absence of viable early warning and risk assessment systems.” Early warning systems are institutions established to provide information on potential conflict zones and the status of ongoing conflicts with the goal of mapping and nipping them in the bud, (conflict prevention), facilitating the de-escalation of an ongoing conflict, (conflict management) and devising measures for post-conflict peace building and reconstruction, (conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building). It was in this light that Nhara (1996) held that preparedness, prevention and mitigation are the main pillars of an early warning system. According
to Carment and Schnabel (2003: 24) “[t]he policy relevance of early warning systems is not restricted to analyzing a crisis, but also to assess the capacities, needs, and responses for dealing with a crisis.” In other words it is the analysis of information on the conflict and development of appropriate response strategies to the crisis in a timely manner which is significant in preventive diplomacy (Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) cited in Carment and Schnabel 2003). The main goal is to establish an early warning and risk assessment network that is multi-departmental, multi-purpose and multi-dimensional in definition, interpretation and response operation.

The assessment of early warning data is used to identify the ongoing conflicts, potential and future conflict zones, and a sequence of events that are logically consistent with the required operational responses (Carment and Schnabel 2003, Lund 2005). Generally, provision of early warning information is the first step in conflict intervention as it gives both the intervening entity and the conflict parties a clearer understanding of the origins, nature and dynamics and strategies for resolution of the conflict at hand (Miall et al 2001). The crisis signals which have been employed by the United Nations, Inter-governmental Organisations and Non-governmental-Humanitarian Organisations to anticipate and monitor imminent crisis and conflict escalation include manifestations of autocracy and undemocratic governance, violent conflict, gross political repression, religious, minorities and opposition persecutions, genocide, gross violation of human rights, state sponsored and institutionalised violence, forced migrations, refugee crisis, increased number of internally displaced persons, weak and dysfunctional institutions of governance, crumbling economic structures, failed delivery of human security and material services, deteriorating living standards and other humanitarian emergencies (Rupesinghe 1992, Kuroda 1992, Thoolen 1992, Beyer 1992, Ramcharan 1992, Davies, Harff and Speca 1997, Davies and Gurr 1998, Annan 1998, Miall et al 2001, Levit 2003, Engel 2005).

The aim of early warning is to provide the recipient entity with comprehensive information on impending crises, ascertaining the underlying structural sources of the conflict for informed decisions on how best to respond. As Rugumamu (2002:15-16) puts it “effective early warning combines historical, social, political and humanitarian information in order to forecast the dynamics of a particular conflict and the instruments to effectively address it before it reaches crisis proportions.” Carment and Schnabel (2003) state that after the conflict information is analysed and weighed and possible resolution strategies decided upon, it is relayed to policy makers for further assessment and implementation. The early warning systems are not confined to simply analysing a conflict, but also relate to and, indeed, see their raison d’etre in the capacities and response strategies for dealing with a conflict. As such the “message must state clearly what the threat is, and what action the receiver is being urged to take” (Rupesighe 1992: xxiv). The central purpose of early warning is not only to identify potential conflict zones but also to trigger political will among the decision-makers for timely and appropriate preventive action (Rupesighe 1992, Walker 1992, Gordenker 1992, Nhara 1996, Annan 1998, Jentleson 2003). Nhara (1996: 1-2) clearly articulates this point thus:
“[t]he provision of information alone does not constitute Early Warning…the receiver of such a forecast and what is done with the information provided become critical in determining the success or failure of an Early Warning system.”

Political will to act is pivotal to the success of preventive diplomacy. In most instances, failure to act by the UN or regional organisations has not been due to lack of early warning signals about incipient conflicts, but lack of political will to act. For example, the international community failed to stem the 1994 genocide in Rwanda despite the availability of information on the impending crisis (Suhrke and Jones 2000, Jentleson 2003). A critical task in preventive diplomacy is ascertaining where and when the most harmful conflicts are most likely to occur or recur, so that appropriate measures of preventive responses may be launched and appropriate resources be committed to averting and/or mitigating the crisis. Conflict mapping, appropriate interpretation and analysis are vital as early warning tools. This is because, if undertaken by experts, they should facilitate provision of data on the underlying conflict sources, character of the conflict, the parties involved, conflict phase, conflict dynamics, diffusion, and escalation, estimation of operational costs, risk assessment, intervention strategies and timing of the intervention. The mapping and analysis of early warning data around a particular conflict will help in identifying the scope for conflict prevention, management and resolution (Mial et al. 2001, Lund 2005).

Research has shown that the UN and regional organisations, more often than not, fail to respond promptly to conflicts before they reach destructive proportions. Most of the post-Cold War conflicts which erupted in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, reflect what has been referred to as “missed opportunities” for the effective implementation of preventive diplomacy. Failure to act timeously may have resulted from: a lack of early warning structures; flawed analysis of data on eminent conflicts or conflict escalation; a lack of political will; poorly resourced intervention missions and failure to fully comprehend the historical underlying sources and dynamics of the conflict (Adedeji 1995, Annan 1998, Surhke and Jones 2000, Hampson 2002, Lund 2002, Cockell 2002, Wallensteen 2002, Jentleson 2003, Carment and Schnabel 2003).

There are numerous problems associated with the gathering, interpretation and analysis of regular, reliable and complete early warning information. This has prompted Nye to assume that “post-Cold War era holds fewer secrets but more mysteries” in terms of resolving the numerous conflicts in the available early warning information (in Lund 2005: 111). Lund (2005: 110-112) identifies some of the factors which hamper gathering of reliable early warning information especially in the post-Cold War era, as follows:

- The sources and loci of emerging threats…are more numerous and widely dispersed, and the processes of gathering and interpreting information about them are likewise widely scattered as well as uneven in their coverage and varied in quality.
• The more diffuse nature of both the pertinent information and the criteria for interpreting (lack of a set of interpretive categories in relation to which news of emerging troubles can be assessed and its significance judged);
• Distinguishing between more and less serious emerging risks and threats (separating ‘signals’ from ‘noise’ or ‘migraines’ from ‘headaches’ has become more difficult.
• Ominous signs for a given country or region may be detected, but it is hard to estimate what kinds and levels of violence or other problems may actually erupts, as well as when, where and how.
• Existence of numerous channels of information or analysis available…may provide contradictory and politicised predictions, thus suggesting widely varying degrees of concern and types of response.
• All information, including early warnings of future conflict is subject to the self-interested biases of its producers and it can be politically manipulated for partisan reasons.
• The potential import for national, regional and international security of signs of instability and discontent is harder to decipher, especially when the signs are low level and dispersed.
• Even if one has adequate early warning information, the psychological tendency exists either to interpret it along familiar lines or to filter out its unfamiliar or inconvenient aspects and thus fit the data into preconceived notions.

The UN and regional organisations in their diverse forms have realised the significance of early warning systems in their bid to prevent outbreaks and recurrence of conflicts in their respective regions. In his Agenda for Peace, Ghali (1995) pledged to strengthen the UN preventive diplomacy by bolstering its early warning structures and information-gathering organs, fact-finding and preventive deployments. Similarly, through the Helsinki Decision (Chapter 11 (3), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mandated the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM), to provide appropriate early warning and early responses to tensions involving national minority issues which have the potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE regional block (Chigas et al. 1996). Regional organisations in the developed world such as the OSCE and OAS have more developed and established early warning systems and capabilities for preventive diplomacy missions than those in the Third World regions such as the SADC and ECOWAS.

The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) and the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) protocols in their goal to prevent contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflicts, pledge to establish early warning units in each member state, and promote exchange of information on and reviews of regional matters and developments. The question is whether the SADC has any established early warning system to detect potential conflict zones, and if so, has identified whether there is any collective capacity to act pre-emptively. In its coercive preventive diplomacy mission of 1998 in Lesotho, the SADC operation is said to have encountered serious operational challenges due to

The ECOMOG preventive operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990-1997 and 1997 to 2000 and 1998 respectively have also been labelled as flawed due to poor or general lack of reliable early warning data on the conflict context (Iweze cited in Sessay 2000). In both the SADC and ECOMOG operations, the troops were hastily thrown into the battlefield without adequate warning information, risk assessment and sufficient preparations for effective engagements. Generally, if preventive diplomacy is to be effectively practised, it is necessary for the UN and the regional organisations to develop strong early warning institutions, information interpretation, analysis, assessment and appraisal systems and capacity to act appropriately (Evans 1998, Carment and Schnabel 2003, Wallensteen 2002, Cockell 2002, Jentleson 2003, Talentino 2003). Central to the planning of preventive action are “the specification of concrete objectives, the identification of realistic preventive measure options to achieve those objectives, and the coordinated integration of the chosen measures to ensure comprehensive unity of effort on the ground” (Cockell, 2002: 192).

This study seeks to investigate whether the SADC has any early warning structures which guide interventions in regional conflicts, as in the case of the Lesotho missions of 1994, 2007 and 2007.

Preventive diplomacy embraces conflict prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The following section will delve into what each of the three concepts entails. It will also discuss how the concepts are inter-related and how preventive diplomacy tools and strategies are applied in each stage of conflict mitigation.

3.5 Conflict Prevention

“Since assuming office, I have pledged to move the United Nations from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention” (Annan 2001: 3). This statement by the former UN Secretary General is indicative of the imperative need for regional organisations and the UN to focus on preventive measures if global peace and security are to be realised and sustained. Conflict prevention is an integral aspect of preventive diplomacy and maintenance of international peace and security in the founding and operational documents of almost all the regional and international organisations. For example, conflict prevention is the first pledge in the Charter of the United Nations in its bid to maintain global security. Lund (1996: 37) defines conflict prevention as “...action taken ... to avoid the threats or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes...” In a paper presented at the Conflict prevention Network Annual Conference in Berlin (31 October 1999), Lund expanded the definition of conflict prevention to embrace structural prevention: that it “entails any structural or interactive means to keep intrastate and interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and to strengthen the
capabilities to resolve such disputes peacefully as well as alleviating the underlying problems that produce them, including forestalling the spread of hostilities into new places. It comes into play both in places where conflicts have occurred recently and where recent largely terminated conflicts could recur....” (cited in Carment and Schnabel 2003: 21). It is supposed to be the first intervention action before conflict eruption, which would require conflict management and conflict resolution. Conflict prevention therefore entails pro-active, as opposed to reactive, actions in fighting the emergence of violent conflicts. Reactive preventive actions have proved to be highly costly for the intervening organisations, hence the shift in emphasis to pre-emptive measures. The latter denotes any measures geared towards anticipating, averting, defusing or containing a conflict in its embryonic stages before it escalates into a violent full-scale war. Van Walraven (2005: 78) distinguishes conflict prevention from other preventive actions that are instituted after the conflict has erupted. He explains that “[t]he essence of the concept involves pre-emptive action being taken before a conflict develops into armed violence” as opposed to mediation, intervention and management of conflicts which envisage mitigations after the conflict has erupted. Van Walraven (2005) stresses the significance of establishing the difference, as many politicians and diplomats have a tendency to refer to conflict prevention in the context of existing violence, in which case conflict mediation would be more appropriate. However, there are many people who view conflict prevention as inclusive of conflict management and resolution. According to Lund (2002: 161), there is confusion over which specific actions constitute conflict prevention and are exclusive of conflict management or one of its synonyms. This has resulted in the diffusion of the preventive concept. Thus, “[w]ith so much existing activity lumped under conflict prevention, there is also a risk it will lose its distinctive value-added meaning.”

Conflict prevention requires both short-term and long-term strategies and policies whose impact will prevent the emergence of conditions that give rise to conflict and its escalation (Annan 2000a, Rugumamu 2002, Jentleson 2003, Talentiono 2005). As Zartman (1991) puts it, conflict prevention is the pre-emptive attention or satisfaction of the parties’ incompatible demands and goals before they become the basis of violent confrontation. Miall et al. (2001) describe preventive measures as geared towards choking off the conflict causal sequence. Cahill (2000) and Annan (2000a) view conflict prevention as analogous to preventive medicine administered to a patient to prevent illness before it occurs. Suganami (1996) and Annan (2000a) provide a set of comprehensive questions to guide any discourse on conflict prevention, namely: “What prevents violent conflicts?” “Can war be prevented by removing its necessary conditions?” “Can the incidence of wars be reduced by controlling the circumstances under which they arise?” and “How can this particular war be prevented from becoming violent?” “How do we define and diagnose the disease of conflict”, “What are its symptoms?” There is no shadow of doubt that these are thought-provoking and searching questions which, if properly addressed, would go a long way to enhancing deep understanding of conflicts, their prevention, management and resolution, and consequently attainment of durable peace and security.
There are different stages and/or modes of conflict prevention. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997: 40) classifies them into two broad categories; namely; operational prevention, which is “early engagement to help create conditions in which responsible authorities can resolve tensions before they lead to violence and structural prevention which entails “strategies to address the structural causes of deadly conflicts.” Operational prevention embraces direct/light prevention whose main goal is to control and eliminate the imminent and short-term sources of conflict before it erupts into violent escalation (Miall et al. 2001, Cockell 2003). Lund (1996) classifies conflict prevention into pre-conflict peace-building, pre-emptive engagement and crisis prevention. All these are pre-emptive actions geared towards reducing or eliminating tensions between parties, creating channels for negotiation and mediation to diffuse uncertainty, mistrust and animosity and deter violent confrontation between the belligerents. Advocates of non-coercive preventive diplomacy maintain that the outbreak of violent conflict reflects a failure of diplomacy. However, these “direct actions [may] reduce or eliminate violence, without necessarily eliminating the conflict as such or its underlying causes” (Wallensteen 2003: 213). In view of this flaws conflict resolution practitioners have called for structural prevention which involves longer time programmes inclusive of “measures such as the promotion of democracy, ethnic integration, international regional cooperation, arms control and disarmament” (Wallensteen 2003: 213-214).

Numerous studies have found that preventive diplomacy measures devoid of actions to tackle the underlying structural sources of conflict are bound to fail in preventing the eruption of violent conflict in the long term (Wallensteen 2002, Hampson 2002, Cockell 2002, and Engel 2005). Structural (Deep) prevention denotes long-term preventive actions geared towards addressing the deeper structural sources of conflicts such as political marginalisation, political oppression, threats to human security, poor governance, weak institutions of governance, failed or collapsed states, electoral frauds, social breakdowns, denial and frustration of basic human rights and needs, economic deprivation, economic failures, underdevelopment, unequal distribution of resources, poverty and any other socio-economic and political ills, and sources of insecurity which deprive the citizens of full rights and liberties which any free human being should be able to enjoy. In view of the significance of addressing structural causal factors, Lund (2002: 161) notes that the core definition of conflict prevention should be “any structural means to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence” by strengthening the parties’ capabilities for resolving their disputes peacefully and reducing the underlying causal factors. Structural prevention is premised on the belief that conflicts emanate from some form of societal malfunction, and preventive measures focused on the structural factors that have the potential to trigger violent conflict should be devised and implemented at a time when that society is not directly enmeshed in violence (Wallensteen 2003). Since the goal is to prevent eruption of violent conflict, the preventive measures must be directed towards reforming and/or reviving the institutions to be functional and able to satisfy the people’s needs and wants. Structural prevention is pivotal in
thwarting violent confrontation in the long term. Most conflict prevention measures have not been successful because they fail to tackle deeper or structural causes of conflict.

Several scholars on conflict have observed that it is critically important for the intervening entity to conduct an in-depth analysis of the structural and underlying sources of conflict in order to devise effective and appropriate responses to eliminate the circumstances, attitudes and motives giving birth to an outbreak of violent conflict (Mitchell 1981, Azar 1990a, 1990b, Burton, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, Galtung 2000, Jackson 2006, Swart 2008). If the deep underlying structural sources of conflict are not addressed, the conflict will remain latent and will erupt or recur at some stage. There can be no successful conflict prevention that can bring lasting peace unless the structural conflict triggers are fully comprehended and the appropriate strategies are applied to tackle them. The European Union has come to the realisation that the cyclical and recurrent nature of conflict calls for the need to devise preventive instruments that address “the social, economic and political circumstances underpinning conflicts, namely the root causes and the most proximate causes” (Perez in Swart 2008: 219-220). Similarly, the UN acknowledges the significance of shifting from operational prevention to a structural prevention strategy “…that would address the root causes of armed conflict, addressing the various political, social, cultural, economic and environmental and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate symptoms of armed conflicts” (Annan 2003: 2). Reactive measures targeting proximate factors tend to be superficial and adhoc, and make little strategic impact on conflicts for the long-term prevention, management and amelioration of the conflict sources (Cockell 2002, Wallensteen 2002, Carment and Schnabel 2003).

Numerous organisations such as non-governmental organisations, development assistance agencies, educational institutions, the business community, religious institutions, regional organisations and the UN through its functional agencies the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations’ Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme, the World Health Organisation (WHO), and the Bretton Woods Financial institutions (the World bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), can contribute to structural prevention and durable peace and stability. The United Nations has the challenge of linking the efforts of these bodies into a coherent preventive diplomacy strategy (Hampson 2002). The then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1997: 37) acknowledged the significance of structural prevention when he stated that “[t]he prevalence of intra-state warfare and multifaceted crises in the present period has added new agency to the need for a better understanding of their root causes.” However, this requires the “awareness and willingness of the states composing the membership of the council and the full UN membership, regarding the realisation of the potential for preventive action. Politicians and diplomats must learn to be more daring in the conception of feasible approaches and in the execution of a commonly arrived plan of action” (cited in Hampson 2002: 149).
Leatherman et al. (1999) maintain that preventive actions should embrace the entire spectrum of conflict, namely the pre-violent stage, the escalation stage and the post-conflict conflict stage. Hence, they categorise preventive actions into: conflict prevention which denotes preventing violent disputes from erupting between parties either through structural, institutional, social, economic and political remedial measures; escalation prevention, which arrests both the vertical and horizontal escalation of hostilities, and post-conflict prevention which entails measures such as economic, political and social reconstruction, reintegration and rehabilitation of the states emerging from conflict to prevent relapse to war.

Preventive action “is best launched at points where there already exists sufficient interest and motivation on the part of the disputants to seek a peaceful resolution, yet not so early that the disputants are incited to intensify their confrontation” (Swart 2008: 53). In reality, the success or failure of preventive action at any stage of the conflict is influenced by the conflict context, the conflict causal factors, the behaviour of the warring parties and their constituents, the mediation strategies of the third party and the positional powers of the belligerents as determined by their military engagements.

The Rwandan genocide of 1994, the Yugoslavia catastrophe and the calamitous effects of conflicts currently gripping most parts of Africa, have awakened the UN, the International community, regional organisations, non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations’ resolve about the importance of preventive measures. According to Annan (2000a: 173) “each of the conflicts would either have been prevented completely or nipped in the bud” if proactive measures had been taken.

Central to conflict prevention is the existence of viable Early Warning Mechanisms and Risk Assessment Systems. According to Levit (2003) no conflict prevention mechanism can be effectively implemented and sustained in the absence of viable early warning and risk assessment systems. These mechanisms are vital for the provision and dissemination of information on impending catastrophes or signs for an escalation of existing conflict. Adequate early warnings followed by prompt preventive responses are key measures in conflict prevention (USIP 1994, Khumalo 1996, Annan 1998, 2000 a, Maxted and Zegeye 2001, International Peace Academy 2001, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, Levit 2003). Rugumamu recommends that if early warning is to be useful, it must promptly trigger the political will to act in a preventive fashion, with coherent coordination and cooperation and commitments to make available adequate resources for preventive operations. There are no divergent views on the necessity of early warning information in nipping incipient conflicts in the bud. In their reports as UN Secretary Generals, both Ghali (1992, 1995) and Annan (1998) proposed strengthening the UN Early Warning systems, and pledged support to reinforce such mechanisms in the existing regional organisations. For example, in his 1995 UN report, Ghali pledged UN assistance in the establishment of an OAU Situation Room to receive and disseminate information on political
developments in Africa, with the intention of expediting conflict prevention, management and resolution. Adebayo and Gelin-Adams (1999: 7) note that “within the UN Secretariat, a Multi-Agency Conflict Prevention Team assesses potential crises spots and submit reports to the Executive Committee for Peace and Security consisting of the UN Secretary General’s principal advisors.” Early detection of conflict symptoms would facilitate early diagnosis of the sources, conflict dynamics and processes, and provide information on what techniques should be employed to prevent its eruption, escalation and diffusion internally and/or externally to neighbouring countries., Regional member states would be in a better position to diagnose and comprehend the history and dynamics of conflicts in their neighbour states, and should therefore devise appropriate preventive measures. This is essential because conflict prevention that is not based on full comprehension and mastery of the fundamental long-term historical causes, as well as the short and medium term causes, will invariably prove abortive (Adedeji 1999).

Conflict prevention can be undertaken through a variety of measures and techniques including fact finding missions, special envoys, confidence and trust-building measures, mediation and negotiations, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, reconciliatory measures, and post-conflict peace-building (Boutrous Ghali 1992, Annan 1998, 2000a, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, Van Nieuwkerk 2000, Maxted and Zegeye 2001, Miall et al 2001). Fourie and Solomon (2002: 3) recommend that the preventive instruments should be applied through both Tracks One (official) and Two (informal) diplomacy approaches in addressing the often complex nature and dynamics of conflicts. They note that “optimal preventive diplomacy would seek to build synergy between the two tracks of preventive diplomacy in terms of what some observers have labelled ‘multi-track.’ In this way, Track Two does not seek to compete with Track One but rather seeks to complement and reinforce it.” According to Carment and Schabel (2003) several Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, International Alert, the Carter Centre’s International Negotiation Network, the International Crisis Group, the Project on Ethnic Relations the Human Rights Watch, and the Conflict Management Group have developed models for multi-track diplomacy to coordinate dialogue between conflict parties, offering training in diplomacy and conflict resolution as individual entities or in collaboration with governments, regional organisations and the UN.

Miall et al. (2001) categorises conflict prevention into “light prevention” which is aimed at preventing a situation with a clear potential for violence from degenerating into armed conflict, and “deep prevention” which is geared to addressing the underlying conflict factors, the root causes of the conflict. It is a communicative action aimed at forestalling conflict through fact-finding missions, early warning systems, negotiation, mediation, peace envoys, good offices, confidence-building measures and preventive deployment, enforcement, peacemaking and peace keeping (Ghali 1992, 1995, Annan 1998, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, Miall et al. 2001, Rugumamu 2002, Levit 2003). For Realists, conflict prevention can be attained through measures such as balance of power, alliance formations,
and coercion and deterrence measures as experienced during the Cold War era. However, while these traditional preventive measures succeeded in preventing direct war between the nuclear super powers, they dismally failed to halt conflicts between and within smaller nations, most of which were fuelled by their ideological bickering. The post-1990 violent intra-state conflicts and the concomitant multidimensional security challenges require new preventive approaches and strategies. Human needs theorists such as Burton (1990, a, b,c) and Azar (1990, a, b) maintain that effective prevention of conflicts can only be attained by addressing and/or attending to the frustrated basic survival needs, such as provision of services, recognition of people’s rights, dignity, identity, security, participation in governance, and access to economic opportunities. If these existential essentials are satisfactorily provided and equitably distributed, there could be no basis for conflicts by any group in society.

Prevention of conflicts and maintenance of international peace is the core duty of the UN Security Council through its various organs. In fact, conflict prevention is a core precept in the Charter of the United Nations (Malone 2002). The UN has been involved in preventing and defusing conflicts in many parts of the world. With regard to pledging the continued and unwavering commitments by the UN in conflict prevention, Annan (1998: 1) states: “[f]or the United Nations, there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict… Genuine and lasting prevention is the means to achieve that mission.” The 1990s UN missions’ successes in the prevention of imminent armed conflicts and diffusion of conflicts in progress have been recorded in Macedonia (1992), Guatemala (1993) and Fiji (1996 and Cambodia (1999) (Annan 2000a, Miall et al. 2001). On the other hand, failed UN preventive missions were recorded in Somalia (1991) and Rwanda (1994) with disastrous effects.

The lesson learnt from the abortive missions in Somalia and Rwanda was that peacekeeping should be in collaboration with regional blocs. This is because the frequency of conflicts has made it difficult for the UN to effectively carry out this mammoth challenging task. Accordingly, several regional organisations have established mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution within their organisational institutions for interventions as individual entities or in partnership with the UN. The European Union established the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). At its 1992 conference in Helsinki, the OSCE states committed themselves to “identify the root causes of tension and provide for a more flexible and active dialogue and better early warning and dispute settlement” (cited in Miall et al. 2001: 116). In addition, in its 1999 Charter for European Security, the organisation committed itself “to preventing the outbreak of violent conflicts wherever possible” (Jentleson 2003: 37). The organisation made significant headway in operationalising its range of preventive diplomacy tools. Through its High Commissioner on National Minorities (Max Vander Steel), the OSCE is credited for having successfully diffused tensions in Estonia in 1992. Among other things, the OSCE established missions for long and short duration preventive actions to more than twelve countries, whose aims were to provide first hand information on potential
conflict spots by gathering early warning information to curb outbreak and escalation of conflicts in their region
(Jentleson 2003).

In the same vein, Kreimer (2003) explains how the Organisation of American States (OAS) established conflict
prevention structures to deal with structural sources of conflicts in their region. He notes: (a) the system for regional
security; (b) the mechanism defined by Resolution 1080 of the General Assembly to defend democracy and
constitutional regimes; (c) the good offices of the Secretary General; (d) the work of the Unit for the promotion for the
Promotion of Democracy in the areas of conflict prevention and electoral observation; (e) the system for the defence
and promotion of human rights, where the principal organs are the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights” (Kreimer 2003: 8). Its most important preventive diplomacy is Resolution 1080,
which was reinforced by the Washington Protocol in 1991. The resolution calls for swift action against any member
which threatens democracy in the regime, including undemocratic means of attaining power through military coups
against democratically elected regimes.

SADC has also established institutions for preventive diplomacy to resolve regional conflicts. In 1996, SADC
established its security wing, the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) for preventive interventions in
regional disputes. Its operations were enhanced by supportive structures such as the Mutual Defence Pact, the
Ministerial Committee, the Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), the State Defence and Security
Committee (ISDSC) and the SADC Summit of Heads of State. Objective (f) of the OPDS reads thus: “use preventive
diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through early warning systems.” The
SADC pledges to resort to coercive measures only in cases where there are humanitarian crises, threats to
democratically elected regimes, and where there is a breakdown of law and order. In 1994, the SADC Troika,
comprising Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa diffused political tensions in Lesotho while in 1998 Botswana and
South Africa, sent a peacekeeping force that prevented a political crisis which was precipitated by a military-royal
The SADC also delegated the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, to mediate the post-2007 election
crisis in Lesotho between the government and the opposition, although with limited success. As will be indicated in
later chapters, the crisis in Lesotho is still brewing. After the collapse of the Masire-led SADC mediation effort, the
Lesotho Christian Council (LCC) and the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisation (LCNGO) are leading
the mediation, with the SADC as a supportive structure.

However, a crisis is looming in Zimbabwe, and regional members are passively watching after their abortive efforts to
avert the crisis through what they called “Quiet Diplomacy” and formation of the government of national unity in
2009.. Alden and Le garth (2003) point out that signals for an imminent economic and political crisis have been
salient in the early 1990s, which could have prompted the regional powers to proactively launch preventive measures and curb the current meltdown. Examples of the signals include state-sponsored land invasions and expropriation, electoral violence and fraud, total breakdown of the rule of law, collapse in the industrial and agricultural sectors, and brutalisation of opposition party activists, all of which have had adverse effects in the SADC region. Zacarias (2003: 49) recommends that there should be a common vision and shared operational principles and framework for SADC and its intelligence organs if its early warning system and preventive action is to be realised.

The political crisis in Zimbabwe has been unfolding and has escalated throughout the 2002 and 2008 elections, all of which were marked by violence by the ZANU PF Mugabe regime against the MDC of Morgan Tsvangirai. Despite the fraudulent elections as reflected by the Commonwealth Observer Mission and the SADC Parliamentary Mission, the SADC Observer Mission maintained that the elections were fair and free. After the violence-ridden 2008, the Mbeki-led SADC mediation team brokered a peace deal between the ZANU PF and the MDC through the Global Political Agreement (GPA). Through the GPA the two rival parties formed a government of national unity, in which Mugabe remained President and Tsvangirai became the Prime Minister while Mutambra of the MDC-M became the Deputy Prime Minister. Although the formation of the government of unity was a commendable initiative by the SADC, the political scenario in Zimbabwe remains tense, as there are numerous fault lines in the operations of the government. Several attempts by the Zuma-led SADC mediation through numerous Summits seem to be failing to save the GNU. Tsvangirai has on numerous occasions appealed to the SADC to rein in Mugabe to respect the GPA, but in vain. As the parties brace themselves for elections in 2011, there are already reports of violence by the Mugabe-security backed supporters against the MDC. The conferences for constitutional reforms have been disrupted, but the SADC has adhered to the policy of quiet diplomacy despite its apparent shortcomings in addressing the Zimbabwean crisis.

ECOWAS is one regional organisation which, more than any other regional organisation in Africa, has successfully diffused conflicts in its turbulent region. Through its military wing ECOMOG, and its security mechanism the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1998), the Mutual Defence Pact Protocol ECOWAS diffused conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Cape Verde, Ivory Coast and Guinea-Bissau in the 1990s.

There are calls for collaborative preventive missions between the UN and regional organisations as the way forward to attain global peace and security. It has become evident that the two can play a complementary role (Knight 1996, Jentleson 2003). Collaboration of the UN and regional organisations is pivotal because “it is likely that some key objectives will not be achievable through the actions of one external actor alone, such as the UN, but will likely require the involvement of others (e.g, regional organisations, non-governmental organisations ) donors as well” (Cockell, 2002: 193).
In fact, the UN Chapter V111 of the UN Charter has acknowledged the comparative advantages of regional organisations in the maintenance of international security. In line with the above, the Carnegie Commission (1997: xiv) made a clarion call to the regional arrangements to strengthen their preventive mechanisms in order to bolster the UN efforts at global peace and security.

However, evidence on the ground suggests that there is a serious lack of any well-integrated, collaborative and institutionalised long-term strategy for strengthening national, regional organisations and the UN capacities to prevent conflicts. Dress and Rosenblum-Kumar (2002: 231) note that “[t]he international community has not yet come to grips with the difficult, yet essential, process of visualising an entire system of conflict prevention and determining how the numerous elements of that system can work together as a more coherent, integrated whole.” In view of these flawed preventive mechanisms, the authors have called upon the United Nations to engage in an internal process of inter-organisations, inter-sectoral and inter-agency dialogue to enhance and maximize the capacities of its agencies and departments in structural conflict prevention, post-conflict peace building and long-term peace planning.

The challenge for regional organisations is to build and reinforce regional early warning systems and conflict prevention mechanisms through which they can share information on impending conflicts, and establish coherent and effective monitoring of potentially violent conflicts in their respective regions. These mechanisms are based on what Boulding (1962) calls Social Data Stations, which he views as analogous to networks of weather stations for “reflection of social temperatures and pressures” and the prediction of “cold or warm fronts” (cited in Miall et al. 2001: 100). Such mechanisms would help regional organisations in developing comprehensive, effective, holistic and coherent conflict preventive measures to nip conflict in the bud. Soderbaum (2001: 76) notes the existence of an International Forum of Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) in which 22 Non-Governmental Organisations, lobbyists, academics and governments could join forces with the UN agencies to “complement existing early warnings and processes, and to make research more relevant to policy and useful to local actors.” Regional organisations could benefit in their preventive measures if they could establish regional based early warning systems affiliated to the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response. The West African Network for Peace (WANEP), a NGO aimed at cross-fertilisation of ideas and exchange of research programmes on conflicts in West Africa, is a member of FEWER (Soderbaum, 2001).

Regional organisations in Africa lack the capacity and resources for preventive measures such as early warning systems and standing peace intervention forces, which can be rapidly deployed to diffuse crises. However, in most cases regional leaders hide behind the principle of non-interference in the affairs of a sovereign state. The principle of non-interference has actually legitimised inaction by regional organisations in the face of impending crises. This is
the same principle which saw the conspicuous inaction of the OAU when the continent was in flames. Critics have argued that the principle is jealously guided by regional leaders in order to protect their counterparts, some of whom have presided over the most brutal and repressive regimes. SADC has used this principle in defence of their passivity towards the unfolding economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe, hence their policy of “quiet diplomacy”, which is tantamount to indifference to the crisis. Critics have accused SADC’s inaction as akin to “quiet approval” of the political meltdown in Zimbabwe (The Business Day, March 22, 2007). Worse still, the principle is discriminatory, because it can be violated when it comes to other conflict situations as evidenced by the SADC military interventions in Lesotho and the DRC in 1998.

In his works on conflict resolution, Burton (1990a,1990b), denounces conflict prevention as a strategy by state-centric power politics theories which do not contribute to resolution of conflicts but only succeed in settlement and containment. Instead of conflict prevention, Burton recommends conflict provention in which the belligerent parties, with the assistance of a panel of expert third party mediators, engage in analytical problem-solving discussions and analysis of the conflict issues, positions, frustrations, constraints, perceptions and resolution options, and reach an acceptable peace outcome free from the power- based, state-centric settlements. According to Burton (1990a: 18), conflict prevention (as opposed to prevention) “addresses the problems of social relationships and all the conditions that affect them.” It is “…concerned with social problems generally, with altering the environments that lead to conflict, and with creating environments that mitigate conflict.” That is, conflict prevention involves the discovering of the causal factors that must be dealt with, and the human conditions which led to behaviours which contributed to the conflicts. Provention would therefore ensure attainment of what Cachill refers to as “dynamic peace” which “is a ceaseless activity geared towards the banishment of all the social ills that generate tensions, violence and war” (2000: 36-37).

Mehler (2005) provides tips on the best practices for successful conflict prevention, namely timeliness of concern, early action, ownership of the process by concerned parties, coordinated partnership between the UN and regional organisations, and consistent monitoring and evaluation of the process. The former Chairman in the Office of the OSCE and former Swedish Foreign Minister Margaretha Af Ugglas, notes that successful conflict prevention is determined by application of five key factors, namely: “the degree of political support from the parties concerned; the prudent selection of political and diplomatic instruments to be applied; a careful balance between public and quiet diplomacy; the adoption of a long-term approach; and the extent of cooperation with other international organizations” (cited in Carment and Schnabel 2003: 24).

Failure of conflict prevention missions has been more pronounced in Africa, which has experienced more conflicts in the post-Cold War era. This is mainly due to paucity of resources, the unmanageable eruption of violent conflicts in
the continent, lack of political will, regional rivalries, partisan regional bonds, failure of collective actions against
dictatorial counterparts, and failure to practise good governance and democracy (Mehler 2005, Carment and
Schnabel 2003).

It is on this basis that regional organisations in Africa have in most cases depended on the Developed World and the
UN to effectively address the conflicts in their regions. This has become a great challenge for African regional
organisations as they are engulfed by a barrage of socio-economic and political problems, some of which require
prompt regional attention.

3.6 Conflict Management
Conflict management entails measures used for the limitation, mitigation and containment of violent conflict (Miall
et al. 2001). It also involves elimination, neutralisation or control of the adversaries’ means of pursuing the conflict
through measures such as denying both sides the means of combat, neutralising one party’s means by slightly
increasing the means of the other one, and separating the combatants in space or time with the aim of preventing
conflict from erupting into a crisis, or to cool a crisis in eruption (Zartman1989). Conflict management tools include
mediation and negotiation where the conflicting parties are brought together by a neutral third party to dialogue their
differences for a peaceful resolution. Conflict management measures also include preventive diplomacy, through
sending of peace missions and special envoys to build confidence and trust between the warring parties, preventive
deployment, peacemaking, peace-keeping, peace enforcement and peace-building, all of which may involve
deployment of troops to monitor the conflict situation and protect the peace agreements between the belligerents,
together with any other tasks which could lead to de-escalation of conflict. Anan 1998, 2000a, Maxted and Zegeye
(2001), Ero (1995) and Levit (2003) assert that conflict management should include humanitarian relief measures to
alleviate the suffering of refugees and internally displaced people. This is integral to the physical and legal protection
of refugees and internally displaced persons as it should ensure peace, security and stability to facilitate voluntary
repatriation, re-integration and rehabilitation of people displaced by conflict. This is because the humanitarian
emergencies, tragedies and crisis resulting from conflicts, if left unattended, will aggravate the conflict dynamics and
its effects such as loss of lives and the spread of conflicts into neighbouring states. This was experienced in the
Great Lakes region (Rwanda, DRC, Burundi and Uganda) and West Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and
Guinea). Annan stresses the essential interlink between the humanitarian, political and security components in
peace-keeping, when he says: “w]here security is absent, humanitarian aid is blocked, violence increases, political
stability is weakened, and the situation is exacerbated” (2000a: 177).

Bercovitch (1984) defines conflict management in terms of the conflict outcomes and their distribution among the
belligerent parties. He argues that the gist of conflict management is to try to influence the course of conflict
termination and the distribution of outcomes between the contestants in a mutually beneficial manner. Bercovitch categorises conflict management into two classes; the endogenous and exogeneous conflict management”. Endogenous conflict management is undertaken by the parties to a conflict through bargaining negotiations to resolve their differences. Several scholars on conflicts have noted that it is difficult and sometimes impossible for the parties in a conflict on their own, to reach positive and mutually beneficial solutions. This is because the process is always dominated by a win-lose victory-defeat dichotomous position and negative labelling between the adversaries leading to destructive, distributive and unilateral outcomes, which will increase the conflict (Deustch 1973, Kriesberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Fisher 1997, Miall et al. 2001, Hauss 2001, Anstey 2006). As such, it is not an effective way of managing conflicts. In fact, there are few, if any conflicts worldwide, in which the warring parties, on their own, have reached a sustainable cease-fire, negotiated and reached a mutually acceptable agreement. This is mainly because once relations have deteriorated because of violence, and attitudes are embedded in “we-they” images of the enemy, it becomes very difficult, if not impossible for the same hostile warring parties to meet without a third party mediator and engage in sober reflections about the conflict and the necessity for peace (Cockell 2002). In a real conflict situation, it is imperative for a third party to mediate and guide the negotiations between the disputants, cool the tempers, transform the parties' negative perceptions and images about each other and the significance of viewing the conflict as a problem which both should be involved in resolving.

Exogenous conflict management entails mediation or intervention by a neutral third party designed “to arrest possible destructive consequences and inhibit a dysfunctional conflict cycle as well as help the parties find a proper and satisfactory basis for an agreement” (Bercovitch 1984: 9). That is to say, the main task of a third party is to help the adversaries realise and acknowledge that they both have a common problem which needs their collaborative efforts to resolve. The third party has to guide and transform the contestants’ attitudes from the confrontational, hostile, polarised, destructive enemy perceptions, hardened win-lose attitudes and zero-sum perceptions, to cooperative, collaborative, problem-solving and tolerant perceptions for a joint, integrative mutually beneficial peace outcome (Kriesberg 1982, Bercovitch 1984, Burton 1990, Isenhart and Spangle 2000, Hauss 2001, Miall et al. 2001). In this sense, an effective way of conflict management is through a third party who may be invited by one or both parties to help them out of the conflict entrapment.

A third party in conflict management can be a prominent person such as a former head of state, an expert, or a panel of experts in conflict issues, a NGO, regional organisation or the UN as individual entities or in partnership. The success and/or failure of the mediation entity is determined by several factors such as the conflict context, the complexity of causal factors, attitude and behaviour of the belligerents, the mediation approach embarked upon and how it is executed, how the mediator acts, operational mandate, availability of resources and political support and will to resolve the conflict.
Conflict management may be facilitated through a variety of strategies such as mediation, peacemaking and peacekeeping.

### 3.6.1 Mediation

Mediation and negotiations facilitated by a third party is crucial for the contending parties to dialogue their differences and conflicting goals, intentions and perceptions in order to reach a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Most conflicts contain inherent obstacles to attainment of a mutual and integrative solution by the conflicting parties on their own. This difficulty emanates from the enemy perceptions and harm committed against each other during the conflict. The aim is to extract a cease-fire and the signing of a peace treaty for de-escalation of violent conflict for more constructive peacemaking efforts. SADC mediated the conflicts in Lesotho in 1994 and 2007 through non-coercive preventive diplomacy, and through coercive military intervention in 1998.

### 3.6.2 Peacemaking

“Peacemaking” refers to measures intended to bring the hostile parties to an agreement through non-violent and non-coercive means such as mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and economic sanctions. Civilian and military missions of limited scope may be deployed for observation and monitoring of the peace process, facilitating dialogue, defusing tensions, promoting national reconciliation, protection of human rights and building confidence among the warring parties and the civilian population. Peacemaking efforts should involve all the stakeholders, that is, all the warring parties, non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations. This will ensure a comprehensive and all-embracing peace outcome owned by all the concerned parties. Several researchers on peacemaking have lamented the marginalisation of the civil society in the peacemaking process as a serious shortcoming, on which all peace mediators should ponder (Botrous Ghali 1992, Salmon and Alkadari, 1993, Fisher 1997, Annan 1998, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, Van Nieuwkerk 2000, Miall et al. 2001, the International Peace Academy, 2000, 2001, 2002, Soderbaum 2001, Ngoma 2005, Barclay 1999).

### 3.6.3 Peacekeeping

“Peacekeeping” entails deployment of both military and civilian personnel in a conflict context to help parties to adhere to the peace treaties and agreements as signed. The lightly armed peacekeeping troops are deployed after a cease-fire between the belligerents with the aim of averting breaches to the truce and preventing resumption of violent conflict. The troops may be deployed in a buffer zone separating the warring parties, as in the case of French forces in Ivory Coast and the UN forces in the Temporary Security Zone between Eritrea and Ethiopia during their 1998 border war. In the words of Ghali (1992: 4), “[p]eacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.” Therefore, for peacekeeping to achieve its goals, it must be
accompanied by “economic and social development, promotion and protection of human rights, good governance and national institution building” (Vraalsen 1999: 34-35). A peacekeeping mission should be well resourced and have a comprehensive mandate with clearly stated provisions for implementation and follow-up in the post-conflict peace-building period if it is to succeed in achieving its mandate (Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1995, Annan 1998, Annan 2000a, Vraalsen 1999, Adedeji 1999). As Annan puts it “if we are to respond adequately to the needs of a situation, present a credible and effective response, and maximise the safety and productivity of those who have gone to serve; the structure and strength of a peacekeeping operation must permit it to do two things: carry out its mandate and defend itself” (2000a: 183 and 184).

A peacekeeping mission requires the consent of all the warring parties before deployment, for it to be accepted as a neutral force. Consent of all the parties is vital to ensure that they own the entire peace process, its outcomes and implementation (Burton 1990a, Azar 1990a, Adebayo et al, 1999, Miall et al 2001). Obtaining consent from both belligerent parties has been a thorny issue for both the UN and regional organisations’ peacekeeping missions. This has resulted in the targeting of peacekeepers by a group that does not recognise or accept their presence. The UN Peacekeeping mission in Somalia suffered from such a fate when General Mohammed Farrah Ideed’s faction targeted them, resulting in the killing of 18 USA marines and the withdrawal of the forces (USA) in 1992 (Henrickson 1995, Adebayo et al 1999, Berman 2000, Annan 1998). The ECOMOG peacekeeping forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone became the target of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone respectively (Barclay 1999, Ero, 2000, Soderbaum 2001, International Peace Academy 2002). The South African intervention force met stiff resistance from the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and opposition parties during the 1998 SADC military intervention in Lesotho. In all the above-cited instances, the intervening forces were deemed to be defending the incumbent government, therefore being impartial. Since they were invited by the regimes without consultation with the opposition, they were viewed with suspicion by the other warring parties. This resulted in the forces becoming part of the conflict instead of a neutral peacekeeping force. The legitimacy of SADC forces in Lesotho was also seriously questioned and disputed by Lesotho opposition parties during their intervention in 1998. The difficulties may have prompted Annan to state that “[t]here must be a genuine desire for peace among the warring parties...no agreement, no matter how well intentioned can guarantee peace if those who sign it see greater benefit in war” (2000a: 179).

Fisher and Keashly (1990) developed taxonomy of third-party facilitation and intended functions and goals as follows:

- **Conciliation**: A trusted third party provides a communication link between the antagonists to assist in identifying major issues, lowering tension, and moving them towards direct interaction, typically negotiation.
- **Consultation**: A knowledgeable and skilled third party attempts to facilitate creative problem-solving through communication and analysis using social-scientific understanding of the conflict processes.
3.7 When is it the best time to intervene in a conflict?

One critical question on the discourse on conflict management is: At what stage of the conflict do mediators intervene? Put differently, the question is: ‘when is the appropriate time for third party intervention? What criterion is used to determine the appropriate time for intervention? Given the sustained importance of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, when should a situation in a state be considered to have deteriorated to such an extent that international and/or regional response is required? Can we always wait for a conflict to ebb and the will for peace to emerge before we intervene? What norms, standards and principles should determine the time for intervention? How long should an intervention take? When should it be withdrawn? (Zartman 1989, Annan 2000a, Neethling 2000, Anstey 2006). Research on how best to manage conflict should strive to address these questions if effective management and subsequently resolution of conflicts can be achieved. However, it is difficult to determine a standard uniform formula on when to intervene in conflict management, since different conflicts have different complexities and dynamics, and many other contextual factors and issues. As such, each conflict will require different stages of intervention, intervention measures and outcomes.

Scholars on conflicts have attempted to answer these questions albeit from different theoretical standpoints. Prominent among them is Zartman (1998, 1991, and 2000) who came up with the principle of a “mutually hurting stalemate” between the adversaries as the determining factor or ripe moment for mediatory intervention in a conflict. According to Zartman (1989), successful conflict management and ultimate resolution depend on identification of the “ripe moment” through the different trends and patterns of the conflict escalation and de-escalation. At this stage, the parties are ready or compelled by the prevailing conflict context to accept a mediator to rescue them from the entrapment corner and impasse by means of negotiations. It is the moment for parties to search for an agreed definition of the problem and how it can be resolved, and to assess the costs of continuing with the conflict (Azar 1990 a, Burton 1990 a, Lund 1996). Rugumamu (2002: 18) notes that “genuine negotiations have proven possible
when the fear for continued fighting exceeds the fear of reaching an agreement.” The parties have to be in a situation where they perceive the costs and prospects of continuing the war to be more burdensome than the prospects and cost a peace settlement.

On the other hand, there is a school of thought that advocates immediate mediation and management of conflicts before they intensify and escalate to destructive and unmanageable levels. This school of thought maintains that early entry reduces positional rigidity, polarisation and the build-up of solidified enemy perceptions and wins-lose attitudes between the adversaries that are barriers for effective resolution of conflicts. The core argument here is that conflicts must be nipped in the bud at the early stages of flare-ups rather than waiting for a period when the belligerents have caused harm to each other. Critics of the late entry in management of conflicts have always argued that mediation comes too late after the harm has already been done, which makes it even more difficult for effective management and resolution. Africa is a victim of this situation hence the continent has hosted the highest number of protracted, deep-rooted and frozen conflicts which have become a structural problem. Thus proponents of early intervention have asked “[c]an we always wait for conflict to ebb and the will for peace to emerge before we intervene? (Annan 2000a: 179). Experience has shown that early intervention to stabilise the situation and limit the extent and momentum of the conflict would be “far preferable to the devastation which is their alternative” (Annan 2000a: 180).

The international community, the United Nations and various regional organisations have decided on the prevalence of humanitarian emergencies during the course of a conflict as the determining factor for intervention (Ghali 1992, 1995, Annan 1998, Ero 2000, Miall et al. 2001, Levit 2001). Beck and Arend (1993: 112) define humanitarian intervention as “the use of armed force by a state (or states) to protect citizens of the target state from large-scale human rights violations there.” In most cases, humanitarian intervention is ostensibly directed at repressive states which for whatever reasons unleash their repressive security apparatus on the civilian population of particular sections of an ethnic group of people (Du Plessis, 2000). However, in most cases it involves employment of military force to protect civilians, defend humanitarian and relief organisations from attacks, and oversee the transportation, allocation and distribution of relief services to the war victims.

In view of this complexity and considering the humanitarian crises which accompany most conflict-ridden countries such as mass displacements of people, refugee crises, hunger, disease, loss of life and other damaging social ills such as grave human rights abuses, humanitarian intervention whether coercive or non-coercive, it is imperatively logical and necessary to alleviate and mitigate the ghastly dire effects of conflicts. Whether the intervening power or body has ulterior motives should not affect the need to defend human life, dignity and security. The intervening power
should embody the principal peaceful and positive reasons for humanitarian intervention in order to distinguish it from ordinary self-motivated aggression. According to Du Plessis (2000: 13), the intervening body should:

- Give concrete expression to the emerging norm of intervention in pursuit of peace and humanitarian concerns, particularly where ethnic and the gross violation of human rights occur;
- Require a mandate from the UN in the form of a Security Council resolution (and similar resolutions from other nongovernmental organisations), as well as impartiality or neutrality on the part of the intervening forces;
- Be mandated and legitimised by the international community of states.

The human rights abuses, influx of refugees, increased number of displaced people, genocide and other humanitarian catastrophes that accompanied most of the post-1990 intra-state conflicts precipitated the move by the UN Security Council and regional organisations to intervene and thwart genocides and massive humanitarian crises. The human tragedies and humanitarian emergencies which were experienced in Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Libya and Yugoslavia, in which innocent civilians became the mass victims, were shocking and unpardonable. As such, intervention has to be justified in the name of protecting civilians’ rights, freedoms and security, in safeguarding humanitarian relief and supplies. The humanitarian justification was used when the UN intervened in Somalia in 1992, NATO in Yugoslavia, and ECOWAS in Liberia and the SADC in Lesotho for example (Henrickson, 1995, Boyadjieva, 2003). The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 in March 2011 to halt the imminent bloodbath and humanitarian crisis by the pro-Gaddafi forces against the rebel revolutionary forces in Libya. The French, British and the USA (later handed to NATO) forces were deployed in Libya to defend, protect and provide relief services to the civilian population, which the long-time despotic Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had vowed to slaughter. In the name of civilian defence, Resolution 1973 mandated a no-fly zone for the Libyan government military flights. NATO has constantly targeted the Gaddafi military installation, command centres and residences to constrain its destructive plans against the civilian population (although civilian casualties have also been high).

These interventions on humanitarian grounds have been questioned by some as being a smokescreen for realist-motivated interventions by the bigger powers in weaker nations to protect their economic and political interests. In light of these perceptions, Roper (1993: 208) argues that “b) by definition humanitarian falls within the narrower conceptualisation and is limited to the use of military force for altruistic humanitarian objectives, the humanitarian rationale being predominant” Hence, Arend and Beck, (1993: 114) posit that “[a]lthough humanitarian motives are often cited to justify intervention, genuine instances of humanitarian intervention are rare, if they have ever occurred at all.” For example, the SADC interventions in the DRC and Lesotho were viewed by critics as resource-based missions to safeguard the interests of the intervening powers. Currently in the Libyan case, critics argue that the
motivating factor is not protection of civilians, but the greed to gain access and control of the vast oil resources in the country.

Worse still, although there are established procedures and rules governing the conduct of humanitarian intervention, in many instances some regional bodies and powerful member states have intervened without following the established route stipulated in the UN Charter and international law. For example, the UN Charter stipulates that regional organisations should seek the mandate of the UN before intervening in another state. However, in their interventions in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997), the DRC and Lesotho (1998), ECOWAS and SADC did not have the authority of the UN as required. This gives room for member states, especially regional hegemons, to exploit the situation for the promotion of their national interests under the guise of humanitarian intervention. Such scenarios have seen powerful nations violating the sovereignty of the weaker ones, hiding behind the need for humanitarian assistance, defence of democracy, international law and security. The USA has invaded numerous countries on this basis, as was the case in the 2003 Iraq invasion.

Accordingly, several regional organisations have included in their founding treaties clauses which mandate members to intervene in cases of humanitarian crises. For example, Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union gives the union the “[r]ight to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity” (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2003: 5). Article 11 (b) (i) of the jurisdiction of the SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security mandates members to intervene in “significant intra-state conflict” which involves “large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights.” At the opening of the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government in Blantyre, Malawi (8 September 1997), Nelson Mandela, the then SADC chairperson, emphasised this imperative need to protect humanity from the evils of conflict. He stated that “our dream of Africa’s rebirth as we enter the new millennium, depends as much as anything else on each country, and each regional grouping in the continent, committing itself to the principles of democracy, respect forhuman rights and basic tenets of good governance... (sovereignty of states and non-interference in internal affairs of member state) cannot blunt or totally override our common concern for democracy, human rights and good governance in all our constituent states” (cited in Ngoma 2005: 175).

Other criteria which have been used for intervention include invasion or threat of sovereignty and security of other states, or a state being on the verge of total collapse. For example, in 1991, the UN Security Council authorised the invasion of Iraq after the latter had invaded and occupied Kuwait. Similarly, the AU has sent a feeble intervention force into the collapsed state of Somalia with the aim to reverse functional democratic governance in the country.
Vale (2003), cautions that some of the interventions in the name of humanitarian assistance may in reality be geared to safeguarding the political and economic interests of the intervening powers. The interventions of such nations as Nigeria in Sierra Leone and Liberia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC and South Africa and Botswana under the auspices of ECOWAS and SADC bombarded with accusations that the national interests of the intervening powers were at the heart of the intervention. Hence, according to Vale, the intervening powers “establish their credentials through the technical aspects of the ‘mission’-casting intervention in narrow, non-political terms-a process that sanitizes its true purpose. This approach...avoids the necessity of asking the important political and moral questions that are at the base of the …intervention” (Vale 2003: 123).

Moore (1986) is non-committal on a particular time which is appropriate for intervention. He argues that “not enough is known to give an unqualified answer as to which circumstances favour early or late entry into a dispute” (paraphrased in Anstey 2006: 254). He suggests that the choice of when to enter should be left to the mediating agent's assessment of the conflict at hand, which will determine “whether an early entry would be more detrimental to the parties than delay” (Anstey 2006: 255). However, the most practical answer to the question is that intervention should always be at the invitation of by one or both of the parties. The mediating agent should be one who is acceptable to both or all the belligerent parties, that is, it must be seen to be neutral and impartial. Of utmost importance is that the mediating agent should be well acquainted with the context, sources, trends and dynamics of the specific conflict in order to provide viable alternative management options for the resolution of the conflict. Ohlson (1991) provides some questions that may guide conflict mediators as follows; What is the conflict about? How polarised are the conflict issues? What is the balance of forces? What is negotiable and what is non-negotiable?

It should be a basic and imperative requirement for any third party involved in conflict management to have a sufficient comprehension of the conflict in question. The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) (1995) introduced what it called the “stakeholder framework” into the conflict management literature. The framework is essential to conflict mediators in the mapping or identification of key stakeholders in the conflict, their relations to the root causes of the conflict (conflict issues), and to each other, their agendas and capacities, and ongoing peace efforts if any (cited in Rugumamu, 2002). This is important because each crisis is distinctly different from any other, and has unique complexities and peculiarities. There is no one-size-fits-all toolkit which provides ready-made solutions to all conflicts. There is a feeling among African scholars on conflict that too often the international community has intervened in conflicts in Africa without sufficient understanding and mastering of the complex forces generating these conflicts, resulting in abortive missions (Ghali 1995, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, Vraalsen 1999, International Peace Academy 2001). This brings in the issue of regional organisations as wielding a comparative and pivotal advantage in regional peace initiatives, with the UN working in close bilateral partnership with them.
The general aim of conflict management is to ensure a peaceful transition from war to peace, and post-conflict peace building which falls into the area of conflict resolution. It gives the parties time and space to refocus and redefine their perception of the conflict goals, and reduce the pressures and hostilities that hinder creative measures to achieve interactive resolution (Bercovitch 1984, Azar 1990, Burton 1990, Mitchell 1990, Zartman 1991, Fisher 1997, Miall et al. 2001). Conflict management is a very difficult process and/or period, in the sense that it requires transition from a highly volatile and polarised conflict situation to peaceful negotiations, collaboration, sacrifices and compromises which should result in mutually beneficial conflict outcome if properly executed. This is to say the transition from conflict to peace is more problematic than that from peace to conflict. Attempts by SADC to manage the Zimbabwean crisis through “Quiet Diplomacy” have been a disaster as the region is passively watching a member state sinking deeper and deeper in crisis escalation. SADC also projected a disjointed effort in managing the DRC conflict with Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, opting for military intervention while South Africa and the rest of the membership advocating a negotiated settlement of the conflict. The SA-led military intervention in Lesotho was also criticised by several critics as illegal and operationally flawed (Nathan 1995, 2003, Neethling 2000, 2004, Martin 2002, Ngubane 2004, Solomon 2004, Hammestard 2004, Ngoma 2005). This fractured response was viewed by some critics as signalling the collapse of the organisation’s resolve of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts, embodied in its founding treaty and the protocols of the Organ for Defence and Security and the Mutual Defence Pact. One commentator had this to say: “[t]he conflicts in the DRC may have tolled the death-knell of diplomatic unity within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and has considerably darkened the future chances of this promising regional cooperation organisation” (Democratic Republic of the Congo War, <http://www.synapse.net/> in Ngoma 2005: 141).

3.8 Conflict Resolution

The concept “conflict resolution” has been used by many scholars interchangeably with “conflict management”. In fact, the dividing line is thin and blurred. The two concepts are tightly interwoven and interlinked for the ultimate goal of attaining durable peace. Mitchell (1981), Bercovitch (1984) and Zartman (1989) distinguish conflict management from conflict resolution in terms of the stages of the conflict, the levels of operations, and the outcomes. They maintain that conflict management is mainly concerned with de-escalation of violent behaviour and confrontation between the adversaries, while conflict resolution goes beyond that to ensure the elimination of the socio-economic and political conditions, structures, attitudes and practices that precipitated the conflict. Bercovitch (1984: 11) explains that “a conflict is settled when destructive behaviour has been reduced and hostile attitudes have been lessened. In contrast to that, a conflict is said to be resolved when the basic structure of the situation giving rise to the destructive behaviour and hostile attitudes has been re-evaluated, or re-perceived by the participants in conflict.” This distinction is similar to that projected by Burton and other basic human needs theorists who stress that the
distinction is vital in devising conflict resolution theories and strategies. The theorists associate conflict settlement with outcomes imposed on one of the parties through authoritative decisions, power-based negotiations, bargaining, coercion, mediation and judicial systems. On the other hand, conflict resolution involves analytical problem-solving, facilitated and exploratory interactions by the adversaries which deal thoroughly with the underlying issues to the conflict to attain an acceptable, durable, long-term and self-supporting relationship between the adversaries, and implementation of the solutions to the conflict (Burton 1990a, 1990b, Burton and Dukes 1990, Mitchell 1990, Azar 1990a, 1990b). Therefore, conflict management is a process towards the complex and enduring route to conflict resolution. Zartman (1989: 8) observes that “[c]onflict resolution is a tall order. It is rarely accomplished by direct action and is more frequently achieved only over long periods of time.”

Basic human needs theorists envisage conflict resolution through an analytic problem-solving model which regards human needs of the individuals and groups as reference points in the analysis of conflict, as opposed to the orthodox state-centric theories which focus on the preservation of the state and its institutions. Burton (1988: 55) notes that “[t]he emphasis on human needs as the basis of analysis and problem-solving is oriented towards the stability and progress of societies: the human needs of the individual that enable him to operate as an efficient unit within a social system and without which no social organisation can be harmonious.” He further noted that “any settlement of a conflict or attempt to order society that places the interest of institutions or even of the total society before those of individual members must fail – unless, as rarely is the case, institutional values happen to coincide with human needs” (Burton 188: 53).

Conflict resolution therefore, also entails all post-conflict peace-building activities geared towards consolidating and maintaining the acquired peace. It suggests instituting changes in the behaviours, attitudes, mindset, structures, policies, decisions and institutions which may have given rise to the conflict, with the intention of preventing a relapse into conflict in the future. In his 1998 report, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan recommended that during the process of managing conflict “there must be a clear assessment of key post-conflict peace building needs and ways to meet them.” He added that “Peace-building elements should be explicitly and clearly identified and integrated into the mandates of the peacekeeping operation,” such that “when a peace keeping operation comes to an end, the concluding mandate should include specific recommendations for a transitional period to the post-conflict phase” (1998: 16).

According to Ghali, post-conflict peace building is “action to identify and support structures which will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (1992: 4). The main aim of post-conflict peace building is to probe and redress the underlying socio-economic and political factors which gave rise to the conflict, and address any conditions which may lay the basis for potential conflict, to avoid a return to conflict. If the underlying sources of
conflict are not addressed on a sustainable basis in a post-conflict situation, conflicts are bound to recur, or new conflicts may erupt (Peck 1998, Vraalsen 1999). It would be logical therefore, to argue that in countries, mainly in Africa, where conflicts have recurred, such as the DRC, Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda, the process of conflict resolution to transform the attitudes and policies that precipitated the war was not undertaken, or if any such initiatives were put in place, then they were flawed. Measures which address the symptoms of conflicts rather than deep, underlying causal factors do not fall within the conflict resolution realm. That is why the basic human needs theorists advocate problem-solving forums, which are geared towards total transformation of the institutions and behaviours that breed conflicts in human society.

Post-conflict peace building is multidimensional. It involves concerted efforts to integrate economic, social and political tools and energies into a coherent reconstruction agenda. Kofi Annan (1998) and Adebayo and Gelin-Adams (1999) summarised post-conflict building activities as encouraging reconciliation between the adversary parties, revitalisation of institutions of governance, fostering inclusiveness and promotion of national unity, mobilising both domestic and international resources for reconstruction and economic recovery, reviving, restructuring and reforming the security forces, civil services and the judiciary, disarmament, rehabilitation, psychological reconstruction, and reintegration of the ex-combatants into the national security structures and productive sectors of the economy, redress economic and social injustices, facilitation and coordination of safe repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, monitoring and investigating human rights abuses, coordinating establishment of a representative transitional government, monitoring electoral reforms and election processes, formation of government of national unity and attention to minority rights. Post- conflict peace-building is crucial in the conflict resolution stage of preventive diplomacy, whose task is the eradication of all underlying conflict triggers and exacerbators which might lead to a relapse into conflict. Nhara (1992: 2) posits that peace building entails “the need to change attitudes, encourage contact between the ordinary people in conflict situations, economic development, confidence building measures, education to enhance mutual understanding and technical assistance...” In this sense is “is dependent not on the absence of conflict but... is instead dependent on the mechanisms and agreements we have in place (whether personal or national) to resolve such conflict” (Wambu, 2011: 90).

Conflict resolution, therefore, suggests making sure that the peace agreement which terminate active conflict is properly implemented, to eliminate any justification for relapse into war by any of the belligerent parties. Generally, conflict resolution or post-conflict peace-building projects should comprehensively address the issues which bred the conflict. According to Adedeji, identifying the origins of the conflict is vital as it will facilitate a framework for comprehending “how the various causes of conflicts fit together and interact; which among them are the dominant forces at a particular moment in time; and what policies and strategies should be crafted to address these causes in the short, medium and long term” (1999: 10). Central to the peace building process is the initiation and sustenance
of a broad-based national dialogue that seeks to address critical issues of the forms of inclusive representation, power sharing, societal healing, reconciliation and reconstruction of institutions of governance and service delivery (Annan 1999, Rugumamu 2002).

Conflict resolution also involves coordinated and concerted measures to change the behaviour and attitudes of the belligerent parties from hostility to cooperation and reconciliation. The social-psychological approach to conflict studies is premised on the belief that conflict reflects conflicting subjective attitudes, behaviours, interactions, negative enemy images, language and symbols and interests among the disputants (Mitchell 1981, Cockell et al. 1999, Galtung 2000, Swart 2008). Therefore “[b]ecause much of human conflict is anchored in conflicting perceptions and in misperception, the contribution of third parties lies in changing the perceptions, attitudes, values, and behaviours of the parties to a conflict. Social-psychological approaches stress the importance of changing attitudes and the creation of new norms in moving towards reconciliation” (Swart 2008: 225). The warring parties should be encouraged to understand that there are several peaceful means of resolving their differences, which can be adopted without violence as an option. This would entrench peace perceptions in the minds of would-be conflict perpetrators. Kelman (1996: 504) illustrates this point thus, “[c]onflict resolution is a gradual process conducive to structural and attitude change, to reconciliation, to development of new relationship mindful of the interdependence of the two societies and open to cooperative functional arrangements between them. The real test of conflict resolution in deep-rooted conflicts is how much the process by which agreements are constructed and the nature of the resultant agreements contribute to transforming the relationship between the parties.” As Swart (2008: 72) observes, “[o]ne of the critical objectives of conflict resolution [therefore] is the elimination of violent and destructive manifestations of conflict, fuelled and exacerbated by persistent negative attitudes.” The process of reconciliation, though long, arduous and expensive, is of critical necessity in mending societal relations, building confidence, restoring dignity, trust and faith among the populace “to prevent bitter memories of the past from poisoning visions of the future” (Rugumamu, 2002: 19). Reconciliation has been successfully implemented in the post-apartheid democratic South Africa, although much of the bitterness and ill feeling between the races remains intact. That is to say, without successful attitudinal transformation, the potential for recurrence of conflict will remain a latent time-bomb that may explode in the future.

The ultimate goal of conflict resolution on which lasting and durable peace is built and sustained, is the assurance that the post-conflict socio-economic and political dispensation satisfactorily attends to the needs and goals of all the parties involved (Burton 1990a, b, c Burton and Dukes 1990, Mitchell 1990). Kelman (1996: 503) summarises the issue this way; “[t]he satisfaction of the needs of both parties is the ultimate criterion for a mutually satisfactory resolution of a conflict. Efforts should ideally be directed not merely toward settling the conflict in the form of a brokered political settlement, but toward…arrangements and accommodations that…address the basic needs of both
parties and to which the parties are committed...Only this kind of solution is capable of transforming the relationship between societies locked in a protracted conflict...” As stated in the Constitution of UNESCO “[a] peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which would secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world...” (cited in Swart 2008: 6). In view of the above, one of the critical goals of conflict resolution should be the eradication of violent and destructive manifestations of conflict and the concomitant attitudes which trigger, fuel and aggravate negative conflictual behaviour among the warring parties.

Conflict resolution should pay more attention to structural defects in societies because that is where the deeper underlying sources of conflicts are found. Structural conflict prevention policies and strategies should target the root causes of violence, such as political marginalisation, economic underdevelopment, deprivation, discrimination, threats to human security, human rights and justice, poor governance and other socio-economic and political ills which breed societal contradictions and confrontations. “Although specific objectives should be stated that address each of the causes of conflict, as a whole such objectives should reflect the larger outcomes of all forms of preventive action: that of enabling sustainable peace. A lasting peace cannot be built if continuing structural threats to human security needs have not been addressed” (Cockell 2002: 193). Cockell (2002) outlines three components of structural prevention that enhance conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building as: preventive peace building, preventive disarmament, and preventive development. Preventive peace-building measures are geared towards preventing threats to core aspects of human security. The measures should therefore be focused on the spheres of governance such as promotion of participatory democracy, multiparty democratisation, decentralisation of political power, power sharing and inclusive governance, strengthening institutions of governance, protection of human security and rights, recognition of minority rights, promotion of equality, democratic constitutional, electoral, media and judiciary reforms, economic reforms for economic growth and equitable sharing of resources to counter the paralysis of legitimate governance and rule of law.

Preventive disarmament measures should be mainly applied in a society emerging from conflict, with the aim of preventing recourse to conflict. It mainly targets ex-combats through promotion of demonisation, disarmament and re-integration programmes, promotion of voluntary arms moratoriums, arms embargoes, monitoring and circumscribing access to weapons, establishing demilitarisation zones, destruction of arms, rewards and incentives for weapons surrendered, and moves towards integration of ex-combatants in employment and community/national development programmes. A poorly coordinated demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programme may lead to accumulated grievances and disgruntlement by ex-combatants, which may result in resumption of war, as experienced in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC and Somalia.
Preventive development is directed at reviving and reconstructing economic sectors and social measures, to promote social cohesion, reintegration, rehabilitation and tolerance. Developmentalist preventive diplomacy aims to produce long-term goals, planning, implementation and outcomes. Economic measures include reviving and reconstructing economic sectors for economic growth, creation of employment, equitable distribution of resources, food security programmes, land reforms, intergroup enterprises, enhancing trade links, poverty alleviation and job creation projects and reforms, to promote equitable access to factors of production and livelihood. They should also involve “strategic engagement of all key conflict causes such that local actors and communities see that there is a real opportunity to break out of the cycle of escalation and that basic grievances are going to be addressed in a concrete way” (Cockell 2002: 193). In this way conflict resolution could be attained in the real sense of transformation of the conflict environment to durable and sustainable peace, stability and security.

The call for structural prevention as an effective preventive diplomacy tool is propounded by Azar (1990a), Burton (1990a, 1990b, 1990c) and Fisher (1997). As discussed earlier, in their studies of deep-rooted protracted social conflicts, for example in the Middle East, they conclude that conflicts triggered by deprivation of fundamental basic human needs and values can only be resolved through transformation of the structural institutions which precipitated the conflict. This means that post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation should be a comprehensive, continuous and collaborative project involving and encompassing all social, economic and political sectors and sections of the population. A genuine conflict resolution process should address the structural sources that precipitated the conflict. Galtung (1996, 2000) views conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are interrelated and are constantly changing and influencing one another in breeding manifest violent conflict. According to Galtung, altering the conflict behaviour ends in direct violence and results in negative peace that does not deal with the underlying causes of violence, but only its manifestations. On the other hand, cultural violence is terminated by changing conflict attitudes, while structural violence is ended by eradicating the structural contradictions underlying sources of conflict in societies.

Conflict resolution strategies geared towards addressing structural defects in societies would ensure durable, long-lasting positive peace. Positive peace is based on efforts to search for positive conditions that resolve the deeper structural causal factors. Peace-building measures should target changing the conflicting parties’ conflictual attitudes, contradictory roles and structural interactions that combine to cause violent conflict. Galtung (2000) observes that conflict resolution policies and strategies restricted to attitudes and behaviours are superficial because they fail to attend to the root causes, the deep contradictions borne by structural defects. Wallensteen (2002: 227) points out that structurally targeted preventive diplomacy “offers an important opportunity to promote reforms in society in the direction of reconciliation, democracy, inter-ethnic cooperation, and economic growth-measures that may in themselves be more effective over the long-term to prevent the recurrence of violence.”
In its bid to promote structural resolution of conflicts and attain durable peace the UN embarked on a holistic programme to eliminate the structural source of conflicts and structural problems that may lead to relapse to conflicts during the post conflict peace-building period. The former Secretary General projected the UN goal thus: “[t]he United Nations operational prevention strategy involves four fundamental activities—early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment and early humanitarian action. The United Nations structural prevention strategy involves three additional activities—preventive disarmament, development and peace-building. Guiding and infusing all these efforts is the promotion of human rights, democratisation and good governance as the foundation of peace” (cited in Luck, 2002:253). The former Executive Secretary of SADC Kaire Mbuende (2001: 48) observes that development is a key to the achievement of sustainable peace and security in Africa. This is because “a society cannot claim to have peace and security when the majority of its people live in poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, nor when it is characterised by large income disparities”

However, while societies emerging from conflict may face similar challenges, there are no rigid blueprints for the remedy of all conflict situations. Post-conflict peace-building and resolution strategies and programmes should be adjusted to the demands of each conflict context. Attempting to transplant a programme which worked in a particular conflict without due consideration of the nature and history of the conflict at hand, the forces involved, conflict issues, conflict trends and dynamics and the general uniqueness and peculiarities of the context in which the conflict occurs, is a recipe for failure. Critics of Western conflict resolution strategies and programmes have always argued that they fail to resolve most of the conflicts in Africa because they are not comprehensively adapted to the conflict situational requirements. This is reason enough to have regional organisations taking leading initiatives in preventive diplomacy missions, as they may be conversant with the regional and historical dynamics of the conflicts.

There is no shade of doubt that conflict resolution is a mammoth and challenging task that needs committed input and a unified approach from all stakeholders, namely the UN, the international community, regional organisations, national governments, non-governmental and civil society organisations in their various forms. Sufficient resources must be made available to help consolidate, implement and follow up agreements and peace accords reached to end the conflict. The United Nations has been involved, in collaboration with regional and Non-Governmental Organisations in post-conflict peace-building efforts in different parts of the world. Examples are Namibia, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Sudan and Yugoslavia (Botrous Ghali 1992, 1995, Anan 1998, 2000a, Vraalsen 1999, Adebayo and Gelin-Adams 1999, Hauss 2001, Miall etal. 2001).
As reflected in the course of the study, different regional organisations have formed security structures and mechanisms geared towards conflict prevention, management and resolution (preventive diplomacy) in their respective regions. Examples are SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (1996), the European Union’s Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1995), the Economic Community of West African States’ ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1998), the West African Network for Peace (WANEP) (1997), the Inter-governmental Authority and its Programme on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management(1998), the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (2002) and the Association of South East Asian Nations’ ASEAN Regional Forum (1997). Partnership, collaboration and co-deployment between the UN and the various regional organisations would drastically reduce the occurrence-recurrence dichotomy of conflicts and maintenance of global peace and security. As Henrikson (1995: 24) notes, “[t]he UN and regional groupings are no longer likely to be regarded as rivals or even as alternatives to one another in international decisions for peace and security, they must work together in partnership.” Different stakeholders need to pool their resources because conflict is a permanent feature of human society. Measures should be put in place to mitigate the effects of war, but it seems impossible to totally eradicate it.

Zartman (1991: 8) posits that “[c]onflict can be prevented on some occasions and managed on others, but resolved only if the term is taken to mean the satisfaction of apparent demands rather than the total eradication of underlying sentiments, memories and interests. Only time really resolves conflicts, and even the wounds it heals leave their scars for future reference.” This position is at odds with the basic needs theory’s stance that through analytical conflict, resolution mechanisms and processes in which all the conflict parties are engaged with the intention of addressing all the basic needs frustrations and deprivation and the consequent satisfaction of the frustrated needs, the underlying conflict factors could be ameliorated and the basis for conflict eradicated (Burton 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, Azr 1990a, 1990b, Mitchell 1990). It is clear from the discussions on the sources of conflict and how it should be eradicated, that there is no consensus. This calls for more concerted research on the complexities of the conflict phenomenon. As Sandole noted, “[i]f it is not clear what the causes and conditions of war are, or how war can be prevented or otherwise dealt with, then war is a research problem as well” (1999: 1).

At the core of conflict resolution is post-conflict peace building which is “perhaps the only strategy that can remove the sources of conflict from society and/or create alternative means of resolving tensions.” This is because it “seeks to address the social and political grievances that could lead again to violence. It looks at once both backwards and forwards, and encourages societal reconstruction along consensual, inclusive, and liberal lines. Peace-building thus includes all three dimensions of conflict... encompassing past and future sources of tension” (Talentino 2003: 72). On the basis of such necessity, governments, regional organisations, the UN and the international community need to
“focus more attention and consequently a greater share of their budgets and resources to the long-term aspects of peace building instead of short-term crisis management” (Dress and Rosenblum-Kumar 2002:230).

Regional organisations in the Third World, mainly in Africa, have failed dismally in conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building missions, as reflected by the existence and recurrence of conflicts. Apart from lack of political will to pursue the long-term goals of structural preventive strategies, regional organisations in Africa are constrained by paucity of resources. This has resulted in protracted and frozen conflicts, as experienced in such places as Somalia, the DRC, Sudan, Uganda, Burundi and Ivory-Coast. It can be argued that these regional organisations have only succeeded in feeble management of conflicts rather than their prevention and resolution. The experiences of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the SADC in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Lesotho, point a bleak picture for their efforts in structural preventive diplomacy. Experience in the SADC has been that the organisation is reactive rather than proactive. The experience of the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho, the DRC and Zimbabwe, attest to this approach to conflict which has resulted in failed attempts at conflict prevention and resolution. It is also clear that the SADC has no established and institutionalised early warning system to detect signals of impending or potential conflict. In instances where the SADC Organ has intervened in conflict resolution, it has failed to stay the course of the post-conflict peace building, and this has resulted in recurrence of war as experienced in Lesotho in 1998 and 2007. On the basis of this, Engel (2005: 116) notes that “[r]espective organisations can succeed if they have enough...capacity for self-criticism and structures that permit them to translate the lessons drawn from such a stock taking of projects and instruments into better practice.”

3.9 Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with different theories on conflicts and preventive diplomacy. The theories outlined what each perceived to be the sources of conflicts and how they can best be prevented, managed and resolved for peace and security to be attained. The chapter also discussed what preventive diplomacy entails, its essential ingredients such as preventive instruments, early warning systems and the significance of timing for effective intervention missions. Among other things the chapter delved into the distinctions and links between conflict prevention, management and resolution. It also called upon regional organisations, especially in the Third World, to strengthen their preventive diplomacy mechanisms to nip the scourge of conflicts ravaging their regional zones in the bud. The role of different regional organisations, solely and/or in partnership with the UN in preventive diplomacy missions, with different levels of success and challenge was discussed. The chapter concluded with a call for well-coordinated partnership between regional organisations and the UN in preventive missions if global peace and security are to be realised. The next chapter deals with theories on the formation and operations of regional organisations.
CHAPTER FOUR
Regional Integration: Theoretical Framework

4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a conceptual framework and literature review on the origin, development and functions of regional organisations in different contexts. It also discusses different theoretical perspectives on regional integration and operationalisation. The aim is to investigate the integration framework in which the SADC was founded and operationalised. The chapter provides insights and foundations on which the SADC evolution and development took place in the regional and global context.

4.2 Regional Cooperation and Integration
Chapter viii (Articles 52, 53 and 54) of the UN Charter authorised the formation of regional organisations to complement its operations in the task of maintaining global peace and security. Today the world is composed of several regional groupings operating within the regionally established rules, objectives, goals, policies, needs, aspirations, protocols and charters to collectively address the social, economic and political challenges faced by individual member states and the region as a whole. Annan reflects that “[a]s a growing number of states found themselves internally beset by unrest and violent conflict, the world searched for a new global security framework” (1998: 3). Initially most of the regional organisations’ goals focused on economic cooperation, development and integration of their respective regions. However, most of them have now expanded their goals to include security issues, with the realisation that economic development and integration will be elusive if not accompanied by peace and security. For example, the African Union and SADC founding treaties noted that security, peace and stability are prerequisites for development and regional integration.

Scholars are not unanimous on the definition of the concept “regionalism”, and debates on a universal definition have not yielded any consensus. Each definition reflects the theoretical inclinations of the different scholars and the political dynamics of the region involved (Bennet 1984, Hurrell 1995). For purposes of this study, the following definition has been selected as it is deemed to be inclusive and comprehensive about what regional integration entails. A regional arrangement in the sphere of international politics may be described as “[a]n association of states based upon location in a given geographical area, for safeguarding or promotion of the participants. A treaty or other agreement fixes the terms of this type of association. It may be designed to serve political, economic, cultural or defensive purposes or some combination of these” (Padleton 1954 in Bennett 1984: 347).

Regional organisations in different parts of the globe have different reasons and challenges for deciding on regional integration. However, regional integration often encompasses cooperation of regional member states in a particular geographical zone in socio-economic, political and security affairs (Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001). According
to Hurrell 1995: 37) regionalism is often analysed in terms of the degree of social cohesiveness (ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history, consciousness of a common heritage), economic cohesiveness (trade patterns, economic complementarity), political cohesiveness (regime type, ideology) and organisational cohesiveness (existence of formal regional institutions).

Definitions of regions are not based on natural geographic characteristics. Regions are generally state-led political projects, constructed, shaped, re-shaped and operationalised on the basis of the prevailing regional and international economic and political dynamics, and will often be state-centric in their functions because they represent the power politics of the member states. The objectives, agendas and operations of different regional bodies reflect the aspirations and challenges of the different regions as perceived and interpreted by the regional actors (Nye 1968, Hurrell 1995). Hammestard (2004: 214) notes that “[t]he countries of SADC make up a region because both insiders and outsiders recognise it as one and act, at least sometimes and in some policy fields as if it were one.”

4.3 Origins of Regional Organisations

Although regional blocs are not naturally determined and emanate from diverse factors, scholars on regional integration are unanimous on the fact that most formal regional organisations took root and shape after World War Two. Therefore, they classify regional organisations’ development in terms of their different character, diversity, goals, aspirations, content, scope and operations within particular historical, international, political and economic orders and trends. The categorisation of emergence and development of regional arrangements is premised on the historical epochs of the Cold War and post-Cold War (old regionalism and new regionalism respectively. The old regionalism epoch is described as the era of hegemonic regionalism since regional organisations’ structures, content and operations were shaped to reflect the agenda of the superpowers, rather than their own regional interests and challenges. The post-Cold War era saw the transformation of regional organisations (freed from the bipolar politics) into regionally focused entities in terms of their character, content, goals, aspirations, operational scope, and intentions (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995, Asante 1997, Hettne 1997, 2000, Sunkel 2000, Howell 2000, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, Hwang 2005).

the post-Cold war period of regional development as “open” regionalism. One distinguishing factor is that regional organisations of the new regionalism order became inclusive of non-state organisations such as non-governmental and civil society organisations (in contrast to the regional arrangements of the old regionalism era, which were state-centric in nature and operations). They were built on the principle of versatility, which accommodates dynamism, flexibility and inventiveness (Vraalsen 1999).

It is in the context of the new regionalism that regional organisations are currently operating. Many regional organisations in the Third World have undergone structural and institutional transformations to face the diverse challenges in their respective regions. For example, post-Cold War Africa (mainly sub-Saharan Africa) was devoured by destructive intra-state conflicts and simultaneously abandoned by the Western powers. As such, they were compelled to reinvent their continental and regional groupings for preventive and peace-keeping reasons. Regional organisations were adjusted to the multidimensional challenges of the new economic, political and security order of globalisation. Therefore as indicated earlier, most regional organisations have developed regional security structures to collectively counter the scourge of conflicts and other challenges in their respective regions. Examples are the EU’s Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, (OSCE), ECOWAS’ ECOMOG and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, the SADC’s Organ on Politics Defence and Security, (OPDS), the ASEAN Security Forum and the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Successive Secretary Generals of the UN, Ghali (1992, 1995) and Annan (1998), have acknowledged in their respective reports that the United Nations lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in the world. It has therefore become imperative in the post-Cold War era for the different regional bodies to collaborate with the UN in maintaining regional and global peace and security.

4.3.1 Factors influencing Regional Integration

The range of factors that are involved in the formation and growth of regional groupings embraces social, economic, political, cultural, geographical, and historical dimensions. The influence of each factor differs from one region to another, implying that there are no fixed factors which fit in all regional setups. Hurrell (1995: 41) states that “regions highlight some features…shared understandings and meanings given to political activity by the actors involved.” Therefore, it is important for regional arrangements to be shaped by contextual forces, problems and challenges if they are to achieve their intended collective goals. Clapham (1987) could not have been more accurate when he stated that “[a]ny set of prescriptions for integration which does not start from an appraisal of the political and economic context of the region is built on sand” (cited in Fawcett 1995: 33). This is not to say that regional organisations cannot apply structural, institutional or policy frameworks from other setups, but that if a regional
organisation is not based on its contextual realities, experiences, challenges and conditions, it is bound to fail because it will be based on false and unrealistic grounds.

Numerous scholars on regional integration projects have indicated that regional integration in the Third World often fail because they are solely premised on external models and experiences (Buzan 1991, Hurrell 1995, Fawcett 1995, Vita 2001, Ngubane 2004, Hammestard 2004). Perhaps aware of this concern, the late former president of Mozambique Samora Machel was quoted (in reference to the SADC) as saying the SADC emerged mainly from the existential experiences of the region as opposed to external considerations (Green and Thompson, 1986). However, the practical reality of this assertion is highly questionable, considering the fact that SADC’s integration model is a carbon copy of the EU model. Therefore, according to Hammerstad (2004: 215), the critical question to be kept in mind when discussing the future of regionalism in Southern Africa, is “[t]o what degree is the agenda for regional integration set according to a western European model rather than adapted to the specific needs of Southern African countries?”

4.4 Theories on Regional Integration

Hurrell (1995) classifies theories on regional integration into three broad categories, namely Systemic/Structural Theories, Regionalism and Interdependence Theories, and Domestic Level Theories. Other theoretical frameworks on regional integration include the New Regionalism Theory and the Security Community or Security Complex paradigm (Schulz, Soderbaum, Ojendal 2001, Mittelman 1999, Fawcett 1995, Hettne and Soderbaum 1998, Adler and Barnet, 1998, Buzan, 2000, Ngoma 2005). The theoretical perspectives are vital in explaining the dynamics of regional integration in different parts of the world (Hurrell 1995). It appears that regional formations all over the world have borrowed greatly from the theoretical perspectives, as they complement each other and provide benchmarks which guide nations and regions on what issues to consider and what challenges to expect in the formation and operationalisation of regional organisations.

4.4.1 The Systemic Theories

The systemic group of theories underlines the importance of the broader political and economic structures within which regionalist schemes are embedded, and the impact of outside pressures and forces working on the region (Hurrell 1995). There are two paradigms under the Systemic theories:

4.4.1.1 Neo-Realism

For the Neo-realists, the politics of regional formation are determined by the geo-political framework within which they occur. Regionalism is understood by analysing the place of the region in the broader international system. The proponents believe that regional organisations are formed in response to external economic and political pressures,
threats and challenges from a hegemonic power (Outside-in-pressure) (Hurrell 1995, Terriff et al. 2004, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001). Hurrell (1995) note that the EU was formed both as a response to the Soviet Union Communist threat and the hegemonic moves of the USA through its Marshall Plan. Other regional organisations which came as a response to external threats are NATO against the communist threat and the SADC against the hegemonic aggression of the apartheid regime.

Neo-realists also note two reasons why countries seek regional integration with a regional hegemony: firstly, the nations will be aiming at constraining the potential disruptive activities of such a power, and secondly the weaker states have hopes for economic and political gains by having a strong power in the regional fold. On the other hand, a regional hegemony which feels its power is declining will push for a regional integration to revive its image, pursue its interests, share burdens and generate international support and legitimacy of its status, influence and policies (Hurrell 1995). Neo-Realists envisage such a pattern of regionalism in situations where weaker states are in close geographical proximity to powerful states. One commentator referred to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland’s relations with South Africa in Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as “hostage states” (Green and Thompson 1986). However, despite the asymmetrical relations and skewed benefits, the three countries remained in SACU (SACU) because of the economic gains, albeit meagre, which they obtained from the developed South African economy. In the same vein, the inclusion of a democratic South Africa into the SADC in 1994 has boosted the economic, political and security image of the SADC. South Africa has abundant resources and a highly developed economy to bolster the integration project which should ultimately benefit the entire region.

Neo-Realists have a pessimistic view about the success of regional integration. They maintain that regional integration is doomed to fail for various reasons. Firstly, the organisations are formed and operate in an anarchical and conflictual international order characterised by intense power struggles, competition, rivalry, mistrust, suspicions and conflicts between nations. The anarchic nature of the international system will adversely affect the cooperation of countries in regional arrangements (Waltz 1979, Groom 1990, Ohlson and Groom 1991, Weber 2001, Terriff et al. 2004). The issue of states’ concern with relative gains and the contention that states are in perpetual competition is best captured by Waltz (1979: 105) stating that: “[w]hen faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states...must ask how the gains will be divided. They are compelled to ask not ‘Will both of us gain’? But ‘Who will gain more? Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities... The condition of insecurity... the uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions...works against their cooperation.”

Secondly, nations enter regional organisations mainly to expand and defend their different national power and interests, rather than for regional solidarity and prosperity. According to the Neo-Realists, in spite of membership of
regional organisations, different nations will not stop pursuing their national interests and in the process, undermining the goals of regional integration. To the Neo-Realists, regional cooperation may be counterproductive to a state’s interests and survival, since events in the international scene are explained in terms of the power of each state rather than regional solidarity (Waltz 2000, Terriff et al. 2001). To some extent, this position by the Neo-Realists is true, because regional organisations, especially in Africa, fail because of lack of commitment and political will by the political leaders. Each state seems to be protecting its power and sovereignty from being eroded by the regional supra-national structure and authority (Groom 1991, Nathan 1995, Weber 2001, Solomon 1994, Hammerstad 2004, Williams 2004, Morganthau 2004). Van Nieuwkerk (2000: 5) notes this problem in the arguments which paralysed the functioning of the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security. He writes “the organisation is caught in essence; in a situation it purposely created. Invoking sovereignty and national interest, very few of the ruling elite in Southern Africa would want to see a powerful and influential Organ on Politics Defence and Security and consequently, it continues to bow to the wishes of its political masters.” Mfune (1993) observes that if countries want to cooperate and integrate, they must be prepared to give up some of their individual interests in order to promote cooperation. Where national interests take precedence, as experienced in most regional organisations, it is very difficult to achieve meaningful regional integration.

Thirdly, in the case of regional organisations in developing nations, they will continue to be subordinated and dominated by the developed nations. Success of sub-regional organisations will be contingent upon the policies of either major powers acting unilaterally or using the might of their groupings (Bull 1977, Buzan 1991, Wendt 1992). Hurrell (1995) suggests that it is the evolving character of the Chinese-Japanese-USA balance that will ultimately determine the fate of existing sub-regional groupings such as ASEAN, APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Considering the fact that almost all regional organisations in the Third World rely on external donors for their existence, there is no way they can escape external control and domination. One critic of SADC’s dependence on Western financial assistance has stated that “[w]estern strategy is no longer to divide and rule, but to re-group and dominate” (in Green and Thompson 1986: 269). Buzan also notes the adversities of dominance of regional security complexes in the Third World by the developed powers, and asserts that “if the essential structure of a complex rests more on external than on internal sources of power, then its durability lies hostage to continued involvement by countries whose main interest lie outside the continent” (1991: 216). Third World regional organisations are victims of this situation because of insufficient resources to finance the integration project and its operations. This leaves them to seek external assistance through which the donors infuse their agendas into the recipient organisations.

Fourthly, the leaders of individual member states suspect and fear loss of power to the regional organisation, and will want to curtail its powers by any means. Neo-Realists argue that a “[s]tate cannot be certain that established higher authority would be used to do it harm in the future. Therefore states must be sceptical about both the idea of a higher
authority and the feasibility of creating it” (Terriff et al. 2001: 53). This problem was noted by Nathan (1995: 9) that “…certain of the SADC states fear that their membership of multi-lateral political and security forums will entail major infringements of sovereignty.” This has been raised by several scholars on different regional bodies as a major obstacle to the progress of regional integration. The fear of loss of sovereignty is more pronounced in regions where the nations are still in the process of consolidating their developments and nation building (Vita 2001, Hammerstad 2004, Moller 2004). The EU did not have any difficulties of ceding parts of their sovereignty to the regional body because it was built on strong nation-states (Moller 2004). Akrasanee and Stifel (1995) maintain that the EU model is not suitable for ASEAN “[s]ince the objective of ASEAN member states has been to cooperate with each other in order to ensure national independence and mutual benefit for all members, not to integrate within a supranational structure” and that “the Bangkok Declaration, which is the basis of ASEAN’s existence, guarantees the supremacy of the members states’ sovereignty over ASEAN” (cited in Ojendal 2001: 157). In light of these problems, Hammerstad (2004: 216) concludes that “[t]he experiences of other parts of the world have shown that regionalism-reaching states to give up some of their hard won sovereignty for a future common good is notoriously difficult.” The former President of Namibia, Sam Nuyoma, may have been compelled by realisation of this problem in SADC when he highlighted “the need to put regional considerations above national interests and the need to relinquish some national sovereignty for the interest of the region” (cited in Nathan 1995: 9).

Lastly, Neo-Realists have a pessimistic view about the success of regional organisations in conflict prevention, management and resolution (preventive diplomacy). Their argument is that regional organisations exist in an anarchical international order, and lack powers of enforcement. They also regard regional organisations as a temporal feature of international relations, since states will give them up in pursuit of their individual national interests. Neo-Realists note that history abounds with regional organisations which have collapsed “no matter what kinds of states and society were involved” (Terriff et al. 2001: 41). This is because there will always be disagreements on the values and powers the regional organisation embodies, when and how it should exercise its authority. As such, a state will only submit to higher authority when it is not at odds with its benefits, when forced to do so, or when the benefits outweigh those of not doing so (Groom 1990, Olson and Groom 1991, Burchill 2001, Terriff et al. 2004).

However, the Realists’ pessimism on the existence of regional organisation has been outweighed by the fact that in spite of the numerous challenges, regional organisations have prospered, and have become a key and integral aspect of the current international order. Regional organisations such as the OSCE, ECOWAS and the SADC have been very instrumental in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in their respective regions. Through regional cooperation and integration, it has been shown that regional enemies can be brought together to co-exist and amicably resolve their differences on the basis of the integration treaties, institutions and procedures. The ideologically hostile nations of Western and Eastern Europe, managed through the EU and the OSCE operational
structures, to mend their differences and live together peacefully. As Sachs (2011: 40) notes, the EU has shown that “ancient enmities and battle lines can be turned into mutually beneficial cooperation if a region looks forward, to resolving its long-term needs, rather than backwards, to its long-standing rivalries and conflicts.”

4.4.1.2 Structural Interdependence and Globalisation

The Structural Interdependence and Globalisation theoretical paradigm is associated with Realist scholars such as Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, and Edward Morse. It maintains that regional cooperation emerged as a response to the powerful trends of globalisation and global interdependence. Globalisation has become an important and pervasive theme in the post-Cold War political order that individual regions must be viewed within the broader global context. The forces of globalisation and international interdependence have created what Neo–realists call “the borderless world” or the “end of geography” (Hurrell 1995). The world has to work as one composite community, the global village of interdependent nations and regions. According to the theory, globalisation acts as a powerful stimulus to economic and political regionalism by intensifying the depth of economic interdependence, exchange of goods and services, communication, flow of information, values, knowledge and ideas which strengthen societal interdependence and impact on the ways in which regimes and regions define their position in the global context. The changing global environment has undermined the possibility of successful national-level responses to the challenges of international competition and other pressures of globalisation. Therefore, regionalism is a logical response by regimes in different regions to pool their resources for collective action within the complex global order (Hurrell 1995, Hettne 2000, Sunkel 2000, 2001, Schulz et al. 2001). Hence, Nye (1968) refers to regional integration as a deeper process which involves economic integration, (formation of a transnational economy), political integration (formation of a transnational political system with some minimum degree of transfer of sovereignty or functions to supranational organs) and social integration (formation of a trans-national society).

Globalisation has forced regional nations to come together so as to have a collective bargaining voice on global economic and political issues such as trade, markets, and in important forums such as the World Trade Organisations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the UN Security Council. However, it appears that regional organisations in the Third World remain marginalised and peripheral in the so-called globalised world. The global economy and political order are still shaped and dominated by the Developed World (Europe and America) at the expense of the underdeveloped and/or developing world.

4.5 Regionalism and Interdependence Theories

This cluster of theories regards regional interdependence (as opposed to global interdependence) as the determining factor in the emergence of regional cooperation and integration. The cluster is composed of three theoretical subgroups, namely Neo-Functionalism, Neo-Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism (Hurrell 1995).
4.5.1 (Neo-) Functionalism

Neo-Functionalismis associated with scholars such as Mitrany, Nye, Haas, Lindberg, Keohane and Hoffman. The theory contends that regionalism emanates from the gradual working together of nations in a region in the social, economic and political spheres, culminating in formal regional integration and institutional development for management of regional affairs. Neo-functionalists regard regional integration as a process which starts from low level cooperation and grows through spill-over stages to higher levels of political integration. They maintain that the initial socio-economic cooperation and complexities of interdependence between nations in a region will create new challenges which will force governments and other stakeholders to expand their cooperative measures into the higher level of political integration and security cooperation (higher politics). Legislation and institutional development in one sphere of cooperation spills into another, necessitating further legislation, treaties, protocols, charters and harmonisation of policies, towards the final stage of political integration and union (Ostegaard 1993, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990, Howell 2000). According to this paradigm, regional integration will grow if supported by functional institutions (supranational structures) to coordinate and promote regional interdependence, and develop, foster and expand regional unity and cohesion. They consider development of regional institutions as highly pivotal in the effective functioning of regional organisations, solving common problems and creating a group identity and loyalty around a regional integration unit other than the nation-state. Functionalists therefore envisage a world society of regional organisational integration free from the pressures of state power politics. The world society will be characterised by a cobweb of regional organisations, with functional institutions geared towards resolving common problems, goals, basic needs, people’s welfare and security, which separate states were unable to guarantee because of their focus on the pursuit of power politics and states’ interests (Groom 1990, Olson and Groom 1991, Hurrell 1995, Howell 2000). As the cooperation and integration spillover spreads into the realm of high politics, member states’ conception of and valuation of sovereignty will gradually change to accord more power to the regional supranational authority.

The result of political integration is a new political community superimposed on the pre-existing ones (Schulz, Soderbaum, and Ojendal 2001, Howell 2000). For Shumitter the concept of integration is “the process of transferring exclusive expectations of benefits from the nation-state to some larger unit... Nation actors of all sorts...cease to identify themselves and their future welfare entirely with their national government and its policies” (cited in Howell 2000: 11). The definitions of regional integration as provided by Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963) echo the same message of loss of sovereignty by member states to the supranational regional authority (Howell 2000).

According to this theory, individual nation-states cede power and authority to the regional governance. Olson and Groom (1991: 91) summarises it thus: “[s]tates sovereignty and national loyalties will be rendered harmless and
obsolete to the extent that they have no continuing functional rational by growth of other institutions based on systems of transactions that maximise welfare. To this extent, the state will wither away."

The Neo-functionalist view of states losing sovereignty is diametrically at variance with the Realist view of states staunchly holding on to their national sovereign power while in regional coalitions. It is also at odds with the highly state-centric regional organisations in the Third World regions. Experience in the Third World regions has shown how states in regional organisations adhere to maintaining their sovereignty by including the principles of respect of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the affairs of member states in their founding treaties (Niewkerk 2000, Schoeman 2001, Adar 2002, Cawthra 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Solomon 2004). In fact, as Schoeman (2001: 143) concludes, "[t]he attempts to regionalise Africa including the case of Southern Africa has been first and foremost aimed at state-building, ...For this reason, any aim and approach that may be considered as threatening sovereignty of a state were destined to dissolve the realm of regionalisation." This position is also maintained by Akraasanee and Stifel (1995) in the case of ASEAN, that its objective was regional cooperation which promotes national independence and supremacy of the state rather than integration into a supranational structure (Ojendal 2001). This adherence to the principles of national sovereignty has impeded numerous organisations' attempts especially at conflict resolution, and rendered many toothless in face of devastating conflicts. The regional organisations in Africa are a perfect example of this. The failure of the OAU can be traced to its adherence to the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. It was these faults in its integration and operation formula which saw the organisation remaining a passive spectator amid numerous conflicts fermenting and tearing the continent apart. Adherence to national sovereignty and territorial integrity remains as prominent clauses in almost all regional organisations, and whenever they are reluctant to intervene for whatever reason, they will resort to the clauses. This has no doubt hampered the efficacy of many regional organisations in conflict prevention, management and resolution mission as “no-one is prepared to hold in abeyance some elements of political sovereignty in order to preserve regional cooperation” (Mfune 1993: 288).

Functionalists also envisage a working peace system in their model of functional regional integration. In their view, “[s]ecurity will depend not upon deterrence and threat systems, but will arise out of association, that is, through playing roles in systems of transactions that are valued and valuable to all parties concerned on the basis of criteria acceptable to them...it will be a working peace system” (Olson and Groom: 1991: 192). This is in line with Mitrany's (one of the most influential scholars on functionalism) assertion that “the essence of security is not to keep the nations peacefully apart but to bring them actively together” (1975: 184). Functionalists assert that institutional flexibilities, participatory decision-making and trans-national ties will tame and transform the power politics and ensure development of legitimised conflict handling mechanisms. They conclude that “[t]he greater the number and diversity of ties, the less likely is war to occur, since any war is likely to disrupt such ties and thereby diminish
welfare.” Therefore, “war will be rejected as a policy...” (Olson and Groom 1991: 191). This position fits well in the realm of a security community.

The Functionalist theory has been criticised for failure to reflect the reality of international politics, in which high politics and state interests shape the international agenda (Terriff et al. 2004). In fact, regional organisations have become forums through which the powerful members want to establish their hegemony and power in the region. Nigeria and South Africa have been accused by other members of hegemonic tendencies in their respective regional interactions. The theory is also flawed in that it seems to be based on inter-state conflicts and says little on intra-state conflicts, which have become a major threat to peace and security in the post-Cold War order. Intra-state conflicts have been fermenting in Sub-Saharan Africa despite the existence of regional organisations such as ECOWAS, COMESA, SADC and their security mechanisms, because members are more concerned with national sovereignty and power than regional integration and security.

However, in spite of its flaws, the paradigm provides vital information based on the success of the EU integration model through development of institutions to operationalise their regional structure. Regional organisations the world over are beginning to develop structures and institutions to coordinate regional affairs. The EU has established the European Union Parliament and the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and the African Union has the Pan-African Parliament. The SADC’s Parliamentary Forum, the ECOWAS’s Standing Mediation Committee and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) coordinate the regional continental affairs. Different regional organisations have also established security mechanisms to deal with regional security challenges such as SADC’s Organ for Politics, Defence and Security co-operation (OPDS); ECOWAS’ ECOMOG, the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the EU’s OSCE. The question is: To what extent are the institutions operational in preventive diplomacy missions? In most cases, Third World security arrangements are dysfunctional or ineffective owing to a lack of resources and lack of political will. For example, in the SADC region, the SADC security mechanism has remained ineffective in addressing the political, economic and security decay in Zimbabwe. Its moves at resolving the conflict through quiet diplomacy have been cosmetic at most, as the recalcitrant President Mugabe regime intensified its brutalisation of its citizens, and jeopardises regional security at will.

4.5.2 Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

Neo-Liberal Institutionalism is associated with the writings of Keohane and Martin Petri. The theoretical perspective embraces some elements of realism, structural interdependence and globalisation and Functionalism, but with slight adjustments. The theory maintains that increasing levels of interdependence generate increased demand for both regional and international cooperation, integration and building of institutions. Like the Neo-functionalists, it stipulates that the success of regional organisations revolves around the establishment of strong institutions for coordination
and harmonisation of their activities. They advocate establishment of supranational institutions with clear organisational norms, rules and procedures for effective coordination and collective action in resolving common problems, and collaboration in regional economic, political and security matters. According to Liberal Institutionalists, institutions are vital in regional cooperation because they provide information, promote transparency and monitor development of convergent and productive goals, expectations, aspirations and coordination between members in a regional organisation. Institutionalised rules, norms and procedures facilitate productive and cost-effective linkages between states in different issue areas thereby enhancing interdependence. It is envisaged that institutions can mitigate states’ concerns about relative gains in cooperation, provide a framework within which disagreements which could be obstacles to cooperation are solved, provide mechanisms that permit states to make trade-offs, develop stable cooperative outcomes, and provide information about gains of all states in the cooperative arrangement (Hurell 1995, Howell 2000, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, Terriff et al. 2004).

The Neo-Liberal Institutionalists maintain that the state is a leading player in the formation and growth of regional cooperation, and that their membership is guided by both national interests and considerations for regional interdependence. The proponents further contend that states in regional co-operations are concerned with absolute gains rather than relative gains. These positions are at odds with the Realists’ insistence that the sole motivation for nation-states in regional membership is national power, self-interest and relative gains. Contrary to the Neo-Functionalists’ stance that nation-states will ultimately lose power and sovereignty to the regional organisation, the Neo-Liberal institutionalism is heavily state-centric and considers the nation-state as central in regional cooperation and as an effective gatekeeper to the domestic and international operations of regional organisations. This theoretical perspective embraces Gamble and Payne’s (1996: 2) definition of regionalism as “[a] state-led project designed to re-organise a particular regional space along defined economic and political lines.” They use the example of the EU, that although the power of member states may be diluted through collective decision-making and regulated by institutional rules, the organisation does not challenge the autonomy and sovereignty of its members. It preserves and strengthens states’ sovereignty, and integration is driven by bargains among member state governments. They envisage regional organisations as a multi-governance institution in which authority and policy-making influence is shared across multiple levels of government, sub-national, national and supranational organs of society (Howell 2000). Hence Keohane (1993: 274) concludes that “institutionalists do not elevate international regimes to mythical positions over states, on the contrary such regimes are established by states to achieve their purposes.”

However, Neo-Liberal institutionalism concurs with the Realists that states’ membership in regional organisations is to some extent driven by national interests, and that states operate in an anarchical international system which will affect the likelihood of cooperation. Their point of differences is on whether supranational institutions can mitigate the states’ quest for power and reconcile their interests within the regional organisation framework. Realists argue that
institutions lack the power to control states, therefore rendering successful regional cooperation and integration sterile. Moreover Realists doubt the power of institutions on security issues because “...a state will not be willing to place its faith on institutions. The fear of cheating is much greater when security could be at risk and institutions cannot overcome this” (Terriff et al. 2001: 50). Liberal institutionalism, on the other hand, regards institutions as providing the forum, rules, information and mechanisms through which states can resolve and reconcile their differences, build trust and confidence, as well as mutual and shared vision among member states, alleviate insecurity and change states’ notion of self-interest for the good of regional cooperation and integration (Hurrell 1995, Howell 2000).

The theoretical perspective is instrumental in guiding the formation, growth and effective functioning of regional organisations. It has been vindicated in that regional organisations with established structures and institutions have proved to be more efficient and effective in their operations. The EU is a living example of such a success story. It has also been shown that regional institutions have brought regional states together more closely than driving them apart. Different regional organisations the world over are growing and identifying themselves as a community with shared values and visions embodied in the regional organisations and their institutions. For example, since its inception, SADC has signed and ratified numerous treaties and protocols (SADC Treaty of 1992, the Organ protocol 2001, the Mutual Defence Pact of 2003) and established numerous structures such the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, the Interstate Committee for Defence and Security (ISCDs), the Interstate Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the SADC Parliamentary Forum, to enhance the functioning of the regional organisation. The critical question is: To what extent do regional organisations or individual member states abide by the rules, norms and standard procedures which they have ratified? In the Third World, regional groupings have included some clauses like non-interference in the affairs of member states, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, which have become excuses for failure to take action even when a member state is in gross contravention of the stated rules and obligations of the organisation. In Zimbabwe the ZANU-PF government contravened the SADC Guidelines on the conduct of elections during the 2002 and 2008 elections and the SADC dismally failed to rein it in or hold it accountable for its violations of the protocol it ratified.

However, it has been established that some regional groupings have operated and achieved their goals without any formalised and entrenched regional institutions. (For example, the Frontline States launched a formidable challenge to colonialism and apartheid in spite of the fact that they did not have any established institutions). Hwang (2005) also notes that the ASEAN organisation still maintains its informal and non-legalistic security approaches in resolving its regional problems. These examples confirm Caporao’s assertion that regional entities can evolve with “less formal, less codified habits, practices and norms of international society” (1993: 54). Mfune (1993) notes that in some instances the creation of supranational bureaucratised institutions tends to exacerbate conflicts of interest within the
regional groupings. The Neo-Liberal Institutionalists, like Neo-realisists, overlook the role of sociological and inter-subjective factors in the evolution and functioning of regional organisations which form the core of the constructivist position on regional integration (Acharya 1998, Reus-Smit 2001).

4.5.3 Constructivism
Constructivism is associated with the writings of Deustch, Adler, Barnett, Onuf, and Wendt. Constructivism takes a sociological approach to the formation of regional cooperation and integration. It gives insights beyond material factors in studying the evolution, nature and character of regional organisations. The theory maintains that regional awareness, cooperation and integration are driven and cemented by common and shared values, tradition, religion, history, identity, aspirations, loyalty and interests, all of which promote a sense of belonging to a particular regional community and interdependence. It cements a sense of “we-ness” (cognitive regionalism) and the subjective idea of feeling part of a community (Hurrell 1995, Vale 2003, Ngoma 2005). Hurrell (1995) asserts that regionalism should be analysed in terms of the degree of social cohesiveness as reflected by ethnicity, race, religion, culture, history, and consciousness of a common heritage. The former (first) Executive Secretary of SADC, Simba Makoni, once commented that a feeling of region-ness was emerging within the region and the people began “to think SADC” (Oden 2001). According to Hetnne, (2001: 24) “[t]he starting point for understanding the origins of region-ness must be the historical and cultural preconditions for regional identity, without which there is no base for a process of regionalisation.” The character, interstate relations, interests and identity within a regional community are shaped by, and based on particular histories, cultures, religion, value sharing, economic policies, security and political experiences domestic factors, and process of interaction with each other and how the actors interpret the world in which their interaction occurs (Hurrell 1995). Hence, Jones (1988: 635) correctly notes that “value sharing is one of the pre-conditions for a viable political community to come into existence.”

While Neo-Realists and Neo-Liberal Institutionalists regard norms, interests and identity of regional organisations as products of material and anarchical structure of the international system, constructivists maintain that in regional formations “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (Wendt 1995: 73). In their discussions of the formation and expansion of different regional organisations’ case studies, different authors have reflected the centrality of shared knowledge, histories and identity as pivotal in bolstering regional integration. Ojendal (2001) mentions “Aseanity or Asian-ness” as a unifying factor in ASEAN, Soderbaum (2001) notes the role of “West-African-ness” in the formation of ECOWAS, while Hetnne (2001) takes note of the process of “Europeanisation” in the formation and expansion of the European Union. In the words of Wiener (1966) “these shared sociological traits make states in a regional organisation “to think together, to see together, (and) to act together” (cited in Ngoma 2005: 12). The constructivist paradigm is reflected in Evans and Newnham’s definition of regionalism as “[a] complex of attitudes, loyalties and ideas which concentrate the minds of
people upon what they perceive their region” (1990: 346). As Vale observes, “constructivist theory suggests that what builds the [regional] community is not structures-treaties, protocols and buildings or even renewal but the subjective idea of feeling part of a community” (2003: 121).

Constructivists have a vision of a dynamic regional community in which interests; identities, principles, and interactional trends change over time, and new forms, perspectives and dimensions of cooperation and integration are constructed and reconstructed by the actors (Hurrell 1995, Kowert 1998 Howell 2000, Reus-Smit 2001). Constructivists also share a view on the significance of operational institutions in regional formations with Neo-Liberal institutionalists. However, unlike the latter who envisage some minimal loss of national sovereignty to regional institutions, they hold a view that institutions ensure formalisation and institutionalisation of regional identity, mutual trust, a shared regional culture, and collective interests, and also reinforce a sense of belonging (Adler and Barnett 1998, Hook and Kearns 1999).

Neo-Realists criticise Constructivism for over-estimating the importance of shared values in the formation of regional organisations and their cooperation within the regional scheme. They hold that violent conflicts, instead of cooperation, have taken place among nations with shared identities and values. They also note that “in Europe, the Americas and Asia, the politics of regionalism may be complicated by the existence of different national conceptions of the region, and there may be deep conflicts over the geographical scope of a region and the values which it is held to represent” (Hurrell 1995: 66).

However, as indicated above, shared identities, cultural values, historical experiences and aspirations have played a pivotal role in the emergence and development of almost all regional organisations. One of the objectives of SADC (Article 5) (h) is to “strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region” (SADC Treaty 1992). In the same vein, a Report on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions (2001) recommends the promotion of common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through legitimate, democratic and effective institutions. In spite of these noble ideals, SADC states still lack a sense of commitment to shared principles, norms, values and community identity, all of which have adversely affected its integration process and the implementation of its regional security and preventive diplomacy goals (Vale 2003, Nathan 2004, Neethling 2000, 2004, Ngubane 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Africa Alternative Strategies 2004). According to Vale (2003), the legacy of deep mistrust and misunderstanding in the SADC emanates from decades of strife in the region. He posits that “the SADC is not located where social relations are intimate, enduring or multistranded but...where social relations are impersonal, anonymous and contractual” (Vale 2003: 121). This absence of intimacy, trust and subjectively feeling part of the community explains why the region’s search for a common vision, shared sense of security, peace, development, good governance and meaningful
integration has in practice remained a mirage. The SADC preventive diplomacy missions in the DRC, Lesotho and Zimbabwe have been marred by implementational flaws, questions on the legality of the missions and efficacy in conflict prevention, management and resolution as will be reflected in chapters five and six.

4.6 Domestic Level Theories

This cluster of theories maintain that apart from shared identities and historical experiences, regionalism is also enhanced by other shared domestic attributes such as state coherence, regime type, democratisation and democratic ethics, commonalities and convergences of economic and political policies (Hurrell 1995). The theories stipulate that regional cooperation and integration prosper where there are coherent and viable nation-states with clearly established mutually accepted territorial boundaries and effective state machinery, as well as transparent and accountable institutions of governance. The assumption is that such a stable political climate will promote peace and coherent regional cooperation between member states. This is premised on the democratic peace theory that democracies do not go to war with each other, and that the more democracies in the world, the greater the zones of peace (Hurrell 1995, Terriff et al. 2001). Fukuyama, one of the democratic peace theorists, argues that “an expanding number of democratic states will continue to change fundamentally the nature of the international system, overcoming the conflictual nature of anarchy” (cited in Terriff et al. 2001: 25). The theorists attribute formation of the most elaborate regionalist schemes in the EU, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Organisation of American States (OAS), Common Market of the South/Southern Cone (Mercosur), NATO and the Warsaw Pact to the existence of relatively strong nation-states, democratic ethics, and commonalities in region types in the regions. Hurrell (1995: 67) states that “regionalism and state strength do not stand in opposition to each other and states remain the essential building-blocks with which regionalist arrangements are constructed.”

The absence of a democratic culture, institutions and governance has been identified by many scholars as the source of failed regional integration projects in Africa. Their report, Assessing the Restructuring of SADC; Positions, Policies and Progress’ Isaksen and Tjønneeland (2001) and the Freedom House Surveys (2002) reflect that most of the SADC member states do not have any established democratic credentials intact, and some are experiencing internal political and economic crises, all of which adversely affect regional integration. Ngubane (2004) and Vita (2001) also note that regional integration in Southern Africa is flawed because most of the member states have not yet fully consolidated their existence as coherent nation-states. According to Vita (2001: 73), “most of the states in the SADC region can be characterised as weak, and some of them as quasi-states. They possess juridical statehood recognised by the international community, but their empirical statehood is weak, ill-functioning or even non-existent.”

Owing to weak national foundations, the security regionalism in most of the Third World can be characterised as “immature anarchy” (Buzan 1991), characterised by “conflict formation” (Vayrynen 1984); “insecurity dilemma” (Job 1992) and “security predicament” (Ayoob 1995) all of which threaten nation-building and regional integration. To
some extent, this position holds water in the sense that the undemocratic and repressive regimes in Zimbabwe and Swaziland, for example, have adversely effected regional integration and tarnished the image of SADC in the eyes of the international community.

The call for democratisation, observance of human rights and economic liberalisation became immensely popular as vehicle and bench marks towards establishment of functional regional organisations in the post-Cold War era. At its Copenhagen Summit in 1993, the EU stipulated the conditions for membership as the existence of stable democracy, the rule of law, a market economy, and acceptable minority rights (Hettne 2001). This came in the wake of application for membership by the former socialist states of Europe. Through Resolution 1080, the Washington Protocol (1991), the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and Renewal of the Inter-American System and the Democratic Charter, the OAS pledged to defend and encourage democracy and constitutional governance in its region. It also committed itself to swift collective action against any member who breached constitutional and democratic rule (Kreimer 2003). Similarly AU pledged to “promote democratic principles and institutions of, popular participation and good governance” (Constitutive Act of the Africa Union, 2002: 4).

The SADC integration prospered in the post-Cold War era as a result of the democratisation process in the region and the end of civil wars in Mozambique (1992), Namibia (1991), Angola (2003) and South Africa (1994). The stability which emerged enhanced regional cooperation and development, especially with the inclusion of the economically and politically powerful democratic and majority-ruled South Africa. In its protocols and treaties, the SADC has also pledged to collectively defend democratically elected regimes and not to accord diplomatic recognition to any government which attains power by unconstitutional means such as coups. Objective (g) of the SADC Organ is to “promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of state parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the AU and the UN respectively” (SADC OPDS Protocol, 2001). These were some of the values which South Africa used to justify the 1998 military intervention of Lesotho. South Africa stated that “the military faction in Lesotho threatened a democratically elected government and that the basic aim of the military intervention in the name of SADC was to restore stability in Lesotho” (du Plessis 2000: 349-350). In the ECOWAS region, the intervention in Sierra Leone (1997) was also justified as a mission in defence of the democratically elected regime of Tejan Kabbar.

However, critics of the theory have argued that successful regional organisations have emerged and exist in regions where nations do not necessarily have common regime types, common economic policies, and a history of democratic institutions. The SADC was formed from nations which by then practised different political and economic ideologies. Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola and Tanzania practised some form of socialism while the rest were capitalist-oriented. The other issue is that some members practised multiparty democracy (Botswana) while
others were brutal and repressive one-party states (Malawi and Swaziland). Another example is the ASEAN in which increased regional interaction and institutional development in both the security and economic spheres have occurred in spite of the region’s outright rejection of Western-style liberalism and democracy (Hurrell 1995, Ojendal 2001).

4.7 The Security Complex/Regime/Community Theories

Buzan (1991) locates the discussion of regional security arrangements within the Realist paradigm. He argues that security complexes are products of the anarchical international system. The interaction of nations in different geographical regions and within the anarchic international structure determines their political power and security relations. In line with this position, Buzan (1991: 187) views security as “a relational phenomenon; a seamless web” such that “one cannot understand national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded.” According to Buzan, the structure and character of security complexes are defined and marked by patterns of rivalry, enmity, amity, power shifts, domination and balance of power politics and dynamics. In the words of Waever (1987), “[w]ithin any given complex, there exists a spectrum of relational possibilities described by the degrees of amity and enmity that define security interdependence” (cited in Buzan 1991: 218). Both the objective and subjective factors are involved in shaping the security arrangement, security perceptions, and the resultant policies and treaties of the key actors (Job 1992). As such, some regional security complexes may be monopolar where a single power is dominant or multipolar, and where two or more powers call the shots. Buzan (1991) gives the example of the Organisation of American States (OAS) as a monopolar complex dominated by the United States of America. The same can be said of Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC (du Plesis 2000, Sesay 2000, Moller 2005).

Buzan (1991) structures the formation of regional security complexes through five evolutionary stages from the extremes of enmity to amity, as follows:

- Chaos in which “all relations are defined by enmity, each actor being the enemy of all the others;”
- Regional conflict formation in which conflictual relations dominate but amity is also possible;
- Security regimes in which a group of states cooperate to manage their disputes and avoid war by seeking to mute the security dilemma both by their actions and by their assumptions about the behaviour of others;
- Security community in which disputes among all the members are resolved to such an extent that none fear or prepare for either political assault or military attack by any of the others;
- Regional integration which ends anarchy and therefore moves the regional security issue from the national and international to the domestic realm (Buzan 1991: 218-219).

This is the highest stage or the stage of “mature anarchy” where nations in a regional complex are politically, economically and militarily embedded and operationalised as a single entity. Buzan’s (1991), Lindsberg’s (1963) and
Haas’s (1958) definitions of regionalism reflect this level of integration. Buzan’s (1991) categorisation of security regionalisation phases is also in line with the Neo-functionalists’ phases of regional integration, in which a political union is the highest level.

Neethling (2004) notes that the difference between a security complex, security regime and security community is very blurred. In fact, there are more similarities and overlaps between the paradigms although they also “exhibit different attitudes to security cooperation” (Van Aadt, 1997: 4). Neethling employs the Buzan classical security complex theory to reflect the three approaches as a continuum in security cooperations. According to Neethling (2004: 2) “[t]he internal dynamics of a security complex can be located along a spectrum according to whether the defining security is driven by amity or enmity.” At the negative extreme of the spectrum is the security complex resulting from rivalry and mutual perceptions of fear among the regional states. In the centre lies a security regime in which states still regard each other with suspicions as a potential threat but have agreed reassurance arrangements to mitigate security challenges among them. The positive end of the spectrum reflects a security community which is characterised by advanced integration guided by institutionalised norms, standards and procedures that the members will not resolve their security challenges using force but only through peaceful means (Neethling 2004). Buzan (1991: 221) designed several insightful questions which can be used to guide the study of regional security complexes and their operational dynamics. The questions are: “[h]ow durable are the complexes in question? What is the relationship between their internal dynamics and their interaction with other complexes? What role does penetration from high level complexes play in the security of local complexes?, How do the trends within the structure of security complexes influence the foreign policy options available to the states concerned? How in turn do the foreign policies of individual states feed into the structure of relationship defined by the security complexes? Are all these states concerned essentially locked into patterns of relationships over which they have little control? Or do some of them have leverage over the structure of events and therefore real choices to make in the directions of their foreign policies?”

The security complex/regime/community approaches have been applied in the study of regional security formations in several regions such as South Asia and the Middle East (Buzan1983), South Asia (Buzan and Rizvi 1986), South East Asia (Buzan 1988), the SADC region (Ngoma 2005) and Waever etal. (1993) applied it in the study of post-Cold War transformations in Europe. According to Buzan (2000: 2), “the essential logic of the theory is rooted in the fact that all states in the system are enmeshed in a global web of security interdependence.” As such “[a] comprehensive security analysis requires that one take particular care to investigate how the regional level mediates the interplay between states and the international system as a whole” (Buzan 1991: 188). The theory poses that security complexes are established in geographical regions for collective security against both internal and external threats. Buzan (2000) notes that most states fear their neighbours more than their distant powers, so they will come together
in a security complex to dispel threats from each other. This is because “political and military threats are most strongly felt when they are at close range” (Buzan 1991: 188). The formation of the SADC in 1980 was mainly to counter the apartheid South African military and economic hegemonic posture in the region. In this case, independent regional states were compelled to the realisation that they are interdependent and more likely to obtain security through political cooperation in regional formations than military competition (Nathan 2003).

4.7.1 Security Complex Theory
A security complex is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently [and] closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan 1991: 190). Thus “[i]n security terms ‘region’ means that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exist among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into a geographical proximity with each other” (Buzan 1991: 188). The definition suggests that countries in the same region will always have the same security threats and/or that security challenges in one nation in the region will affect the entire region. Therefore, the driving force for formation of regional organisations where nations pool their resources for collaborative defence and security in the region are the patterns of amity and enmity among nation-states in a particular geographical zone (Buzan, 1991, 2000). The dimensions and intensities of fear, shared interest, security and insecurity determine the nature, content, character and operations of security complexes. The evolution, development and operations of the Frontline States and NATO were characterised by the amity and enmity of apartheid and communism respectively. On the other hand, the former USSR formed the WARSAW PACT to defend their regimes from the capitalist onslaught.

4.7.2 Security Regime Theory
Acharya (1994: 89) defines a security regime as “[a] formal or informal arrangement whose main objective is to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the likelihood of war by securing adherence to a set of norms and values that constrain the conflictual behaviour of the regional actors in relation to one another.” Put differently, it is defined by a set of principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures that guide states to “exercise restraint in the belief that others will reciprocate” (Deustch cited in Nathan 2003: 3). The security regime paradigm is rooted in the realist and state-centric traditions that states will only become members of regional formations and alliances when they fulfil their national interests of state security, expansion and consolidation of their power bases. Such alliances therefore are inherently weak, since they are built on competition and mistrust, and member states are reluctant to establish strong security cooperation mechanisms which will bind them together (Morganthau et al. 1993, Terriff et al. 2004). In the opinion of Dittgen and Peters, the level of cooperation in a security regime “will remain intergovernmental and the functional scope will strictly be limited to the military realm” (cited in Neethling, 2004: 2).
Van Aardt (1997: 6) provides an insightful summary of the characteristics of security regimes as follows:

- Security cooperation is considered to be concerned with an “individual” problem that can be solved in its own terms. In other words, problems can be “isolated” and “contained.”
- Security cooperation is a reactive rather than a pro-active process. It results from the need to cooperate in order to defend national interests.
- Common norms develop and rules are formulated as the need arises and patterns of behaviour are established over time.
- Participants make a formal expression of expectations, principles, norms and outcomes and negotiate rules, practices and structures as and when the need arises.
- The attitudinal base of this approach reflects a concern by member states to promote their national security through regional security cooperation, but the mutual understanding is that it can never lead to creation of a “larger state”.
- The nature of cooperation pursued is functional for the continued interests of the individual actors who form part of the security regime.
- There is no specific provision for collective defence. This implies that a member not threatened by an external aggressor might jeopardise its own security should it become involved in the defence of a neighbouring partner in the regional security regime.

This analysis reflects several aspects of regional security mechanisms in Africa. For example, in the SADC region, member states seem to be more concerned with protecting their sovereignty than promoting strong regional security integration. In the interventions which are said to have been authorised by SADC, the intervening states were mainly driven by their individual national interests. Angola intervened in the DRC for security reasons, while Zimbabwe and Namibia went in for economic gains. In Lesotho, South Africa is also alleged to have intervened to protect the Katse Dam Water project. ECOWAS suffered the same fate, as Nigeria was accused of sponsoring her national interests through the organisation when she led the military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

This confirms Van Walraven's (2005) assertion that third party interventions seldom occur without the motive of self-interest. That is, “[t]he third party will intervene principally in pursuit of his own interests, in whatever way these are formulated.... Since the third party has his own interests to consider, mediation or intervention might be achieved for reasons other than the peaceful settlement of the conflict...” (Van Walraven 2005: 79).
4.7.3 Security Community Theory

Deutsch (1957) defines a security community as “[a] group of people, which has become ‘integrated’ [through]...the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of security and of institutions and practices strong and wide spread enough to assure...dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief...that common social problems must and can be resolved by a process of peaceful change” (cited in Ngoma 2005: 8). Deutsch, in Ngoma 2005), distinguishes between two types of security communities. The first is an amalgamated security community that is characterised by a salient formal merger of member states into a single larger regional unit with some type of common government. The second is a pluralistic security community which is defined by less political unity, as member states retain their legal sovereign independence. That is to say, the sovereignty of the member states is not compromised or jeopardised by their membership of the community. This form of a security community would be acceptable to the Third World regimes which tend to be fearful of regional integration as a threat to their national sovereignty. Deutsch (1957), Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990) note three conditions for the success of a pluralistic security community as follows:

- Compatibility of major political values;
- Capacity of the governments and politically relevant strata of the participating countries to respond to one another’s messages, needs, and actions quickly, adequately and without resorting to violence;
- Mutual predictability of the relevant aspects of one another’s political, economic and social behaviour.

The authors maintain that pluralistic security communities are easier to establish and manage than amalgamated security communities because in the former members retain their sovereignty. Most of the security groupings in the Third World are pluralistic security communities (Archaya 2001, Ngoma 2005, and Hwang 2005).

Both the amalgamated and pluralistic security communities pledge for peace and denounce war as an option in resolving their differences. In view of this Rosamond (2000: 12) defines a security community as “[a] group of states amongst whom the prospects of war is eradicated...a condition where war as a means of dispute settlement between states becomes obsolete.” In a security community, in contrast to the realists’ position, regional organisations, guided by established norms, values, standards, and institutions, can be established to mitigate conflicts peacefully. This entails a high level of integration in which nations in a security community share security concerns, visions and commitments for mutual and collective resolution of conflicts in the region. The member states are so interwoven in their military and security agreements and commitments that the issue of war among them or against each other does not arise. The region becomes what Vale refers to as a “warm zone”, Singer’s “zone of peace” or Bauman’s “cozy and comfortable place” (in Ngoma 2005).
Deutsch’s concept of a security community has been further developed by Adler and Barnett (1998) who have devised a three-tiered analysis of the phases of a security community development (Swart and du Plessis 2004, Ngoma 2005). The first phase consists of factors which precipitate states’ gravitation to security cooperation, integration and joint coordination. The factors include existential social-economic and political realities, and internal and external threats to regional and global security. The second phase involves examination of factors such as shared cultural values, socio-economic and political goals, aspirations, interests, regime systems and other regional traits which are conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity. The third evolution stage consists of the actual development of mutual trust and collective identity formation to ensure conditions for “dependable expectations of peaceful change” in which members do not consider war as an option in addressing their regional challenges. Swart and du Plessis (2004: 18) refer to this stage as the “acid test of a security community” as “members do not fear war or prepare for it.”

Schoeman (2002) describes a security community as evolving through three phases. The first is the “nascent phase” in which governments begin to consider ideas on how to coordinate their relations for ultimate security cooperation and integration. The second stage, the “ascendant phase”, involves the implementation of the cooperative ideas hatched in the first stage. It is characterised by development of new institutions, policies and mechanisms which reflect security cooperation mutual trust among the members. The third is the “mature phase” in which the security community has reached maturity in terms of institutional establishments, implementation of cooperative security measures, and the ultimate goal of a security community in which the option of war as a means of resolving differences among members is non-existent. According to Ngoma (2005; 24), a security community suggests a mature form of regionalism in which states “move away from competition to cooperation, embracing consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction and interdependence rather than unilateralism.” That is, “[s]ecurity has to be defined together with, and not against other states” for joint survival and peaceful coexistence (Ohlson, 1991: 242). According to Hammerstad (2004), several regional organisations including SADC have not attained the status of a mature security community. She maintains that the reality is that SADC is still at the nascent phase of security integration.

Members in a security community become militarily intertwined, such that they share information on security matters, and engage in joint military exercises so as to have peacekeeping troops with similar professional military standards, code of conduct and doctrines during peacekeeping missions. The European Union has such exercises through its Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) while SADC also embarked on Blue Hungwe (1997) and Blue Crane (1999) joint military exercises in Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively (Moller 2004, Ngoma 2005).
Van Aardt's (1997: 7-11) summary of the characteristics of security communities is as followst:

- The members of a security community remain separate entities, but their cooperation takes regional security into consideration. The overriding concern is a belief that the security of a region is indivisible and of primary concern.
- It is based on a belief that the identification of common interests, the building of common identities, and the spreading of moral obligations should be underpinning long-term security.
- Security cooperation is a pro-active rather than a reactive process. This implies a heavy reliance on early warning measures, and the idea of community implies a vision or strategic goal of what is to be achieved. The structures and resources needed to build a community, as well as necessary steps and phases, are identified and tackled systematically.
- Collective security is not so much aimed at protecting “against” each other as at protecting each other in the face of what contemporary security terms “threats without enemies”, while mutual defence signifies military assistance against extra-regional aggression and threats.
- Its attitudinal base reflects a concern by member states that the security of the region as a whole is of paramount importance. To this end, a sense of common regional identity prevails. In addition, a security community indicates involvement based on mutuality – a sense of belonging together as a group of individual entities.

Van Aardt adds that the political will by members to implement all the necessary steps and procedures is pivotal for the realisation of an effective and functioning security community.

One example of a security community is NATO. Article 5 of NATO’s ratifying protocol reads thus: “[t]he parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently...if such an armed attack occurs, each of them...assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (cited in Moller 2004: 124). Moller (2004) and Hammerstad (2004) also make reference to the EU’s transformation from a conflict formation to a security community in which there are policy assurances that the members will not fight each other physically, but will resolve their disputes amicably through dialogue. Moller (2004) refers to this regionally coordinated military move as “Europeanisation of European security.” Acharya (1994: 85) commends the EU “as the most prominent example of a regional security community in the developed West.” It saw the EU developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Stability Pact for Southern Europe, all intended to expand the EU’s role in conflict prevention, management and resolution (preventive diplomacy). In fact, “[t]he OSCE is a regime for cooperative, not collective security, designed to promote security through on-going dialogue and persuasion, not coercion...The OSCE does not have any mandate for enforcement action or the commitments through sanctions, military enforcement action, or collective response against aggressors or other violators.” In this sense, it has “evolved into one of the primary instruments for preventive diplomacy in Europe” (Chigas 1993: 33 and 35).
Although not yet fully fleshed security communities, some regional organisations in Africa have established security organs and signed mutual defence pacts which, in principle, would enhance security cooperation and collective defence to dissuade conflicts among member states. The ECOWAS has ECOMOG and the Mutual Assistance on Matters of Defence (MAD). Through MAD, ECOWAS member states:

- “Declare and accept that any armed threat or aggression directed against any members state will constitute a threat or aggression against the entire community” (Article 2).
- “Resolve to give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression (Article 3).
- “Agree that when an external armed threat or aggression is directed against a member state of the community, the Head of State of that country shall send a written request for assistance to the current Chairman of the Authority of ECOWAS... the request shall mean that the Authority is duly notified and that the Allied Armed Forces Council (AAFC) are placed under a state of emergency. The Authority shall decide in accordance with the emergency procedure as stipulated in Article 16...” (ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, May 29 1981: 19 and 23).

4.7.4 SADC: A Security Complex, Regime or Community?

Neethling (2004: 4) poses two searching questions which can help us determine whether SADC, which is the core of this study, is a security community or security regime. The questions are:

- To what extent could SADC be considered as a security community, and does it, as a sub-regional organisation, display some of the characteristics of a functioning security community?
- Is there a sense of mutuality and sharing within SADC, both in terms of ideas and practice, which denotes a different approach from the way in which security regimes operate?

Booth and Vale (1995: 285) also pose useful guiding questions in the study of SADC security regional integration, namely:

- Can a regional community emerge from the wars of destabilisation in Southern Africa?
- Can a sense of regional community grow in a region in which there has been so much enmity and violence?
- What are the possibilities for developing a shared view of the real world among actors in the region?
- Can outsiders help to develop a sense of regional community in Southern Africa?

Considering the evolution and growth of the SADC, it can be ascertained that in spite of the obstacles and the snail pace, the SADC has achieved some of the characteristics of a security community, and is gravitating towards this status in terms of its goals and operational agenda. The SADC has ratified the OPDS (1996) and the MDP (2003) protocols to coordinate its regional security operations. The SADC has also pledged peaceful preventive diplomacy.
initiatives in its founding treaty, the OPDS and MDP Protocols, in settling both intra-state and inter-state conflicts. This, to some extent, makes it fit in principle and spirit into the security community realm. In fact, Moller (2005: 65) notes that “[w]ar among Southern African states has become increasingly unlikely, and it does not even figure as a contingency for national security planning. [As such] “[t]he states of the sub-region may...constitute, or at least approach the status of a security community (in the classical sense of Karl Deutsch), within which interstate, war has become inconceivable.”

Ngoma (2005: 10) has applied the security community theory in studying the SADC security mechanism, and concluded that it has prospects for a functioning security community. He also notes that “SADC is on a democratic trajectory with its states at differing points and should not be excluded from the security community paradigm than the Western Europe states and North American states that Deustch studied." Bjuner (1998) also acknowledges the transferability of the security community paradigm to other regions, and SADC has shown sufficient readiness to work towards conflict prevention through common and collective security measures. The argument is that SADC has a common agenda reflecting the promotion of common economic, political and security values through “democratic, legitimate, and effective institutions as well as the consolidation and maintenance of democracy, peace and security” in conformity with the Security Community approach” (Ngoma 2005: 182). Among the SADC OPDS objectives which reflect movement toward a security community are as follows:

a) Prevent, contain and resolve inter and intra-state conflict by peaceful means (objective e)
   a) ii) consider development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats (objective h)
   a) iii) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and coordinate the participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations (objective k) (SADC Treaty 1992).

Article 11(a, b, and c) of the Protocol and Structure of the SADC OPDS is emphatic on the organisation’s commitment to resolution of regional conflicts by peaceful means. The members pledge to “[r]efrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, other than for the legitimate purpose of individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack” (OPDS Protocol 2001). This is in line with the Security Community pledge which rules out war as an option in resolving disputes among the member states.

Other instances of SADC’s wish to be a Security Community are the establishment of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Zimbabwe and joint multi-national military exercises such as Exercise Blue Hungwe and Blue Crane held in Zimbabwe (1997) and South Africa (1999) respectively, all involving troops from SADC nations and designed to enhance cooperation in peacekeeping operations. The SADC is credited with signing the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials to address the problem of proliferation of small arms.
and precipitation of civil conflicts (Moller 2005). The SADC is also in the process of establishing a standing peacekeeping force for effective peacekeeping, peace-building missions and maintenance of durable peace in the region. The ratification of the OPDS and the MDP (2003) protocols also show commitment to a security community (Neethling 2000, Hammerstad 2004, Fisher and Ngoma 2005, Ngoma 2005). The then South African Minister of Defence, Mosiua Lekota, noted that the SADC Mutual Defence Pact aimed at “stabilising the region…cultivating an atmosphere conducive to investment and long-term stability…providing a mechanism to prevent conflicts between SADC countries, as well as with other countries, and for SADC to act together against aggression by outsiders…allowing for SADC intervention in major conflicts between signatories,… and in intra-state conflicts which have the potential to affect the stability of the whole region” (cited in Ngoma 2005: 2000). Fisher and Ngoma (2005) note that the establishment of what they term the “delivery tools” by SADC in the form of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) are indicative of the region's commitment to collectively deal with its political, defence and security challenges. Fisher and Ngoma add that the SADC OPDS objectives (a, d, e, f, g, and i) pledge resolution of regional conflicts through peaceful means, while article 2 (a), (g) and (i) of the ODPS protocol reflect a security mechanism which has embraced new security trends in which protection of people and development, promotion of democratic institutions, and human rights, human security, coordination of the police and other security apparatus which are pivotal to peace, stability and security. The inclusion of these central security issues into its operational documents is typical of an organisation en-route to becoming a functional security community structure. Hence, Ngoma (2005: 15) suggests that “the security community paradigm provides the most encompassing insights into the political and military dynamics in the Southern African sub-region including those relating to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.” Moller (2005) rules out the possibility of conflicts among member states owing to the spirit of cooperation prevalent among them; this could be viewed as a step towards the establishment of a security community which does not contemplate conflict among its members.

However, Zacharias (1999), Isaksen and Tjonneland (2001), Vita (2001), Van Niewkerk (2003), Vale (2003), Nathan (2003), Neethling (2004), Ngubane (2004), Swart and du Plessis (2004) and Hammerstad (2004), argue that SADC does not qualify as a security community because most of its members lack democratic credentials and common values, are weak and poorly integrated, domestically and politically fragmented, have weak state institutions, and have a fragile economic basis. Nathan (2003) vehemently opposes Ngoma’s (2005) and Van Aardt’s (1997) arguments that SADC is progressing towards a security community status. Instead he regards SADC as a security complex as defined by Buzan (1991: 190) as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.” The conclusion that SADC is a security complex rather than a security community is shared by Oden (2001). Vita (2001) Swart and du Plessis (2004), and Neethling (2004) acknowledge that SADC’s objectives are aimed at building a
security community in the region, and that it may be regarded as a multi-national institution that has made some progress in pursuing the ideals of a security community. However, they insist that the region has not yet established functioning and effective regional security architecture typical of a security community. Some of the problems hindering the SADC security co-operation from being a functioning security community are lack of democratic governance and gross human rights abuses by some members states’ regimes, the lack of political will to implement regional security agreements, weak economies in most of the member states, members’ adherence to protection of individual nation’s sovereignties at the expense of regional integration, adherence to state security rather than human security, mistrust between some members as reflected in the polarisation of SADC over the interventions in the DRC, and the general power struggle for regional hegemony as evidenced by Zimbabwe and South Africa over the operational status of the SADC security OPDS (Van Niewkerk 2001, Nathan, 2003, Barengu and Landsberg 2003, Zacarias 2003, Vale 2003, Neethling 2004, Solomon 2004, Hammesrstad 2004, Fisher and Ngoma 2005). In the opinion of Vale (2003) there is very little real sense of community in Southern Africa, and the SADC is less than what it pretends to be: “[t]he hard truth we have already seen is that beyond the rhetorical gestures at bonding, Southern African states are not prepared to share sovereignty, to become a community even a security community. [This is because] “[t]he history of the SADC suggests that the organisation was conceived as a collective attempt to defend the sovereignty of individual states from apartheid destabilisation” (2003: 122). As such, the member states jealously guard against any attempts, through regional integration or collective security, which they deem to be tampering with each member’s national sovereignty and power.

Acharya (1994: 85) is unambiguous about the absence of security communities in the Third World. In his view “[s]ecurity Communities are virtually non-existent in the Third World…none has succeeded in achieving a level of integration that would create the conditions for a security community, whether of the amalgamated or the pluralistic variety.” Duffy and Field (1980) also dismiss regional groupings in Africa and Latin America as “founded on the reefs of distrust, non-cooperation and parochial nationalism” and therefore not applicable to the Functionalist model of regional integration through spill- over effects from the lower economic levels to higher political integration, security cooperation and community (cited in Acharya, 1994: 85). This is premised on the functionalist assumption that “[i]f functional regional groupings could successfully foster economic integration, regional security would ensure that the actors would, over a period of time, learn to resolve their conflicts peacefully and come to cooperate on common security issues” (Acharya 1994: 84). Rugumamu (2002: 23) adds his voice to the debate by stating that “Africa’s collective security arrangements are, more often than not, an aggregation of weakness…state-building, nation-building and democratic governance in most of Africa have not produced robust foundations on which to construct larger security arrangements.” The criticism is anchored on the fact that most of African nation-states are economically and politically weak and therefore cannot establish strong functional, regional organisations, let alone security communities.
However, it appears that the dismissal of the efforts made by some regional organisations on security matters in spite of the difficulties is grossly unfair. Regional organisations such as ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC have made commendable strides in economic and security cooperations and have been instrumental in management and peaceful resolution of conflicts in their respective regions. More noticeably, ECOWAS successfully launched preventive peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Despite its hurdles and shortcomings, it is worthwhile to acknowledge that ECOMOG succeeded to some extent in mitigating the bloodbath and humanitarian emergencies in the two countries (Sesay 2000). The SADC also made a mark in Lesotho as will be discussed in detail in chapter six, and is currently involved in resolving conflicts in Zimbabwe and Madagascar. As such, despite the hurdles, regional organisations in the Third World are engaged in initiatives for peace, democracy, good governance and security in their respective zones and globally. What is needed is material support from the UN and the Developed World in curbing the conflicts.

Van Niewkerk (2001) and Nathan (2003) consequently recommend the regional security regime model as useful for the African context. Van Niewkerk (2001: 8) suggests that “[i]nstead of developing grand and expensive security designs African regional communities should rather concentrate on the goal of constraining the option of military force in conflict management.” It is the view of Nathan (1995: 5) that a common security regime would have many advantages in the African context. “It could provide a basis for early warning of potential crises; building military confidence and stability through disarmament and transparency on defence matters; engaging in joint problem-solving and developing collaborative programmes on security issues; negotiating multi-lateral security arrangements; and managing conflict through peaceful means.” Moller, on the other hand, advises SADC and ECOWAS security structures to emulate the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) rather than NATO, since the former’s purpose is to “consolidate respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law, to strengthen peace and to promote unity” while NATO’s purpose is “to provide a system of collective defence in the event of armed attack against any member” (cited in Van Niewkerk 2003: 8). The understanding is that the security organs should be peace-orientated rather than militaristic in their goals, principles and operations.

The Security Community theory expands the role of regional organisations beyond the traditional security scope of security and defence of the state and the incumbent regime. It envisages security which encompasses non-military issues such as economic development, equitable distribution of wealth, environmental preservation, gender, human security and human rights, which is in line with the broadened and new security challenges of the post-Cold War world order (Nathan 1995, Buzan 2000, Ohlson 2001, Terriff etal. 2004, Schulz etal. 2001, Fisher and Ngoma 2004, Swart and du Plessis 2004, Ngoma 2005). Miall etal refer to the new security thinking as the cross-sectoral heterogeneous security complexes. An understanding of the contribution of non-military security factors to instability
and conflicts would go a long way in enhancing efficacy by regional organisations in their preventive diplomacy missions.

The Security complex/regime or community paradigm is relevant to this study which aims to investigate SADC’s security institutional capabilities and mechanism and challenges in the region. As Buzan explains, “[a]n approach based on security complexes focuses attention on sets of states whose security problems are interconnected. Security is viewed as only partly divisible; a substantial portion of it is residing in essentially indivisible relational patterns among states” (1991: 224). Buzan (1991) further praises the security complex paradigm as a powerful tool which offers a systematic approach to security analysis at both the macro-level, (international), the middle level (regional) and the micro-level (national). There is no doubt that the formation of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and its supportive operational structures have been guided by these theoretical perspectives.

4.8 The New Regionalism Theory

The post-Cold War era was characterised by revitalisation and proliferation of regional bodies in terms of numbers, membership, diversity and operational context, goals, scope and procedures. The EU for example expanded by admitting former Socialist states of Eastern Europe. Regional organisations in the Third World, such as the SADC and the ASEAN, also expanded their membership and established security mechanisms. SADC was boosted by the membership of a democratic South Africa in 1994, while ASEAN was joined by former communist states such as Cambodia and Vietnam (Nathan 1995, Malan and Cilliers 1997, Buzan 2000, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, Hettne 2001, Oden 2001, Moller 2004, Ngoma 2005). This emergence of revitalised regional organisations came to be known as the New Regionalism, and scholars devised the “New Regionalism theory” for an appropriate analytical framework of the emerging regional organisations in a new world order.

The new regionalism movement is distinguished from the Old Regionalism (Hegemonic Regionalism) of the Cold War bipolar politics. The proponents of the theoretical paradigm maintain that the regional bodies which emerged were a spontaneous process from below and within the region itself, and more in accordance with regional histories, experiences, peculiarities, needs aspirations and challenges (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995, Hettne and Soderbaum 1998 Schulz et al. 2001). In this light Ojendal (2001: 175) notes that “ASEAN is a project well rooted in the region, taking place on the members’ conditions and taking care of its members’ problems” rather than the Cold War interests. The regional organisations became heterogeneous and multidimensional, embracing a wide range of issues from the military, political security to human security, human rights, democracy, good governance, gender and environmental security. They are also inclusive of non-state actors such as Non-governmental and Civil Society Organisations in their preventive diplomacy interventions (Hettne and Inotai 1994, Nathan 1995., Fawcett and Hurrell 1999, Buzan 2000, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001, Terriff et al. 2004, Ngoma 2005).
Therefore, the pluralism and multidimensionality of contemporary regionalisation begged for a new framework of analysis which “transcends the dominant theories of regional integration such as neo-realism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, institutionalism, market and trade integration, structuralism and development” (Schulz et al. 2001: 2). The argument raised by proponents of the new regionalism theory is that the classical theories do not capture the pluralism and multi-dimensional dynamics of new regionalism and the concomitant challenges of the post-Cold War world. The new regionalism theory therefore is an open-ended approach built on the strength and flaws of the earlier theoretical expositions. It is designed to capture the multi-dimensional facets and trends of contemporary regionalism from a historical and interdisciplinary perspective (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995, Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel 2000, Schulz, Soderbaum and Ojendal 2001). Hence, Mittelman (1999) posits that “[t]he New Regionalism approach is an important advance on the different versions of integration theory (trade or market integration, functionalism, neo-functionalism, institutionalism and neo-functionalism”. All of them are deficient in as much as they understate power relations and fail to offer an explanation of structural transformation. In some ways a break with this tradition, the New Regional Approach explores contemporary forms of transnational cooperation and cross-border flows through comparative, historical, and multilevel perspectives (25-26).

The theoretical perspective proposes to put discussions of regionalism within the current global context and also capture the regional peculiarities, particularities and concomitant challenges of different regional formations. Such an approach would capture regional dynamics from different contexts and halt the classical trend where regional formations were to be understood on the basis of European integration models. It would also enhance the discourse on regionalism by tapping into the histories and peculiarities of the different regions. Regional integration formations' operational modalities in preventive diplomacy are to a large extent determined by the contextual challenges in the regions (Fawcett 1995, Hettne 2001, Schulz et al. 2001).

The New Regionalism Theory is well suited to accommodate the numerous regional organisations and their expanded operational scope and goals in view of new non-military regional security challenges as prerequisites for peace and stability. The theory also provides a realisation that durable peace and stability can only be achieved by addressing the structural sources of conflict, such as underdevelopment, undemocratic governance, unequal distribution of resources, access to opportunities and basic survival needs, marginalisation of minority identities, weak governance institutions and other non-military security challenges. In view of this, regional organisations have embarked on holistic pledges in their treaties and protocols to deal with the existing structural deficiencies in their regional spheres.
The SADC’s growth from being an economic community to a security complex should be understood within the parameters of this theoretical paradigm. The questions to be answered are; “will the ‘new regionalism’ serve Africa’s interests better?” And “Are such arrangements effective in today’s climate of globalisation and the concomitant marginalisation and exclusion?” (Du Pisani 2001, Van Nieuwkerk 2003). Answers to such thought-provoking questions will be based on the study of future operations of regional organisations and how they face the security challenges in their respective regions and the globalising world. The fact of the matter is that it is a daunting challenge to Third World regional organisations to overcome the power of globalisation and its impact.

4.9 The significance of Regional Organisations in Preventive Diplomacy

Several reasons have been advanced by different scholars as to why it has become so important for regional organisations to be actively involved in conflict prevention, management and resolution in their respective regions, especially in the post-Cold War era. In the words of Mortimer (2000: 188), “[t]he concept of regional approaches to peacekeeping and conflict resolution is an attractive one to many theorists of international relations.” The clarion call for regional organisations’ role in the maintenance of global peace has become more pronounced since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. This was because during the Cold War regional organisations were tied and manipulated by the superpowers to accentuate their bipolar political agendas. The Cold War politics interfered with regional organisations’ role in peace maintenance. The post-Cold War political climate saw a less competitive intervention by great powers in external regional security matters and a gradual decentralisation of security responsibility to regional blocs (Buzan 1991, Ghali 1992, Annan 1998, De Waal 2000, Levit 2001, Miall et al. 2001, Ngoma 2005). Therefore, according to Rugumamu (2002: 22), “the recent move toward security regionalism is consistent with the post-Cold War concept of shared responsibility between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organisations.” In light of this changing international political landscape Buzan (1991) contends that “[i]ndigenous patterns of regional security will be increasingly important features of the international system in the twenty-first century, thus closing forever the...historical period in which huge differentials in technology and socio-political organisation enabled a handful of states to impose their control on the entire community” (1991: 208-209).

The following are some of the key reasons why regional organisations must play a leading role in regional preventive diplomacy missions. Firstly, Chapter viii, articles 52-54 of the United Nations accommodate the formation of regional arrangements with the view of tackling regional conflicts to complement the UN in the mammoth task of maintaining global peace and security. It was seen by the UN founding fathers that the UN on its own could not effectively carry out the task of global order. Successive UN Secretary Generals Perez de Quellar, Ghali, Kofi Annan and currently ban-Ki-Moon, have constantly called upon regional organisations to play an active role in maintaining regional and global peace. In one of his reports to the UN Security Council (1 November 1995) Boutros Ghali has lamented the untapped potential of regional organisations in conflict prevention, management and resolution. He posits that “[i]t is
increasingly apparent that the United Nations cannot address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or sub-regional organisations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the United Nations in containing them” (1995: 2). This message was echoed by Annan in his 1998 report entitled “The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable and sustainable development in Africa”.

In view of the stated positions, successive UN Secretary Generals have consistently called for efforts and measures to strengthen the capabilities of regional organisations in preventive action and peacemaking initiatives (Ghali (1995, Annan 1998). This was deemed necessary because “wherever possible the international community should strive to complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa’s problems…” (Annan 1998: 10). According to Hwang, through this newly developed interest, the Secretary Generals “… hoped that regional organisations in Africa would increasingly fill in the vacuum left by the United Nations’ reluctance to act in conflict management in the region” (2005: 182). The former OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim has added his voice that “while recognising the primary and overarching responsibility of the UN... he called on Africa to have a role to play in maintaining peace and security in their regions whether in support of the UN efforts or its own initiatives (in Nhara 1996).

The core point is that there should be effective collaboration and partnership between the UN and regional organisations in security issues at both the regional and international levels. Malone (2002: vii) argues that “[i]t is (the collaboration of the UN and regional organisations) widely accepted that more of it would be a very good thing, particularly for a world organisation sagging under strain of multiple complex peace operations supported restlessly by sometimes unreliable funders.” This is mainly because “each in its own way, on its own issues has been reluctant to endow the UN Security Council with needed capacity to act decisively” (Jentleson 2002: 37). Faced with such complex and multifaceted post-Cold War conflicts, it is highly unlikely that some key objectives [for intervention] will be achievable through the actions of one external actor such as the UN, hence the necessity of a multi-pronged multi-organisational and multi-sectoral approach involving regional organisations, donors, NGOs, Civil Society Organisations in fighting conflicts (Peck 1993, Henrikson 1995, Cockell 2002).

Ghali (1992: 14, notes that active participation by regional organisations in regional peace efforts would ensure cooperation between the UN and the regional organisations, through decentralisation, delegation and “also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation of the international affairs.” Proponents of this partnership “see greater involvement by regional organisations in preventive diplomacy and/or advocate the creation of new institutions at the regional level under the UN auspices that would have a specialised role to play in conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy” (Hampson 2003: 153). Thus in his report entitled “Building Peace and Development” of 1994 Ghali alludes to a meeting held between him and the heads of regional bodies to establish
stronger working relationships and new modalities for collaboration among the different regional groupings and the UN. The agenda of the meeting was to assess the existing cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. It was agreed that there should be a symbiotic relationship between the UN and regional bodies for efficient exchange of information on emerging crises for both preventive and resolution purposes. The meeting also agreed on the necessity of the UN training of regional organisations peacekeeping forces and personnel for joint coordination and operations in peacekeeping (Henrikson 1995).

Therefore, the role of regional organisations should not be construed to be taking away the cardinal and primary role of the UN of maintaining international peace and security, but that partnership between them would go a long way in resolving conflicts worldwide. The call for regional organisations’ role in conflict resolution should be understood within the context of the changing global international order which needs new approaches to broadened security challenges. In response, the UN, through its various functional departments such as the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) and the World Bank, is collaborating with different regional organisations and NGOs such as the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD), the Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network, the European Platform on Conflict Prevention, the West African Peace-building Network, the Southeast Asia Regional Forum on Peaceful Conflict Resolution and Good Governance and many others in its bid to prevent and resolve global conflicts (Dress and Rosenblum 2002).

In its conflict resolution and peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS has partnered with the UN in bringing peace and stability in the conflict ridden countries. Commenting on the significance of the combined ECOMOG-United Nations Organisation Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), Ghali states that “[t]he process in Liberia poses a special opportunity to the UN in that UNOMIL would be the first peacekeeping operation undertaken by the UN in cooperation with a peacekeeping mission already set up by another organisation; in this case a sub-regional organisation... This relationship potentially present some challenges but I am confident that with goodwill...this relationship will be successful and may even set a precedent for future peacekeeping missions...” (cited in Sessay 2000: 235). There was extensive cooperation between the UN, the OSCE and NGOs to curb the ethnic conflicts which were brewing in Macedonia. “Both organisations shared complementary objectives in the crisis. A broad network of international, regional and local NGOs also tried to address ethnic tensions at the local and community level reducing prejudice and working towards ethnic reconciliation” (Hampson 2002: 146). Ackerman, cited in Vayrynen (2003: 50) asserts that “with the support of the regional organisations, the deployment of the UN troops in Macedonia has been construed as a paradigmatic case of successful preventive deployment....” The UN Preventive
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) was bolstered by the local consent, and a sense of ownership of the peace operation and its outcomes was achieved. Although the overlap in the UN–OSCE mission operations in Macedonia bred some mutual tensions, they ultimately amicably resolved the hurdles in 1993 through an agreement on the principles of coordination between them (Vayrynen 2003).

Although conducted under controversial circumstances, the Zimbabwe-led SADC intervention in the DRC was indicative of how a regional organisation has committed its meagre resources to mediate in a member’s intra-state conflict. In fact, it paved the way for the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) which came in to bolster the peace initiatives laid by the SADC leading to some relative stability in the country. MONUC consistently worked with the SADC in guiding the peace process and democratic dispensation in the DRC. The process is on-going but there is hope that the collaboration will bear some positive results.

Commendable as these UN and regional organisation collaborative efforts are, there is still much to be done to establish more coherent partnerships. Dress and Rosenblum (2002: 232) posit that “current efforts notwithstanding, the United Nations and the international community have yet to achieve an integrated, collaborative long-term strategy for strengthening national, regional and international capacities to effectively manage conflict.”

Secondly, the multidimensionality, pervasiveness and complex nature of current conflicts need the input of regional organisations. Engel (2005) observes that post-Cold War Africa experienced a new trend of wars characterised by opportunistic, self-serving warlords’ extreme violence and brutality targeted more directly at the civilians than other armed groups. According to Van Walraven (2005: 77), in many of these complex intra-state conflicts, “[t]he UN proved unable to make a difference – especially if the individual member states were pursuing their own conflicting interests as evidenced in the Balkans, Somalia and the DRC.” Most of the intra-state conflicts which ravaged the world, especially Africa, were historically rooted and became so regionalised in their causal factors, diffusion trends, dynamics and effects that they required regional solutions based on the knowledge of the historical sources of the conflict and the cultural, political and geographical dynamics of the regions’ politics. The regionalised conflicts in West Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions, indeed would require an active role by the regional organisations and if necessary a partnership with the UN. In fact, the UN Charter “does not assume that the Security Council will address all security problems or that it will necessarily be the first recourse in case of threats to international peace and security.” Article 53 (1) of the UN Charter states that “[t]he Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.” In other words, the UN advocates the possibility of coordinating the efforts of regional bodies or working in partnership with regional organisations in preventive missions. Annan concedes this point when he states that in order to “address complex causes, we need complex, interdisciplinary solutions. Implementing preventive strategies...requires
cooperation across a broad range of different agencies and departments... Cross-sector cooperation...is a prerequisite of successful prevention” (cited in Cockell 2002: 186).

The efforts of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, SADC in Lesotho and IGAD in Sudan and Somalia, albeit with little success, should be viewed in this context. The urgency of regional organisations’ role in the maintenance of global peace is also necessitated by the expanded nature of security threats which the UN cannot successfully handle without partnership with regional organisations. The current security challenges are no longer limited to security and defence of the state. They embrace both military and non-military areas such human rights, human security, environmental security, immigration issues, development and economic growth issues and ethnic identity questions, freedoms and liberties, all of which, if not addressed, would give birth to protracted and deep-rooted conflicts (IPA 2001 Azar 1990a, Burton 1990b, 1990b, Buzan 1991, Thomas 1991, Benjamin 1992, Adedeji 1999, Barengu and Landsberg 2003, Zacarias 2003, Swart and Duplessis 2004, Terriff et al. 2004, Field 2004, Ngoma 2005). The expanded security challenges and call for the role of regional organisations are vividly illustrated by Cawthra (2004: 32): “[s]ince the end of the Cold War, there have been increasing expectations that regional and sub-regional organisations should take on the security function...It is felt that the complexity of the conflicts, the multidimensionality of ‘widened’ security issues, the erosion of sovereignty, the trans-national character of the new security threats and the new wars, the growing pressure on the United Nations system for peacekeeping and other actions, the pressure for democratisation and security sector reform, the complex effects of globalisation, all lends themselves to regional solutions.” Therefore, in view of the above, regional organisations have a vital role to play in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in their respective regions, solely and/or in partnership with the international Community and the UN.

In response to such a call, regional organisations have formed security organs for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, peacekeeping and peace-building missions, and have already made their marks as evidenced by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the SADC in Lesotho. According to Sesay (2000: 196), “West Africa put that concept into practical use at the opportune time in mounting ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone” in the 1990s. There is no doubt that the rise of preventive diplomacy discourse has markedly shaped the functioning of African governments’ diplomatic interactions and relations. Due to the benign neglect by the West, African regional organisations have been compelled to assess their responsibility in conflict prevention, management and resolution. As Van Walraven (2005: 75) correctly observes, “African policy makers, diplomats and international civil servants began to refer to early warning, conflict prevention and peacebuilding in their public pronouncements, their thinking and their search for strategies that could improve the continent’s declining effectiveness in handling its own-especially intra-state conflicts.”
Thirdly, after the Cold War, Africa lost its economic, political and strategic value to the West as the battle-ground for bipolar politics. Western powers and the United States' foreign policies shifted to disengagement from the continent in spite of the numerous civil conflicts which erupted as a result of the residues of the Cold War politics (for example, in the DRC, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Liberia and Somalia), and the escalation of those conflicts which were fuelled by superpowers' bipolar ideological struggles such as in Angola, Mozambique and the DRC. The Security Council, which is controlled by the major world powers, became indifferent to the conflicts plaguing the African continent. This policy of inaction has been dubbed the “Africa fatigue” (Miall et al. 2001), the “Afro-pessimism”, the “peace fatigue” the “conflict fatigue” (USIP 1994), and the “intervention fatigue” (Sorbo, 1999), while Martin (2002) dubbed it the policy of “benign neglect”. Vraalsen (1999: 23) succinctly captures this attitude thus: “Let Africa drift in her own sea of misery and hopelessness. It is of no concern to us.”

The reluctance to commit UN and Western governments' resources in resolving conflicts in Africa mainly resulted from the abortive UN operation in Somalia in 1993, which saw 18 USA marines killed by the warring Somali factions (the Somalia/Mogadishu Syndrome). The UN peacekeeping forces withdrew, leaving Somalia to disintegrate into a collapsed and failed state, which it is today. The reluctance by the UN Security Council reached its peak when it remained passive during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Salim, then the OAU Secretary General, denounced the passivity by the UN as a laissez-faire attitude in the face of a tragedy. Shockingly the UN remained passive in spite of the numerous warnings by the commander of the inadequate UN force in Rwanda on the impending human catastrophe (Annan 1998, Adebayo et al. 1999, Berman 2000, de Waal 2000, Miall et al. 2001, IPA 2001, 2002, Levit 2003). According to Jentleson (2000c: 258), in the UN “information from the field about extremist plans in Rwanda was assessed in light of what happened in Somalia. There were fears that the UN may face a scenario that made Somalia look pale.” Therefore, the new self-imposed rule in the [UN] Department of Peacekeeping Operations became “Don’t cross the Mogadishu line.”

Sesay (2000) observes the prevalence of this indifferent attitude during the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The gross massacres, human rights violations and the concomitant humanitarian crises in the conflict-torn countries did not immediately trigger UN and international community intervention to curb the bloodbath. This was within the parameters of the post-Cold War politics in which the West and the USA would only commit their troops in situations where their strategic, political, economic and security interests were under threat. Sesay asks “[h]ow else does one account for the neglect of the war in Liberia and Sierra Leone by the great powers for so many years? Surely it was because the two countries were of lesser strategic and economic importance to the West…” With such established reluctance by the UN Security Council, peacekeeping in Africa was in jeopardy, as the international community feared another Somalia if they were to intervene. The situation confirmed the former USA Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker's observation that “[t]he end of the Cold War created both greater opportunities for negotiated
peace (in the absence of Cold War competition by proxy) and simultaneously diminished international interest in providing the resources and political engagement necessary to secure such peace” (cited in Suhrke and Jones (2000: 263).

Disengagement by the United States as the sole world power was consolidated by the passage of the Presidential Decision Directive (PPD 25) of May 1994 during the Clinton administration. It clearly stated that the USA will only commit its military resources when its national and strategic interests are threatened. This tragic u-turn in the USA policy on international intervention prompted Hass to describe the resourceful nation as “a reluctant sheriff.” De Waal (2000: 49) summarised the nonchalant attitude of the Security Council and the major powers towards conflict mediation in Africa thus: “the main feature of the international engagements in Africa, especially since the collapse of the Somali intervention, has been their lack of seriousness. Western powers, and notably the US, are simply not willing to risk military resources, and above all, the lives of their troops in Africa. [The] policy has been marked by only a ‘soft’ engagement–verbal and symbolic commitments not backed up by resources or hard political and diplomatic work.” The Western governments were either reluctant to provide substantial support or they intervened on their own terms or hid behind the bureaucratic UN decision-making process.

The major powers have also resorted to the principle of “African solutions to African problems” and have pledged to enhance African security and peacekeeping capabilities by providing training to African peacekeeping forces to take over the responsibility for peace and security in the continent. These came in the form of training of a Rapid Reaction Force, the African Crises Response Initiative (ACRI) by the USA; the Reinforcement of African Capabilities for Peacekeeping (RECAMP) by France and other security initiatives by Britain and the Nordic countries in the early 1990s. In 1991, for example, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia and Uganda provided battalions for training through the US ACRI initiative. Currently the USA intends to establish military bases in some African regions/countries for peacekeeping missions and mainly for its global war against terrorism. Other nations such as Nigeria and South Africa have their suspicions about the initiatives (IPA 2000, 2001). Herbst (2000: 311) remarks that “[f]or a variety of historical, tactical and relatively recent reasons, African solutions to African problems have been embarked across the world as the operational code for future peacekeeping operations in Africa.” It was in light of this situation that Salim was quoted as saying “[t]he declining enthusiasm of the outside world for getting involved in African issues and escalating demands on the UN for peacekeeping missions should lead to a greater devolution of responsibility for conflict resolution on regional organisations” (in Joseph 1999: 11).

Faced with such institutionalised neglect at a critical moment, African leaders and governments have realised the importance of consolidating their regional organisations and establishing security organs to tackle the emerging and/or recurring conflicts. They have taken it as a challenge to be more organised, coherent and bold, to face the
conflicts within their respective regions and the continent at large. This was evidenced by the establishment of ECOMOG and its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Security (MCPMR) which intervened in Liberia and Sierra Leone while SADC established its OPDS which facilitated the intervention in Lesotho and arguably in the DRC. IGAD has since been instrumental in trying to find lasting peace in the long-running conflicts in Sudan and Somalia, albeit with little success. The underlying assumption and driving motive for ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone is that the West has turned its back on Africa. As du Plessis (2000: 343) puts it, “vital national interests were still a decisive determinant in international relations as the great powers in general, simply ignored the collapse in Liberia and Sierra Leone because their vital interests were not directly threatened. ECOWAS thus felt obliged to act alone.” The ECOWAS Secretary General Abbas Bundi was quoted as saying ECOWAS intervened in Liberia because of the “realisation that there was a problem from which everyone was running away. ECOWAS states cannot stand by and watch a member state slide into anarchy” (cited in Soderbaum 2001: 69). These sentiments were also projected by the Coordinator of the Conflict Prevention and Research in the OAU Division of Conflict Management, William Nhara, that Africa should brace itself for full responsibility in maintenance of peace and security, as the continent has been deserted by the international community and the United Nation Security Council (Hebrst 2000).

This response by African leaders of establishing preventive diplomacy security mechanisms moved Hammerstad (2005) to comment that during the first few years of the 21st century there has been an immense growth in Africa’s security institutions, creating the hope that the regional organisations are prepared to play a leading role in resolving the continent’s political conflicts. However, it is important to note that in most cases, on their own, African regional organisations have not been successful in conflict resolution missions due mainly to a paucity of resources, lack of political will, and partisan complicity in some regional conflicts. In view of this, the partnership of regional organisations with the UN in preventive diplomatic interventions is crucial, because the UN would inject political legitimacy and operational expertise and resources to the mission. The Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict observed that “regional organisations can be greatly strengthened for preventive purposes. They should establish means, linked to the UN to monitor circumstances of incipient violence in the regions. They should develop a repertoire of diplomatic political and economic measures for regional use to help prevent dangerous circumstances... Such a repertoire would include ways to provide advanced warning of conflict to the organisation members and to marshal the necessary logistics command and control efforts authorised by the UN” (Job 1992: 19). In the view of Dress and Roseblum-Kumar (2002: 230), “[i]f prevention is framed in [such] an integrated and comprehensive way, governments and the international community will focus more attention and consequently a greater share of their budgets and resources, to the long-term aspects of peacebuilding instead of short-term crisis management.”
Fourthly, African leaders have always expressed and still express a keen desire for full sovereignty in the cultural, economic, and political and security spheres. Such sentiments were evidenced by the formation of the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and the existence of the Pan Africanist ideology, which were geared towards a United States of Africa, in which the nations of the continent would pool their resources to resolve their problems. Pan Africanist leaders and scholars such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Ali Mazrui, advocate the principle of “Pax Africana” in which genuine independence by the African continent can only be achieved when there is self-reliance in tackling the social, economic, political and security challenges. Although the OAU was a dismal failure in the maintenance of peace in the continent, it did have its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) which is evidence of the willingness to undertake the task, if it was not constrained by resource paucity and a lack of political will and commitment by some of the leaders. The organisation also maintained the “Try OAU First Principle” in which member states were encouraged to refer their conflicts to the OAU before they could be sent to the UN, as happened during the border wars between Ethiopia and Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi, and Morocco and Algeria. The West African region called for the formation of an African Fire Brigade -- a form of a Standing Army to quench the conflicts which were raging in the continent. The same aspirations are embodied in the invigorated African Union, its Peace and Security Council and NEPAD divisions, which are geared towards ensuring the stability, security and economic prosperity of the continent. The establishment of the African Union Parliament reflects the determination of the continent in combining efforts to resolve its problems and the accompanying challenges. The former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, spearheaded the African Renaissance, while Obasanjo of Nigeria proposed a conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation to empower Africa to confront her problems without necessarily waiting hopelessly for external support (IPA 2000, 2001, Field 2004). Such efforts have been evidenced by the African Union sending a peacekeeping force in Darfur (Sudan) although it is seriously constrained by paucity of resources. At the African Union meeting held on Saturday the 9th of September 2008 at Sirte, Libya, the late Libyan Leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, reiterated his calls for a United States of Africa in his rejection of the deployment of United Nations troops in the Sudanese Darfur region. He is quoted as having said: “Africa could be a black giant able to solve problems like Darfur on its own if countries were united in a federation…rather than existing as separate states vulnerable to outside manipulation” (cited in the Business Day, Monday 11 September 2008: 6). Although this appears to be a mirage, it shows how African governments wish and dream to be in a position to be independent and capable of addressing their challenges without always heavily relying on the UN and the Developed World.

The call for regional organisations to partake and play a leading role in conflict prevention, management and resolution should be viewed in the light of a continent still struggling for substantive economic and political independence. Mandela expressed these sentiments when he stated that “the time has come for Africa to take full responsibility for her woes; to use the immense collective wisdom (she) possesses to make a reality of the ideal of
the African renaissance whose time has come” (cited in Green 1999: 40). Hebrst (2000: 312) recommends the delegation of peacekeeping to regional organisations, and views this as an important move in the history of the continent. He writes: “[t]he Africanisation of peacekeeping is an important development in the international relations of the continent. The fact that peacekeeping is increasingly being seen as an African responsibility is part of a larger process that is leading to the development of much more profound and important international relations within Africa...the history of international relations in Africa is just beginning.” In response to the criticisms levelled against the Nigerian-led intervention in Liberia, the then military strongman Ibrahim Babangida said: “I, as should Nigeria and other responsible countries in the sub-region, standby and watch the whole of Liberia turned into one mass graveyard?... We know that there are those who are watching to see the Liberian crisis as a concrete indicator of Africa in disarray and despair, purposeless and without any direction or control... In Liberia were are first and foremost reflecting the love we have for our respective countries, our sub-region and mankind” (cited in Sesay 2000: 215-216). As a result of these insights, regional organisations have become increasingly prominent in the African political landscape to champion economic development, peace and stability in their respective regional zones and the continent at large.

Finally, regional organisations are well placed to mediate in disputes in their respective regions because they have an immediate interest in regional peace and stability and are compelled to avert conflict spill over and their effects into their respective states and the region at large, or deteriorating into regional complexes. This is a security imperative for regional states since inaction may spell their undoing. There are living lessons of how intra-state conflicts can swiftly spread and become regionalised if not nipped in the bud. This was experienced in the Great Lakes region, West Africa and the Horn of Africa regions. Regional organisations are well suited to play key roles in finding durable solutions to regional conflicts because they command considerable knowledge and understanding of their historical, cultural, political and geographical contexts and dynamics (Ghali 1992, 1995, Job 1992, Lund 1996, Annan 1998, Adedeji 1999, International Peace Academy 2001, Carment and Schnabel 2003, Anthony 2003, Basupi 2007). Job 1992: 19) summarised the reasons why regional organisations should be integrally involved as follows. They:

- Have the advantages of familiarity and proximity;
- Are likely to have direct interests in seeing tensions reduced and conflicts ended, given the likelihood of the spill over effects of economic uncertainty, voluntary and involuntary flows of refugees, [and] cross-over incursions;
- Are sensitive to the nuances of regional and local political and security cultures;
- Have first-hand knowledge of the issues at hand;
- Are likely to be more functionally capable in terms of language and logistical matters;
- Have incentives to stay the course and see post-conflict peacebuilding efforts satisfactorily concluded because they will reap the benefits of a stable environment, not suffer the consequences of further regional instability.
Adedeji (1999) and Rugumamu (2002) correctly note that what is primarily required in resolving a conflict is to master and comprehend the underlying structural causes, histories and trends of the conflicts. In fact, Adedeji (1999) and Toure (1999) argue that failure by the United Nations to resolve conflicts in Africa emanates from lack of comprehension and mastery of the history and dynamics of the conflict at hand.

Therefore, it is envisaged that regional organisations can provide illuminating insights into the sources and dynamics of conflicts in their respective regions. It is also worth noting that regional powers can mobilise a peacekeeping force rapidly as compared to the United Nation Security Council which has to go through numerous bureaucratic procedures. There is also a belief that regional peacekeeping troops will in most cases be more acceptable in conflict-torn countries than forces from the UN. As Cantori and Spiegel (1970) observe, “[i]n general the experience of intrusive powers has been that it is easier to impose conflict than cooperation upon members of a subordinate system” (cited in Buzan 1991: 214). However, this is questionable considering the resistance which the ECOWAS and SADC forces faced in Liberia and Sierra Leone, DRC and Lesotho respectively. It has also been argued that several African countries have participated in the UN peacekeeping missions and have acquired skills and experience to carry out regional peacekeeping with or without support from the UN. For example in SADC, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa have participated in the UN peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Mozambique and the DRC. In the view of Hettne (2001: 107 and 103), “security has become a regional issue in Africa and will continue to be so in the years to come” therefore it is imperative for Africa “to develop a structure of trans-national governments in all the sub-regions.” Hettne even envisages a future world order characterised by regional multilateralism, while Buzan (1991) asserts that if the consciousness of regional security dynamics was to grow in the minds of policy makers, it might ensure better focused efforts to deal with both regional and international conflicts.

The call for regional organisations’ role in maintenance of peace and security should not alienate the UN as the international body for international peace and security. The UN retains its central and primary role of ensuring global peace and security. As Doyle (1998: 10) rightly notes, “[t]he UN holds a unique claim to legitimate authority on international peace and war.” According to Jentleson (2002: 37) “[t]he UN brings two great strengths to preventive state craft. One is its unique normative role for ‘collective legitimation.’ No other body can claim comparative legitimacy for establishing global norms and for authorising actions in the name of the international community, be it diplomatic intermediation or military intervention. The other is its network of agencies, which provide it with significant institutional capacity to help cope with refugee flows, help relieve starvation and perform other humanitarian tasks.” The argument is that external assistance, especially by the UN, should be built on the efforts of regional organisations, as in the case of Liberia, where the UN came in to boost ECOMOG’s peacekeeping efforts. Henrikson
(1995) refers to this system as “subcontracting upwards from the regional groupings to the UN” while the United States Institute of Peace (1994) calls it the “layered response” (In this way the Africans would own the peace process and its outcomes.) After the abortive UN mission in Somalia, Mohammed Sahnoun, the special representative of the Secretary General, confessed that “the priority of regional response, with the UN providing mainly substantive support seems so far to have been the dominant lesson learned from the Somalian catastrophe” (cited in Henrikson 1995: 150).

Therefore, given the “greatly increased burden placed upon the UN since the end of the Cold War, it is logical to delegate a greater role to regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security” (Mosieleng 2001: 15). The UN should intervene at the invitation of a regional organisation following the exhaustion of regional peace initiatives. The organisations should be complementary in their roles. This is because there is no one international or regional actor that can singularly overcome the challenges posed by the incessant global conflicts. While most people would point to the UN actor as the optimal key player, it is important to remember that the UN has its own resources and institutional limitations which need to be complemented by other stakeholders such as regional organisations, NGOs, and CSOs (Jentleson 2002).

However, despite the fact that combined UN and regional organisations’ peace efforts have experienced difficulties; the international community should not and cannot relent. This is because as Jentleson (2002: 43) observes “…in this post-Cold War era we need to work with the core idea of preventive statecraft; Act early to stop disputes from escalating or problems from worsening: Reduce tensions that if intensified could lead to war. Deal with today’s conflicts before they become tomorrow’s crises. Much more development, refinement, elaboration, modification, adaptation and extension are needed. For if we know one thing for sure, it is that the need for prevention is not going to subside at any time soon.”

4.10 Challenges faced by Regional Organisations in Preventive Diplomacy Missions

Although there is “reason to believe that regional actors are intrinsically equipped to deal with the dynamics of regional conflicts... the hopes placed on regional organisations are unduly optimistic, if not altogether misplaced” (MacFarlane and Weiss 1992: 7). This is because the efforts of regional organisations to resolve political crises and wars have met with varying degrees of challenges and failure (Hammerstad 2005). Regional organisations in the Third World, especially Africa, are faced with a myriad of challenges in the mammoth and daunting task of preventing, managing and resolving the recurrent and devastating conflicts bedevilling the continent. The challenges have, in some cases paralysed the efficiency of the organisations in implementing the good ideals in their founding documents. Most of the ideals have remained theoretical with little or insignificant practical implementation and benefits to the member states and the regions. Salim Ahmed Salim (1995) notes that “there was a large gap between
assertions about African ownership and leadership and the blunt realities of African organisational weaknesses and external dependence” (in Joseph 1999: 11). According to Joseph (1999), existing evidence on African regional organisations in conflict resolution suggests that the gap between their aspirations and real achievements will take a long time to bridge. However, the experiences gained through ECOWAS operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone and SADC in Lesotho and the DRC provide valuable lessons and insights into the pros and cons of regional organisation interventions (Ero 1995, Vraalsen, 1999, Neethling 2000, International Peace Academy 2001, Nathan 2004, Ngoma 2005, Likoti 2006). Some of the challenges encountered by regional organisations in their preventive and peacekeeping missions are as follows.

First and foremost, the Third World countries are seriously underdeveloped owing to a wide range of factors such as colonial exploitation, neo-colonial economic domination, unfair and exploitative trade relations with the developed world, corruption and ill-advised and implemented development policies, crippling debt crises, and the marginalisation effects of globalisation on the already peripheral economies (Buzan 1991, Annan, 1998, Adedeji 1999, Bedjaouni 2000, Mangu, 2003, Cilliers 2004). Economic insecurity has become an ever-prevalent threat to intra-state, regional and international peace. As a result, Third World regions have been gripped by numerous political upheavals since attaining independence. To date, some African countries such as the DRC, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia and Angola, have never known peace and stability. The limited economic resources have been wasted in sustaining the protracted conflicts instead of being used for sustainable development, economic growth, human development projects and service delivery. The regimes in the Third World countries have been compelled to channel most of their energies and efforts into national issues more than to regional matters. The leaders are more into nation-building, struggling with the gnawing challenges of underdevelopment, unemployment, poverty, disease, illiteracy and defence of the states and their regimes, than to regional development, peace and integration. As Nathan (2004: 19) puts it, “It is improbable that states will agree to be bound by rules and decision-making in the political and security spheres if they do not support the underlying norms and trust each other.”

Because of underdevelopment, regional organisations, especially in the Third World, have dismally failed to extricate themselves from dependence on external funding for their survival, despite the rhetoric of regional sovereignty by the leaders during their Head of States Summit gatherings. SADC is one such an organisation which since its inception has heavily relied on external funding from the developed world, individual nations, the European Community, the Nordic countries, Canada, USA and organisations such as the European Union and the World Bank. Bryant (1988) notes that right from its natal stages; SADC identified 500 projects valued at 6.5 US billion dollars of which 40% was to be from external donors. The International Peace Academy (2000: 20) delegates in Botswana raised concerns about this dependency syndrome. They noted that “SADC’s overwhelming financial dependence on the EU begs the question of whether or not a genuine partnership between donors and SADC can be forged within such a framework
of dependence.” A report on the Review of the Operations of SADC Institutions (2001) revealed the painful reality that SADC is dependent on the international donor community for 80% of its operations costs. The out-going Chairman of SADC, former President Festus Mogae of Botswana, also lamented this heavy dependence of the SADC operations on donor funding as crippling the sovereignty and integration integrity of the organisation. (Botswana Daily News 18th August 2006).

This is the same problem which polarised SADC on the issue of the status of its security organ in relation to the mother body. The Zimbabwe-led camp advocated for an independent security organ since the SADC was donor-dependent and therefore not appropriate to handle sensitive security issues (Nathan 1995, 2003, Mallan and Cilliers 1997, Colliers 1999, International Peace Academy 2000, Ngoma 2005). Viewed objectively, this was a logical and sensitive argument, since regional leaders themselves were suspicious of the intentions of donors. But the question is, whether regional members would have been in a position to finance the organ considering the numerous socio-economic and political problems they were faced with in their respective countries. The paucity of resources has crippled regional organisations’ efforts in the maintenance of regional peace and stability. For example, they do not have standing armies for deployment in crises, and logistics for early warnings and risk assessment are non-existent. The African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur, Sudan, has been paralysed by lack of resources, and was characterised by dismal performance, hence their appeal for a UN peacekeeping force in the country, which the Sudanese government has vehemently rejected.

The lack of resources and logistical support has resulted in failure by regional organisations to effectively conduct preventive interventions, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building activities such as election monitoring and the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants, reconstruction and revival of institutions of governance in war torn societies. This has resulted in recurrence of conflicts, as the underlying root causal factors would not have been addressed. The former Secretary General of the OAU Salim Ahmed Salim (1992) lamented the paralysing effects of resource paucity, that “…many times, we have looked around for the OAU to intervene constructively in a conflict situation only to find that it is not there, and when present, to realise that it is not adequately equipped to be decisively helpful” (Cited in Rugumamu, 2002: 14). Failure in this regard has resulted in recurrent conflicts in countries such as Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and the DRC (De Waal 2000, International Peace Academy, 2001, Soderbaum 2001, International Crisis Group Report No 62, April 2003). As such the former Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan has never relented to call for provision of adequate resources, equipment and personnel as prerequisites for any credible and effective intervention and peacekeeping by any organisation. When South Africa and Botswana intervened militarily in Lesotho in 1998, there were concerns on the ill preparation and ill-equipped force all of which adversely affected the efficacy of the regional organisation in its intervention missions. South Africa is even alleged to have required the Lesotho government to pay for the damages
caused and the presence of its troops during the mission while Botswana paid for herself. This confirms Job’s (1992) observation that regional institutions, especially in the Third World, lack adequate resources to plan, support and implement major peacekeeping missions. The African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur is a living example of how the AU failed to mobilise resources for the peace mission. The resource strapped mission has persistently appealed to the UN to collaborate and/or take over the mission due to the insurmountable challenges of financing the operation. Another example is the case of the collapsed state of Somalia since 1991. The withdrawal of the UN forces left the AU always making unfulfilled pledges during its summits to contribute troops to restore a legitimate regime and democracy in the country. Currently a poorly resourced force from Uganda and Ethiopia has been battling the recalcitrant and highly committed Islamic Militants. The situation on the ground suggests that the restoration of peace and stability in the country will remain a dream unless the AU and the regional organisations in partnership with the UN can take a coordinated and principled resolve to address the conflict.

Secondly, regional organisations tend to confirm the realists position that nations are not interested in regional integration per se, but in preservation of power, sovereignty and national interests. It appears nations in regional integration are suspicious of each others’ intentions and fear loss of national sovereignty to regional supranational institutions as predicted by the neo-functionalists (Nathan 1995, Howell 2000, Schoeman 2001, Adar 2002, Solomon 2004, Hammerstad 2004). According to Nathan (1995: 9) “certain members of the SADC states fear that their membership of multi-lateral political and security forums will entail major infringements of sovereignty. This is an entirely legitimate concern which has also bedevilled efforts to consolidate the European Union.” Such fears perhaps prompted the former Namibian President, Sam Nuyoma, to appeal to other SADC member states for “the need to put regional considerations above national interests and the need to relinquish some national sovereignty for the interest of the region” (cited in Nathan 1995: 9). In SADC the geo-political power struggle between South Africa and Zimbabwe which coalesced around the status of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security emanated from the struggle for domination and fear of losing regional power by the two contenders. In fact Van Nieuwkerk (2000) observed intentions by the Southern African ruling elite to prevent the establishment of a powerful and influential organ on security lest it interferes with their undemocratic regimes. It is this fear of losing national sovereignty which has seen the principle of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, sovereign equality, political independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states being integral in the founding documents of almost all regional organisations in the Third World. Although it is important to guard against regional hegemons using their might against member states for their selfish reasons, the principle of non-interference has paralysed many organisations in the face of regional turmoil. The Organisation of African Unity failed because of this principle (Levit 2003, Field 2004, Ngoma 2005). The defence of national sovereignty goes hand-in-hand with the incumbent regimes/leaders determination to protect their regimes and personal power base against threats from regional organisations and institutions. Most of the leaders mainly in the Third World tend to cling to power by any means...
even if they are despotic and endanger regional peace, stability and the freedom of their citizens. They would ratify regional protocols but when it suits their autocratic interests they contravene them at will and with impunity. For example, most of the SADC nation-states do not fully observe the Rules on the Regulation of Democratic Elections as agreed. Swaziland for example, remains the bulwark of autocratic dictatorship while elections in Zimbabwe have been an epitome of unbridled fraud and an assault on democracy.

The SADC policy of ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ seems to be born out of fear of interfering in the domestic affairs of the sovereign state of Zimbabwe despite the crippling effects the crisis in the country has had in the entire region. This attitude has given credibility to criticisms of regional organisations as clubs for regional leaders to protect each other and their undemocratic regimes (Nieukerk 2000, Schoeman 2002, Adar 2002, Terriff et al. 2004, Cawthra 2004, Solomon 2004). As Nathan notes “states that have weak defacto sovereignty are understandably resistant to regional mechanisms that would dilute it further through binding rules and decision-making that heighten the possibility of interference in their domestic affairs” (2004: 19). Slinn (1984: 183) notes that it is not surprising for the Sub-Saharan Africa regional member states, which are still in the process of nation building to tenaciously cling to the notion of sovereignty rather than regional integration. He posits that “[i]t is particularly difficult for the political leadership of countries which have only relatively attained national independence to abandon some element of sovereignty in the interest of regional solidarity.” The adherence to national sovereignty has seen interventions by regional organisations in their respective zones being accused by the one of the warring parties in the intervened country of violating its sovereignty and territorial integrity. These accusations were levelled against ECOWAS and the SADC in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Lesotho respectively. For example, the leader of the opposition in Lesotho, Qhobela Moloapo, lashed out that “Lesotho is a sovereign state, not a SADC colony” in protest against the SADC military intervention on the side of the government (cited in Ngoma, 2005: 33).

This adherence to national and sovereign power has killed the good intentions of regional integration and collective security in regional matters. This is exacerbated by the suspicions existing among powerful regional powers for control of the regional organisation. The strong members are often suspicious of each other as using the regional project to gain an upper hand as a regional hegemon. The problem has been experienced in both the ECOWAS and SADC. In the ECOWAS, Nigeria and Ghana are the competitors for the position of regional hegemon. According to Sessay (2002: 219) “Ghana is known to have leadership aspirations in West Africa, and is highly suspicious of Nigeria’s intentions in the sub-region.” In the ECOWAS the competition is aggravated by the historically entrenched Anglophone and Francophone rivalries. The Francophone countries are always suspicious of the intentions of the Anglophone countries and vice versa. This was experienced during the ECOWAS interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia. In the SADC region, as shall be indicated in the subsequent chapters, the competition was rife between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Each wanted to entrench its sovereign power within the region through SADC. This
resulted in President Mugabe leading a questionable military operation in the DRC under the SADC name without the mandate of President Mandela, who then was the organisation’s chairman. Such competition to establish national and sovereign power through regional organisations always dilute the efficacy of regional organisations in conflict prevention, management and resolution operations. As Moller (2005: 68) observed “[g]enerally SADC is hampered by the apparent rivalry between South Africa and the rest based on the fact that South Africa possesses all the wherewithal of hegemony (in military, political, economic, demographical and geographical terms) or even regional unipolarity.”

However, it is commendable for regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the SADC that although they pledged to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their members, they also pledged to intervene where gross violations of human rights, genocide atrocities and humanitarian emergencies and collapse of legitimate governance are experienced. As Wheeler (1994: 4) observes, “the fundamental argument in favour of a right of humanitarian intervention is that the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention- the cornerstone of the international legal order cannot be sacrosanct in the face of massive human suffering caused by either the collapse of the state into civil war and anarchy or a government’s oppression of its people. Those who support a right of humanitarian intervention do so on the ground that we all have moral obligations to do what we can to alleviate human suffering wherever it occurs.” The SADC and ECOWAS interventions in Lesotho, Liberia and Sierra Leone were justified on humanitarian grounds. At the World Press Conference in Lagos, the then President Babangida of Nigeria indicated that “[w]e are in Liberia because events in that country have led to the massive destruction of property by all parties, the massacres by all parties of thousands of innocent civilians including foreign nationals, women and children some of whom had sought sanctuary in the churches and mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals and under Red Cross protection, contrary to all recognised civilised behaviour...” (cited in Sesay 2000: 215). The only burning issue is that countries in a region will always be biased in their interpretation of what constitute a humanitarian crisis inviting a regional response. The situation is further complicated by regional political power plays, as regional powers will always intervene where their national interests are in jeopardy. In other cases, they just pretend that the situation is a domestic affair which needs a domestic solution, thus resorting to the principles on non-interference and respect for members’ national sovereignty and territorial integrity. This has led to Neethling’s question that: “[g]iven the sustained importance of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, when should a situation in an African state be considered to have deteriorated to such an extent that an international and/or regional response is required on humanitarian grounds?” (2000: 315-316). President Museveni of Uganda, who was the OAU Chairman during the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, attempted to answer this question when he justified the organisation’s intervention on the grounds that “[t]he principle of non-interference applied to the actions of a state not interfering in another ‘functioning state’ and that this principle did not apply to Liberia, because there was no longer any central authority in the country” (cited in du Plessis 2000: 343).
Thirdly, regional members' interventions in peace missions are more often than not determined by the national interests of the intervening powers rather than the motive for bringing peace to the conflict-ridden country or region. This is in line with the Realists' perspective that nations will always intervene when their national interests whether economic or political are in jeopardy. As indicated earlier, the Realists are "sceptical of the notion of the international community and hold that international interventions can still be best understood in terms of the power and interests of particular states, especially the great powers acting individually or collectively. Such states may cloak their interests in the language of the common good and may claim to be acting in the name of the international community" (Lyons and Mastanduno 1995: 13). It is an indisputable truism that in the international political arena "governments have found it desirable to justify interventions in the name of the international community in order to build up the broadest possible political support" (Lyons and Mastanduno 1995: 12). This scenario was exercised by the USA in the Gulf (Iraq), Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo. A common factor in all these interventions is that the dominant actor (USA) sought to "monopolise the right to interpret the laws and norms...to attain a situation in which it can invoke the entire international authority, behind its interpretation of the rules in support of its own interests" (Nye, cited in Ohlson 1993: 239).

While the international community has been accused by African leaders that the UN failed to intervene in conflict-torn nations like Somalia, Rwanda and others, if their interests are not jeopardised, regional organisations have also caught the disease. This is because “[m]ajor powers [be they regional or international] are increasingly reluctant to become embroiled in military intervention beyond the confines of their geopolitical and national interests” (du Plessis 2002: 19). Du Plessis (2000: 32-33) further observes that “[a] major problem is that the purpose and motive are usually equated with the proclaimed national interest of the intervener....the fact cannot be ignored that national interest but not necessarily the defence of national security or territorial integrity, is likely to remain paramount as motivation for military intervention.” Moreover, “[i]t would always be difficult to distinguish the (arguably disproportionate) exercise of military force for selfish or predatory reasons, or for a strategic advantage, from its use for lawful, justified or humanitarian purposes. Since... interventions cannot be completely delinked from national interest, irrespective of the justification, it will always be questioned and deemed suspect by non-beneficiary actors.”

Most, if not all regional and international organisations’ interventions are conducted under the false rubric of humanitarian intervention, peace support operations, restoration of legitimate government and protection of human rights, concealing the deep reality that the interventions are primarily driven by national self-interest. “Whether states intervene individually or regionally, leaders tend to justify their actions with many and varied arguments, ranging from a need to ensure stability or to alleviate suffering to a need to restore democracy” (du Plessis 2000: 333). When ECOMOG and SADC intervened in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Lesotho and the DRC respectively, they couched their
interventions with such humanitarian terms to gain regional and international support (du Plessis 20000). As Hedley observes, interveners “almost vicariously seek some form of collective authorisation, or at least post facto endorsement of their policies” (cited in Lyons and Mastanduno 1995: 4). Thus, it should be noted that “the publicly aired motives for intervention are not ipso facto evidence of the rationale of the third party actors...” (Van Walraven 20005: 79-80). Examples abound where individual and/or regional organisations intervened under the pretext of restoring democracy, peace and stability while in actual fact, the mission serves the interests of some or all of the member states, especially the regional hegemons. Nigeria has been accused of sponsoring its national interests through ECOMOG in its interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Sesay (2000: 242) notes that ECOMOG’s interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone “partly supported the realists’ argument that states are often driven by narrow national interests in their responses to situations in the international system.” Sesay argues that although the Nigerian–led ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone was launched on the pretext of reinstating the democratically elected government of Tejan Kabbar; the intervention was mainly motivated by Nigerian national interests. Sesay notes that the military leader Sani Abacha:

- Wanted to divert attention from his regime which had come under increasing pressure both at home and abroad, especially after the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa [and other Environmentalist activists];
- Expected some concessions from the EU and the USA which were not only critical of the poor human rights record of his regime but had also headed the crusade to isolate Nigeria, leading to imposition of sanctions;
- Shifted attention from his dictatorial military regime to be viewed as a saviour of democracy, peace and stability in the region.

What raised more questions regarding the Nigerian motives in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean interventions is that it did not make sense for a military government to pretend to be opposed to military coups in the region, as was the cases of Nigeria, (Ibrahim Babanginda and Sani Abacha) Ghana (Jerry Rawlings) and Burkina Faso (Blaise Kompaore). As such, Sesay (2000: 209) justifiably asked: “[w]hy did an undemocratic military regime lead a crusade on behalf of democracy against another military regime? Why would an illegitimate military regime champion the cause of a democracy in a neighbouring state?”

The SADC interventions in the DRC as launched by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia have been viewed by numerous commentators as resource-based intervention. The intervening powers were accused of using SADC to propel their individual and politico-economic and security interests. Zimbabwe and Namibia are alleged to have had a stake in the rich mining sector in the DRC while Angola is alleged to have had the motive of dismantling UNITA military bases in the country. In Lesotho, South Africa was also accused of using the SADC to protect its economic interests at the Katse Dam, the Lesotho Highland Water project, which is vital for the operation of industries in South Africa (Mathee 2000, Vale 2003, Neethling 2000, Hwang 2005, and Likoti 2006). In the light of this, Van Walraven (2005: 95)
observes that “the supposed diplomatic involvement of Southern Africa’s regional organisation thus concealed, but only thinly, the naked pursuit of narrow elite and personal interests.”

These interventions, driven by national interests rather than the interests of resolving the conflict and restoring regional peace and security, often blemish the credibility of the organisations and their legitimacy as regional arbiters. Regional organisations such as the SADC and ECOWAS, in spite of the commendable efforts they have made in restoring order, have suffered stinging criticisms as a result of this alleged manipulation of the conflict situation for selfish interests mainly by the regional hegemons. In view of thus Sesay (2000: 239) maintains that “ECOMOG has set a precedent that other subregional hegemons will probably want to emulate in future. South Africa’s incursion into Lesotho is already proof that regional hegemons are ready to take risks and will move into neighbouring states if their interests are ‘threatened.’ Realisation of such motives by other members of the regional organisations has led to disjointed preventive peace operations. This is because other members would be reluctant to embark on a mission that they suspect to be for the benefit of one or some of the members. This situation was experienced in the 2003 USA-led invasion of Iraq, when France refused to contribute troops as it deemed the invasion as contravening the UN Charter and only serving the USA political and economic agenda. Other SADC member states also stayed out of the Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola intervention in the DRC when it became clear that they had their own national interests to fulfil rather than regional stability. As such “[t]he substance of the factual rationale - or motivation for - the intervening parties must [always] be studied, since these impinge heavily on the character, execution and outcome of intervention” (Van Walraven 2005: 79).

Because of the numerous questions which hung around the legitimacy and /or motive of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Sesay (2000: 200-201) poses sharp and thought-provoking questions as follows:

- To what extent were the interventions humanitarian or peace support operations?
- Were they designed to promote a common international goal such as the maintenance of global peace and stability in West Africa?
- To what extent were the operations a re-enactment of hard-nosed Real politik especially by the sub-regional giant, Nigeria?
- Were the two operations contrived by the interveners to promote their parochial national interests as the realists would have us believe?
- Did the interventions lead to real political, economic and political transformations and stability in the target states?
Perhaps research consistently guided by some of these questions may unravel the real motives of regional and international organisations’ interventions in other states if they are not only motivated by the protection of national interests.

Fourthly, there is an arguably established belief that regional organisations’ interventions always target weak member states, while they remain passive when the powerful regional members threaten regional peace and stability. The perspective is that regional organisations’ interventions, especially military and other coercive measures such as sanctions, are often led by the regional hegemons mainly against the economically and politically weak regional members. For example, military intervention requires an asymmetry in power between the intervening states and the target state. In view of this, Otte (1995:10) defines military intervention as “[t]he planned...use of force for a transitory period by a state (or a group of states) against a weaker state in order to change or maintain the target state’s domestic structure or to change its external policies...” According to du Plessis (2002: 37), “[t]he very nature of these instruments and their use support the idea that military intervention is primarily the prerogative of the major powers, regional hegemons and intergovernmental organisations; that it is the prerogative of the more developed, influential and rich actors in world politics.” This is because they have the economic, political and military power to influence the regional political landscape and dictate the agenda, rules and procedures during peace missions (Sesay 2000, du Plessis 2000). This dovetails well with the activities of the UN’s Security Council interventions against states which are deemed to be a threat to international peace. The interventions are more often than not, directed against weak nation-states, especially in the Third World or those which are not in the good books of the great powers politically or economically. Nevertheless, when the powerful and developed nations violate international law or jeopardise international peace and security, no action is taken. The traditional thinking, which is still prevalent, “has always regarded military intervention as a tool of the powerful against the weak; of older and established states against new states; and of the centre or 'inner circle' of world politics against those marginalised or peripheral” (du Plessis 2002: 38). For example, the USA, the EU and the UN Security Council are highly critical of North Korea’s and Iran’s alleged manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction, and have even threatened military action (as happened in Iraq) but have no qualms about Israel’s military arsenals.

Regional organisations also apply the principle in addressing their regional conflict issues. For example, the ECOMOG and SADC military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone and Lesotho respectively, were viewed within the framework of Nigeria and South Africa exercising their regional hegemonic powers against their weak neighbours. Commenting on the ECOMOG issue, du Plessis (2002: 344-345) notes that “[w]hile stronger states have used military intervention to interfere in the problems of vulnerable governments, smaller states still regard the regional powers of West Africa, such as Nigeria or Ghana, as untouchables, immune against intervention in their own domestic affairs by others. It is improbable, they argue, that smaller countries will ever take steps against possible
renegade military governments of regional powers, such as Nigeria and Ghana.” In fact, in the case of Nigeria, it was surprising because the country was also ruled by dictatorial military regimes under Babanginda and Sani Abacha when they launched the interventions against what they considered to be undemocratic regimes in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In the 1998 Lesotho crisis, South Africa and Botswana sent troops under the auspices of SADC to restore order and the democratically elected regime which was under siege from the opposition protests. The two intervening powers suffered stinging criticism, mainly from the opposition, for invading Lesotho because of its unique geographical position within South Africa and because Lesotho is a small politico-economic entity which could not resist the military might of South Africa. The criticism could be justifiable in the sense that South Africa under President Mbeki, who also headed the mediation in the crisis-ridden Zimbabwe, had vehemently resisted any calls for coercive measures to force the renegade Mugabe regime to respect good governance and human rights principles. This lends credibility to arguments that South Africa and SADC could not think of military intervention in Zimbabwe because she is a regional power to be reckoned with. But in the case of Lesotho, military intervention was considered the right medicine in the case of the 1998 mission.

The possibility that coercive measures are not equally applied to any renegade member but are selectively applied on the weaker members seriously hampers the efficacy of regional organisations in their preventive diplomacy missions. The legitimacy of their operations is compromised, as the weaker members will always question the motive of the operations. The criticism is hinged on the assumption that since national power is an important factor in international relations, the strong may still interpret the regional and/or international laws and justify operations to their advantage. This is because great powers, be they global or international, often strive to obtain multilateral consensus on interventions in order to achieve their hidden agenda in the target states (du Plessis 2000, Neethling 2000, and Sesay 2000).

Fifth, most regional organisations are state-centric, that is, their norms, rules, objectives and mandates are determined by the regimes, and more often than not, reflect the interests of the regional leaders in defending their regimes. Security is still narrowly defined in militaristic terms as defence of the state and the regime of the day, in spite of the broadened definition of security challenges in the current world order (Buzan 1991, Thomas 1991, Benjamin 1992, Nathan 1995, Vita 2001, Solomon 2004, Ngubane 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Swart and du Plessis 2004, Cilliers 2004, Field 2004). Suffice it therefore, for one commentator to have posited that “it is difficult to determine exactly how most African governments define their security…[i]t usually implies a rather narrow definition of security, based on considerations of military defence and regime stability…Some leaders confuse national security with government survival, or even personal power” (AllAfrica.com1March 2002 cited in Africa Strategic Alternatives 2004: 129-130). For example, what some regimes are doing is in direct contravention and negation of the collective commitment and vision for respect of fundamental values, promotion of good governance and human rights. In the
SADC region, the political climate in Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Madagascar does not reflect the shared visions of the region as envisaged in the SADC treaty and security protocols (Schoeman 1997, Nathan 1995, 2003, Van Niewkerk 2003, Ngoma 2005). In Zimbabwe, the SADC has consistently pursued the policy of quiet diplomacy despite its lingering failure to reign in the recalcitrant and autocratic Mugabe regime which violates human rights and regional protocols with impunity. More shocking still, the SADC seems to be unconcerned, and sees no evil in the undemocratic monarch autocracy in Swaziland, despite its endless lip service pledges to promote democracy, the rule of law and good governance in the region.

Similarly, the ASEAN also has in its fold the authoritarian military regime in Burma, but has argued that they are pursuing a policy of “constructive engagement” rather than isolation as a strategy to encourage reforms in the country (Ojendal 2001). The fact that regional organisations in the Third World have accommodated autocratic regimes in their membership, contrary to their rhetoric for promotion of good governance, democracy, human security and human rights, has led some critics to dub them clubs for defence of the regimes and personal grip to power, rather than the security of the regions and their citizens (Nieuwkerk 2000, Ojendal 2001, Schulz et al 2001, Cawthra 2004, Solomon 2004, Ngubane 2004, Ngoma 2005). In the view of Cawthra (2004: 38), “[a]n inherent danger in collective security arrangements, and especially in collective defence arrangements, is that they secure regimes, not citizens. If security is isolated from issues such as democracy and human rights, then illegitimate regimes—even individual dictators—can effectively protect themselves not only against external interventions but also against internal challenges by calling on their neighbours for support.” In light of this, Louis xiv might have been correct when he said African leaders are “the state in their respective countries. As such, even major policy decisions, could be made merely to satisfy their whims and caprices, no matter what the long-term consequences might be for the state and its citizens” (paraphrased in Sesay 2000: 217).

The SADC member states have consistently supported Zimbabwe against international pressure for the Mugabe regime to embrace democratic governance and protection of human rights of the citizens. The SADC response has been marked by such rebuttals that the international community seeks to “set the agenda for the regional states and/or are interfering in the domestic/regional affairs.” The SADC Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) “expressed serious concern on the continued foreign interference in the internal affairs of some member states, especially Zimbabwe”… while the Ministerial Committee of the Organ “took note that those opposed to Zimbabwe have tried to shift the agenda from the core issue of land by selective diversion of attention on governance and human rights issues” (cited in Nathan 2003: 11). President Mbeki is said to have protested that the issue of “Zimbabwe had become a smokescreen for those who did not want to address Africa’s other problems” (Hanekom 2002, cited in Neethling 2004: 11). The SADC Summit of 2003 “re-affirmed the indivisibility of SADC and solidarity with Zimbabwe. It was in view of this scenario that Simon Banza, remarked in an interview by Fisher and Ngoma (23
March, 2003) that “SADC represents political elites and that [its] objectives, although poised to address regional challenges, have nevertheless been ‘privatised by the states’...that the SADC Organ no longer protects its people as initially intended but protects the state from its people” (cited in Fisher and Ngoma 2005: 3).

Nathan (2003) laments that there is visible lack of political will by the states in the SADC region to act on what are considered to be "hard" issues of democratic governance and human rights abuses by some member states. That most of the regional organisations lack the political will and commitments to implement regional economic, political and security functions prompted Lavergue (1997: 4) to describe their approach as “one whereby the Heads of State assemble on a regular basis and pronounce ambitious declarations of what they are going to do, as a prelude to actually doing nothing,” while Solomon (2004: 195) notes that “SADC remains all image and little substance” in that it “continues to function at the rhetorical level and continues to be a club to protect the excesses of its political elite as opposed to being concerned with the true emancipation of its citizens.” The views by Banza and Solomon as stated above answer Schoeman’s question as to whether the Organ on Politics Defence and Security “will be used by Heads of States and governments to protect each other, or whether in the spirit of the SADC Treaty it will be used to protect the people of the region” (2002: 20).

Sixth, there are problems posed by regional hegemons in regional integration and issues of collective security. Almost all regional organisations have their powerful, dominant and influential members. Such a power with the economic, political and military might dominates and influences the regional political landscape and economic order. Conversely stated, security complexes, as geographical entities will always include low power states which often have little impact on the structure of the complex (Buzan 1991). The USA is the political hegemon in the Organisation of American States and NATO, Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC. There are two ways in which the presence of a regional power can affect regional integration and maintenance of regional peace and stability. One school of thought maintains that for regional integration to prosper there has to be a regional hegemon to resource the integration process and peacekeeping operations. The assumption is that regionalisation is an expensive and colossal task which needs enormous resources, and the regional hegemon should be ready to spend a great deal. As Herbst (2000: 314) observes, “[f]or a collective good to be produced, one country may have to take on the costs disproportionate to the benefits it expects to reap and provide political leadership.” Hence, Ajulu (2004) notes that the absence of a hegemonic power in IGAD is responsible for its inefficiency in tackling regional challenges. The situation in which the dominant regional power uses its economic and political might for the benefit of regional integration, peace and stability is referred to as “constructive, benign or benevolent hegemony” (Herbst 2000, Mortimer 2001, International Peace Academy 2000, 2001, Ngoma 2005). According to the proponents of this view a “hegemony can sometimes contribute to stabilising conflict situations and need not always be associated solely with bullying dominance” (International Peace Academy 2000: 13). Van Walraven (2005) traces the failure of the OAU to
undertake decisive peace operations and military interventions to the absence of an undisputed hegemonic leadership within the organisations. He argues that “without a strong leadership provided either by a particular member state or group of powerful states, it has been difficult to generate inter-state cooperation on many issues.” Due to “this lack of hegemonic leadership...it has always been very difficult for the Pan Africanist body to execute forceful strategies in conflict mediation” (Van Walraven 2005: 81).

The immense contribution in terms of military and personnel resources by Nigeria during the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone and South Africa in Lesotho should be viewed in the light of this perspective. For example, Nigeria was instrumental in the evolution of ECOWAS and its military wing-the ECOMOG and how the organisation addressed the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Sesay (2000) and du Plessis (2000) maintain that Nigeria played a dominant role throughout ECOMOG interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone as she provided 70% or more of the soldiers and the finance for the operations. In the same vein, South Africa, as a regional hegemon in the SADC region, is always looked upon to provide leadership in peace and security missions. Accordingly South Africa has led the SADC mediation and peace interventions in the DRC, Lesotho and Zimbabwe, though with limited success in the latter. South Africa is also conscious of its leadership role in the region, hence in justifying the South African military intervention in Lesotho, the government emphasised “the fact that it was increasingly being required of South Africa to play a role in regional peacekeeping” (du Plessis 2000: 349). Other SADC member states seem to be conscious of South Africa’s incontestable hegemonic status in the region. Hence, she has always been delegated to lead most of the mediation processes as is the case of Zimbabwe. In view of this situation, Moller (2005: 68) maintains that the success of the SADC “depends on South Africa’s continued commitment to the organisation and the acceptance by other members of its role as a benevolent hegemon and primus inter pares.” Van Nieuwkerk notes how the Southern African states were concerned “[w]ether South Africa, having obtained a ‘black-led government, would actually undergo a complete change from one which exported violence to one which would live in harmony and utilise its economic dominance to improve the general economic levels of the region...as an accepted and trusted member of the Southern African region” (1999: 1). In the view of Realists, the presence of the regional hegemon is beneficial in terms of it strengthening and entrenching its power. On the other hand, the Neo-Liberal view is that “there is a symbiotic relationship between the hegemon and the lesser or middle powers, which foster cooperation (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995: 52).” However, in most cases the regional hegemon may seek to dominate the construction and operations of the regional organisation. This view is consistent with what is prevailing in the evolution and operations of almost all regional organisations. In spite of their other hidden agendas, regional hegemons have played instrumental roles in financing and leading peace operations in their regional zones and at the same time projecting their national power and interests. In fact Moller (2005) argues that it is unlikely that other states in the SADC and ECOWAS can be in a position to field any major military operations without the participation of South Africa and Nigeria.
The other perspective considers regional hegemons as a source of disintegration in regional integration as most of them use their powers to dominate the organisation and fulfil their national political agenda in the region at the expense of the regional project. As Rotberg asserts, "[t]he country that dominates the region writes the rules -- always has and always will" (cited in Vale 2003: 133). Realists have observed that "[i]f the hegemon is in an extremely dominant position, the very extent of that power may make institutions, and in this case institutionalised regionalism unnecessary, or at best marginalised" (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995: 52). Its presence in an organisation brings with it hegemonic power and authority that can enact and enforce rules of operation behaviour by the organisation concerned (Keohane 1984). Such behaviour by regional hegemons is what Nye described as "the alternative way of exercising power, namely, to set the agenda and make others feel [that] they accept this agenda" (in Ohlson 1993: 239). For example, during interventions, regional hegemons monopolise the right to interpret and influence the laws and norms to "attain a situation in which it can invoke the entire authority behind its interpretation of the rules in support of its own interests" (Sesay 2000: 241).

This dominant position held by a particular power has been a source of friction in many regional organisations, as more often than not it will be challenged by other contending relatively strong regional members. In reference to the United States of America in NATO, Calleo (1987) remarked that "[a]s the net provider of security, the US certainly felt entitled to a greater say on alliance matters than its European allies, all of which were 'net consumers' of security. NATO thus became a vehicle for US hegemony over Western Europe" (cited in Moller 2004: 125). The same problem existed in ECOWAS with the dominant position by Nigeria as a thorny issue in the organisation. For example, ECOMOG was born within the conflictual Anglophone-Francophone regional politics. Yoroma (1993: 87) observes that "[t]here was no consensus between ECOWAS' Francophone and Anglophone members. Senegal expressed misgivings that Nigeria might use ECOMOG to complete an ambitious design in the sub-region." In light of this problem, the ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary Cheik Diarra once observed that "Nigeria is both the problem and the solution in the move towards a Pax West Africana. ECOWAS needs Nigeria, but the spectre of a bulldozing hegemon is still a source of concern for many states. Because Nigeria is expected to play a dominant role in West Africa, its actions must be responsible, accountable and transparent" (International Peace Academy 2001: 15). The competition for the position of regional hegemon between Nigeria and Ghana, and between the Anglophone and Francophone members, has adversely affected the efficacy of the organisation in its peace missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. As Mortimer (1996: 15) notes, "[h]owever high their moral ground, Nigeria's leaders had to realise that any operation mounted from Lagos risked exacerbating West Africa's fears of Nigeria's regional hegemon."

The struggle between South Africa and Zimbabwe over the status of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was in actual fact a struggle for regional domination. This led to some critics accusing South Africa of
thirsting for continued domination of the region, as did its aggressive apartheid predecessor. As Barengu puts it, “[t]he common denominator between the apartheid and the new South African state is the quest to maintain and sustain the Republic’s hegemony in regional and African affairs” (cited in Ngoma 2005: 152-153). Vale (2003) argues that in the SADC the “affairs of the region continue to pivot around the strongest player…South Africa as the first in a community of unequals” (2003: 123). The position is echoed by Sorbo (1999: 49) that in the SADC “the region’s peace can only be a peace which supports the peace interests of its hegemony,” which is South Africa in this case. The fears of hegemonic relations in SADC were clearly expressed by Adedeji (1996: 3-4) on the eve of South Africa’s attainment of democracy in 1994 and its expected regional role. He wondered “[w]ill due attention be given to restructuring hegemonic relations with South Africa’s neighbours towards more equitable, fair and less tense ones?” These examples confirm fears noted by Buzan that “when a complex becomes monopolar, the dominant power may well adopt a wider security perspective or the pattern of intervention into neighbouring regions” (1991: 217). This was experienced when the USA as the sole global hegemon invaded Iraq without UN authorisation, and President George W. Bush even boasted that world nations have to choose whether they are with them (USA) or the terrorists.

In the case of the SADC, according to Vale, “the intervention in Lesotho reinforced and reaffirmed South Africa as the first among a region of unequals” and that “the SADC is the formalisation of the region’s hierarchical structure, a form of multilateralism constructed around South Africa’s power” (2003: 132). In view of the supposed South African dominant posture in the SADC, Santho (2000: 1) notes that “[t]he major challenge facing these regional institutions is to manage the legacies of dependence and countervail the hegemonic tendencies of big states in the economic and security spheres.” The difficulty emanates from the established view that the economically, politically and militarily powerful regional members will always exploit the regional entity to reinforce their relatively advantageous positions and widen the existing disparities” (Mfune 1993: 289).

The struggle for power within regional organisations has adversely affected their coherence and shared resolve in conflict prevention, management and resolution. Political differences within the regional coalitions prevent them from developing and implementing a unified, coherent and sustainable strategy for intervention in regional conflicts (Sorbo 1999). This prompted Nathan (2003: 14) to remark that “in Africa, the regional body is an arena for disputation rather than conflict resolution.” The polarisation of regional organisations over hegemonic dominance was experienced in SADC between the camps led by Zimbabwe (Angola and Namibia) and South Africa (Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania) leading to the uncoordinated and embarrassing intervention in the DRC and Lesotho conflicts (Malan and Cilliers 1997, International Peace Academy 2001, Oden 2001, Vita 2001, Martin 2002, Zacarias 2003, Landsberg and Barengu 2003, Nathan 2003, Vale 2003, Van Nieuwkerk 2003, Bah 2004, Ngubane 2004, Neethling 2004, Hammerstad 2004, de Coning 2004, Ngoma 2005). In the case of ECOWAS, the friction is exacerbated by the Anglo-Franco colonial divide between its members. During the Nigerian-led interventions in Liberia and Sierra-Leone, ECOWAS was immensely fractured along the Franco-phone and Anglo-phone blocs. The Francophone camp
resented the domination by Nigeria in the ECOAWS-ECOMOG operations. On the other hand, the Anglo-phone camp resents the interference of France in the economic, political and military affairs of her former colonies and consequently the region at large. For example, France maintains her military presence in her ex-colonies and continues the provision of military training and equipment to some ECOWAS members such as Senegal and Mali through RECAMP (Mortimer 2000, Herbst 2000, Ero 2000, International Academy 2001, and Soderbaum 2001).

The struggle within regional organisations culminates in questions over the legitimacy of regional organisations' interventions in regional peacekeeping. As members are divided and the organisation is polarised, there are always bitter exchanges and opposition to intervention on the basis of which camp the country in which the intervention is to be conducted belongs. Nigeria suffered an avalanche of criticism, especially by the Francophone bloc, in her interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria was accused of extending her hegemonic expeditions in the region. Soderbaum (2001: 69) notes that “ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were Nigerian dominated operations; without Nigeria; there would simply be no ECOMOG.” Akodjoe (1997) questioned the logic of a military dictatorship (Nigeria) intervening in another nation to establish democracy and good governance. The Francophone Press, for example Sud-Quotadien in Dakar, questioned Nigeria’s “eternal quest for leadership” and discerned “opportunism” in her intervention (cited in Mortimer 2001: 199). The Nigerian government brushed the criticism aside and argued that ECOMOG was doing a superb job in maintaining regional peace and stability. The country’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Ikimi, was quoted as saying “[w]e have an instrument which has proved that it works. Our sub-region is the envy of the world’s other regions” (cited in Mortimer 2001, 199-200). He lashed out at foreign countries which sought to weaken ECOWAS by dividing it along the Anglo-Francophone lines.

South Africa also suffered scathing attacks from the Lesotho opposition during their joint SADC Operation Boleas with Botswana. South Africa was accused of applying “big brother” tactics reminiscent of the old apartheid regime (Matlosa 1999, Southall 1999, Nieuwkerk 1999, Neethling 2000 and 2004, Vale 2003). The Business Day (Johannesburg) 25 September 1998, questioned the legality of the intervention thus; “Its correctness is under dispute, as is the motive behind what is variously described as an ‘invasion’, ‘incursion’ or ‘intervention’ depending upon to whom one speaks” (cited in Neethling 2000: 291). The South African-led intervention (1998) revived and perpetuated memories of the country’s past military destabilisation escapades in the region, and was viewed as a projection of its regional supremacy (Neethling 2000, du Plessis 2000). The opposition in Lesotho were totally opposed to the intervention. The leader of the opposition, Evaristis Sekhonyane, lashed out that “the government is there to the extent the South African government is there to secure certain individuals and calls them a government” (cited in Ngoma 2005: 167), while Molapo Qhobela of the Basotho Congress Party warned that “[a]ny intervention from outside will be interpreted by our people as aggression against King Letsie and his kingdom. Therefore, whatever happens from now, we are ready. Lesotho is a sovereign state and not a SADC colony” (cited in Ngoma
2005: 33). Numerous commentators also argued that the South African-led military intervention in the Kingdom was driven by self-interest rather than the motive for regional peace. The then Presidential Spokesperson Mankahlana rightly concluded that “many and varied voices had been heard on the appropriateness of SADC’s intervention in Lesotho” (cited in Neethling 2000: 293). All these reflect questions hanging on the legitimacy of intervention by regional organisations. In fact, the South African-led military intervention in Lesotho was criticised as unilateral, as it was said to be not mandated by the SADC, the AU or the UN, therefore unjustifiable in terms of international law (du Plessis 2000, Neethling 2004, Matlosa 2004, Nathan 2004, Likoti 2006). The Africa Strategic Alternatives (2004: 77) also argues that “[i]t was also claimed that the SADC never formulated clear guidelines for military involvement in SADC member states.”

However, Habib and Selinyane (2004) argue that post-apartheid South Africa has proudly shifted its foreign relations from striving for regional hegemony to being a "pivotal state" that pursues non-hegemonic cooperation through multilateral organisations like SADC, the African Union and the United Nations for both regional and international peace and stability. Therefore the post-apartheid South African regime has always opted for peace making rather than peacekeeping in shaping the regional order, to avoid acting like a regional hegemon (Venter 2001, Ralinala and Saunders 2001, Alden and le Pere, 2003, Habib and Selinyane, 2004, Logde 2004). It is perhaps in view of this non-hegemonic approach that South Africa together with SADC has adhered to the strategy of Quiet Diplomacy in managing and resolving the conflict in Zimbabwe in spite of the mounting pressure from the West and USA for South African–led action against the autocratic Mugabe regime. Hwang (2005) notes how South Africa cautiously avoided militaristic approaches to resolution of regional conflicts when she successfully stabilised the volatile DRC through consistent and tireless bilateral and multilateral cooperative approaches. Lodge summarises the South African regional foreign policy thus; “[w]ithin its hinterland, in defiance of the reality of its overwhelming power in resources, South Africa, has maintained a tactful discourse of equality in its relations with neighbouring states... to avoid being perceived as a regional bully or as imperialist proxy” (2004: 2). But the question which emerges is why South Africa led a military intervention in Lesotho when she was so staunchly opposed to the same approach in the DRC and that coercive intervention was against its foreign policy.

Questions and suspicions over the legitimacy of interventions by regional organisations are also borne out by a variety of other factors, some of which are given below.

4.10.1 Interventions without UN Authorisation

Most regional organisations’ interventions have more often than not, contravened international law and the UN Charter. Chapter VII stipulates that regional arrangements can only intervene in regional conflicts with the authority of the UN Security Council. Article 53 of the UN Charter states that “[n]o enforcement action shall be taken under
regional arrangement or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council” (United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 1945). This is because peace-keeping is essentially a UN domain and therefore “it has to be endorsed by the world body and conducted in accordance with the international ethos of the UN Charter. This implies that any justification for military intervention on the grounds that it is in the interests of peace should be in line with the UN Charter” (Neethling 2000: 317). The UN has, in realisation of the numerous and multidimensional conflicts besieging the world, authorised regional interventions upon securing its authority and mandate. It is vital to note that the authorisation of the UN often makes available high levels of legitimacy and resources to the operations (Henrikson 1995, Jentleson 2003). The UN has opened up for collaboration and partnership with regional organisations in peacekeeping operations. It is opposed to military interventions in other states, as stipulated in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty. Through this declaration, the UN General Assembly has stated that “[n]o state shall organise, assist, ferment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state” (General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) 1965, cited in du Plessis, 2000: 336). However, “since the correlate principles of sovereignty and non-intervention form the basis of contemporary international relations, military intervention always requires justification” (du Plessis 2000: 335). International law permits coercive interventions in another state for humanitarian purposes: namely “state’s right to protect its citizens abroad, self-defence, self-determination, an existing treaty and humanitarian reasons” (Elias 1988, cited in du Plessis 2000: 336-337). The interventions authorised by the UN should employ acceptable levels of force in self-defence and should be within the framework of the UN mandate as provided for the conflict context. The interveners should also adhere to the principles of ‘just war’ in their humanitarian interventions and peace operations. The principles of a just war are as follows;

- Just cause, that is using force only to correct a grave, public evil
- Comparative justice, meaning that where there are rights and wrongs on all sides of a conflict, the justice suffered by one party should significantly outweigh that suffered by the other;
- Legitimate authority, that is using force for a just purpose and only for that purpose;
- A probability of success, that is not using arms for a futile cause requiring disproportionate measures;
- Last resort, using only after peaceful alternatives had been earnestly tried and exhausted;
- Proportionality, meaning that the good achieved should outweigh the overall destruction expected from the use of force;
- Non-combatant immunity, that is excluding civilians as the objects of direct attack and minimising indirect harm to civilians (cited in du Plessis 45-46).
However, as will be indicated in the subsequent chapters, almost all the military interventions which were launched by ECOWAS and the SADC in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC and Lesotho respectively were not mandated by the UN as required. As such, they were a violation of the UN Charter and international law. The regional organisations operated on the basis of their organisations’ clauses that they could intervene for humanitarian reasons; when there were threats to democratically elected regimes, grave human rights violations, human insecurity, mass loss of life, and humanitarian emergencies in their various manifestations. The regional organisations also justified their involvement on the basis that they were invited by the legitimate regimes of the host nations as required by the UN and international law. But this did not remove the legitimacy debates surrounding the interventions. Because of the legitimacy questions, the military interventions met organised resistance that exacerbated the conflicts such that instead of peacemaking and peacekeeping the intervening entities engaged in peace enforcements and they became trapped as part of the conflict. This shows that no matter how justified the interventions were, the fact that they lacked the UN endorsement opened them to criticism of illegitimate operations. The intensity of the conflict and the concomitant destruction and loss of life which ensued after these ECOWAS and SADC interventions are clear indications that the operations also failed to adhere to the principles of a just war.

Nevertheless, there are many who feel that regional organisations should not be burdened with the yoke of having to obtain UN authorisation when faced with humanitarian crises and regional complexes. For example, Neethling (2000) observes that the formulation of the UN mandates is generally a protracted bureaucratic process which would hinder swift interventions to nip in the bud horizontal and vertical conflict escalations. Therefore regional organisations should be permitted to act swiftly to prevent conflicts from occurring rather than await a UN endorsement and intervene when the conflict has escalated. At this stage “[a] major risk is the potential escalation from an act of peaceful intervention to one of coercive intervention, or to a limited or even a major war... [and] the economic costs that such an intervention may incur” (du Plessis 2000: 336). In view of this, the Commander of the SADC forces during Operation Boleas in Lesotho, Colonel Robbie Hartslief, pleaded that “[e]verything possible should be done to prevent civil war, and this can be achieved only if intervention takes place before armed conflict can occur. The problem is that people romanticise peace operations...firstly, they want to have an outbreak of civil war, then a ceasefire, then an agreement which is acknowledged by the UN and only then should the peace force move in” (cited in Neethling 2000: 317). The commander of Operation Boleas recommended that interventions such as those mounted by ECOWAS and SADC without prior UN authorisation “should be accepted as a new kind of peace operations in Africa because such operations may prevent a massive loss of lives and enormous economic damage” (cited in Neethling 2000: 317).

There are also views that the UN mandates on peace operations can be very restrictive and not in tandem with the conflict contextual situation. For example, it may stipulate the circumstances for the use of force and the amount of
force to be applied. This has often compromised the peacekeeping troops in situations where some of the warring parties target them as unwanted intruders. The UN, SADC and ECOWAS forces were victims of such attacks in Somalia, Liberia and Lesotho. Given this situations “[t]he formulation of the UN mandates should inhibit swift intervention in internal crises and regional and sub-regional organisations should provide clear guidelines for military responses to internal conflicts” (Neethling 2000: 317). As such, the UN operational mandate should take into consideration the conflict situation, and recommend peacekeeping strategies as dictated by the conflict context. The UN and regional organisations’ pledged collaboration in maintaining global peace is a step in the right direction in terms of mitigating conflicts and their effects. In fact it is the regional organisation, because of its proximity to the conflict context, and which is privileged with the knowledge of the historical causes and trend of the regional conflicts, which should be allowed to act swiftly without any bureaucratic hindrances from the UN. If the UN comes in, it should be on the terms of the regional organisation.

4.10.2 The impartiality of Intervening Powers

This has been a major problem for regional organisations when some members are known to support one of the belligerent parties. Van Walraven (2005) argues that in most African states foreign affairs and/or relations are conducted and influenced by personal relations of Heads of State centred on political and/or business relationships and marriage arrangements, all of which adversely affect their interactions in regional organisations when called upon to intervene in peace missions. Job (1992) notes that in some instances member states are directly or indirectly party to the dispute in question and the situation compromises their willingness to be involved or become impartial when conducting the peace mission. ECOWAS was faced with this problem in Liberia and Sierra Leone when Nigeria was accused of being sympathetic to the regimes of Samuel Doe and Kabbar. The Nigerian military ruler, Ibrahim Babangida, is alleged to have been a staunch supporter of Samuel Doe, while Burkina Faso and and Cote d’Ivoire supported Charles Taylor (NPFL) and Foday Sankoh (RUF). In this context, when ECOMOG deployed its troops “there was a real danger that the operation would...open old wounds and rivalry between the Anglophone and francophone states, especially between Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire” (Sesay 2000: 224). There were member countries like Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Guinea which supported the rebel movements in Liberia (the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, ULIMO-J and ULIMO K) and this no doubt adversely affected the efficacy of the regional organisation in its peace mandate. The former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, was also known for sponsoring regionalised conflicts in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast, making it difficult for ECOWAS to effectively resolve the conflicts, as some of its members were implicated (Ero 2000, Mortimer 2000, Sesay 2000, du Plessis 2000, Neethling 2000, International Peace Academy 2001, Soderbaum 2001, International Crisis Group Reports No 62, April 2003, No 72, November 2003). As Van Walraven (2005: 94-95) puts it, “[t]he attitude of certain countries on the ECOMOG was informed by their different interests in Liberia, many of which were of a private nature involving friendship and business deals (again between the embattled Doe and the Nigerian Head of state); private security
arrangements (between Burkina’s president and Charles Tailor); and private liaisons (again, between Burkina’s leader and a niece of the Cote d’ Ivoire head of state who had married into Liberia’s presidential family and been widowed by Doe); Much of this accounts for the apparent aberration in ECOMOG’s deployment of troops, which actually concealed the pursuit of private and other interests behind a façade of multilateral intervention to an extent that conflict began to masquerade as conflict resolution."

In view of the above stated problem, Mosieleng (2001: 16) posits that the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia “is a locus classicus of how partisanship, rivalries...could seriously hamper well intended missions to build peace and security." As a result of the conflicting political bonds within the ECOMOG, its intervention troops were not an impartial arbiter but a major party to the conflict. “At a stage rather than act as a tool for conflict resolution, ECOMOG itself became a party to the conflict...the inability of the force to maintain neutrality in its endeavours created a situation in which the factions lost faith in the peace-keepers. Rather than serving as an organisation maintaining peace for the good of Liberia, ECOMOG appeared to be a mere cover for foreign exploitation. ECOMOG deteriorated into an inadequate peace-keeping force... which prolonged the war and weakened regional security...its intervention only delayed the inevitable; Taylor’s assentation to the presidency” (Iweze, and Yoroms and Aning cited in Sesay 2000: 227).

The same problem is rife in the Horn region of Africa. IGAD faces a crisis of legitimacy in resolving the conflicts consuming the region because of complicity of its members in the conflicts. For example, Sudan supports the Lord Resistance Army of Uganda, the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia and rebel movements in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Chad. On the other hand, Uganda and Ethiopia are known to be staunch supporters of the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) (Onyango, 2002, Ajulu 2004). The current protracted conflict in Somalia is exacerbated by Eritrea’s support of the Union of Islamic Courts and Ethiopia’s support of the Interim Transitional government (SADC Africa News 30 October 2006). In the SADC region, the crisis in Zimbabwe has been a thorn in the member states' flesh due to conflicting allegiances by members to Mugabe and the Zimbabwe government. Countries such as Zambia under the late Levy Mwanawasa and currently Botswana under President Ian Khama, have denounced the SADC policy of Quiet Diplomacy and called for a more proactive approach in resolving the deepening crisis in Zimbabwe. The rest of the membership, led by South Africa, has since adhered to the hopeless policy, while the crisis escalates. For example, instead of pushing the Mugabe regime into fulfilling the requirements of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the Government of National Unity (GNU) they call upon the West and the USA to lift the sanctions they imposed on Zimbabwe for its tainted human rights record and undemocratic governance. The SADC also experienced divisions in its intervention in the DRC when Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola launched military intervention in support of the Kabila senior government, while South Africa, Botswana and Tanzania were opposed to the coercive measures and advocated for peaceful non-coercive measures. In the Lesotho interventions
of 1994, 1998 and 2007, as will be shown later, the SADC was accused by the opposition of supporting the incumbent government, which they accused of rigging the elections and therefore being illegitimate.

4.10.3 Contravention of Peacekeeping Mandates

In most cases, regional peacekeeping forces have been compelled by the hostile resistance of the belligerent parties, to drift away from the mandate and objectives of peace-keeping, to peace enforcement. In some instances confusion in adherence to the mandate of intervention is aggravated by lack of clear, achievable and practicable mandates within the capabilities of the intervening organisation (Annan 2000a). In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Nigerian-led ECOWAS peacekeeping force became so entrapped in the conflicts that it was difficult to differentiate it from the original warring factions (Ero 1995, Sorbo 1999, Soderbaum 2001, Mortimer 2001). In view of this situation, the Ghanaian Foreign Minister was quoted at the ECOWAS Defence Ministers’ Conference in Accra as calling for “a clear definition of the status of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, its objectives, its rules of engagement, its force levels, the necessary resources, as well as a withdrawal strategy” (cited in Mortimer 2001: 201). The complicity of ECOMOG was also described by Adibe (1997: 482) as “ECOWAS violated the cornerstone of every successful peacekeeping mission – strict adherence to the principle of impartiality.” The operation was also deemed a contravention of international law as it was not sanctioned by the UN and the AU, and there were also questions as to whether it was unanimously mandated by ECOWAS.

Neethling (2000) highlights how the South African troops became entrapped in quenching the Lesotho crisis during Operation Boleas in 1998. The South African troops engaged in street battles with the opposition supporters and military-police mutineers, resulting in some civilian casualties. This gave birth to the South African troops being regarded by the opposition as an invading force instead of a peacekeeping force. Neethling (2000: 292) posits that “[m]ilitarily, the operation was bungled due to poor intelligence about the likely level of resistance, inexperience and lack of coordination with the Botswana force which arrived a day late.” The South African troops were accused by the opposition of bullying Lesotho because of its weak economic and political status. The South African force was accused by the Basotho opposition of unprofessional conduct, as they entered Lesotho not as a mediating, but an invading force. For example, while the Botswana Defence Force flew the SADC flag on entrance in Lesotho, the SA Defence Force is alleged to have flown the South African flag. This angered the Basotho who became very hostile to the South African troops while relatively receptive to the Botswana Defence Force as aSADC mediation, peacekeeping and peacemaking force. The destruction which the South Africans visited upon central Maseru and the concomitant casualties appears to have gone beyond the mandate of a peacemaking intervention. (Southall 1999, 2001, Neethling 2000, Likoti 2008) In the case of the intervention by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in the DRC, De Coning (2004) observes that it fell outside the scope of neutral third party mediation because they sided with one of
the conflict parties. Worse still, it was not recognised as a SADC peacemaking force by the rebel forces and some of
the SADC member states. As such, de Coning labels it an “expeditionary coalition” engaged in “neo-interventionism”.

The issue of complicity in the conflict is not limited to regional organisations, as the United Nations Peacekeeping
Missions have also been trapped into the conflicts in Somalia, the DRC and Bosnia. In most cases, complicity of
peacekeeping forces is motivated by failure by one belligerent party to honour the peace agreement, thereby forcing
the peacekeepers to shift their mission to peace enforcement, as happened with the UN missions in Somalia and the
DRC and ECOMOG in Liberia. Evidence abounds of some warlord groups without any ideological programmes save
the lust to seize power, signing treaties that they had no intention of honouring, either for diplomatic or strategic
purposes (Annan 1998, Joseph 1999, de Waal 2003). In some cases the contravention of a peace accord is
committed by the government of the day. As a result of these “orphaned agreements” as the United States Institute of
Peace dubs them, protracted and destructive conflicts were experienced in countries such as Angola, Liberia,
Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, the DRC, Uganda and Burundi, to mention a few. In some cases, the operation
mandates are so restrictive that it puts the safety of the peacekeeping troops in danger, especially in situations where
they are targeted by one or other of the warring factions.

4.10.4 Engagement in Unprofessional Conduct

In some instances, regional organisations’ peacekeeping troops have been caught up in unprofessional conduct such
as looting and plundering of the host country’s resources, illegal trade, and human rights abuses in their diverse
manifestations. Such conduct has raised serious questions about the motives of interventions by some countries. In
such instances the prevalent thinking is that the interventions are not motivated by the desire for regional peace and
stability, but by selfish economic and political interests by the intervening powers. South Africa’s intervention in
Lesotho in 1998 is said to have been driven by the need to protect her interests in the Katse Dam (Vale 2003,
Neethling 2004, and Likoti 2006). The conduct of the South African troops also left much to be desired as they did not
come as a SADC peacemaking force but an invading force, hoisting its flag. In the DRC, some of the intervening
powers such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, were accused of looting and trading in the
2004, Ngoma 2005). Regarding the SADC intervention in the DRC and the accompanying plunder, the UN report of
November 2001 cited Zimbabwe as the “most active”. In fact President Mugabe is quoted as having conceded that
Zimbabwe will be rewarded economically from the DRC’s vast resources (Neethling 2004). It was in view of this
perhaps, that the Zimbabwean-lead intervention in the DRC was described as “profit-seeking” Schoeman 2000 or a
“resource-based operation” (Hwang 2005). The ECOWAS peacekeeping troops fell into the same unprofessional
conduct during their missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The ECOWAS forces were alleged to have been
enmeshed in the “political economy of Warlordism” involving wars over control of diamonds, gold, timber, palm oil,
rubber, looted goods, illegal trade and trade networks (Soderbaum, 2001). So serious was the looting and plunder by ECOMOG forces that they earned an unpleasant name, that the acronyms ECOMOG stands for “Every Commodity and Movable Object Gone” (Soderbaum 2001: 70). The South African troops in Lesotho were also accused of professional misconduct, and there are many critics who feel that the Lesotho intervention revealed that the troops were not fully prepared for handling regional peacekeeping operations.

These instances of unprofessional conduct have tarnished the otherwise good intentions of maintaining regional peace and stability by regional organisations. In view of these unpleasant incidents, the United States Institute for Peace posited that what the Liberian experience demonstrated is that there is a great gap between theories about the advantage of sub-regional organisations in regional conflicts resolution and the reality on the ground. Realisation of such incidents may have motivated the UN Secretary General Boutrous Ghali (1992, 1995) and Kofi Annan (1998) to pledge concerted efforts to assist in the training of regional peacekeeping forces in standard conduct and professional doctrines in peace-keeping. Kofi Annan has always maintained that “peacekeeping must above all be conducted in such a manner as to uphold the legitimacy and credibility of the intervening party” (cited in Mortimer 2000: 204). Salim Ahmed Salim (1995) also notes the existence of tensions created by regional members' intervention in regional conflicts and suggests that the concerns can be ameliorated by “combining the principle of neighbourhood with the principle of distant impartiality” (cited in Joseph, 1999: 15). In order for regional collective security organisations in Africa to maintain their integrity and legitimise their peace-keeping operations and interventions, they should have clearly defined organisational structures, criteria, norms, standards, procedures and principles which guide and govern their decision-making mechanisms and conflict-mitigation efforts (USIP, 1994, Rugumamu 2002). It is hoped that regional organisations, through their security mechanisms and protocols, joint military exercises and mutual defence pacts, will be in a position to establish standing peacekeeping forces well trained and well resourced for peacekeeping operations.

The last of the challenges faced by regional organisations in Africa is that most of the states in the continent are weak, and have undemocratic regimes which are so corrupt and underdeveloped that they are faced with pressing national demands of development, nation-building, service delivery and consolidation of power, than with regional issues. As such it is extremely difficult to expect a coherent and a powerful regional security mechanism which can boldly and successfully confront regional security challenges. That the regional security arrangements are built from weak and fragmented and autocratic nation-states will always be reflected in the regional organisations’ dismal performances in their conflict prevention, management and resolution missions (Buzan 1991, Thomas 1991, Benjamin 1991, Acharya 1994, Zacarias 1999, Isaksen and Tjonneland 2001, Vita 2001, Rugumamu 2002, Van Nieuwkerk 2003, Nathan 2003, Ngubane 2004, Hammerstad 2004). The problems of poor governance, weak states' institutions, and unrepresentative governments of some countries, have been a serious challenge to regional
organisations in their bid to promote democracy, peace and stability in their respective zones. This situation has created a legitimacy crisis whenever some regional organisations have been involved in peacekeeping missions. ECOMOG’s intervention in Sierra Leone to restore the toppled democratically elected regime of Tejan Kabbah suffered this stinging criticism. Ofuatey-Kodjoe lamented “the notion that a group of states headed by military dictatorships have the right to intervene in another state in order to establish a democratic regime [as] grotesque” (cited in Adibe 1997: 485). Therefore, “without acceptable standards of governance of the region…regional security mechanism is likely to degenerate into a protection of racket autocrats” (Rugumamu, 2002: 23). In light of this situation, when the SADC denounced the Rajoilina military-backed coup against the Ravalomanana regime in Madagascar (February 2009), Rajoilina lashed back by asking questions meant to discredit the SADC as being protective of despots at the expense of the suffering masses. He asked: “Who does SADC help? Who benefits from being a member of the SADC? Is it the president or the people?” He answered that “[i]t is the despots and tyrants who have run down the economies of our states that benefit from the SADC. Even in extreme cases where the people of a given country are forced to suffer immeasurably, the SADC does not intervene on behalf of the ordinary people” (cited in Dhalmini, Botswana Guardian, Friday 8th May 2009). In the same vein, after the controversial 2008 presidential elections in Zimbabwe, President Mugabe attended an AU Summit in Libya. Before leaving for the Summit he challenged any of the AU member leaders, most of whom he knows are also despots, to the debate. The point is, Mugabe felt that not many in the AU had the right to criticise his despotic rule and undemocratic elections because most of them share the disease and some do not even hold elections in their countries.

There is no doubt that the issue of legitimacy is pivotal in determining the nature, character, operational standard and outcomes of regional organisations’ preventive interventions and peacekeeping missions. Most of the African regional organisations’ interventions have been marred by deficiency in legitimacy due to the intervention powers’ national interests, rivalries, partisanship and lack of neutrality during the interventions, as has been shown in the preceding discussion.

Nathan (1995: 2) summarises the problems faced by several regions of Africa, posing serious challenges to regional organisations as “[a]n absence of effective governance, internal political and ethnic conflict, unstable civil-military relations, a proliferation of small arms in private hands, a large number of demobilised soldiers who are destitute, chronic underdevelopment and attendant poverty, illiteracy and unemployment; countless refugees and displaced people; an acute debt crisis and a net outflow of capital; and rampant disease and environmental degradation, compounded by natural disasters like drought.” These issues form the core of the broadened or new security threats in the post-Cold War era which regional organisations should devise measures to address.
However, in spite of the daunting challenges, regional organisations have played a pivotal role in conflict prevention, management and resolution. ECOWAS to some extent succeeded in diffusing the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, SADC in Lesotho, the DRC and Zimbabwe, while IGAD is unrelenting in its bid to find a lasting solution to the protracted conflicts in Sudan and Somalia. As Hammerstad (2005: 1) notes, “despite their chequered record regional organisations have been in the vanguard of a process which is slowly transforming international relations in Africa.” Great hope has been pinned by both African governments and their Western partners on improving the ability of regional organisations to take the lead in preventing, managing and resolving the continent’s political crises and conflicts (Hammerstand 2005).

4.11 Conclusion
The chapter has dealt with definitions of regional integration, factors which influence regional co-operation and theories of regional integration. The evolution of regional arrangements was discussed within different theoretical frameworks also focusing on how conflict prevention management and resolution are tackled within each theoretical framework.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Evolution of SADC and its Preventive Diplomacy Mechanism

5.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the history of SADC, and how it emerged and developed through the Cold War and post-Cold War epochs. It describes how SADC transformed from the SADCC into the present day SADC which has broadened its objectives, institutions and operations from economic integration to include issues of regional security, democracy and good governance. The chapter also examines the merits and challenges of SADC’s preventive diplomacy missions in the DRC (1998-2003) and Zimbabwe (2002) to date.

5.2 History of SADC: Origin
Southern Africa has a history of security co-operation and alliances albeit with different purposes and agendas. In the 1950s and 1980s the white minority colonial regimes formed an alliance geared towards protecting and consolidating colonial rule in Southern Africa. Ngoma (2005) refers to this security alliance between apartheid South Africa and the colonial regimes in Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe as the “Pretoria-Lisbon-Salisbury Axis” or the “Unholy Alliance.” The White Co-operation bloc was cemented by a sense of common origin, history and objective of defending the white colonial minority regimes from the liberation movements and the independent states in the region, most of whom were members of the Frontline States. According to Grundy (1990), the colonial regimes saw their future existence as militarily, economically and politically intertwined if they were to defeat the anti-colonial upsurge sweeping across the region and the continent at large.

The Frontline States, on the other hand, were formed in 1974 from the Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa, and comprised Zambia, Botswana, Angola and Mozambique, later joined by Zimbabwe (1980) (Green and Thompson 1986, Du Pisani 2001, Zacarias 2003, Cilliers 2004, Bah 2004, Ngoma 2005). The aim of the the Frontline States was to assist in the liberation of the region from colonial rule and apartheid. As Maphanyane (1994: 3) puts it, the struggle was “based on African nationalism and the twin objectives of African liberation and African unity, reinforced a spirit of political and cultural symbiosis whose most poignant expression was the Frontline States.” It became both the symbol and the mechanism through which the struggle to liberate the people of the region was coordinated and executed (Bah 2004). Regional security co-operation among the independent states in the region was centred on the Frontline States and its security arm, the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDC). The members provided logistical support and training bases to liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO). Zacharias (2003: 34) describes the security situation thus: “the region witnessed increased militarization, on the one hand by forces that viewed colonial regimes as hampering their freedom, independence and security, and on the other hand by colonial powers who saw their acquired benefits and interests
in peril.” For instance, the Frontline States promoted SADCC while the apartheid South African regime promoted CONSAS as the future regional economic, political and security order in Southern Africa.

The experiences from the political and security co-operation that evolved within the Frontline States entrenched collective thinking among regional members which laid the foundation for the birth of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) in 1980, and subsequently the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its security mechanism in the 1990s. According to Hwang (2005: 97), “the Frontline States impacted on the establishment of SADCC in terms of structure, driving force and strategy” and continued to play a pivotal role in the security operations of the organisation until its dissolution in the mid 1990s. Commenting on the necessity of Southern Africa’s regional integration and the expected difficulties, the Director of Queen’s University Centre for International Relations, Pentland, states: “[d]evastated and impoverished by decades of conflict, colonial, racial, civil and transnational crime, this part of Africa long seemed the most in need of regional cooperation for development and security and the least likely to experience it” (in Bah 2004: iii). However, Slinn (1984: 186) argues that “[t]he roots do not lie in the colonial past but in the response of the newly independent countries of Southern African to the problem of confrontation with the remaining white ruled states of the sub-region.” However, in spite of the legacy of protracted conflicts and history of suspicion and distrust which characterised the region from the 1960s to the 1990s, Southern Africa had taken notable steps in the process of regional co-operation and integration (Nathan 1995, Zacarias 1999, Oden 2001, Bah 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Field 2004, Ngoma 2005). Tordoff (1994) hailed the birth of the SADCC as the most substantial of the regional groups to have emerged out of Africa.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional organisation mainly composed of Southern African states. It was formed on the 1st of April 1980 as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The founding fathers were the former Heads of State of the independent Southern African states in the region which had formed the Frontline States (1974) and its military wing, the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (IDSC) to assist the liberation movements for independence in those countries which were still under settler minority regimes, namely, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Its founding members were Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola. It was later joined by Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe (1980) Namibia (1989), South Africa (1994), Mauritius, Seychelles, the Democratic Republic of Congo (1998) and Madagascar (2005). Therefore, SADC was based on the Frontline States Alliance which was the first regional body for collective efforts in security and political matters. On the political front, the SADCC strove to liberate the regional states which were still in the grip of the repressive colonial and apartheid regimes. Apartheid South Africa “constituted the main focus of generalised, if not united African resistance throughout Southern Africa and beyond.” In light of this, SADCC was unrelenting in almost all its Summits in calling for the liberation of Namibia, South Africa and the entire region from apartheid oppression and incursions. At its Summits of 1985 and 1987 in Arusha Tanzania
and Lusaka Zambia, respectively the SADCC consistently called for the unconditional dismantling of apartheid and the independence of Namibia. At the Arusha Summit, the SADCC Communiqué noted its concern that “[t]he apartheid regime continues to arrogantly occupy Namibia and to brutalise her people in complete defiance of international law and opinion... A new initiative is urgently called for to end the violence of apartheid, the occupation of Namiba and the acts of destabilisation against [regional] states” (SADCC Communiqués, Arusha, 9th April 1985).

Like other regional organisations, the SADC was born and graduated through the periods of the Old and New Regionalisms. It was also mainly dominated by an economic agenda, although it had a political agenda dictated by the destabilising policies of apartheid South Africa. This scenario is well captured by Kapungu, stating that SADCC was not formed “in unity against South Africa. It was formed as an instrument for development, for improving the standard of living and the quality of life of the people in its member state...But because of the destabilisation of South Africa [against its neighbours]...the political dimension of SADC became more pronounced” (cited in El-Ayanti 1994: 45-46). Hwang (2005) notes that the politico-security regionalisation in Southern Africa manifested itself in the Frontline States, and evolved over time with roots of a nationalist sovereignty orientation deeply embedded in the colonial history of the region. In this sense, the process laid the foundations of “a distinct Southern Africa personality which promoted both political solidarity and economic cooperation” (Maphanyane 1994: 3).

The SADCC founding document, the Lusaka Declaration of 1980, established guidelines for economic co-operation, liberation, development and ultimate integration of Southern Africa. At its birth, the organisation was aimed at the reduction of economic dependence on South Africa (which made the regional member states vulnerable to its aggressive and manipulative apartheid policies), forging links to create genuine, equitable and coherent regional integration, harmonisation and mobilisation of its national, inter-state and regional policies and resources for regional economic development and growth and securing international cooperation within the framework of a strategy for economic liberation (Green and Thompson 1986, Southern African Records 1987, Ohlson 1991, Maphanyane 1993, 1994, Zacarias 1999, Du Pisani 2001, Oden 2001). At its founding conference in Lusaka, SADCC emphasised economic development and independence. The first President of Botswana, the late Sir Seretse Khama, one of the architects of SADCC, noted that the organisation was on an evolutionary route to develop “a new economic order in Southern Africa and force a united community” (cited in Mfune in Saddiqui 1993: 293). Mfune (in Saddiqui 1993: 288) summarised the 1980 Lusaka meeting as having four main objectives, namely:

- To coordinate the reduction of dependency on the metropolitan powers especially that on the sub-regional centre of South Africa;
- To create and operationalise equitable economic integration among members;
- To muster local and foreign resources so as to effect national, interstate and regional policies utilizable in the reduction of dependency and the establishment of genuine cooperation among members;
• To secure financial and technical resources from private and governmental sources in the international arena.

The SADCC Summit Communiqué of 1st April 1980 which laid the foundations for regional integration embraced the economic agenda driving the regional organisation. It read thus: “[t]oday, in a historic Summit meeting, leaders and representatives of the nine independent countries of Southern Africa made a joint declaration of their strategy for a closer integration of their economies. This marks a new commitment to coordinate their economies so as to accelerate their development and reduce their dependence on the Republic of South Africa” (SADCC Summit Communiqué, 1st April 1980). As such, despite the Southern African states’ argument that SADCC was not directed against South Africa, the organisation was clearly a co-ordinated attempt to lessen dependence on the domineering apartheid South Africa, and create economic alternatives for regional development and growth (Mfune 1993).

The member states devised a regional division of labour in which each country was responsible for coordinating a specific economic sector on behalf of and for the benefit of the entire region, for example; Angola, energy; Botswana, crop research and animal disease control; Lesotho, soil conservation and land utilisation; Malawi, fisheries, wildlife and forestry; Mozambique, transport and communications; Swaziland, manpower; Zambia, mining; Tanzania, industrial development and Zimbabwe, food security (Glickman 1987, Green and Thompson 1986, DuPisani 2001). The division of the economic sectors was based on the principles of comparative advantage wielded by each member state over others. SADCC adopted a project co-ordination approach which emphasised the need to promote projects in the areas of industrial production and infrastructure in order to bolster co-operation and regional development. In this regard, SADCC had its own unique approach to regional co-operation instead of the common market oriented integration model used by most organisations (Hwang 2005). The decentralised structure of SADCC emphasised national autonomy in the responsibility of allocated economic sectors to member states. The main goal of the cooperation was to form functional coordination to enhance complementarity of the production, leading to regional economic development and transformation (Seidman in Mfune 1993). However, Mfune finds fault with the integration model adopted by the SADCC. This was because the allocation of economic sectors to each member state did not necessarily lead to regional integration and development, as each member state’s national and more often than not separate interests and development priorities took centre stage. Although it’s political objective was to negate the historically entrenched economic dependency on South Africa, its main objective was to promote balanced economic development among its member states. The major aim of the SADCC was not reduction of dependence on South Africa, but regional growth and collaboration. This position was emphasised by one of the founding members, the late President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, when he said “[o]ur purposes are not simply greater independence from South Africa. If South Africa’s apartheid rule ended tomorrow, there would still be need for states of Southern Africa to cooperate” in regional socio-economic and political matters (cited in El Ayouti 1994: 46). However, empirically the objective of reducing dependence on South Africa and enhancing balanced
development among the member states remains a mirage, as South Africa remains the dominant regional hegemon in the economic, political and military spheres.

It is therefore vital to note that although the SADC[C] made some commendable strides in regional economic cooperation, practically, it was and still is difficult for the organisation's member states to end their dependence on South Africa. This is mainly because "the entire region had been constructed around South Africa with peripheral states tightly integrated into the core” (Niemann 2000: 111). Or, as Thompson (1992: 6) puts it, the Southern African economic relations are products of the colonial-apartheid system in which "the dominant economic regime in the region between South Africa and SADC[C] is reinforced by the dependency patterns which link the region to the capitalist system." Worse still, the SADC[C] was and is still constrained in its goals of achieving regional integration and development by the paucity of funds. Several sources have reflected the miserable situation in which more than 90% of the organisation's projects and operations are externally funded, which contradicts the objective of economic independence which formed the hub of the formation of the SADCC (Bayart 1993, Mfune 1993, Maphanyane 1993, 1994, Ramsamy 1995, Lee 1999). “Paradoxically, some of the biggest aid givers to SADCC were the countries most deeply involved in South Africa economically” (Mfune 1993: 297). As such, SADCC had “become a soft option, a face saving commitment, [and] a dubious counter balance to their continuing involvement with South Africa” (Mandaza paraphrased in Mfune 1993: 297). In fact, at its 11 July Maputo Summit, SADCC raised concern about the support the Western countries accorded to the apartheid regime in spite of its undemocratic and vicious political system. The Summit Communiqué noted that “South Africa can invade and occupy sovereign states, blow up vital installations, massacre populations at no apparent cost to its relations with its main allies. Some of these friends of South Africa who provide the racist regime with weapons necessary to carry out such a policy seek also to improve their relations with SADCC (SADCC Summit Communiqué, 11 July 1983, Maputo).

The SADCC established a decentralised administrative structure in which power rested with the Heads of State Summit and the Council of Ministers, to maintain the sanctity of members' national sovereignty. In the views of Anglin (1983: 365), and Hwang (2005: 108), “SADCC’s administrative arm was deliberately kept small, weak and fragmented apparently in order to preserve and strengthen each member state’s influence and authority above any other intervention or interference.” On this score, SADCC’s decentralised structure was obviously at variance to the neo-functionalist regional integration model in which nation-states will ultimately surrender their national sovereignty to the supra-national regional institutions. The SADCC, therefore, from the onset until today has been state-centric in its regionalisation approach as envisaged by the realists and neo-liberal institutionalists’ models. Mumbengegwi (1987: 79-80) captured the link between SADCC's weak economic foundation and decentralised administrative structure thus: “[d]espite its claims for political strength and unity, the very framework of cooperation chosen indicates the shaky foundation on which SADCC was built...SADC is a loose arrangement from which a member can opt out
However, Slinn (1984) saw the future of SADCC as comparative to the ASEAN and hailed it as one of the most effective of the development communities so far established. Slinn noted that the SADCC had the advantage of learning from the integration faults of its predecessors. He envisaged that “SADCC may...learn from past mistakes and... devise a new formula for regional cooperation... [and] achievement of regional development goals” (Slinn 1984: 183-184).

5.2.1 SADC: During the Cold War

During the Cold War, SADC suffered a wide range of subversive incursions and destabilisations which hindered coherence of the organisation and achievement of its goals. In the view of Bah (2004: 1) the region became “the theatre of political and ideological battles between the Soviet Union and the United States with each superpower propping up different factions during the sub-region’s three decades of conflicts.” Apartheid South Africa, with the support and blessings of the Western capitalist bloc, was the messenger of doom in the region. South Africa sponsored rebel groups such as RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola, which launched protracted civil wars and acts of sabotage, adversely affecting the entire region. South Africa used its military and economic power to undermine the regional efforts at integration and cooperation. The South African regime, through its militaristic policies of “Total National Strategy”, “Hot Pursuit”, and the “Constellation of Southern African States” (CONSAS), mobilised its political, military and economic might to disrupt the integration of SADC. The regime invaded the neighbouring states on the pretext that they were harbouring liberation movement activists. South Africa even sent troops to Mozambique and Angola to assist rebel movements to topple the legitimate regimes in the two countries on the pretext of the perceived communist “total onslaught” against it. In the 1980’s the South African commandos invaded Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia and Namibia, fuelling intense regional insecurity. Thus, Benjamin notes that “from much of the 1980s Southern Africa seem[ed] to be trapped in a vortex of conflict and anarchy” (1992: 1).

The South African aggressive incursions, on the other hand, became a unifying and solidifying issue and factor for SADCC member states who never relented in their opposition to apartheid as a diabolic political system and the source of instability and insecurity in the region. The regional countries’ abhorrence of South Africa’s apartheid policy had a significant unifying impact on both the creation and evolution of security regionalism in Southern Africa (Mfune
For more than three decades the regional security climate was dominated by conflict between apartheid South Africa and the rest of the region which formed a bulwark of resistance. The South African regime viewed SADCC and the Frontline States organisations as major threats and enemies to its existence as a regional hegemon (Green and Thompson 1986, Gibb and Vale 1996, Oden 2001, Zacharias 2003, Swart and du Plessis 2004, Ngubane 2004, Ngoma 2005). As such, the old regionalism in Southern Africa should be understood in the context of the hostile conflictual climate of the Cold War and apartheid (Swatuk 1996, Landsberg and Berenug 2003). The apartheid regime pressurised some of the SADC member states, for example Mozambique, to sign the Nkomati Accord in 1984 in which the two countries pledged to prevent the use of their territories by political adversaries. While Mozambique abided by the terms of the treaty, the South African apartheid regime did not. Instead, it used the treaty as a tactic to extend its agenda for regional domination (Davies 1989).

SADCC was uncompromising in its belief that security in the region could only be attained by dislodging apartheid and its aggressive regional stance. In spite of the hardships imposed by South Africa, the organisation soldiered on and through its Summits and Frontline States meetings relentlessly called on the international community to impose sanctions on South Africa to force political reforms for a majority, multi-racial and democratic regime in the country. The strong voice of SADCC against apartheid as a crime against humanity and source of regional destabilisation and instability, significantly contributed to the liberation of South Africa in 1994. The organisation's anti-apartheid stance became its source of unity, regional identity and strength (Mfune 1993, Maphanyane 1994, Booth and Vale 1995, Sawatuk 1996, Gibb and Vale 1996).

However, the regional integration of SADCC during the Cold War era was hijacked by the bipolar ideological conflict between the East and the West whose proxy wars were battled in Angola and Mozambique. South Africa was the “honourable” messenger of the West, as it sponsored rebel movements in the two countries, all of which adversely affected regional integration and development in Southern Africa. As Weimer (1991: 79-80) observes, “the material cost of South Africa’s destabilisation for the period between 1980 and 1988 was estimated as high as US$60 billion; it is more than four times the amount the SADCC received as Official Assistance for Development over the same period.” Because of the bipolar ideological contestations, the regional organisations’ security mechanisms were non-existent, and if existing at all, they were hampered by the Cold War political order. For example, the Frontline states and the Non Aligned Movement only engaged in verbal protests against apartheid and calling for the independence of those countries such as South Africa and Namibia, which remained under the yoke of apartheid subjugation. The OAU was imprisoned in the Cold War politics such that it remained passive amid numerous conflicts brewing in the continent. “Regional institutions were weak, bureaucratic, under-resourced and toothless” (Hammerstad 2005). The status of most regional organisations underwent tremendous transformation in their structures, objectives and
operation mandates in the post-Cold War period, and they started making some sound impacts in their respective regions.

5.2.2 Post-Cold War SADC

The post-Cold War era saw SADC growing in terms of membership, character, operational goals and aspirations within the new regionalism context provided by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new world order. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent dismantling of apartheid shifted the politics of Southern Africa from the battle field, destabisation and conflictual militarisation of the region to those of democratisation, multi-partyism, regional cooperation and integration and peaceful resolution of regional problems (Benjamin 1992). Many other developments in the region provided fertile grounds for the prosperity of the SADC integration. They included the resolution of the Mozambiquean civil war, the attainment of independence in Namibia (1990) and South Africa (1994) and their subsequent membership of SADC. The 1990s saw new members in SADC, some of which were the Seychelles, Mauritius, the DRC and Madagascar. It appeared that the storm was over since the sources of regional havoc had now been peacefully resolved and SADC states had an opportunity to repair the damage and re-build a coherent community with a shared vision and common purpose. The regional organisation had to be transformed in preparation for the post Cold–War era security challenges (Benjamin 1992, Nathan 1995, Malan and Cilliers 1997, Oden 2001, Ngoma 2005, Moller 2005, Hammestad 2005).

Consequently, at the Windhoek Summit of August 1992, the SADC Treaty was signed and the regional organisation was transformed from a co-ordinating conference to a community. The Heads of State and Government declaration which accompanied the SADC Treaty noted that “[g]ood and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region and peace and mutual security are critical components for regional cooperation and integration. [And that] The region needs therefore to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security.” The members also pledged that the “existing cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences, common problems and aspirations” will always constitute their motivation to “promote regional welfare, collective self-reliance and integration in the spirit of equity and partnership” (SADC Treaty 1992). Among SADC’s guiding principles in Article 4 of its Treaty are “sovereign equality of all member states, solidarity, peace and security, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, equity, balance and mutual benefit”, and “peaceful settlement of disputes”. Article 5 objectives (b) and (c) are related to security of the region. The members pledged “to evolve common political values, systems and institutions”, and “promote and defend peace and security.” The SADC Treaty reflected the inevitable and interwoven links between security, peace, justice, order, democracy and development and the general welfare of the regional populace (Zacarias 2003, Lansberg and Barengu 2003). Zacarias observes that “[s]oon after the signing of the SADC treaty, recurrent statements by regional leaders called for a new security agenda that would favour peaceful resolution of conflicts, prefer conflict prevention to resolution, and be based on
concrete problem solving methods” (2003: 36). In light of this transition, Landsberg and Barengu (2003) note that although the SADCC was premised on the political solidarity of independent regional states to promote economic integration and counter white-minority-ruled South Africa, the Windhoek Treaty of 1992 also promoted a model of regional integration that would address the region’s deep-seated structural political, economic and military challenges. In 1996, the SADC established its security wing, the OPDS, to prevent, manage and resolve regional conflicts and other security challenges. The signing of the Organ Protocol in 2001 and the Mutual Defence Pact Protocol in 2003 marked a turning point in the development of the SADC security architecture. The guidelines and procedures for the operationalisation of the OPDS were strengthened by the endorsement of the Strategic Indicative Plan at the 2003 Summit.

Whether the noble goals for regional security as established in the SADC Treaty and its security protocols will be attained will depend on several internal and external factors and challenges. However, experience has shown insurmountable difficulties by nations, especially in the Third World, to effectively implement coherent security cooperation (Buzan 2000, Landsberg and Barengu, 2003, Hammestad 2004). The SADC region is comparatively calm, and is regarded by many as a beacon of hope in the troubled continent. This begs the question of whether the relative calm is a result of the sense of community embodied in SADC or a breathing space from a period of prolonged regional conflicts. However, the economic and political crises in Zimbabwe, the DRC, Madagascar and Lesotho remain a thorn in the flesh of SADC as they threaten regional security and stability. The efficacy of the regional organisation in addressing the conflicts is inherently flawed as will be shown in the next chapter.

Whatever the case, Hammerstad (2005) argues that in the post-Cold War era the seeds were sown for more ambitious, reformed and restructured policy institutions and security mechanisms in the different regions of the world, as evidenced by the formation of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, The ASEAN Security Forum, ECOMOG and OPDS. The transformations were geared towards enabling the regional blocs to effectively deal with challenges of peace and security. More interesting about the reforms of regional organisations’ security mechanisms was the broadening of the conceptualisation of security from the traditional state-centric and military bound definition to include factors such as democracy, good governance, human rights, human security, food security and environmental security, all of which are threats to peace and stability. The regional organisations’ treaties also pledged to intervene in member states in cases of gross violation of human rights, genocide, military coups against legitimately elected regimes and any other humanitarian crises. The ECOWAS and SADC interventions in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1997) and Lesotho (1994, 1998 and 2007) respectively were arguably justified on these grounds. Although flawed in many aspects, the interventions brought some degree of peace and stability for negotiated settlements of the conflicts.
5.3 The Evolution of SADC: Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS)

Like other regions of the world, SADC also felt the side-effects of superpower disengagement and the general pressures of the new post-Cold War political order. The post-Cold War era ushered in new security challenges and it was logical for SADC to establish its security wing to mitigate the effects of the unfolding challenges. It had also dawned on SADC regimes that for economic integration to be successfully forged, it is vital and essential for a stable and secure political environment to be established. The evidence from protracted civil wars and the disruptive apartheid South African aggressions provided fruitful lessons in this regard. Regional organisations in different parts of the world have also realised the importance of regional initiatives in conflict prevention, management and resolution in the post-Cold War world. This feature of international relations was also encouraged and supported by the UN, as reflected in the Boutrous Ghali’s (1992, 1995) and the Annan’s (1998) reports to the Security Council. There was a growing realisation that regional security challenges can best be resolved through increased cooperation and collective measures (Ghali 1992, Henrickson 1995, Hurrell 1995, Fawcett 1995, Van Aardt 1997, Annan 1998, Matlosa 2001).

During this period SADC established its mechanism for collective security in preventive diplomacy (conflict prevention, management and resolution). The Organ was established with the goal of “allowing more flexible and timely responses, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations” (SADC communiqué 1996). In the SADC Treaty Article 5, objectives (b) and (c), the organisation aims to “evolve common political values, systems and institutions” and “promote and defend peace and security”. According to Colliers (1999), the resolutions and recommendations of the SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security held in Windhoek (1994: 1) “set SADC on a formal involvement in security coordination, conflict mediation and military cooperation at the Heads of State level.” Thus at SADC’s Summit in Gaborone, Botswana on 18th January 1996, the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security was formed. It constituted the security leg of SADC to deal specifically with conflict prevention, management and resolution (preventive diplomacy) (Ohlson and Stedman 1993, Nathan 1995, Malan and Cilliers 1997, Colliers 1999, De Coning 1999, Schoeman 2002, Williams 2004, Ngoma 2005). The Organ replaced the Frontline States in the task of maintaining regional peace and security. It was created after the rejection of a proposal to establish an Association of Southern African States (ASAS) as the military (security) sector of SADC. According to Zacarias (2003), the SADC Heads of State Summit rejected the ASAS proposal because it called for a military alliance similar to NATO, and implied the establishment of a new secretariat to deal with security affairs and having one member state heading the security sector.

The Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Protocol was signed by the SADC Heads of States and Governments in August 2001 and its structure and objectives are mainly the promotion of democracy, rule of law, solidarity, regional peace, security and good governance. A number of related protocols and forums such as the Protocol against
Corruption, the Protocol on Control of Fire arms, Ammunition and related materials and the Protocol on the Tribunal and Rules of Procedures and the Mutual Defence Pact, the SADC Parliamentary Forum, and the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum, were also subsequently signed/established to bolster the Organ in its mission of collective security and regional peace. Isaksen (2002) notes that substantial work needed to be undertaken before the Organ Protocol and objectives and principles could be operationalised as an integral part of SADC. In spite of its subsequent salient operational flaws, SADC member states took a commendable step in formalising and institutionalising its security mechanism to guard the region from sliding back into conflict. As Landsberg and Barengu (2003: 6) note, “[i]f it had been properly operationalised, the OPDS would have brought about a revolutionary shift in peace and security thinking and practice in the region. It would have laid the foundation for a fully coherent regional security architecture in Southern Africa.”

The operational institutions of the Organ are stated in Article 3 of the Protocol and Structure of the Organ and comprise the following structures.

5.3.1 The Chairperson of the Organ

The Organ Chairperson and the Deputy Chairperson are elected by the Summit of Heads of States on a rotational basis annually. The Organ Chairperson consists of the incumbent chairperson, the deputy chairperson (who will be the incoming chairman in the immediate subsequent next Summit) and the immediate outgoing chairperson -- forming the Troika. The Chairperson, in consultation with the Troika, the Ministerial Committee, the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), is responsible for the overall policy direction and implementation of the Organ objectives and functions. The Chairperson reports to the Summit of the SADC Heads of State or Government which is the supreme policy making institution of SADC. The functions and operational procedures of the Organ Chairperson are outlined in article 4 of the Protocol and Structure of the Organ.

In Ngoma’s (2005) diagnosis of the chairpersonship of the Organ, he commends the aspect of consultation of the Troika by the Chairperson on security matters as a democratic principle which would mitigate dictatorial practices by the Chairperson. However, he questions the efficacy of the working relations between the Chairperson and the Ministerial Committee. In his opinion, the fact that the Chairperson can only “request” reports and consideration of the Organ matters from the Ministerial Committee may result in inaction or delayed responses to crisis situations by the SADC Organ in the event of lack of cooperation between the chair and the Ministerial Committee. Article 4 of the Protocol and Structure of the Organ is loudly silent on the exact nature of the powers wielded by the Chairperson in terms of responding to regional crises and maintenance of peace and security. The chairperson’s powers are explicit regarding the Ministerial, the ISPDC and the ISDSC report to him or her. This "powerless" position of the chairperson
of the SADC Organ which is subordinate to the SADC body may have been predicted by President Mugabe and his

camp when they advocated for an independent SADC security Organ which will mandate the chairperson to take
action without bureaucratic references and authorisation by the SADC chair. In the current arrangement the Summit
wields the real power and authority on the operations of the Organ. Whether this is for the good of the Organ remains
to be seen. The open secret is that the Organ has remained passive in the face of regional crises in Lesotho, the
DRC and Zimbabwe, perhaps due to the power politics between the regional member states. Put differently, the role
of the OPDS in instances where the SADC is said to have intervened, for example in the DRC and Lesotho has not
been clear. The interventions were also marred by the fact that, for example, the 1998 military interventions in the
DRC and Lesotho were launched before the OPDS Protocol which guides such interventions was signed and ratified
by all the SADC member states. This has raised questions on the mandate and the efficacy of the regional security
organ in maintaining regional peace and stability. This suggests that substantial work remains to be done before the
organ protocol objectives and principles can be operationalised as an integral part of the SADC peace and security
efforts (Isaksen 2002).

5.3.2 The Ministerial Committee

The Ministerial Committee comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public and state security
from each member state. The operational procedures of the Ministerial Committee are contained in Article 5 of the
Protocol and Structure of the Organ. The Ministerial Committee is chaired by a minister from the same country as the
chairperson of the organ for a period of a year. It reports to the chairperson of the Organ. The Committee is tasked
with the coordination of the work of the Organ and its structures. Ngoma (2005: 19) also notes that the Committee is
responsible for the daunting challenge of “balancing intra-regional political dynamics and the general apprehension of
external influence” over the Organ. Its meetings are convened once annually. The Committee works in conjunction
with the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
(ISDSC). Ngoma (2005) suggests that the inclusion of the ministers of foreign affairs in the Committee may have
been a move to include the non-military or non-defence sector in regional defence issues. This to some extent would
neutralise the classical view of security solely in military terms. Articles 8 (a) and (c) of the Protocol and Structure of
the Organ (2001) stipulate that “the quorum for all meetings shall be two thirds of the State Parties” and “decisions
shall be taken by consensus.” Although it is a democratic requirement for major decisions to be taken by consensus,
some analysts view it as a serious shortcoming which can hamper effective functioning of an organisation on critical
regional matters. For Solomon (2004: 190), “[t]his is problematic…decisions by consensus are effectively a right to
veto the majority decision and allows one recalcitrant member to hold the SADC Organ hostage.” As established
earlier, the role of the Ministerial Committee during the SADC preventive missions in the DRC and Lesotho, like that
of the OPDS, remains misty.
5.3.3 The Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC)

The functions of the ISDPC are outlined in Article 6 of the Organ protocol. It comprises ministers responsible for foreign affairs from each member state. Its functions centre on issues of politics and diplomacy to enhance achievement of the Organ objectives. Its objectives are to promote regional coordination and cooperation on political, security and defence matters. Ngoma (2005) posits that the duties of the ISDPC include promotion of political cooperation, cordial international relations, diplomacy and democracy and human rights, all of which are central to the achievement of the mission and the Organ agenda. Therefore, it is the political leg of the Organ and focuses on "softer security issues" (Van Aardt 1997, Hammerstad 2004). The ISDPC is chaired by a minister from the same country as the chairperson of the Organ, and it reports to both the Ministerial Committee and the Organ chair. There is room in its operational procedures to "establish such sub-structures as it deems necessary to perform its functions" which is a positive option for efficiency. For example, the plan was to have two sub-committees, one focusing on politics and governance, addressing issues of good governance, human rights, the rule of law and corruption, while the other focuses on diplomacy matters (Isaksen 2002). Similarly, as with the two mentioned SADC structures, the input of the ISPDC during the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho and the DRC has not been established. In fact it should be playing a leading role in diplomatic and non-coercive preventive missions for peaceful resolutions of regional conflicts as established in the organisation’s founding treaty.

5.3.4 The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)

The ISDSC was originally established in 1975 as the military wing of the Frontline States. During the transformation of SADC and the establishment of the Organ it was retained as a security structure of the organisation. It is composed of ministers responsible for defence, public security and state security from member states. It is chaired by a minister from the same country as the chairperson of the Organ on an annual and rotational basis. The chairperson of the ISDSC convenes meetings as he/she deems necessary or as requested by any minister in the Committee. Like the ISPDC, the ISDSC reports to both the Ministerial Committee and the Organ’s chair. It specifically deals with the Organ issues of defence and security that is conflict prevention, management and resolution and general maintenance of peace and stability in the region. This suggests that it handles “hard security” issues such as regional joint training sessions, intelligence data and logistics of peace operations (Van Aardt 1997, Matlosa 2001, Hammrstad 2004). The ISDSC was bolstered by the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact in June 1996 and the establishment of the SADC Regional Training Centre in Harare Zimbabwe responsible for joint regional security training and exercises. The institution reports to the Defence sub-structures of the ISDSC. The establishment of the training centre was a significant step in SADC’s security cooperation and integration, as it would coordinate preventive and peacekeeping policies and strategies for standard and quality preventive diplomacy operations. However, its operational gains were stalled when the main donor to the regional institution; Denmark withdrew its funding in 2002 (Isaksen 2002). Currently, the ISDSC is considering the modalities for the establishment of a SADC
stand-by brigade for swift peace-keeping purposes (de Coning 1998). A regional standing peacekeeping force would be easy to mobilise for peace missions and can ensure efficiency as the troops would be trained on standard and professional peace missions’ ethics.

Ngoma (2005) takes issue with the fact that it seems the Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) plays a leading role in the regional security organ instead of the Foreign Affairs Committee (ISDPC). This scenario, according to Ngoma (2005: 148), counters the acceptable logic and practice in the military realms that “security is always subordinate to politics.” Van Aardt (1997) and Hammerstad (2004) argue that the fact that the ISDSC deals with “hard security” issues while the ISPDC is relegated to the “softer security” matters seems to reflect the classical state-centric militaristic definition of security. De Coning (1999) questions the compartmentalisation of the political, diplomatic, public security, state security, and defence and disaster management with different committees, instead of an integrated approach for the Organ. It is also interesting to note that the chairpersons of the Organ, the Ministerial Committees, the ISPDC and the ISDSC in a particular year are from one country. This could lead to a situation where the nation in charge may hold the Organ at ransom and fail to act in order to satisfy its political interests at the expense of the region.

5.3.5 The SADC Secretariat

The SADC Secretariat is based in its Headquarters in Gaborone (Botswana). It provides the administrative and secretarial services to the Organ. The department of Politics, Defence and Security comprise three units, namely the Directorate for Politics and Diplomacy, the Directorate for Defence and Security, and the Strategic Analysis unit, all of which are tasked with coordinating preventive diplomacy missions, contingency and operational planning, and training of peacekeeping forces. It is headed by the Executive Secretary who serves for a renewable five-year term. Before the Organ Protocol was signed in 2001, the country holding the chairmanship provided the secretarial services. After the resolution of the Organ impasse, it was resolved that it should be an integral component of the SADC hence being operational from the organisation’s secretariat headquarters. Within the new Secretariat SADC organisational structure (as approved by Council on 25th February 2005 in Mauritius) there is the Directorate on Politics, Defence and Security Affairs which is mandated to coordinate the security affairs of the Organ. It is headed by a Director under whom are the Director of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Zimbabwe, the Senior Operations and Training Officer, the Senior Administration and Finance Officer, the Senior Officer - Political and Diplomatic Affairs, Senior Officer – Defence, Senior Officer - Security, Senior Analyst – Socio-Economic Threats, and the Senior Analyst – Political and Security Threats.

The SADC Organ was complemented by the establishment of SADC Parliamentary Forum in 1996 (approved by the SADC summit in 1997). One of its purposes is to “[p]romote peace, democracy, security and stability on the basis of
collective responsibility and supporting the development of permanent conflict resolution mechanisms in the SADC sub-region” (cited in Van Nieuwkerk 2001: 5). The SADC Electoral Commissions Forum was created in 1998 “to strengthen cooperation among the bodies managing elections in member nations, with a view to enhancing democratic electoral processes and democratic culture as well as developing standard electoral practices” (Landsberg and Barengu 2003: 4). However, the Secretariat appears to play a peripheral role in the evolving institutional structure of the Organ (Isaksen 2002). The SADC Secretariat is already over-stretched, has little power and implementational capacity and insufficient resources to implement its decisions. Moreover, the Organ needs a specialised personnel and operational secretariat on security matters, which will be responsible for planning, preparation, deployment and coordination of peace and security operations (Solomon 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Fisher and Ngoma 2004, De Coning 2004).

On paper the proposed structures of the Organ sound like coherent preventive diplomacy tools which could only function provided there are adequate resources, political will and commitment by the regional states’ regimes and leadership to implement the regional peace objectives, goals and agreements. Put differently, the security institutions put up by SADC “are important steps towards deeper integration,” but they “remain empty structures, waiting to be filled with implementation policies and actions” (2004: 216 and 211 respectively). The establishment of these structures is in line with the neo-liberal institutionalism paradigm that for efficacy, regional organisations should develop operational and functional institutions. The Head of the Department for Peace and Security, Joao Ndlovu, notes the “reluctance for planners to disburse funds that were budgeted for the defence and security sector because they give preference to developmental issues” (cited in Fisher and Ngoma 2005). This situation will have adverse effects on the development of the human capacity of the SADC Organ and its operational efficacy. The Organ’s implementational potentials have been paralysed by lack of operational institutions, as well as lack of political will and the dynamics of regional power politics on regional security matters (Colliers 1999, de Conning 1999, Neethling 2003, Nathan 2003, Ngubane 2004, Hammerstad 2004), Fisher and Ngoma 2005, Ngoma 2005).

The post-Cold War and the apartheid era were not followed by total peace, seeing that threats to regional stability were looming. There were fears of renewed conflicts in a region with a history of prolonged civil wars. Threats of regional instability were evidenced by the attempted coup in Zambia (1998) and Lesotho (1994 and 1998), emergence of secessionist tendencies in Tanzania, Zambia and Namibia, continued post-election disputes in some regional members (Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia), and the prevalence of undemocratic governments in some member states such as Swaziland and general economic challenges in most of the regional members that could destabilise the region (Ohlson and Stedman 1993, 1995, 2003, Vale 1999, Oden 2001, Schoeman 2002, and Ngoma 2005).
All these factors created a sense of insecurity in the region, and moved the SADC leadership to be prepared to intervene in case of intra-state or inter-state conflicts. In the words of Vale (1999: 44), in Southern Africa, “decades of strife have bequeathed legacies of deep mistrust and crippling misunderstanding”, deteriorating economies, proliferation of arms as such “… renewed conflicts appear inevitable…” The security organ therefore is an instrument to guard against the relapse of the region into the conflicts which afflicted the region in the past decades with devastating effects.

5.3.6 Objectives of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security

In its general objectives, the OPDS stipulated the promotion of regional peace and security as its priority. Article 11 of the Protocol and Structure of the Organ deals specifically with conflict prevention, management and resolution. Through the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, SADC pledges to manage and resolve intra- and inter-state conflicts. The instruments for amicable resolution of regional conflicts include “preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration and adjudication by an international tribunal” (cited in Ngoma 2005: 301). SADC also pledges only to intervene when requested by a State Party to mediate in the conflict and will always seek to obtain the consent of the disputant parties to its peacemaking efforts. This is a very important factor if peace is to be attained and sustained. The organ (SADC) will respect the territorial integrity and political independence of its members. It is noted that military intervention will only be employed when all peaceful channels of trying to resolve the conflict are futile. If military intervention is to be employed, the United Nations’ Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union will accordingly be informed as per the requirements of the Charter of the UN. It is important to note that when the SADC intervened in the DRC and Lesotho, it did not consult the AU and the UN as required by the Organisations’ Charters and the SADC founding Treaty and its security protocols. This lapse deprived the missions of the legitimacy of their mandate.

5.3.7 The SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP)

The MDP was adopted by members at the 2003 SADC Head of States Summit in Tanzania. This was in line with one of the objectives of the SADC Organ Protocol “to conclude a mutual defence pact to respond to external threats” (SADC Communiqué 1996). In its classical form a mutual defence pact entails establishment of a military alliance and signing of binding treaties for collective defence in cases of aggression on a member state and general commitments for the development of individual and collective capacity to resist armed attacks and acts of aggression on any member state. The commitments for collective military actions against any aggression on a member state are vividly stipulated in the ECOWAS Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD) (29th May 1981). A mutual defence pact suggesting high security integration is found in amalgamated security communities such as NATO (Moller 2004, Dinstein 2004).
The main objective of the Mutual Defence Pact was therefore to operationalise the mechanism of the SADC Organ for mutual cooperation in political, defence and security matters. Article 3 of the Mutual Defence Pact dwells on peaceful resolution of conflicts in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Article 9 focuses on Defence Cooperation. SADC member states committed themselves to defence cooperation through joint military exercises in each other's territory (as was done in Blue Hungwe and Blue Crane joint military exercises held in Zimbabwe (1997) and South Africa (1999) respectively) (Ngoma 2005). The joint exercises are aimed at establishing a common code of professional standards and doctrine required in regional security co-operation and peacekeeping missions. The joint military exercises ensure regional military preparedness for rapid deployment in cases of regional unrest and threats to regional security. The members have also pledged joint research, development and production of military equipment, exchanging military intelligence, and any information on security which is deemed to enhance or promote regional peace, stability and security.

Article 7 is on Non-interference, by which members are to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of others unless requested by the State party or "where in the opinion of the SADC Summit action needs to be taken in accordance with the SADC Organ Protocol." Although this aspect is essential in dispelling regional members from undue interference, and ensures members' respect for the territorial integrity and independence of member states, it has handicapped many organisations' efficacy in prevention, management and resolution of internal conflicts. The Organisation of African Unity became a toothless organisation because of the principle of non-interference (Nieuwkerk 2000, Zartman 1989, 2000, Levit 2003, Field 2004, Van Walraven 2005). It is argued that the principle of non-interference may prove to be SADC's undoing in its intended goals of promoting regional security, peace, good governance and development (Isaksen 2002, Field 2002, Solomon 2004). It gives dictatorial leaders room to "hide and continue to oppress and exploit their people while claiming that no one has the right to interfere in their domestic affairs" (Adar 2002: 100-101). Currently an economic and political crisis is brewing in Zimbabwe and is adversely affecting the entire region. That the regional organisation remains passive save for its failed efforts through Quiet Diplomacy may be a result of the previously mentioned principle. This is more so because the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, has been unrelenting in his scathing confrontations of any critical voices against his repressive regime.

Article 6 of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact is focused on Collective Defence. Through this Article 6 (1) "[a]n armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional security. Such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action by all State Parties." Collective action in the case of SADC will be mandated by the Summit of Head of States on the recommendations of the Organ. The SADC MDP also stipulates that any armed attack and measure taken in response will immediately be reported to the Peace and Security Council of the AU and the UN Security Council for proper authorisation. However, the geo-political power struggle by the Zimbabwean and
South African led camps in SADC resurfacing during the discussions of the contents of the Mutual Defence Pact at the Blantyre (Malawi) Summit. The Zimbabwe-led camp advocated for a defence pact legally binding members to assist a member in internal conflict, while the South African-led group wanted the defence pact limited to assistance against external threats (Isaksen and Tjonneland 2004). The compromise article 6 (3) consequently reads “[e]ach State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate” (SADC Mutual Defence Pact 2003). As such the decision to intervene or not to intervene in case of an external aggression on a SADC member was left to the whims of individual member states (Hammerstad 2004).

This situation in which there are no clear, legal standard parameters for intervention may spell doom for the SADC in its bid for regional collective security cooperation. The situation which occurred when Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia intervened militarily in the DRC to assist a member under external aggression, while the rest of the SADC member states opted for a negotiated settlement, may be repeated. Solomon (2004) and Hough (1998) describe the SADC Mutual Defence Pact as a complex combination of elements of a classical mutual defence pact as stated in article 6 (1) and elements of a non-aggression treaty as reflected in article 3 (1). With the exception of the preamble and articles 7 and 8 of the Mutual Defence Pact which touch on human security, the bulk of its articles focus on the security of the state. In this regard the pact can be viewed as the custodian of the state and regime security (Alagappa 1998, Adar 2002, Cawthra 2004, Solomon 2004, Swart and Duplessis 2004). This scenario seems to confirm Alagappa’s assertion that “in most developing regions, security suggests protection of the existing political system and the survival of the incumbent government” (1998: 625). Consequently, Zacharias, (2003: 40) notes that one major challenge facing the SADC regional security is the lack of firm “institutional framework(s) needed to formulate policy in line with the new security thinking” The conflictual history of the region could have influenced the mainly state-centric view of security against the clarion call by many researchers for SADC to expand the definition of security to include non-military human security factors in line with the post-Cold War new security thinking (Buzan 1991, Nathan, Zacharias 2003, Schoeman 2004, Swart and Du Plessis 2005, Ngoma 2005).

Critics of the SADC security mechanism maintain that apart from being state-centric, both the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Mutual Defence Pact do not legally commit regional member states to collective resolution of regional conflicts (Hammerstad 2004, Hwang 2005). Swart and Du Plessis (2004: 35) maintain that the SADC defence pact is devoid of definite assurance of collective military response and therefore it “is considered to be one of the weakest forms of military alliance.” This, according to Nathan, is because, “very few of the ruling elite in Southern Africa would want to see a powerful and influential Organ on Politics, Defence and Security and consequently it will continue to bow to the wishes of its political master” (2004: 5).
Van Aardt (1997), Neethling (1999), Van Nieukerk (2003, Ngoma (2005) and Fisher and Ngoma (2005) regard the signing of a Mutual Defence Pact as signifying high-level regional cooperation on security matters and moves to formation of a security community by SADC. In the view of Van Nieukerk (2003: 3) “[t]he significance of the pact can be seen to be a strengthening of the South African approach to regional affairs—...the tendency to avoid military in favour of diplomatic intervention.” The expected benefits of the defence pact were summarised by the then South African Minister of Defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, that it will provide a mechanism for prevention of intra- and inter- state conflicts, collective action against external threats and aggression and ensure long-term stability conducive to investments and development of the region (cited in Ngoma 2005). He notes that “[w]ithout an instrument that provides guidelines to protect legitimate governments in the region from foreign armed aggression, peace cannot be guaranteed” (cited in Collier 1999: 7). However, Isaksen (2002) argues that the Defence Pact may be difficult to implement because it requires greater supra-national authority than a mere collective security arrangement which exists in the SADC security cooperation. The other implementation hurdle envisaged by Isaksen is that a defence pact presupposes a commitment and willingness to supply mutual information on defence and security issues, which many SADC member countries may be reluctant to do. This may be in line with the Realists’ position that states are in perpetual struggle for power and may not trust each other with such vital security information.

5.3.8 The Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO)

SADC has also drawn up a Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) and instituted a review on the operations of its institutions which are geared towards reviewing and providing recommendations on how best to ensure effective operations of the Organ in the political, defence, state security and public security sectors (Isaksen, 2002, Ngoma 2005, Ngoma and Fisher 2005). This followed a recommendation by the SADC extraordinary meeting in Blantyre, Malawi on the 14th January 2002 for “the SADC OPDSC to prepare the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ which would provide guidelines for the implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation for the next five years” (SADC SIPO on OPDSC 2004: 11). The strategic activities stipulated in the SIPO are geared towards guiding the implementation of the common agenda outlined in the Report on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions approved by the Windhoek Extraordinary Summit in March 2001. (SADC SIPO 2004). The then Chairperson of the Organ Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili of Lesotho, noted the core objectives of SIPO in the foreword as creating a peaceful and stable political and security environment through which the region would endeavour to realise its socio-economic, security and political objectives (SADC SIPO, 2004).

All these are good intentions by SADC in conflict prevention, management and resolution. However, the critical question is how prepared in terms of resources, and committed, in terms of political will, are leaders in ensuring that the organ’s goals are attained? As De Coning note, “the protocol and pact set out the macro policy goals and objectives of a common SADC peace and security system, and define its institutions. What remains is for the protocol
and pact to be operationalised, including developing more detailed and direct policies and procedures that will define a common SADC peacekeeping system...” (2004: 167). Hammerstad questions the possibility of implementing the SIPO requirements because “neither SADC nor its member states have the financial and human capacity to implement all the ambitious objectives of the strategic plan” (2004: 227). He further notes that “[t]hroughout the 1990s...cooperation within African inter-state organisations remained fraught... weak, bureaucratic, under-resourced and toothless. Progress in strengthening regional integration consisted mostly in worthy declarations at summits but with little practical follow up.” Several scholars on the SADC security mechanisms unanimously commend its visionary integration objectives and goals, but consistently lament the lack of implementation capacity for practical results of the security integration. Hammerstad expresses this problem thus; “…formal integration is not only about agreements, but also about implementation of the agreed policies and practical pursuance of common goals. While SADC has many regional agreements, it has relatively weak regional institutions and has not come far in the implementation of the agreed protocols.” In theory, the SADC Organ has a strong security mandate, which includes the task of promoting democracy and human rights within states and which endows the regional body with the power to “consider enforcement action as a last resort to prevent, contain and resolve inter-state and intra-state conflicts” (Hammerstad 2005: 14). The problem is that it is easier to sign agreements, treaties and protocols than to implement them. The question should be how capacitated are the regional bodies in implementing the regional agenda? (Du Pisani 2001, Van Nieuwkerk 2003, Moller 2005). What remains to be seen is the extent to which the defence pact will transform the OPDSC into a functional regional security mechanism.

5.3.9 Power Struggle in the Organ 1996–2001

Despite its impressive intentions as outlined in its protocol, the SADC Organ on Defence and security has been paralysed by the geo-political power struggle between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The power struggle has invaded the Organ since its inception and has become a crippling factor in its functions of maintaining regional peace and stability. The conflict revolved around the status of the security organ in relation to the mother body - SADC. In the view of Zimbabwe (President Mugabe who was the first chair of the organ) and other like-minded nations such as Angola and Namibia, the Organ has to be an independent structure which can act without reference and consultation with the mother body. The Mugabe camp felt that the Organ deals with sensitive security matters which could be jeopardised if put under SADC which is heavily reliant on foreign donations. This camp also felt that the Organ should adopt the informal and flexible model of its predecessor, the Frontline States, in its operations to avoid the bureaucratic delays by the mother body in the resolution of regional disputes. On the other hand, the camp led by South Africa, comprising Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique (then President Mandela as SADC Chairperson) felt that the Organ should be an integral part of the SADC in its mandate and operations. They argued that the SADC Treaty does not provide for an autonomous organ. This camp strongly felt that the Organ should be subordinate to the Head of States’ Summit which the SADC Treaty mandated as the “supreme policy-making institution of SADC”

Some analysts and political observers maintain that the dispute was also about competition for personal recognition between Mugabe and Mandela. They argue that Mugabe as a senior statesman who played a prominent role in the politics of the region, felt eclipsed and marginalised by the increasing regional and international prominence of Mandela (Matlosa 2001, Sparks 2003, Fisher and Ngoma 2005). In view of this bickering, it was “clear that there was no consensus among the member states with regard to the ways in which this newly created OPDS should function” (Zacharias, 2003: 38). This was more so because there was “no institutional mechanism established to coordinate the operations of the OPDS and SADC mother body” (Zacharias 2003). It is documented that at the SADC Summit in Malawi (1997) Mandela threatened to resign as chairperson if the Organ were not made subordinate to the SADC Treaty and summit (Cilliers 1999, Colliers 1999, Nathan 2003, Zacarias 2003, Ngoma 2005). As such the organ’s operations were hampered as a result of the power contests and disagreements between South Africa which saw the Organ as being subordinate to the SADC as a whole, and Zimbabwe which resented South Africa’s hegemony in the region (Van Walraven 2005).

The impasse was ultimately addressed at the Malawi Summit of Head of States in August 2001. De Coning (1999) suggests that two critical events in 1999 provided fertile grounds for the resolution of the Organ impasse; first the replacement of Mandela by Thabo Mbeki as the president of South Africa, and secondly South Africa passing the chairmanship of SADC to Mozambique (President Chissano). This implies that these two events may have eroded the grounds for friction between Zimbabwe and South Africa, and/or between Mugabe and Mandela. Thus the impasse was ultimately resolved at the 2001 Maputo Summit in favour of the organ being a SADC structure, subordinate and accountable to the SADC Summit. Solomon and Ngubane (2003) view the integration of the OPDSC into SADC as a step in the right direction because it prevented the abuse of the organ by one state for national and/or even personal reasons. The SADC Summit in Malawi August 2001 formally adopted the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security as a “SADC mechanism” by signing the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (Hanekom 2001, cited in Neethling 2004: 9). According to Landsberg and Barengu, “[t]he decisions at [the Blantyre] Summit signalled progress towards not only collective security but also collective accountability” (2003: 8).

However, the resolution of the impasse was attained after several years of the Organ’s paralysis, and was not to substantively transform the Organ into a functioning security machinery since to date it has remained inefficient in the
face of regional turmoil. The power struggle had polarised SADC into two camps (the Defence Treaty and the Peacemaking blocs, Schoeman 2002) as reflected by the disjointed and fragmented responses to the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Lesotho in 1998. “Far from acting as a security community where unified, proactive action takes place on the basis of a clear vision or strategic goal of what is to be achieved, SADC member states got involved in these conflicts in a dubious, ad hoc and haphazard manner” (Neethling, 2003: 6). The paralysis of SADC which culminated in the uncoordinated responses to the crises is vividly captured by Tsie (1998: 2) that “[t]here is presently confusion and stalemate over the respective leadership roles of the two Chairpersons. The vexing question is: should President Mandela as the Chair of SADC take the initiative in pre-empting and resolving regional conflicts or should that role be left to President Mugabe as chair of the Organ.” The SADC Human Development Report (2000: 131) indicated how the military intervention by Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia in the DRC and South Africa’s insistence on a negotiated settlement highlighted tensions around “autonomy (the relationship between the OPDS and the SADC summit), the legal framework in which the OPDS should be operating and the hegemonic power struggles in the post liberation, post apartheid era.” The reality is that the interventions in Lesotho and the DRC were not authorised by SADC or the OPDS. As Hwang notes in the case of the DRC intervention, “if the Zimbabwe-led intervention was indeed an act of collective self-defence under the SADC auspices, one would have expected SADC to have authorised such an operation at the level of the SADC...Summit with a specific mandate... or have appointed the Head of Mission and force commander. But SADC took none of these actions associated with an authorising body” (2005: 171). According to some commentators, “[t]he conflict in the DRC may have tolled the death-knell of diplomatic unity within the Southern African Development Community and has considerably darkened the future chances of this promising regional cooperation organisation” (cited in Ngoma 2005: 157). This is because SADC presented an embarrassingly disjointed response position to the civil strife. It illuminated the lack of common principles, a shared vision, and deep rifts on how regional peace and security could be attained and maintained in the region (Zacharias 2003, Landsberg and Barengu 2003, Ngubane 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Bah 2004, Moller 2005). As Moller puts it, “Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia became militarily involved in the DRC in what was formally speaking a textbook collective defence operation intended to protect a member state against aggression from Rwanda and Uganda. The deployment only received a SADC mandate ex post facto.”

South Africa (which held the chair) and its camp advocated a peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict (Neethling 2003, Ngoma 2005). The Zimbabwe-led camp called for a collective military intervention to assist a fellow member state which was under invasion by Rwanda and Uganda (It is important to note that South Africa and Botswana used the same justification in their intervention in Lesotho in September 1998). They (‘SADC Alliance’) further justified their intervention on the basis that Kabila had appealed for assistance from SADC. The camp proceeded to form what they called the SADC Alliance, and signed a Mutual Defence Pact comprising Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. The
trio sent troops on a mission dubbed “Operation Sovereign Legitimacy” to the DRC, and claimed to operate on the license of the regional organisation and in accordance with Article 4 (c) of the SADC Treaty which refers to the “achievement of solidarity, peace and security in the region” and objective (a) of the SADC Organ which pledges to protect the people of the region from both intra- and inter-state aggression” (Nathan 1995, 2003, Mallan and Cilliers 1997, Martin 2002, Ngoma 2005). Adler and le Pere (2003) posited that Mandela viewed the Zimbabwean-led military intervention in the DRC in the name of SADC as jeopardising the organisation and a direct challenge to South Africa’s aspirations for regional leadership. When President Mandela as the Chairperson of SADC challenged the trio’s authority to send troops to the DRC on behalf of SADC, Mugabe’s response was a stinging one, that “[n]o one is compelled within SADC to go into a campaign of assisting a country beset by conflict. Those who want to keep out fine. Let them keep out, but let them be silent about those who want to help” (cited in Nathan 2003: 13). It was clear that the DRC conflict and the intervention of the self-styled SADC Alliance polarised SADC and strained the relations between the different member states. However, at the SADC Summit in Mauritius, in a bid to mend the rift in SADC, Mandela, the Organ Chairperson, made an about-turn and commended the Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia alliance for their intervention in the DRC on behalf of SADC. It appears to have dawned on the SADC leadership that continued denunciation of the DRC intervention would fuel and exacerbate the divisions in the organisation instead of having the desired effects of promoting regional solidarity and common purpose.

The SADC military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 saw South Africa and Botswana sending troops to foil a military and royal monarch coup against a democratically elected government. Although it was regarded as a legitimate SADC intervention and successfully restored peace and stability in Lesotho, it had a lot of question marks. The fact that the Lesotho mission was carried out by only two members of SADC and that none of the members which intervened in the DRC participated in it raised eye brows regarding the unity of the organisation. There were a lot of questions on the legitimacy of Operation Boleas, as the peacekeeping mission was dubbed. The unanswered question is whether the two interventions were authorised by SADC or whether they were just undertaken by some members for their own economic and political reasons in the name of SADC (International Peace Academy 2000, Neethling 2000, Neethling 2003, Nathan 2003, and Ngoma 2005).

This does not augur well for regional cooperation and integration, which are so pivotal in regional peace and security. This is also because the region has its own security challenges: the war raging in the DRC, the volatile economic and political crisis fermenting in Zimbabwe, and potential threats to regional peace posed by the recalcitrant and only undemocratic monarch regime in Southern Africa, in Swaziland. The Zimbabwean crisis has proved to be a piercing thorn in the flesh of the regional organisation. It has adversely affected the region in terms of the influx of Zimbabwean economic refugees to neighbouring countries, especially Botswana and South Africa, and has also dissuaded foreign investment and development in the region. SADC appears to be glued to its policy of Quiet
Diplomacy despite its dismal failure to resolve the crisis. The inaction of SADC in the face of a brewing civil strife seems to vindicate the position held by many critics of regional organisations, especially in the Third World, as mere clubs of dictators determined to use regional structures to protect their positions and regimes at the expense of democracy, human rights, human security peace and stability for the regional populace (Alagappa 1998, Zartman 1999, Nieuwkerk 2000, Ojendal 2001, Schoeman 2002, Zacarias 2003, Terriff et al 2004, Cawthra 2004, Solomon 2004, Ngoma 2005). The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security suffers from numerous implementation constraints such as lack of coherent institutional facilities, operational security policies and strategies, financial resources, regional power politics, and lack of political will, lack of clear operational framework and mandate and commitment by regional leaders in such areas as combating corruption, promotion of good governance, human rights and regional security (Malan and Cilliers 1999, Isaksen 2002, Nathan 2003, Ngubane 2004, Hammerstad 2004). In view of the above, Vale (1999: 48) argues that “the states in the region are outside the core of the countries which may prosper and deliver security in the next century.” Vale strongly believes that because of their peripheral position in the global economic and political order, Third World regions will always be susceptible to conflicts.

This study is aimed at investigating the SADC members’ preventive diplomacy mechanism in the face of the unfolding regional conflicts as evidenced in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, DRC and Madagascar (The SADC intervention in Madagascar is not discussed in detail). The SADC region is faced with serious challenges and cannot afford to remain passive in the face of conflicts which adversely affect its human, national and regional security and development. The SADC interventions in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007 will be used to provide insights “on how the sub-regional organisation could improve on its, so far, not very impressive record of promoting a comprehensive security agenda in Southern Africa” (Hammerstad 2005: 15). The SADC intervention in Lesotho (Chapter Five) will be used as a case study in examining and evaluating the efficacy of its preventive diplomacy machinery.

5.4 The SADC Preventive Diplomacy Missions in the DRC and Zimbabwe

5.4.1 Introduction

From the 1990’s, the SADC has been involved in conflict prevention, management and resolution missions in the DRC, Lesotho and currently in Zimbabwe and Madagascar. Each of the cases reflected different dynamics in the SADC security operations and regional preventive diplomacy. The DRC and the Lesotho missions in 1998 saw military interventions by some member states in the name of SADC, thereby reflecting the deep rift and polarisation which engulfed the regional organisation. The military interventions also revived fears of regional destabilisation and insecurity which characterised the Cold War period and the apartheid era. As Southall (1999: 30) notes “If the Zimbabwean operation in the DRC and that of South Africa in Lesotho are anything to go by, militarism has returned to the SADC security framework.” Conversely the SADC mission in Zimbabwe is characterised by a projection of a
seemingly unified front by the organisation amid criticism in the region and largely from the West and the USA. The SADC has consistently rejected calls for confrontational measures with the Mugabe regime and opted for a diplomatic, peaceful and negotiated resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis through quiet diplomacy.

The SADC intervention in Lesotho will be used here as a benchmark case study to determine the experiences, lessons, prospects, successes, and challenges of SADC in conflict prevention, management and resolution (preventive diplomacy).

5.4.2 SADC and the Conflict in the DRC
The DRC, formerly Zaire, is a vast country (2,344,885 square kilometres) located in Central Africa’s Great Lakes region. It shares borders with eight other nations, namely Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Sudan, Congo Brazzaville, Angola, Central African Republic and Zambia. This central geographical location coupled with the country’s vast natural resources turned the DRC into an epicentre for both regional and international contestations and conflicts during and after the Cold War era (Munyae 2000, Matthee 2000, Cleaver and Massey 2001, Maseti 2001, Power 2004). Since it joined SADC in 1997, the DRC has become a thorn in the cohesion of the organisation and a test for the efficacy of its conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanism.

5.4.3 The 1998 DRC conflict
The overthrow of the Mobuto dictatorship and installation of the Laurent Kabila regime in 1997 did not resolve the institutionalised structural socio-economic and political problems which have besieged the country since its independence. The unresolved issues which precipitated the demise of the Mobutu regime continued haunting the Kabila regime, culminating in another conflict of calamitous proportions in 1998. Due to the intensity of the conflict and the large number of countries involved, it was variously dubbed “Africa’s First World War”, “Africa’s Great war” and “Africa’s scramble for Africa” (Shearer 1999, Reybtjens 2001, Ngoma 2004, Power 2004, Cleaver and Massey 2001). The recurrence of intense conflicts which lasted from 1998 to 2003 and the continued strife in the Eastern DRC led by rebel leader General Nkunda, gave credence to King’s (2008: 13) description of the DRC as a country “conceived in conflict and born at independence...in crisis.”

The Kabila regime inherited a country in socio-political and economic disarray. The government was immediately faced with the mammoth task of reviving the country’s collapsed economic and political institutions, unifying the numerous and diverse rival ethnic groups, and instituting political reforms and democratic governance. Worse still, the new government was inextricably indebted financially and politically to the governments of Rwanda and Uganda which had catapulted it to power (Matthee 2000, Munyae 2001). The government’s administrative and military establishments were dominated by the Tutsi; hence it was virtually hostage to the political whims of Rwanda, Burundi
and Uganda. The long-established problems of politicisation of ethnicity, struggle for political power and external intervention in the internal affairs of the DRC became a source for recurrent friction and instability (Munyae 2000, du Plessis 2000, Matthee 2000, and Maseti 2001).

Although Kabila had pledged democratic political and constitutional reforms and elections, he dismally failed to fundamentally change the political order of Mobutu’s 32 years’ rule. In the process of consolidating his power, he entrenched his own version of autocracy, replacing "Mobutuism" with "Kabilaism" (Tshyembe 1999, Munyae 2000, Matthee 2000, Taylor and William 2001, Mangu 2003). A replica of his predecessor Kabila’s power base in and around Kinshasa rested on military force, foreign support and a patronage network (Solomon 1997, Taylor and William 2001, Du Plessis 2000, Matthee 2000, Munyae 2000, Mangu 2003). The exclusion of various groups from governance created fertile grounds for an anti-Kabila rebel alliance. Kabila’s government was also dominated by Rwandan and Ugandan military officials. Kabila later fell out with Rwanda and Uganda when he questioned their domination and ultimately expelled them from the DRC (Naidoo 2000, b, Matthee 2000).

Consequently, in response, the expelled Tutsi military and government officials, with the full backing of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, formed the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) (5th August 1998) under Professor Wamba dia Wamba. The group established its base in the Eastern DRC among the Banyamulenge Tutsi which formed the core of the rebellion that assisted Kabila to overthrow Mobutu. The Kabila regime was under immense survival threat as the RCD advanced towards Kinshasa, capturing the towns of Kivu, Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani, Bunia and Uvira (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Matthee 2000, Munyae 2000). According to Munyae (2000), by December 1999, the rebels were in control of about three quarters of the country and had reached the outskirts of Kinshasa. The rebel advances to Kinshasa were halted and repelled by the military intervention of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia under the auspices of the SADC Alliance. This marked the genesis of what came to be known as Africa’s First World War with the SADC Alliance (Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola) and Sudan and Chad on the government’s side, while Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi backed the rebel RCD (Shearer 1999, Munyae 2000, du Plessis 2000, Matthee 2000, Maseti 2001, Cleaver and Massey 2001, Power 2004, Ngoma 2004, Ngoma 2005). In the view of du Plessis (2000: 347), the DRC conflict “became one of the most spectacular examples in the 20th century of military intervention by African governments in another African country.”

The 1998 DRC conflict threw the SADC organisation into disarray and posed a serious challenge to the efficacy of its preventive diplomacy mechanism, its cohesion and survival as a regional organisation which had the capacity to prevent conflicts and maintain peace in the region.
5.4.4 The SADC Military Intervention in the DRC

The DRC joined the SADC in October 1997 after the overthrow of the Mobutu dictatorship. Accordingly, to repel the rebel RCD military advances, Kabila appealed for assistance from SADC against what the government viewed as an invasion by Rwanda and Uganda. There have been dissenting views on the merits and demerits of the SADC decision to admit the DRC as its member. Many critics argue that it was ill-advised and a cardinal error for the SADC to have admitted the DRC as a member, considering the undemocratic manner in which the Kabila government assumed power. Others feel that the SADC should have awaited stabilisation, democratisation and meaningful political reforms in the DRC before admitting it into its fold (Malan 1999, Khadiagala 2001, Vale 2001, Ngoma 2004). In the view of Khadiagala (2001) the admission of the DRC imported the perennial insecurities of the Great Lakes region into the SADC region, with devastating consequences. The predicament of the SADC is articulated by Malan (1999: 5) that “SADC admitted the DRC into its fold without prejudice and now the proverbial chickens have come to roost. Rather than benefit from the potential wealth of the DRC, SADC has virtually been torn apart by its membership.” Numerous commentators on the SADC security mechanism unity and operations concur that the DRC conflict presented the most formidable challenge in its collective security agenda, mission and existence as a unified regional entity (Malan 1999, Ngoma 2004, Ngoma 2005).

The SADC response to the invitation by the Kabila regime for assistance clearly exposed the divisions, rivalry and polarisation of the organisation, which had been building up since the members’ differences on the status of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security to the mother body, SADC (Neethling 2000, du Plessis 2000, Matthee 2000, Mosieleng 2001, Schoeman 2002, Nathan 2004, Van Nieuwkerk 2004, Bah 2004, Ngoma 2004, 2005). Schoeman notes that the SADC was polarised into the Defence Treaty Bloc comprising Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola, which formed the SADC Defence Alliance and intervened militarily in the DRC and the Peacemaking Bloc comprising South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, which opposed military intervention and advocated dialogue and peaceful resolution of the conflict. Whatever the case, the fact of the matter is that the SADC presented a disjointed and fractured response to the DRC conflict, contrary to the expectations of a regional organisation with a shared collective security vision as stipulated in its founding treaty.

The military block formed the SADC Alliance, signed the Mutual Defence Pact and sent troops to the DRC in the name of SADC to repel what they deemed an invasion of the DRC (a SADC member state) by Rwanda and Uganda (Cornwall and Portgieter 1998, Malan 1999, Munyae 2000, Matthee 2000, Mosieleng 2001, Neethling 2004, Ngoma 2004). The SADC Alliance justified their intervention by claiming the following:

- It was in accordance with the OAU [AU] Harare Declaration of 1997 calling for collective security and protection of legitimate regimes against military coups.
• It was in line with the objectives of both the SADC Treaty and the OPDS Protocol calling for solidarity and collective security in the region against internal and external threat and aggression to any member state. They also claimed that the deployment was authorised by the Organ and the ISDSC (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Nathan 2004).

• They were requested by the legitimate regime of the DRC, which was also a member of SADC for assistance against threats to the nation’s sovereignty (the same reason used by Botswana and South Africa in Lesotho). Mugabe noted that the SADC Alliance “responded to a call for assistance by the DRC government following the invasion by Uganda and Rwanda... Our decision was a gallant one and our response so far has prevented the aggressors’ from achieving their goal” (cited in Ngoma 2004: 4).

President Mugabe, then the Chairperson of the Organ, justified the military intervention, which was dubbed Operation Sovereign Legitimacy by arguing that “[a] prolonged struggle in our region that destabilises the principle of the region and principles of democracy...must be resisted. What is a threat to your neighbour is a threat to you...” (cited in Ngoma 2004: 4). Mugabe further justified the military option by drawing a parallel with the European Union countries in the Balkans. He posed the question: “[i]f it was right for European countries to get involved in Bosnia and to think of getting involved in Kosovo, why should it not be right for us?” (cited in Ngoma 2004: 8). In response to criticism by the then SADC Chairman, Mandela, that the intervention was not mandated by SADC, Mugabe retorted that no member was forced to assist and that those who did not wish to assist should be silent (Nathan 2004). Ngoma comes to the defence of the Zimbabwe-led military intervention that it was dictated by the precarious security situation faced by the DRC at the time. As such it is doubtful as to whether “a more peaceful approach would have been appropriate considering the dire security situation the DRC was faced with...neither can it be determined that leaving the regime to collapse would have ensured a more stable future” for the country and the region (2004: 4).

5.4.5 Effects of the Military Intervention

The interventionist nations suffered stinging criticism for their militaristic posture both regionally and internationally. This was mainly because of the questionable intervention motives by the different powers, and the fact that the military approach seemed to have complicated and escalated the conflict making it catastrophic, expensive and difficult to win or resolve. The intervening nations were economically drained and crippled by the protracted conflict, thereby stirring domestic opposition and agitation. The most hit by mounting domestic opposition was Zimbabwe, which was lambasted for venturing on an expensive mission regardless of the deepening economic decline at home. The Zimbabwe economic meltdown was aggravated by the devastating land invasions and the imposition of sanctions by the West and the US against the Mugabe regime for what they deemed an autocratic regime perpetrating human rights violations against its citizens. Zimbabwe’s military intervention was criticised as “one big disaster, a case of pride, greed and political miscalculation” (Roftopoulos) and Mugabe was accused of letting his
“ego and his associate’s business interest in the DRC’s lucrative diamond industry” mire “the country in a costly and unwinnable war” (cited in Ngoma 2004: 10).

In the same vein a Namibian opposition leader, Katuure Kauri, lashed out at the Namibian involvement that “[i]t is inexplicable that Namibia as a democratic country could involve itself in a conflict to keep in power someone who is at present nothing less than a dictator who took power by means of an armed rebellion” (cited in Ngoma 2004: 4). According to Cornwall and Potgieter, Angola and Zimbabwe planned a strategic exit from the war zone because of the strain it placed on their economies and their military establishments. They posited that “[t]here were indications that the military chiefs of Angola and Zimbabwe were both seeking permission to withdraw from the DRC in light of the strains placed upon their countries by continued operations” (1998: 4). This was a reflection that the military intervention was neither sustainable nor tenable.

Apart from lacking the political and material mandate of the regional and international organisations, the intervention of the SADC Alliance was not so much driven by the peace and security interests of the DRC and the region as by the national economic and political interests of the intervening powers. In fact, all the intervening powers in both the government and rebel camps intervened for self-interest as if to vindicate the Realists’ position that nations will always and/or only intervene in other countries to protect their national interests or gain more power. The looting and plunder which Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe unleashed on the DRC mineral wealth is evidence of their involvement for self-enrichment (Malan 1999, Matthee, 2000, Munyae 2000, Miti 2000, Maseti 2001, Cleaver and Massey 2001, Taylor and William 2001, Schoeman 2002, Ngoma 2004, Hwang 2005, Van Walraven 2005). According to Miti, the involvement of foreign powers “turned the war into a predatory war of Zaire’s huge economic resources. The final outcome has been the division of the country into commercial spheres of various external and internal forces” (2000: 18).

One other major motive for intervention in the DRC, especially by Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola, was national security. The security and sovereignty of these countries were jeopardised by the different rebel groups’ incursions operating from within the DRC. Rwanda and Burundi were determined to crush the Interahangwe militia and ex-Hutu Defence force rebels, Angola to dismantle the UNITA bases in the DRC, while Uganda also aimed at flushing out its numerous rebel movements in the DRC namely the Lord Resistance Army (LRA), the Ugandan Allied Democratic Front (ADF), the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) and the Ugandan National Rescue Front (UNRF). This became the justification for the intervention of these powers as the Kabila regime failed to secure the security of his erstwhile backers, and worse still, recruited the rebel groups into his military structures against the Ugandan-Rwandan- backed Rally for the Congolese Democracy (RCD) (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Munyae 2000, Matthee 2000, Power 2004, Van Walraven 2005).
South African-led camp comprising Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania, on the other hand, advocated dialogue among the warring parties as the solution to the conflict. This was in line with South Africa’s foreign policy position to promote regional peace through diplomatic multilateral constructive engagements rather than military confrontation. The new South Africa was to avoid the military posture projected by the apartheid regime in the region prior to the 1994 democratic dispensation. As such the South African approach was informed by its own history of apartheid militaristic regional destabilisation. It was from this basis that Mandela as the President of South Africa and Chairperson of SADC rejected outright military intervention in the DRC and dismissed the Zimbabwe-led military expedition as being without the SADC mandate (Malan 1999, Nathan 2004, Ngoma 2005).

The South African-led diplomatic initiative culminated in two Summits in Pretoria (22-23 August 1998) attended by representatives of the Kabila government and presidents of Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya. Conspicuously absent were Kabila and the SADC Alliance group which dismissed the summit as immaterial seeing that the SADC was already embarked on a peace mission in the DRC (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Nathan 2004). Nevertheless, the Pretoria Summit mandated Mandela to initiate dialogue for ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign forces and subsequently a negotiated peaceful resolution of the conflict. South Africa maintained that the decision to intervene militarily served to fuel rather than solve the conflict (Breytenbach 2000, Mosieleng 2001, Meyns 2003, Ngoma 2004, Ngoma 2005, Hwang 2005, Van Walraven 2005). As such South Africa’s objective was “to secure an immediate ceasefire that would freeze all troop movements for a negotiated settlement of the conflict” (Mosieleng 2001: 365). It was also South Africa’s hope that a ceasefire would ensure that all stakeholders would enter into an equal and open national dialogue to identify the root causes of the conflict, agree on a constitution and the building of democratic state institutions, and participate in internationally monitored all-inclusive elections for lasting peace and stability in the country and region at large (Du Plessis 2000).

South Africa as the regional hegemon with economic, political and military might was expected by many to shape and dominate the security landscape of the SADC region. The regional hegemon’s decision not to intervene militarily and opt for a multilateral diplomatic engagement was criticised by some scholars and the SADC Alliance members. The diplomacy and negotiation approach advocated by South Africa was also refuted by the Kabila regime which insisted that the country was not under attack by the rebels but by an armed invasion by Rwanda and Uganda. It was from this position that Kabila, with the support of the SADC Alliance refused to negotiate with the rebel groups, and rejected the SADC-OAU-backed former president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, as the facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue). President Mandela’s invitation to the Congolese Rally for Democracy’s (RCD) Wamba Dia Wamba and Kagame of Rwanda was interpreted by the Kabila regime as collusion with the rebels and the invading powers (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Matthee, 2000, Munyae 2000, Maseti 2001, Ngoma 2004, 2005). However, it
was to be the South African-led diplomatic approach which ultimately brought peace to the DRC. South Africa insisted that an inclusive dialogue of all the belligerents was the answer to a lasting solution.

The question whether Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola acted with the mandate of the SADC or not, is an issue that has dogged the debate on the DRC intervention for some time. Several commentators maintain that the intervention was not authorised or mandated by the SADC Summit as stipulated in the SADC Treaty and the Organ Protocol (Matthee, 2000, Munyae 2000, Meyns 2002, Ngoma 2004, De Coning 2004, Power 2004, 2005, Bah 2004, Nathan 2004, Neethling 2004, Hwang 2005, Likoti 2006). The military intervention clearly exposed the political dynamics of a polarised and fragmented SADC. Hwang (2005: 171) contends that “[i]f the Zimbabwe- led intervention was indeed an act of collective self-defence under SADC, one would have expected SADC to have authorised such an operation at the level of the SADC Organ or Summit, with a specific mandate and perhaps that SADC would have appointed the Head of Mission and Force commander. But SADC took none of these actions associated with an authorising body.” In the same vein, de Coning dismisses the Zimbabwe-led operation as “a neo-interventionist force; an expeditionary coalition” since “no other country, international or regional body including SADC itself recognised the Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia troops as SADC forces” (2004: 164).

However, in a strange turn of events, the SADC Alliance military intervention was later recognised as legitimate and mandated by the SADC at the Mauritius Summit of September 1998. In a bid to mend the rift which was tearing the regional organisation apart, the then Chairperson, President Mandela, made a round-about turn and congratulated the SADC Alliance for successfully launching the operation on behalf of the organisation (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Munyae 2000, Du Plessis 2000, Matthee 2000, Nathan 2004, Neethling 2004, Ngoma 2004, 2005). At a press conference Mandela stated that “[i]t was quite reasonable when the legitimate Head of government of a country says I have been invaded by a foreign force, come and help me defend my country… for the neighbouring country to respond positively” (cited in Cornwall and Potgieter 1998: 5). This position was echoed by the Mauritius SADC Summit Communiqué which unequivocally “commended the governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for timorously providing troops to assist the government and people of the DRC defeat the illegal attempt by the rebels and their allies to capture the capital city and other strategic areas…” (The SADC Communiqué September 13-14 1998). According to Makoa (1998), the change of stance by South Africa (Mandela) was motivated by the fear of isolation and loss of the regional hegemon status to Zimbabwe (Mugabe). The fears were born by the fact that in 1998 Mugabe was alleged to have called a meeting of Defence Ministers from nine SADC member states from which South Africa was excluded. Mugabe is also alleged to have exploited South Africa’s vacillating political stance on the the DRC civil conflict, accusing Mandela of misconceiving the African political agenda with the intent of marginalising the country (South Africa) in regional affairs and leadership. As such South Africa is said to have “been under intense
pressure from SADC states with close leanings towards Zimbabwe to abandon its notion of preventive diplomacy and adopt, a robust African policy” (Makoa 1998: 9).

Du Plessis (2000) dismisses this retroactive approval of legitimising the intervention as a SADC mission. He argues that “legitimacy is virtually always questioned when regional security structures endorse the military intervention of individual states only after it has started” (2000: 353). However, at the Mauritius Summit a compromise of the divergent approaches to the DRC conflict was hatched. The accommodative approach is described by Ngoma as: “SADC adopted a two pronged strategy. Firstly, the summit in Mauritius congratulated Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for acting on behalf of SADC – seemingly militaristic approach. Secondly, by tasking the President of Zambia with spearheading peace initiatives, it meant that the organisation was also pursuing a negotiated path – the preferred strategy by South Africa” (2004: 7). The spirit of compromise born at the Mauritius Summit provided fertile ground for cooperation and shared vision for SADC, and the ultimate resolution of DRC conflict. The peace and unity in purpose at SADC was sealed by the signing of the OPDS Protocol and the Mutual Defence Pact Protocol, both of which would guide future SADC interventions in peace missions and operations of security mechanism.

5.4.6 SADC [South Africa] Multilateral Approach to the DRC Conflict
The magnitude, complexity and impact of the DRC conflict was reflected by the numerous peace and diplomatic initiatives from individual nations, bilateral, regional, continental and international summits, and personal diplomatic efforts to resolve it (Mosieleng 2001, Naidoo 1999, Munyae 2000, Matthee 2000, Ngoma 2004, Hwang 2005, Van Walraven 2005). The DRC conflict attests to the significance of regional organisations’ efforts to harness the cooperation and partnership of the continental (OAU-AU) and international organisations (UN) in resolving conflicts. Among the numerous summits held, it was the Lusaka SADC Summit of 15 January 1999, (broad based-attended by Angola, Botswana, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Gabon, Kenya, Mozambique, Libya, Namibia, Tanzania, the DRC and the rebel groups, OAU and UN representatives) which made significant headway towards the resolution of the conflict. The Lusaka Summit mandated then President of Zambia, Chiluba, to mediate the conflict, and this culminated in the signing of the Lusaka Peace Accord of June 11 1999, which paved the way for the resolution of the conflict. It has been hailed as a success of African diplomacy in that it was the SADC which mainly mediated the peace process (Dindelo 2006).

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement paved the way for other peace agreements and mechanisms in the form of the Pretoria Agreement and Luanda Agreement (2002), the Global and Inclusive Accord (2003), the Joint Verification Mechanism as well as the Tripartite Plus Commission and the Memorandum of Intent on Regional Security in the Great lakes (2004), all of which committed the warring parties to disarming, demobilising and reintegrating all the armed rebel groups and militias operating in the DRC territory. In addition to the summits, personal and private
diplomatic efforts were launched by Mandela, meeting the RCD leader Wamba dia Wamba and Kagame of Rwanda, mediation between Kabila, rebel goups and Museveni (Uganda) by the Libyan leader, Gaddafi, on 8 April 1999, and the Mbeki Renaissance Peacekeeping Plan involving Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, South Africa and the DRC, as well as the OAU delegation of Masire as the facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dilaogue.

On the 24th January 2000, the UN’s Security Council held a Special Session on Africa as part of the UN “Month of Africa”. The UN forum accorded the Head of States of the warring parties the opportunity to address the Security Council on the conflict and how it should be resolved. The UN further appointed a Special Representative of the Secretary General to the Congo, Moustapha Niasse, to deal with the root causes of the debilitating conflict and strive for a lasting solution (Cornwall and Potgieter 1998, Malan 1999, Munyae 2000, Maseti 2001, Solomon and Fourie 2002, Taylor and William 2003, Ngoma 2004).

5.4.7 Factors which hampered the Resolution of the DRC Conflict

The resolution of the DRC conflict proved a protracted, thorny and bumpy route despite the numerous regional and international diplomatic initiatives embarked upon to resolve it. Several factors made attaining peace in the DRC a very rough process. Primarily, the conflict involved a large number of nations and rebel groups with different clashing economic and political agendas. It became very difficult to find a solution accommodative to the diverse interests of the nations and belligerent groups in the DRC conflict. This made the calls for a ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign troops difficult to attain. Matthee aptly summarises the reluctance of the above powers to withdraw their troops from the DRC thus: “[m]any of the leaders of the anti-Kabila forces link the pursuit of their interests to the removal of Kabila from the political scene. They do not believe that Kabila will voluntarily relinquish power after negotiations, so military force seems the only solution. In addition, on all sides there are militarised economic enterprises that profit from continued conflict and little control by the government in Kinshasa” (Matthee 2000: 270).

Secondly, there were difficulties posed by the different definitions and interpretations of the conflict by the numerous warring parties involved. The matter was further complicated by denial by some parties, for example Rwanda and Burundi, that they were involved in the conflict. The Kabila regime and the SADC Alliance defined the conflict as a foreign invasion by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, rather than an internal rebellion by the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC). It was from this premise that the Kabila regime sent Rwanda and Uganda to the International Court of Justice for challenging the sovereignty of the DRC and persistently resisting inclusion of the rebel groups in the DRC peace talks. Kabila entertained hopes for a military victory against the rebels if Rwanda and Uganda were forced to withdraw, and had no faith in a negotiated settlement. As such he adroitly used the ceasefire moments to prepare for new offensives (Matthee 2000).
On the other hand, South Africa and the rebel movements viewed the conflict as a civil war in spite of the presence of the external powers. Therefore, a long lasting peace could only be attained through a multilateral process which included all the warring parties. These differences gave birth to a volatile climate in which there was no commitment to peace by the different warring groups, and violations of the ceasefires became the order of the day. This was aggravated by the multiplicity of rebel movements and militia in the DRC. In addition, the rivalry, mistrust and suspicion against each other created serious differences in the choice of a suitable mediator and venue who/which would be trusted and accepted as non-partisan by all the warring factions. Du Plessis (2000) observes that the Lusaka Accord resulted from a military stalemate and the high costs of continued engagement which affected all the parties, which forced them to opt for dialogue.

Despite its enormous prospects for peace which had eluded several other initiatives, the Lusaka Peace Accord had its own flaws, mainly in the implementation process. Solomon and Mngqibisa (2000) observe that “the manner in which the Lusaka Agreement was reached and operationalised significantly contributed to its failure. Firstly the peace accord failed to include all the warring parties in the signing of the ceasefire and the subsequent peace negotiations.” The peace accord was signed only by the major belligerents, namely the DRC Government, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC). Other warring factors such as UNITA, Front for the Liberation of of the Enclave of Kabinda (FLEC) (Angola), the Interahangwe and ex- Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR), Forces for the Defence of Democracy (FDD), National Congress for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) (Rwanda), the Lord Resistance Army (Uganda) and the numerous militia groups such as the Maimai maimai in the DRC were excluded. This gave them a licence to continue their attacks, as they were not bound by the ceasefire agreement and the subsequent peace talks. As such “in spite of the respect of the ceasefire by the main actors, the war has continued through the actions of these militia” groups making peace more evasive in the DRC (Dindelo 2006: 76).

Secondly, the Lusaka Peace accord did not substantively address the underlying security concerns of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda which consistently justified their continued presence and refusal to withdraw their troops from the DRC on the pretext that they were tracing the rebel groups operating from the bases in the DRC. For example, the MONUC failed to disarm and dismantle the rebel groups operating in the Eastern DRC, thereby giving credence to the presence of foreign troops for security reasons. Although the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement acknowledged that addressing the security concerns of the DRC and its neighbours was integral to the realisation of peace, there was a lack of concerted political will to implement the provision. Dindelo (2006: 77) states that “one of the criticisms about the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement is the fact that it left its implementation to the good will of [the] conflicting parties.” Countries like Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda and the main rebel groups such as the MLC and the RCD continued the conflict as it provided the opportunity to exploit the mineral resources for personal benefit as well as financing the
war. Such a situation created insurmountable challenges in the implementation of the Lusaka Accord. In view of this, Dindelo (2006) posits that the Lusaka Agreement only addressed grievance factors of the warring parties and failed to halt the illegal exploitation and plunder of the natural resources in the DRC.

Thirdly, there was difficulty in forming a coherent and operational transitional government of national unity from the diverse political formations which had bitterly fought each other. They remained suspicious of each other and each wanted to secretly maintain its private military in case the transitional government and the electoral dispensation did not accommodate their interests.

In spite of its recorded implementational shortcomings, the Lusaka Accord provided a solid foundation for the ultimate resolution of the DRC conflict. To some extent "[i]t had the merit of ending the hostilities among the main conflicting parties, therefore creating an environment of unstable peace for the use of preventive diplomacy, to address the underlying causes of the conflict" (Dindelo: 2006: 77). Chapter five of the Modalities for the Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement in the DRC called on the warring parties to do their utmost to facilitate the inter-Congolese political negotiation to attain a new political dispensation in the country. Thus accordingly from 1998 to 2005, 34 resolutions were adopted by the United Nations Security Council and four peace agreements were signed, namely the Pretoria Agreement (2002), the Luanda Agreement (2002), the Global and All inclusive Accord (2003), and the Memorandum of Intent on Regional Security in the Great lakes. Numerous mechanisms such as the Joint Verification Mechanisms and the Tripartite Plus Commission embracing the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi were put in place to address the security concerns of the neighbouring states (Dindelo 2006). The Lusaka accord also facilitated the partnership of the United Nations, regional organisations, Civil Society Organisations and individual member states in finding a durable solution and peace in the DRC. The multilateral approach to the resolution of the DRC made commendable overtures for relative peace and stability in the DRC and the region at large.

The facts that the conflict seemed to be impossible to win militarily, the assassination of Laurent Kabila on the 17th of January 2001 and the ascension of his son Joseph Kabila, created fertile grounds for the peaceful resolution of the crisis (Solomon and Fourie 2002). Indeed the demise of Kabila senior was followed by profound changes in the approach to the resolution of the conflict. This was evidenced by the opening of an inclusive dialogue, acceptance of Masire as the facilitator, the numerous peace summits hosted by South Africa, the OAU and the UN which culminated in the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Accord, the establishment of an inclusive government of national unity, the deployment of a multilateral UN peacekeeping force (MONUC), and the holding of elections and creation of a democratically elected, representative government in 2006. The elections were won by the Kabila (junior)-led party which formed the government and shouldered the mammoth task of leading the country to democracy and economic recovery.
Unfortunately, the subsequent elections to transform the country from war to democracy, peace and stability, were marred by violence, accusations of vote rigging, and post-election clashes between the government forces and rebel militias of Bemba and General Nkunda. Several political commentators are pessimistic about realisation of durable and lasting peace in the DRC. Fourie and Solomon (2002) note that effective preventive diplomacy in the DRC conflict would have been realised “before August 1998 when comprehensive structural changes could truly have prevented the second rebellion,” but “unfortunately, most of the International community was so relieved that Mobutu was on his way out that it did not notice the impending crisis.”

Jan Van Eck warns the peace facilitators in the DRC of the risks of pursuing a military solution to the conflict. He posits that “[t]he only solution people are trying is the use of military force. There is no military solution to this [the Eastern DRC] whatsoever. It is clear that unless a new strategy is formulated—one that will focus on addressing the real root causes of the conflict—the region will move irrevocably towards a major new crisis. In such an event, not only the Eastern DRC will be drawn in, but also its Eastern neighbours, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, since the present ethnically based conflict in eastern DRC has its origin in these countries” (cited in King 2008: 14). On the basis of the continuously unfolding and recurrent conflicts in the DRC, one is compelled to concur with du Plessis’s (2000: 349) assessment that it was logical that “when foreign military exit the DRC intense political struggles will continue to feature strongly in the patch work of power zones.” Such assumptions are motivated by the belief that addressing the structural and deep-rooted sources of the conflict will ensure attainment of lasting peace as envisaged by the Basic Human Needs theorists such as Burton and Azar. As Burton (1987) observes “[a]ny situation of conflict has many components, and in conflict resolution it is necessary to break down the whole into its separate parts and issues” (cited in Dindelo 2006: 74).

The SADC through the South African multilateral diplomatic approach to conflict resolution got the credit for regional peace and security. South Africa has also sent troops to assist in the maintenance of peace and reconstruction of the DRC. However, it is not clear whether South Africa sent its troops under the auspices of the SADC or the UN. There are questions on the efficacy of the organisation’s measures to prevent the recurrence of conflict and post-conflict building mechanisms considering the fact that war is still raging in the DRC. As Mills notes “South Africa and its regional supporters were guilty of appeasement, and should have been tougher on enforcing compliance in agreements. The Kabila supporters in SADC, in contrast used the regional organisation as an alliance through which they could extend their influence at the price of peace.” (Fourie and Solomon 2002: 14). Currently it is difficult to establish any substantive role SADC is playing in the unfolding conflict in the DRC save verbal pledges during its Head of States Summits for dialogue and peace among the warring groups in the country.
It appears that the SADC has surrendered its regional conflict prevention, management and resolution task to the UN peacekeeping Force (MONUC) instead of being in practical collaboration with it. The conflict in the DRC continues to rage. However, its intensity and scope have been dramatically reduced, with collaboration of MONUC and government forces gradually crushing the pockets of instability by rebel groups and militias in the Eastern parts of the country. Whether lasting peace will ever be realised in the DRC remains to be seen. The fact of the matter is that the efficacy of the SADC preventive diplomacy in the DRC remains questionable, and calls for concerted revamping and revitalisation.

5.5 The SADC and the Crisis in Zimbabwe

The economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe has had adverse effects on the SADC individual member states and the region, and has become one of its main preoccupations. The success or failure of the SADC as an organisation for regional economic and political stability will be tested in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe became independent on the 18th April 1980 after a protracted liberation war by the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU-PF) and the Zimbabwean African Peoples’ Union (ZAPU) against the British colonial rule (Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence). Independence was ultimately attained after the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement between the British government and the liberation movements on September 10th 1979 (Gregory 1992, Goldman 2003, Lee 2003). The terms of the Lancaster House Agreement are viewed by many analysts as the root source of the present crisis in Zimbabwe as “Britain and the United States of America insisted that the whites’ political and economic privileges be maintained” (Lee, 2003: 4) which the Robert Mugabe regime violently challenged in the mid-1990s.

In the 1980 first democratic elections ZANU-PF won a resounding majority (63% of the national vote) and Robert Mugabe became the Prime Minister and later the President of Zimbabwe (1987), the position he has held until today. In the first years of governance the ZANU government preached national reconciliation and creation of a democratic and a non-racial Zimbabwe. The government’s commitment to reconciliation was evidenced by moves to integrate the liberation forces with the former Rhodesian army to form a united Zimbabwean National Army headed by the former Rhodesian commander, General Peter Walls. A government of national unity was also put in place, which was inclusive of cabinet ministers and parliamentarians from all political parties (Gregory 1992, Meredith 2007).

Zimbabwe was regarded as a credible member of the international community with membership of SADC, the Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations. Its economy flourished and the country was regarded as the “bread basket of Africa”. As the then US Deputy Secretary of State for Africa Frank Wisner stated before a House subcommittee hearing in 1984, “Zimbabwe remained an important model for the rest of Southern Africa, both politically and economically… other states in the region could learn from Zimbabwe’s example” (De Rouche 2001: 323-324). The British government also credited Zimbabwe as a functioning democracy compared to many other
African states (Lee 2003). These positive tags were replaced by negative references to the Mugabe regime as being a dictatorship, and Zimbabwe as a “post of tyranny” by the West and the US when Mugabe started forceful expropriation of land from the white farmers, which marked the genesis of the economic and political decline of the country with catastrophic effects in the SADC region.

5.5.1 The Zimbabwean Crisis 2000 to the Present

There is no question that Zimbabwe is in a state of deepening crisis. The term “crisis” is often employed to describe the profound and complex political and economic conditions in Zimbabwe since 2000 (Goldman, 2003, Lee 2003, Sachikonye 2003, Areseb and Kibble 2005, Townsend 2005). The political and economic crisis manifested itself in the mid-1990s and 2000 when the Mugabe regime implemented its controversial policies of land seizure to resolve the thorny issue of land redistribution to the landless black Zimbabweans. The Lancaster House Agreement which paved the way for Zimbabwe's independence included clauses (the Sunset Clause) which protected land rights of the white farmers. The British government pledged a land resettlement grant of $75 million while the USA pledged $200 million (Moyo, interview in Lee 2003: 5). However, the British government is said to have provided only $44 million of the pledged land reform fund, and withheld the rest after accusing the Mugabe regime of misusing the funds and allocating the purchased land to ZANU-PF government officials and cronies instead of the needy masses (Goldman 2003, Lee 2003, Meredith 2007, and Boateng 2011). The then British Secretary of State for International Development, Claire Short, is said to have written to the Zimbabwe Minister of Agriculture and Lands, stating her government's decision to halt the land fund pledge: “we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe” (Internet; assessed; 30 September 2007). This was to mark the beginning of acrimonious relations between the Mugabe regime and the Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair.

It is a truism that the liberation war against white settler regime was propelled and coalesced around the issue of land. Fearing to be accused of a failed revolution, the Mugabe regime embarked on a land reform programme as a political tool to retain its nationalist status and support base among, mainly, the rural population and the war veterans, and hold on to power. After the expiry of the Lancaster House restrictions on land redistribution, the Mugabe regime passed the Land Acquisition Act of 1992. This marked the genesis of a period of institutionalised land seizure and political violence which culminated in the current economic meltdown inflicting Zimbabwe (Gregory 1992, Lee 2003, Meredith 2007). The Mugabe regime fuelled racial divisions around the land issue, portraying it as a contestation between the land–hungry black majority and a greedy few white settler farmers unwilling to share the national resource -- land (Meredith 2007).

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank’s decision to withhold loans and grants for the violent land seizure was dismissed by Mugabe as a tool used by the West and the USA to stifle development in the Third World.
The Zimbabwean regime was not going to “dance to the whims and caprices of the World Bank and the IMF” (Meredith 2007: 129). This was to usher in a period of hostile political bickering between the Zimbabwean government, the European Union and the USA, and the consequent collapse of the economy of Zimbabwe with dire economic and political consequences in the SADC region.

The volatile political situation in Zimbabwe was aggravated by the formation of an opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999. The party, led by the former General Secretary of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU), Morgan Tsvangirai, posed the first organised challenge to Mugabe’s ZANU PF which has dominated the political landscape since independence in 1980 (Lee 2003, Goldman 2003). The Mugabe regime denounced the MDC as a counter-revolutionary imperialist proxy party sponsored by the West and the USA to topple his regime or to orchestrate their “regime change” agenda. To counter the opposition and increase its popularity with the suffering mass electorate, the government instituted a referendum in February 2000 for constitutional amendments which would have increased Mugabe’s presidential powers and mandated the government to expropriate white commercial farms without compensation (Moyo 1995, Lee 2003, Goldman 2003, Merethe 2007).

The defeat of the government in the referendum marked the genesis of the Zimbabwe crisis, when the government institutionalised violence as a weapon to crush the opposition and retain power in the 2000 and 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections. The security apparatus became Mugabe’s primary source of power and instrument of violence during the land redistribution period dubbed the “Third Chimurenga”. The aggressive and violent campaign targeted the opposition strongholds and the white commercial farmers who were regarded as the financial and the economic backbone of the opposition, which resulted in the government defeat in the referendum. It was from this basis of accusing the white farmers of sabotaging the economy, supporting the opposition with the aim of regime change, and installing a puppet regime, that the revolutionary clarion call for the Third Chimurenga and accelerated land expropriation and redistribution, was born and institutionalised.

Thus the 2000 and 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections took place in an atmosphere of regime-sponsored and institutionalised violence, lawlessness, assaults, arson, abductions, arbitrary arrests, torture, intimidation, escalating violence and murder of members of the opposition. As the International Crisis Group put it, “[t]he widespread use of violence, intimidation and coercion formed the backbone of the government’s strategy to cow the electorate into supporting ZANU-PF, not supporting the MDC or staying away from polling places” (cited in Goldman 2003: 35).

It goes without saying that having been subjected to such intense violence by the state machinery, the MDC justifiably rejected the results and the legitimacy of the emergent ZANU-PF government. They called for the
annulment of the elections and holding credible elections conducted in a democratic and transparent manner; calls which the Mugabe regime simply ignored. The international community, especially the European Union, the USA and the Commonwealth Observer Teams as well as the SADC Parliamentary Forum Observer Mission, rejected the elections as fraudulent and incredible due to the high level of violence which prevailed during the campaign period. The Commonwealth Observer Mission denounced the election results as reflective of a “climate of fear and suspicions and a systematic campaign of intimidation” visited upon the opposition by the ZANU-PF militia and security forces (Meredith 2007: 229). The MDC leader Tsvangirai dismissed the elections as “daylight robbery” by ZANU-PF (Meredith 2007).

Perhaps for political expediency and solidarity reasons, the South African, Nigerian, African Union and SADC Observer Missions endorsed the elections as fair, free and a legitimate representation of the will of the people of Zimbabwe (Isaksen 2002, Alden and Garth 2003, Sachikonye 2004, Lodge 2004, Areseb and Kibble 2005, Townsend 2005). Commenting on this regional support of the Mugabe regime, USA Senator Russell Feingold indicated that it “raise[d] real doubts about the commitment of these regional leaders to democracy, and over the long term, these failures threaten the prospects for stability and prosperity throughout the region” (cited in Kibble 2005: 7).

The 2000 and 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections escalated and exacerbated the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe, a country once referred to as “Africa’s bread basket”, experienced total economic collapse, with catastrophic consequences in the region (Benjamin 1992, Gregory 1992, Goldman 2003, Lee 2003, Dell 2005, ICG 2007). The economic and political crisis “has turned the country from extremely prosperous by African standards into one of the most impoverished places on earth” (Goldman 2003: 31). This was because the international community, the European Union and the USA, imposed economic sanctions on the ZANU-PF for stolen elections, human rights abuses, poor governance, and breakdown of the rule of law in the country. These sanctions, coupled with the disruptions in the agricultural production sector resulting from the farm invasions, led to the total collapse of the economy and institutions of democratic governance. The developed world’s imposition of economic sanctions lends credibility to accusations that they are a tool to facilitate regime change in the country. The perceived Western “orchestrated plot” to collapse the economy of Zimbabwe and effect their goal of regime change was confirmed by the passage of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act in December 2001, in which the USA government pledged to put economic and political pressure on the ZANU-PF regime by de-campaigning it in the international front, and sponsoring the opposition “democratic” forces in Zimbabwe.

It is with such evidence that the Mugabe regime has successfully garnered the support of the continent and the SADC region, to counter what they perceive as a Western imperialist plot to re-colonise Zimbabwe and the entire continent. For example, in his speech after his presidential “victory” in the 2002 elections Mugabe was quoted as
stating that he had dealt a “stunning blow to imperialism…That ugly head that we thought we had smashed through our anti-colonial struggle, no, we left it alive and it is rearing it again, perhaps calling for a much more devastating blow to the head, no longer to the body of that monster” (cited in Meredith 2007: 229).

On the other hand, the Western governments and the USA, the godfathers of the targeted sanctions, have categorically denied that the economic turmoil in Zimbabwe resulted from the sanctions. Instead they lay the genesis and escalation of the economic and political meltdown at the door of the dictatorial ZANU-PF regime and its institutionalised misrule, gross mismanagement of the economy, and the chaotic and disastrous land reform programme which disrupted the once productive commercial ultimately turning Zimbabwe from being a “bread basket” to a “basket case” (Boateng 2011).

Attempts by the SADC organisation and individual member states to help revive and reconstruct the collapsed economy remain elusive. Calls by Tsvangirai, who joined the Mugabe regime as Prime Minister to form a government of national unity following the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in 2008, for the West and the USA to lift sanctions on the Mugabe ruling elite have not borne any significant fruits. The EU and the USA have instead renewed the sanctions, as in their view the government of national unity has not shown any meaningful and identifiable moves towards economic reconstruction and democratic governance.

5.5.2 Political Effects of the Crisis

Politically, Zimbabwe is on the brink of becoming a failed and collapsed state. The dictatorship of the Mugabe regime has turned the country into a militarised and criminalised state. The formation of the Joint Military Command (JMC) evidenced the militarisation of the country governance and state institutions. The Mugabe regime now relies on the security establishment to safeguard its power base by means of political repression (ICG 2007). Key ministries, institutions and diplomatic missions of the government are headed by the regime’s loyalists, mainly from the security services, symbolising Mugabe’s power networks (Meredith 2007).

The political crisis in Zimbabwe has become an established source of regional insecurity, violating the pledge by SADC for promotion of democracy, good governance, peace and stability, human rights protection and development. The economic and political meltdown in Zimbabwe was aggravated by the brutalities of the ZANU-PF regime, as evidenced by the violent crushing of any democratic demonstration.

The repressive nature of the regime was reflected on the 11th of March 2007, when the security forces violently crushed a prayer meeting organised by the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, a coalition of the opposition, the church and civil society, and brutally assaulting Morgan Tsvangirai. In response to the international outcry against the regime’s
brutalities against the opposition, democracy and human rights, the ever-defiant Mugabe told the international community to "go hang" as the opposition was an instrument of the West, sponsored to orchestrate regime change in Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime remains obstinate and confrontational in both its domestic and foreign policy posture in spite of the enormous crises the country is deeply sinking into. The regime’s brutalisation of the opposition has crippled the latter’s capacity to mobilise the masses for an open rebellion against it. The opposition mobilisation capacity was further eroded by its split into two antagonistic and competing factions led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara (Ncube 2007, International Crisis Group September 2007, Meredith 2007).

Through its propaganda machinery, the Zimbabwean government has consistently denied the existence of any political crisis in the country. The regime’s propaganda dismisses any reports, especially by the Western media, as an imperialist engineered plot for regime change. In its characteristic combative fashion, the Mugabe regime has consistently accused the West and the USA sanctions for causing the current economic and political situation in Zimbabwe. This is in spite of the fact that the regime’s misconstrued economic policies and political decay are largely responsible for the destruction of the country’s once prosperous and functioning economy and government. The position of the Zimbabwe government is that the country has been subjected to such vicious vilifications because they have dared taken back land from the minority white commercial farmers in order to attain economic independence. The Mugabe regime has always argued, convincingly in some quarters, that the West will always use their economic and political might to crush any attempts by developing countries to achieve economic liberation.

The brutal will and determination of the Mugabe-led ZANU-PF government to cling to power was reflected in the March 2008 Presidential elections, which, as has become customary, were characterised by state-sponsored violence perpetrated by the war veterans, ZANU-PF militia, and the security apparatus against the opposition MDC, especially Tsvangirai’s faction. When the Electoral Commission was expected to release the results, they delayed for a month for unexplained circumstances, which obviously fomented suspicions that the regime was rigging the results. As expected, when the results were released, neither of the major contestants Mugabe and Tsvangirai had won the required 50 +% of the vote. The re-run, which was set for June 2008, saw ZANU-PF unleashing its violent machinery against the MDC, thus forcing Tsvangirai to withdraw from the race as many of his supporters were arrested, tortured and killed by the ZANU-PF militia and state security apparatus. Although Mugabe claimed victory and was declared and inaugurated as the legitimately elected Head of State, many nations, especially in the European Union and the USA, rejected the elections as a joke, and did not recognise his government. Some states in the SADC region like Botswana under President Lieutenant General Seretse Khama Ian Khama, also refused to recognise Mugabe as the legitimate President of Zimbabwe.
In a bid to remedy the politically soiled climate, the SADC mandated the then president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, to facilitate dialogue between Mugabe and Tsvangirai, which after protracted tribulation and bickering, resulted in the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and formation of a government of national unity in February 2009. The GPA called for the formation of a unity government between the ZANU-PF and the Tsvangirai and Mutambara MDC factions. In the government of national unity Mugabe remained the President, while Tsvangirai and Mutambara became the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively. It is important to note that the GPA and the resultant government of national unity were seriously flawed in that they granted Mugabe, who had allegedly lost in the 2008 polls, full executive powers, while Tsvingirai, who won the elections, and Mutambara are just powerless figureheads with little influence on governance policy and operations. This has created fault lines in the government of national unity as President Mugabe started violating the agreements of the GPA and the government of national unity, much to the dismay of the MDC and the SADC.

President Mugabe has deliberately stalled the development of a new constitution which will govern the elections and governance in Zimbabwe beyond the government of national unity. ZANU-PF has been pushing for the holding of elections in 2011 despite the fact that the preparatory measures such as the availability of a new constitution as required by the GPA are not in place. Objections by the MDC and reference of the matter to the SADC for mediation have been met with indifferent obstinacy by the Mugabe regime. As a result the MDC (Tsvangirai) has threatened to pull out of the unity government if Mugabe does not adhere to the provisions of the GPA and the government of national unity. Jacob Zuma, who has replaced Thabo Mbeki as the president of South Africa and mediator in the Zimbabwean political impasse, has frequently visited Zimbabwe to save the government of national unity which has always been on the brink of collapse since its birth. The painful reality is that ZANU-PF has never been interested in sharing power with MDC, and therefore they have devised measures to make them uncomfortable partners in the government of national unity. On many occasions Mugabe has made unilateral decisions without consulting Tsvangirai as the Prime Minister in the unity government.

The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), who are accused by the Mugabe regime of being puppets of the West in its mission to effect regime change, has been unrelenting in its position that the economic and political situation in Zimbabwe has resulted from the ZANU-PF economic mismanagement and repressive political system. The MDC has called on the international community and the regional organisation (SADC) to impose sanctions on the Mugabe regime, which it regards as illegitimate because of the fraudulent and violence-packed elections of 2000, 2002 and 2008.

Whatever the truth is, the reality is that the Mugabe regime seems to be obsessed with defence of the state and the regime at the expense of human security, development and service delivery, as evidenced by the regime’s
indifference to the suffering of impoverished Zimbabweans in Zimbabwe and those who have escaped economic pangs and political repression to other parts of the world. Because of the instability and dysfunctional situation in the unity government, there is talk of holding elections in 2011 as none of the GNU partners are comfortable with the partnership. The mention of elections revives fears of electoral violence, arrests, torture, and intimidation and massacres among the Zimbabwean voters (mainly opposition supporters) as experienced before and during the 2002 and 2008 elections.

5.6 The Response of the International Community and SADC to the Zimbabwe crisis

SADC has been confronted by a number of grave security problems threatening the region’s stability and development. The wars in Angola and the DRC, the violent conflicts in Lesotho and the deepening political crises in Zimbabwe and Madagascar, have been addressed in different ways, mainly through ad hoc interventions due to lack of a functioning security mechanism and also due to the unique peculiarities and complexities of each case (Isaksen 2002, Barengu and Landsberg 2003, Neethling 2004). Of all the security threats facing Southern Africa, the Zimbabwean economic and political meltdown remains a persistently gnawing thorn in the regional organisation’s flesh. Bound by geography, history, economic and political links and the pledges of regional integration, the SADC cannot afford to ignore the calamitous effects of the turmoil in Zimbabwe. Several analysts and observers are concerned that the difficulties confronting Zimbabwe are damaging to the consolidation of democratic governance, the regional integration project and the fragile economies of the region (Alden and Garth 2003, Lee 2003, Sachikonye 2004, Ngoma 2005).

The effects of the Zimbabwean crisis on the SADC region and the continent’s development potentials and initiatives are also persistently projected by the West and the USA. These global centres of economic and political power have tied development financial aid and assistance to the return of democracy, good governance, protection of human rights, free, fair and transparent elections, freedom of speech, independence of the judiciary, the media and prevalence of the rule of law in Zimbabwe and other nations of the Third World in general (Goldman 2003, Lee 2003). It is in this framework that Zimbabwe has become a subject of both regional and international debate. The Zimbabwean issue has become a dividing matter between and among the European, African and regional nations.

5.6.1 The Response of the European Union and USA to Zimbabwe Crisis

Subsequent to the 2000 and 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections, the Western nations and organisations and the USA have adopted a confrontational policy of isolation and containment towards Zimbabwe to pressurise it against what they perceive to be a dictatorial regime, characterised by state repression, gross human rights abuse, abrogation of the rule of law and suppression of the freedom of speech and the media, and crimes against humanity, especially after the controversial land reform programme in 2000. The European Union (EU), the white
Commonwealth nations (Australia, Canada and New Zealand) and the USA consistently launch diplomatic assaults on the Mugabe regime as an international outcast and a post of tyranny. The confrontational posture by the West and USA was evidenced by the enactment and signing into law of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act on the 21 December 2001 by George W Bush. The law forbade any American business entity and international financial institution to engage in any business ventures with the Mugabe regime.

The immediate post-Blair British Prime Minister Gordon Brown wrote in The Independent Newspaper (20 September 2007) calling for the EU to tighten the sanctions against the Mugabe regime: “[w]e will ensure that the EU maintains sanctions against the 131 individuals in the ruling elite including President Mugabe who have committed human rights abuses.” Brown further threatened to boycott the 2007 EU-Africa Conference in Portugal if Mugabe was invited. The confrontational stance was further reflected by statements by the representatives of the West and USA governments such as “formation of a coalition of the willing” to deal with Zimbabwe (Frazer, USA ambassador to South Africa), condemnation of the Robert Mugabe regime and Zimbabwe as a “post of tyranny” (US Secretary for State Condi Rice), a regime “whose time has come and gone” (Collin Powell, 2003).

The sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States of America and the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth were also part of the pressure to force the Mugabe regime to democratic governance and reversal of the controversial land reform programme. The Developed countries persistently called upon SADC, especially South Africa, to use its political and economic might to force Zimbabwe on to the route to democracy. They dismiss the regional organisation’s policy of quiet diplomacy as a monumental failure (Goldman 2003, Lee 2003, Townsend 2005, Areseb and Kibble 2005).

If the confrontational approach by the West and the USA was intended to cow the Mugabe regime into submission, it failed dismally; instead the regime exploited it to reinforce its repressive apparatus and resolve under the pretext of defending the nation’s sovereignty against the Western and opposition plot for regime change. President Mugabe successfully turned it into a nationalist rallying point for the defence of Zimbabwe against re-colonisation by the West.

Many questions were raised against the real intention of the European Union and the USA against Zimbabwe. Several analysts smelled some sinister agenda on this Western and USA foreign policy obsession with Zimbabwe. Many felt the real issue was that Zimbabwe has expropriated land from the minority white commercial farmers, hence the vilification. Questions were raised why the obsession with Zimbabwe about their contested elections when there are other countries with similarly contested elections. Mawere (2007) posits that “[w]hile many argue that there is no causal link between the economic crisis and the land issue, no one has been able to explain why the international community would be so angry with Zimbabwe and not with Nigeria, Pakistan or Ivory Coast if democracy was the real
Weir (2007) also notes that “[t]he behaviour of the West and the so-called ‘international community’ has been strange and disproportionate. Presidents in most of the developing world are dictators in a similar mould to Robert Mugabe, and yet the West loves them or at least makes little noise about their misbehaviour (in financial and/or human rights terms)” (New African October 2007: 60). Such perceptions have boosted Mugabe’s status as an anti-imperialist hero struggling for the economic independence of Zimbabwe and Africa as a whole (Lee 2003, Ncube 2007, Sasa 2007 ICG September 2007).

There are suspicions from many critics that the land question is the bone of contention and it is a signal to other countries such as South Africa and Namibia in which the explosive land question remains untouched, that if they employ the Zimbabwean style they will suffer the same punitive measures (Kgwete 2007, Boateng 2011).

Some analysts argue that the ambivalent and disproportionate attitudes by the West towards Zimbabwe may have consolidated the SADC cohesive solidarity behind Zimbabwe. Kgwete (2007) brilliantly captures this thinking that “[c]learly SADC is not convinced that the mounting pressure to punish Mugabe and his government is worth heeding. In fact (and rightly so), the SADC leaders are doing the opposite of what some pressure groups, international organisations and certain Western countries want them to do in Zimbabwe. They are helping Zimbabwe instead of punishing it” (New African October 2007: 59). Indeed the SADC has called upon its members to invest capital in the reconstruction of the collapsed Zimbabwean economy and institutions of governance. In August 2009 Botswana has negotiated a loan of P500 million with the local banks to rescue the economy of Zimbabwe. The government of Botswana has gone to the extent of sending a delegation of economic experts and business people to Zimbabwe to identify the business sectors in which the government and the private business individuals can invest with the aim of reviving the economy of Zimbabwe. The government of Botswana under President Ian Khama which broke ranks with other SADC member states on Zimbabwe after the chaotic 2008 elections. changed course late in 2010 after a visit to South Africa. In a dramatic change of foreign policy stance, Khama, who has all along called for the tightening of sanctions on the errant tyrant regime and refused to recognise and sit in any SADC conference attended by Mugabe, called for the lifting of sanctions on Zimbabwe to give it a chance, since there were signs of progress. The Botswana government seemed to have sensed regional isolation due to its unpopular stance on Zimbabwe. This shows how it seems difficult for any SADC member state to sustain an anti-Mugabe stance.

However, the West and the USA have at last surrendered, and pledged their support to the SADC-led initiative to resolve the crisis. This in a way is a clear admission that their megaphone diplomacy, policy of isolation, sanctions and persistent demonisation of Mugabe has been ineffective, and has even driven prospects for a peaceful constructive engagement with the regime further down the drain. The targeted sanctions have not achieved any meaningful objective since their imposition; instead they have escalated the economic and political meltdown and the
suffering of the ordinary masses of Zimbabwe. The best way would be for the international community to change strategy by collaborating with SADC for a constructive engagement with the Mugabe regime. The stand-off continues at present with the EU and the USA renewal of their targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe in view of the fact that the ZANU-PF Mugabe regime has done very little if anything in economic and political reforms in spite of being in the government of national unity with the MDC. The fault lines in the government of national unity are getting wider, with the Mugabe government accusing the MDC of failure to convince the EU and the USA to lift the sanctions which it helped to impose on Zimbabwe. The Mugabe regime has vowed that it will not fulfil some of the pertinent requirements of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) until the MDC has convinced their friends in the West to lift the sanctions. Calls by both Tsvangirai and the SADC for the lifting of sanctions as a gesture which would facilitate the speedy recovery of Zimbabwe from its economic and political malady have been ignored by the EU and the USA.

5.6.2 SADC and Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe

It was in this hostile regional and international climate that SADC adopted the policy of Quiet Diplomacy as a diplomatic and political tool to address the crisis in Zimbabwe. The SADC resisted sustained pressure from the West and the USA for a confrontational approach and instead opted for a constructive non-coercive diplomatic engagement with the Zimbabwe government. That is, SADC chose quiet diplomacy as opposed to the megaphone or shouting diplomacy pursued by the West and the USA. Quiet Diplomacy as the policy employed by SADC to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe is characterised by silence and sometimes mild statements by the organisation and individual member states against the Zimbabwean regime’s violation of human rights and autocratic governance. It is also defined by solidarity with Zimbabwe against what some SADC member states perceive to be an onslaught by the West and the USA against the sovereignty of the nation (Sachikonye 2004).

Virulent and vicious statements were levelled by some SADC leaders against the West for imposition of sanctions and suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. At the March 28-29 2007 Head of States’ and Governments’ Extraordinary Summit, the SADC members called upon the West and the USA to lift all sanctions on Zimbabwe. This solidarity posture was more shocking as it was not altered by the brutal crushing of an opposition gathering by the Zimbabwean regime on March 11 2007, in which the MDC leader Tsvangirai was arrested with scores of his supporters and brutally assaulted by the police. The regional organisation’s support for Zimbabwe was further evidenced by the SADC Observer Mission and individual member states’ endorsement of the fraudulent 2000 and 2002 elections as free, fair and a representation of the will of the people of Zimbabwe (International Crisis Group 2002, Isaksen 2002, Goldman 2003, Lee 2003, Kibble 2005, and Townsend 2005). This was so in spite of the fact that the elections were marred by state-sponsored political violence and institutionalised rigging, and openly contravened the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (Isaksen 2002, Sachikonye 2004, Kibble 2005, and Townsend 2005). The SADC states further recognised the ZANU-PF government as legitimately
elected, a position they restated at the Extraordinary Summit in Tanzania in the 28-29 March 2007 (SADC Communique March 2007).

Some analysts have provided reasons why the SADC opted for quiet diplomacy rather than the confrontational diplomatic avenues. Firstly, SADC was compelled by the need to project a sense of solidarity and a common policy approach to the Zimbabwean issue. Although individual SADC member states entertained different views regarding the crisis in Zimbabwe, they adopted quiet diplomacy to keep SADC united and maintain regional solidarity as expressed in the SADC founding treaty. This was essential given the polarisation which ravaged the organisation during the formative discourse on the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security; interventions in the DRC and Lesotho and during the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth. There are indications that some SADC member states, Botswana and Mauritius, voted in support of the suspension at the Commonwealth Conference in Abuja (Logde 2003). The SADC member states reiterated their solidarity with the Mugabe regime at their Summits in Tanzania and Zambia in March and August 2007 respectively) (SADC Communiqués March and August 2007). At the Lusaka Summit, the SADC members, for example, noted that “we feel that the problems in Zimbabwe have been exaggerated.” The International Crisis Group (September 2007) argued that some SADC member states’ solidarity with Zimbabwe was borne by the fact that they were as guilty in the violation of human rights as Zimbabwe. Most of them were embraced by legitimacy crises themselves, and as such it became difficult to take objective positions on the autocratic nature of one of their counterparts without opening themselves for scrutiny. Unanimously, save for few isolated voices like Botswana, recognised Mugabe as the legitimate leader in Zimbabwe while at the same time mandating the regional organisation (SADC) to initiate dialogue between the warring parties. The SADC regional group has always entertained the false hope that Mugabe might change his dictatorial tendencies if they pursued a policy of appeasement towards him.

Secondly, the Mugabe regime adroitly exploited the Western calls for regime change to drum up solidarity from SADC member states and the rest of the continent. He projected a conspiracy by the West against ex-liberation movements’ regimes in Southern Africa; that; “[t]here is a Western, and especially Anglo–American plot to destroy ZANU-PF and evict it from power because it was a liberation movement. If this plot succeeded in Zimbabwe, it would then be applied against all other ruling liberation movements in Southern Africa” (in Johnson 2002: 8).

Thirdly, SADC did not want to appear under pressure from the West and the USA to act against Mugabe. The arrogance of the West and their calls for regime change placed SADC countries in a difficult position. The SADC region recognised the legitimacy and sovereignty of Zimbabwe and the necessity of engaging it through constructive diplomacy. Some SADC member states questioned the double standards in the West’s and the USA’s calls for regime change in Zimbabwe while they fully recognised other regimes/countries where there were also flawed
elections and undemocratic governance. These perceptions tended to project President Mugabe as a hero who has stood up against the West’s imperialist machinations (lodge 2003, Townsend 2005, Ncube 2007, International Crisis Group September 2007). Quiet diplomacy is mainly in tune with the regional and international foreign policy of the SADC regional hegemon, South Africa. As the economic and political power house of the region, South Africa’s foreign policy framework was central to the SADC development and application of the policy of quiet diplomacy. The South African government’s foreign policy is geared towards shedding the unilateral and confrontational approach of the apartheid regime, to embrace a policy of constructively engaging regional and international organisations in resolving conflicts.

5.6.3 Reasons for South Africa’s Adherence to the Policy of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe

Although South Africa has both the economic, political and military might to pressurise Zimbabwe (individually or collectively as SADC) to engage in political reforms, she has adhered to the policy of non-coercive diplomacy through which the region would constructively engage the Mugabe regime in peaceful dialogue for a lasting resolution of the crisis. Analysts have advanced various reasons for South Africa’s adherence to quiet diplomacy in spite of the fact that it has not produced any concrete results since its inception.

Firstly, South Africa pursued the policy of quiet diplomacy to maintain regional unity and avoid isolation. The aim was mainly to adhere to the principles of multilateral, cooperative and constructive engagement of both regional and international stakeholders in the resolution of conflicts. The key goal was to avoid confrontations with the government, and promote multilateralism in resolving the Zimbabwean political impasse and regional conflicts in general. In this policy framework South Africa would dispel negative labels such as “regional big brother” “regional superpower” or “regional bully” which formed the negative tags during the apartheid era (Lodge 2003, Sachikonye 2004, Kibble 2005, Townsend 2005). As articulated by the International Crisis Group, “Pretoria was reluctant to move beyond SADC lest it fatally divides an organisation which is a foundation of its security policy” (September 2007: 13). In the same vein South Africa may have been compelled by fears of a recurrence of the acrimonious geo-political rivalry which existed between it and Zimbabwe during the discussions on the operational status of the SADC security Organ and the Zimbabwean-led military intervention in the DRC. Moreover, the South African government was conscious of the existence of strong regional sympathies with the Mugabe regime. Regional members such as Namibia, Angola, and the DRC have maintained a bond of loyalty with Zimbabwe since the days of liberation and their military intervention the DRC. Makoa (1998) noted that when Mandela changed tone against the Zimbabwe-led operation in the DRC, it was in fear of regional isolation and the usurpation of the status of regional hegemon by Zimbabwe whose President adroitly exploited its (South Africa) vacillating foreign policy on the DRC.
Secondly, the South African government employed quiet diplomacy especially in the face of the ZANU-PF-sponsored forced land expropriation and occupation because it was fully conscious of its vulnerability on the land question (Lodge 2003, Knapp 2004, Sasa 2007). Just as it was in Zimbabwe, the bulk of the commercial farms in South Africa and Namibia are still in the hands of a minority of white farmers. In the view of Sasa (2007), “South Africa also sees the issues which Zimbabwe is tackling as, in fact, a menu of matters it has to attend to within its own territory. The land question is as much South African as it is Zimbabwean. In fact, it is a thousand-fold bigger in South Africa than it is in Zimbabwe” (in New African August/September 2007: 138). Moreover, the South African position on the Zimbabwe land reform was aggravated by the West’s governments and media obsession with the issue, making it appear a racial debate. The International Crisis Group (October 2002: 1), observed that “[t]he international media’s over-concentration on the plight of white commercial farmers has given Mugabe’s liberation rhetoric greater resonance in many African quarters, reinforcing the belief that the West cares about Zimbabwe only because whites suffer.”

Thirdly, South Africa resisted confrontation with Zimbabwe because “a policy based on force will aggravate an already unimaginable situation and hasten a melt down” (Landsberg cited in Lodge 2003: 8). A collapsed Zimbabwean state would have “rebounded on Pretoria with disastrous effects via a mass influx of refugees, disrupted trade links…and generalised chaos on the borders” (Mckinly 2004: 358-359). In spite of the economic and political meltdown in Zimbabwe South Africa still has prosperous trade links with Zimbabwe. Sasa (2007) cites statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry and Zimbabwe Central Statistic Office that for example, in 2006, Zimbabwe’s total imports of US$1.966bn, US$1.094bn came from South Africa. Zimbabwe remains one of the biggest importers of South African goods. Lastly, South Africa feared escalating the crisis if it were to project a confrontational stance against the Mugabe regime. It was, arguably, within this context that South Africa and the SADC member states insisted on Quiet Diplomacy as opposed to "noise or shouting" or coercive diplomacy.

5.6.4 The SADC Diplomatic Initiatives in Zimbabwe

Since 2000, several diplomatic initiatives have been launched by SADC, mainly championed by South Africa, to mediate in the crisis between the ZANU-PF government and the opposition MDC, and almost all of them (save the 2008/2009 which led to the formation of a government of national unity) were abortive. From 2000 to the present, facilitation of constructive dialogue between the government and the opposition has become the main focus and preoccupation of the SADC and the South African official engagement with Zimbabwe (Lodge 2003, Sachikonye 2004).

Guided by this situation, South Africa has taken protective positions against Zimbabwe in the international podium. In April 2003, a South African motion at the UN Human rights Commission blocked an effort by the European Union to
obtain a UN condemnation of Zimbabwe for human rights abuses and violation (Lodge, 2003). In April 2007, as the Chair of the UN Security Council, South Africa voted against a motion by the British ambassador to the UN to put the Zimbabwe crisis and human rights violation on the Security Council agenda (SABC Africa, 180 Degrees, 2007). In line with the South African foreign policy framework, South Africa believes and encourages peaceful resolution of the crisis in Zimbabwe through dialogue and without alienating any of the stakeholders in the process. Moreover, in Zimbabwe, South Africa (SADC) cherishes a regional approach and solution to the crisis, hence the continued resistance to outside interference. A South African-facilitated peaceful transition was achieved in the DRC when they held their first democratic elections in decades in 2006.

The SADC Extraordinary Summit of March 2007 in Tanzania mandated President Mbeki to facilitate dialogue in Zimbabwe. After the volatile March and June 2008 Presidential elections, Mbeki, after numerous abortive attempts, successfully convinced ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions to sign the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in 2008, which led to the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) (February 2009) in which Mugabe remained President, Tsvangirai Prime Minister, and Mutambara Deputy Prime Minister. Although the operation of the GNU has been beset by numerous difficulties and challenges, the fact that SADC managed to bring the hostile political formations together under one government should be viewed as a success to some degree.

At its April 2000 Victoria Falls Summit, and the subsequent Summit of August 2001, the SADC leaders acknowledged their support for land reform in Zimbabwe and disapproved the land invasions, forced expropriation and the resultant violence. The Summit also emphasised the significance of respect for human rights, good governance and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. SADC leaders appealed to the British government to honour its Lancaster House pledge of funding the land redistribution programme. President Mbeki made efforts to talk to the British government and the International Monetary Fund to solicit funds for the land reform programme, but in vain (Lodge 2003, Goldman 2003, Lee 2003, Townsend 2005, Kibble 2005). However, none of these Summits' resolutions changed the Mugabe regime's position on forceful land expropriation.

The January 2002 Blantyre SADC Summit mandated establishment of a task force on Zimbabwe comprising Malawi, Tanzania, South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique (Isaksen 2002, Field 2002, Barengu and Landsberg 2003). The task of the task team was to facilitate dialogue between ZANU-PF, the MDC and civil society to resolve the land crisis and restore a democratic dispensation in the country (Field 2002). The SADC summit acknowledged that the economic and political situation which was unfolding in Zimbabwe was adversely affecting the entire region. Isaksen (2002: iv) stated that “for the first time in the history of the SADC” the task team publicly criticised Zimbabwe on the crisis which bred lawlessness and political violence; human rights abuses and economic collapse while the government passively watched. This passivity by the government amid political mayhem gave credence to the
accusations of its (government) complicity in the turmoil. However, the intervention, like the others before it, failed to achieve its intended goals. It “had little impact and there was virtually no diplomatic follow-up” (Isaksen 2002: iv). President Mugabe remained defiant, to the chagrin of SADC member states that nevertheless firmly stood on his side against international criticisms and vilifications. Even with the two MDC factions in a government of national unity President Mugabe has consistently violated the regulations governing the GPA which ushered in the unity government. The current SADC facilitator for the dialogue in Zimbabwe, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa (who replaced Mbeki) has been in Zimbabwe on numerous occasions to quench the fires consuming the functioning of the government of national unity. There seems to be no light at the end of the tunnel regarding political stabilisation in Zimbabwe. Currently there are talks of elections in 2011, which has revived fears of the state-sponsored violence against the opposition akin to the 2000 and 2008 period.

In its multilateral approach to resolution of conflicts, SADC embraced the Organisation of African Unity (African Union) in its initiatives for the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis. According to Alden and Garth, “[w]here SADC as an institution has been unable to muster a strongly articulated position on a conflict because of the involvement of its constituent members, the South African government has been able to participate in other multilateral initiatives that actively promote its concern to bring about peaceful resolution” (2003: 41).

SADC, the organisation and individual member states, were disturbed by the deteriorating situation and repression in one of their member states. In fact signs of divisions and disintegration of the solidarity wall in both the African Union and SADC were beginning to show with the then AU Chairman President John Kuffor of Ghana and the late Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa breaking the silence. Kuffour described the incident as an “embarrassment to Africa” while Mwanawasa was quoted as saying “SADC has failed to make progress in Zimbabwe; quiet diplomacy has failed to help solve the political meltdown in Zimbabwe” (in The Business Day (Johannesburg) Thursday, 22 March 2007: 1). However, surprisingly the, SADC emerged from the Summit a united force in solidarity with the Zimbabwean government which they acknowledged as legitimately constituted through the “free, fair and democratic” presidential elections held in 2002

South Africa has started the difficult journey of mediating in the Zimbabwe crisis. A Mediation Team has been established to kickstart the mediation process. However, although the process is at its natal stages, there are obstacles projected by the rival camps. The ZANU-PF government has persistently advanced conditions for negotiations as the opposition’s recognition of the legitimacy of the Mugabe regime, respect for the country’s sovereignty and laws, the irreversibility of the expropriated land, an end to promotion of violence, a stop to urging external interference in the domestic affairs of the country, and a call for the lifting of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe which the MDC advocated. The opposition, on the other hand, has called for a new constitution and the
levelling of the political space as the conditions for their participation in the talks and elections in 2008. There have been calls by different Zimbabwean Civic Groups for the Mbeki-led mediation initiatives to involve Civil Society Organisations such as political and labour pressure groups, the business community, church groups and trade unions to ensure full participation of all stakeholders and a broad-based ownership of the process -- an arrangement reminiscent of the South African Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) forum (Association of Zimbabwe Journalists: Internet, 21 June 2007).

At the SADC Summit in Zambia held on the 17th and 18th of August 2007, President Mbeki is said to have reported on progress in his mediation on the Zimbabwean political crisis that the parties had agreed on substantive issues and were ready for dialogue. The SADC Executive Secretary, Tomas Salamao's report on the economic rescue package for Zimbabwe was referred to the regional organisation’s ministers of finance for further discussions (The Herald 21 August 2007). The International Crisis Group (September 2007) noted the Salamao rescue package recommendations obtained from the confidential report as calling for the liberalisation of the exchange rate, elimination of the government-sponsored price control, privatisation of parastatals, civil service reforms, budget deficit reductions and a predictable policy environment. The SADC solidarity with Mugabe was reiterated by the incoming chairperson, the late Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa. He called on Zimbabweans to retain unity and safeguard their hard-won independence and assured them that “in the mean time the SADC is there for you. This organisation is always ready to assist where it can to resolve the problems affecting member states” (The Herald 17 August 2007). Akin to the Dares Salaam Summit, the regional organisation’s Head of States noted that the problems in Zimbabwe were “exaggerated”. This solidarity is shocking as it is entrenched in the middle of the deepening economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe with devastating effects on the region as a whole. This solidarity amid deepening crisis prompted Melber (2007) to label the regional leaders “Zimbabwe regime cronies and professional denialists.”

5.7 The 2008 Elections and the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe

In spite of all these proposals, the March 2008 Presidential elections were held in a hostile climate, with the ZANU-PF militia and the security establishments unleashing violence on the opposition MDC. The latter had difficulties holding political rallies to commend itself and its candidates to the electorates. There was a total media blackout for opposition parties, and only state-sponsored propaganda to boost the position of the government, Mugabe and ZANU-PF. ZANU-PF were projected as the liberation vanguard and the nationalist movement which is the only hope to protect the interests of Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwean people. The MDC was negatively presented to the electorates as a Western sponsored party bent on giving back the country to the colonialists. The Electoral Commission whose representatives were hand-picked by the President, was viewed by many especially the opposition, as not independent but a partisan stooge institution of the ruling party. The Mugabe regime has also blocked almost all the European-based election observers from coming in to monitor the elections because of their
persistent criticisms of the government and denounciation of the 2002 elections as fraudulent. Only election observers from organisations deemed to be sympathetic to the government, such as the AU Observer Mission and the SADC Observer Mission, were granted permission to observe the polls. The election process was characterised by violence, intimidations, detentions, torture and murder of opposition supporters and candidates by the state agents and ZANU-PF militia. The election results were viewed by many election observers as fraudulent in light of the above scenario. These intimidatory machinations, bolstered by the pro-government state media, adversely affected the MDC performance in the elections. When the results were ultimately released the MDC had won a majority in parliament while none of the presidential contenders had won the required 51+. As a result there was need for a rerun in June 2008. There are suspicions from many quarters that the MDC had acquired the required percentage but the ZANU-PF government and its partisan Electoral Commission rigged the results to create room for the ZANU-PF to prepare its killing squads on the eve of the rerun. Indeed this was to be the case. In its bid to disrupt the opposition MDC led by Tsvangirai which in the March polls garnered 47% of the votes above the Mugabe ZANU-PF 43% the government intensified its state sponsored violence through its security apparatus. Tvangirai was constantly arrested and detained whenever he was to address political rallies and his rallies were more often than not disrupted by ZANU- PF thugs who would beat, torture and kill the supporters. During the campaigns for the rerun an estimation of about one hundred opposition supporters were killed, while many more were detained or forced to flee the country. Due to this hostile political climate Tsvangirai pulled out of the race. The elections went ahead, and Mugabe retained the presidency and was sworn in as the legitimately elected head of state, to the shock of all credible observers of the election.

Consequently the European Union and the USA denounced the elections as fraudulent and not representative of the will of the people of Zimbabwe. Some SADC nations, especially Botswana under President Lieutenant General Ian Khama Seretse Khama, rejected the election results and refused to recognise the resultant regime as legitimate. In a move which was interpreted by many as recognition of Tsvangirai as the winner of the election, the government of Botswana granted him refuge after he had fled the country amid state-orchestrated threats to his life. The Botswana government clearly stated that it does not recognise Mugabe as the President of Zimbabwe, as the elections contravened all known ethics for democratic elections. The Botswana government and the European Union called for new polls which would be conducted in a fair and free climate and monitored by credible international Observers and the UN. Surprisingly the AU and SADC Observer Missions remained uncritical of the undemocratic manner in which the elections were conducted. More surprising was the passivity of the SADC in spite of the fact that the Zimbabwe elections contravened the SADC guidelines for the conduct of elections in its member states.

Immediately after inauguration the elated Mugabe attended an AU Summit in Libya. The African Union, much to the dismay of the European Union, recognised Mugabe as the legitimate President of Zimbabwe. However as an
acknowledgement that the elections were not fair, free and representative of the Zimbabwean populace, the AU mandated the SADC to facilitate dialogue between the government and the MDC formations. Within this fold Mbeki was requested to continue his facilitation role despite the fact that the opposition Tsvangirai-led MDC and many other political commentators had lost confidence in Mbeki and his quiet diplomacy approach to the Zimbabwe impasse. There are many commentators who rightly or wrongly felt that Mbeki was being too mild or sympathetic to Mugabe (ZANU-PF) due to the life-long political friendship between their political parties (the ANC and ZANU-PF).

However, after several diplomatic engagements, the Mbeki-led Task Team managed to bring the warring ZANU-PF and MDC formations to the table for a negotiated settlement of the Zimbabwean political crisis. In 2008, the Mbeki Task Team secured the signing of the watershed Global Political Agreement (GPA) agreement between the political groupings. By February 2009 the ZANU-PF and the MDC factions formed the government of national unity in which Mugabe retained the Presidency with all executive powers, while Tsangirai and Mutambara became the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively. To date the GNU has been besieged by numerous implementation problems and challenges which threaten its existence and survival. The ZANU-PF is accused by the Tsvangirai MDC for taking unilateral decisions on important national issues without involving them as required by the GPA and the GNU. The GNU has become stillborn as Mugabe and ZANU-PF continue to frustrate its operations.

In the view of Zuma, who has replaced Mbeki as the President of South Africa and facilitator in Zimbabwe, the government of national unity has made tremendous progress, and the EU should reciprocate by lifting the sanctions. The Botswana government which had in 2008 broken rank with other SADC member states and called for the tightening of sanctions and holding of fresh elections, changed after the president visited South Africa in October 2010. Perhaps in fear of isolation in the region and the continent, the Botswana regime changed course and recognised Mugabe as president in the government of national unity. The government has now joined the SADC chorus calling for the lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwe as there have been indications of progress in the country. This change of tone by the lone voice and possibly the only hope for a SADC objective stance against injustice must have placated the Mugabe regime, much to the chagrin of the MDC and the international community. This, to some extent, shows how difficult it seems for any SADC member state to sustain an anti-Mugabe stance. The EU and the USA maintain that the GNU has not done much to warrant the lifting of sanctions. The Mugabe regime on the other hand has turned the screws on the MDC to convince the West to lift the sanctions (which it accuses of advocating) as a condition for fulfilling the requirements of the ZPA and the GNU. This standoff has paralysed the functioning of the GNU and the SADC efforts at finding a lasting solution to the Zimbabwean political turmoil. The GNU remains paralysed mainly on the political front. The rival parties are so burdened by each other that none enjoy the political marriage and partnership. Hence, in spite of the fact that no considerable preparations have been made, they all seem to be in favour of elections in 2011. Whether this will provide a solution to the impasse remains to be seen.
5.8 Quiet Diplomacy: A success or failure in Zimbabwe?

Quiet diplomacy as a SADC tool for the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis has generated heated controversy both within and outside the region. According to Sachikonye, “perspectives on quiet diplomacy range from the sceptical to the critical, to those that are supportive and passionately defensive about this approach; a very few hold a neutral position on this issue” (2004: 581). An objective exposition on the success or failure of the policy of quiet diplomacy can perhaps be justly done by provision of answers to the following questions;

- What have been the motivations and considerations behind this form of diplomacy?
- What are its strengths and weaknesses?
- How has this brand of diplomacy been assessed by the international community and within Zimbabwe? (Sachikonye 2004: 570).

If there is any success in quiet diplomacy, it can be the fact that SADC has managed to maintain solidarity with the repressive Zimbabwe government, and that the regional organisation has constructively engaged with the Mugabe regime rather than isolate it, as did the West and the USA through their megaphone diplomacy. In the view of one human rights lawyer, Molokele, “[n]owhere in the past... years has anyone demonstrated to the suffering Zimbabweans that ‘shouting’ diplomacy is more effective than quiet diplomacy. At least Mbeki [SADC] has left the door open for dialogue with the Mugabe regime” (Zimbabwe Independent, Internet 08 06, 2007). Given this scenario the SADC position of engagement appears to be the only effective tool which the international community should support in resolving the crisis in Zimbabwe (Ncube 2007, ICG September 2007). At the Extraordinary Summit of Head of States and Government held on the 17th - 18th August 2007, Mbeki and the SADC Executive Secretary Salmao reported on progress regarding the political mediation and plans for economic rescue in Zimbabwe respectively.

It can be argued that the SADC secured some degree of success in the Zimbabwean crisis. The military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho by the polarised SADC faction members may have provided invaluable lessons to the organisation to maintain a principled commitment to politically negotiated conflict resolution as opposed to military confrontations. To some extent the SADC mediation brought the once bitter rivals together in a government of national unity to say they need each other in resolving the country’s economic and political challenges. The fact that there is collective dialogue over the constitutional amendments, economic and political reforms and preparations for elections in 2012 should be a plus for the SADC in its mission for regional peace and security.

Those who hold sceptical and critical views point to the fact that there has not been any change or improvement in the economic and political situation in Zimbabwe since the inception and implementation of quiet diplomacy. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, the Democratic Alliance in South Africa, COSATU, the
West, the USA and media both from inside and outside, have criticised the regional organisation for its passivity in the face of mounting economic and political crisis in one of its members as tantamount to open support or quiet approval.

It appears SADC has caught the disease suffered by the rest of the regional organisations mainly in the Third World, where the incumbent regime parties use regional organisations to protect each other at the expense of the citizens' personal security. The inaction by SADC opens itself to the criticism that the leaders are protecting the security of the Mugabe regime. In view of this situation Isaksen posits that "[i]t is difficult to escape the conclusion that SADC has not sufficiently pursued the issue of good governance and human rights since it began to address the Zimbabwean situation. Instead…the existence of solidarity bonds between some of the regions leaders has prevailed" (2002: v). The SADC delegation of Mbeki as the peace facilitator in Zimbabwe threw South Africa into the centre of the controversy that it had failed as a regional hegemon to provide constructive leadership in the region. Many critics felt that instead of simply relying on non-coercive diplomacy, South Africa (SADC) should have employed its economic, political and military might in the form of the carrot and stick diplomatic manoeuvres to pressurise Mugabe into accepting a compromise for the timely resolution of the crisis.

It can also be argued that SADC has dismally failed to implement effective preventive diplomacy in Zimbabwe in spite of the signs that the country was sliding into a political abyss and economic malaise. This failure raises questions as to whether the organisation has any established and functioning early warning and risk assessment structures to detect impending conflicts and security threats to the region, for effective preventative measures. One need not be a security expert to see the unfolding warning signs in Zimbabwe as reflected by the increased militarisation of the state, enactment of draconian media laws, suppression of freedom of the press and speech, gross violation of human rights, electoral violence and malpractices, economic collapse, growing political despotism and deterioration of democratic governance and the resultant mass migrations. These are warning signs of the total collapse of a nation-state which in its founding treaty the SADC stated would be justifiable reasons for intervention in a member state to restore law and order. Surprisingly in the case of Zimbabwe, the factors did not move the regional organisation to take coercive or a combination of coercive and non-coercive diplomacy measures to enforce normality in the country. Instead of taking concrete and consistent preventive and conflict resolution measures, SADC has presided over the collapse of one of its member states and only engages in reactive adhoc measures such as the Extraordinary Summit in Tanzania when Zimbabwe has provided them with an agenda item to meet and discuss. This lack of a consistent framework approach to the Zimbabwe crisis plays into the hands of the Mugabe regime. Seemingly concerned by the SADC inertia towards the deepening crisis in Zimbabwe, Cross (2007) warns that “they will have to deal with a real failed state when finally the political implosion takes place or see Zimbabwe spiral downwards into a Somalia style situation of lawlessness and poverty” (Internet, 29 September 2007).
Failure by SADC to substantively intervene or mediate in the Zimbabwe crisis is in contravention of its Organ’s pledge:

- To use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region both within and between states, through early warning systems.
- To protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against problems arising from the breakdown of law and order…

In a paper presented at the Africa University Annual Conference on the Commemoration of the Legacy of Dag Hammarskaad held in Mutare (Zimbabwe) (24-26 September 2007), Melber clearly summarised the SADC fiasco in the Zimbabwean crisis. He noted that “[i]t is fair to assume that Zimbabwe has posed fundamental questions about the extent to which SADC members can and should intervene in the internal affairs of other countries for the sake of regional interests….SADC has been slow to respond to the crisis. It has failed to replicate the positive solidarity that SADC members once levelled against apartheid South Africa” (Internet; 28 September 2007).

In the context of the Basic Human Needs theory on which this study is also premised, SADC (quiet diplomacy) is a dismal failure in the management and resolution of the crisis in Zimbabwe. The regional organisation has failed to define the crisis in terms of the consistent deprivation and frustration of basic human needs and human security of the people of Zimbabwe by the Mugabe regime. This is in spite of its pledge to advance human security as stated in its preamble to the Mutual Defence Pact; that it is “determined to defend and safeguard the freedom of their peoples and civilisations, as well as their individual liberties and the rule of law.” The organisation has failed to launch any substantive interventions in spite of the pledge in Article 13 (b, i), of the Organ Protocol that it will intervene in cases of large-scale violence between sections of the population and/or the state, and gross violations of human rights. The organisation operates in the orthodox realist power politics paradigm in which the concern is with the security of the state and the governing elite, not human security. Given this scenario, Solomon was justified to dismiss SADC as “…a club to protect the excesses of its political elite as opposed to being concerned with the true emancipation of its citizens” (2004: 195). As the basic human needs theorists observe, attempting to resolve the conflict through classical high politics strategies such as negotiations and bargaining does not work in needs-based conflicts. Thus one commentator pointed out that “when issues at stake are fundamental …affecting issues of human freedom or the whole future development of the society, negotiations do not provide a way of reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. On basic issues, there should be no compromise” (Sharp; internet, 03 .7. 2007).

Instead of finding a lasting solution to the crisis, the SADC initiatives will only achieve a settlement of the Zimbabwe crisis rather than a resolution. Unless and until SADC embarks on mediation measures which address the core issues of needs deprivations and frustrations of the masses in Zimbabwe, the crisis will continue, with devastating
spill-over effects on the region. In a situation where people’s basic needs are frustrated, conflict will not be deterred by coercion (Burton, 1988, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, Azar 1990a). The resilience of people struggling for satisfaction of their basic human needs in Zimbabwe was vividly expressed by the Crisis on Zimbabwe Non-Governmental Coalition that: “Slurs, verbal abuse and intimidation may win arguments, but they can never reconstruct, heal or rehabilitate societies. NGO may be closed, elections rigged, newspapers may be bombed and millions starved, but it will never kill the peoples’ love for liberty” (cited in Kibble, 2005: 18). The same courage and spirit of resistance amid state-sponsored violence in Zimbabwe was noted by the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai in his address to the Mashonaland East Province. He categorically stated that “violence, no matter how intense, can never stop the people from wishing for change and transformation. All it does is achieve a temporary dislocation of our organisational capacity but the spirit of the people remain unshaken” (Tsvangirai; Internet, 3 July 2007).

The crisis in Zimbabwe is mounting, and it is also becoming difficult to facilitate a resolution process. This is mainly because both the regional organisation and the international community are partisan to the rival parties in the country, as reflected earlier in this chapter. While Mbeki appeared acceptable to the ZANU-PF regime, the MDC had serious reservations about his neutrality. Tsvangirai consistently accused him (Mbeki) of colluding with Mugabe in frustrating initiatives for the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis. For example, the GPA and the resultant GNU which is the brain-child of the Mbeki Task Team tended to give more powers and authority to Mugabe and little to the Prime Minister. On several occasions, Tsvangirai has dismissed the SADC and its quite diplomacy as a failure in resolving the Zimbabwean impasse. On the other hand, the ZANU-PF viewed the West and the USA as evil powers intent on bolstering the MDC for ultimate regime change. As such, their efforts at mediation were deemed as imperialist encroachments in the domestic affairs of Zimbabwe. In light of this situation it will be difficult to find a neutral or impartial mediator acceptable to both camps. Moreover, both the regional organisation and the international community (the EU and the USA), have failed to impress upon the Mugabe regime the need to institute substantive reforms through their different diplomatic tools (quiet diplomacy and megaphone diplomacy respectively).

There are many analysts who feel that the international Community’s policy of containment, isolation, persistent demonisation of Mugabe and sanctions have been ineffectual and counter-productive as they have only bolstered Mugabe’s claims that he is a victim of neo-colonial assault to orchestrate regime change. The international community should accept that they have lost the battle against Mugabe and should therefore support the regional initiative for a diplomatic, collaborative and constructive engagement of Zimbabwe for a peaceful negotiated resolution of the deepening crisis (Ncube 2007, ICG 2007, and Kagwanja 2007). Sensing defeat, the international community has ultimately returned to its position of “African solutions to African problems”. However, they remain steadfast on the targeted sanctions which both the EU and the USA renewed in 2010 on the basis that no positive changes have been realised on economic revival and good governance by the unity government as Mugabe runs
amok in destroying the country. This was evidenced by George W Bush’s reference to Mbeki as the "point man" in the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis in 2003. Tony Blair during his last visit to South Africa as Prime Minister also endorsed the SADC initiative and delegation of Mbeki to facilitate dialogue in Zimbabwe. This prompted one human rights lawyer, Daniel Molokele, to pose the question that "[i]f both ‘isolation’ and ‘engagement’ have produced the same results, shouldn’t both sides be revising their strategies and tactics instead of making Mbeki a scapegoat for Mugabe’s repression?’ (Internet, 8 June 2007).

The above stated view is mainly because a large section of the Zimbabwean society and civil organisation have no faith in SADC and Mbeki as far as the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis is concerned. The problem emanates from the attitude of the SADC member states towards the despotic Mugabe regime. The regional organisation, according to several critics, has shown solidarity with the autocratic regime despite its effects on the masses of suffering Zimbabweans and the region at large. For example, the SADC Electoral Observer Team declared the fraudulent 2002 elections in Zimbabwe to be fair and free, have always shown resolute solidarity with the regime during their summits, and have dismally failed to openly and objectively denounce the political repression unfolding in Zimbabwe. In the fraudulent and violence-packed March and June 2008 elections the SADC remained passive even when Mugabe trampled on its regional electoral guidelines and rules which all member states including Zimbabwe ratified. The SADC has consistently appeased Mugabe by linking the Socio-economic and political crises in the country to the EU and USA sanctions. Even the President of Botswana, Ian Khama, who upon attaining the reins of power, broke ranks with other SADC member states, has, in 2010 after an official visit to South Africa joined the chorus calling on the West and the USA to lift the sanctions to give the government of national unity a chance.

However, critics fail to understand how fair negotiations can take place when the government continues with its state-sponsored violence against the opposition. In October 2007 the Tsvangirai MDC faction wrote to the SADC threatening to pull out of the talks in protest against government-orchestrated violence against its members. They cited a series of coordinated attacks as “a total of 103 rallies and marches crushed, 7 murders, 18 rapes, 69 abductions, 459 cases of torture, 2323 cases of interference or intimidation,1141 cases of assault and 152 cases of unlawful detention.” The party further contended that “while MDC and ZANU-PF are engaged in dialogue in Pretoria, the regime has continued to hound our supporters, brutally assaulting and attacking them against the spirit of the dialogue process. There is no use being in talks in Pretoria and at war here at home” (cited in The Mail and Guardian, 19 October 2007). It was within this scenario that Makuni asks the following questions which beg for answers regarding the SADC preventive diplomacy in Zimbabwe. “What will SADC do this time to ensure that the ruling party will keep its word? How can ZANU-PF be said to be negotiating in good faith when state violence and repression are escalating?” (Internet 30 September 2007). In a comment which can be interpreted as questioning the validity of the current ZANU-PF and MDC cooperation in the negotiations, Makuni (2007) also points out that “[t]he
governance problems at the core of the crisis must be solved so that every Zimbabwean can live in dignity, peace and security. The negotiation should not be a process for the leaders to extract what they want as individuals in terms of positions they can get or appointments they can make, but about the national interests and to end the suffering of the masses of Zimbabweans” (Internet, 30 September 2007).

Although the talks between the ZANU-PF and the Movement for Democratic Change mediated by President Mbeki were veiled in secrecy, there were reports that there is progress towards resolving the deepening crisis in the country. At the SADC Summit held on the 18th -19th August 2007 in Zambia President Mbeki and the Executive Secretary, Thomas Salmao, reported positive progress in their political and economic assignments regarding the Zimbabwean crisis. President Mbeki noted progress in bringing the ZANU-PF and MDC factions to a negotiation forum, while Salamao presented a regional economic rescue package for the country. The Herald (South Africa), reported that there are signs of agreement towards granting suffrage to Zimbabwean citizens in the diaspora, reforms to the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission to be genuinely independent, the election of the electoral Commission by parliament instead of the president, and abolition of the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). In theory these were positive steps towards fair and free polls in March 2008. But, as indicated earlier, this was not to be.

The Morgan Tsvangirai MDC faction that has always accused the SADC of inaction and dismissed it as a failure in mediating the Zimbabwean crisis, has ultimately regained faith in the regional organisation. This must have emanated from the fact that in spite of its differences with SADC, the regional organisation is integral in the resolution of the impasse. In view of this, Tsvangirai stayed the mediation course to its logical conclusion with the signing of the GPA and being part of the unity government. Repelling criticism that the mediation is flawed since it is basically a South African instead of the SADC venture, Tsvangirai was quoted as saying “[t]he ongoing dialogue and mediation process is not just a South African initiative but a SADC initiative. SADC will guarantee that no one is going to walk from the negotiation. Why should we doubt SADC when we are committed to the negotiations taking place?” (Makuni 2007). Furthermore the International Crisis Group report of September 2007, also recommended that “the regionally negotiated solution would be the most feasible option for Zimbabwe” (Internet, 30 September 2007).

It is very difficult at this stage to draw a substantiated conclusion as to whether the SADC quiet diplomacy would be a success or failure in resolving the Zimbabwe crisis. This is mainly because seemingly irreconcilable differences between the ZANU-PF and MDC (Tsvangirai) are still fermenting within the unity government, and the SADC appears to have run short of any meaningful alternative strategies to address the impasse. The friction between the ZANU-PF and the MDC within the GNU has been grinding on such issues as reform and command of the partisan security sector (Rupiya, 2011).
The MDC formations of Tsvangirai and Mutambara are in an embarrassing dilemma. The failures of the GNU, mainly orchestrated by the ZANU-PF, also reflect badly on them as they are supposedly an integral part of the government. Conciliatory overtures by Prime Minister Tsvangirai in his interaction with the West, to the effect that the GNU was functional, have not moved the recalcitrant Mugabe regime to also be reconciliatory in its approach. Faced with such a hostile political situation, the MDC (Tsvangirai) has consistently appealed to SADC to rein in Mugabe to respect the GPA and the GNU.

Despite the hurdles, the Zimbabwe crisis provides the litmus test for SADC’s capabilities in conflict prevention, management and resolution through constructive engagement as the only option, as military intervention is out of the question. The Zimbabwean crisis will also test the regional organisation’s political will and resolve in implementing African solutions to African problems which African leaders have often championed in international forums. As The International Crisis Group correctly observes, “[t]here are absolutely no easy solutions to the Zimbabwe crisis. But if they act decisively, SADC leaders can prove that ‘African solutions to African problems’ is indeed a viable concept not merely rhetoric with which to forestall unwanted Western interference” (September 2007: 20). The SADC appears determined that this time around, a credible election which would return the country to democracy, peace and stability should be realised. The question is how they are going to ensure this in the face of the uncooperative ZANU-PF government. This is more so because, the SADC has adhered to the policy of appeasement in spite of Mugabe’s total disregard of the regional organisation’s efforts to assist the democratisation project in the country. The SADC has, in the case of Zimbabwe, a mammoth and thorny task in its bid to promote regional peace and security. Zimbabwe will be a test to gauge the efficacy of the regional organisation’s security mechanism.

5.9 Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with the origins of the SADC and its evolution from a coordinating conference to a community. It has also dwelt on how the SADC evolved through both the Cold and post-Cold War eras and expanded its objectives from economic growth to embrace regional political and security matters. The chapter has also discussed the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in the DRC and Zimbabwe to highlight the successes and challenges of its security mechanism. The next chapter deals with the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho (1994, 1998 and 2007) as the main thrust of this study.
CHAPTER SIX
The SADC Preventive Diplomacy Missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho

6.0 Introduction
This chapter constitutes the case study of this thesis. The main objective of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of the conflictual history of the Kingdom of Lesotho since independence, and how these incessant conflicts consequently precipitated the SADC preventive interventions in 1994, 1998 and 2007 respectively. The chapter also focuses on the role of the various stakeholders, mainly the political organisations and/or leaders, the military, the monarchy and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the Lesotho crises of 1994, 1998 and 2007 with a view to establishing the contribution each had in the preservation of democracy and peace or in undermining of democracy in Lesotho. The specific circumstances that triggered the SADC interventions, the dilemma, successes and challenges of the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho will be systematically explored. General observations on some lessons learned and insights gained from these interventions on the efficacy and flaws of the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism will be highlighted with the intent to determine what improvements could be made to the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism and its operation modalities and strategies.

6.2 Background to the Lesotho Conflict and the SADC Intervention
Lesotho is a small landlocked mountainous kingdom in Southern Africa. Almost the size of Belgium, it has a population of about 1.3 million. Lesotho is surrounded by the Republic of South Africa or as Davidson (1983) puts it “Lesotho is right inside South Africa” (in Pherudi 2000: 4). The modern state of Lesotho emerged under the capable nation building and leadership of King Moshoeshoe I amid the Difaqane/Mfecane conflicts in the early 19th century. Moshoeshoe, the founding father and builder of the Basotho nation, successfully amalgamated heterogeneous groups such as the Basia, Bamonaheng, Baphaleng, the Bapedi, the Batlokwa, the Bakubung, the Bamokotele, the Bakgatla, the Baphuting and the Nguni refugees fleeing from the Zulu (Shaka) expansionist military aggressions into a united homogeneous federation. Unlike the Zulu kingdom and other nations which emerged during that time, Moshoeshoe’s kingdom did not emerge through conquests but through diplomatic and peaceful means of embracing people of different backgrounds into a unified kingdom that was economically viable. Maundeni (2010: 129) notes that Moshoeshoe “rose to dominate the federation, not by defeating the others, but by occupying a strategic mountain (Thaba Bosiu) that provided superior defences and whose surroundings consisted of fertile soils and rich water resources.” It was from Thaba Bosiu that Moshoeshoe I consolidated Lesotho. Consequently, through his leadership, all the constituent parts of the Basotho nation which shared a common language, culture, and desire for socio-political unity, identity, security, protection and economic development, prevailed within the kingdom until this tranquillity was disrupted by the British and Afrikaner colonial encroachments (Eldridge 1993, Pherudi 2000). During the colonial era, Lesotho together with Botswana and Swaziland constituted what was called the three High
Commission Territories under British Protectorate rule. Lesotho attained independence on October 4th, 1966 and was one of the founding members of the SADC in 1980.

Lesotho became a British Protectorate on March 28th, 1868 on Moshoeshoe’s request under immense threats of annexation by the Afrikaner republics which resulted in numerous anti-colonial wars. The Basotho had also engaged on numerous wars with the British colonial expansionists from the Cape colony before submitting to protectorate status. The protectorate proclamation stated that “…the said tribe of the Basotho shall be, and be taken to be, for all intents and purposes British subjects, and the territory of the said tribe shall be, and shall be taken to be the British Territory (Institute of Southern African Studies, Annexation Proclamation No 14 of 1868, cited in Pherudi 2000:6). Lesotho was a British Protectorate until 1966 when she attained independence.

Lesotho attained her independence under Chief Leabua Jonathan of the Basotholand National Party (BNP). In Pherudi’s view, “[i]t was the end of colonialism and the beginning of the new political complications” (2000:10) in Lesotho. Of the three former British High Commission Territories’ post-independence Lesotho became the most vulnerable and dependent on South Africa both politically and economically due its unique geographical location. The geographical position of Lesotho adversely affected the country’s economic and political sovereignty and sense of nationhood. The country’s survival, access to the outside world and political agenda is dominated by issues of economic survival and political independence from South Africa. Santho vividly captures this geographical tragedy of Lesotho thus: “[s]ince its independence in 1966, Lesotho, a small state with a peculiar geopolitical position and features of structural dependence in relation to South Africa-has had to exercise its self-determination and sovereignty within this constraining environment. In this context, Lesotho has faced and continues to face dilemmas of economic and political survival” (2000: 1). Due to its unique geographical situation, Lesotho has been dubbed “the Switzerland of Africa” (Martin 1994), "the kingdom in the sky" (Bulpin 1970 in Pherudi 2000) and also regarded by some as a "hostage state" (Shaw and Heard 1979). During apartheid rule in South Africa Lesotho was described as a nation ‘in the belly of the beast” (Naidoo in Pherudi 2000:4). On the other hand, as it provided refuge to many anti-apartheid political activists, it was viewed as an “island of freedom” (Maylam in Pherudi 2000).

However, in spite of its insignificance in terms of size, vulnerable geographical, economic and political status in the region, the country has been a political hot spot in the SADC region. The Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM) aptly captured the tumultuous history of Lesotho’s politics thus: "Lesotho has been engulfed in various forms of conflict, open and hidden, violent and non-violent, short-lived and protracted since its political independence from Britain in 1966. The critical highlights of Lesotho’s conflict map include the 1970 forceful seizure of power by the incumbent party, the 1986 military takeover of government, the 1994 temporary seizure of power by the King, the 1994 and 1995 military scuffles and police mutiny and the 1998 violent encounter between the ruling party and
opposition parties” (cited in Santho 2000: 3). According to Maundeni (2010), it is surprising that Lesotho has suffered incessant political turmoil and state dysfunctionality despite the fact that it is territorially small (30,355sq km), has a largely homogeneous Sotho ethnic group (99, 5%) and a small population (2.2 million) compared to most of the African nation-states.

Scholars of Lesotho's conflictual history have summarised the major sources of the conflict as: the problem of its geographical peculiarity, a weak and dependent economy, unequal resources distribution, a flawed electoral system, restrictive political participation and representation, fragile political institutions, lack of a democratic culture in governance, existence of an intolerant and rebellious political culture, questions on the legitimacy of the government, the politicisation of the monarchy and the security apparatus, a history of armed conflict and political violence, poor service delivery and external interference and influence especially from South Africa mainly during apartheid rule. The political contestations and conflicts in Lesotho were further exacerbated and complicated by the winner-takes all electoral system which has resulted in the opposition contesting the election results, the representativeness and legitimacy of the government. Consequently, almost all the national elections in the Kingdom have been followed by violent protests which in 1994, 1998 and 2007 led to preventive interventions by the regional organisation SADC to restore peace and stability. The involvement of the politicised security and the monarchy and the external influences of South Africa especially during apartheid further complicated the conflicts in Lesotho making it very difficult to find a durable and lasting peace in the country.

6.2.1 Lesotho Political Contestations and Conflicts 1965 to 1998

The winds of change which swept across Africa championing calls for self-rule and independence from colonial rule were also actively heeded by the Basotho populace which had suffered under British imperialism since 1868. This resulted in the formation of political groupings to coalesce the Basotho demands for independence. The first of such formations was the Basotho Progressive Association (BPA) in 1907. Its membership was primarily teachers, writers, traders and clerical workers in the colonial civil service. The BPA advocated peaceful resistance to the colonial government. It called for parliamentary democracy and preached peaceful resistance to the abuse of powers by the chiefs in courts and on issues of land allocation. Although it crumbled in 1950, it had laid the foundation for Basotho’s call for independence. The other group was the Lekhotla La Bafo (LLB) led by Joel Lefela. It was mainly composed of uneducated commoners and was entrenched in the Basotho traditional culture. As such, it pledged to represent the mostly rural and non-Christian populations. The LLB was more radical than the BPA which it accused of being “suspiciously soft and inevitably condemned some of it leaders as pawns of the British colonialism” (Weisfelder 1974: 400). In its radical posture, it vehemently questioned the legitimacy of British colonial rule in Lesotho. For example, it opposed the spread of Christianity and mission schools which undermined the indigenous Sotho traditions and the participation of Basotho in World War 2. Its politics were bolstered by its association with the South Africa Communist
Party. As such, it was the Lekhotla La Bafo which presented the first formidable anti-colonial challenge to British rule. In response, the colonial government in conjunction with the paramount chiefs and the National Council, banned and violently crushed its gatherings. Despite the harsh response, the LLB “had displayed the legendary uncompromising character of Basotho political elites, thus making it very popular” (Maundeni 2010: 132). It can be argued that the LLB and its radical politics paved the way for the birth of more organised nationalist political parties such as the Basotho Congress Party (BPC), the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) all of which ultimately projected the country to full self-determination in 1965. According to Pherudi (2004: 7), the LLB “pressed hard for the emancipation of the Basotho. [And] self-rule became desirable and that became evidence through the birth of various political parties.”

Consequently, the Basotho African Congress which later became the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) was formed in 1952 under the leadership of Ntsu Mokhehle and Mohau Mokitimi. It was a radical organisation which had links with the Pan Africanist Congress and the Communist Party of South Africa (Strom 1986, Weisfelder 1974). As a result, the apartheid regime supported the Basotho National Party (BNP) to deter the BCP from attaining state power in Lesotho after winning the national elections in 1970. The BCP’s politics were hinged against “the established power blocks such as chieftaincy, foreign owned commercial establishments, churches ([the] Roman Catholic Church (RCC) in particular) and the colonial administration” (Pherudi 2004: 7). It was the BCP posture, mainly its association with the Communist Party, which triggered hostilities with the RCC and the South African regime whose major aim was to crush the spread of communism in Southern Africa. The BCP’s radical politics and anti-chieftaincy stance also led to the fission of the party and formation of the Marematlou Party (1957) led by Chief S.S Matete and the Basotho Freedom Party (1960) led by B.M Khaketla. The two break-away factions later merged to form the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) in 1963 (Pherudi 2004). To date the MFP has its roots and support base within the monarchy.

The other nationalist political party which emerged and became a major player in the Lesotho body politics was the Basotho National Party (BNP) (1958) led by Chief Leabua Jonathan and G.A Manyeli. Initially known as the Christian Democratic Party, the BNP had its support base from the RCC, and the Chiefs and Traders’ Organisations (Strom 1986, Pherudi 2004). The RCC backed the BNP on the basis that it was anti-Communist as such it would assist to repel the BCP which was considered a communist and anti-religious grouping. To confirm that the party rode on the support from the Christian denominations, it was the only organisation which reflected cognisance of the Christian faith in its constitution (Pherudi. 2004). The anti-communist posture of the BNP also invited moral and material support from South Africa. Moreover, only the BNP was allowed to campaign in South Africa in the large Lesotho mine migrant labour electorate. It was the South African financial and material backing which bolstered the BNP to win the 1965 elections and to launch a coup after the 1970 elections, which the BCP had won (Cockram 1970, in Pherudi 2004). However, Leabua was to later make a turn around and adopt an anti-apartheid position after the
1970s which triggered the South African regime to shift its support to the BCP and its military wing—the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) and later in 1986 to sponsor a military coup led by General Lekhanya against his government.

6.2.2 The 1965 Elections and Lesotho Independence

It was the above-mentioned political parties, the BCP, the BNP and the MFP which contested the 27th January 1965 elections. As stated earlier, the BNP with the support of the RCC and South Africa won the elections with 31 seats (41.6% of votes), the BCP obtained 25 seats (39.6% of the votes) and the MFP got 4 seats (16.5% of the votes). The Lesotho First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system assisted the BNP to a landslide victory. For example, the British Westminster form of government and the British FPTP electoral system was inherited in totality without any consideration of the emergent political uniqueness and peculiarities of the Lesotho context. The system is seriously flawed as it permits the winner-takes-all posture in parliamentary distribution of seats and representation in governance. This has become a source of conflict in the Lesotho political elections as reflected in the 1970, 1984, 1994, 1998 and 2007 post-election conflicts. The FPTP electoral system ensured that the percentage of seats won by the winning party became greater than the votes they won and so enabled them to form a majority while marginalising other contending parties with lower vote percentages from governance.

It was within this electoral context that the first independence elections in 1965 were contested by the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) of Ntsu Mokhehle and the Basutho National Party (BNP) under Chief Leabua Jonathan which won and formed the first post-independence government. The combined vote of the BCP and the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) was 58 percent but had fewer seats in parliament due to the functioning of the first past-the-post electoral system (Southall and Petlane 1995). The central outcome of the majoritarian (plurality) FPTP electoral system is that it produces a single party majority in both parliament and government. Simultaneously, the system creates tensions with the losing parties which feel marginalised. This is because the FPTP electoral system has an in-built and intentional tendency to produce a result where the winner’s share of the seats is higher than its share of the votes (Elklit: Internet: 12 May 2010). Matlosa and Calleb (2000: 30) argue that “such a system was inappropriate for the country and more than once it resulted in [one] party receiving all parliamentary seats even though opposition parties had won a large percentage of the vote.” It was this flawed electoral system which became a source of incessant post-election violence. Because of the discontentment with the system it was replaced by the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system after the post-election conflict of 1998.

Following the 1965 victory, Leabua Jonathan stressed his anti-communist stance to the delight of South Africa (Pherudi 2004). However, Moshoshoe resented the BNP victory and power as he felt sidelined. Rather than be designated a ceremonial Head of State, the King “wanted both executive and legislative powers which could enable him to control the army, finances, foreign and internal affairs” (Pherudi 2000: 11). Consequently, Leabua Jonathan’s
government faced resistance from King Moshoeshoe II and his royal supporters. For example in 1966 Chief Lerohodi led a rebellion intended to oust Chief Jonathan and replace him with the King as executive head of state. In 1967 Moshoeshoe II, in defiance of a government order held a massive rally with the intention of marching to Maseru to depose the government. Both of these agitations were crushed by the security forces (the Police Mobile Unit (PMU), and the King was placed under house arrest (Pherudi 2004). This marked the genesis of strained political relations between successive Lesotho governments and the monarchy culminating in the banishment of the King from political involvement by the Leabua and General Lekhanya dictatorial regimes. This also created fertile ground for the role which the Lesotho monarchy played in both the 1994 and 1998 crises in the country. The BCP collaborated with the Monarch in denouncing the 1965 elections as fraudulent. This also marked the birth of hostile politics between the two political formations (BCP and BNP) which still dominate the Lesotho political arena.

Leabua Jonathan’s BNP regime presided over a brutal and repressive regime which killed the prospects for democracy. Its monopoly of state power and resources helped the BNP government to entrench an authoritarian political culture in the country. Lesotho became a defacto one party dictatorship with a highly politicised security establishment. In the words of Berger “Lesotho went Africa’... and declared a... holiday from democratic rule” (in Pherudi 2000: 12). For example in 1969 the Local Government Repeal Act was passed and District Councils were abolished “primarily because the ruling BNP controlled only one while the BCP controlled nine” (Shale; cited in Maundeni 2010: 133). As such it was the ruling BNP which killed democracy in Lesotho at its embryonic stages and replaced it with repressive politics as evidenced during and after the 1970 and subsequent elections in the country.

It is important to note that like most of the post-colonial states in Africa, post-independent Lesotho was engulfed by socio-economic and political adversities and defects inherited from the colonial administration (Mandaza 1992, Sejanamane 1996).

6.2.3 The 1970 Elections and the BNP Coup
The 1970 elections took place in a hostile political climate. The police gathered evidence of gross electoral intimidation and irregularities which would no doubt taint the credibility of the election results. For example “[a]t one polling station the entire staff had been kidnapped and all their equipment stolen, including the special stamp used to validate the ballot papers” (Pherudi 2004: 11). Indications were that the BCP would win the elections and this was unpleasant to the BNP and the apartheid regime in South Africa. Indeed when the results were announced, the BCP had trounced the BNP with 33 seats to its 23 seats. The MFP won only one seat (Ajulu 1995, Southall 1995, Petlane 1995, MCcartney in Pherudi 2004). According to Pherudi Jonathan had announced his intention to resign and hand over power to the BCP which was vehemently opposed by some of his cabinet and security officers. Oliver (1986) in Pherudi 2004: 11) indicated that the Police Commissioner J.J Hindmarsh warned Jonathan that “[d]uring the election
campaign, the Basotho Congress Party declared quite openly that if they won the elections, they would hang Jonathan in the streets of Maseru and that they would shoot all his officers of the Mounted Police Unit.” It was on the basis of this advice and pledge of support by the security apparatus that Jonathan declared a state of emergency for fourteen days and suspended the constitution. The BNP Youth League was trained into a powerful para-military instrument to bolster the highly politicised and partisan police and the military to defend the illegitimate BNP power (Molomo 1999).

The appetite to cling to power by the BNP was evidenced by its seizure of power with the assistance of the security apparatus after losing power to the BCP in the 1970 elections. The BNP’s abrogation of the 1970 election inflicted a blow to Lesotho’s fragile electoral democracy and ushered in the politics of suppression and confrontation (Pherudi 2004, Maundeni 2010). The opposition-led resistance to the government’s arrest of the democratic dispensation was brutally crushed and followed by imprisonment of opposition leaders, banning of political parties, suspension of the constitution, declaration of a state of emergency, banishment of King Moshoeshoe II to the Netherlands (who was accused of political interference) and institutionalised politicisation of the military as a BNP instrument to keep it in power and defend its illegitimate rule (Mills 1992, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995, Ajulu 1995, Southall 1998, 1999a, Santho 1998, 1999, Mahao 1999, Vale 1999, 2000). Pherudi observed that as a result of the 1970 coup “[t]he BNP became a de facto one party dictatorship in which decrees and outright repression became synonymous with that government” (Pherudi 2000: 13). The coup was followed by popular resistance and the unmitigated state repression both of which had adverse effects on the cohesion of the Kingdom. Consequently, the government was “increasingly confronted with a legitimation crisis” (Ajulu 1995: 10). The coup was denounced by the OAU, the Commonwealth, and the UN as a travesty to democracy. Not surprisingly the dictatorial Leabua regime was supported by South Africa under John Vorster who stated that “[d]espite the 1970 coup, I am prepared to continue good relations with Leabua…” (Pherudi 2000: 14).

Faced with such a hostile and repressive political environment the opposition leader, Mokhehle went into exile in 1974 where he established the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) to fight the illegitimate and undemocratic BNP government. The LLA was sponsored by the apartheid South African regime against the government after it had shifted its support from the apartheid regime to the African National Congress, providing it with refuge and bases for guerrilla operations against South Africa (Ajulu 1995, Southall 1995, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995). The shift in foreign policy by the BNP government against South Africa emanated from the economic and political predicaments faced by the government as a result of the domestic resistance which followed the 1970 power grab and its awkward diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa. In spite of its collaborationist policy, the government did not get sufficient economic assistance to create a sustainable economic growth. As Ajulu puts it: “[t]he collaborationist policy despite maintaining the BNP in government had not yielded sufficient economic resources to enable the party to
enlarge its social base. Moreover, the pro-South African policy was very unpopular with the majority of Basotho. The anti-Boer sentiment—very much a historical tradition—was further fuelled by the fact that there was not much to show for the five years of collaboration with South Africa. ... It was in these circumstances that the regime decided to multilaterise the country's dependency [by]... adopting policies which would ingratiate Lesotho to international donors" (Ajulu 1995: 11 and 12).

The Lesotho government started distancing itself from apartheid South Africa, accommodating South African refugees and political activists and establishing diplomatic ties with the Eastern Socialist world. For example, Leabua Jonathan issued a strongly worded criticism of apartheid following the 1976 Soweto uprisings, stating that its domestic policies were "bound to lead to tragic consequences for both black and white and unforeseeable consequences for Southern Africa" (Ajulu and Cammack 1986 cited in Ajulu 1995: 12). The apartheid regime was irked by the shift in Lesotho's foreign policy which would undermine its regional hegemony and legitimacy. It thus responded by sponsoring the BCP proxy army—the LLA and a right wing group within the BNP to topple Jonathan from power. The ultimate consequences of the South African destabilisation policies in Lesotho were the 1982 and 1985 South African National Defence Force raids on the ANC houses in Maseru and the 1986 military coup by the Lesotho Defence Force led by General Lekhanya (Ajulu 1995, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995, Southall 1995).

6.2.4 The Lesotho Security Establishment and Lesotho Politics

The politicisation of the state apparatus, especially the security forces (Lesotho Defence Force) sowed seeds of discord in the Lesotho political field. This largely defined the limits within which brute force could be relied upon as an instrument of retaining political power and the cohesion of the Lesotho nation characterised by weak institutions of governance (Ajulu 1995, Petlane 1995, Matlosa 1995, 1999, Santho 1999, Nathan 1999, Vale 1999, Mahao 1999). This politicisation of the military had devastating effects on the political landscape of Lesotho and resulted in the 1986 military coup and the military-led attempted coups of 1994 and 1998 as the military opposed demilitarisation of the Lesotho politics and undermined democratisation of the government and the country under the leadership of Ntsu Mokhehle (Mills 1992, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995, Southall 1998, 1999, 1999a, 1999b, Santho 2000.). Since helping the BNP to seize power in 1970, "the armed forces have over the years tended to assume a special status as a politicised political constituency" (Petlane 1995: 145). Commentators at the Crisis in Lesotho (1999: 33) also observed that "the Lesotho army is a very partisan institution... The BCP and LCD governments have also tried to win the allegiance of the military but have failed to do so." This clearly accounts for the military being involved in almost all the political turmoil in Lesotho including the 1994 and 1998 crises which precipitated the SADC intervention. As Weisfelder (1982) observed, "[t]he disregard for constitutional norms (evidenced by the 1970 coup de'état, the 1994 military revolts)...meant that Basotho leaders vying for power in the future will be tempted either to mobilise the requisite force to strike a bargain with (or indeed to depose) incumbents instead of trusting the ballot
“box” (cited in Petlane 1995: 150). The military has been and continues to be used as a political tool, representing a resource available to politicians to mobilise in partisan struggles for power” [and]... as a political constituency and an actor in national politics with their own political interest, autonomous from political parties per se” (Petlane 1995: 151). Thus the BCP government was faced “with the military which it neither trusted nor could constitutionally control” (Sejanamane 1996: 66). Consequently when the BCP and the LCD attained office in 1993 and 1998 respectively, they were faced with a hostile military which was still engrained in the BNP politicisation allegiance and the politics of military rule (1986 to 1993).

In this case the military junta was reluctant to relinquish power to a democratically elected civilian government in 1994 and 1998, confirming Hutchful’s (1993) assertion that “there are significant differences in the way military issues are posed, centering around whether or not the regime intends to withdraw altogether or succeed itself” (in Matlosa 1995: 120). Put differently, “[o]nce having tasted state power, the military tends to become addicted to it. This inevitably has a bearing upon the degree to which a new civilian government can have effective control and authority over its armed forces” (Matlosa 1995: 119). Makoa (1995: 10) argues that the political instability in post-military Lesotho should be viewed against the backdrop of the historical role of the armed forces. He observed that “[o]ne of the most serious dilemmas confronting the BCP regime since April 1993 has been how to impose its authority over the country’s politicised army which had ruled the Kingdom for over 6 years. Apart from protecting Jonathan’s unconstitutional government between 1970 and 1985, Lesotho’s army had ruled the country for 7 years between 1986 and 1993 before it relinquished power to an elected government.” During the democratisation process and preparations for elections the military instituted amendments and provisions to the constitution which would provide indemnity to the armed forces from prosecution for crimes committed during military rule (Lesotho Constitution Order No 5, 1993), and inclusion of restrictions, checks and balances in the powers of the in-coming civilian government, all of which posed severe threats to effective control of the state. The central purpose was continued military influence and control in the national political arena to advance its sectarian interests and powers (Southall 1995, 1998, 1999a, Matlosa 1995, Fox 1995, Petlane 1995, Sejanamane 1996). It is within this context that Matlosa (1995: 119-120) laments the flawed transition to democracy as it was wholly managed “by the very military which is supposed to be subjected to civilian authority after the transition. As such the rules of the transition are set and defined by the military which often would like to create a protected political space for itself under the post-transition political dispensation.” The tense political climate raised questions such as “[w]ould the elections be allowed to run its course? Would the results be accepted? Known to favour the BNP, would the military permit the BCP to claim its anticipated victory?” (Fox 1995: 98). All these are indications of how the military were bent on hijacking the democratisation process in Lesotho as evidenced by the 1994 and 1998 crises in which they were the primary actors. According to Sejanamane (1996: 69) as evidenced by most coups in Africa, “the military has acted in order to pre-empt what they consider adverse action being contemplated by their civilian bosses against the institution as a whole.”
However Sejanamane (1996) maintains that both political entities (BNP and BCP) in Lesotho were guilty of colluding with the army against each other for political survival. He argues that “[t]he contesting forces seemed oblivious of the danger of their ‘game’ of using and/or involving the army directly in politics. It is not surprising therefore that both the government and the BNP were blamed for complicity in the factional fighting that took place within the army in January 1994.” (1996: 66). Such political manipulations and manoeuvres strengthened the military resolve in undermining democracy, peace and stability in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The BCP government blundered by maintaining a hostile attitude against both the military and the monarchy and inadvertently enhanced their solidarity as both read the government’s intent to facilitate their demise in the Lesotho political theatre.

6.2.5 The Monarchy and the Lesotho Politics

One other situation which complicated the Lesotho politics was the position of the King and the government of the day. Traditionally and historically, the monarchy was a very pivotal institution in the Kingdom of Lesotho. Present day Lesotho emerged around Moshoeshoe I’s monarchical rule. Therefore the monarchy has ever since been highly revered as a “symbol of unity, oneness and brotherhood. It was a sign of national identity and pride...hence most Basotho in their praises refer to themselves as ‘Bana ba Moshoeshoe” (Children of Moshoeshoe) (Pherudi 2000: 109). Because of this historical and cultural foundation there were expectations among the Basotho that post-independence governments should give the monarchy substantive power and respectable status in the government. However, this was not to be and this bred unbridled mistrust, rivalry and hostilities between the successive regimes and the monarchy culminating in the disruptions which have dominated the Lesotho politics since independence in 1966. As stated earlier, the King was unhappy with the powers he wielded in the new post-independence political dispensation. Within the constitutional Monarch and the Westminster type of parliamentary democracy, Lesotho experienced the struggle for supremacy and state power between the Monarch and the regime creating intense hostility which saw the monarchy in most cases colluding with the opposition against the government of the day. The relationship between both the BNP and the military governments has been characterised by hostilities resulting in the dethronement and banishment of King Moshoeshoe II (Southall 1995, Petlane 1995, Ajulu 1995, Sejanamane 1996).

As will be indicated in subsequent sections, the monarchy was to play a central role in the politics of Lesotho. According to Sejanamane (1996: 64) “[w]hich ever faction was in power was automatically challenged by a combination of the monarchy and those in opposition. Thus for most of Lesotho’s independence, the monarchy has acted as either an opposition instrument or at best as a counter balancing force to the successive cliques that have emerged by force or election.” This was evidenced by the Monarch’s cooperation with its erstwhile enemy the BNP against the BCP and LCD electoral victories in 1994 and 1998, respectively throwing the country into turmoil.
Pherudi observes that, in both the 1994 and the 1998 crises, the newly elected BCP regime “found itself in a difficult situation, because it had to deal with the monarchical problem which was not of its own making” (2000: 167). That is “the controversy surrounding the dethronement of King Moshoeshoe II and enthronement of his son King Letsie III…” (Sejanamane 1996: 66). However, it is important to note that in its formative years, the BCP held a radical socialist-oriented and anti-monarchy ideology. The party regarded the said institution as a conservative and reactionary entity working in collaboration with the colonial administration for the oppression of Basotho. At an Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Conference in Accra (Ghana) the BCP leader Ntsu Mokhhle was quoted as having stated that the “…Basotho Congress Party would endeavour to destroy the chieftaincy hierarchy and get rid of the position of the paramount chiefs because both the chiefs and the church identify themselves with colonial oppression” (cited in Pherudi 2000: 171). It was this deep-rooted hostility between the monarchy and the BCP which led to the 1994 and 1998 monarchy-cum-military coups in Lesotho. Although the BCP had watered down its stance against the royalty after its victory in the 1994 elections, it blundered by its failure to reinstate Moshoeshoe II. Sejanamane (1996: 78) notes that “for most observers of the Lesotho political scene, the dissolution of the government by the King in August 1994 was directly connected to the bigger debate on the position of the monarchy in general and the reinstatement of Moshoeshoe II in particular.” Hence a few months after the elections, Moshoeshoe II wrote a letter to the Prime Minister Mokhehle seeking reinstatement to the throne from which “the military regime illegally and unjustly removed him …” (Sejanamane 1996: 67). In the letter, the King stated that “the issue of the monarchy, and in particular the reinstatement of His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II, is an issue of great national importance and significance, and one which directly affects and concerns me, and as a result it has been in the forefront of our discussions since you assumed office in April 1993” (Letter from His Majesty King Letsie III, 4th August 1994, in Sejanamane 1996: 78). Rather than take the opportunity to reconcile with the monarchy Mokhehle dismissed it on the basis that he was not party to “the circumstances that brought about the rapture of the relationship between the monarchy and the military…” The Prime Minister further advised the King to “seek redress in the court of law if he felt that injustice has been done to him” (Sejanamane 1996: 67).

Instead of a negotiated solution to the problem, the party instituted a commission of inquiry into the operations and status of the institution in the politics of Lesotho since independence (Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). Consequently instead of reconciling the two erstwhile rivals, the commission further drifted them apart and inflamed the rivalry between the two entities. Sejanamane (1996: 67) observed that the “Commission became an extremely divisive issue and it virtually terminated whatever relationship [that] had existed between the King and the Prime Minister.” The King and the pro-monarchists perceived the Commission of inquiry not as a reconciliatory gesture but as a vindictive move to further marginalise the royalty (Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). Furthermore, some opportunistic anti-BCP political parties such as the BNP exploited the divisions and agitated the King to denounce the Commission, its intent, terms and findings. According to Sejanamane (1996) the Commission’s terms of reference
were biased against the King and geared towards finding fault with the monarchy. To add insult to injury, the composition of the Commission raised a lot of questions as it comprised known anti-monarchists. As such in his letter to Mokhehle regarding the Commission of inquiry Letsie III wrote: “[b]y its composition, the commission can hardly be taken and accepted as neutral, impartial and without prejudice, especially when some members of the commission are self-professed anti-monarchists who have on many occasions made public utterances which directly attack and besmirch both the person of His Majesty and the institution of the monarchy itself. While they are of course free to hold views and opinions of their choice, their membership to a tribunal or commission of this nature is bound to reflect bias and prejudice … I can only conclude by expressing my concern and fears to the effect that this Commission –as it presently stands –is not intended to establish the truth and do justice to the wronged. On the contrary, it has been created to provide an arena for conducting a political vendetta against His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II. A commission of this nature will not be seen as having the required and necessary integrity by the public whose interests it is supposed to serve. Therefore, it will be virtually impossible for me to accept the results of its work and its findings as being objective, fair, impartial and just…” (cited in Sejanamane 1996: 68). Consequently, the King in collusion with the military and some opposition political parties launched a coup which brewed the 1994 crisis and the ultimate SADC intervention.

Sejanamane (1996) argues that the marriage between the monarchy and the military against the BCP government was borne by the party’s consistent attacks on both institutions for their past cooperative relationships with the oppressive BNP regime. The BCP government’s discomfort with the two institutions was evidenced by the establishment of commissions of inquiry against the said entities, which they both interpreted as an orchestrated government strategy of undermining and victimising them. The intervening powers had since called for the definition of the role of the monarchy in the politics of Lesotho as one factor which could lead to long-term peace in the country (Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996, Southall 1995, 1999a). The 1994 SADC Task Force recognised the centrality of the monarchy in the Lesotho political arena and it duly recommended that “…the monarchy should…be tackled from the standpoint of…seeking to confirm or possibly restore legitimacy of the institution of and minds of the people of Lesotho…” (Report on the Presidential Visit to the Kingdom of Lesotho; 11-12 February 1994; in Pherudi 2000: 173). The volatile rivalry between the government, the military and the monarchy was aggravated by the weak economic situation of Lesotho which was inescapably dependent on South Africa and the outside world.

6.2.6 The Lesotho Economy and the Kingdom’s Conflictual Politics

The dependent nature of the Lesotho economy on South Africa has had a negative impact on the survival of the country as a sovereign state. According to Ajulu (1995: 9) “[t]he post-colonial state in Lesotho was, and remains relatively weak in comparison with other post-colonial states in Africa. It inherited neither a manufacturing, commercial, nor a secure agricultural base. It was therefore a dependent state par excellence. This dependent nature
placed restrictions on what the state was capable of achieving, irrespective of which ever class or alliance of classes secured control of state power.” The British Colonial Administration left the country with virtually no infrastructure upon which economic development could depend. ...Lesotho had no reserves and depended on annual British grants —in-aids to balance its recurrent budget” (Sejanamane 1996: 61). Mills (1992: 64) notes that “Lesotho is possibly the most economically vulnerable of all South Africa’s neighbours. About 90% of its exports go to South Africa which supplies more than 95% of its imports, most of which are routed on South Africa’s surface and transport facilities.” This economic vulnerability was exacerbated by Lesotho’s geo-political location within the then-hostile apartheid South Africa. This led to the continuation of the post-independence status as a reservoir of cheap migrant labour for the South African mines as designed by the colonial administration (Mills 1992, Matlosa 1993, Ajulu 1995, 1998, Southall 1998, 1999a, 2001, Santho 1999, 2000).

Ajulu (1995) notes that by the 1970’s the economy of Lesotho remained essentially remittance and subsistence, as only 6% of the labour force was engaged in formal employment in Lesotho, while over 70% of the rural household income was made up of remittances from the migrant labour and 3% sustaining itself from subsistence farming. Matlosa (1993) also notes the ubiquitous unemployment in Lesotho was a matter of concern which exacerbated dependence on South Africa to date. He posited that of its 1.5 million and a total labour force of 600,000, Lesotho has about 40,000 of its labour unemployed, or at least under-employed. With such a weak industrial and agricultural base Lesotho is possibly the most economically vulnerable of all South Africa’s neighbours (Mills 1992, Matlosa 1993, 1995, Ajulu 1995, Sejanamane 1996). Makoa (2002) notes that only 9% of Lesotho’s land is suitable for crop production which means that the country falls far below in terms of food security to its around two million citizens. Worse still, Mills (1992) observes that about 90% of its exports go to South Africa while more than 95% of its imports are from South Africa. Through these structural economic problems, Lesotho and its citizens are intractably tied into a hyper-dependent relationship to external forces which casts doubts on the country’s sovereignty (Matlosa 1993, Makoa, 2002).

Post-independent economic growth in Lesotho was further constrained by paucity of resources, a weak economic base, lack of job creation and income generating industries, high domestic unemployment, dependence on migrant remittances and foreign aid, its awkward geo-political position visa-vis South Africa and its complete integration into the South African dominant economy through the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Monetory Area (CMA) and limited local markets (Matlosa 1993, Sejanamane 1996, Makoa 2002). Sejanamne (1996: 60) observes that ironically the country’s dependence is “fuelled by even those institutions and structures which in theory are supposed to be engines of domestic growth like the Custom Union and the Common Monetary Agreement”… which in practice have turned “successive regimes in Lesotho”… into “mere tax collectors…or “ a mere bureaucratic contrivance.” In this sense “[t]he intricate dialectic of this dependency…is that Lesotho survives on this
dependence, feeds on this dependence, and grows within this dependence, hence her deformed economic growth” (Matlosa 1993: 127). In such a captive economic status Lesotho projects a bleak economic future in which she does not have any substantive prospects for an independent development trajectory and domestic generation of wealth (Sejanamane 1996, Matlosa and Calleb 2005).

With such an umbilical dependence on foreign sources of funds, it becomes difficult, if not impossible for the Lesotho nation-state to effectively and legitimately influence the economic activity of its citizens let alone their political allegiance. In the words of Makoa (2002: 16-17) “with this tenuous economic base, the state in Lesotho has been unable to assume a dominant political role in society. It neither can create a most basic ‘welfare state' covering every adult citizen nor exert control or influence over the country’s politically conscious migrant workers, whose earnings support over 80% of the rural households and whose remittances finance nearly 57% of merchandise imports.” Such a situation spells doom for peace and stability in the Kingdom as the Basotho political parties are spurred to contest for attainment of political power as the vehicle for control of the nation’s meagre wealth (Matlosa 1993, Makoa 2002).

As history has proved, since 1970, every election in Lesotho has been followed by political discord and contestations of election results with the losing parties rejecting the elections outcome. On the other hand, the winning party would not want to yield to opposition election contests as they also want to hold on to power for economic survival. With such a weak economic base, Lesotho lacked the resource and institutional capacity to resolve its own political turmoil, hence the SADC interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007. Santho argues that Lesotho’s weak state institutions and political processes resulted from the legacies of authoritarian and military rule and lacked “the capacity to manage and contain the pressure and stress of transition to multiparty democracy and the virulent political contestation between rival parties” (2000:1).

As a result of this inherently weak economic status and surrounded geographical position, the immediate post-independence administration was thrown into the dilemma of having to collaborate with the apartheid regime for survival. The lack of an autonomous economy has always raised the stakes for the country’s political survival as an independent entity (Mills 1992, Matlosa 1993, Sejanamane 1996, Ajulu 1995, Southall 1995, 1999a, Matlosa and Calleb 2005). The apartheid regime has consistently called for the incorporation of the economically dependent Kingdom into South Africa. The South African apartheid Prime Minister Verwoerd was quoted as having said an independent Lesotho “could well become a danger to South Africa” (Lord Bailey, cited in Makoa, 2002: 3). Ajulu (1995: 10) argues that “between 1966 and 1970 the BNP opted for a collaborationist policy because it was perceived as the best way of enabling those it represented to retain control of state power as well as reproducing themselves as a political and social force.” The government’s pro-apartheid stance helped maintain the repressive regime in power as indicated by the South African regime’s backing of the 1970 coup after the BNP lost to the BCP although it was opposed by the majority of Basotho (Ajulu 1995, Southall 1995, Sejanamane 1996).
Within this political position Lesotho became a hostage nation to the machinations of the apartheid regime which used its economic and political might to coerce her into submission. Matlosa (1993: 132) states that the apartheid state “used labour migration strategically in congruence with its regional carrot and stick policy.” For example, after the BNP regime’s shift from collaboration with the apartheid regime to support the South African liberation movements in the 1980s, South Africa threatened to reduce Lesotho’s migrant labour inflow if the government does not expel ANC activists and sign a non-aggression pact with her. It also sponsored the BCP military wing (the LLA) to de-stabilise the Leabua Jonathan government. In 1982 and 1985 the South African military raided Maseru and the government ultimately imposed an economic blockade and sponsored a military coup under Major General Lekhanya in the country. The military government was to fully cooperate with the apartheid regime for both economic and political survival (Mills 1992, Ajulu 1995, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995 Southall 1995). For example, the military government closed the military camps and expelled the ANC and PAC activists from Lesotho to placate the apartheid regime (Mills 1992). The historical over-lordship of South Africa on the independent Lesotho has raised questions concerning the sovereignty of the nation. The fact that the government had appealed to South Africa for a rescue mission in 1994 and 1998 revived the debate about whether the country should remain an independent entity or be incorporated into the democratic South Africa. Cynical comments were heard in the wake of the South African-led intervention that Lesotho was in effect becoming South Africa’s tenth province (Southall 1999a). Politicians from the opposition argued that South Africa’s “real agenda for intervening was to prepare the way for the eventual political integration of Lesotho” (Southall 1999b: 7).

Various scholars agree that most of the conflicts which ravaged post-independence Lesotho emanated from economic underdevelopment and dependence, weak state institutions, political and electoral contestations and disputes. In almost all the crises, the primary adversaries were the Lesotho government of the day, and the main opposition parties-the BNP the BCP the MFP the All Basotho Congress (ABC), the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) depending on which one is in power and in the opposition. The political crises in Lesotho were further aggravated by the involvement of the security establishment and the monarchy, all of which were highly politicised institutions (Van Nieuwkerk 1999). The “fragility of this post-colonial coalition made accountability almost non-existent resulting in the state becoming virtually privatised by any of the factions that assumed power” (Sejanamane 1996: 60).

The political-security problematique in Lesotho has become structurally institutionalised and entrenched with each of the contending parties gunning for political dominance and access to resources through undemocratic marches to political power. The structurally institutionalised challenges culminated in the 1986 military coup, the 1994 attempted military/monarchy coup, the 1998 civil turmoil and the strives which gripped the country after the 2007 elections.
Santho (2000, 2) argues that the 1994 and 1998 crises reflected an “intense rivalry between elites dominated political parties over access to state power and state resources within a worsening environment of poverty, unemployment and limited economic options.” These adverse socio-economic and political characteristics provided the environment that made the transition to, and consolidation of, multi-party democracy extremely problematic culminating in the 1994, 1998 and 2007 crises which brought the SADC interventions.

It was in this context that the regional organisation SADC intervened in the 1994, 1998 and 2007 turbulence to restore stability and order to the country. Given the crisis situation in the country “[t]he region has had to play a fire brigade role lest the crisis spills over into other states” especially South Africa within which Lesotho is engulfed (Sejanamane 1996: 60). As the South African Director General of Foreign Affairs L.H Evans stated in an interview “Lesotho [is] totally surrounded by South Africa, any instability in that small country has repercussions for us” (cited in Sejanamane 1996: 70-71). The question that needs to be answered, however, is whether it was SADC or South Africa in collaboration with Botswana as an individual member which militarily intervened and facilitated the peace in Lesotho. Sejanamane (1996: 61) raised crucial questions which also need to be addressed in evaluating the SADC preventive diplomacy in Lesotho. The questions are as follows:

- Has the Lesotho experience yielded a coherent regional security in Southern Africa?
- Can it be reproduced in similar situations?
- How sustainable is this approach as a peace mechanism?

It is hoped that the findings of this study will provide answers to these insightful questions.

6.2.7 The 1993 Elections and the SADC Intervention

The end of the Cold War and its conflictual politics ushered in a new world order which promoted democratisation, good governance, human rights, and multi-party elections and shunned any form of authoritarian rule. It was within this political context that the military regime in Lesotho found itself under immense pressure to demilitarise and democratise governance in the country. Apart from the incessant domestic calls for democratisation by different Lesotho political formations and Civil Society Organisations, the process of democratisation in Lesotho was also dictated by the politics of multi-party democratic transition which were sweeping across the region including the moves towards the eradication of apartheid in South Africa. Southall and Petlane (1995: xi) state: “[t]his shift to democracy within Lesotho, a tiny impoverished state encircled by South Africa, was very much a by-product of the end of the Cold War, a decreased international tolerance of authoritarian regimes, and crucially, the outbreak of negotiations among contending forces in South Africa, which heralded the demise of apartheid and progress towards democracy in that long-benighted country.” It was in this context that Southall (1999a: 20) states: the “South African transition to democracy in 1994 constituted a paradox for Lesotho – a welcome crisis.” The regional organisation-
SADC which has been transformed in content, character and objectives and was on the verge of embracing a democratic regional power-South Africa would not condone de-stabilisation of its economic and political integration project by a tiny insignificant Lesotho. Among other things, “the donors cracked down and suspended the economic aid upon which the regime was heavily reliant. Begrudgingly, the military were drawn into a democratisation process” (Daniel 1995: 97).

Faced with a combination of internal and external pressure, the military regime had no alternative but to initiate political reforms towards a democratic dispensation (Mills 1992, Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996, Southall 1999a). As Southall (1999a: 2) notes “a combination of both internal and external pressures after 1990 saw the military government reluctantly accede to a return to the barracks.” This was reflected by the military regime’s lifting of political restrictions imposed after the 1986 coup and opening up political space through the acceptance of the return of BCP political exiles, including its leader Ntsu Mokhehle and granting them full amnesty from prosecution in 1988, the return of King Moshoeshoe II from exile, revision of the independence constitution of 1966 and nomination of a National Constitutional Assembly with representatives from all political groupings to prepare for national elections which would steer the country back to democracy. Although the military pushed through amendments which would protect the military from prosecution for crimes committed during military rule, and instituted clauses which were geared towards curtailing the powers of the incoming civilian government, and to maintain certain powers in the government, it ultimately acceded to elections on the 27th of March 1993 (Southall 1995, Petlane 1995). It is crucial to note that the electoral preparation and the prevailing atmosphere was tense as there were fears and suspicions that the 1970 electoral drama may recur especially as the military had indicated reluctance to relinquish power. Numerous questions were raised among the electorates, among others: “would polling go peacefully and smoothly? Would the military accept the results? Would the election really be free and fair? (Southall 1995: 42). The apprehensive atmosphere was borne by the conflictual election history of post-independence Lesotho. As Petlane (1995: 150) posits: “Lesotho’s post-independence history has particularly lacked trust and confidence in elections as a legitimate democratic process. Starting in 1970, the seeds were sown for the mistrust and contestations that have characterised the reactions of political leaders (and the general public) to electoral processes and results since.” That the Lesotho military reluctantly relinquished power and allowed the democratic dispensation was evidenced by the way in which they became central to the disruptions to democratic governance after the 1993 and 1998 elections.

However, in spite of minor organisational and logistical hurdles such as shortages of electoral materials and incomplete voter lists, the general elections took place in a peaceful atmosphere. The elections were contested by the BNP, the BCP and the MFP. The 27th March 1993 elections granted the Basotho the opportune moment to freely elect their leaders - a right which they had been denied for almost two decades. Petlane (1995: 140) asserts that “[t]he 1993 general elections in Lesotho marked an important milestone in the country’s recent political history.
Ending more than 20 years of political domination by the BNP, it gave Basotho their first opportunity since independence to articulate their collective will and have a say in the composition of their government.” The elections became a liberation moment for the Basotho electorate who voted en-masse to impose a heavy punishment for the BNP which had subjected them to years of brutal dictatorship (Daniel 1995, Fox 1995, Southall 1995, 1999a). The BNP’s predicaments were also aggravated by its internal leadership wrangles and an umbilical association with the military which brutalised the citizens from 1986 to 1993 (Southall 1995, Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995, 1999a). The BCP, on the other hand, entered the elections with an image of a liberating force with a rich history of nationalist struggles against colonial rule, the BNP and military dictatorships. “This granted the BCP a clean bill and it swept all the 65 parliamentary seats and about 74% of the total votes cast culminating in the transfer of power by the military regime to the democratically elected government. The result registered a massive popular protest against nearly three decades of authoritarian rule (both civilian and military) and a demand for the nation’s politics to be reconstituted on a basis of popular accountability and good governance” (Southall 1995: 18). Fox (1995) notes that the BCP support vote increased from 39.84 percent in 1965 and 49.8 percent in 1970 to 74.7 percent in 1993 while the BNP’s vote declined from 41.73 percent in 1965 and 42.2 percent in 1970 to 22.6 percent in 1993. On the basis of the winner-takes-all (FPTP) electoral system employed, it meant that the BCP forms the government and the BNP had no parliamentary seat which would have been the case in a Proportional Representation model.

Nevertheless, the elections were declared fair and free and representative of the will of the electorates by all the international election monitors involved (Ajulu 1995, Daniel 1995, Petlane 1995, Southall 1995, 1998, 1999a, 1999b). The Commonwealth Observer Mission in Lesotho credited itself as having played a pivotal role in shaping the country’s road to democracy. “Not only did it ensure that the election – its technical flaws not withstanding – actually took place but the collective judgement of the observer groups as to its freeness and fairness was also crucial in ensuring that the transfer of power to the winning party came about” (Daniel 1995: 94-95). In her electoral report, Lewis (1994) noted that “the observer teams made a positive contribution by (i) helping defuse tension arising from the problems and delays of the day; (ii) strengthening the confidence of voters and the electoral officials; and (iii) by going beyond the official UN brief by becoming involved in dispute resolution, communication and on behalf of electoral officials… transporting election materials and ballot boxes…” (cited in Daniel 1995: 99). All in all, the 1993 elections were declared free and fair and the defects were inherent in the FPTP electoral system which consequently produced a de facto one party state. This was exacerbated by the BNP’s rejection of Mokhehle’s offer to have two representatives in the Senate. The conflictual history of Lesotho repeated itself as a result. The rejection of the election outcome and the resultant turmoil led by the BNP demonstrated the existence of deepening political intolerance which thwarted the smooth transition to democratic rule in Lesotho. This was a replica of the 1970 political crisis (Matlosa 1995, Ajulu 1995, Pherudi 2000). In spite of the fact that the BNP had thrived on the flawed
electoral system from 1965, it cried foul and bitterly protested the BCP victory through the same system which had sustained them in power.

Consequently what had appeared to be a peaceful and open route to democracy was to be marred when the losing party - the BNP - contested the result of the elections as fraudulent and unfair and called for its nullification (Sekatle 1995, Petlane 1995, Southall 1998, 1999b). Despite the seemingly democratic and peaceful elections, the BNP contested its outcome and this was a clear indication that “democracy had not and has not yet come about” in Lesotho (Sejanamane 1996: 65). It also reflected that “the unusual election results did not allow Basotho politicians to learn anew the normal compromises in a democracy” (Sejanamane 1996: 66). Instead of embracing the democratic dispensation, the BNP solicited and mobilised the support of the monarchy and the military against the recognition of the BCP and Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle’s administration. In fact during the campaign, the leader of the BNP had shown his established hostilities to the BCP and its leader Ntsu Mokhehle. He was quoted as saying: “[i]n no circumstances will the BNP allow Mokhehle to rule if the BCP wins the elections” (Roman Catholic Weekly in Pherudi 2000: 123). To their dismay, the BNP’s allegations of electoral irregularities were dismissed by the High Court as unfounded. The court ruled that “they were founded more upon a pervasive lack of trust which existed between politicians in Lesotho than upon any firmly grounded evidence” (Sekatle 1995: 105). Also dismissing the BNP contestations to the elections, the BCP Secretary Mphanya stated that “[t]hey [BNP] have no guts for defeat” (New Nation (1997) in Pherudi 2000: 124).

However, the BNP relied on its long-time politicised partisan military which had kept it in power since independence in 1966 to bolster its resistance to the democratically elected BCP government. It can be argued that the military found a golden opportunity to regain the political power which they had reluctantly relinquished. Apart from being a partisan instrument and constituent of the BNP, the military had its own suspicions and mistrust of the BCP government. The issues which unsettled the military under a BCP government included fears of losing their jobs (job security) as punishment for having been a BNP force, and proposals for the integration of the BCP military wing (the Lesotho Liberation Army or LLA) into the national army (the Royal Lesotho Defence Force or RLDF) (Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995). According to Petlane, “it is not immediately clear to what extent this tension has roots in the history of the RLDF as a BNP force vis-à-vis the LLA as a BCP force; or the degree to which it is a purely internal and technical problem of integrating a guerrilla force with a controversial army” (1995: 153). The fact of the matter was that “[i]mmediately after the announcement of the BCP victory…fears reigned within the armed forces. This fear was related to the possibility of the LLA being imposed over the established officer corps which could also translate into retrenchment of some officers. This fears instigated some fraction of the army to contemplate a military coup so as to nip the new BCP government in the bud…” (Matlosa 1995: 122). This volatile and suspicious atmosphere was aggravated by comments by the BCP Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Marketing and Youth Affairs -
Ntsunyane Mphanya - who stated that the LLA will be integrated into the country’s armed forces, regardless of whether or not the opponents of the regime like it...” (Mo-Africa cited in Pherudi 2000: 138). This statement starkly contradicted an earlier announcement by the Prime Minister Mokhehle that the LLA had been disbanded and if there were any intentions to integrate it into the national defence force it would be an issue for discussion between the government and all the stakeholders in the Lesotho political landscape (Pherudi 2000).

Exploiting these contradictory positions from the BCP government officials, the leader of the BNP at the time, Retselisitsoe Sekonyane, fuelled military suspicions and divisions. In a rally held on the 13th November 1993 he was quoted as saying “[b]ecause of the political crisis in Lesotho peace has been threatened particularly by government failure to bring the Lesotho Liberation Army under control. The LLA are allegedly being armed with AK 47 automatic machine guns. ...It is surprising that Prime Minister Mokhehle earlier announced publicly that the LLA has been disbanded, yet the same LLA is very much alive and it constitute a serious threat to peace. ...When the LLA is busy arming itself to the teeth, the government watches with folded arms. If the Lesotho Defence Force is afraid of the LLA, we, the BNP members will fight the LLA until we are killed if need be...” (cited in Pherudi 2000: 136). Worse still, the military was divided into pro-BNP and pro-BCP factions, further threatening the security of the transition to democracy. There were allegations that the military high-ranking officers supported the BNP while the lower-ranking soldiers supported the BCP (Petlane 1995, Sejanamane 1996). Matlosa (1995: 124) notes that “instability and tension within the army had reached a boiling point by December 1993. [And] neither the government nor the Defence Commission, possessed effective control over an increasingly restive and divided officer corps.” The government’s response while appealing for calm also further aggravated the already hostile and explosive atmosphere. The Minister of Information at that time, Mpho Malie, countered by saying “[g]overnment would like to strongly advise political parties which are bent on sowing seeds of confusion which threaten peace and stability to refrain from such. The aim of these people is mainly to instil fear on Basotho in order to disrupt peace. ...Government’s patience is unfortunately sometimes interpreted as weakness. These people, we know, were bitter with the BCP landslide victory during the elections and were defeated in court while contesting the election outcome. Government therefore appeals to Basotho people to stay calm and dissuade themselves from instigation by opportunists” (cited in Pherudi 2000: 141).

The apex of political rivalry and divisions in the army took the form of clashes between soldiers from the two politically partisan factions of the Makoanyane and Ratjomore barracks on the 13th and 23rd of January 1994 (Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). The BNP, other political parties and the monarchy exploited the divisions within the army to further sow seeds of confusion and undermine the authority of the BCP government. Consequently, “national political life was paralysed for the first four months (and more) of 1994 because of the army fracas” (Petlane 1995: 153). Given such a confused political climate and suspicions of the reluctance of the military to hand over
power, there was a 7-day delay in the swearing-in of the BCP Prime Minister until the 2nd April 1993. This was confirmed by Mokhehle himself: “[t]hough it has not been publicly announced, it is common knowledge that my swearing in as Prime Minister was delayed unnecessarily because of disagreements within the army. This only happened on the 2nd April, yet the elections were held on the 27th March - a week earlier” (cited in Matlosa 1995: 120). The challenge to the BCP government was “to seek to resolve the continuing crisis in the civil-military relations by negotiating a lasting domestic solution with its rebellious army” (Matlosa 1995: 127). Mokhehle had to be “careful not to offend 2000 men who had a tendency to storm out of the barracks and assume power at gunpoint” (Pherudi 2000: 131). It was in this context that during inauguration he stated: “[t]he BCP has no intention, whatsoever to dismiss public servants from their jobs (including army personnel) upon taking over the administration of the country” (Lesotho Today, in Pherudi 2000: 129). However, the BCP government conceded that it was powerless to control the armed forces warring factions confirming Stephan’s (1988) assertion that “[t]o the extent that the military has a monopoly of physical power, the capacity of a democratic government to exercise effective control and command over the management of force within the state apparatus is extremely limited” (paraphrased in Matlosa 1995: 119). At this stage the government viewed the army as an enemy of democracy as it appeared to be supportive of those who called for the nullification of the election results and dissolution of the BCP-led government.

By November 1993 the military intensified its disruptive action resulting in the capturing of 4 senior military officers and some cabinet ministers while some fled in fear for their life after the military killed the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Selemetse Baholo, who was opposed to the pay rise demanded by the army (Matlosa 1995, Pherudi 2000). The disgruntled LDF further complicated issues for the Mokhehle government by demanding a 100% pay rise. They wrote: “…we are making this request in order to meet our daily needs in view of the high cost of living. We had stated in our request that we would like the salary increase to take effect from 1st January 1994. We therefore request a clear response to our request before the 24th January 1994. We wish to assure you Sir, that we as members of the Armed Forces of Lesotho remain committed to the maintenance of peace and stability at all times” (cited in Pherudi 2000: 143). While the Mokhehle regime noted its preparedness to meet and resolve the pay rise issue with the military, it had reservations about the tone of the letter, the setting of deadlines and thus to the military commitment to peace and stability in Lesotho as they claimed in their letter. Attempts by the representatives of Non-Governmental Organisations, the Business People of Lesotho and the Lesotho Council of Churches and Trade Unions for an amicable resolution of the crisis were abortive (Matlosa 1995, Pherudi 2000).

The peak of the crisis was also evidenced by the military-cum-King’s coup which followed a BNP procession on the 15th August 1994 (led by its leaders Sekhonyane and Lekhanya) to petition King Letsie III calling for the reinstatement of King Moshoeshoe II, the dissolution of the BCP government and formation of a government of national unity and fresh elections supervised by an independent electoral commission and based on the proportional
representation to ensure equitable parliamentary representation system (Matlosa 1995, Sekatle 1995). With the full backing of the military, the BNP and MFP, Letsie III dissolved the government, suspended the constitution, granted himself legislative powers and installed a 6-person Provisional Council (an interim government) composed mainly of appointees from the defeated minority parties to administer the country for an interim period of 8-9 months. The King together with the Provisional Council Chairperson, Hae Phoofolo, denounced the BCP government for lack of transparency and accountability and mishandling of the monarchy issue and the post-election military disturbances (Southall 1999a, Matlosa 1995, 1997, 1999, Vale 2003, Ngoma 2005).

This was a treacherous reversal of democracy, akin to the BNP seizure of power after the BCP victory in the 1970 elections and the 1986 military coup. In the view of Matlosa (1995: 135), “[b]y combining the forces of the monarchy with those of the military, Letsie’s intervention replaced the coup of 1986. However, whereas the father [Moshoeshoe II] had to combine with the army to topple an unpopular and illegitimate regime, the son had now acted with politically discredited forces to remove a government whose democratic credentials were without parallel in the modern history of Lesotho.” The BCP government denounced the King’s actions as unconstitutional. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs released strongly worded statements denouncing the coup. Addressing the nation, Mokhehle stated: “I, Ntsu Mokhehle, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Lesotho exercising my responsibilities and function as de jure Head of the Lesotho Government, declare to you all my country man that the purported statement issued this morning by His Majesty King Letsie III is unconstitutional and ultra vires his power. It came as a total surprise to my democratically elected government (The Citizen 18th August 1994 cited in Pherudi 2000: 184). In the same vein Qhobela Molapo (Foreign Affairs) echoed: “[t]he BCP government was elected by the people and King Letsie III does not have the power to dissolve it. There is no way in any democratic setting whereby the constitutional monarchy, not even the monarchical oligarchy of the 14th century Louis XIV of France who used to say, ‘at the end of the day I am France’…could simply dissolve a democratically elected government” (cited in Pherudi 2000: 185).

Consequently, in solidarity with the BCP, its supporters staged a mass demonstration against the Royal-Military coup. The demonstration was violently crushed culminating in the death of 5 protesters and 16 injured. The Lesotho National Council of Non-Governmental Organisations, joined by the National University of Lesotho students, teachers, the Lesotho Law Society, and Trade Unions organised a 2-day stay-away, called for a national conference to discuss the political crisis and threatened more mass actions as a way of pressurising the King for the restoration of democracy, but in vain. Although the coup lacked legitimacy as evidenced by popular opposition, Letsie’s administration was fully backed by the military which imposed curfews and heavily guarded all the strategic government institutions (Matlosa 1995). At this stage the then Minister of Justice, Law and Human Rights, Kelebone Maope, conceded that “the government is incapable of implementing its policy nor can it stop nor investigate violence because it is not in control of the police and the armed forces” (cited in Pherdui 2000: 149). The crisis had resulted in
immense damage to property and the casualties stood at 5 soldiers and 11 civilians wounded (The Citizen 1994 in Pherudi 2000: 155).

The nation had experienced a coup and the government appealed for assistance in the form of a peace-keeping force from South Africa, the OAU, UN, the Commonwealth and the regional body SADC. The South African government which was fully engaged in the demanding political transition from apartheid to democracy was unwilling to intervene militarily although the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Pik Botha, emphasised the government opposition to the coup. He noted that “…the government will not tolerate any government that came to power by a military coup in Lesotho. We will make it impossible for such a government to survive” (The Citizen 1994 in Pherudi 2000: 145). On the 19th and 25th January 1994, the UN and the Commonwealth respectively, responded by sending representatives to Lesotho to meet all the stakeholders to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the political turmoil engulfing the Kingdom, but in vain (Pherudi 2000). The regional organisation - the SADC - accordingly responded and established a Task Force to manage and resolve the crisis. The government’s request for external assistance was considered mainly by the opposition and other stakeholders as inappropriate, unconstitutional and a reflection of the country’s dependency syndrome which has characterised its socio-economic and political agenda since independence. In their letter to the Prime Minister the opposition objected that the sovereign parliament of Lesotho had not been consulted on the decision to call for outside intervention. And moreover, the internal options to resolve the conflict had not been exhaustively explored. They also sent a stern warning statement to the SADC against its interference in the domestic affairs of Lesotho. It read thus: “[w]e urge all outside military interventionsists whose interests are not affected at this stage to know that should they be tempted with intention to, they would be doing so against a unified political expression of an entire nation. Their action will be understood by Basotho and the sovereign Lesotho as a naked interference and a rape against our nationhood” (Statement by Political Parties on the Crisis in Lesotho 1994, in Pherudi 2000: 152). However, in spite of the objections by the Lesotho opposition parties, the SADC intervened in the form of a Troika of Masire, Mugabe and Mandela who were mandated to restore law, order and democracy in the troubled Kingdom.

6.2.8 The SADC intervention in Lesotho 1994

In spite of the intense opposition to external intervention, the SADC heeded the government’s appeal for assistance to reverse “a coup that was in progress” (Matlosa 1995: 129). In any case the SADC was deeply concerned about regional stability and their resolution to avert the emergence of an undemocratic government in the small mountainous Kingdom which had embarked on multiparty elections after a prolonged period of autocratic civilian and military regimes. As such, at its summit in Gaborone (Botswana) the SADC unequivocally called for the reinstatement of the democratically elected regime. Its communiqué read: “[t]he Summit expressed strong objections to the …decision by His Majesty King Letsie III to unlawfully dissolve parliament and disband the democratically elected
government in gross violation of the constitution of the Kingdom. The Summit advised His Majesty to act in the best interest of his country and the region at large by immediately and unconditionally reinstituting the legitimate government of Prime Minister Mokhele” (SADC Communiqué 29th August 1994). The Summit also appointed a Tripartite Task Force comprising of Botswana (Masire-the Chairperson of SADC), Mugabe (Zimbabwe-Chairperson of the Front Line States) and South Africa (Mandela) charged with resolving the crisis and restoring order to Lesotho (Matlosa 1995, 1997, Petlane 1995, Southall 1998, 1999b, Vale 2003, Ngoma 2005). The Troika was tasked to provide a rapid assessment of the situation as a basis for determining the root causes of the crisis and “to seek a solution as well as to examine ways to prevent similar incidents in future” (Matlosa 1995: 127).

In line with the SADC Treaty (1992) and Harare Declaration of 1991, the region was determined to avert any military coups against democratically elected regimes in Southern Africa. The SADC Treaty of 1992 pledged commitments to democratic governance, regional cooperation, peace and stability and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. According to Matlosa (1995: 135) the regional organisation did not want “to see the reputation of the new SADC – now inclusive of South Africa - besmirched by its inclusion of unelected governments as it sought to re-jig its appeal to investors and international donor countries in the increasingly competitive post-Cold War era.” As such the SADC was duty bound to restore the democratically elected government and ensure regional peace and stability. The SADC Harare Declaration of 1991 on the other hand, had unequivocally pledged “protection of the fundamental political values of the Commonwealth; democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government” (cited in Ngoma 2005: 165). It was in this context that the Chairman of the SADC security Organ pointed out that “a task force would be sent to knock sense into those elements causing lawlessness in the country” (Africa Today in Pherudi 2000: 152).

In fulfilment of these commitments, the regional organisation refused to recognise Letsie’s government and persistently called for the restoration of the democratically elected BCP government. The SADC clarion call was also boosted by the OAU, the Commonwealth, the USA, the European Union, the Council of Churches and the South African National Union of Mine Workers (Matlosa 1995, Southall and Petlane 1995). In its assessment of the situation, the Troika submitted that the crisis was broader than a struggle between the BCP government and the Lesotho Defence Force. In their view, “discontent was but symptomatic of a much broader, more deep-rooted malaise within Lesotho, a malaise which was essentially political in nature” (Report on the Presidential visit to the Kingdom of Lesotho 13; in Pherudi 2000: 158). They recommended calling an all-inclusive national dialogue to discuss the problems engulfing the nation and how best they could be resolved. The Troika also found that the BCP government was faced with thorny and immense challenges. Matlosa observed that “…the BCP …found itself in contradiction with both a civil service and an army that had been recruited and trained to serve the BNP government. The manifest mistake of the BCP was to assume that its massive majority in the elections, which accorded it
legitimacy, did not thereby nullify opposing centres of power in the society. ...Its ultimatum was to forge an alliance between unruly military in which discipline had sadly broken down and the monarchy...” (Matlosa 1995: 160). To that extent, it failed to implement an effective and transparent national reconciliation and integration programme. As the Troika asserted “…it was and remains our very clear impression that, notwithstanding a recognised need for reconciliation, little if any progress has been made towards the implementation of such policy towards the promotion of a truly national dialogue…” (Report on the Presidential visit to the Kingdom of Lesotho in Pherudi 2000: 154). The Troika further emphasised development of a comprehensive programme to build a non-partisan national army to maintain law and order, defend the citizens, democracy, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lesotho (Matlosa 1995, Petlane 1995, Pherudi 2000).

To resolve the quagmire, the Troika summoned all the political protagonists to a meeting in Pretoria. In the view of Sejanamane, “[t]he Pretoria meeting was important in that it set in motion a process of resolving the political crisis in Lesotho under the auspices of the regional states” (1996: 71). The negotiation document for the BCP government called upon the SADC to:

- With one voice denounce the so-called Council of Ministers imposed on the People of Lesotho.
- Impose immediate economic sanctions and travel embargo and isolate the imposed regime in Lesotho. (It called upon South Africa to play a leading role)
- Help disarm the present army which was set up and continues to serve partisan political interests and help set up a national army.
- Support a referendum on the issue of the monarchy in Lesotho. (Request for support of the democratically elected government of Lesotho in Sejanamane 1996: 75).

Sejanamane (1996) argues that the government's bargaining position was boosted by the mass opposition to the King's coup as evidenced by the successful 2-day stay away in protest, and the immense regional and international condemnation of the coup and persistent calls for the reinstatement of the democratically elected government. Among other things, the King's coup had "limited objectives", namely, to halt the government's commission of inquiry on the monarchy and reinstatement of his father Moshoeshoe II to the throne. Bolstered by these assurances, Mokhehle called for the unconditional and immediate restoration of his government. He posited that “[i]t is the first step that His majesty must take and at the latest by Monday 5th September 1994” (cited in Sejanamane 1996: 76). It is important to note that although the government had the massive internal and external support, its shortcoming was that it was too dependent on foreign support for its restoration in the face of Letsie III who had a firm grip on the security apparatus (Sejanamane 1996).
On the other hand, the King's bargaining position was buttressed by the control of the security apparatus, the Provisional Council and other political parties such as the BNP and Hareng Basotho (Sejanamane 1996). Although his coup was largely denounced by the regional and international community, the King did not capitulate without a fight. According to the South African Director General of Foreign Affairs of the time who was centrally involved in the negotiations "...the King didn't want to say, 'well, I'm just rescinding the order, I did the wrong thing and I now put it right'..." (in Sejanamane 1996: 76). The Palacy's bargaining position was framed around the King's acquisition of an "honorable exit". As such he bargained for the:

- Abolition of the commission of inquiry on the monarchy and the reinstatement of Moshoeshoe II
- Immunities for himself and those who acted on his behalf in the period under discussion
- Agreement on holding a National Forum and other constitutional guarantees for the civil service and the military (cited in Sejanamane 1996: 79).

In the view of Sejanamane (1996), the King's negotiation position was protective of the monarchy to the detriment of the interests of the other constituencies which backed his coup. Sejanamane posits that "[t]he constituencies which had joined Letsie III found themselves losing everything as a result of the agreement while his primary objectives were fully met" (1996: 78). While the fundamental issue for the government was its unconditional restoration, the King dug in his heels on the reinstatement of Moshoeshoe II, amnesty to the coup proponents and cancellation of the commission of inquiry against the monarchy (Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). In spite of the difficulties involved, a diplomatic solution was ultimately reached and the dispute was amicably settled.

During the 1998 intervention, the SADC employed both diplomatic and coercive measures to compel both parties in the conflict to a negotiated settlement. On the 25th of August 1994, the SADC Tripartite task Force and the OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim, invited Mokhehle and King Letsie III for dialogue. The Task Force called upon the King to reverse his coup and restore the democratically elected government of Mokhehle. He was subsequently required to draw up a time-table for the handover of power and was given 7 days to resolve the crisis (Southall and Petlane 1995, Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). The Troika’s uncompromising message to the King was that the coup was totally unacceptable in the region. King Letsie and the Provisional Council embarked on delaying tactics and made numerous conditions for handing over power, such as indemnity to all those who supported the fall of the BCP government, the restoration of King Moshoeshoe II to the throne, creation of reserve powers for the King and establishment of a national forum to discuss reconciliation and national unity. The BCP government rejected the demands and threatened mass action if the provisional government did not step down (Matlosa 1995). To pressurise the King for a speedy resolution of the crisis, the Tripartite Task Force and the EU threatened economic and other strategic sanctions against the illegitimate regime.
In a letter to King Letsie III, dated 30th August 1994, President Mugabe (Zimbabwe) unambiguously stated: “I wish on behalf of my colleagues and myself, to draw your Majesty’s attention to the need for the restoration of constitutionality in Lesotho within a 7-day period following the Pretoria meeting. As we explained to your Majesty, it clearly meant the reinstatement of the Government of Dr Ntsu Mokhehle without reservations. It also meant the withdrawal of the unconstitutional orders and other measures that your Majesty enacted following your Majesty’s assumption of executive powers. ... Your majesty, we would be pleased if your response to our appeal could indicate a forward movement towards the establishment of a constitutional and legal order. The absence of such a forward movement would leave the region with no other alternative but to join the rest of the world in imposing economic sanctions. In the event of no progress being made, we would have no alternative but to consider the imposition of such specific measures as members of our region would agree upon” (cited in Sejanamane 1996: 71-72).

South Africa, as the regional powerhouse, used its military and economic power to persuade and pressurise the adversaries to dialogue. For example, there are allegations that South Africa (on which Lesotho is inextricably dependent) threatened economic sanctions on Lesotho. Power politics and threats of military strikes were evidenced by constant fighter flights hovering over the Lesotho air space (Matlosa 1995, Southall 1998, Vale 2003, Ngoma 2005, Likoti 2006). Ngoma points out that “[t]he constant flights by fighter aircrafts over the Lesotho air space and parachute drops in full sight of the citizens of Lesotho’s capital were designed to instill apprehension and consequently intensify pressure on the political leadership to give in to the pressure by SADC” (2005: 166). In this way “[d]emocratic South Africa cajoled a reversal of the King’s coup… with a mixture of arm twisting and negotiation” (Southall 1998: 5). This was in line with Reagan’s Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s assertion that “historically negotiations were aided by the military capabilities a nation could bring to bear if diplomacy failed” (cited in Doughterty and Pfaltzgraff 1990: 109). It has also been established that “for success to be achieved in diplomatic negotiations, the victim has to know clearly what is wanted and also how he can avoid adverse consequences” (Sejanamane 1996: 72). Threats of coercive measures coupled with dialogue (non-coercive) compelled the King to restore the democratic and constitutional government in Lesotho.

Consequently, the monarchy succumbed to regional pressure and restored the deposed Basotholand Congress Party government (Sejanamane 1996, Matlosa 1995, Southall 1999a, Vale 2003, Ngoma 2005). The agreement overseen by the SADC Troika Task Force was signed on the 14th of September 1994 and it restored the BCP democratically elected regime, annulled the Commission of Inquiry into the position of the monarchy, pledged consultations with a view to widen the democratic process [in Lesotho], established modalities for cordial relations between the Head of State and other central institutions of governance and called for the neutrality, independence and loyalty of the armed forces (Matlosa 1995, Sejanamane 1996). The resolution of the crisis was followed by the SADC establishment of a Commission of Inquiry comprising military personnel from South Africa and Zimbabwe to
investigate the sources of the unrest. The BCP government also established a commission of inquiry to embark on an in-depth examination of the history of the Lesotho Defence Force, its recruitment and training processes and its role in the entire crisis of 1994 and how to curb future military instigated turbulences (Legal Notice No 61 of 1994; in Pherudi 2000). As a reconciliatory gesture, the government announced an across-the-board salary increment of 10% for all civil servants and 66% for the military (Pherudi 2000).

Vale attributes the successful resolution of the conflict to the outstanding international personality and stature of President Mandela. He asserts that “...international legitimacy, not to mention credence, was delivered to the intervention by the active role played by Nelson Mandela. This personalisation of regional multi-lateralism was, however, largely missed by those who hailed the Troika’s intervention as an important development in the making of regional order” (2003: 120). Determined to influence the regional political climate and reflect the peacekeeping role of a new democratic South Africa Mandela had stated that “Southern Africa cannot sit back and allow the subversion of democracy in any country” (Cape Times 15 September 1994, cited in Vale 2003: 121). However, it is crucial to note that Mandela and the South African government were not solely keen on the military option which Mugabe seemed to imply in the case of non-compliance by the King. According to Sejanamane, “President Mandela was keen to disassociate himself from the hawkish stand taken by President Mugabe….Instead he also concentrated on the incentive that could be derived from cooperation” (1996: 73). This was evidenced by President Mandela’s peace delegation of Bishop Tutu and the Foreign Affairs Director General Evans to Lesotho to discuss the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Sejanamane further indicates that the position of President Masire regarding the option to resolve the crisis remains unclear. In spite of this lack of clarity Sejanamane maintains that “whatever his [Masire] position was, it is clear that there was no consensus on the use of force which seemed to have been President Mugabe’s preferred option” (1996: 73). Mandaza reasons that the military option in the absence of a regional consensus “might give rise to problems which may undermine political cooperation and create conditions for insecurity in the region” (paraphrased in Sejanamane 1996: 73). The military option was also opposed by the U.S government. It cautioned the regional bloc that “[a] military intervention should only be undertaken as a last resort when all other options have been exhausted. In addition, a military intervention should have a clear political/military goal and an end point... We are also concerned about the threat of a military intervention and a probable armed resistance to such an intervention...” (cited in Mandaza 1994: 27).

Of paramount importance is that a combination of both the "stick and carrots" resulted in a peaceful diplomatic resolution of the crisis. The peaceful resolution of the Lesotho political conflict was hailed as “the first litmus test for the sub-region to truly act as a community of states...” (Ngoma 2005: 166). It also marked the SADC’s success in “using preventive diplomacy rather than peace-keeping as the point of intervention” (South Scan 16 September 1996, cited in Ngoma 2005: 166). In its recommendations for a long lasting peace in Lesotho, the Tripartite Task Force
called for a depoliticised neutral and loyal military in which the BCP military wing (the LLA) would be incorporated, and for the resolution of the controversial status of the Lesotho monarchy vis-a-vis the political establishment. It posited that “Lesotho needed a monarch who, while standing above party politics, could be an all-important symbol and a rallying point around which a troubled nation could unite” (cited in Matlosa 1995: 128). The government vehemently resisted this clause, calling the reinstatement of Moshoeshoe II unconstitutional. However, the Troika was determined that the reinstatement of Moshoeshoe II was central to the lasting solution of the crisis. As such, they rejected the government’s legal arguments as flawed. They argued that “no known constitution can be above the sovereign power of its people to amend it” (Sejanamane 1996: 80. Inter-alia, they rejected the “argument as logically and legally untenable” since “the act of parliament which we have suggested, is empowered by section 154 (1) of the constitution itself and does not amend or change the constitution” (Report on the visit by three Presidential emissaries and Legal experts to Maseru, cited in Sejanamane 1996: 81).

The Tripartite Task Force also called for concerted attention to the structural sources of conflict in Lesotho. It concluded that “[i]t is clear that until or unless the broader underlying political issues are addressed, there can be no guarantee that such confrontation will not erupt again” (cited in Matlosa 1995: 128). In the true spirit of diplomatic settlements, both the government and the monarchy were beneficiaries through negotiation and compromise. As Sejanamane correctly asserts: “… negotiations tend to succeed in situations where the parties have calculated both their strengths and weaknesses. A balance of the two tends to bring about compromises particularly where failure to agree could hurt. …” As such “… diplomacy seeks outcomes that though not ideal for either party, are better for both than some other alternatives…” (1996: 75). For example, while the government attained its reinstatement, the monarchy achieved its objectives for the cancellation of the commission of inquiry into the institution and the reinstatement of Moshoeshoe II to the throne. Furthermore, peaceful resolution of the conflict prevented a degeneration of the country into a full-blown destructive civil war in which all would be losers (Sejanamane 1996).

Although Sejanamane acknowledges the success of the SADC diplomatic resolution of the crisis, he is also concerned that “it signalled the end of an era where Lesotho could even remotely claim to be a sovereign state in Southern Africa” due to the overdependence of the country for its survival on external forces. (1996: 60). In practice, the country had been converted from a sovereign state “to some sort of ‘trust colony’ of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe” (Sejanamane, 1996: 60-61). This is because in the settlement accord, the SADC Troika Presidents were designated as guarantors of the Lesotho future peace and democracy prospects. In the view of Sejanamane, “that could mean that the guardianship of role over Lesotho by the 3 Presidents and their successors is guaranteed in perpetuity” (1996: 80). As if the government was conscious of its weakened position as a result of the accord, Prime Minister Mokhehle assured the Basotho that the nation’s sovereignty was safe and intact. Sejanamane insists that “[b]ut through whatever lens one looks at the agreement signed by the King and Prime Minister in 1994, it will be
found to have severely restricted the scope of the operation of the present and future governments in Lesotho” (Sejanamane 1996: 81). It is this fragile sovereignty of Lesotho coupled with its structurally weak political and electoral institutions and a rapidly declining economy which are the sources of the current and potential future turmoil in the country (Sejanamane 1996). Indeed Sejanamane’s prophecy became a truism as the history of political conflicts was replicated after the 1998 elections.

Evidently, peace and stability in Lesotho was short-lived as political turmoil erupted again in 1998. This could be interpreted as a sign that the 1994 non-coercive preventive intervention did not address the core underlying structural socio-economic and political issues surrounding the strife. According to Vale, “it was the nature of the intervention that effectively sowed the seeds of further conflict because it reinstated the Basotholand Congress Party as the country’s government; a move that made the three intervening powers-South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana-the guarantors of the country’s democracy and its orderly behaviour in the region…” (2003: 120). Put differently, it implied that “…Lesotho’s continuing independence is in a very large measure dependent upon its adherence to newly regionally endorsed democratic norms” (Southall and Petlane 1995: xvi). The recurrence of conflict in 1998 was indicative of the fragility of the foundations on which the country’s democracy was built. It raised the question of how deep the commitment to democracy ran amongst the various actors (parties), pressure groups, the military and the monarchy in the Lesotho political landscape (Southall and Petlane 1995, Petlane 1995, Matlosa 1995). It also reflected that “democracy constitutes more than the mere holding of multiparty elections, more than the simple replacement of an old, hated party and the righting of the ’1970 travesty’, [and] more than the substitution of military politicians with civilian politicians…” (Petlane 1995: 156-157). The challenge to the Lesotho political actors remained “the development of a culture of political tolerance… a recognition by all major political actors that their opponents cannot be eliminated and a movement beyond the view of politics which sees the winners as taking all” (Southall and Petlane 1995: xvi). Lack of political commitment to the above-mentioned principles resulted in the 1998 post-electoral crisis which necessitated another SADC intervention in the form of military action.

6.2.9 The 1998 Lesotho Crisis and the ‘SADC’ Military Intervention

In August 1998, Lesotho was gripped by another more devastating civil commotion following the disputed May 23rd 1998 elections. The elections took place in a highly charged political climate following Prime Minister Mokhehle’s break-away from the governing BCP and formation of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) after irreconcilable internal differences. According to Southall (1999a) the ruling Party (BCP) was torn apart by a power wrangle for succession of the ageing and ailing Ntsu Mokhehle, between Molapo Qhobela who controlled the party executive and Phakalitha Mosisili who was favoured by Mokhehle as successor. During the BCP’s summit held between the 28th February and 2nd March 1997, the summit passed a vote of no confidence on Mokhehle and called for his removal from the leadership of the party. The matter was ultimately taken to court which ruled in favour of Mokhehle. Despite
the court ruling, the rivalry of the BCP’s warring factions continued with adverse effects on the party’s ability to govern efficiently. Consequently, the failure by the 2 factions to reach a compromise resulted in the Mokhehle-Mosisili faction forming the LCD on the 10th of June 1997. The new party became the majority in parliament and thus formed the government as 41 Members of Parliament out of 61 crossed the floor to the LCD (Pherudi and Barnard 1999). The BCP was turned into an opposition party and it consequently protested the Prime Minister’s move as a parliamentary coup, a travesty to democracy and in contravention of the constitution of Lesotho. The BCP appealed to King Letsie III to prevail upon Mokhehle to resign. The opposition parties also called, in vain, for the dissolution of the government, and postponement of the 1998 elections. These high political tensions created fertile ground for the political fermentations which followed the 1998 elections. In the words of the SADC Parliamentary Forum: “[a]s the May 1998 election drew closer, the bitterness among the contestants became increasingly pronounced. The animosity and the rivalry were real as the opposition parties planned to either dislodge or destabilise the LCD government through both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary means” (SADC Parliamentary Forum, 2003: 7).

The 1998 polls, according to Pherudi and Barnard (1999: 39) were, unlike the previous ones, “driven by real issues, like policies rather than personality cults.” Moreover, “[i]t appeared that the political muscle of the principal parties would be fairly and genuinely tested because of the partial completeness of the governing circle of Lesotho.” Another fascinating aspect of the 1998 polls was the increased number of contesting political parties namely the MFP, BNP, Sefhate Democratic Party (SDP), the BCP, the National Progressive Party (NPP), the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD), Kopanang Basotho Party (KBP), Lesotho Labour Party (LLP), the United Democratic Party (UDP), Christian Democratic Party (CDP), the National Independent Party (NIP) and the independents candidates. Such an expanded political landscape was indicative of “political dynamism and diversism among the Basotho, and provided a broader choice for the electorate” (Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 39). The elections were held on the 23rd of May 1998 and were closely monitored by the Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho (IEC) and election observers from the African Union, the SADC and the Commonwealth, the European Union, the United Nations Development Programme, a wide range of local Non-Governmental Organisations such as the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL), Lesotho Trade Union Congress, Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisation (LCNGO), Lesotho Federation of Women Lawyers, and Lesotho Catholic Bishops the elections and government representatives from Canada, South Africa, the United States of America and China.

When the overall results were announced the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) had overwhelmingly won 60.5 percent of the vote and 79 out of the 80 parliamentary seats. Commenting on the results Southall, 2001: 154) demonstrated that “as in 1993, the mechanics of the plurality system had worked to deliver one party a virtual clean sweep.” The opposition got an insignificant share of the vote, the BNP (24.4%), BCP (10.4%) while the remaining parties only garnered 4.7% of the national vote (Southall 1998, Southall 2001, Likoti 2006). The landslide victory of
the LCD was unexpected because the party was a newly formed entrant into the Lesotho political arena. Inter-alia the emergence of the party had “triggered an unprecedented bitterness among political elite and the electorate alike which had a cumulative effect of casting a thick cloud of doubt over its performance in the elections race” (Pherudi and Barnard, 2003: 123). The Chairperson of the Independent Electoral Commission declared the election results as free and fair and Phakalitha Mosisili of the LCD was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Lesotho. The declaration of the election results as a true reflection of the wishes of the Lesotho electorate was supported by all the election observers as listed above. On the other hand, the opposition parties protested the results and labelled the elections fraudulent and rigged by the ruling LCD. The election results and the representation of the opposition political parties in parliament were further distorted by the FPTP electoral system. As the Ace Electoral Knowledge Network observed, “[t]he result in terms of the number of seats won was yet another example of how the FPTP electoral system can lead to remarkable discrepancies between the share of the vote and the share of the seats won by political parties” (Internet 12 May 2010). This lack of proportional participation in government in spite of the sizeable number of electorates who voted for them incensed the opposition parties which fermented disorder in the country.

Dissatisfied with the electoral outcome, the opposition parties (mainly the BCP, BNP and MFP) formed the Opposition Alliance and unanimously rejected the election results as fraudulent and not representative of the wishes of the Basotho. They read a conspiracy between the LCD and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). The opposition alliance formed a Task Force of 16 members which embarked on the physical recounting and verification of the ballot papers from the different constituencies. According to Pherudi and Barnard (1999: 40), “[i]n 31 constituencies made available to the Task Force, there were without exception large differences between the physical counting of those who voted and were cancelled on the voter’s roll and counting by the IEC at the exit polls.” As such, “[w]ith the noted pattern of enormous differences between [the IEC figures and [the] actual count of votes cast, it became even more imperative that the ‘ghost’ voters...should be firmly established as they have explicitly affected the outcome of the elections” (Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 43). Other irregularities unearthed by the Task Force were:

- All supplementary voters’ lists were not certified but were used for voting as reflected by the cancellation of some voters’ names on the lists. (Their validity and authenticity were therefore highly suspect by the Opposition Alliance).
- “A large number of sheets/pages containing names of persons entered in ball pen and marked as having voted show up on the voters’ lists of several polling stations in all constituencies processed by the Task Force. [And] [i]n some polling stations these penned lists went into more than one page” (Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 44).
- In one constituency (Makhaleng) “two A45 forms were completed for one polling station, with the same result but different dates” (This irregularity heightened suspicions that “there was a deliberate act of manipulation of
electoral documents weeks after the announcements of the election results” (Transformation Resource Centre (TRC) cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 44-45).

Bolstered by the revelation of such grave irregularities which, if true could have affected the election outcome, the Opposition Alliance organised its position front to dismiss the pronouncements of the IEC regarding the election outcome as null and void. In their protest they unanimously called for the:

- Checking [of the] registered voters per constituency;
- Matching [of] the above with the outcome;
- Checking [of] the total printed ballot papers;
- Checking [of] the unused ballot papers;
- Checking [of] the spoiled papers;
- Checking [of] the sample of the polling station documents;
- Sampling [of] some election results;
- Performing any test which the auditors would find necessary for their audit (Mphene 1998; cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 45).

As expected, the government remained unmoved thus triggering a violent response from the Opposition Alliance and other discontented sections of the society. This polarity in positions between the contesting political blocs threw Lesotho on the brink of total civil war as each maintained a confrontational and uncompromising position.

In collaboration reminiscent of the 1994 crisis, the opposition, the military and the monarchy colluded to depose the newly elected government. The Opposition Alliance mobilised their supporters to camp at the Royal Palace in Maseru from August 1998. They also handed a petition to King Letsie III agitating for a coalition interim government to lead the country and called for fresh, transparent and democratic elections. The protesters who camped at the Royal Palace vowed never to decamp until the King had addressed their demands and the political impasse besetting the nation. The crisis and the gathering of the opposition supporters at the Royal palace put the King into a very precarious position. This was mainly because by allowing the protestors to camp at the Palace, the King gave an impression that he was supporting the opposition. Such an eventuality would be in gross contravention of the constitution of Lesotho which barred the King from active political involvement (Pherudi and Barnard 1999). The Lesotho FPTP electoral system which entails winner-takes-all did not help the situation as it gave an unfair advantage to the dominant party and the marginalisation of the others (Matlosa 1995, 1999, Southall 1998, Pherudi 1999, 2003, Santho 2000, Likoti 2006). Southall (1998) observes that the elections were generally fair and free as indicated by both the local and international observers. He locates the source of the problem as the flawed FPTP electoral system which deprived the 41% opposition electorate of democratic representation in parliament. He
reasons that “as in 1993 what was wrong with the election was not the result but the electoral system which deprived opposition voters of representation” (Southall 1998: 4). The political elite failed to reach a consensus on dialogue for a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Attempts to resolve the conflict through the Lesotho Crisis Committee - a Non-governmental organisation mediation structure comprising the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) and the Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM) - were abortive as the government deemed it as pro-opposition. This shattered an opportune moment for Track Two diplomacy which could have ensured a domestic dialogue and peaceful resolution of the impasse (Likoti 2006).

Thus, the country was rapidly gravitating towards a full-scale civil war as the government had lost control and the ability to govern the country. On the 8th of August 1998, the opposition parties organised a protest march to the Royal Palace to present a memorandum calling for the dissolution of the government. The protest became more violent when it was subsequently joined by the mutinous junior officers from the military (after dismissing 28 of their commanding officers for colluding with the LCD to rig the elections) and the country became virtually ungovernable and was on the brink of a coup (Matlosa 1999, Khabele 1999, Southall 1998, 1999a, Vale 2003, Pherudi 2003, Neethling 2000, 2004 Santho 2000, Ngoma 2005, Likoti 2006). In the view of Santho (2000: 2): “[t]he 1998 political crisis over the administration and outcome of the election was the most violent manifestation of a multifaceted political crisis with socio-economic roots in a stressed socio-political environment.” Despite the intensity of the protests, the LCD government refused to step down arguing that they were democratically voted into power by the Basotho and that, among other things, the legally constituted Langa Commission did not find anything fraudulent about the polls to warrant their nullification. In a bid to arrest the chaos and maintain order, the government declared a national curfew. However, the curfew failed to stem the violent agitation by the opposition protestors triggering the government invitation of the SADC to rescue the situation.

The regional organisation (SADC) was alarmed by the unfolding violence and disorder in Lesotho and prevailed over the political adversaries for the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry led by the South African High Court Judge Plus Langa to review the election process and its outcome. The Commission’s terms of reference were to inquire into all the alleged irregularities in respect of the 1998 national elections in Lesotho and make recommendations to the SADC within 14 days on a possible solution to the political impasse. Focus was on the alleged:

- Fraudulent acts in the compilation of the voters’ roll;
- Acts of vandalism in respect of the electoral materials;
- Irregularities in the demarcation process;
- Irregularities in the reconciliation of votes cast with the voters’ roll;
- Irregularities in the counting of votes (Transformation Resource Centre cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 46).
The commission report submitted on the 17th of September noted numerous administrative flaws and irregularities in the electoral process, but surprisingly concluded that the discrepancies do not warrant the nullification of the election results (Matlosa 1995, Southall 1995, 1998, 1999a, Mosieleng 2001, Likoti 2006). The Commission stated: “[w]e are unable to state that the invalidity of the elections has been conclusively established. We point out however, that some of the apparent irregularities and discrepancies are of sufficiently serious concern. We cannot, however, postulate that the result does not reflect the will of Lesotho electorates” (The Commission of Inquiry cited in Likoti 2006: 161). As if that was not enough, the report could not be released on the 10th of September as initially promised as it had to be discussed at the SADC Mauritius Summit of 13th-14th September 1998 in Mauritius. The Summit denounced the post-electoral crisis in Lesotho and embraced the SADC-led mediation initiatives upon receipt of the Commission report on the Lesotho crisis. The ambiguous position of the Langa Commission further agitated protesters who were already infuriated by the delay in the release of the commission report, giving credibility to the brewing suspicions that the report was doctored by the SADC in favour of the government (LCD) (Matlosa 1999, Southall 1999, Mosieleng 2001, Vale 2003, Likoti 2006). Thetela notes that “[t]he vague and contradictory conclusion fuelled allegations that the report had been re-written at the Mauritius SADC Summit” to save the LCD government (in Likoti 2006: 162). Consequently the opposition protestors became more agitated. As the Star (Johannesburg), cited in Makoa; 1998: 8 puts it, “people have generally been disappointed by this latest delay on the Langa report, and tension has heightened as there is belief that underhand tactics are in play to shield the LCD regime.” There were allegations that indeed the government had prevailed against the presentation of the report to the Lesotho disputing parties before it was discussed at the SADC Summit of Head of States in Mauritius (12th - 13th September 1998). The South African Deputy Prime Minister at the time, Thabo Mbeki, bowed to pressure from the LCD government much to the dismay of the opposition parties. Emboldened by the sequence of events, the Foreign Minister, Tom Thabane, stated that since the Langa Commission could not establish any substantive electoral fraud to warrant its nullity, the dispute had been resolved and the LCD remained a legitimately elected government (Makoa 1998). This added more fuel to already raging fires of opposition protests. The opposition rejected the "doctored" findings of the Langa Commission and unwaveringly demanded the resignation of the LCD government and the formation of a government of national unity to organise fresh polls. Attitudes were hardened as the LCD government responded that it would neither resign to give way for fresh elections, nor form a government of national unity (Southall 2001).

The protests took a more violent and precarious twist when some sections of the security forces mutinied and joined the protestors against the government. For example, the junior officers forced the Head of the Armed Forces, Commander Lieutenant-General Makhula Mosakeng who was suspected of collusion with the LCD government, to step down and be replaced by Brigadier Anton Thibeli who it could be logically concluded was aligned with the mutineers’ cause in support of the opposition. The fission of the military into the pro-government and pro-opposition camps marked a dreadful threat to peaceful transformation to democracy in Lesotho (Pherudi and Barnard 1999).
Neethling vividly captures the soldiers' mutiny thus: “[t]he mutinous Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) seized arms and ammunition and expelled or imprisoned their commanding officers. Government vehicles were hijacked, the broadcasting station was closed, the Prime Minister and other ministers were virtually held hostage and the Lesotho police had lost control of the situation” (Neethling 2000: 287-288). Justifying their involvement, the mutinous military stated that they were not staging a coup but were engaged in a mission “to create a non-partisan defence force by ridding the army of a top structure loyal to the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy” (Sunday Independent 13 September 1998, in Mosieleng: 361). By August 1998, the escalating unrest compelled the Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili to request intervention of the SADC to restore order in the country. The request was made without the knowledge of the King, whom the Prime Minister considered part of the problem. There were also questions as to whether the King had the authority and power in the constitution of the Kingdom to dissolve a democratically elected government (Southall 1998a, 1999a). According to Matlosa (2001: 96), the Prime Minister’s letters “graphically painted a picture of an impending civil war in Lesotho and a covert coup in the making.” In the first letter dated 16th September 1998 addressed to Mandela, the SADC Chairperson Mosisili vividly presented a situation in which his government was powerless to maintain law and order and was appealing for military intervention. He stated: “I wish to urgently request your Excellency to come to the rescue of my government and the people of Lesotho. The intervention I do request urgently is of military nature... This morning the situation has worsened... further serious threats being made included abducting ministers, killing the Prime Minister and foreign Affairs Minister at any time. The most serious tragedy is that the police, in particular, the army are, at best spectators... We have a coup on our hands...” (Mail and Guardian 18-24 September 1998 cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 47-48).

In spite of the gravity of the situation, the SADC delayed responding with the intention of addressing the matter at the 20th September 1998 SADC Summit in Mozambique. Sensing the imminent collapse of his government, Mosisili wrote a second letter projecting a more serious picture in which the country was descending into armed conflict which threatened the lives of the citizenry in general. Mosisili noted that “...This morning we have received reports of a shooting attack at night on the house of a local member of parliament...extensive damage of property has been occasioned. For three days running, life in Maseru has been grounded as rampaging hordes of armed opposition party protestors, and some soldiers continue to terrorise the city... a sniper shot has been taken at a cabinet minister’s car, as a result ministers of government are confined to their residences... The situation is so desperate that some of us may not see the planned meeting of Sunday 20th... (September 1998)”. This may have projected an ugly situation of an imminent full-scale civil war as it moved the acting President of South Africa Mangosuthu Buthelezi (then Minister of Home Affairs in the Mandela government mandated to act while the President Mandela and his Deputy Thabo Mbeki were out on diplomatic missions) to authorise military intervention in the Kingdom as the turmoil in Lesotho would no doubt permeate into South Africa due to the intertwined geographical positions of the two countries. It is important to note that the Opposition Alliance was vehemently opposed to the government’s invitation
for the SADC intervention. In response the BCP leader, Molapo Qobela, issued a stern warning that any military intervention by SADC in Lesotho would be deemed an invasion against which the Basotho citizens would gallantly resist and defend themselves. Because of the volatile situation in which battle lines for confrontation appeared to be drawn, the SADC forces from South Africa and Botswana moved in to restore order in Lesotho. The military intervention was launched despite the fact that not all stakeholders such as the Opposition Alliance, church organisations, the business community and the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations were consulted nor did they accede to the intervention. This became one of the major flaws of the SADC mission as it was labelled an invasion instead of a peace-keeping force by the opposition forces.

On the 22nd and 23rd September 1998 respectively, South Africa and Botswana, supposedly acting under the authority and mandate of the SADC, deployed troops in Lesotho. The intervention force which launched the mission dubbed "Operation Boleas" comprised 600 South African and 200 Botswana soldiers. The main goal of the Combined Task Force was to thwart further anarchy, disarm the dissident LDF elements to deter further deterioration of security in Lesotho and restore order in the security establishment and government operations, create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order, revive operations of institutions of governance, protect the democratisation process in Lesotho and facilitate negotiations for the peaceful resolution of the crisis (Neethling 2000, 2004, Mosieleng 2001, Likoti 2006). The SADC argued that its intervention was precipitated by the unfolding situation of chaos and anarchy in the Kingdom which, if not nipped in the bud, would jeopardise regional peace, democracy and stability. The intervention and mainly the presence of the South African military triggered a violent resistance in Lesotho against what the citizen protestors and the opposition viewed as an invasion of their sovereign state to save the incumbent LCD government. One spokesperson of the opposition, Mamello Morrison, lashed out: “South Africa acted dishonourably, by failing to discharge its moral duty, failing in protecting the people and instead it decided to protect the government...” (SABC-CCV: TV 24th September 1998 cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 49).

There were grounded suspicions that the main motive for the South African military invasion was to protect its economic interests specifically the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (Katse Dam) rather than for the protection of democracy as officially justified. The leader of the opposition BCP captured the mood of the citizens when he stated that “South Africa was looking for an excuse to flex its military muscle ...in the region” (African Bulletin 1998, cited in Ngoma 2005: 168). He further warned that “[a]ny intervention from outside will be interpreted by our people (the Basotho) as aggression against King Letsie and his kingdom. So whatever happens from now, we are ready. Lesotho is a sovereign state and not a SADC colony” (The Mail and Guardian 24th September 1998 cited in Ngoma 2005: 33).

Indeed the South African intervention force met formidable and protracted resistance from the LDF and protestors in the capital Maseru which culminated in massive loss of life, forced displacement of people and immeasurable damage to property. The bitter clashes culminated in huge casualties, for which different observers give different
figures as follows: 66 deaths, (Neethling 2000), 8 South African soldiers, 158 Lesotho soldiers and 47 civilians, (Vale 2003), 11 South African soldiers and 113 Lesotho civilians (Matlosa 1999). The intervention also led to mass influx of refuges into South Africa estimated to be about 1300, and sharpened anti-South African sentiments in Lesotho (Pherudi and Barnard 1999). Infuriated by the South Africa-led SADC invasion, the opposition protestors attacked and burnt down government buildings and private properties, mainly South African-owned shops (Metro Cash and Carry, Pep Stores, Shoprite, Ok Bazaars, Jet Stores and other outlets) causing untold damage. Du Plessis observes that the initial stages of the intervention triggered massive destruction and looting by the rebel faction in central Maseru which became economically paralysed. On the other hand, the Opposition Alliance spokesperson, Mamello Morrison, held the South African-led forces responsible for the mass destruction. She lamented that “we protested here for several days, for almost a week without a single window being broken, but now look at our city - it has been destroyed” (Mail and Guardian 25 September 1998 cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 51). This ugly trail of destruction is vividly captured by Southall (1998: 5) as: “the burnt out shell of Maseru’s main street says it all.” The intervention resulted in massive destruction estimated at R3 million by Matlosa (1999) and R10 million by Vale (2003). According to Van Nieuwkerk (1999: 13), “the intervention was accompanied by an orgy of destruction and looting” which saw 246 businesses burnt down, 3000 workers laid off (Matlosa 1999, Southall 1999a). The LCM estimated that the damage caused by the 1998 conflict amounted to R160 million, with a reconstruction and rehabilitation cost of R300 million while about 4000 people were left unemployed. The South African Bishops’ Conference expressed shock at the massive loss of life and destruction of property perpetrated by the South African troops. In their view, the bombing of military barracks, their hospitals and the killing of civilians were not signs of peaceful intervention but of an invasion. They launched a scathing attack on Operation Boleas as “ill-advised and ill-prepared” and stated that “South Africa’s participation is in stark contrast to the hospitality offered by Lesotho during the apartheid era” (Mail and Guardian 25 September 1998 in Pherudi 2003: 127). The South African Council of Churches also joined the condemnation of the South African-led military intervention noting that the political impasse could have been solved amicably through all inclusive non-coercive diplomacy.

6.2.9.1 The Media Criticisms on Operation Boleas
Many analysts maintain that Operation Boleas was bungled due to the under-resourced and ill-equipped intervention force, lack of substantive early warning and risk assessment process on the nature and extent of crisis, poor and defective intelligence on the magnitude of the crisis and the possible level of resistance, poor planning and flawed execution, lack of clear intervention doctrine, the illegality of the intervention, inexperience, and lack of operational coordination between the South African and Botswana troops (Santho 1998, Nathan 1999, Southall 1999a, 1999b, 2001 Du Plessis 2000, Neethling 2000, 2004, Vale 2003, Ngoma 2005, Likoti 2006). Nathan (1999: 40) summarises the shortcomings of the SADC military intervention. He reasons that the operation failed because it “ignored the seven rules of successful peace-keeping: clarity and consensus among decision makers, adequate resources,
political resolve, effective command and control, adequate financial backing, a clear intelligence picture and an accurate estimate of casualty tolerance." The media in its diverse forms was awash with headlines such as “the incursion that went wrong” (Pretoria News, 26 September 1998) “the South African National Defence blunder” (Janes Defence Weekly, 30 September 1998, (in Neethling 2000: 291), “Lesotho invasion back fires” (The Cape Times), “the SADC was running chaotic in Lesotho” (The Sowetan, 25 September 1999, cited in Vale 2003), “fearful milestone for South Africa”, “Lesotho tarnishes South Africa’s peacemakers image” and many others. One other fascinating factor about the intervention was that the mighty South African Defence Forces (SANDF) underestimated the degree of resistance which they would encounter from the supposedly feeble Lesotho Defence Forces. As one commentator observed, “[t]he South African forces were also dangerously under strength, more than likely because of poor intelligence about the level of resistance anticipated and entered the country prepared for the best case rather than a worst-case scenario. So instead of securing the capital and preserving peace and stability, as was the mission’s intention, SANDF troops became tied up in a protracted battle with mutineers, giving opposition supporters the opportunity to plunder, loot and burn the city centre” (Business Day 25th September 1998, in Pherudi 2003: 130). This reality was also revealed by the mission Commander, Colonel Hartslief, and the South African Defence Minister of the time, Joe Modise, in that they did not expect to encounter such an intense resistance from the Lesotho Defence Force and the opposition protestors. The military intervention did not augur well for the democratic South African regime.

The new democratic government also suffered stinging criticism that it was, just like the apartheid regime, pursuing an aggressive policy towards its powerless neighbours. Among the many critical commentators on the military intervention was one Stan Maher who concluded: “[i]t seems to me a totally pointless and amateur decision to send troops into a situation where the generals have run away, and the military backing the opposition... the only thing we could do was to become the jam in the sandwich. It seems an extremely ill-conceived and amateur operation... I don't know what they hoped to achieve” (ISAS-NUL cited in Pherudi 2003: 128). The opposition political parties in Botswana (which also sent troops into Lesotho) namely the Botswana National Front (BNF), the Botswana Congress Party (BCP), the United Action Party (UAP) and the People’s United Socialist Organisation (PUSO) also voiced their reservation about the efficacy of coercive diplomacy in resolving regional conflicts. They felt that the military actions of South Africa and Botswana (SADC) were an embarrassment as they went into Lesotho to defend a government which had rigged elections.

However, the problem of inadequate and defective intelligence information on the reality of the situation on the ground and the operational landscape in Lesotho should not only be viewed as a consequence of the South African military shortcomings. It also resulted from the rapidity with which the chaos erupted and spread into the Kingdom giving the intervening powers limited time for adequate operational preparations (Pherudi 2003). Among other things,
the South African intervening troops were made to believe that they would have full support of the Basotho in their peace mission hence the decision to send only 600 troops. Worse still, they did not await the arrival of the Botswana contingent for a collective operation. As such, the South African and Botswana intervening forces seemed to operate as different entities which gave credence to those questioning whether the mission was in reality mandated by the SADC or was an adventure by the individual nation-states. For example, there were reports that the intervention approaches of the 2 forces differed. The South African force is alleged to have maintained a confrontational posture hoisting the South African flag; the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) is said to have entered Lesotho as a peacemaking force hoisting the SADC flag. That the two intervening powers raised two different flags upon entering Lesotho further raised controversy on the “SADC-ness” and legality of the mission.

As expected, the South African government vigorously repulsed the criticisms of the operation. Through its spokesperson, Parks Mankahlana, the government hailed the intervention as a success and criticised the media for biased and inaccurate reporting, oblivious of the values and sacrifices behind the Lesotho intervention. He pointed out that “[t]he candidness of our government does not deserve to be rewarded with verbal abuse and disingenuous disregard... We all depend on the media to know what is happening in the country and the world. There is therefore an obligation on the part of the media not only to report accurately, but to offer informed comments as well...” (The Star 14th October 1998 in Pherudi 2003: 131). The cabinet endorsed the intervention as “principled and correct” and commended the South African forces for the “firm manner in which they conducted themselves” (The Star September 1998 in Vale 2003: 128). The South African government also praised its fallen soldiers as heroes. Its statement in acknowledgement of their role in the restoration of democracy in Lesotho read: “the South African government recognises members of the SANDF who have laid down their live as heroes in defence of stability and democracy in South Africa and Southern Africa. They will be given their honour in tribute to their loyalty...” (The Citizen 24th September 1998 cited in Pherudi 2003: 126). Worth noting is that all the opposition parties in South Africa (with the exception of Inkatha Freedom party whose acting President Buthelezi sanctioned the military operation) criticised the military mission in Lesotho as an invasion which undermined the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Lesotho. For example Tony Leon, (then leader of the Democratic Alliance) and the United Democratic Movement's Bantu Holomisa noted that the military mission was dispatched without consultation with both Cabinet and Parliament. Therefore it violated the Constitution of South Africa. In the same vein the President of the Azanian People’s Organisation, Mosibudi Mangena, held that the “military intervention suggests that the actions of these countries (South Africa and Botswana) [were] directed more by wish than principle” (Sowetan 23 September 1998 cited in Pherudi 2003: 127). The opposition parties in Botswana also criticised the Botswana government for committing the BDF into an external military operation without approval from parliament (Likoti 2006).
6.2.9.2 General Criticisms of the Military Intervention

Right from its embryonic stages, the military intervention by South Africa and Botswana was subjected to a wide range of criticism from different quarters. First and foremost, there were several questions as to whether the intervention was mandated by SADC. Critics argued that the intervention in Lesotho was a reflection of the deep polarisation which gripped the regional organisation due to disagreements over the status of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) to the mother body (Southall 1999, Schoeman 2002, Neethling 2000, 2004, Vale 2003, Bah 2004, Hammerstad 2004, Nathan 2004, Ngoma 2005). This is because there was no authorisation of the intervention by either the SADC Summit or the OPDS. Therefore, “in the absence of summit approval, the deployment did not comply with SADC’s decision making rules” (Nathan 2004: 12). Schoeman (2002: 20) vividly captures the situation as follows: “[t]he extent to which one can in all honesty refer to either the Lesotho intervention or the regional involvement in the DRC as SADC operations is doubtful.”

Two issues were put into question regarding whether the 1998 intervention in Lesotho was mandated by SADC. Firstly, in 1998, the SADC Protocol establishing the Organ on Politics Defence and Security had not yet been ratified. As such, it could not have been the Organ which authorised the intervention. As the SADC Secretariat stated, “SADC had not yet ratified the protocol establishing the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security” (cited in Likoti 2006: 178). Secondly, there was controversy over the payment of the operation costs. The costs were not footed by the SADC as they should have been, had it been the authorising institution. Instead, the Botswana government settled its own operational costs while the former South African President Mandela was on record as saying that the Lesotho government will shoulder the costs of the South African National Defence Force operations (Santho 2000, Likoti 2006). The organisation was divided into two opposing camps and this adversely affected its coherence, shared visions and collaborative actions. The SADC became an organisation through which individual member states justified interventions for their selfish national interests. As the discussants at the African Dialogue observed, “[t]he intervention of South Africa in Lesotho was a typical case where countries use the pretext of international organisations to further their own interests” (1999: 26). Mashisi (2003: 78) maintains that in the case of Lesotho, the “South African government realised that the conflict…was an opportune moment to establish its hegemonic role.” Du Plessis (2000: 333) observes a trend world-wide that whenever states intervene militarily in other states, they will always legitimise their actions by resorting to principles of defending sovereignty, democracy and human rights. This ambiguity has more often than not raised questions around the credibility and legality of the operation and its outcomes as was the case in the Lesotho intervention. On the basis of these unanswered questions on the legality of the operation, one of the Opposition Alliance leaders dismissed the SADC intervention as devoid of transparency and credibility. He stated that “the so-called mediators from SADC have displayed dishonest brokering starting with the treatment of the Langa report” (cited in Likoti 2006: 162). Given the questions hovering around the legality of the
mission, Southall (2001: 159) summed it up as “having been hastily conceived, haphazardly executed and of doubtful
international legality.”

Secondly, the intervention was launched without the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council, hence in
contravention of article 53 (1) of the United Nations Charter that “…no enforcement action shall be taken under
regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council…” Neither was the intervention authorised by the
OAU in accordance with its charter. It is within this context that Southall (2001) posits that “[i]t is unclear through
which legal procedure the South African and Botswana decision to intervene in Lesotho was taken and whether it
was sanctioned by the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security; the Organisation of African Unity or the
United Nations Charter…” (Southall 2001: 29). The fact that the intervention lacked both the regional and
international mandate further discredited the operation. With these shortcomings inherent in the intervention, Berman
and Sam (1998: 9) posit that “labelling the intervention of the South African armed forces in Lesotho a regional SADC
venture after only a series of telephone calls had been made between some Heads of States” makes a joke of the
legality of the mission. This is because, as De Coning puts it, “it was unclear who took the decision? When the
decision was taken? And what that decision was? It is unclear if there was any formal SADC decision that authorised
the Lesotho intervention. If such a decision was taken by SADC it is unclear if it was authorised at the SADC Summit
in Mauritius, at the Ministerial meeting or at a meeting of of Chiefs of Staff. Assuming that SADC did approve the
intervention, what was the mandate… for the mission?” (in Likoti 2006: 174).

Likoti maintains that since there are no records of a SADC Summit to deliberate on the Lesotho crises and a
communiqué authorising military intervention, the decision to intervene could only have been taken at a meeting of
Defence Ministers held in Gaborone on the 15th of September 1998 which was only attended by South Africa and
Botswana. If that is true the intervention begs answers to pertinent questions regarding why the decision to intervene
was taken at a Ministerial rather than at a Summit level? And to add insult to injury, why was it taken in the
attendance of only South Africa and Botswana, when they did not constitute a SADC forum? Further more, if the
Task Force which was designated as the guarantor of the Lesotho democracy after the 1994 diplomatic intervention
included Zimbabwe, why was Zimbabwe not part of the equation during the 1998 intervention? Such a move
contravened the SADC Treaty of 1992 which called for consensus on deciding and implementing collective actions.
Therefore in the absence of a SADC Heads of States Summit to approve the intervention and mandate of the
mission, it was illegal (Southall 2001, Hwang 2005, Likoti 2006). More questions on the legality of the operation as a
SADC mission were stirred by the fact that it was launched on the 22nd of September 1998 before the member states
had resolved the impasse on how the Organ should relate to the SADC and to issues on its operation mandate.
Worse still, the SADC member states had not, by 1998, ratified the Organ Protocol. A statement from the SADC
Secretariat was unequivocal on this matter: “SADC had not yet ratified the protocol establishing the SADC Organ on
Politics, Defence and Security” (cited in Likoti 2006: 178). Moreover, another controversy denouncing the legality of the intervention as a SADC mission concerned the payment of the operation costs. Surprisingly and contrary to the norm, the costs of the mission were not footed by the SADC but by the government of Botswana which settled its intervention bill while the South African government burdened the Lesotho government with its operation expenses (Molomo 1999, Likoti 2006). The lack of clarity on who authorised the intervention gave credit to criticisms that it was a South African intervention geared to safeguard her national interests, bolster the LCD government and enforce her regional hegemony rather than a SADC peace mission. If these suspicions are anything to go by, then the 1998 South African-led military intervention in Lesotho was a unilateral intervention (as opposed to collective intervention) which contravened international law (Laund 1984, Du Plessis 2000).

Thirdly, it has been argued that the intervening powers held different approaches to the intervention thus opening it up for further questions regarding its "SADC-ness and legality". According to Makoa (in Likoti 2006: 175), “the two countries had differing interpretations of their mission and its source of legitimacy. For example, on entering Lesotho, the Botswana Defence Force flew a white flag, indicating that it saw itself as a peace-keeping force. The BDF behaviour contrasted sharply with that of the SANDF which entered Lesotho at dawn as an invasion force, pounding the Royal Palace, the two main army barracks in Maseru and the small LDF garrison at Ha Katse.” As if that was not enough, the BDF stated that it had sent troops to Lesotho at the behest of the SADC Troika (South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe) which were declared guarantors of political order in Lesotho after the 1994 post-election conflict. This was in contrast to the South African troops which on entrance waved the SADC emblem as the source of its mission mandate and legitimacy (Makoa 1998, Pherudi 2003). Further confusion was fuelled by the South African and Botswana troops coming on different dates and times. There are allegations that the BDF came late because they were not allowed immediate entry into Lesotho by the South African authorities (Pherudi 2003). This gave the impression of an uncoordinated mission with no coherent agenda as would be expected from a mission driven by a regional organisation of the calibre of the SADC.

Among other things, according to Likoti (2006: 177) the SADC military intervention failed to adhere to the principle of the use of minimum force as authorised by the UN mandate. He notes that “judging by the scale of war that ensued and the casualty levels among soldiers and civilians at the Makoanyane barracks, the Royal Palace gate and elsewhere, the force used was severe.” In the view of Nathan (1999: 40), “the Lesotho operation suggested that the South African National Defence Force was not adequately trained and equipped for a peace-keeping operation” as the operation “rapidly changed to peace enforcement mission.” In any case, as Du Plessis (2000: 335-336) observes, military intervention by its nature is a dangerous risk since “it is easier to initiate than to terminate. A major risk is the potential escalation from an act of peaceful intervention to one of coercive intervention or to a limited or even a major
war.” The bitter confrontations which occurred between the rebel LDF and SANDF constituted a coercive intervention which hadbordered on full-scale warfare.

Fourthly, the operation was not in accordance with the core principles of mediation and conflict resolution which demand coordinated consultations and consensus of all the belligerent parties. The conflicting parties, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the local population should be involved in all stages, agree to the mediator, the mediation approach and agenda. Such a processwould ensure the ownership of the peace process, its implementation and outcomes hence lasting peace. As De Brito correctly observes, “[t]he deployment of peace forces of all kinds demands a delicate and critical relationship with the host government and other parties to the conflict such as the local population. Any third party intervention requires a sensitive approach in situations of internal conflict as it is suggestive of the deployment of a ruling force from outside” (cited in Neethling 2000: 310). However, in the case of the 1998 Lesotho intervention, the mission was a purely South African-led military affair which totally marginalised and denied the Opposition Alliance, the monarchy, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the civil society any meaningful role in the resolution of the conflict. This concern was voiced by the NGOs and the South African Council of Churches as “the act denied the basic premise upon which our own democratic nation was founded; the principle of negotiated settlement and peaceful resolution of differences by the parties concerned without any dominating intrusion of outside forces…” (Khadalie in Likoti 2006: 177). The hostility which the intervention force, especially the South African troops, encountered attest to the absence of this domestic initiated and driven peace process. The intervention was deemed as an invasion of the sovereign state of Lesotho akin to the apartheid destabilisation policies of the 1980s. Similarly the NGOs and the South African Council of Churches, the Justice and Peace Department of the Lesotho Catholic Bishop’s Conference denounced the intervention as an invasion (rather than a peace-keeping operation) which undermined the statehood of Lesotho as an independent entity mainly because of its weak and vulnerable position in the region. The late BNP leader, Evaristus Sekonyane, sarcastically asserted that “one evening SADC drank political Viagra and woke up the following morning feeling stronger than others…” (SABC-CCV: TV News, (Lesotho) cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 49).

Because the intervention was not a result of consensus by all the adversaries in the conflict, it turned into peace enforcement rather than a peace-keeping mission. This is because there was no peace agreement and therefore no peace to keep. What happened in Lesotho fits well into Nathan’s observation that “peace enforcement only deals with the symptoms and not the causes of the crisis and is more likely to exacerbate rather than resolve or diffuse the situation” (1999: 5). To show that the operation and its outcomes would not be acceptable and owned by the opposition, Molapo Qobela, then the BCP leader, pointed out that “[t]he allied forces were betrayed by the battle-shy ruling LCD which had lost touch with what is happening in the country. He (President Mandela) is honestly deceiving himself. As soon as SADC leaves we [will] go back to square one. I am not going to disclose what we are going to
do‖ (ISUS-NUL in Pherudi 2003: 129). This is so because the political and electoral defects which triggered the 1994 and 1998 crises had not been adequately addressed considering the political disturbances which followed the 2007 elections in Lesotho. In other words, to the opposition, the coercive preventive diplomacy measures were bound to fail as they did not effectively address the deep-rooted structural problems of the country’s economy and political set-up.

Fifthly, because of lack of both the regional and international authorisation, the intervention was denounced as a South African invasion to protect its economic interests especially the Katse Dam Water project in Lesotho (Matlosa 1999, Southall 1999a, Van Nieuwkerk 1999, Mashishi 2003, Neethling 2000, 2004, Nathan 2004). In an interview with Vale in 2002, Matlosa stated that protection of economic interests “…was part of the grand scheme and probably at the heart of the entire South African National Defence Force intervention;…and the fact that the project was the very first target of the entire military operation makes perfect sense in terms of the hierarchy of South African interests in Lesotho” (Vale 2003: 127-128).

Moreover, there are arguments that the intervention in Lesotho was a fully South African driven affair as evidenced by the commission led by a South African judge, negotiations led by the South African Defence Minister and the South African Officers leading the intervention. Mashishi (2003) pointed out that South Africa also intervened to defend its newly established democracy by showing solidarity to a democratically elected government to deter a trend where “small irregularities” become “a route for ambitious elements in the military forces in the sub-region to pursue their (narrow and undemocratic) political aspirations” (Mashishi 2003: 80). Such views give credence to the position that the involvement of Botswana troops “only served to legitimise what otherwise would have been dubbed a South African invasion of Lesotho to pass as a SADC intervention” (Molomo cited in Vale 2003: 128). One is compelled to agree with Tuathail and Agnew’s (1998: 83), assessment that in Lesotho, South Africa was the “dean, administrator, regulator and geographer” of the intervention. Likoti (2006) noted that the visit of the SADC forces in Lesotho by the Minister of Defence and the South African Defence Force commander General Siphiwe Nyanda, both of whom held press conferences with Operation Boleas commander Colonel Hartslief, further added credibility to the impression that it was a South African mission rather than a SADC regional operation.

The fact of the matter is that military interventions in the international arena have mostly been driven by defence of national interests and seldom occur where the intervening nation’s self-interests are involved. In light of this, Van Walraven (2005: 79) argues that “the third party will intervene principally in pursuit of his own interests, in whatever way these are formulated…” It is also important to note that political explanations and publicly stated justifications for interventions do not always advance the real motives and agenda of the intervening powers (Du Plessis 2000, Van Walraven 2005). In view of the above positions the realists’ hypothesis that peace interventions are more likely when
the national interests of the hegemon are at stake, fits well in the case of the Lesotho military intervention by South Africa. There is no doubt that any destabilisation in the region (more so in the Kingdom of Lesotho situated in the belly of South Africa) would adversely affect the latter’s security, political stability and economic growth as the regional powerhouse both in the economic and political realms. In the view of Mashishi (2003: 83,) South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho resonates with the arguments that a “sub-regional organisation is only effective when a hegemon wants to utilise it for its own purposes…”

The South Africa Military White Paper on military interventions stipulated that the country will only militarily intervene where its economic and political interests are in jeopardy. This could only confirm the speed with which the South African government recommended military action in Lesotho while she was so consistently opposed to the same action in the case of the DRC conflict. This position was vividly projected by the Pan Africanist Secretary-General Muendane as indicative of the inconsistency in South African foreign policy. He posited that “they are people who said no [military] intervention in Congo, no intervention in Nigeria, but now are sending troops in Lesotho. It just does not make sense” (Sowetan 23 September 1998 cited in Pherudi and Barnard 1999: 49-50).

On the basis of the above-stated reasons, opposition parties reasoned that the intervention was a “military invasion and occupation of a vulnerable neighbouring country in support of the government” (Du Plessis 2000: 350-351). They further read South Africa’s real agenda for the intervention as the eventual political integration of Lesotho into South Africa as the tenth province (Southall 1999b, Du Plessis 2000). This position is in tandem with Santho’s (2000: 10) assertion that “it is generally accepted that small states are susceptible to risks and threats, both internal and external sources. Such states have relatively lower threshold than larger states, given the interaction between size and vulnerability…” The orthodox thinking “has always viewed military intervention as a tool of the powerful against the weak and older established states against weak states” (Du Plessis 2000: 335). In this sense the South African–led military operation in Lesotho dovetails well with Otte’s definition of military intervention as “the planned and limited use of force for a transitory period by a state in order to change or maintain the target state’s domestic structure or change its external policies” (Otte 1995: 3).

Finally, there were criticisms that the military intervention as an option in Lesotho was rapidly taken before efforts for a peaceful negotiated settlement were exhausted. The military intervention starkly violated the SADC principles of non-interference into the internal affairs of member states in pursuit of respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Among other things, a hastily launched military intervention deviates from the internationally established norms of peaceful existence and embarking on military coercion as a last resort. This raised questions of whether “the SADC intervention was not facilitated by the size of the country-relatively small and engulfed by a larger country…” (Ngoma 2005, 168). Surprisingly, the military intervention in Lesotho followed the categorical opposition of
the same approach by Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola in the DRC. Why South Africa and Botswana felt it was appropriate to use military measures in Lesotho and peaceful diplomatic means in the DRC remains a secret within the political dynamics of the two intervening powers’ foreign policies. The inconsistency in how to maintain regional peace and order reflected lack of a clear intervention policy and doctrine within SADC (Southall 1999a, Vale 2003, Mashishi 2003, Likoti 2006).

To some commentators, the military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho revived fears of militaristic destabilisation, domination by the powerful and insecurity of the weak which characterised the SADC region in the 1980s (Southall 1999a, 1999b, Matlosa 1999, Neethling 2000, 2004, Vale 2003). Vale notes that “[i]n the search for quick policy responses to the unfolding regional challenges, the idea of peace - its making, its keeping, [and] its ordering” through peaceful means were sacrificed for coercive power politics and tactics (Vale 2003: 133). Du Plessis (2000: 335) also argues that the advent of military intervention has politicised warfare to the extent that “it has become extremely difficult to distinguish between coercive diplomacy, military intervention and limited war.’

However, the intervening powers justified their action on the basis that:

- The regional organisation had an obligatory duty “to contain the emerging situation of chaos, anarchy and a creeping coup” which threatened regional peace (Santho 2000: 2).
- The 1992 SADC Treaty obliges the regional organisation to collectively assist member states in situation of coups against legitimately elected regimes and gross human right violations. As the then Senior Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President (Mogae) observed “…The situation in Lesotho has reached a high state of anarchy. The government of Lesotho has been reduced to a position where it is unable to govern. … [Our troops] “will remain there until the situation is stabilised” (Mail and Guardian 23 September 1998 in Pherudi 2003: 124).
- The 1994 Memorandum of Understanding which resolved the 1994 crisis mandated the SADC through the Troika of Mandela (SA), Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Masire (Botswana) as the guarantors of Lesotho’s democracy.
- They were invited by the Prime Minister Mosisili and the government of Lesotho to stabilise the domestic crisis and restore a democratically elected government. (This tended to confirm the internationally accepted principles that before any intervention could be executed “the government under attack must specifically request military intervention from a potential intervener” (Du Plessis 2000: 335).
- It is in line with the SADC treaty to prevent coup detats and unconstitutional regime changes in Southern Africa.
- Military intervention was the last resort to avert the coup and full-scale civil war after all attempts at peacefully resolving the conflicts were abortive.
- South Africa also noted that it was within its foreign policy framework to play a constructive role in regional peacekeeping, development, security and order.
• The intervention was to deter a coup and a full scale civil war, create a conducive climate for a negotiated settlement, lasting peace and democracy all of which were positive aspects for the region (Santho 2000, Mosieleng 2001, Neethling 2000, 2004, Vale 2003, Pherudi 2003, Ngoma 2005).

6.2.9.3 Merits of the SADC Military Intervention in Lesotho

However, despite the gnawing criticisms and questions surrounding its legality and subsequent operational blunders, Operation Boleas succeeded in crushing the rebellion, averting the impending coup and full scale civil war and restored law and order in the country and the region at large. Van Nieuwkerk argued that “[u]nlike the impression created by some media reports, Lesotho was not a country in a state of peace and harmony thrown into chaos as a result of the South African-led military intervention” (1999: 14). Therefore the intervention brought stability, created a climate for negotiations around issues of governance, electoral reforms and establishment of a Civil-Military Operation Centre (CMOC) and an Interim Political Authority (IPA) in which all political parties which participated in the 1998 election were represented. The CMOC was composed of the South African High Commissioner (Chairperson), a representative of the High Commission of South Africa (Vice Chairperson), the Chief of the LDF, the Director-General of the Lesotho National Security Services, one representative each from the BDF and the SANDF and a Humanitarian Adviser. The overall task of the CMOC was to bring the civil society and military institutions together for an inclusive dialogue on the normalisation of the politico-security situation in the country (Pherudi 2003). After the restoration of order the SADC met the LCD, the opposition leaders and other stakeholders in October 1998 to dialogue on how best to find a durable solution to the country’s political woes. The participants agreed on reforming the electoral system and the security forces for stable democracy and a climate for reconstruction and development to be created in the Kingdom. The Memorandum of Understanding agreement was signed on 2 October 1998 at the United Nations House in Maseru. The parties agreed:

• To review the electoral system with a view of ensuring greater and inclusive participation in the political affairs of Lesotho;
• To restructure and establish a genuinely Independent Election Commission for fair and free elections;
• To hold fresh elections within a time frame of 15 to 18 months (2002);
• To abide by and respect the outcome of the elections;
• To establish an Interim Political Authority (IPA) in which all political stakeholders are represented to steer the country to the next elections of 2002 (Mololi 14 October 1998: cited in Pherudi and Bardnard 1999).

The Combined Task Force representation remained in the country for post–conflict building purposes and also played a pivotal role in the rebuilding of the Lesotho Defence Force. For example by the 24th of September 1998, the Lesotho army chief Lieutenant General Mosakeng and 60 senior officers had resumed command of the Lesotho Defence Force. A training team comprising the SANDF and BDF embarked on Operation Maluti whose task was the
retraining and restructuring of the Lesotho Defence Force in line with the principles and professional standards of defence and security in a democracy (Pherudi 2003). In this sense the SADC conducted a meaningful post-conflict peacebuilding to mitigate the recurrence of conflict in Lesotho (Southall 1999a, Matlosa 1999, Nieuwkerk 1999, Neethling 2000, Vale 2003, Likoti 2006). The late South African Foreign Affairs Minister, Alfred Nzo, congratulated the South African and Botswana contingents for a successful collective military operation in Lesotho. He noted that “this concept of joint operations is likely to be the pattern for the future and will be a key part of SANDF training from now on...” (SALUT July in Pherudi 2003: 136).

However, Sejanamane casts doubts on the Lesotho interventions as reflective of coherent and efficient SADC security and preventive diplomacy machinery. Sejanamane dismisses the hyped success of the SADC diplomatic solution on the grounds that the mechanism was only possible because of the diminutive and hostage position of Lesotho in the region. In his view what the SADC carried out in Lesotho cannot be reproduced in other powerful regional members. He concluded that “those..., who are looking at the Lesotho situation as a model, must perhaps focus their attention somewhere else” (1996: 83). Southall (1999a, 1999b, 2001) also argues that the peace process in Lesotho as championed by the SADC remained faulty while efforts to establish democratic and peaceful government were marred by uncertainties. For example, as Southall (1999a; 6) observes: “[t]he LCD government did not recognise the legitimacy of the IPA as it felt it was imposed on its moral electoral victory by SADC rather than forged by a genuine agreement between the parties themselves.” The structure of the IPA in which each party was represented by 2 members created tensions between the governing LCD party and the IPA. This was mainly because the 11 opposition parties had 22 representatives while the ruling party which dominated the national Assembly had only 2 representatives. As such “it can be no surprise that the opposition’s overwhelming majority on the IPA - by 22 to 2 against the government of the day was not conducive to a constructive climate of negotiation” (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network: Internet 12 May 2010). As a result, the LCD resented the IPA as a SADC imposition to undermine its legitimate authority in the country. Southall (2000: 6) notes that “the relationship between the government and the IPA has been highly contentious. In particular the LCD has proved reluctant to participate fully in the deliberations of a body it has viewed as competitive to parliament (which it dominates).”

Moreover, “no system was put in place to ensure a smooth and constructive relationship between the IPA majority and the government, which commanded a strong majority in the legislature, through all legislation, including that emanating from the IPA, had to pass” (Elklit: Internet, 12 May 2010). This lack of mutually constructed democratic dispensation was to be evidenced by the post-2007 electoral violence over the allocation of seats to the different parties in the proportional representation government formation as the opposition parties cried foul. There were fears of violent protests reminiscent of the post-1994 and 1998 elections. However, the 2002 elections which were
organised by the IPA through the newly agreed Mixed Member Proportion (MMP) electoral model, granted a credible election and a representative government in Lesotho.

6.2.10 The 2002 Elections in Lesotho

One of the successes of the post-conflict peace-building measures in Lesotho was the establishment of the 24 member Interim Political Authority (IPA) as an interim government of national unity in which each of the political parties in the country were represented by 2 members (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network, Elklit, Fox and Southall; Internet 12 May 2010). The mandate of the IPA was to review and reform the Lesotho electoral FPTP system which had been a source of electoral disputes, and organise credible, democratic and representative elections in 2002. Its objective was “[t]o facilitate and promote, in conjunction with the Legislative and Executive structures in Lesotho, the preparation for the holding of elections within a period of 18 months from the date of the commencement of this Act by (a) creating and promoting conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, (b) levelling the playing field for all political parties and candidates that seek to participate in the elections...” (Interim Political Authority Act 1998, cited in Elklit: Internet 12 May 2010).

Discussions surrounding the review of the election system were tense with the opposition parties advocating the MMP model because of its proportional representation component. This is because, as observed by Likoti (2009: Internet 12 May 2010) “[t]he major political aim of the principle of proportional representation is an accurate reflection of social and political groups in parliament.” As such the opposition parties in the IPA “were eager to suggest an electoral system which would keep the single-member constituencies and at the same time provide for a much more proportional outcome...than had been the case in 1998” (Ace Electoral Knowledge Network: Internet 12 May 2010). In other words the MMP system would benefit from the merits of both the FPTP and proportional representation (Likoti 2009). The governing LCD party on the other hand argued for a parallel electoral system (the Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) in which the majority party would have the advantage of winner-takes-all principle. For example while the opposition parties’ representatives in the IPA called for maintaining the 80 seats constituencies and 50 seats for the compensatory proportional representation, the governing LCD argued for 40 proportional representation seats. Logically, its “reasoning was apparently that if they (LCD) did as well in the coming election (2002 election) in the constituencies as in 1998, LCD candidates might sweep the country, giving all constituency seats (or at least most of them) to the government side, and with their preferred parallel system, also a ‘fair’ share of the PR seats. This would give the government more than two thirds of all seats, enough to change the constitution....” (Elklit: Internet 12 May 2010). The compromise model was that the MMP system should be modelled on a National Assembly of 120 seats with 80 constituency seats and 40 proportional representation seats in which the interests of both the opposition and the government were catered for. The constitutional amendment was formally adopted in May 2001 upon acceptance by both the National Assembly and the Senate.
Consequently, after protracted and intense disagreements between the opposition parties and the ruling LCD government, the FPTP electoral system inherited from Britain upon attaining independence, was replaced by the MMP representation system in which the representation of the contesting parties in parliament will be proportional to the percentage of votes cast for each. The MMP model “allowed adherence to the FPTP electoral system in single constituencies, at the same time providing for a strong proportional component in the overall seat allocation procedures” (Elklit: Internet 12 May 2010). The IPA electoral review outcome and how the MMP electoral system was to be implemented is vividly articulated by Fox and Southall: “all [the] existing 80 constituency seats [were] to be elected by the plurality system and 40 compensatory seats [were] to be elected by a national list system of proportional representation. Hence voters had 2 votes: 1 for a constituency Member of Parliament (MP), [and] 1 for a party in the Proportional Representation (PR) election. For the PR seats, the total national list vote cast was to be divided by 120 (that is the total number of seats in the national Assembly) to determine the quota per seat...” (Internet: 12 May 2010).

The system was hailed as a significant shift from the FPTP system which had always resulted in a winner-takes-all result thus giving an unfair advantage to the majority party. Lesotho was the first country in Africa to adopt and implement the MMP electoral system amid continent-wide clarion calls for electoral reforms for transparent, credible and representative elections (Fox and Southall, Elklit, Internet 12 May 2010). The 2002 elections were conducted through the new electoral system and there were questions regarding whether the Lesotho voters would clearly comprehend the new system and what it entails, or whether the country was to drift into another post-election turmoil as experienced in 1994 and 1998 in the event the political parties challenge the operationalisation of the allocation of seats in parliament. The pertinent questions according to Fox and Southall were how to present the new system to the voters and how the voters would respond to the system of casting 2 votes rather than 1.

On 25 May 2002 Lesotho went into an election within the framework of the MMP with the optimistic hope of promoting democratic elections and inclusivity in governance. As a result, the poll attracted considerable international focus, material and logistical support mainly from the European Union, the Commonwealth, Britain, the USA and South Africa (Fox and Southall: Internet 12 May 2010). Concerted efforts were taken by the IEC during the preparations for the elections to minimise transgressions which might compromise the credibility of the polls and give any contesting party grounds for protesting the results. The registrations for the election were conducted in August and September of 2001 and citizens were efficiently trained to guide the election process. Fox and Southall clearly summarise the voting procedure and all the required processes: "[f]irst based on a registration programme...a computerised voters' list was completed by January 2002. Voters were required to dip their fingers in indelible ink when registering, and would be able to vote only on presenting a voter's registration card that displayed their
photograph, fingerprint, and signature (with indelible ink again being used at the poll stations). Second, immense care was taken to involve the parties at all stages of the process; for example, party representatives sat on eight committees concerning the electoral law, security, and such matters. In particular, the parties were employed alongside IEC officials in explaining the dual voting process. Third, ballot boxes were transparent. Fourth, immense care was taken at the polling booths to explain and to separate the casting of the two votes. Finally, after the results had been announced locally, they were dispatched to an Election Results’ Centre (financed by the EU), which was open to the party leaders and registered election monitors and journalists (Internet; 12 May 2010). More important, election observers drawn from various entities such as the SADC, the Commonwealth, and the EU and from local non-governmental organisations were spread all over the country to monitor the poll. Given the enormous effort put in, the preparations for the poll according to the description stated above, one would expect credible elections.

Apart from the low voter turn out (64% compared to 71% in 1998 and 72% in 1993), the elections were declared transparent, free and fair. The BNP’s attempts to cry foul that the elections were rigged were vehemently dismissed by all the election observers. In view of this Fox and Southall note that “Lesotho had completed what was by far the most widely accepted general election in its tumultuous post-colonial history” (Internet 12 May 2010). The results were that once again the LCD obtained an overwhelming number of seats in the constituency votes (77 out of the 78 seats with 57.7 percent of the vote. The Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC) bagged the single constituency seat while the BNP, Basotho African Congress (BAC), BCP (BCP), LWP MFP Patriotic Front for Democracy (PFD), NIP and the National Progressive Party (NPP) obtained zero seats. However, the losing parties had an advantage of representation in parliament under the new MMP electoral system while the majority party (LCD) was disadvantaged. In the proportional representation votes, the results of the proportional allocation of seats were as follows: the BNP 21, the LPC 4, BAC 3, BCP 3, LWP 1, MFP 1, PFD 1, NIP 5, and the NPP 1. It is important to note that under the MMP PR electoral system, the LCD had already exceeded its quota of PR seats by virtue of overwhelming majority in the constituency votes. The 40% PR seats were only allocated to the opposition parties to ensure proportionality in parliamentary representation (Fox and Southall: Internet 12 May 2010).

According to Fox and Southall the electoral process and outcome showed that there was immense voter education before and during the polls. As such, the voters did not experience any serious difficulties in voting within the new system. For example, “[t]he small proportion of invalid votes (17,618[3.2%] and 12,063 [2.1%] for the constituency and proportional representation votes respectively) testifies to the care taken by the authorities in the voter education process, both before and during the polls” (Fox and Southall; Internet 12 May 2010). Inter-alia through the MMP system “the level of disproportionality between vote and seat shares declined dramatically compared to the previous elections” in which only the FPTP system was employed (Elklit: Internet 12 May 2010). The success of the MMP electoral system in Lesotho has been hailed as a triumph of electoral reforms and a triumph for democracy which
other African countries can emulate (Elklit, Fox and Southall, Internet 12 May 2010). As Fox and Southall put it: “[T]iny Lesotho may have set the ball rolling towards the wider adoption of mixed electoral systems throughout the region” (Internet, 12 May 2010). According to Elklit the MMP model has already been discussed in South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Mauritius. Given the success of the MMP electoral model in the 2002 election Elklit recommended that “it would be a good idea to keep the electoral system as it is for at least three consecutive elections, in order to allow all stakeholders - political parties, the media, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the ordinary voters - a chance to fully understand the mechanics of the system before changes are considered” (Internet, 12 May 2010). It can be concluded that on the basis of the May 2002 elections which were conducted peacefully and a government in which all the participant political parties were represented, that the SADC preventive diplomacy was a success.

However, in spite of its successful implementation in the 2002 elections, the MMP system created problems in the 2007 general elections when the opposition challenged the allocation of the proportional representation seats by the ruling LCD. This led to further turbulence in which the SADC once again had to mandate the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, to facilitate dialogue between the political parties for a negotiated settlement. The Masire-led facilitation mission encountered insurmountable challenges from the LCD government, resulting in him retiring the mission before its completion.

6.2.11 The 2007 Elections in Lesotho

On the 17th of February, Lesotho held its second election within the framework of the MMP electoral system. The political climate prior to the 2007 election was characterised by a major split in the ruling party (the LCD) when 17 of its members of parliament led by Thomas Thabane (former Minister of Communications) broke away to form the All Basotho Convention (ABC) in October 2006. For political expedience and survival both the LCD and its breakaway formation (the ABC) formed alliances with each of the smaller parties. The LCD formed an alliance with the NIP while the ABC joined forces with the Lesotho Workers Party (LWP). It was this formation of alliances with other parties whose implications were never envisaged in the MMP system, which was to later lead to contests over the allocation of proportional representation seats after the 2007 polls (Likoti 2009). A total of 13 political parties contested the elections, and as in the 1998 and 2002 elections, the LCD led by Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili, emerged the winner with 61 of the 79 seats contested. Other contesting political parties obtained as follows; the ABC 17, NIP 21, LWP 10, Alliance of Congress (ACP) comprising the LPC, BAC, and BCP 3, the BNP 3, Basotho Batho Democratic Party (BBDP) 1, PFD 1, and MFP 1. The MMP system combined the best aspects of the FPTP and proportional representation models improved diversity and led to wider inclusiveness of different political parties in the national assembly. Compared to the 2002 elections, the 2007 election saw an increase in the number of parties represented in parliament from 10 to 12 (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] News: Internet 8 April 2010). The
elections were declared credible, peaceful and free by both the international and local observer missions such as the Transformation Resource Centre, the Lesotho Council of NGOs, the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) and the SADC Electoral Observer Mission. The ABC party’s stance was that the elections were free but not fair and it intended to take legal action to challenge some of the results. The opposition parties also objected the allocation of the Proportional representation (PR) seats. They felt that the LCD has violated the MMP electoral system through its coalition with the NIP. The LCD, which was advantaged by the alliance arrangement stood firm that it did not in any way contravene the constitution. This position was bolstered by the High court ruling after the MFP took the matter to court to consideration.

However, some of the challenges of the MMP electoral system became more pronounced during the 2007 election. One of the complications was brought about by the formation of alliances by the bigger parties, namely the LCD and the ABC with smaller formations of the NIP and LWP respectively. The problem was further compounded by the fact that the LCD and ABC only contested 80 FPTP seats on their respective parties’ tickets and teamed up with 2 smaller parties for the proportional representation seats. This scenario was not envisaged in the constitutional reforms which introduced the MMP system as it complicated the proportional representation allocation of seats formula (Likoti 2009, UNDP News). As such, “[a]ccording to experts of the MMP electoral model in countries such as New Zealand, which provided inspiration for Lesotho’s adoption of this model, the Lesotho political party alliances of 2007 undermined the purpose of the MMP, which aimed at maximising party participation in parliament within the spirit of the law” (UNDP News: Internet; 8 April 2010). Maundeni (2010: 136) observes that “[t]he whole idea of coalition politics in Lesotho in 2007 was to defraud rather than to comply with the MMP electoral system.” The point of the LCD-NIP alliance “was to render the compensatory MMP system inoperable by preventing it from excluding the winning party as happened in the 2002 election.” This created controversy and questions regarding the legitimacy of the government which emerged from the polls.

Given this scenario, the MFP which obtained a single PR seat took the matter to court arguing that the formation of alliances and participation in the 2007 election as alliance partners by the LCD and ABC distorted the MMP formula for allocation of PR seats and disadvantaged it in its share of the seats. The Lesotho High Court dismissed the MFP case and maintained that there was nothing unlawful about the alliance formation and the way the proportional representation seats were allocated. Part of paragraph 53 of the judgment read thus: “...a political party is not prohibited under law to form any alliance pact with any other political party or parties and the Independent Electoral Commission is not enjoined to treat – for purposes of PR allocation-any alliance as a single entity unless such alliance contested the constituency seats as a single entity. This must be clear to all concerned in these proceedings. If the I.E.C treated any unregistered alliance as a single entity-it would be acting so ultra vires and its allocation would have been illegal outright” (Cited in the Lesotho Government Response to the Masire Report: 2009: 4).
In spite of the High Court ruling, the ABC leader (Thabane) in collaboration with other opposition parties - although acknowledging that the LCD won the election - contended that the proportional representation seats were not properly allocated. The reluctance by the LCD government to engage the opposition in talks regarding the issue of PR seat allocation prompted Thabane and other opposition parties to threaten street protests to pressure the government into holding fresh elections. Consequently, post-electoral violence reminiscent of 1994 and 1998 was triggered, with residential places of some ruling party Members of Parliament bombed. The peak of the simmering violence was the aborted assassination attempt of the Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili in 2008. The eruption of the 2007 post-election violence may be correctly read to suggest that the combination of the FPTP and MMP electoral systems to thwart the historical protests which have dominated the Lesotho political arena since the 1970s, failed to defuse post-election conflicts and move Lesotho to democratic dispensation (Maundeni 2010). The LCD, which had benefitted from the FPTP electoral system and was notably opposed to the new electoral system, adroitly manipulated the new system to its advantage through coalition pacts. This constitutional loophole was not envisaged by the architects of the MMP system in the Lesotho context.

6.2.11.1 The SADC Preventive Diplomacy: Post-2007 Election

Fearing a repeat of the 1993 and 1998 post-election conflicts, the SADC mandated the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, to mediate between the government and the opposition parties in the allocation of seats as per the functions of the proportional representation electoral system which replaced the problematic FPTP system in the country. The main objective of the SADC-initiated Eminent Person Mission for the Facilitation of the Post-Electoral Political Dialogue in Lesotho was to undertake an assessment of the post-electoral situation, bring the ruling party, the opposition and other stakeholders to a negotiated settlement of the dispute and submit a report to the SADC Organ on the way forward. The SADC worked jointly with the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) to facilitate the resolution of the political impasse. Subsequently the SADC Organ Troika Summits emphasised the need for dialogue and called upon all the political parties and the Basotho people to commit themselves to resolving the impasse peacefully. Addressing the media after one such summit, the President of Mozambique, Armando Guebuza, stated: “[w]e assure the Basotho complete support of SADC with a team of facilitators that will be appointed with immediate effect to work jointly with the Christian Council of Lesotho in mediation” (Tlali: Internet: 14; April 2010). The SADC Executive Secretary also assured the Basotho political stakeholders that the dialogue will be an inclusive participatory process to find a lasting solution to all the contentious issues regarding the elections, the allocation of seats and how the political parties should handle their political differences.

Worth noting is that initially both the governing LCD government and the opposition parties embraced the choice of Masire as the mediator. The leader of the ABC Thabane welcomed the SADC mediation when he stated: “[w]e have
not planned a revolutionary change of government where the government is expected to be unseated by force. We will remove the LCD from power through peaceful means....There is hope because SADC at the Heads of State level is guaranteeing to help Lesotho solve the problem” (Tlali; Internet 14 April 2010). All in all, the Masire-led dialogue facilitation mission embarked on 6 interactions with the Lesotho political stakeholders from June 2007 to July 2009 (Masire Briefing to the SADC Organ Troika: 13 July 2009).

However, the mediation process led by Sir Ketumile Masire commenced in 2007 and carried on into 2008 without any success in breaking the impasse, mainly due to the contentious issues which gave birth to the dispute. One such issue was the invitation of the MMP experts to hold a seminar on the operations of the electoral model and to give recommendations on how best to operationalise it in Lesotho. According to Masire the government objected to the inclusion on Prof Elklit in the Committee of Experts due to an article which he wrote on the Lesotho 2007 elections entitled “[t]he 2007 General Election in Lesotho: Abuse of MMP System?” The government felt Elklit has already expressed a biased and partisan view on the application of the MMP system in Lesotho. The other area of difference was that the opposition parties felt that if the Committee of Experts identified any anomalies in the Lesotho MMP system, immediate corrective action should be taken. The government, on the other hand, argued that the question of whether or not the PR seats were properly allocated had been finalised by the IEC and any recommendations by the Committee of Experts could only be used for future electoral reforms. Furthermore, the Lesotho government rejected the dates for the Experts seminar (25th - 29th November 2008) as proposed by the opposition. The government further held that the seminar would not take place in Lesotho without its permission. Ultimately, the Memorandum of Understanding which was expected from the outcome of the Committee of Experts to propel the resolution of the dispute never materialised, further jeopardising the peace process. (Masire Briefing to the SADC Organ Troika: 13 July 2009).

By July 2009, the dialogue between the government and the opposition over the allocation of proportional representation seats in parliament had reached a deadlock. In an attempt to break the impasse Masire proposed:

- Acceptance of the status quo with the seat allocation even when experts pronounce it flawed, and to work towards a transition for holding proper elections in a period as determined by the parties involved;
- Compensating the Opposition with some form of recognition, particularly for the Leader of the Opposition and implementation of the Roadmap as agreed;
- Seat reallocation by increasing the size of Parliament;
- Experts not to dictate what Lesotho should have done, but rather advice on the seat allocation. It was up to Basotho to take it... in line with the provisions in the Lesotho Constitution. (Masire Brief to the SADC Organ Troika: 13 July 2009: 5).
The stakeholders, especially the government, rejected Masire’s proposals and that compounded prospects for the failure of the SADC-initiated preventive diplomacy mission in the Kingdom.

Consequently, the LCD government through the Communications Minister, Mothetjoa Metsing, informed the mediator that the talks over allocation of proportional representation seats had been settled and closed after the 2008 Lesotho High Court judgement that the allocation as conducted by the IEC was legitimate. In a press conference, the mediator also confirmed that the dialogue had hit a deadlock due to irreconcilable differences between the contending political blocs in Lesotho. In his report entitled “Talking Notes: Closing of Dialogue” Masire slammed the LCD government in particular for lack of cooperation which ultimately stalled the talks. On the basis of the lack of progress, Masire stepped down as the facilitator. Pronouncing the termination of the mission, Masire stated: “[f]ollowing many attempts to continue with my assignment in the Kingdom of Lesotho which all failed due to the Government’s reluctance to allow the holding of the MMP Experts Seminar, I found it fruitless to push for further dialogue in Lesotho and decided to end my engagement in the country” (Masire Brief to the SADC Organ Troika: 13 July 2009: 6). The Head of the Facilitation Team reflected on his mission’s views on the sources of the dispute and the dialogue process as follows:

- The MMP Electoral Model was not applied appropriately during the February 2007 elections in Lesotho.
- The 2 main political parties, the LCD and the ABC, were wrongly allowed by the IEC to form alliances with smaller parties without merging which undermined and rendered the rationale of the MMP electoral model ineffectual and distorted the allocation of seats in parliament.
- The electoral laws of the Kingdom of Lesotho should be reformed; for example “...to limit the amount of time for an election petition to be brought, and the period during which the petition must be heard and determined” (Masire’s Brief to the SADC Organ Troika: 13 July 2009: 7).
- That jurisdiction and authority of Lesotho Courts to hear and determine election petitions should be placed beyond doubt. (For example in Masire’s view the High Court of Lesotho ‘s determination on the Marema Tlou Freedom Party’s contention regarding the allocation of the PR seats was flawed and unhelpful as far as resolving the dispute was concerned).
- The Leader of the Opposition should be legally recognised and duly allowed to assume that office as there were no reasonable legal impediments involved.

Masire concluded by appealing to all political parties in Lesotho to always place the interest of the Basotho people first in order to curb the recurrence of conflict after every election in the Kingdom. He stated: “[i]n this spirit, I would urge all political parties in Lesotho to continue dialogue in terms of the the Roadmap, and to periodically interact in the best interests of the people of the Kingdom of Lesotho” (Masire Brief to the SADC Organ Troika: 13 July 2009: 9).
The collapse of the dialogue sparked fearful responses from the leaders of some opposition parties. The Leader of the BNP, former military junta General Metsing Lekhanya, posited that “Masire’s report falls right within our concerns. We are committed to making a peaceful dialogue with all concerned regarding seats reallocation. If push comes to shove, we will resort to some means which might cause instability. It won’t be good for the country if there is no stability” (Internet; 14 May 2010). The ABC leader also lashed out: “[W]e will fight for our rights. ... Masire is gone but we will sort out this problem. We will not allow other citizens of this country to bully us. We all belong here. The constitution is for all of us. It does not protect only people in power. We have rights too. The government want blood... They said that the army is on their side. Why do they need to say such things especially when they are talking to an opposition that does not have an army” (Lesotho Times: 16 July 2009). With such heated comments from the already grieved opposition, there were fears that an ugly political climate was imminent.

The LCD government was incensed by the Masire report which traced the abortive talks to its doorstep. In a strongly-worded response, the government accused Masire of having been pro-opposition throughout the mediation process. The government stated: “as the process unfolded, serious difficulties began to show and there was a perception, rightly or wrongly, that the Eminent Person’s Mission was not conducting its business in an open and transparent manner, which induced a sense of bias and partiality on the part of the mission. ...Notwithstanding this, the Government never tired or ceased to cooperate with and assist the Mission. But the dynamics of the process took a turn for a complete deadlock: and certainly, in our view, this cannot, in all fairness, be put solely at the doorstep of the Government and the ruling party as being responsible for lack of progress” (Lesotho Government response to Masire’s Report: 2009: 2). The government justified its position on the dialogue as premised on respecting the judgement of the Lesotho courts of law and institutions of democracy such as the IEC. The government also pledged support for the continuation of the dialogue between the political parties and the government by the CCL. It stated: “[O]n the way forward, I can happily report that the CCL has picked up the baton of dialogue which fell from Sir Ketumile Masire’s hand. They are currently supervising dialogue by Lesotho’s political parties and promoting a culture of peaceful resolution of conflicts without sacrificing basic principles of good governance and respect for the rule of law in the process” (Lesotho Government Response to Masire Report: 2009: 11).

The failure of the SADC-sponsored dialogue to resolve the post-2007 election disputes in Lesotho are indicative of the failure of the SADC preventive diplomacy in the country. It is very doubtful if the CCL will come up with a credible and lasting solution to the crisis besieging the Lesotho political arena. This means that the root sources of the conflict in Lesotho remain intact and conflict may be sparked by any dissatisfactory eventuality. In Southall’s (1999: 2) assessment, the “prevailing indications are that the conditions for maximising democratic possibilities in Lesotho are not yet in place... What is needed is not just more time...but a more concerted peacebuilding effort designed to establish a reasonable degree of consensus between the conflicting political parties.” This is because “[t]he
persistent questioning of the legitimacy of the government fuels hatred and rivalry, and prevents Lesotho from moving forward” (Maundeni 2010: 135). The 2007 post-election violence which was hinged on protesting the allocation of PR seats under the MMP electoral system which replaced the often faulted FPTP system prompted Maundeni (2010: 136) to pose this rhetorical question: “[c]an any electoral system defuse political tensions in Lesotho...?”

Lessons from the DRC and Lesotho interventions may have been very central in determining the approach to the unfolding crisis in Zimbabwe where the SADC maintained a seemingly and arguably unified position against coercive measures and adherence to constructive engagement through "quiet diplomacy". The structural defects in the Lesotho political arena remain intact and the cumulative political grievances from the 2007 elections may erupt after the 2012 elections. Friction is reportedly building up in the preparations for the elections and the SADC should brace itself for another preventive diplomacy mission. Lesotho should provide invaluable lessons for the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism on the basis that it is the only nation in the region where the regional organisation has employed both coercive and non-coercive strategies and a combination of both during the 1994, 1998 and 2007 intervention missions. Whether the SADC will make good use of the lessons provided by the Lesotho interventions in its future regional peace efforts remains to be seen.

6.3 Conclusion
The chapter discussed the sources of incessant conflict in the Kingdom of Lesotho, these being its weak and dependent economy, fragile political institutions and flawed electoral process. This has resulted in post-election disputes since the 1970s. The cyclical conflicts invited the interventions of the SADC in 1994, 1998 and 2007 with differing degrees of success and challenges. The chapter also indicated that the SADC missions revealed lack of a clear regional policy on interventions. The next chapter focuses on the methodology used in this study.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Methodology

7.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the methodology employed in the gathering and presentation of data. Methodology denotes the study of particular methods, techniques or procedures employed in the process of implementing the research design for reaching a desired end, an objective or solving a problem (Leedy 1993, Babbie and Mouton 2006). The description embraces the research design, study population and selection procedures, data collection instruments (interviews and documentary analysis) and data analysis approaches. It is vital that the group of methods selected for research be coherent, consistent, appropriate and effective, to deliver data and findings which answer the stated research questions (Henning, Van Rensberg and Smit, 2004). The chapter also considers justifications for the use of selected techniques, their strengths and limitations, and discusses ways of ensuring data quality and authenticity of the research findings, as well as ethical issues. It further briefly discusses the modes of data interpretation and analysis during fieldwork and post-fieldwork phases.

7.2 Research Design
A research design entails a plan or strategy for conducting research. It is a framework for research activities that generates evidence to answer the stated research question(s) (Yin 1984, Maykut and Morehouse 1994, Mertens 1997, Wiersma 2000, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Yin defines a research design as “an action plan for getting from ‘here’ to ‘there’ where here may be defined as the initial set of questions to be answered, and ‘there’ is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions. Between ‘here’ and ‘there’ may be found a number of major steps including the collection and analysis of relevant data” (cited in Naoum (2006: 37).

This study employs the qualitative research design of the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho. Qualitative researches design “is an umbrella term which incorporates a number of research strategies that share certain common characteristics” (Schurik 1998: 239). “It is a collection of methods and techniques which share a certain set of principles or logic” for the study of social action (Babbie and Mouton 2006: 270). Qualitative designs comprise ethnographic studies, case studies and life histories, and the common methods of data collection are in depth interviews, participant observations and use of personal documents (Manion and Cohen 1994, Cresswell 1994, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). In this study, the case study research approach is applied.

Several characteristics distinguish qualitative research from a quantitative research paradigm. First, qualitative research is conducted in the natural setting of the phenomenon under study. It focuses on the natural setting of the actors and their activities and actions hence it has also been dubbed the "naturalistic inquiry, the field research, the contextualist or holistic research strategy" (Cresswell 1994, Cohen and Manion 1994, Bryman 2001, Babbie and
Mouton 2006). In qualitative research, the “natural setting is the direct source of the data…the researcher goes into the field to interview and observe the participants in their own environment” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 4). Epistemologically, qualitative research is interpretivist. As Potter puts it, “[t]he world … is constituted in one way or the other as people talk it, write it and argue it” (1996: 98). In this study the natural setting is the SADC and its preventive diplomacy institutions and operations in relation to preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho. Lesotho as the context in which the SADC conducted its preventive diplomacy missions, is another natural setting on which the study was based. The study was conducted at the SADC headquarters in Gaborone which is the administrative operational centre of the organisation and in Lesotho as the case study in order to get the insiders’ perspective on the operations and challenges of the organisation during the interventions. Interviews were conducted in the SADC security organ (the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security) and with various Lesotho political parties, the monarchy, non-governmental organisations and other expert organisations on security issues to get their views and insights.

Secondly, qualitative research is premised on the insiders’ views and perspectives. The researcher’s focus is on the actors’ perceptions, beliefs, context, history, experiences and the way they make sense and meaning about their world (Bogdan and Taylor 1992, Creswell 1994, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Taylor and Bodgan locate the emic roots experienced in qualitative research to phenomenological research. They posit that “[t]he phenomenologist views human behaviour as a product of how they interpret their world. …In order to grasp the meanings of a person’s behaviour, the phenomenologist attempts to see things from that person’s point of view (Bogdan and Taylor 1975 cited in Babbie and Mouton 2006: 271). Similarly, in qualitative research, “meanings and interpretations are negotiated with human data sources because it is the subjects’ realities that the researcher attempts to reconstruct” (Creswell 1994: 192). Qualitative research is therefore mainly interested in deep understanding of the particular event or case under study within its own context and through the eyes of the actors (Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). In this study, the views, opinions, perceptions and experiences of the respondents form the focus of the data collection, analysis and presentation.

Thirdly, the researcher is the primary instrument in the data collection, interpretation and analysis processes (Guba and Lincoln 1985, Merriam 1988, Fraenkel and Wallen 1990, Eisner 1991, Stringer 1999, Babbie and Merriam 2006). Stringer (1999: 15) posits that “…the researcher is both the participant in the action and inquirer into the same action.” That is, the researcher as the key instrument has to be enmeshed in an in-depth investigative and exploratory inquiry into the everyday life of the setting chosen for the study, searching for the respondents’ world, perspectives and meanings through a systematic inquiry interaction (Marshall and Rossman 1989, Creswell 1994, Bryman 2001). As Psathas puts it, the qualitative researcher’s questions to the respondents are meant to discover “what they are experiencing, how they interpret their experiences and…how they structure the social world in which
they live” (in Bogdan and Biklen 1992: 32). The goal of the interaction is to obtain data which has to be interpreted and understood within the world and perspectives of the insiders. The researcher’s focus is on the process as it is experienced within the study phenomenon and the inquiry product and outcome (Merriam 1988, Fraenkel and Wallen 1990, Bogdan and Biklen 1992, Taylor and Bogdan 1998). It is this centrality of the researcher in the research process which has earned qualitative research the criticism that it is biased and less scientific, that its end product is flawed in validity, reliability, objectivity and generalisability as compared to the quantitative paradigm.

However, as indicated below, there are measures introduced in qualitative research to ensure credibility, trustworthiness, authenticity and objectivity of the research product. Among other things, qualitative research is premised on the ontological and epistemological assumptions that knowledge and reality are subjective and multidimensional as interpreted by the participants in the study. It acknowledges that the research process and product will to some extent be influenced by the researcher’s world view, perspectives, value judgements and experiences (Creswell 1994, Stringer 1999, Coffey 1999, Schofield 2000, Bryman 2001, Mehra 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Some proponents of the qualitative research design argue that the merging of data from the diverse sources of evidence and the researcher’s input enhances the fertility of research knowledge, cross-fertilisation and complementarity of ideas, multiple and informed understanding of the social world of research (Locke etal. 1987, Mehra 2002).

A cross-fertilisation of data from the SADC and Lesotho respondents; documentary studies, literature review and interpretations by various experts and the researcher is regarded as vital considering the multidisciplinary nature of conflicts, conflict prevention, management, resolution and the diversity of preventive measures which form the hub of this study.

Fourthly, qualitative research is an inductive approach. In most qualitative research, unlike quantitative research, the researcher does not have apriori established theory or hypothesis which the inquiry product has to approve or disapprove. The researcher commences with an in-depth investigation of the selected natural setting, describing events as they occur and subsequently developing and generating theory and hypothesis from the patterns, themes and issues emerging from data collection, compilation, analysis, and presentation (Cohen and Manion 1994, Creswell 1994, Rossman and Rallis 1998, Taylor and Bogdan 1998, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). In this study, numerous theories on conflict, conflict resolution (preventive diplomacy) and regional integration provided the theoretical framework and guidelines on the interpretations and presentations of the research data. The aim is not to approve or disapprove the theories but to show how the theories can complement each other in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts for lasting peace and security to be sustained.
Fifth, the qualitative study is an emergent design. The research design is flexible and continuous in nature and therefore allows the researcher to alter the research plan, adapt the research methodology, use multiple sources of evidence, and accommodate emerging issues or conditions as dictated by the research environment and process. Inter-alia, the researcher does not assume any prior knowledge on the research topic before conducting the research (Bogdan and Biklen 1992, Creswell 1994, Rubin and Rubin 1995, Taylor and Bogdan 1998, Babie and Mouton 2006). The process of data collection, compilation, comparing and contrasting, categorising, patterning, synthesising and analysing is a journey in building an emergent comprehensive picture of the phenomenon under study.

Finally, a qualitative research design inquiry product is characterised by “thick” detailed descriptions of the research environment, subjects, events and actions within the research context, research methodology and data analysis strategies. The qualitative research is interpretive and descriptive and the inquiry product is more often than not presented in the form of words rather than statistical data and numbers. It entails detailed discussions and interpretative accounts of events as opposed to the quantitatively measured variables as experienced in the quantitative paradigm (Creswell 1994, Golden-Biddle and Loke 1997, Holliday 2001, Henning et al 2004, Rossman 1998, Bryman 2001, Babie and Mouton 2006).

Thus, the qualitative design is consistent with the case study approach as employed in this study. The purpose is to get information on the SADC security institutions, strategies, prospects and challenges in conflict prevention, management and resolution through in-depth interviews with the SADC officials at the SADC Headquarters (the Secretariat and the Directorate on Politics, Defence and Security), the Lesotho political organisations, non-governmental organisations, the monarchy and experts on security issues such as academics, researchers and conflict mediators. Babie and Mouton (2006: 309) commend the qualitative research design as “appropriate to the study of attitudes and behaviours best understood within their natural setting as opposed to the somewhat artificial settings of experiments and surveys” characteristic of quantitative research.

7.3 The Case Study Approach
The case study method is essential in qualitative research. The origins of the research approach are associated with Malinowski in anthropology. Babie and Mouton (2006) outline some of the defining features of the case study approach as the emphasis on an individual unit, significance of conceptualisation around the research unit, contextual detail and in-depth description, use of multiple sources of data and analytical strategies. The case study method accommodates a variety of research techniques such as participant observation, interviews, questionnaires, and documentary studies (triangulation). A case study entails a detailed, in-depth and intensive exploration and analysis of a specific case (which could be a person, a family, community, social group, institution, organisation, a country, an event, a programme) in its natural setting and from the perspective of the insiders (social actors). Hence,

There are 3 types of case study approaches: the descriptive, the analytical and explanatory case studies (Naoum 2006). The case study approach explains theory and causality and “tries to show linkages among the objects of the study. It asks why things happen the way they do. The researcher collects facts and studies the relationship of one set of facts to another, with the hope of finding some causal relationship between them” (Naoum 2006: 46). A case is also crucial for an in-depth analysis which provides a framework for understanding issues in other similar settings or units. Cohen and Manion (1994: 102) define it as an “investigation of an individual unit to probe deeply and analyse all characteristics of the unit to establish generalisations about the wider community to which it belongs.” However, the crucial factor is not whether the findings can be generalised to a wider universe, but how well the researcher interprets and analyses data and generates theory from the findings. Case studies can be used in both theory generation and theory testing research studies (Mitchell 1983, Yin 1984, Merriam 1999, Bryman 2001). It is flexible, emergent and allows diverse interpretations, thick and comprehensive explorations of different aspects of the phenomenon under study (Cresswell 1994, Babbie and Mouton 2006, Stake 2008). The stipulated merits provide the justification for the choice of the qualitative research design in this study.

7.3.1 Merits of the Case Study Approach

Like any other approach, the case study has its pros and cons. There are several advantages associated with the case study research approach. Firstly, it allows for an intensive, holistic and thick description, analysis and understanding of the single unit of study within its context or natural setting (Cresswell 1994, Cohen and Manion 1994, Merriam 1999, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Goode and Hart point out that the case study approach is “a way of organising social data to preserve the unitary character of the social object being studied…always this means of approach includes the development of that unit…” (in Gomm, Hammersley and Foster 2000: 169).

Secondly it facilitates creation of meaning and understanding of the unit of study from both the insiders’ and the researcher’s views. Through interviews and observations the researcher experiences the world of the research unit from the emic perspective and through his or her own perspective, resulting in deep interpretation and rich research findings. It is an interpretative approach in which the researcher gains understanding of perceptions, values, actions and processes of the institution and/or situation studied (Trauth 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006, Snodgrass 2006).
Thirdly, it has been noted that case studies have a great potential for theory generation and development (Cohen and Manion 1994, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Cohen and Manion observe that in most qualitative case studies, “theory is emergent and must rise from particular situations. It should be ‘grounded’ on data generated by [the] research act…” (1994: 37). Fourthly it can be argued that the thick data emanating from the case study research can form the basis for credibility, trustworthiness, dependability, and transferability of the findings to other similar situations (Guba and Lincoln 1985, Erlandson et al. 1993, Cresswell 1994, Babbie and Mouton 2006). According to Cohen and Manion the case study data is “strong in reality. …This strength in reality is because case studies are down to earth and attention-holding…and thus provide a ‘natural’ basis for generalisation” (1994: 123).

Fifth, data and findings from case study research can be instrumental for future improvements of the case studied. As Cohen and Manion (1994: 123) put it, it can be used “for staff or individual self-development, for within-institutional feedback, for formative evaluation and in policy making” and implementation. It is for this reason that the authors refer to case studies as “a step to action” beginning in a world of action and contributing to it. Finally, case studies are “capable of offering some support to alternative interpretations.” This is because they accommodate diverse interpretations which ensure “democratisation” of knowledge and research. That is “they allow readers to judge the implications of a study for themselves” (Cohen and Manion 1994: 123).

In this study, the SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho are used as the case for an in-depth qualitative investigation of the SADC’s role as a regional organisation in conflict prevention, management and resolution. It is also used for insights into a variety of theories on conflicts, conflict resolutions and theories of regional integration. The case study approach is relevant for this study as its goal is to provide an in-depth exploration of SADC’s perceptions on regional conflicts and how they can be resolved, the operations, efficacy and challenges of its preventive diplomacy mechanisms as an intergovernmental regional organisation.

7.3.2 Limitations of the Case Study Approach
However, there are limitations associated with case study research designs. Many quantitative scholars contend that the case study research approach and its subsequent findings are less scientific and lack validity, reliability, generalisability, representativeness and replicability (Bryman 2001, Babbie and Morton 2006). Case study results have also been criticised as lacking valid basis for objective, accurate and authentic generalisations and transferability to other settings, therefore devoid of external validity. The difficulties in generalisations of the findings arise from the fact that different organisations may be shaped and influenced by different contextual socio-economic and political forces. For example, the challenges faced by SADC as a regional organisation may differ from those faced by ASEAN because they exist in different contexts. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that generalisability of qualitative research findings can be attained as the design provides thick and descriptive explanations on the
research domain. Information from other similar settings can also be obtained through documentary studies on different organisations.

Rejecting the criticism, qualitative researchers argue that the focus in the case study is not the transferability or the ability to generalise the findings, but deep understanding of the meanings and realities of the phenomenon under study in its natural context. As Cresswell aptly puts it: “the intent of qualitative research is not to generalise findings, but to form a unique interpretation of events” (1994: 158-159). In the view of qualitative researchers, research findings can never be a final and accurate representation of what transpires in the research domain at different times. There will always be a multiplicity of voices, insights, experiences and perspectives as the world is not static but dynamic (Guba and Lincoln 1985, Denzin 1994). Therefore what counts as data and how it is used as evidence will in each case differ radically depending on who conducts the research, his or her epistemological orientations and the general prevailing socio-economic and political climate within which the research is conducted (Scholstak and Scholstak 2008: 25). Considerable effort was made by the researcher in this study to follow the guiding principles and frameworks for qualitative case study research designs in the collection and analysis of data.

7.4 Study Population and Selection Procedure

A "sample" refers to the population from which evidence and data for the study is obtained, interpreted, analysed and the findings presented. Bryman (2001: 495-496) outlines 3 essential questions to guide researchers in the sampling process. The guidelines are as follows:

• Who do you need to study in order to investigate your research questions?
• How easily can you gain access to a sampling frame?
• What kind of sampling strategy will you employ (for instance probability sampling, theoretical sampling, convenience sampling)?

The purposive/purposeful selection procedure is employed in this qualitative research study. This is whereby “a selection of those to be surveyed is made according to a known characteristic (such as being a politician or union leader)” (May 1999: 88). The argument for the selection method is that the researcher identifies those who are “fit for the purpose” (May 1999); that is, those who are in a position to provide informative data and answers to the research questions and problem, due to their professional training or occupational advantage and experience (Patton 1990).

According to Merriam (1998) the purposive non-probability sampling procedure is logical as long as the researcher needs the data to solve qualitative problems such as discovering what occurs, the implications and relationships of the occurrences rather than to answer questions such as how much or how many. This is because “qualitative research seeks to maximise the range of specific information that can be obtained from and about that context, by
purposely selecting locations and informants that differ from one another. Therefore sampling in the interpretive paradigm is often purposeful and directed at certain inclusive criteria rather than random” (Babbie and Mouton 2006: 177 and 288). The merit of purposeful sampling is that it provides expert answers to what one wants to discover, understand and gain insight into. It also accords the researcher the opportunity to select the respondents on the basis of his/her knowledge of the population, its elements, the aims and rationale of the study and the researcher’s judgement of the purpose of the study (Babbie and Mouton 2006).

For this study, therefore, the research population was selected from the SADC Headquarters in Gaborone (Botswana). Representatives from relevant units such as the Secretariat, the SADC Directorate on Politics, Defence, and Security Affairs, Conflict Resolution Unit and professionals, and experts on security, academics, conflict mediators and representatives from non-governmental organisations. The Directorate on Politics, Defence and Security is targeted since it directly handles security matters in the SADC and is expected to provide an insider's expert view. Respondents were also selected from the different Lesotho political organisations, the monarchy and non-governmental organisations as they, in their different capacities played a role during the conflict and peace-building efforts during the 1994, 1998 and 2007 SADC interventions in Lesotho. One former President of Botswana was also interviewed as he was involved as one of the Troika member during the diplomatic preventive mission of 1994 and as the SADC mandated facilitator of dialogue between the Lesotho political players after the 2007 elections. Representatives from the Lesotho Council of Churches (LCC) and the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (LCNGO) which have been involved in peace mediation during the SADC interventions were interviewed to give the views of civil society on the issue. The purpose is to get views and insights from different sources for an informed interpretation of the data. As Babbie and Mouton (2006) advise: “the best way to elicit the various and divergent constructions of reality that exist within the context of a study is to collect information about …events and relationships from different points of view. This means asking different questions, seeking different sources and using different methods.” A total number of 24 respondents were interviewed.

To gain access to the research and archival sites, the researcher had to obtain the approval of the “gate keepers” (relevant authorities) and maintain a productive relationship with the respondents. As Schotstak and Schostak put it, “the negotiating process involves inscribing the reasons for being with people and [at] places relevant to the research into the agendas that prevail in the given social circumstances.” In other words “[h]ow does the reason for the researcher to be around make sense to those encountered?” (2008: 237). Letters requesting permission to conduct studies through interviews were posted and/or submitted by the researcher to the selected institutions and individual respondents. The letters explained how the studies were to be conducted, that is, the data collection instruments, the proposed respondents, the time frame and how the data would be used and shared with the respective institutions and respondents. This is in line with Miles and Huberman's (1984) parameters for conducting qualitative research.
studies. Specifically, the researcher has to establish the setting (where the research will take place), the actors (who will be observed or interviewed), the events (what the actors will be observed doing or interviewed about) and the process (the evolving nature of events undertaken by actors within the setting) (in Cresswell 1994: 149). This provided the framework for conducting the study. However, as is the norm in every study, the researcher did not get responses from some of the intended respondents’ institutions such as the Ministries of Defence in Botswana and South Africa, the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

7.5 Data Collection Instruments
Data collection instruments are pivotal in any research since they determine how and where the data is to be obtained, the trustworthiness and authenticity of the data to be collected and the findings of the study. Therefore, as Wiersma (2000: 3) asserts, “the process of data collection requires proper organisation and control so that the data will enable valid decisions to be made about the research problem at hand.”

The study employed in-depth interviews and document analysis for data collection. It was decided to use these two instruments as they would complement each other by providing insights and answers to the research problem from different angles. In other words, it was presumed that the study would benefit from the process of triangulation which entails the use of 2 or more methods of data collection procedures within a single study (Leedy 1993, Cohen and Manion 1994, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Triangulation has numerous merits in research. Leedy (1993, 143) opines that it “enables one to use several frames of reference or perspectives in the analysis of the same set of data. Data triangulation attempts to gather observations through the use of a variety of sampling strategies to ensure that a theory is tested in more than one way…” This study benefited from triangulating data from the respondents and documentary analysis and diverse literature on regional SADC, its prospects, challenges and the efficacy of its preventive diplomacy interventions in the Kingdom of Lesotho as the case study.

7.5.1 Interviews
One of the methods of data generation in this study was the interview research instrument. An interview (face-to-face or interactive) as a research technique is a conversation between the interviewer and the interviewee for the purpose of eliciting information from the respondents. It is an interpersonal role situation in which the interviewer asks respondents questions designed to elicit answers pertinent to the research problem (Kvale 1996, Naoum 2006). The interview is focused on the respondents’ experiences, views and opinions regarding the institution or situation under study. It thus constitutes an “ideal speech situation characterised by a process free from domination where the parties involved in construction of meaning exchange arguments without coercion” (Stringer 1999: 36).
A semi-structured interview was employed because of its adaptability and flexibility. The flexibility in the semi-structured interview guide allows the researcher to formulate other questions on the basis of information emerging from the responses of the interviewees. Qualitative interviews give the interviewer the opportunity to sift data from the respondents’ attitudes, feelings, interests, concerns, gestures, facial expressions and tone (Cresswell 1994, Rubin and Rubin 1995, Kvale 1996, Bogdan and Bikini 1998, Krathwohl 1998, Gay and Airasian 2000, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006, Naoum 2006). Such invaluable data cannot be obtained through other research methods such as the quantitative questionnaire surveys. The other advantage as indicated in the definition is that it can be administered in person, therefore the researcher is an active participant, has control over the line of questioning, the response rate is relatively high and the researcher is fully assured that the respondents are the ones for which the interviews were intended.

However, the interview research instrument has its challenges and shortcomings such as the presence of the interviewer and the manner in which he or she asks the questions influencing the interviewee. Babbie and Mouton (2006: 289) note: “all too often, the way we ask questions subtly biases the answers we get.” Put differently, “the researcher’s assumptions and values shape the inquiry and become part of the argument…there can be no disinterested research…the researcher is both a participant in the action and inquirer into that same action” (Stringer 1999: 15). In view of this, Linklater (2001: 145) asserts that “[s]ocial inquiry is never objective and value –free but supports, however indirectly, particular conceptions of society which favour identifiable sectional interests.” The interview instrument can be obtrusive and disruptive to the respondents’ daily schedule, performance and production targets. Some respondents may be too busy for interview sessions, thereby affecting the progress of the research process. In some instances, the respondents may be biased and selective with the information they give to the researcher in accordance with the rules and regulations of the organisation. In this case, the researcher can be denied access to vital information which could ensure fertile research findings. In this study, the researcher anticipated difficulties in extracting some of the sensitive information pertaining to the internal politics of the SADC organisation. Interviews with different political parties in Lesotho elicited partisan positions regarding the SADC interventions in Lesotho. The researcher had to contend with the challenges of guiding some of the respondents to focus on the questions for more focused discussions without stifling the perspectives and insights which they wanted to advance.

A detailed interview schedule (guide) comprising open-ended semi-structured questions on the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho, its efficacy and challenges (of conflict prevention, management and resolution and peace-building) was drawn. Open-ended questions are regarded as highly relevant in this qualitative study as an instrument to extract more information from the respondents. Each interview session was expected to last for 45 minutes to an hour depending on circumstances emerging from each particular session and setting. With the
permission of the respondents, the interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed by the researcher for appropriate data coding, categorisation and analysis.

The researcher also took extensive field notes during the interview sessions on respondents' answers and other emerging issues including his observations and interpretations of the respondents' gestures and expressions during the interview sessions. From these notes, the researcher later reconstructed the dialogue and accounts of particular events, speculations, impressions, ideas and problems as emerging during the interview sessions. It is important to record as much as possible from the interviews. The field notes and data from the audio tapes complemented each other for thick and credible data for the research findings. Continuous reference to the field notes and the transcribed data ensured the development of the study as an emergent design which is one of the essential features of the qualitative research approach (Guba and Lincoln 1989, Bryman 2001, Patton 2002, Babbie and Mouton 2006).

7.5.2 Document Studies

The term "documents" embraces a heterogeneous set of sources such as personal documents (letters, diaries, autobiographies, photographs), official documents from the state, organisations and other private sources (policy documents, annual reports, communiqués, memos, minutes of meetings, newspapers, magazines, journals) (Cohen and Manion 1994, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton, 2006). Documentary studies are an invaluable source of data in research as they provide vital information in all the stages of research from the formulation of the topic, research questions, literature review, field work, analysis and presentation of the research findings. It is the duty of the researcher to sample the relevant documents during the course of the research proceedings. Scott (1990: 6) provides the criteria for assessing the quality and relevance of documents by researchers in relation to the topic under consideration. The guidelines comprise 4 aspects as follows:

- Authenticity - is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin?
- Credibility - is the evidence free from error and distortion?
- Representativeness - is the evidence typical of its kind, or if a-typical, is its extent known?
- Meaning - is the evidence clear and comprehensive?

It is the responsibility of the researcher to deeply interrogate the different sources to screen and identify those relevant to his or her research topic, and to validate the authenticity and accuracy of the documents. This is because no document "must...be taken at its face value when used as a research source; it is also necessary to have considerable additional knowledge of the social context to probe beneath the surface" (Scott 1990: 195). Documents cannot always be regarded "as providing objective accounts of a state of affairs. [As] they have to be interrogated and examined in the context of other sources of data" (Bryman 2001: 377). The different stances, dimensions, views and perspectives reflected by different documents can be used as "a platform for developing insights into the
processes and factors that lie behind the divergence” (Bryman 2001: 377), and as pointers to other sources of information. Documentary sources are classified as primary or secondary materials. Primary sources are “those which came into existence in the period under research” while secondary sources are “interpretations of events of that period based on primary sources” (Bell 1999: 108). Both sources were vital and complementary in the provision of the required data in this study.

Relevant documentation on SADC and its preventive diplomacy mechanism’s activities in the Lesotho missions were obtained and analysed to augment data from the reviewed literature and interviews. Documentation comprised information on the SADC summit meetings and conferences, policy documents, communiqués on the activities of the organisation, and other scholarly research on regional integration and security from different setups. Information was also obtained from journal contributions from researchers and websites on research institutions on conflict prevention, management and resolution. For instance, policy and other operational documents on SADC were accessed through its website: www.sadc.int. An in-depth study of the related documentation helped delineate the study problem and provide topics and sub-topics to be covered in the investigation and highlights for the interview questions.

The merits of document studies are that most are a primary source of information and enable the researcher to obtain the data in the language of the respondents. Compared to other data collection instruments such as the interview, it is less obtrusive. Moreover, “the nature of the document is not affected by the fact that you are using it for the enquiry” (Robson 1993b: 272). Robson (1993b) further observes that documentary sources possess several advantages: “data is permanent, can be re-analysed, and allows reliability checks and replication” (paraphrased in Ketlholiwe 2007: 104). The sources may be “used by the researcher for some purpose other than that for which they were originally intended” (Bell 1999: 109-110). For example, in this study the researcher used some of the information on the SADC policy documents to answer the research questions on the organisation’s preventive interventions in Lesotho.

Demerits of document studies can be that some information may be protected and unavailable for public access and consumption and thus difficult for the researcher to obtain (Cresswell 1994, Bryman 2001). Such a problem could be expected with some information regarded by the inter-governmental organisation (SADC) as highly sensitive and classified especially on security matters. The information in documents could also be flawed, such as documents which paint only a positive image of the organisation and its activities, thus denying the researcher comprehensive evidence from which to embark on objective analysis and presentation of the findings.
The triangulation of data collection instruments is regarded as one of the best ways of overcoming the deficiencies that may emanate from one investigator or method, neutralise personal bias, ensure complementarity of data and ultimately the validity, credibility, trustworthiness, confirmability, dependability, generalisability and transferability of the research findings in the interpretive research study (Lincon and Guba 1985, Denzin 1989, Leedy 1993, Cresswell 1994, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). In this study, triangulation was effected through the use of in-depth interviews, purposeful selection of respondents from the SADC and other expert institutions, representatives of the Lesotho political organisations, the monarchy, non-governmental organisations and individual respondents such as the former President of Botswana, Sir Ksetumile Masiire, who facilitated peace efforts in Lesotho in 1994 and 2007. This together with extensive literature reviews and documentation analysis and the diverse qualitative data analysis modes ensured a detailed description and presentation of the research findings.

7.6 Validation of Research Instruments

Cresswell argues that qualitative researchers “have no single stance or consensus on addressing the traditional topics of validity and reliability” (1994: 157). Their argument is that the main intent of the qualitative research is not to quantify and generalise the findings but to build meanings based on interpretations of what is prevailing within the research context. It is an investigative and interpretive process through which the researcher constructs an understanding and meanings from the study phenomenon by contrasting, comparing and classifying the emerging issues and themes of the study object. Therefore, instead of relying on the traditional validity and reliability measures, the qualitative researcher seeks trustworthiness, authenticity, credibility and believability based on the coherence of interpretations, analysis and presentations through the process of verification (Guba and Lincoln 1985, Eisner 1991, Erlandson et al. 1993). “If one assumes there are multiple realities (as is the case with qualitative studies) the notion of reliability is no longer as relevant” (Krefting in Poggenpoel 1988: 350) as the “…knowledge is no longer the mere reflection of an active objective reality, but the construction of social reality…” (Kvale 2002: 309).

Babbie and Mouton acknowledge the difficulties encountered by researchers in their bid to ensure validity and reliability of the research findings. They posit that “[a]lthough we should strive with everything in our power to do truly valid, reliable and objective studies, the reality is that we are never able to attain this complexity. Rather it remains a goal, something to be striven towards although never fully obtained” (2006: 276). Achieving reliability, validity and objectivity is more difficult in qualitative research as the researcher is largely instrumental in the entire research process, making it impossible to eradicate his or her biases in the inquiry product.

Authenticity and reliability of the research product were ascertained by piloting the interview questions with the Bachelor of Education 4th-year student teachers at the University of Botswana. The point of the exercise was to check the consistency and accuracy of the data collection instruments items for appropriate adjustments. The
accuracy and reliability of the data was also established through triangulation of data collection instruments. Data for the research was solicited through in-depth interactive interviews from purposively sampled respondents, extensive literature survey and study of relevant documentation. Gall et al. (1996), Bogdan et al. (1998), Tsayang (1995) point out that in case study research, it is vital to authenticate findings through corroborative evidence drawn from multiple data collection instruments and sources.

This study employed interviews and document studies to generate data. The advantage of triangulation is that the methods complement each other. Shortcomings and deficiencies inherent in each method and source are neutralised when they are used in conjunction with others (Leedy 1993, Cresswell 1994, Babbie and Mouton 2006). The data was interpreted and presented in detail synchronising the research findings, data interpretation and theoretical positions within the study area in order to present a holistic and accurate picture of the SADC preventive diplomacy security mechanism. According to Babbie and Mouton (2006) triangulation is generally considered to be one of the best ways of enhancing authenticity and trustworthiness in qualitative research.

7.7 Ethical Considerations

Ethical measures are very important in ensuring that the researcher complies with the ethical standards, codes and procedures for conducting credible research and obtaining accurate, objective, trustworthy, valid and reliable research findings. The norms for conducting research include adhering to the principles of voluntary participation and informed consent by the respondents, protection of the privacy, rights and safety of the research subjects, guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality of respondents and the information they provide, and accountability and professionalism in the presentation of the findings (Leedy 1993, Cresswell 1994, Bryman 2001, Bak 2005, Denzin 2005, Christian 2005, Babbie and Mouton 2006). Ethical considerations revolve around "how threats to the security of the researcher and the researched are to be ensured during the research process? What is at stake for each individual involved? How does the reason for the researcher to be around make sense to those encountered? (Sholstak and Scholstak 2008: 238 and 237 respectively). "How should we treat the people on whom we conduct research? Are there activities in which we should or should not engage in our relations with them? (Bryman 2001: 476). The general rule and expectation is that "ethically, people should not be exploited, their dignity diminished, their safety compromised" (Schostak and Schostak 2008: 238) or deceived to perform reprehensible acts as this would be a transgression of the research code of conduct.

Therefore, it is the responsibility of the researcher during all stages of the research process to ensure that the dignity of the participants is safeguarded. As De Vos et al (1998: 23) correctly observes, "[t]he final responsibility for ethical conduct rests squarely with the researcher concerned." This suggests that any research study should be "built on trust between the researcher and the participants, and the researchers have a responsibility to behave in a
trustworthy manner, just as they expect participants to behave in the same manner” (Gray, Mills and Airasian, 2006: 19).

The researcher adhered as much as possible to the agreed norms and standards (as stipulated in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Ethics Code of Conduct) by explaining the purpose of the study to the participants, the methods to be used in data collection and how the findings will be disseminated. Participants were briefed about the purpose of the study and their rights as participants in the research before they consented. The aim of such briefings was to ensure informed consent, responsibility and accountability by participants regarding the responses they provide during the interviews. This information was clearly stated in the letters of request for permission to conduct the research in the selected institutions and individual respondents. The research respondents were also informed of the commitment by the researcher to adhere to the ethical principles of confidentiality, in that no names would be reflected in the final research presentation unless with the consent of the respondent.

7.8 Data Analysis and Presentation

Data analysis entails the critical and reflective descriptions, explanations, interpretations, synthesis, evaluation, inferences and verifications of data collected for a comprehensive and coherent presentation of the research findings. The information gathered is analysed, corroborated, compared and contrasted with data from available literature, theoretical paradigms and the researcher’s interpretations, insights and views. According to Tesch (1990), the process of data analysis is multifaceted. There is no single "right way." Data analysis also involves segmenting the data, generating and developing categories, themes and patterns and matching them for a coherent and comprehensive presentation. Lofland (1971), Lofland and Lofland (1995: 164) warn researchers against what they refer to respectively as “analytic interruptus” (in Bryman 2001: 388) and "descriptive excess,” which would stifle the analytic interpretations and arguments in the presentation of the findings as a result of the excessive data collected.

The researcher synthesised and analysed information from the research inquiry, literature review and theoretical surveys through the processes of data reduction, de-contextualisation and re-contextualisation of the interpretation schema to form the basis for the emerging research story. The processes of data coding, categorisation, interpretation, pattern-matching, explanation-building and generalisation were based on the evidence provided by the respondents, literature reviews and theoretical frameworks. According to Bryman (2001: 398) “coding is the starting point for most forms of qualitative data analysis.” The researcher classified data into component parts and labelling it according to themes, concepts, theoretical positions and research questions to be addressed in the study. As Charmaz (1983: 186) puts it, “codes…serve as shorthand devices to label, separate, compile and organise data.” Data analysis and processesing were simultaneously carried out during data collection in line with requirements of the qualitative research paradigm On-going data analysis and processing is also in line with the qualitative studies
reliance on inductive grounded theory from data. Thus the approach is “iterative or recursive... [in] that data collection and analysis proceed in tandem repeatedly referring back to each other” (Bryman 2001: 390).

The interpretation and analysis of responses from the different participants resulted in detailed descriptions of the findings. As Tesch notes, “[w]hile much work in the analysis process consists of ‘taking apart’ (for instance, into smaller pieces), the final goal is the emergence of a larger consolidated picture” (1990: 97). The qualitative research paradigm is an interpretive approach as its results have often been in the form of thick, descriptive narratives rather than quantified scientific reports common in quantitative studies (Miles and Huberman 1984, Cresswell 1994, Mason 1994, Cohen and Manion 1994, Rossman and Rallis 1998, Holliday 2001, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). This approach describes the data holistically, taking into account the complexity of social systems rather than concentrating on discrete variables as in quantitative research. In the process of data analysis and presentation, the researcher strove to balance subjective and objective interpretations, engagement and disengagement for credible and objective research findings. That is, the researcher was conscious of the effects of his beliefs, feelings and world view on the research process, data interpretation and presentation. Care was taken to present the findings in an objective manner.

The researcher made a concerted effort to code, categorise, interpret and analyse the research data on the basis of identified and emerging themes from the findings. Some relevant features fitting within the context of the study were adopted and adapted while some features which were deemed unfitting were left out. In analysing data, the researcher coded the core themes such as motivations and justifications for the interventions, the legitimacy of the missions, challenges faced during the preventive diplomacy missions, successes of the missions and the lessons drawn from the SADC interventions in the Kingdom of Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007. The central themes and categories were deduced from the main research questions, the literature review and the subsequent responses from the interviews. To enhance the authenticity and credibility of the research findings, the researcher quoted the participants’ interviews verbatim.

7.9 Conclusion
This chapter dealt with research design, respondents' selection procedures, interview and document analysis data collection instruments and the merits and demerits of each. The chapter also outlined the ethical aspects considered in the study and how data was validated during the analysis and presentation of the findings. It also briefly described how the data would be analysed and presented. The next chapter focuses on discussions of the research findings.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Discussions and Presentation of Findings

8.1 Introduction
Data was analysed and presented through the descriptive and explanatory qualitative approaches. Data from the interviews and document studies were coded and classified into themes according to the research questions and objectives and emerging themes. The categories include the SADC security organ’s preventive diplomacy mechanism, conflict prevention, management and prevention strategies, and the views of respondents from the SADC, Lesotho political organisations, the monarchy, Lesotho non-governmental organisations, Lesotho dialogue facilitator, academics and military officers some of whom participated in SADC interventions in Lesotho. Data from the research inquiry was also matched, categorised, compared and contrasted for a holistic picture, full and systematic analysis and understanding of the research unit - the SADC - and its preventive missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in Lesotho. Inductive reasoning strategies were employed in the matching, patterning, and categorisation of data and evidence to facilitate a systematic interpretation of data from the interviews, literature review and document studies (Poggenpoel 1998, Strauss 1998, Bryman 2001, Mason 1994, Snodgrass 2005). The quantitative approach was only used to reflect the number of respondents. Confidentiality and anonymity of data and responses was maintained in accordance with the ethical norms, codes and standards of research during data interpretations and presentations.

This chapter presents an analysis of data from interviews on SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in the Kingdom of Lesotho. It is an analysis of the participants' understanding, experiences, views and reflections on the SADC preventive diplomacy interventions in Lesotho. Data was obtained through detailed interviews with the SADC officials, representatives of different political parties in Lesotho, retired soldiers (from Botswana) who participated in the 1998 mission, representatives of non-governmental organisations in Lesotho, academics from the Political Science Departments from the National University of Lesotho (NUL) and University of Botswana, (UB) and the facilitator during the 1994 and 2007 SADC missions in Lesotho who is an ex-President of Botswana. The thrust of the analysis is to determine, examine and reflect on the efficacy of the SADC preventive diplomacy in Lesotho based on the reasons (motivations), justifications, challenges success, lessons learnt and remedial measures to the identified shortfalls in its conflict prevention, management and resolution architecture.

The findings of this empirical study are analysed with the view to search for patterns, relationships, differences, inconsistencies and any relevant information which provides answers to the overarching research questions which guided the study. The findings are also discussed in relation to the literature review and theoretical framework which provided the scope for the study. As a qualitative study, the presentation employs detailed excerpts from the
interview responses to reflect the views of the respondents and buttress or dispute their positions, insights and conclusions.

8.2 Justifications and motives for the interventions
As indicated in Chapter 6, SADC’s intervention was to defuse post-1994, 1998 and 2007 elections disputes. In 1994, the SADC employed non-coercive preventive diplomacy led by the Troika of Masire (Botswana), Mandela (South Africa) and Mugabe (Zimbabwe); while in 2007 the SADC mediation was led by Masire in respect of the SADC overtures to eminent persons’ roles in regional peace initiatives. The 1998 intervention was a military mission launched by South Africa and Botswana, arguably on behalf of the SADC. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they felt the missions were justified and/or necessary. As expected, a wide range of responses were received from the different participants in line with the positions of their different institutions, organisations, political inclinations and affiliations.

8.2.1 Interventions; A response to Threats to Democracy
Several reasons were advanced by participants who viewed the interventions as justified, legal and procedural. Those who felt that all the interventions were necessary and justified were from the SADC OPDS Unit, the party which was in government when the respective missions were launched, and some of the respondents were from opposition parties. Those who argued that the interventions were justified, reasoned that SADC is a regional organisation, legally tasked and mandated to assist a member state when there are threats to democracy and security which could destabilise regional peace and stability. The proponents argued that the SADC is mandated to restore order and peace in its member states and nip in the bud any unconstitutional means of gaining power or threats to democratically elected governments. According to Southall (2001:162) during the 1998 mission, the Troika of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana (the parties mandated as the guarantors of the Lesotho democracy in 1994), “were particularly alarmed by the junior officers’ rebellion and convinced that it was a precursor to a military intervention...All the three governments had good reasons for wanting explicit commitment by SADC states to the norms of civil rule and democracy; they were not prepared to stand back and see that commitment breached by the weakest member state within the regional organisation.” Given this context therefore, the SADC was operating within its mandate as stipulated in its founding treaty, the OPDS and MDP protocols, which govern the organisation’s intervention and security operations and the assessment by the Troika guarantors. They stated that in all the interventions, the governments of the day in the Kingdom were faced with threats of coups and destabilisations from the opposition protesting the outcomes of the 1993, 1998 and 2007 elections. Most of them felt that Lesotho is a member of the SADC and had ratified the SADC treaties and protocols, and that; therefore, nothing was amiss with the SADC assisting its member. One of the respondents from the OPDS Unit stated: “...It is relevant and acceptable in our treaty..., and protocols that the member states can support each member in the event that a member state
feels threatened and that exactly what we did” (Interview with R 2; 28 June 2010). In the same vein, the opposition Marematlou Freedom Party interviewee also noted that the interventions were justified because when SADC “… was build up and given the arms which they could use..., in intervening, we were all involved; all countries of SADC were involved; nothing was... forced by any one group of SADC members. So there was justification in the interventions…” (Interview with R 15, 07 July 2011) Respondent 2 echoed this position when he said that the protocol which established the SADC security mechanism in 1996 was acceded and ratified by all SADC member states. He noted: “… that all of the member states accepted to enter into this protocol clearly saved as a stepping stone to have an assistance to be provided to other member states” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010).

A former President of Botswana who was involved in the 1994 and 2007 SADC preventive missions in Lesotho argued that all the interventions in their different forms were justified because if swift action was not taken, the discord was bound to spread to other member states in the region. As he puts it: “yes, yes indeed both of them were justified because what goes wrong with the other member state of SADC concern all other members of SADC, not only politically and emotionally but even economically. It does affect and there is also loss of life that we should all try to prevent” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). The position that SADC member states should assist when there are civil commotions in another member, is in agreement with the SADC protocols and treaty. For example, Article 11 of the Protocol and structure of the Organ clearly stipulates that the SADC is duty bound to intervene in both inter- and intra-state conflicts. Articles 11(b) (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) on the jurisdiction of the OPDS state that the SADC will intervene in significant intra-state conflicts as manifested by large scale violence between sections of the population and/or between the state and its people, amounting to genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights, in instances of military coups against a legitimately elected government and any large threats to regional peace and stability. SADC used these clauses to justify its interventions in the DRC and Lesotho. The above scenarios prevailed in the case of Lesotho following protests spearheaded by the opposition against the outcomes of the 1993, 1998 and 2007 elections. The protests against the 1993 and 1998 elections which were won by the BCP and LCD respectively were followed by coups led by the military and the monarchy and there was general threat to internal and regional peace which moved the regional bloc to intervene and restore normalcy. The post-2007 election Masire-led dialogue facilitation was also geared towards deterring a deterioration of Lesotho into political chaos reminiscent of the 1994 and 1998 cases. In view of the above it can logically be argued that the interventions were necessary and justified.

8.2.2 SADC as Guarantor of Lesotho Democracy

It emerged from most of the interview responses that what justified the SADC interventions in Lesotho, (mainly the 1998 and 2007 missions) was the fact that after the 1994 SADC Troika mission, the SADC was mandated to be the guarantor of the Lesotho democracy, peace and stability. In the words of Respondent 15: “after 1994, SADC was
charged with looking after the affairs of Lesotho literally. The Troika in particular was to keep an eye on what was happening in Lesotho” (Interview with R 15, 07 July 2011). In line with this mandate, the SADC was put on guard and committed to ensuring that democracy was maintained and sustained in Lesotho. Any indications to the contrary would invite SADC’s intervention. When the democratically elected government faced the post-1998 and 2007 election violence and threats of coups, SADC undertook its mandate as accorded by the regional organisation. Confirming this commitment regarding the 1998 military intervention, Respondent 10 posited: “[t]hat is why South Africa and Botswana went in because we should have been three there, we should have been Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe. But we thought we would alert the Basotho and create a lot of commotion if the army came all the way from Bulawayo and Harare....” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). According to one former Commander of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), the military intervention was a continuation of diplomatic initiatives by the Presidents of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe that were duly declared by SADC as guarantors of the Lesotho peace and democracy (Interview with R 12, 14 June 2011). In keeping with this mandate, “...SADC... promised to remain seized with the events and affairs of Lesotho....So Lesotho formally became a mountain that was constantly under the guidance of SADC” (Interview with Respondent 16, 07 July 2011) To this end, since 1994, the SADC has been involved in monitoring the Lesotho political situations particularly the conduct of its national elections to date. Hence, when the 2007 elections sparked opposition protests, SADC swiftly delegated Sir Ketumile Masire to defuse the situation through dialogue.

8.2.3 Interventions to Restore Law and Order

Most respondents argued that the levels of violence and insecurity which followed national elections in Lesotho were major reasons why SADC interventions should be credited as valid and justified because they restored law and order in the country and also protected democracy and a democratically elected government. A representative of the party which was in government during the intervention felt that all the SADC missions were justified and necessary to restore democracy, law and order. An interviewee from the ruling LCD party indicated that both the 1993 and 1998 elections which saw landslide victory by the BCP and the LCD respectively, were credible, fair and free and they ushered in democratically elected governments. In his view, the problem was that the military and the monarchy were hostile to the BCP and did not want to accept the will of the people and the advent of the democratic dispensation which was emerging in Lesotho following the 1993 and 1998 elections. The 1994 and 1998 post-election coups led by the monarchy in collaboration with the military and the opposition were a travesty to democracy in Lesotho and had to be thwarted by the regional organisation. He stated that they “… were very happy in the manner in which SADC handled it (the intervention). There was not any other way. That was the government elected by the people. So other people were not accepting the outcome of the elections” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). A participant from the the opposition ABC concurred with the views of Respondent 6 that somebody had to come in to defend democracy and the democratically elected governments (1994 and 1998). He hailed the interventions as “good in
terms of restoring the democratically elected government(s) and also encouraging debate to see where the problem is" (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). Another respondent from the opposition LPC also noted that the justification of the SADC interventions emanated from the fact that the 1993 and 1998 general elections were legal and there was nothing unprocedural with the general elections. In light of this, the elections resulted in democratically elected governments which had to be respected and defended which the SADC accordingly did in 1994 and 1998. He further highlighted that what was flawed was the FPTP electoral model which promotes the winner-takes-all route. If any issue had to be raised, it should have been that of reforming the electoral model, not questioning the outcomes of the elections and legitimacy of the government. In light of this he posited: “[s]o in my view the intervention was legitimate but there were also legitimate concerns by the opposition. That is why I support the present electoral model—the Mixed Member Proportion (MMP) model (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010)

8.2.4 Interventions to thwart Violence

Similarly, some of the respondents observed that the interventions were justified considering the intensity of violence which accompanied the post 1993, 1998 and 2007 general elections in the Kingdom. The palace coups of 1994 and 1998 were characterised by loss of lives (for example the killing of the Deputy Prime Minister), destruction of property, looting and total collapse of the government, all of which bred unbridled lawlessness that in turn rendered the country ungovernable. In his letter requesting assistance during the 1998 dispute the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Phakalitha Mosisili, noted that “[s]ince returning from the SADC meeting in Mauritius, I have come back to a city and a government held at ransom by the demonstrators of the BCP, BNP and the MFP with their leaders urging them on” (cited in Molapo, 1999: 1). The post-2007 elections were also followed by opposition riots which culminated in the bombing of the residences of the government officials and the attempted assassination of the Prime Minister, Phakalitha Mosisili. What aggravated the chaos and insecurity especially in the cases of 1994 and 1998 was the involvement of the military which, for some of the respondents, had reneged on its national duty of maintaining peace, security and order in the country. According to the Prime Minister: “[t]he most serious tragedy is that the police, and in particular the army, are best spectators” (cited in Molapo, 1999: 1). The security forces had been a partisan entity since the era of the Basotho National Party under Leabua Jonathan and later after 1986 when it launched a coup and ruled until 1993 when democracy was restored. In view of this, the Lesotho Defence Force was tempted to destabilise the democratic dispensation and retain political power. This is how Matlosa (1995: 138) recounts the situation: “[h]aving tested power, the military proved extremely reluctant to make way for the democratic government to render itself subject to democratic control mechanisms, and to concede its corporate material interests to civil supervision.” The military is therefore accused of taking advantage of the opposition protests to paralyse the government and hijack the democratic trajectory in Lesotho. The ABC respondent described the situation as follows: “[b]ecause Maseru was under the control of the opposition and the main government offices were under threat, nobody was safe and somehow people were saying our security, that is our defence force was
being classified as if they are part of the opposition support base, not owing allegiance to the government” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). The military was no longer taking orders from central command or the government. Both the military command and the government in the cases of 1994 and 1998 were paralysed by the military mutiny and the concomitant opposition uprisings and palace coups. The country had become virtually ungovernable (Interviews with R 3, 03 August 2010; R2, 28 June 2010; R 12, 14 June 2011; R 11 and 13, 04 May 2011 and 16 June 2011 respectively).

This volatile scenario was better described by a former Botswana Defence Force retired Brigadier who was involved during Operation Boleas. He stated that “...military intervention was necessary because the military in Lesotho itself had gone out of hand. It was no longer following the constitution or its reason for existence in whatever they did in Lesotho because they were politicised and unfortunately they were the opposition was in control of the military and the military deterred the police from taking on their duties....In other words the military was encouraging lawlessness” (Interview with Respondent 12, 04 May 2011). One of the respondents from the SADC OPDS also stated that the SADC interventions were justified because “[such acts were, you know; undertaken by the powers, by the institutions that are employed to ensure that peace and security in the country” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). The mandate of the SADC particularly during the 1998 mission was to disarm and contain the LDF, restore the democratically elected government and return the country to normalcy. As a result of these ugly scenes, the SADC interventions came as a welcome overture. According to a retired academic at NUL “...it was a frightening situation; yah. Any force that could restore order and stability was definitely justified....the government had collapsed. The only force which could restore the government to power and thereby ensure... order was the SADC” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011).

If the views expressed above are anything to go by, the SADC interventions were motivated by justifiable and noble reasons, and were therefore necessary. The SADC had pledged to defend democracy and denounce unconstitutional means of attaining power in the region. In its treaty, the OPDS and MDP protocols, the SADC has pledged collective resolve and commitment to promote and defend democracy, peace and security. Chapter 3, Article 4 on principles of the SADC treaty commits the organisation “to defend human rights, democracy and the rule of law, solidarity, peace and security” within its member states and the region at large (SADC Treaty 1992). To the extent that there is evidence that Lesotho’s democracy and security were in jeopardy, the intervention was logical and the SADC as the regional body was operating within its regional mandate of maintain regional peace.

8.2.5 Government-requested SADC interventions

The other perspective which emerged from the interviews to justify the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho was that in all the missions the SADC did not take unilateral decisions. On the contrary, the SADC was
accordingly requested by the legitimate government of Lesotho for assistance to quench the turmoil which was unfolding in the Kingdom. The SADC persistently pointed out that the organisation came at the invitation of the legitimate government in Lesotho. If indeed the interventions were responses to requests by the government of the day, then SADC was in line with Article 7 of the MDP which reads: “no action shall be taken to assist any State in terms of this Pact, save at the State Party’s own request or with the consent...” (SADC Mutual Defence Pact 2004). In fact, the governments at the times of the SADC interventions have it on record that they invited the SADC in face of coups and insurmountable civil turmoil which threatened full-scale civil war. For instance, in his briefing to the South African Parliament on why South Africa deployed troops in the Kingdom, Mangosotho Buthelezi who was the acting President read the letter written by Prime Minister Mosisili to the South African government requesting assistance. In the letter, the Prime Minister said “[i]n my capacity as the Prime Minister and Head of Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho; I wish to urgently request your Excellencies Heads of States of Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe to come to the rescue of my government and the people of Lesotho. The only intervention I can and do request is of a military nature... It is against this background that I submit a formal and urgent request... in accordance with the SADC Agreements to put together, quickly a strong military intervention to help Lesotho to return to normalcy” (cited in Molapo 1999: 1). Similarly, during the 1994 conflict, the then Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle of the BCP, had written a letter to the South African government stating that due to the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Royal Lesotho Defence Force, the government of Lesotho was urgently requesting the South African Government to assist by dispatching a peace-keeping force to Maseru to defuse a bloodbath which might flow from the disastrous situation.

A sizeable number of the respondents held this perspective as an indication that the interventions were at the behest of the government of the day. Respondent 2 argued that in all instances of SADC’s interventions, “Lesotho had a legitimate government... it was the one that requested assistance from the regional body and that government had the right to ensure the security of the nation and protection of the entire citizens” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). Another respondent, an officer in the SADC security unit, also stated: “[y]ou must also realise that SADC did not take the unilateral decision; there was an intervention from the government of Lesotho particularly from the Prime Minister that a coup has occurred...and the government was in a state of paralysis....so the Prime Minister himself said the assistance we request is of military nature” (Interview with R 1, 25 May 2010). The request for military intervention was mainly because “the Lesotho army has become a player in the unrest and so cannot be seen to be a neutral force able to create a safe environment for the solution of the problems of the country” (ANC Parliamentarian Fatima Hajaij, 1998 cited in Molapo 1999: 2). Supporting this fact, regarding the 1998 military intervention, Respondent 13, a retired Brigadier who participated in both the 1994 and 1998 missions provided a quotation of a public statement by the Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili to parliament that: “[t]he armed forces of Botswana and South Africa are in Lesotho at the express invitation of the government of Lesotho. That they are not an invasion but an intervention
force” (Interview with R 13, 16 June 2011). This view is shared by another interviewee (Respondent 14), a Brigadier General attached to the SADC Headquarters. He maintained that “it was the decision of the government that there should be an intervention. So the government in its wisdom found that it was necessary for the intervention to be carried out” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011).

With such evidence, the SADC “cannot be faulted for coming to the help of a legitimate government, recently elected, which requested assistance” (Southall, 2001: 166). Despite the dissenting views, there is evidence that in both the 1994 and 1998 interventions, the SADC was invited by the governments of the day which the regional body recognised as legitimate. Therefore, it was to some extent within its operational mandate as stipulated in its protocols. However, the shortcoming was that the SADC did not “obtain the consent of all the disputing parties to its peacemaking efforts” as stipulated in Article 11 on the procedures of the OPDS protocol. In both the 1994 and 1998 interventions, the SADC did not make any efforts to determine whether their intervention would be acceptable to the opposition. This might be, perhaps understandably, because they were invited by the legitimate authority in Lesotho and the urgency of the need to defuse the volatile political situation in the country.

However, some of the interviewees maintained that according to the Constitution of Lesotho, the invitation for intervention ought to have come from the King who was the head of State, and not from the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, in accordance with the Lesotho constitution should have invited intervention with the approval of the King, which was not the case during the 1998 intervention (Interviews with R 16; Coordinator of the Lesotho Transitional Resource Centre (TRC) Development for Peace, R 21, 13 July 2010 and 09 August 2010 respectively). In questioning the legality of the South African-led intervention, the New National Party (NNP) parliamentarian Geldenhuys emphasised the issue thus: “[t]he argument that the government of Lesotho requested SADC to intervene does not hold water. In terms of the Lesotho Constitution, the King must be consulted on all issues of government business. The King of Lesotho was not consulted on this issue and therefore there is no question of a legitimate request by any government” (cited in Molapo, 1999: 2). But, that was not the case because of the political rivalry which had existed between the Lesotho government and the monarchy. In both the 1994 and 1998 disturbances in the Kingdom, the King was at the centre of the attempted coups and the Prime Ministers did not consult the King because they regarded him as part of the problem rather than the solution. As other respondents portrayed, the historical animosity and power struggle between the Prime Minister and the monarchy dated back to 1965 when the Constitution of Lesotho was drawn.

The core of the strife was that the monarchy wanted the constitution to accord it executive powers instead of the ceremonial powers which it currently holds in the Lesotho government. As the LPC interviewee puts it “at independence there was a dispute between the position of the King versus that of the Prime Minister and there was
some opinion which said that the King should have executive powers and the Prime Minister should just be subordinate to the King...Then at independence it was finally said that the Prime Minister must have executive powers. Now that was never accepted by the monarchy” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). This political tug-of-war between the government and the monarchy was cited as one of the source of friction in the Lesotho political arena. The NIP respondent described the relationship in the following words: “[s]o...we have a Prime Minister who has been elected and we have a King who is there by virtue [of birth]. So these two heads...we honestly really have a problem all the time because there are some people who believe in their King [and] there are others who believe in their Prime Minister. So we have two bulls in the kraal” (Interview with R 3, 03 August 2010). It is this animosity and the involvement of the monarchy in the 1994 and 1998 disputes, supposedly on the side of the opposition parties, which the participant from the ruling LCD relied on to say there was no way the government could have consulted the King because he was spearheading the conflict and the Prime Minister had no alternative but to use his executive powers to invite the SADC to restore law and order in the country. Disputing this view, a University of Botswana academic noted: “you need to realise that he King was not an innocent bystander in the whole thing; you recall the vigil at the King’s Palace and I believe he sympathised with the people. So he was an interested party in some way. So I think it was...something prudent that the Head of state (Prime Minister) intervened in that manner. Had the Prime Minister not intervened in that particular manner, I am sure we would be talking a different story about the stability of that Southern African country” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). In fact, the Prime Minister in his letter emphasised the urgency of the request: “I will appreciate your Excellencies’ timely intervention before it is too late” (cited in Molapo, 1999: 2).

In any case, if indeed all the interventions were at the invitation of the government of the day, then they could fit in well as legitimate in international law. One of the requirements for intervention is that it “should be specifically requested of the potential intervener by the government of the country under attack; the requesting government should have the clear support of the majority of its population; the requesting government should itself act with intelligence and humanity and be demonstrably more responsive to the needs of the people...” (Millar; cited in du Plessis 2000: 45).

These reasons for the justification of the SADC interventions in member states are an acknowledgement to the pledge by the SADC to champion democracy, political stability, peace, human rights and democratic governance in its member states and the region as a whole for it to realise its core goals of regional integration and economic development. Chapter 3 Articles 4 and 5 of the SADC Treaty on the principles and objectives of the organisation outlines its core duty as defence of human rights, democracy and rule of law, evolve common political values, systems and institutions, promote and defend peace and security (SADC Treaty 1992). That the SADC successfully
restored the democratically elected government, peace, stability and thwarted the outbreak of full-scale civil war in Lesotho is a commendable effort by the regional organisation. It fulfilled Article 2 (a, b and g) in which it pledged to:

- Protect the people of and safeguard the development of the Region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict and aggression;
- Promote political cooperation among State Parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions;
- Promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided in the Charters and Conventions of the African Union and the United Nations respectively (Protocol and Structure of the Organ 2001).

Article 11 of the Organ Protocol states the central task of the SADC as prevention of large-scale violence and coups which may jeopardise regional peace and stability. Sub section b (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) define significant intra-state conflict within the territory of a state party as:

- Large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights;
- A military coup or other threats to the legitimate authority of a State;
- A condition of civil war or insurgency;
- A conflict which threatens peace and security in the Region or in the territory of another State party (Protocol and Structure of the Organ; 2001).

A close assessment of the disturbances which erupted in Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007 shows that they fit into the above description. Hence, SADC was within its legitimate regional mandate as stipulated in its treaty and security protocols.

As if in anticipation that some of the respondents would denounce the SADC missions as unjustified, Respondent 2 and 4 raised a critical point regarding the question of the justification of the intervention as the response would be determined by one’s political inclinations. Respondent 4 stated: "[I]n my view the interventions were justified but to convince the opponents of the regime is not easy" (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). Put differently, as noted by Respondent 2, there is normally no justified intervention. This is because to those people who might feel that the disturbances would have benefitted them, the intervention would always be unjustified. Nevertheless, to those who felt threatened by the disruptions to peace and security, the intervention was justified (paraphrase from an interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). For example, for the government, the SADC interventions were the only available solution as the country was rendered ungovernable and the government paralysed by the opposition protests. The retired NUL academic concluded: "[I]t was justified...definitely intervening in that kind of situation and under those circumstances, it was justified; to the extent that Lesotho was in crisis" (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). The
justification is also boosted by the official requests made by the government to the SADC Heads of States for assistance as stated earlier.

8.3 Opposing Views on the Motives and Justifications of the Interventions

Conversely, while some of the respondents from the opposition parties had similar views on the justifications of the 1994 and 2007 non-coercive interventions, they held a different view regarding the 1998 military intervention. Most of them hailed the 1994 and 2007 peaceful settlement of the dispute through dialogue and negotiations as the best tool the SADC should employ in resolving regional conflicts. Such feelings emanate from the pledge by the SADC in its treaty and protocols that it would strive to "prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflicts by peaceful means (mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation)" (The SADC Treaty 1992; Article 11 (b) and (c) on objectives).

In this regard, even the Basotho National Party interviewee who was virulent throughout against the SADC missions in Lesotho, calmed down when he noted that the 1994 and 2007 missions "...were partly justified; you know; as sister countries to come in for talks; to make sure that they bring both sides to a peaceful understanding" (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). Regarding the 1998 military intervention, it became clear that most of the opposition parties' respondents were bitterly against the SADC. The mentioning of the 1998 military intervention invited such comments as "military invasion incursion", "violation of the Basotho sovereignty", "territorial integrity and nationhood" and "interference in the domestic affairs of Lesotho". Some even argued that the intervention was not a SADC project but was the South African military against Lesotho, and therefore unjustified. The interviewee from the Lesotho Royalty (Respondent 19) summed up the anger of the Basotho nation against the military intervention of 1998 when he said: "1994 was quite amicable, wasn't it? Now because there were talks that were offered, 1998 you know, the military might will always hurt some one. And we are saying we felt we have been raped as men when a man comes into your country and bombards your army places, your whatever, even entering the palace and pointing guns at the King's house. That was the biggest humiliation we have ever suffered as a nation" (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011).

8.3.1 SADC Interventions: An intrusion in the Domestic Affairs of Lesotho

Numerous reasons were advanced by those who view the SADC interventions as unjustified encroachments in their domestic affairs. The views that the SADC intruded in the domestic affairs of Lesotho may have been motivated by the SADC pledge in its treaty, the OPDS and MDP protocols that the organisation will respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. In its OPDS Principles, section (a), the SADC pledges to "respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and its inalienable right to independent existence." In the preamble of the Protocol and Structure of the Organ, the SADC unequivocally stated its commitment to the principle of strict
respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighbourliness, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of other States” (Protocol and Structure of the Organ; 2001).

Article 7 of the MDP also emphasises that the organisation will observe the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. Thus the BNP respondent contended that “[f]or us, it is not [an] intervention; I call it an interference in our domestic affairs. It was a purely political matter between the ruling party LCD and opposition parties over how the LCD was running the country” (Interview with R 18: 07 July 2011). Another respondent argued that to the extent that Lesotho lost its sovereignty during the 1998 SADC intervention, then its justification was questionable. This is how he articulately put it: “[y]es we were definitely sacrificed. There is no way in which it was not going to be sacrificed if you have an external force intervention, with that kind of superior military might and totally subordinating the country, that country is not sovereign at least during the temporary occupation...That is any intervening force, if superior to the force that is being occupied, will definitely deprive the latter of the sovereignty. Although temporarily, Lesotho lost its sovereignty during the entire SADC military presence in the country....They determined and directed the course of things and processes; how people behaved and so on...which of course was unconstitutional” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011).

The above sentiments are echoed by the Basotho Congress Party interviewee (Respondent 17). In his view, “[t]he interventions were not justified to the extent that...they went to encroach on the sovereignty of the country” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). According to the BNP Secretary General, the 1998 military intervention was a “violation of international law. It was total interference, unwarranted and not supported by any legal instrument” (Interview with R 17, 07 July 2011). It is such views which bred animosity between South Africans and some Basotho mainly from the opposition who felt that South Africa was acting like a regional bully and had intentions of usurping Lesotho to be part of South Africa. Respondent 18 had this to say on this issue: “[s]o to them we are not an independent country; we are not a sovereign country. They think we are just a small boy on which they can do anything they like in our country. And we feel so sad about that” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). These views were shared by almost all respondents from the opposition parties. They indicated that the SADC had violated one of its principles of not interfering in the domestic affairs of member states and respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of member states. In fact Southall and Petlane, 1995: xvi) argue that although the 1994 SADC mission is credited for restoring democracy; Lesotho’s independence was enormously compromised when the SADC Troika was put on alert as the guarantors of Lesotho democracy and peace. They maintain that, “Lesotho’s continuing independence is in very large measure dependent upon its adherence to newly regionally endorsed democratic norms.” The SADC interventions of 1998 and 2007 under the auspices of the SADC Guarantors of the Lesotho democracy are evidence of how Lesotho independence is controlled by the regional body.
The insinuations that South Africa had the intention of incorporating Lesotho as one of its provinces has a long history. In fact, the Kingdom was saved from being part of the apartheid Union of South Africa by the British who declared the country a British Protectorate together with Botswana and Swaziland. The apartheid regime had wanted to have the Kingdom as part of the Union. The inclination was also spurred by the surrounded geographical position of Lesotho and its economic dependence on the Republic of South Africa. This has been an invidious issue to Basotho who had all along vowed to defend their nation. Questioning the deployment of South African troops in Lesotho, some opposition members of parliament viewed the military intervention as intended to annex the Kingdom to be part of South Africa. Geldenhuys of the New National Party (NNP) interrogated: “[w]hy [if that was not the intention] was the South African flag hoisted on the premises of the Palace? Was this to demonstrate a deed of annexation because this is how it is interpreted in Lesotho?” In his view the 1998 military mission was a shortsighted act of aggression which would sour the future relations between South Africa and Lesotho (cited in Molapo, 1999: 2-3).

However, Southall (2000) contends that there was no way that a democratic South Africa which was still in the embryonic phase of consolidating its democracy, could have moved to incorporate a tumultuous and perennially conflict-ridden impoverished Kingdom. In his view, it would have been a gross political miscalculation and politically suicidal. Southall posits that even though South Africa had lucrative investments in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, she would not contemplate integrating the Kingdom. Instead, “[t]he real challenge will be to find an internal solution to Lesotho’s political problems that can be combined with a closer functional relationship which respects the Kingdom’s political sovereignty, yet acknowledges the necessity for it to work with South Africa economically” (Southall, 2000: 7).

8.3.2 SADC Inconsistency in its Preventive Diplomacy Missions

The other reason advanced by those who question the justification of the SADC military mission of 1998 is that the SADC is not consistent in its applications of interventions. They accuse the regional body of double standards. The respondents who hold this view felt that while the SADC swiftly moved in Lesotho, they have not done the same in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Madagascar which they feel have been embraced by similar political turmoil. The BNP respondent angrily questioned, “[w]hy they don’t go sending an army into Zimbabwe...Why don’t they do it in Madagascar now? Why don’t they do it in the DRC? Why did they do it in Lesotho only?” (Interview with R18, 07 July 2011). Reverend Meshoe of the African Christian Democratic Party in South Africa commended the position taken by South Africa on the DRC conflict as a wise and logical one. However, he recorded his misgivings about the South African military intervention in Lesotho. This is what he said on this issue: “[w]e fail to understand why our executive did not use the same caution and wisdom before deciding to invade the tiny Kingdom of Lesotho” (cited in Molapo, 1999: 3). The perceptions that the SADC is selective in its coercive interventions inevitably triggered views that the
SADC only targets the weaker member states to intervene militarily. Respondent 19, who is a member of the monarchy, argued: "[t]o me SADC looks like a double standard type of body. It all depends on who you are. Look at what is happening in Zimbabwe, they did nothing with them. Look at what is happening in Madagascar, they didn’t do anything; except what has happened in Lesotho. The cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe shows you that they are double standards people, or they were able to only attack the weaker...They cannot do that in Zimbabwe" (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011). The validity of such questions was also raised by respondent 7 - an academic with the University of Botswana - that indeed there was a coup in Madagascar and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe which did not meet the same coercive response as was the case with Lesotho (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). The above responses confirm perceptions that the coercive intervention was only possible because of the diminutive status of Lesotho in the region and that the same cannot be reproduced in other conflict-ridden regional member states such as Zimbabwe (Sejanamane, 1996). Makoa (1998: 21) lambasted South Africa for being fork-tongued in its foreign policy. While South Africa advocated dialogue in the DRC conflict, it swiftly engaged militarily in the case of Lesotho. He expressed shock at the about-turn in South Africa’s approach to conflict resolution in the Lesotho instance: from a blanket insistence on negotiated settlements to military intervention. The fact that the SADC intervened militarily in Lesotho shows that the organisation is not a security community, since members of such a community do not resort to coercion in resolving regional disputes.

However, on the issue of double standards, respondents from the SADC Organ unit and an academic from the University of Botswana argued that the SADC interventions in different conflict situations are determined by the contextual factors such as the nature of the conflict, the sources, the level of violence involved and the stakeholders in the conflict. The University of Botswana academic stated, "[i]t depends on the situation; it’s contextual. I mean when people protest peacefully then you sit down and talk to them. But when people are burning the commercial district, then you have to come in force" (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). In its founding treaty and security protocols, the SADC has pledged to resolve regional conflicts through non-coercive diplomatic means. But it goes on to say that where there is grave and gross human rights violation, massive loss of life, genocide and other abrogations to normal human existence, it will use any means necessary, including force, to normalise the situation. The SADC also pledged to resort to coercion as a last resort option after the diplomatic non-coercive measures have failed. Article (g) of the Objectives of the Organ states that “only where diplomatic means fail, would the Organ recommend that the Summit should consider punitive measures” (SADC Organ Protocol 2001). In fact the SADC raised issues to the effect that the military intervention was preceded by peaceful measures through the Langa Commission and numerous delegations by the then-South African Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, which did not bear fruits as far as diffusing the situation was concerned. In the view of the SADC and other interviewees the situation which prevailed in Lesotho in 1998 was drifting towards total warfare. As Southall (1998: 2) portrays the situation: “the internal dynamics of the situation had been transformed by the army
revolt..." The government "...was steadily losing any last remaining grip on power as the BNP and BCP soldiery and the police were working together to paralyse the functioning of the government." A former commander of the Botswana Defence Force (Respondent 12) described the scenario thus: "[w]hat was happening is that it had reached a point where it was difficult for government [and] people to conduct normal life. I mean going to work. The soldiers were stopping people, commandeering government vehicles; people, ministers could not go to their offices. The there was destruction of normal life in Maseru. So government was paralysed... So this was a deteriorating situation" (Interview with R 12, 14 June 2010). In his letter requesting assistance, the Prime Minister gave graphic details of the political chaos in the Kingdom. He portrayed a situation of "...rampaging demonstrators congregating at various offices, government vehicles taken by force from civil servants, civil servants being stopped from going to work, abduction of ministers, and senior military officers, and the killing of the Deputy Prime Minister”. This, no doubt reflected the intensity of the political anarchy unfolding in Lesotho which should have moved the regional organisation to intervene militarily, more so because the armed forces were part of the destabilisation.

The organisation cannot be accused of double standards and selective use of coercion regarding its 1998 military mission in Lesotho. The issue of high intensity violence as one of the factors which the SADC depended on to determine the use of coercion, was contested by the BCP respondent who said that before the arrival of the SADC forces, the demonstrations were peaceful. In his words: "[t]hey came in on the 22nd of September; before then there was no looting, there was no torching or destruction; there was nothing. But everything went astray from the moment the forces of South Africa entered Lesotho” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). These sentiments are in consonance with Southall's (1998: 1) assertion that "South Africa’s...armed incursion into Lesotho has provoked a massive controversy...it is widely blamed for precipitating an orgy of looting, arson, and violence which left the main street of Maseru, the capital, a burnt out shell. It has also raised questions concerning the necessity of intervention, the international legality of such actions, the credibility and consistency of South African foreign policy, the effectiveness of South Africa’ armed forces and the appropriate role for SADC.” In the view of one opposition Member of Parliament in South Africa, “sending troops into Lesotho clearly contravened previous commitments to peaceful solutions to conflict situations on the continent” (cited in Molapo, 1999: 2). In fact, the SADC official interviewed indicated that the SADC intervened militarily in the DRC. However, it is on record that South Africa had insisted on diplomatic solutions of the DRC conflict. She only deployed her troops as a post-conflict peacebuilding effort with the United Nations Peace Mission in the DRC (MONUC).

8.3.3 SADC Intervention: A Violation of Lesotho Sovereignty
Whatever the case, some of the Basotho, mainly from the opposition parties, persistently projected the SADC military intervention of 1998 as an incursion which violated their sovereignty and statehood. It emerged abundantly from the responses of the opposition participants in this study that the Basotho were reeled by the South African troops...
hoisting the South African flag, as if they were a victorious invading force over the Kingdom. The alleged violent approach by the South African troops and the affront bred by the hoisting of the South African flag was accordingly interpreted as an invasion and violation of the Lesotho sovereignty. The citizens were emboldened by the spirit of patriotism to defend their country. To add insult to injury, they advanced to the royal palace and this was viewed as an unpardonable affront as the monarchy in Lesotho is regarded as an embodiment of the Basotho nation and statehood. This, to a large extent, triggered the historical animosity between the Basotho and/or Lesotho Defence Force and the then-apartheid South African troops which invaded Lesotho on several occasions in pursuit of the liberation activists. Consequently, apart from the fact that South African troops entered Lesotho first when the situation was still volatile, the historical animosity between the two neighbours was fully revived. It ultimately manifested itself with a high level of resistance which the South African troops met from the Basotho, compared to the hospitable and less hostile reception of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). It has also been established that, compared to the BDF which is credited as having been professional in its operations and which hoisted a white flag symbolic of a peace-making force upon entering Lesotho, the South African troops were very confrontational and unprofessional in their approach and this sparked hostilities and a collective spirit of resistance. One respondent indicated that “[t]here was an understanding that no, no, South Africa was now invading and taking over the country. And all, by and large, that was the information that was being spread over that South Africa is taking over the country. And again when the South Africans got to the Palace, they raised their flag and that was very offensive...; it was assumed that these people are now raising up their flag at the highest seat of government in Lesotho. Basically, it meant South Africa has taken over. That is how it was interpreted and that is one of those things that led to the mass uprising by the people who said we would rather burn down everything else” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). The differences in the operational approaches of the South African and Botswana contingents are clearly articulated by the leader of the Basotho African Congress (Respondent 5). He argued that the “Botswana army was very, very professional because when they came into the border, they just pushed up a white flag calling for peace and every body you know gave that gentle approach back to them and they were very friendly with the people. That is why they were able to build their mission successfully because people listened to them whilst the other military units (South African) had it very difficult because people were fighting with them” (Interview with R 5, 04 August 2010)

The volatile situation was worsened by poor communication from the paralysed government to the public that the South African and later Botswana contingents were carrying out a legitimate SADC mission and mandate as requested by the government. This may have persuaded some Basotho not to interpret the mission as a South African attack. However, the media fuelled the view that the operation was a South African invasion to the detriment of the perception of the whole mission. This lack of transparency and clarity, coupled with flawed communication by the Lesotho government and the SADC regarding the mandate and legitimacy of the mission gave ammunition to the
opposition parties to present the entire operation as a South African incursion, much to the chagrin of the SADC which wanted it to be viewed as a regional peace-keeping operation (De Coning 1998; Basupi 2007). Questions still hang over the Lesotho political space on the legality of the 1998 military mission. In view of this, the New National Party member of parliament wondered who in fact instructed him [the Acting President of South Africa, Buthelezi] to intervene militarily in Lesotho and for what reasons? (cited in Molapo, 1999). Although both sides raised compelling arguments on the issue of the justification and motivation for the interventions, the bottom line is that the SADC did not follow its stipulated rules and procedures in launching the 1998 mission which the majority of the participants in this study contested and resented. With such perceptions against military intervention, SADC’s “involvement may be judged according to whether it has laid the basis for non-violent resolution of political conflict within Lesotho” (Southall, 2001: 168).

8.3.4 Questions on the Legitimacy of the SADC 1998 Military Intervention

Chapters 52, 53 and 54 of the UN Charter mandated regional organisations to intervene in regional conflicts upon being granted permission by the United Nations Security Council. The SADC has also stipulated in its founding treaty and security protocols that it will always consult the UN and the AU in cases where the organisation has to intervene in member states disputes. Furthermore, SADC has pledged to comply with rules of interventions as stipulated in the UN and AU Charter and international law conventions. The Organ Protocol Article 11 on methods, item (d), states that “[t]he Summit shall resort to enforcement action only as a matter of last resort and, in accordance with Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, only with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council” (Protocol and Structure of the Organ, 2001). However, in the cases of the SADC military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho in 1998, the SADC had not sought the approval of the AU or the UN. The missions were conducted and retroactively referred to the UN and AU relevant organs. This has raised questions regarding whether the SADC missions in the DRC and Lesotho were even mandated by the SADC. Sceptics argued that the two missions were launched by Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and South Africa and Botswana as individual nations representing their own national interests.

According to those who hold this view, there was no SADC summit of head of states as required by the SADC treaty to deliberate on the Lesotho crisis, and subsequently mandating the SADC to intervene. Worse still, the OPDS Protocol and MDP (the legal instruments through which military intervention could be undertaken and coordinated in a member state) had not been ratified by all the SADC members during the 1998 military mission (Southall 1998). They were only ratified in 2001 and 2004 respectively. That in 1998, both the Organ and Mutual Defence Pact protocols had not yet been ratified and no recorded summit meeting to determine what action to take in the Lesotho crisis, it is not surprising that there are so many questions about who really authorised and coordinated the operation. Explaining this situation, one of the respondents noted, “I would say that perhaps, at the material time that we are
talking about, SADC has not as it were put its house together in terms of, you know rolling out the legal instruments to facilitate the process” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). Molomo (1998: 8) therefore posits that “the question of paramount importance in Lesotho intervention is whether or not it was legitimate? [And] this begs a further question, legitimate for whom?” These perceptions increasingly gave credence to the beliefs that the 1998 military intervention was a South African incursion rather than a SADC peace-keeping mission.

To add insult to injury, there seemed to have been no SADC flag and logo to symbolise and designate the operation as a SADC peace-keeping operation. The fact that the two intervening forces - Botswana and South Africa - hoisted different flags on entering the Kingdom raised more questions than answers on the mandate and legitimacy of the operation (Makoa 1998, Basupi 2007). Makoa (1998: 10) points out that “South Africa and Botswana claimed that their intervention in Lesotho is a SADC initiative. But, initially, they differed radically in terms of their perceived role... For example; on entering Lesotho the BDF hoisted a white flag, indicating that it saw itself as a peace-keeping force. This contrasts sharply with the behaviour of the SANDF which entered the country as an invasion force, attacking the royal palace, the two main army barracks in Maseru, and the rural LDF garrison at Ha katse. South Africa flaunted the SADC as a source of its authority. But Botswana explained that the SANDF and the BDF were in Lesotho at the behest of the Troika countries (South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe) which became guarantors of political stability in Lesotho following their mediation of the crisis engineered by the 1994 short-lived palace coup.” With the South African flag flown by the South African troops, the Basotho felt insulted and deprived of their nationhood and sovereignty. The prevalence of such perceptions were also aggravated by the fact that it was the South African forces which came into Lesotho first and conducted the bulk of the intervention task before the arrival of the Botswana Defence Force contingent (Mashishi 2003, Ngoma 2005, Hwang 2005, Likoti 2008). According to Mashishi (2003: 84), “[i]t was the South African government that received a request from Lesotho. It was South Africa that initiated the possibility of mounting peace intervention in Lesotho. It was South African troops that... intervened first without a proper mandate from SADC.” The mission command structure was headquartered in Bloemfontein (South Africa). In view of this situation one of the respondents argued that the involvement of Botswana “...was to improve the image that it must be SADC, not South Africa, conducting the intervention” (Interview with R 4, 08 August 2010). This has raised questions on the legitimacy of the SADC mission and gave ammunition to those who viewed it as unjustified.

These perceptions are used by those who deem the SADC intervention, mainly the 1998 coercive measure, as unjustified and in contravention of international law which it has pledged to comply with in its founding treaty and operational protocols. Worse still, the letter which the Prime Minister wrote requesting assistance was not addressed to the SADC but to the South African government. This has raised criticisms that the South African-led military intervention was not a SADC mission but a South African incursion. Difficulties experienced by the South African
government in convincingly locating the intervention within the realms of international law, therefore led to political antics of referring to the intervention as justified by “customary international law” - whatever that means (Seiler, cited in Southall, 2001: 167). According to the BCP respondent the mission was conducted pursuant to an agreement signed by the acting President of South Africa, Mangosotho Buthelezi, and the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Phakalitha Mosisili, and not with the SADC as a regional body which should have been the case. South African, rather than SADC forces, intervened on the basis of the agreement between the two parties. Based on this view, the BCP respondent said, “[t]hat is where it loses the meaning of being a SADC intervention because if it was a SADC intervention, one would have thought that the agreement would have been between the government of Lesotho and the SADC machinery or the SADC head office” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). Within this context and considering the letter from the Prime Minister to the South African government, it becomes very difficult to convince sceptics that the mission was authorised and mandated by the SADC. Respondent 17 further maintained that “[t]his was just a matter between two states and when it was done, there was no prior authorisation by the SADC. There was no SADC seating and authorising that oh no let South Africa act on our behalf. It was not like that. It was just an agreement between South Africa and Lesotho.” The participant went on to illustrate why his party thinks it was not a SADC mission. He stated, “[t]hat is exactly what we are saying that this was never a SADC mission because even prior to the signing of the agreement between Lesotho and South Africa, there was never a meeting of SADC to discuss the Lesotho situation. Even before that could be done South Africa was already in the country protecting its interests...There was never a SADC sanction; there was never an African Union sanction [and] there was never an United Nations sanction in respect of that intervention” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011).

These sentiments were echoed by the BNP interviewee who posited that “...there was not even any law nor any agreement of SADC to send its troops into the country. [This is more] especially because, this regional agreement or arrangements are only done after they have been requested to do so by the United Nations Security Council. But nothing like that happened; they just came in” (Interview with R18, 07 July 2011). The above sentiments were echoed by Basupi (2007) in his thesis on the SADC 1998 military operations in Lesotho. He notes that the Status of Forces Agreement, (SOFA) that is, the agreement on the entrance of foreign troops in Lesotho, was not signed between the SADC and Lesotho but between the individual intervening countries (South Africa and Botswana) and Lesotho. The situation is that “there was no SOFA with SADC, as SADC does not yet have a body which has the authority to enter into such an agreement, nor has it developed the necessary policies and procedures in this regard” (Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence: 1998: 6). Basupi (2007) further observes that there were also mixed feelings regarding the code name of the operation (Operation Boleas) as it did not reflect the regional image and symbolic meaning and purpose of the mission as per international practice. For example, different missions have been code-named to carry the banner of the authorising body like the AU Mission in Darfur and Somalia and the UN missions in the DRC (MONUC), UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to mention but a few. However, in the case of Lesotho, “at no
point was there any symbolism that the intervention force was under the authority of SADC, or of a civilian head that can be identified with SADC..." (Basupi, 2007: 42). As if the damage was not enough, it is alleged that the commander of the South African contingent reported to the South African Defence Force Chief of Staff and the South African Minister of Defence as opposed to the SADC Security Unit Troika and/or the SADC Chairperson if at all it was truly a SADC-mandated operation (Basupi, 2007).

8.3.5 Questions on Payment of the 1998 Mission’s Costs

Several questions were raised on how the costs of Operation Boleas were paid. The BCP leader observed that after the intervention, the South African government required Lesotho to pay for services rendered and compensate for the destruction which ensued during the mission. Article 13 of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Lesotho (1998: 6) stated that on settlement of debts for the 1998 mission, "[t]he Parties agree that the Receiving Party shall be liable to the Sending Party for all real expenses and costs incurred by the Sending Party, with regard to the provision of military assistance to the Receiving Party. Upon receipt of an account from the Sending Party, the Receiving party shall pay the expenses and costs within a period of 30 (thirty) days. Interim accounts may be lodged by the Sending party and upon conclusion of the military assistance a final account shall be lodged." A consideration which brings more questions than answers and complicates the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the mission is why, if any payments were to be made, were they not directed to the SADC? In fact, if it was truly a SADC mission, SADC should bear the costs of the operation and an agreement should have been signed between the government of Lesotho and the SADC as a regional body rather than with an individual member state. The fact that the payments were to be made to South Africa, made some people logically conclude that it was a South African mission. In view of this, the BCP interviewee noted: "Then we are saying payments were made to South Africa. Lesotho paid South Africa...If it was a SADC exercise; the expense would have been that of SADC isn’t it? And the question is, would SADC have charged Lesotho for intervening in a political conflict? We don’t think so" (interview with R 17, 08 June 2011). The respondent further argued that people should not be hoodwinked by the retroactive statement by the SADC headquarters that the mission was sanctioned by the organisation because, "In our humble view it was just an after thought... A cover-up of something that had been done already. It was not initiated by them. That is why we are saying, in so far as we are concerned, the so-called SADC intervention in Lesotho was in no way a SADC intervention but a South African intervention" (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). In fact Du Plessis (2000) had denounced this tendency by the SADC to retroactively legitimise operations taken by individual member states as SADC missions, as an indication that the SADC lacked concrete intervention guidelines and operation principles. In the same vein, it appears that the intervening powers (Botswana and South Africa) used their own financial and material resources. The question to ask is, why, if it was a SADC mission, was it not funded by SADC? For example, the two countries used their own transport facilities and troops as the SADC Standby Force was still in its formative stages. Reflecting on this issue, respondent 7, an
academic with the University of Botswana remarked that “[m]uch as we are talking about SADC, these countries (South Africa and Botswana) were using their own resources. The SADC Brigade as we speak has not been fully established” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). Consequently one of the retired Brigadiers from the BDF, who was involved in both the 1994 and 1998 operations lamented that “…the BDF was stretched to the limit by this operation which ate into their coffers for that financial year” (interview with R 13; 16 June 2011). It has also been established that while the South African government required Lesotho to refund it for the intervention, Botswana pledged to cover for the expenses of its operations in the Kingdom. With such evidence in place, one is compelled to agree with those who felt that the operation was labelled a SADC operation for political expedience, to save the image of the regional body and protect the integrity of South Africa from being labeled a regional bully.

8.3.6 SADC Interventions Motivated by National Interests

Further evidence is given by those who question the "SADC-ness" of the 1998 mission. To them it was a realist mission led by South Africa to defend its economic interests in the Kingdom. Several opposition participants in this research raised the issue that South Africa, under the pretext of a SADC operation, invaded the country to protect its economic interests, mainly concerning the Highlands Water Project at Katse Dam which is essential for supply of power to industries in the Gauteng Province. In their theses on the SADC operations in the DRC and Lesotho, Hwang (2005) and Likoti (2006) compellingly argue that the interventions were resource-driven to protect the national interests of the individual member states. This perspective consistently emerged mainly from the opposition participants who maintained that South Africa did not intervene in Lesotho for protection of peace, democracy and security as she claims but for national benefits. This confirms the Realists' position that in international politics, nations will more often than not intervene where their national interests be they political, strategic and or economic are in jeopardy (du Plessis 2000, Terrif et al. 2004). In line with this perspective, one of the interviewees held that indeed the trend of the South African 1998 intervention was shaped by their economic interests and that was the main reason why they extended their operations to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project rather than limiting it to Maseru where the uprisings were concentrated. He concluded that “[m]ember states, no matter what framework we put into place, they will always go where they have those interests. So national interests at the end of the day call the final shots. We may agree as a region that we need to intervene in a particular area, but eh, as to where we will go, [laughs], individual member states will determine that on the basis of their interests” (interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). The participant surmised that this was the reason why South Africa and Botswana, and Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia went into Lesotho and the DRC respectively in 1998.

This perspective did not escape the diagnosis of the opposition participants during the interview sessions. They felt that the intervention had nothing much to do with the SADC and defence of regional peace and security. On the contrary, the opposition viewed the 1998 mission as a resource-motivated hegemonic invasion of Lesotho. The BCP
respondent made it abundantly clear that “[w]hen SADC intervenes, it should be with a view to protect the interests of that nation; the member state. Then they can say the interests of this nation are at stake as a member state. We intervened to safeguard, to protect those interests and the well-being of that member state. But with this intervention, it was no so. It was merely a dictation of South Africa as a stronger neighbour. And purely for economic interests” (Interview R 17, 08 July 2011). What made the opposition parties in Lesotho and almost all the opposition respondents conclude that the mission was a South African economic venture, was that when the South African troops entered Lesotho, they first headed to the Highland Water Project at Katse Dam and killed all the soldiers who guarded the dam. The question which persisted within the responses of the opposition participants is: since the protests were concentrated in Maseru, why did the South African troops capture the dam? The respondent from the BCP provided the answer to the question when he stated: “[t]he first moment they came in, once their armoured vehicles entered the border they were already at Katse, right inside the country...In the early hours of that morning, they did not only occupy the Highlands Water area, they actually massacred, the Lesotho soldiers who were on guard. They killed all of them. Remember that there were no protests at Katse. The protests were in Maseru the capital city. But instead they went to their only interest; water to purely safeguard their national interest-the Highland Water Scheme” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011).

Sessay (2000: 239) has also dubbed the South African-led intervention into Lesotho as “proof that regional hegemons are ready to take risks, and will move into neighbouring states if their interests are threatened.” Mashishi (2003) notes that South Africa had invested immensely in the Lesotho Highlands Project to supply its industries with water. Therefore no wonder that its intervention under the auspices of SADC is associated with efforts to protect its national interests. That the South African military intervention was spurred by national interests is evidenced by the fact that the country violated its foreign policy principles underpinning intervention in other nations. In its foreign policy position on peace operations, it stated that the South African Defence force would only be deployed outside South Africa if there was:

- a peace settlement that is in place and agreed to by all belligerent parties;
- an established time frame for the operation;
- clarified aims and objectives;
- approval of South African participation in the peace forces by all parties to the conflict;
- sustainable and feasible deployment and acceptable command and control arrangements (Cilliers, 1995: 11).

Makoa argues that during the South African-led military intervention, none of the above principles were observed. He notes that “[i]ndeed until 22 September, 1998 this was a popular myth in South Africa. The country’s media in particular, believed that these represented an unambiguous foreign policy orientation” (Makoa1998: 21).
Against this backdrop, the 1998 military intervention has been mirrored by mainly the opposition political parties as a South African invasion in defence of its national economic and political interests. The BNP respondent went further to indicate that South Africa had an agenda beyond simple defence of its economic interests. He argued that Lesotho is strategically a very important area in South Africa and is well-endowed with numerous minerals such as water and diamonds; hence, South Africa has always entertained an idea of absorbing Lesotho. In his words: “[w]e have all the water; we control all the water here; we have diamonds. We have a lot of things which South Africa is eyeing and that is why…South Africa has always been wishing Lesotho becomes part of South Africa so that we can share these resources” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). He lamented the fact that South Africa unfairly benefits from the Lesotho water, hence their motivation to intervene militarily to defend their economic life veins which they felt were in danger. However, the point of Lesotho being a strategically important country which motivated the South African military intervention is contested by one respondent. The respondent also expressed doubts that South Africa could only have moved to protect the water project. In his view, “Lesotho strategically is not very important. It doesn’t have well-known deposits of natural resources in abundance. I am not saying we have nothing. We have water which we supply to South Africa and I don’t think it is an overriding motivation. It could have been one of the motives but it could not be overriding” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011).

The NUL academic still concurred to some extent with those who felt the intervention was motivated by protection of South African interests. The fact that South African troops took control of the Katse Dam, and the official statements by the South Africa military commanders and the government that they were protecting their interests, provide answers to the question of the motivation for the intervention. Consequently, this exacerbated the suspicions that SADC was not involved (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). The BAC respondent also acknowledged that the driving motivation for South Africa was to protect its economic interests and that the capture of the Dam and the concomitant brutal killing of the soldiers on guard were triggered by information from the Lesotho government to South Africa that the opposition intended to destroy the dam to hijack the supply of water to its industries. According to the BAC respondent, “…they were actually trying to protect their interests in the Highlands Water Project because they were given false information that the opposition was going to bomb the dam” (Interview with R 5, 04 August 2010). This position is shared by a respondent from the ABC that South Africa came in to protect its businesses because there was a strong allegation by the government that the people wanted to demolish the dam” (Interview with R 5, 10 August 2010).

**8.3.7 Interventions to Defend the LCD Government**

Respondents from the opposition maintain that the South African government intervened to defend its counterpart, the LCD government, which had virtually crumbled owing to opposition mass protests. Mashishi, (2003: 80) argues that South Africa as a new entrant to the world of democracy, was poised to protect its newly attained democracy by
showing unflinching support for what they considered a democratically elected government. This was also “to avoid small election irregularities becoming a route for ambitious elements in the military forces in the sub-region to pursue their political aspiration...” against democratic trends unfolding in the region. Most of the opposition participants expressed bitterness against the South Africa for hiding behind the SADC in defence of a government which had come to power through flawed and fraudulent elections. This, they said, was confirmed by the Langa commission, although its report, perhaps for political expedience, deviated from its original findings to say that the electoral flaws of the 1998 did not warrant annulment of the election outcomes. The fact the the Commission was instituted by South Africa, not SADC, and was led by a South African High Court Judge, Pius Langa, and the fact that the release of the report was delayed gave credit to the suspicions that it was being doctored by the South African government to help the LCD government remain in power despite the irregularities of the elections which brought them to power. As the Reverend Stanley Magoba of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) stated in parliament: “[t]he manner in which we (South Africa) handled the Langa Commission report was very clumsy. We took so long and tensions in Lesotho complicated the situation instead of simplifying them... The added problem is the legitimacy of the present government in the light of the Langa Report and... it is an embarrassment to us. The question of law and order in Southern Africa and does affect us...But the critical point is that if we do intervene in Lesotho, it should be for the sake of defending the Basotho... rather than the present government” (cited in Molapo, 1999: 3). The BCP respondent indicated in his submissions that Judge Pius Langa “…was referring to some irregularities that may have happened and we were of the view that may be from that report... measures would be taken put in place to rectify what was done wrong. But that is not what came to be... the report was never published to the nation. In fact when we thought that it would be given to the stakeholders, it was taken to Mauritius and there after everything was stalled...” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). The above stated view is also expressed by the then fiery Democratic Alliance leader, Tony Leon, when he said: “[t]he Langa Report, sponsored by SADC accepted as a way-through by all parties in Lesotho as to why the publication of that Report was delayed for so long, because the suspicion which arouse in the interim period...is that there was tempering; there was doctoring and that tensions were inflamed to a combustible point” (cited in Molapo, 1999: 3).

The controversy surrounding the Langa Commission and its delayed report even dragged the SADC into what most Basotho felt was a South African scheme to assist the LCD government to stay in power. The opposition in Lesotho lambasted the SADC as nothing but a group of dictators who were just poised to defend each other from the people no matter how genuine the peoples’ demands were. One respondent felt that “SADC was interveng on behalf, or was reacting in that way...sort of saving the face of a fellow SADC member state” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). To bolster the above perspective, the BCP leader had this to say: “You see, ‘ntate’ there is no good will in the running of SADC. Why, because SADC is run by people who are not very democratic themselves. It’s not an entity or an establishment that is for people. In fact, it is an entity that is for rulers; for the power holders; those who are in power.
That is the problem with SADC. It cannot be effective in that sense because as we say it now becomes an entity whose function is but to protect those in power. It is a club for the rulers. They protect each other; they make favours for each other” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011).

According to a respondent from the BAC, SADC is “losing face in the territories of operation because the decisions that it takes are the decisions of the government of the day” (Interview with R 5, 04 August 2010). Respondent 19 also indicated that the SADC has lost integrity as a regional body because “its always South Africa’s hand that really translates everything into action rather than the body itself” (Interview with R 19, 07July 2011). Implicit in this response is that the 1998 intervention, even if it was dubbed a SADC mission, was pushed by South Africa. To this end “[m]ost Basotho say it was not the SADC which was planning. It was just between the countries interested to assist the Lesotho government” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). On this note the latter called upon the SADC to address real issues instead of protecting their political allies. Similarly Molomo (1998: 9) suggests that “the moot question that the SADC has to address is whether it was intervening on behalf of the people of Lesotho or the government of Lesotho.” Furthermore, if indeed it was a South African invasion, questions would inevitably be raised as to “whether the region with South Africa taking the lead, is sliding back into the era of destabilisation.”

Opposition parties felt that by restoring the LCD to power, South Africa (SADC) had virtually imposed an undemocratic government on the people of Lesotho. The MFP respondent lashed out that the SADC “…came into our area….and they leave their pet: the Head of government; leave him to act like a clown” (Interview with R 15: 07 July 2011). The respond from the BNP alleged that because the Prime Minister is assured of support from South Africa he “even boasted openly that if you (the opposition parties) do any nonsense, I will call them in again” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). For them, the LCD was in government through a fraudulent election and when it was on the verge of being toppled by the discontented masses, it was fraudulently saved and restored by South Africa under the auspices of the SADC. Sessay (2000: 194) argues that the South African-led military intervention in Lesotho was reminiscent of the ECOWAS (ECOMOG) interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone to restore the governments of Samuel Doe and Tejan Kabbar respectively. He asserts that West Africa presented the first example of a subregional organisations’ military intervention in the domestic affairs of member states in the 1990s. And, to him, this “seemed to have opened up a Pandora’s Box. For in December 1998, South Africa under the democratically elected government of Nelson Mandela, sent troops to neighbouring Lesotho to prop up the government of that country which was coming under increasing pressure from the army and the opposition.”

The opposition participants further claim that during the Masire-led intervention post-2007 election disputes, the LCD government has displayed unparalleled intransigence and resisted any peace initiatives suggested by the facilitator. Illuminating this problem, the LPC respondent noted that “[t]he regime is becoming autocratic and even now we are
engaged in some political dialogue concerning the outcome of the general elections of 2007. It is clear that the election was fraudulent. Yet the government is just intransigent” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). This uncompromising stance by the government during the dialogue facilitation was also raised by the SADC OPDS Director, the Coordinator of the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL), and all the opposition political parties’ participants in this research. The Coordinator of the CCL (Respondent 9) stated that “[t]hey are negotiating in bad faith, especially the government did not want to give any offer no matter how valid are the reasons presented by the opposition. In fact, the government wanted to maintain the status quo...I am saying this because among all the contentious issues, none of them has been resolved. The situation is as it is because it is the government and nobody can move the government from its original position” (Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010). The BAC participant depicted the government's uncooperative stance in a more diplomatic way when he said, “[o]ne would think the government of the country has to take a lead to harmonise the situation. But if the government is not taking the lead and is negative on every aspect, arrogant, then you are dealing with a very complex situation” (Interview with R5, 04 August 2010).

The facilitator during the post-2007 election disputes also alluded to the uncompromising and uncooperative attitude of the government as the main reason for terminating the mission. The government did not accord attention to the facilitator's observation that the alliances formed by the LCD and NIP, the ABC and LWP respectively, contravened the electoral procedures of the Mixed Member Proportionality (MMP) electoral model; hence a distorted allocation of parliamentary seats which the opposition were vehemently contesting as it granted unfair advantages to the parties which formed coalitions. The government also snubbed the facilitator's suggestion to invite the MMP expert Professor Eklirk to assist in breaking the impasse by granting his expert views and opinion on the operational modalities of the model. The Lesotho dialogue facilitator demonstrated at length how the government frustrated his mediation efforts. He held that “[t]hings went very well for a period but then... as the discussion developed people felt more and more sure that the government had cheated and was not prepared (1) to own up that they had cheated and (2) to do something to ameliorate the situation and (3) the more vocal the opposition became, the more government wanted to show they are not going to give in” (interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). A suggestion by the facilitator to invite the MMP expert, and appealing to the negotiating parties to then sign a Memorandum of Agreement on what the expert would have determined, unleashed a governmental negative response to the effect that the election results should not be altered irrespective of the determination by the expert. No doubt the opposition also rejected this suggestion by the government as disingenuous and against the spirit of fair negotiations. When the facilitator contested that such an undertaking would be tantamount to pre-judging the expert's findings, the government refused to sign the proposed Memorandum of Agreement. “So at that point I felt my purpose in Lesotho had come to an end because why should I be continuing to claim this is Lesotho I know when these people are not prepared to go ahead with the negotiations” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 211). In view of the consistently mentioned government uncooperative
stance, the BNP official observed that this confirms their position that “the government doesn't want peace because they think that they will be supported by SADC through its armed forces” in case of any threats against it (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011).

The SADC is constantly accused by most of the participants from the opposition and the academics interviewed in this study for failure to support the dialogue facilitation process to pressure the government to concede to some of the peace initiatives as they would have gone a long way to resolve the political impasse in the Kingdom. The ABC Youth leader lamented the fact that the SADC has “engaged Ntate Masire; he has recommended, but the SADC does not back up the ideas of Ntate Masire....Nothing so far that deal with the recommendations. So I don't see SADC backing up those recommendations. ...So I wonder why they have commissioned him to intervene, unless they were just trying to buy time or engaging themselves as a regional organisation” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2011). According to one participant from the royalty in Lesotho, if the SADC and the government of Lesotho had supported, resourced and implemented the Masire recommendations and suggestions, this would have made a positive impact on the political landscape of the Kingdom (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011).

To those who hold this view, the failure and/or reluctance by the SADC to reinforce the dialogue recommendations goes to show how determined SADC was to keep one of theirs in power no matter how detrimental that was to regional stability and security. It can be logically argued that the intransigent resilience by the LCD government to peace initiatives might have been born by the knowledge that “…this body (SADC) cannot arm twist them or make them do anything... for a better change” (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011). The MFP official lashed out that SADC should “…keep a fair hand in dealing with the personalities involved. It is no use in coming to intervene, if you go and talk to the guilty man privately [and] when he defies you, you say well, the man is the Prime Minister; after all we have to give him an opportunity. I mean this is just nonsensical” (Interview with R 15 07 July 2011). On the basis of this seemingly unsupportive posture by the SADC, the BNP leader said, “[s]o we have no faith in SADC whatsoever and we don’t even know what SADC is all about. It’s just you know a paper tiger that is making a lot of noise but you don’t see it doing anything to try and protect the ordinary civilians against abuse by the governments” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011).

It was within this context that the BNP and the MFP interviewees vowed never to allow any SADC military intervention in the country since it had made the government more autocratic against its people as it was assured of SADC assistance. Reflecting his determination to oppose any future SADC military interventions in Lesotho, the BNP respondent posited that “[w]e have had enough of that. I don’t think we will allow any SADC army to come into our country again. Never. It won’t be the same. I can make you believe we shall fight; we shall fight” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). The MFP respondent clearly stated that “[i]f there was to be anything that comes, I think I would resist
their coming in. If they feel they are forced to come in they must come by force; I would resist it. They have acted so poorly that I would resist it” (Interview with R 15, 07 July 2011). In this sense the SADC, if indeed it was a SADC mission, “should be more towards listening to the people; doing what is in the best interest of the people; not what is in the best interest of a ruler or a person in power. In other words SADC can only be successful if it tends to be more of a people centred entity rather than ruler-centred entity” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). The Coordinator of the Transitional Resource Centre Development for Peace, a non-governmental organisation for promotion of peace and democracy in Lesotho, felt that while the SADC successfully restored the government in 1998, it did that at the expense of democracy and detriment of its integrity and image especially among the opposition in Lesotho (Interview field notes with R 21, 09 August 2010).

8.4 Views that the 1998 intervention was mandated by the UN
Several questions, as indicated above, were raised as to whether the 1998 intervention was mandated by the SADC. Many respondents felt that it was not authorised by the UN therefore it was illegal, a violation of the Lesotho sovereignty and international law on intervention as stipulated in the UN Charter, Chapter 53. Some of the respondents held the view that the SADC, as the regional body of which Lesotho is a member and has ratified its treaty and protocols, was within its mandate when it launched all 3 missions in Lesotho (1994, 1998 and 2007). Concentrating on the 1998 military mission -as it was the one almost all the opposition participants denounced as illegitimate - they had issues in defence of the SADC action. These are detailed below.

8.4.1 SADC has the Mandate to Intervene in Regional Conflicts
Firstly, some of the participants maintained that the SADC as the regional bloc has an obligation in its own right to maintain regional peace, security and stability. This responsibility, according to those who hold this view, is enshrined in its founding treaty (1992) and security protocols establishing the SADC OPDS (2001) and the MDP (2003). Through these instruments, the SADC has pledged to engage in collective efforts against any threats to regional security be they internal, intra- or inter-state conflicts. The UN Charter, Chapter VII, articles 52, 53 and 54 recognises the significant roles of regional organisations, solely or in partnership with the UN Security Council or the AU Peace and Security Council. They argued that the SADC as the regional body was duty bound to act when one of its signatory members was in political turmoil which jeopardised internal and regional peace, security and democracy. They are also of the view that the SADC countries, as observed by Basupi (2007: vi) are first “the most likely to feel the negative effects of the conflict and are consequently interested in its resolution; secondly, they understand the issues at the centre of the conflict as well as the actors involved better than ‘outsiders’; and thirdly, they command moral authority and legitimacy both from within the international community as well as the member countries in their attempts to mediate in local conflicts.” In other words, it is assumed in international relations, that states in a particular geographical region would be in a relatively advantageous position and better acquainted with the conflict
causal problems, the nature and complexities of the regional conflicts, the contextual particularities of the conflicts; characteristics and motives of the belligerent parties and therefore could devise well-informed strategies of resolving or managing regional conflicts. As Burton and Dukes (1990: 19) correctly observe, “[b]y understanding conflict we may learn about the probable characteristics of war under different conditions and the methods most suitable for regulating, preventing and winning wars.”

It is this understanding which informed the United Nations’ Security Council particularly during the post-Cold War era that partnerships with regional blocs were essential if global peace and stability were to be achieved and sustained. This motivation also emanated from the fact that the major powers which control the Security Council had become unwilling to commit their material and military resources in the Third World as the ideological conflict had subsided and their individual economic, political and strategic interests were no longer endangered by each other. Simply put, “major powers are increasingly reluctant to become embroiled in military intervention(s) beyond the confines of their geopolitical and national interests” (Du Plessis 2000: 19). Within this new political climate, the United Nations and the big powers devised policies such as empowering the regional organisations with the responsibility to resolve conflicts in their respective regional zones. In light of this, Odunuga (1999: 51) advises that “African leaders will have to summon the political will to pull the continent out of the present morass in which it has been bogged down for too long. Thereafter, the international community will itself be obliged to be a partner in progress.”

It was in this context that resolutions like “African solutions to African problems” were brought up. In the case of Africa, the end of the Cold War and the resultant withdrawal and reluctance of the UN and developed world to be involved in Africa was followed by a plethora of conflicts which threatened the little gains of independence. This also motivated African leaders to strengthen their regional blocs to deal with regional conflicts. Evidently, different regional organisations such as the ECOWAS and SADC formed security wings of their regional groupings. The ECOWAS formed the ECOMOG which subsequently intervened to quell conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone; the SADC formed its OPDS and the MDP which facilitated the interventions in the DRC and Lesotho and currently Zimbabwe and Madagascar. The respondents therefore used these political scenarios to justify the SADC intervention in Lesotho as legitimate and within the framework of the post-Cold War international relations arena. The Director of the Security Organ argued that although the UN Charter requires regional bodies to request permission before intervening, it also allows them to intervene in emergency crisis situations and report to the UN thereafter. He explained that the 1998 Lesotho situation was an unfolding coup against a legitimately elected government which the Geneva Convention, the UN, the AU and regional organisations in their diverse manifestations are opposed to, and have pledged collectively to nip in the bud wherever and whenever it emerge. He said: “I want to mention again [that] in 1998 and even all other interventions are also in line with the Geneva Convention which clearly says that no way that the AU
can accept coups. The SADC treaty and protocols are also taking...the cue from that convention” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010).

According to the Organ Director, the SADC abided by the UN and AU Charters, the SADC treaty and protocols. Reinforcing this point, he stated that “The UN and the AU Charters say if there is a need, a region can take collective response and report to the UN later. The UN and AU are now concerned with what happened in Rwanda in 1994 and no leader would like to see that happening again. So there are certain tough times and the scenario is that you are allowed intervention in a member state” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). In the same vein, Sessay (2000) argues that the ECOWAS military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were carried out without prior authorisation of the United Nations’ Security Council but were retroactively endorsed by the UN and the AU. This “endorsement of the ECOWAS initiative in Liberia can be seen as a tacit devolution of responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and security by the UN, one of its primary missions” (Sessay, 2000: 235). In fact, according to one official from the SADC security organ interviewed in this study, in an ideal situation, the regional organisations should not be subordinate to the UN and the AU in case of needing to make a decision on whether to intervene or not and on what methods to use when faced by crisis in their respective regional zones. He elaborated that “[t]he relationship between the AU and SADC ...is not the other way round. SADC composes of sovereign regional states. SADC proposes to the UN and AU. The AU does not have the power to direct regional organisations on what to do. That goes for both of them” (Interview with R 1: 28 May 2010). However, according to the UN and AU Charters, regional organisations are required to consult the two bodies before intervening especially in cases where coercive measures are to be employed. This is important because with the authority of the UN, the mandate of the regional organisation would carry weight as testimony of the collaboration and partnership of the two in promoting global peace. It was for that reason that in Article 11 of the Organ protocol on methods, item (d), the SADC stated that the summit shall resort to enforcement action as a last resort and in accordance with the UN Charter. That the SADC did not procure the authorisation of the UN Security Council before the intervention in Lesotho indicates how the organisation contravened the clauses to that effect.

The view that the UN permits regional organisations to intervene in emergency situations and report later, was shared by several respondents in this study. One such respondent pointed out that “[t]he UN in one of its clauses gives the subregional bodies [mandate] to deal with an emergency [and] subsequently to seek UN Security Council approval later....The logic is that sometimes the situation on the ground is such that, you have to prevent loss of life. You cannot run to New York when people are dying. So as a contingent measure regional bodies like SADC are allowed to do whatever they can do to save lives. But then seek the sanctions of the UN. ...We didn’t want a holocaust to happen. After Rwanda I don’t think anybody would like to see a similar situation unfold” (Interview with R 12, 14 June 2011). The UB academic noted that although it appeared to contravene the UN Charter, it had to be
carried out because there was threat to human lives, law and order in the Kingdom. He said “[y]ah, so it was ratified in retrospect; so clearly it was untidy but you know war or instability is something that has to do with peoples’ lives; you cannot just sit back... when people are engaged in violent deaths, arson and other illegal acts...you have no other way but to use force...as a means to an end...to restore law and order...You cannot wait for a summit of the Head of states to convene first, by then people are gone” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). According to the NUL academic, the 1994 and 1998 protests naturally kept the SADC worried because “…they involved a lot of nasty political episodes... As you remember the killing of the former Deputy Prime Minister among others...and the government had collapsed” (Interview with 16, 07 July 2011).

As such, it was in accordance for the SADC as the regional body of which Lesotho is a member and has ratified all its treaties and protocols, to intervene to restore order. For the NUL and UB academics, the fact that the SADC, albeit retroactively, officially took the responsibility and acknowledged that the Lesotho and the DRC missions were sanctioned by the SADC, should be reason and evidence enough that it was a SADC mission. The NUL retired academic argued that although the operation created suspicions and gave the impression that it was not a SADC but South African hegemonic invasion, “…people learnt later that SADC was accountable; ... and actually accepted its role” (Interview with R 7: 07 July 2011). The issue of retroactive approval of regional intervention is contended by Du Plessis (2000) as a travesty of international law as it can easily be abused by stronger member states against weaker states with the assurance that if supposedly convincing reasons couched with the right vocabulary such as humanitarian peace operations, defence of democracy and so forth are raised, the operation would be endorsed by the regional body, the AU and or the UN.

8.4.2 Intervention was Mandated by the SADC

Secondly, on the question of whether indeed the 1998 mission was mandated by the SADC and therefore a SADC operation, the aforementioned participants emphasised that it was nothing else but a SADC-mandated intervention. Responding to the question, one of the interviewees, who led the BDF contingent in Lesotho during operation Boleas opined that “I believe that such commentators, there is a motivation for them to say whatever they are saying. And you know politicians will normally differ especially coming from different camps and you will find that those who say that are politicians who are probably the adversaries to the ruling parties in their countries” (that is Lesotho, South Africa and Botswana) (Interview R 11, 04 May 2011). Unsurprisingly, that was the case as most of the criticism regarding the military intervention came from the opposition entities in the countries which were directly involved. The respondent further revealed that he recalled a meeting held at a South African staff college at which the SADC sanctioned the military intervention to restore order in Lesotho in 1998. According to another participant the September 1998 Mauritius SADC summit of heads of states authorised the SADC intervention through the Troika of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe as per the 1994 Memorandum of Agreement which entrusted them as the
guarantors of peace, democracy and stability in Lesotho (Interview with Respondent 12, 16 June 2011). This perspective is also corroborated by de Coning albeit with a slight variation on the countries delegated to undertake the intervention. He points out that “[s]ome commentators believe that the Lesotho Prime Minister requested SADC military assistance at the SADC Summit in Mauritius. Some suggest that a decision was taken at the Mauritius Summit authorising South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique to deal with the matter on behalf SADC...” (de Coning 1998: 3).

In the same vein, another interviewee who is the Secretary General and a Minister in the LCD government said the question of whether the 1998 operation was a SADC mission or not is unfounded and misleading, as the SADC member states never differed on the Lesotho mission. He asserted: “SADC has never said that...even at once...SADC has never complained...as the organ... you know, if there was any quarrel within SADC that we are not happy.” He further established that, unlike Zimbabwe and the DRC where it is on record that member states differed on the approach to mediating the conflict, on Lesotho “[w]e did not have any country saying what this one did was wrong...If somebody was saying no there was a dissenting view from SADC that this would not have happened; but I don’t remember any [SADC] country saying that...It is certain people [who] have the audacity to say things like that; they don’t indicate that it is their view” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). The respondents, who hold the view that the 1998 mission was mandated by the SADC, argue that the mission was in line with the Memorandum of Agreement signed between the SADC Troika of Mugabe, Mandela and Masire who brokered the 1994 political impasse. As one of the respondents explains it, “[m]ilitary intervention was necessitated by a deterioration of the security situation in Lesotho. There has been a diplomatic process that has been going on since 1994; and this diplomatic initiative was by Presidents Masire, Mugabe and Mandela who were declared as guarantors of the diplomatic process in the country” (Interview with R 12, 14 June 2011). One of the respondents, who was part of the SADC Troika and also facilitator of the post-2007 dispute dialogue confirmed that, “[t]his is where the Memorandum of Understanding came in. We had to give an undertaking that we shall be eh umpires; we shall look at the play and adjudicate where we feel anyone of the two parties had gone against the agreement” (Interview with R 10, 20 May 2011).

According to these participants, the fact that Botswana and South Africa led the SADC military mission in Lesotho is evidence enough of how the two countries were committed to carrying out the SADC 1994 mandate. A retired BDF Brigadier who was involved during both the 1994 and 1998 missions noted: “[t]here was a memorandum of understanding which was signed by His Majesty King Letsie III, the then Rightful Honourable Ntsu Mokhehle, the Presidents of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe who acted as guarantors and they remained seized with efforts to secure peace and stability in Lesotho” (Interview with R13, 16 June 2011). Therefore according to proponents of this perspective, South Africa and Botswana carried out the operation on behalf of, and on the authority of, the
regional body. According to Snyder (1999), “[t]he Troika was determined not to allow a military coup in Southern Africa” and they also justified their intervention by appealing to the Harare Declaration of 1991 which called upon all SADC member states to collectively and jealously guard against any threats to democracy, democratic processes and institutions, rule of law and democratic governance (cited in Ngoma, 2005: 165).

8.4.3 SADC Intervention for Humanitarian Reasons

Thirdly, the arguments that the intervention violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lesotho, is also contested by this group of participants. In the first place, they argue that in its founding treaty and security protocols, the SADC had clearly stipulated that it would intervene by any means necessary, coercive measures included, in cases of grave human rights violations, genocide and large-scale violent eruptions within and/or between any of its member states. Since Lesotho was on the verge of civil war during both the post-1993 and 1998 election disputes, the SADC had to intervene to thwart the deterioration of the situation which could have imperilled regional security and development. Such operations are covered by the UN Charter under the umbrella of humanitarian support or peace operations. This is in congruence with the assertion by Lyons and Mastanduno (1995: 3) that, “we are currently witnessing the emergence and recognition of a legitimate ‘right’ to intervene in the domestic affairs of [other] states in the name of [international] community norms, values or interests. Instead of the view that intervention in international conflicts must be pre-emptively illegitimate, the prevailing trend today is to take seriously the claim that the international community ought to intercede to prevent bloodshed by whatever means available.”

In the views of Pukesh (1995) and Sessay (2000), under circumstances of bloodshed, genocide, exploitation and persecution of minorities by the state or any group, massive refugee outflows and other forms of humanitarian emergencies, the international community and or the relevant regional organisation should intervene. The concerned “state’s claim to sovereignty can be set aside... [as] its sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct... Other countries should feel free to take any actions necessary to restore law and order in the affected state or states” (Sessay, 2000: 198). Humanitarian intervention should also be justified “...when the state has virtually ceased to exist [and] when there is no effective civil authority... Since there is no state, the question of respecting its autonomy simply did not arise. Its subjects are rendered political orphans and need a period of time to sort out their collective affairs...” (Parekh, 1995: 23). The retired NUL academic concurred and commented that the situation in Lesotho was so ghastly that the SADC had to intervene, even if it was to trigger criticisms of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lesotho. He maintained that “[i]t is now generally accepted in some extreme cases, sometimes for humanitarian reasons, countries can intervene and violate that sovereignty if they were to restore order and protect human life” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). The retired academic further cited the humanitarian interventions of the ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone which did not have to await authorisation by the UN because there was an emergency situation and the governments in the particular countries had collapsed as cases in point. Illustrating this point, Sessay (2000:
215) observes that “[t]he two operations were not directly sanctioned by the world body, but they both not only received retroactive approval from New York, the UN even played second fiddle to both ECOWAS and ECOMOG in the two countries.” In this regard, the President of Uganda defended the ECOMOG interventions by saying, “[w]hen we talk of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country, we mean one state which is functioning not interfering in another functioning state...we are not interfering in the internal affairs of Liberia because there was no longer any central authority in that country” (cited in ECOWAS Secretariat, 1998: 8).

The SADC has also consistently used the reasons of state collapse, defence of democracy, threats to human life, violations of human rights and general threats to regional peace as their motivation for the 1994, 1998 and 2007 interventions in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The LCD respondent hailed the SADC interventions as timely and having achieved their objective of restoring democracy, peace and stability in Lesotho. As he puts it: “[i]f SADC is a democracy; [and] one of its tenets is to ensure that there is, we democratise the region; and because that is one form of government which the world seem to be believing in all the systems we have...where democracy is at stake, they can be no other justifications more than that. Here, rule of law, democracy itself was at stake; so it was justified” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). This broad task of the SADC is covered under the jurisdiction of the Organ where the regional bloc pledged to intervene where there are coups or threats of unconstitutional means of attaining power as happened in Lesotho in 1994 and 1998. Therefore, since the SADC viewed the government as legitimately constituted, and they had been requested by such a government, the SADC was fulfilling its stated regional mandate.

8.4.4 Intervention Requested by the Government of Lesotho

Fourthly, the mission should be recognised as a SADC operation on the basis that in both cases, the SADC came into Lesotho at the request of the government of the day. In the cases of 1994 and 1998, the government had written official letters inviting the SADC to intervene. Most of the participants referring to the fact that the Prime Minister wrote official letters detailing the deteriorating security situation and the impending coups in Lesotho in 1994 and 1998, suggest that the mission was conducted by the SADC at the invitation of the legitimate government of the day. For instance, during the 1994 intervention, the then Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle of the BCP, wrote a letter to De Klerk dated 14 January 1994 in which he stated: “[a]s a result of a rapidly deteriorating situation in the Royal Lesotho Defence Force...[we] urgently request the South African Government to help us by dispatching a peace-keeping force Maseru...Our Army Commanders have been overpowered by the rapidly deteriorating situation...The situation is so grim as to warrant your government’s urgent...response...” (Government of Lesotho Letter to the Government of South Africa; 14 January 1994: 1 -2). The issue of SADC invasion and violation of the sovereignty of Lesotho should not arise. One of the retired BDF Brigadiers quoted a paragraph from the High Court judgement against the opposition protests in 1998 which states that the SADC military in Lesotho was in contravention of international law. “The law provided that if government does anything to assert authority in its mandate, it is not the legality of the
action, but rather the political authority that should be considered to prevail within the constitutionality of international law” (Interview with R 13, 16 June 2011). The retired NUL academic reiterated the fact that the intervention “occurred at the behest of the complainant...there was an official letter written by the Prime Minister of the country requesting South Africa to intervene; and by implication of course the SADC...So it was requested by the Prime Minister although paralysed... It was not a unilateral discretionary decision of South Africa” (Interview with R 16: 07 July 2011). In fact, on briefing the South African parliament on the 1998 mission, Buthelezi, who was the Acting President, stated that the letter from the Prime Minister of Lesotho was addressed to Presidents Mandela (South Africa), Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Mogae (Botswana) and Chissano (Mozambique (cited in Molapo 1999).

The respondent from the LCD maintains that there was nothing amiss with the letter being addressed to South Africa because she held the SADC chairmanship at that time. For a speedy response to mitigate the deteriorating security situation, the letter had to be directly addressed to the chairman for him to consult other members and the relevant organs of the SADC. On these grounds, the Lesotho sovereign government has the right to call for assistance because the “government was elected, whether people were questioning it or not; whether people question its legitimacy or not, they were a government; they were entitled to call for intervention. In their own view, and they would account to the populace whether it was right or wrong to do so or not. So it does not, in my opinion matter whether SADC did meet or decide, whether the UN did meet or decide and all this kind of things. A sovereign state can determine issues of sovereignty in its own jurisdiction” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Similarly, one of the officials at the SADC Organ unit argued that the accusations of a South African invasion of Lesotho do not hold water. In his view, “SADC member states within the region have bilateral agreements among others, of which you know, entail assistance in times of crisis. Therefore any time, I think any member state is free to appeal to SADC or any of the member states... in assisting to alleviate whatever challenges are there. As such in the case of Lesotho the coup was eminent, lives were under threat, the government was under siege [and] South Africa and Botswana helped SADC. They had the advantage in terms of their own protocols” (Interview with R 1, 28 May 2010).

8.4.5 Intervention for Defence of National Interests in International Relations

Fifthly, on the issue of South Africa having conducted the military intervention to defend its national interests, the participants in this group did not contest the situation that South Africa had both economic and political national interests to defend in Lesotho. In fact, in its national defence and intervention policy document, the South African government has made it abundantly clear that it will mainly commit its defence resources where its interests are at risk. This is an established trend in international politics and is the core of the realists’ theory that nations will often intervene where their interests are in danger or where they intend to establish some economic, security, strategic and political links to boost their national influence. Therefore, like any other nation in the world South Africa had the legitimate right to protect its interests in the Kingdom and if its economic hub was the Highlands Water Project, which
the South African military is accused of having swiftly captured upon entering Lesotho, so let it be. One of the respondents pointed out that with the Lesotho High land Water project “being their source of revenue, selling water from Lesotho, it needs not be a surprise that when an issue of this nature arises, then the immediate first port of call would be South Africa” which is the beneficiary from the scheme (interview with R14, 10 June 2011). Therefore, it should not be surprising that one of the motivating factors for the South African military intervention was to protect its economic and political interests in Lesotho. The participants further maintain that with Lesotho in crisis, the economic and political status of South Africa would no doubt be endangered considering the fact that Lesotho is geographically and economically in the belly of South Africa. The participants argued that there was no way South Africa could not be adversely affected by turmoil in Lesotho. As such, it was politically prudent for South Africa to intervene to restore order before the disorder permeated into its own boundaries with calamitous consequences. It would have been politically suicidal for South Africa to remain passive when there were fermentations which would no doubt boil across its borders. In the words of the LPC participant: “[h]ere was a political hotspot which was hanging in the bowels of South Africa; so to speak; so it was only South Africa which could be expected to keep order within the geographical area. No other power” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010).

According to Respondent 11 this was because South Africa was going to be a victim of the outflow of refugees from Lesotho subsequently jeopardising its own security and political stability. He stated: “South Africa was going to have its own toll of casualties in the sense that the life in Lesotho if it depreciated because of a state of anarchy, South Africa was going to be adversely affected” (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2010). One respondent aptly captures this complex economic and geographical relationship thus: “Lesotho is placed in the heart of South Africa with a lot of economic problems; the lack of capacity of the state to support the population. So...South Africa faces the ever present challenge possibility of Basotho crossing into South Africa because of economic problems. These are economic considerations but in a very negative sense. South Africa will always be worried by what is happening here [in Lesotho] because what happens here will force people to cross the border into South Africa and of course be a drain on South Africa’s resources” (interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). It is in this sense that the NUL academic contended the insinuations that South Africa may have been principally driven by economic self-interest in Lesotho. With these arguments and the established historical fact that South Africa has been, and remains the economic fountain of Lesotho in terms of provision of employment through migrant labour, and the fact that inevitably when there is a crisis in either of the countries people would flee to seek refuge in the other, South Africa should have considerable interest in the stability of Lesotho. Sharing the same view that economic motives could not have been the major driver of the South African-led intervention is Southall (2001) who argues that South African commerce has not been jeopardised by the political upheavals which had rocked Lesotho since the 1970s. He also doubts if the government which could have emerged from the coup would have interfered with the Highlands Water Project which is a major source of revenue for the landlocked and impoverished mountainous Kingdom.
The intervention of South Africa and Botswana is viewed as an act of good neighbourliness, a spirit of brotherhood and an indication of commitment to historical and cultural ties. For example, during the political turbulences in both South Africa and Lesotho, refugee flow from and to each neighbour was a common trend. Lesotho harboured South liberation activists while the apartheid South African regime gave refuge to the BCP’s Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) which fought the Leabua Jonathan autocratic regime from the 1970s to the 1980s. In the same vein, activists and refugees from both South Africa and Lesotho flocked into Botswana. In a way Botswana had an interest in the stability of Lesotho to prevent a refugee crisis in its territory. The UB academic illustrated the point this way: “South Africa especially was fighting or acting in its own national interests because if Lesotho burns, where will Basotho go? We in Botswana also had historic ties with Basotho. You would know that when Leabua Jonathan declared a state of emergency, where did Basotho refugees go to? They were here in Tlokweng. And we know how difficult it is to carry out national development when you have refugees in your midst...” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). The historical and cultural affinity between Botswana and Lesotho as one of the factors which motivated Botswana to send its contingent, reverberated in the responses of the NUL and UB academics, the retired soldiers from Botswana and the LDF soldier at the SADC headquarters. They noted that Lesotho and Botswana are linked in culture, languages (Setswana-Sesotho) and the fact that historically the two countries formed the British High Commission Territories with Swaziland during colonial rule. The respondents went further to establish that, apart from the cordial and professional approach displayed by the BDF, these cultural affinities partly contributed to the warm and hospitable welcome the BDF received from the Basotho during the 1998 operation. One of the respondents extrapolated, on this basis that, “[h]ad the intervention been led by Batswana, there probably wouldn’t have even been that resistance that was there...This is because they were culturally acceptable...less belligerent...and offensive” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2010). The participation of Botswana has been used as a rebuttal tool for those who want to only view the 1998 mission as a South African invasion for economic reasons. They argue that Botswana does not have any recorded economic ties and interests in Lesotho but were involved in the peace operation. This, they say, goes to show that the operation was a regional mission and the two nations were carrying out a SADC mandate in the Kingdom. It is logical to assume that these sentiments indicate that although Botswana had no recorded economic interests in Lesotho, it had cultural ties and was interested in seeing a politically stable Lesotho.

8.4.6 South Africa Played its Role as a Regional Hegemon

Finally, the participants who argue that the 1998 operation was a legal SADC peace operation maintain that there is no doubt that South Africa is the hegemon in the SADC region. After freeing itself from the octopus grip of apartheid bondage and attaining democracy and majority rule and joining the regional body (SADC), South Africa had, without any doubt, the legitimate responsibility to promote and defend sustainable democracy, peace and stability within the regional member states and the region at large. As an economically, politically and militarily powerful nation in the
region, South Africa has the responsibility to provide leadership in the integration and peacebuilding project. It was therefore the duty of South Africa to respond to the calls by the Lesotho government for assistance against the violent threats to democracy and peace. According to the LPC official, “If 1998 the democratic government was established [in South Africa], so it was easy for that country to intervene because it considered itself now legitimate to do that. The image of apartheid was no longer there. Even we ourselves here as the authorities of the country, we were comfortable except that it must still not be a South African intervention but it should be a SADC intervention” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). This was because Lesotho is in the bowels of South Africa geographically (and economically) and the disruptions in Lesotho would be precarious to its newly attained democracy, peace and security. Added to this was the regional pledge through the SADC treaty and protocols that the regional bloc would not at any time condone unconstitutional attainment of power and would use whatever means at their disposal to thwart such undemocratic tendencies. Apart from the proximity of Lesotho within South Africa, the latter was the country mainly poised to exercise regional leadership as the regional hegemon. History has shown that in all regional groupings, regional hegemons have inalienable responsibilities of maintaining regional stability. This was evidenced by Nigeria during the ECOWAS peace-keeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

As previously discussed, after the 1994 intervention, South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe were designated by the SADC as the guarantors of the Lesotho democracy. Hence, in 1998 Botswana and South Africa continued their task of defending democracy in Lesotho on behalf of the SADC. In the words of the UB intellectual, “they have already been committed to be guarantors of democracy in Lesotho [and] they were already involved in the process” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2011). Therefore it should be noted that to the extent that South Africa contributed the bulk of the resources and was largely engaged during the 1998 crisis in Lesotho, South Africa is the regional hegemon and has the responsibility to provide leadership in regional affairs. This is what regional hegemons do the world over, be it the USA in NATO or Nigeria in ECOWAS/ECOMOG. The South African-led intervention should therefore be viewed as a constructive benevolent hegemonic action to build and consolidate democracy and development in the region. That the South African-led intervention was actually invited by the democratically elected government to repulse an impending unconstitutional acquisition of power is testimony that South Africa was a maturing democracy engaged in a democratic mission for the benefit of Lesotho and the region at large. The SADC efforts through the establishment of the Troika of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe (1994), formation of the IPA and reforms of the FPTP electoral model to an inclusive MMP model, the retraining of the Lesotho army, and the intervention by the Masire-led dialogue facilitation may give credence to the perspective that neither the SADC, nor South Africa has any ill intentions in Lesotho. In fact the benefit of peace and stability in the sub-region would be of advantage to all regional members but mainly to South Africa as the regional economic and political power house (Mashishi, 2003).
8.5 Perceptions that the Interventions were motivated by Lesotho’s Weak Politico-Economic position

There are prevalent perceptions in international relations that interventions are usually uni-directional. History has it on record that military interventions, be they between states, regional or inter-regional, will always be carried out by powerful nation-states politically, economically and militarily against their weak counterparts. Conversely, “[s]mall states are susceptible to risks and threats, both internal and external sources. Such states have a relatively lower threshold than larger states, given the interaction between size and vulnerability” (Santho, 2000: 1). It is also a truism of history that each and every regional organisation has its own regional hegemon which drives the integration project in terms of resources, political influence, and policy direction and implementation capacity. The same regional powerhouse always provides leadership whenever there are regional challenges which require measures such as military intervention, sanctions or execution of any major mediation for regional peace efforts. In the ECOWAS, Nigeria is such a power while in the SADC, it is South Africa. Such powers will always provide the bulk of the contribution be it financial, military or any other resource to assist the operation. The perception is that whenever there are political disturbances in comparatively weaker regional members, the regional hegemons will be quick to resort to coercive measures to pressure the weaker member; while the same cannot be done where relatively powerful members are concerned. For instance it is believed that the SADC could not contemplate military intervention in Zimbabwe because it is a relative power to contend with. Hence the SADC has continued to pursue quiet diplomacy in spite of its apparent failures in resolving the political impasse which has besieged the country for more than a decade. Expressing this perspective, one of the respondents posited that “[i]t begs the same question as to why when we saw that human rights were being violated in Zimbabwe whether there was any [military] intervention. And it also begs the question as to whether, if there were problems in South Africa SADC would be in a position to intervene...” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). Another diplomatic response depicting the reality of the smaller countries being victims of regional organisations’ coercive measures was presented by Respondent 10. He pointed out: “[n]o I don’t think we took advantage of the smallness of Lesotho but I think at the same time, it could have been difficult if Lesotho were South Africa. We would have wished to go in but would have found eh, the game was not worth the gamble. [As] we would not achieve the intended objectives...Certainly we thought Lesotho was...not as powerful as South Africa...” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). This answers Molomo’s (1998: 8) poignant question: “if there was an abrogation of democracy in any Southern African country, would the SADC forces intervene? Put more directly, “if the governments of Zimbabwe or South Africa faced similar problems, would SADC forces intervene?” Molomo goes on to state: “in the case of Lesotho one is hard pressed to dispel the thinking that it was the case of the strong prevailing over the weak!”

It follows therefore, as the LPC official observed, that “[w]hen it comes to the powerful members of SADC, no similar interventions can be conducted; whether it is South Africa or Zimbabwe. No. So Lesotho was an easy target because of its small size” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). This position fits well with Molomo’s (1998: 8-9) assertion that
“Lesotho finds itself in an unenviable geo-political situation of being totally surrounded and economically dependent on South Africa. In order to assert its independence and sovereignty, it has to find the right balance to co-exist with its powerful neighbour on mutually beneficial terms. The maintenance of that balance has not been easy for the Kingdom.” In the same vein, Matlosa (1993: 127) portrays Lesotho as an extraordinary case of economic captivity and political pliability almost unparalleled in the sub-region which in turn casts doubts on the country’s integrity and independence.

This perspective was vociferously and forcefully portrayed by the opposition MFP, BNP and BCP political parties’ participants during the interviews. The contending voices suggest that maybe South Africa wanted to flex its muscle as a hegemon within the SADC region. The proponents of this perspective argue that South Africa had attained multiparty majority rule and democracy and would tend to exert its power in the region by testing its military might on smaller regional powers. To this end, the Lesotho political turmoil provided an opportune moment for such an act where the regional hegemon would flex its political muscle through the regional body. As Mashishi (2003: 83) observes, “a sub-regional organisation is only effective when a hegemon wants to utilise it for its own purposes.” There have always been fears and suspicions mainly among the many and less developed SADC members that South Africa might use its economic and political might “to dominate the region and that these imperial intentions are bound to occur under the guise of humanitarian intervention or other similar peacekeeping ventures” (Basupi, 2007: 40). Matlosa (1993, 127) described the Lesotho political-economic dependency on South Africa as "hyperdependency” on which Lesotho “survives, feeds and grows” on, hence her deformed economic growth.

The painful reality is that the apartheid South African regime adroitly used the labour migration issue strategically in congruence with its regional "carrots and sticks" policy to pressurise its economically weak neighbours to toe its defined political line. For example, in 1984, South Africa threatened to cut down the number of migrant labour from Lesotho if the country did not sign a non-aggression pact with it (Matlosa, 1993). The central question was whether a black majority-led government would completely shed the apartheid aggressive posture of exporting violence to live in harmony with other regional members, promote peace, stability, regional integration and development (Ngoma 2005; 1999). Worse still, Lesotho has adverse historical memories of the apartheid South African forces which used to launch their murderous raids in the Kingdom at will. The South African apartheid government had also used its powerful economic position to suffocate the economically dependent Lesotho to force her in line with its inhuman political policies. Most cited was the time when the apartheid regime assisted a military coup against Leabua Jonathan’s government in 1986 for allegedly harbouring the African National Congress (ANC) guerrillas.

Given such a sour historical relationship, the Basotho should be forgiven for not thinking that even the black majority South African government may also fall to the same political posture against the Kingdom. As Matlosa and Sello
(2005: 51) put it, “the Lesotho situation is further complicated by its unique geographical position as a tiny state surrounded by a country whose internal and external policies have always been [the] object of profound distrust and therefore a contentious and perennial issue in its domestic policies.” In this sense Lesotho has, historically and to date, been a victim and prisoner of her geographical position, weak political status, fragile institutions of governance, a highly politicised military, lack of resources and a dependent economy (Matlosa 1993,, 1995, Molomo 1998, Santho, 2000). One respondent from the royalty in Lesotho summarised Lesotho’s gloomy position thus: “[w]e are completely surrounded by South Africa. We get everything from them. So they have all this upper hand. And the real politik, of course. If you say no to South Africa, remember what happened in 1986; the military coup; they were helped by the South African government because two of our borders were closed and poor Jonathan could do nothing about the problem. And then his government had to go on its knees. He had nothing. There was no paraffin, no candle, no petrol; nothing...” (Interview with R19, 07 July 2011).

The BNP official also highlighted how Lesotho is at the mercy of South Africa because of its geographical situation and weak economic position. He posited that “[b]ecause of our small size and our geographical position of being surrounded by them...they know that whether we go east or west, we are at their mercy. So they are strangling us; this is what they are doing” (Interview with; R 18, 07 July 2011). It is such historically entrenched experiences which moved the opposition political parties to view the SADC military intervention of 1998 as a South African military incursion on a small, economically and geographically vulnerable Lesotho. For example, historically, Lesotho has been a perennial supplier of migrant labour to the South African mines and South Africa has used the issue as a weapon to manipulate Lesotho politically. The apartheid regime sponsored the 1986 military coup against the BNP government because it had refused to sign the non-aggression pact through which Lesotho was expected to commit itself not to harbour South African liberation activists. In a similar vein the MFP interviewee saw the South African-led military intervention as a hegemonic stunt by a regional bully (South Africa) against its weaker counterpart (Lesotho). In his view, “...it was like the big boy threshing the small boy...They played that game” (Interview with R 15, 07 July 2011). The feeling that the SADC and/or South Africa launched a military incursion owing to the weak position of Lesotho was advanced by one opposition leader, Molapo Qhobela during the 1998 operation that SADC seems to be taking Lesotho for a SADC colony rather than a sovereign state. His passionate calls to the Basotho to resist the SADC invasion were reiterated by the BNP and the MFP respondents who staunchly vowed during the interviews to gallantly resist any future SADC interventions in the Kingdom.

However, other interviewees including some from the opposition, hold a different view on this issue. They argue that there is no way that the newly democratic South Africa would have wanted to endanger and tarnish its image regionally and internationally by invading a small and vulnerable member state for purposes of hegemonic entrenchment in the region. South Africa would have been more cautious since the ghost of the apartheid regime’s
invasions against the neighbouring states was still lingering in both the regional and international political arena. Instead, South Africa immediately after attaining majority rule, has established itself as a champion of democratic dispensation in the region and the continent via its political vanguard policy of African renaissance. As Mashishi, (2003) surmised, South Africa would not do anything that could jeopardise its newly attained democratic image. There is no shadow of doubt that a South African orchestrated annexation of a small and vulnerable neighbour would adversely affect South Africa’s political prospects both regionally and internationally. Entertaining such intentions would therefore have been contradictory to South Africa’s larger goals of providing political leadership in the continent through the SADC, the AU and NEPAD. Hence in response to the question, the LPC respondent said, “I don’t agree with the view that South Africa was mainly arrogant... It was also the new democratic government which was sensitive to African aspirations. It was building an image of itself internationally. I don’t think they would let this tarnish their image as the democratic government to come and act arrogantly over a small country” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). Another participant stated that he did not “see any hegemonious threats from the so called superpower in the SADC which is South Africa” (Interview with R 13, 16 June 2011). This is because “SADC treats all its members as equals and...any intervention is guided by legal instruments and also the UN Charter which clearly states the rights of the relevant parties” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). The ABC respondent did not entertain the perception that the SADC intervened in Lesotho because of its weak economic and political status. He clearly stated that “[w]e believe that they came here just because there was a problem. We don’t think of maybe because we are a small country they can do whatever they want to do because all the time they don’t come here but they only come when we have problems. So it means that they were here to prevent that problem. Well... we are a small country; we don’t have many forces...but I think they respect that... our country...It is us who always create problems...and they would be coming because we are a member of SADC” (Interview with R 8, 03 August 2010). Another respondent was brief and to the point. He asserted: “[e]ven in small countries, called weak, life is also very important. We cannot just sit down and say a country is weak when their soldiers are killing the leaders. So I don’t agree with that assessment” (interview with R 12, 14 June 2011). In other words, SADC could not and should not use the fear of being accused of invading a small country as an excuse for not going into a country bedevilled by crisis to restore order and save lives. In fact, the SADC has clearly stated in its security protocols that it would intervene in member states whenever gross violation of human rights, genocide and threats to democratic governments are perpetrated.

8.5.1 Why did South Africa and Botswana Oppose Military Intervention in the DRC

The participants were asked why South Africa and Botswana, the two nation-states which intervened militarily in Lesotho, were the same nations which vehemently opposed the Zimbabwean-led military intervention in the DRC. A variety of reasons were advanced by different participants. One of the respondents advised that in responding to the question, it is important to scrutinise the dynamics of the politics within the SADC region at the time. He reflected: “[i]t
may have been primarily influenced by the relationships amongst the Head of States within the SADC at the time... [For example] Zimbabwe was somewhat aligned to a number of countries that could see eye to eye whereas South Africa on the other hand and Botswana, may not have necessarily eh, acknowledged that position” (Interview with R 13, 16 June 2010). This was in reference to the intense differences which ensued in the 1990s between Zimbabwe (Mugabe) and South Africa (Mandela) as the respective OPDS and SADC chairpersons. The differences between the two leaders emanated from the struggle for control of the regional body. Their differences which coalesced around the operations of the SADC Security Organ visa-a-vis the mother body, divided the organisations into two camps. The Mugabe-led camp (Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola) advocated for a security organ autonomous from the SADC mother body when it came to making decisions to respond to conflict situations. On the other hand South Africa, Botswana and Tanzania held that the Organ should be subordinate to the SADC chair in its operations as per the SADC treaty. This is the scenario which led to ruptured SADC responses in both the DRC and Lesotho cases. The participants acknowledged that each of the SADC camps had immediate national interests to safeguard when they intervened in the two countries. As previously indicated, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola had their economic, political, strategic and ideological interests to protect in the DRC. Similarly, Botswana and South Africa felt compelled to quench the fires in their immediate vicinity because their interests would be immensely jeopardised by a collapsed Lesotho.

Also worth noting, according to one of the respondents, is that “the case of the DRC really was very fluid. It was not as clear cut as that of Lesotho...In the DRC, eh, in that vast country, there was no clear defined force that was in power. And in Lesotho, it was simply for Botswana and South Africa to intervene on behalf of one warring faction. In my view, I think it was the government” (Interview with R 17, 07 July 2011). Put differently, “Lesotho was much easier to safe than a larger problem which was never saved by the countries which militarily intervened in the DRC. If you comparatively look into the two cases, you find that in the DRC, almost fifty percent of African states intervened. But the desired results were never achieved and warring factions in Africa whoever had differences would want to have their playing ground in the DRC” (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2011). Resolving the DRC conflict was further compounded by the fact that there was no clearly spelled out mandate; no common desired result for the conflict among the warring factions, and the intervening countries had diverse and conflicting interests which hampered efforts to find a lasting solution to the conflict. That is the reason why the DRC conflict was dubbed by some commentators "Africa’s First World War" and "Africa’s scramble for Africa." On the contrary, in Lesotho (apart from the fact that it is a small country and the conflict was strictly limited to the capital city Maseru), from the military perspective one of the issues to consider is the geographical area of operation and the logical question to ask during the planning of the operation would be, "[w]hat are the available chances of successfully executing the operation given the existing geographical area of operation?” In the two scenarios under consideration, “the DRC is a complex country, the terrain is very difficult, the country is huge, there were a lot of forces that were involved. But in Lesotho, it
was a very confined simple issue, it was easier, the operation was more feasible” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Among other things in the view of the latter participant the South African and Botswana military contingents would probably be more familiar with the terrain of Lesotho than with that of the DRC.

On the basis of these perspectives the NUL academic hailed the decisions of South Africa and Botswana as reflective of maturity in their foreign relations and strategic in their posture. To him, military intervention in the DRC could have made political sense only if it was in defence of a democratically elected government as was the case in Lesotho. But at the time the Kabila senior government had come to power through the toppling of the Mobuto regime which was also dictatorial (Field notes from Interview with R 16, 7 July 2011). The Johannesburg’s Sunday Times newspaper dated 6 September 1998 (cited in Makoa, 1998: 21) also commended the South African government position on the DRC conflict. It posited: “[b]ut having been slow out of the starting blocks, South Africa since led with maturity, insisting on a dialogue and cease-fire and taking a principled decision not to send troops to that country. This stance does not arise out of an assessment of the tactical and strategic odds of losing soldiers in a foreign war. It comes out of the very hard lesson of the futility of conflict that South Africans have learned from the experience of their country.” The position of South Africa and Botswana that the DRC conflict should be addressed through diplomatic, non-coercive measures was vindicated as that was the measure which ultimately led to the resolution of the conflict instead of the military intervention as pursued by the Zimbabwe-led SADC camp.

However, Makoa also held the view that the decision by South Africa for coercive intervention in Lesotho and non-coercive means in the DRC was reflective of the vacillating nature of its foreign policy still haunted by the apartheid ghost. He posits that “unable to break out of the apartheid mould, the ‘new’ South Africa has maintained what can be described as a dichotomous, but rather ‘polarised’ Africa policy-an indifferent and hesitant, and an aggressive and bullish. The former is mirrored by the response to the DRC crisis, while the latter is exemplified by the intervention in Lesotho” (Makoa, 1998: 19). According to Southall (2001: 167-168), it revealed that South Africa’s foreign policy was in disarray. This is because “[t]he handling of the intervention was taken as evidence of inconsistency in South Africa’s post-apartheid policy...The shift from an insistence upon the need for a negotiated settlement in the case of the DRC, and the...imposition of a political solution in Lesotho, inevitably aroused concern.” In the view of Van Nieuwkerk (1998: 15), South Africa’s intervention suggested that it was based upon ‘ad hoccer’ and that it had not yet attained the right blend of strategies and practices to implement its proclaimed role as regional leader, mediator and peacemaker.”

8.6 Role Played by Civil Society Organisations during the SADC Missions in Lesotho
One aspect of critical significance in conflict prevention, management and resolution which regional organisations or any conflict-mediating body should embrace is the civil society organisations (CSOs). “Civil society organisation” is
an encompassing term which brings together labour movements, trade unions, religious and church organisations, intellectual and professional associations, NGOs, business community, private sector and pressure groups in their diverse formations. History and experience show that these groupings have influenced socio-economic, cultural and political policy formulation and implementation globally albeit with different impacts, successes and challenges. Their role in preventive missions is of paramount importance because they are highly representative of the different sections of the population and also command considerable support and influence among their members and from the societies in which they operate. In the words of Minear and Weiss, (cited in Jentleson, 2000; 12) “the hallmark of NGOs is their activity at the grass roots level...working on the frontlines...” It follows that they are deeply embedded in the socio-economic and political fabric of society. Their involvement would ensure the people own the intervention process, its outcomes and commitment to implementation of its resolutions to their logical conclusion.

Since they operate mainly at grass roots level, they are in a better position than the political elite to comprehend the day-to-day existential challenges affecting the ordinary masses. Based on this it is assumed that they can add incredible value to peace-keeping, peacemaking, humanitarian peace support and post-conflict peace building undertakings. In addition, it is assumed CSOs can bring new reflections, experiences, perspectives and insights to the preventive diplomacy processes. This is so because their strategies and approaches may not be so tainted by subjective political connotations as those of the warring parties. Moreover, although in some cases NGOs and CSOs may be partisan in their ideology and affiliations, they have a significant role to play in peacemaking and peace operation missions globally. For instance while the UN and any regional organisations are engaged in track 1 diplomacy (formal negotiations between representatives of the warring parties), CSOs can embark on track 2 diplomacy (non-official diplomatic overtures with the warring parties to ease tensions and open other channels for negotiations). At the end of the day, the two efforts would complement each other for peace to be realised. As Fisher (2011: 8) correctly observes, “[a] peace process is largely a matter of cooperation between different actors, parties and other peace mediators, governments, civil society and international organisations.” In other words, CSOs and NGOs will help to consolidate and develop the UN and regional organisation’s capacity to engage more effectively in conflict prevention, management and resolution. Lund (2002: 173) also observes that effective implementation of preventive engagements requires the collective efforts of governmental and non-governmental actors “...so as to provide the range of needed instruments (mediation, deterrence, institution building, etc) and resources to address the leading sources of the conflict. In the process, these actors form a ‘critical mass’ that visibly symbolises a significant international commitment to non-violent change. Rarely can any single actor or action prevent serious violent interstate conflicts.”

It should also be noted that CSOs are well-positioned to promote the new security thinking into the conflict prevention, management and resolution processes. The new security perspective expands the definition of security
to embrace the eradication of social ills such as poverty, discrimination and marginalisation (on the basis of gender, race, religion, and ethnicity), disease, environmental degradation, human rights violations, persecutions, oppression and exploitation as anathema to peace, security, healthy living, justice, democracy and freedom. The agenda of different CSOs is to promote the infusion of non-military interpretations of insecurity in the conflict prevention, management and resolution arena. Preventive diplomacy measures which take into consideration the needs, rights, freedoms and living standards of people are in a better position to identify and address the deep underlying sources of conflicts in society compared to the classic militaristic view of security and insecurity, hence coercive remedial measures. In fact, CSOs bring the civilian version, expertise and insights into the preventive diplomacy missions, and regional organisations should include them in their security mechanisms. For an example, the TRC Coordinator (Respondent 21) concurred that the SADC’s interpretation of peace and security is predominantly limited to the conventional realm of security for the defence of the state rather than human security. In this regard, CSOs are pivotal in infusing the human security aspects into its preventive diplomacy mechanism operational modalities and missions.

This section dwells on the role CSOs and NGOs played during the SADC preventive diplomacy missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The aim is to investigate the extent to which the SADC involved civil society during the peace operations and post-conflict peace-building period. It is also to examine the contribution of the CSOs in the promotion and building of peace in Lesotho. This is because it is envisaged that inclusion of civil society would “enhance the SADC’s capacity for, and expertise in mediation and preventive diplomacy and thereby heighten the prospect of success in regional efforts and resolve inter and intra-state conflict(s)” (Machakaire; 2011: 3). During the turmoil in Lesotho (1994, 1998 and 2007) civil society organisations such as the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL), the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (LCNGO) and the Transitional Resource Centre for Peace and Development (TRC) had tremendous input in trying to broker peace between the opposition parties and the government. The Coordinator of the TRC (Respondent 21) mentioned that in 1991, the TRC organised a national conference to provide a forum for all political parties to discuss and share experiences before the 1993 elections. The Coordinator stated that this was motivated by the volatile political climate which then existed, especially between the BNP and the BCP as evidenced during the campaigns. The purpose of the national conference was therefore to educate the politicians on the importance of peace and prepare them for a common understanding of the democratic dispensation in the Kingdom. He noted how both the BCP and the BNP viewed the national conference with suspicion and the two rival parties were reluctant to participate. (Field notes from interview with R 21, 10 August 2010) In the same vein, the LCNGO Coordinator (Respondent 22) also indicated how they facilitated mediation between the government and the opposition to inculcate values and ideals for peace and peaceful resolution of the political impasse. The three CSOs (CCL, TRC and LCNGO) also attempted to broker talks with different opposition political parties and the government after the 2007 elections but in vain (Field notes from
interviews with R 9, R 21 and R 22, August 2010). All these efforts were carried out by the CSOs on their own, as local groups with vested interests in the defence of peace, democracy and stability in Lesotho.

8.6.1 Perceptions that SADC did not officially involve CSOs

Evidence from interviews with four participants from the TRC, LCNGO and the CCL revealed that during the 1994 and 1998 SADC preventive missions, the regional body did not officially involve the CSOs in finding the solution to the conflicts. In the words of the TRC Coordinator, they “became intruders...SADC came in to force parties to dialogue” (Interview with R 21, 09 August 2010). The LCD respondent acknowledged that the CSOs were not formally involved but were only consulted about the process. He stated that regarding the 1994 and 1998 SADC missions, “I don’t know to what extent but I think there had been consultations with civil society” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). The LCNGO Coordinator noted that while they were invited during the 2007 Masire-led dialogue facilitation, they did not play an active role in the talks. Instead they were just “observers; point of reference with no formal engagement in the process” (Interview with R 22, 11 August 2010). On the other hand, the CCL Coordinator noted that he was not in a position to give testimony on the extent to which the CCL was involved during the 1994 and 1998 SADC missions because he was not part of the CCL administration by then. However, he confirmed the central role played by the CCL during and after the SADC dialogue facilitation. He indicated that in the 2007 mission the CCL was involved from the embryonic stages of the process. He said: “[w]hen Sir Ketumile Masire was given an assignment to look into the Lesotho post-electoral dispute, CCL was one of the NGOs that was involved right from the onset... we attended all the meetings in which he was the mediator” (Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010). After Masire retired his mission due to the collapse of the talks opposition parties wrote an official letter to the CCL requesting the organisation to take over the dialogue facilitation. Upon taking over the process, the CCL embraced the LCNGO and the TRC for a combined effort in driving the process of breaking the political quagmire and restoring peace and stability. In the view of the MFP participant, this was the only time the CSOs played a prominent and substantive role in mediating a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Lesotho (field notes from the interview with R 15, 07 July 2011).

Some of the participants noted that the SADC never officially involved the CSOs in its regional preventive diplomacy scheme. In response to the question regarding the extent to which the SADC involved the CSOs, the NUL academic markedly stated: “[n]ot really; not officially; they have made contacts with them...In other words they were missing from the official state sponsored specific resolution.” It was only after the CCL’s relatively successful mediation that the SADC appeared to have realised that “these guys have their own citizen resolution mechanism, hence the official support of the CCL initiatives” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). That may have indicated that “the role of the civil society in the SADC is not yet projected to its legitimate levels” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). The view that
CSOs were only informally consulted is echoed by the ABC and LCD respondents during the interviews for this study.

The BCP respondent clearly stated that the SADC did not substantially involve the CSOs during its missions in 1994, 1998 and 2007. Perhaps, in the case of the 1994 and 1998 missions, the volatility of the conflict situation could have thwarted any meaningful involvement of the CSOs. He responded to the question with: “[n]ot very much...I wouldn’t say the civil society was involved in a meaningful way...So much that when Masire left, not having completed the assignment...the churches took over and that is when now SADC endorsed them, which is an indication that they were never meaningfully involved in the first place before Masire failed” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). The BNP respondent was irascibly combative in his response. He confined himself to the 1998 military intervention and described the mission as an invasion of the Kingdom led by South Africa under the pretext of a SADC peace mission. There was no way Basotho civil society could cooperate with the invading forces. In his assessment, “[n]one of the CSOs ever supported SADC; they condemned SADC; so they would never mix with scum. This South African army was just a scum as far as we are concerned. It was not a professional army. It was just a group of hired assassins: a mercenary army” (interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). Viewed on the basis of the above responses, the SADC had a flawed mission as it did not officially involve the most representative organisations in the country in finding a resolution to the country’s problems.

8.6.2 Perceptions that SADC involved CSOs

However, there are research participants who felt that the SADC did its best within the conflictual context to consult and involve different CSOs in the search for the resolution of the 1994, 1998 and 2007 disputes in Lesotho. A retired Brigadier from the BDF who participated in the 1994 SADC mission in Lesotho made reference to the SADC conducting “a number of seminars and workshops where upon we had NGOs views represented....so that they should also appreciate the need for a shift from the pre-1993 elections” and embrace the evolving democratic dispensation. He further indicated that “the churches were very influential in that as we had a number of churches represented at different fora” (interview with R 13, 16 June 2011). That the CSOs participated during the 1994 SADC mission is also confirmed by a participant from the monarchy who noted that their involvement “was very satisfactory in 1994...They really did their best to involve the NGOs and stakeholders into the dialogue...And even marked other things to be looked after by the civil society itself...So they did really have a forum and we applaud that, we really want to salute the SADC for that” (interview with R 19, 07 July 2011). That the 1994 SADC mission involved CSOs is also confirmed by Weisfelder (1997: 35). He states that the Troika of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe facilitated “a national dialogue on reconciliation which would include all political parties and interested non-governmental organisations” during the 1994 intervention. Matlosa and Sello (2005) also indicate that the Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (LCNGO) played an important role in Lesotho’s historic return to
multiparty democracy in 1993 after more than two decades of one party dictatorship. In addition, Matlosa (1995: 127) noted how the LCNGO organised a march on the 26 January 1994 in opposition to external military intervention in the Kingdom (as per invitation by Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle). It advocated a domestic solution through:

- amnesty to all warring soldiers;
- special parliamentary session on instability in the LDF;
- national dialogue forum to address the crisis.

Matlosa also indicated the role played by the LCNGO in staging a 2-day stay away from work (22nd to 24th August 1994) to pressure King Letsie III into restoring democratic rule in the country. It also joined combined protests by NUL Lecturers and Researchers' Union, the Lesotho Law Society, Trade Unions and students to prevail on the King to call a national conference to “seek a solution as well as examine ways to prevent similar incidents from recurring in the future” (Matlosa, 1995: 127).

Although there is no concrete evidence that the King relented due to this pressure in conjunction with that from the SADC Troika; the pivotal role played by the LCNGO in striving to find a lasting solution cannot be discounted or ruled out.

Santho also noted the prominent role played by the Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM) in the formation and operationalisation of the Interim Political Authority during the 1998 SADC mission. It is on record that there were vicious debates and differences between the opposition and the government on how the IPA should operate. The LNCM vehemently appealed to all political stakeholders to cooperate and engage in fruitful and constructive debates within the IPA forum for the sake of the country. They noted that “[i]t is our considered opinion that the spirit and letter of this agreement will inspire all political actors in Lesotho to strive to deepen the country’s democracy and political stability. Our politicians must strive to accept each other. They must recognise that their main vocation is to lead the country and assure prosperity in the new millennium; not to compete in trading deadly political blows at the expense of the country...” They went on to indicate how the government and the opposition would complement each other in the growth of democracy in the Kingdom; “[i]n all democracies a strong ruling party needs a strong opposition. Without a strong opposition democracy is undermined and ruling parties are easily tempted to drift towards veiled authoritarianism” (in Santho, 2000: 3).

Among other things, the NGO initiated a post-conflict National Peace Accord (Building national peace accord) in partnership with other CSOs. The National Peace Accord Proposal marked the genesis of CSOs' unified input to the process of national peace building in Lesotho. Its core provisions required the promotion of a non-violent political climate in Lesotho, an inclusive multi-party democracy, political tolerance, freedom of speech and association and establishment of a non-partisan security sector all of which would enhance national unity, peace-building, democracy,
and social and economic reconstruction and development (Santho; 2000). Southall (2000) also noted how the CSOs, in Lesotho with the financial assistance of the United Nations’ Development Programme (UNDP) initiated the National Consultative Forum (NCF) which comprised a broad spectrum of society to enhance the functions of the IPA. The forum gathering, which was initially opposed by the government (LCD) ultimately, progressed as planned on the 21 and 23 February 1999. Chaired by the LNCM, it was attended by 350 delegates from parliament, the judiciary, political parties, chiefs, civil society and the diplomatic community. The forum resolved to reform Lesotho’s electoral model and laws and embrace a culture of democracy, tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Southall 2000). Southall (2000) also noted the role of the NCF in the organisation and facilitation of a two weeks workshop with the IPA to discourse on electoral alternatives, consensus and consensus building.

Ostensibly, the above evidence is indicative of the reality that CSOs organisations did not remain passive; instead they made commendable efforts in deciding the way forward for the country, with or without the partnership of the regional body.

To the extent that the opposition and the government ultimately cooperated in operationalising the IPA; engaging in electoral reforms and organising the ever peaceful 2002 elections, it can be argued that the CSOs had a positive input in the process.

Arguably, the bulk of the evidence from the interviews show that it was only after the withdrawal of the Masire-led SADC mission that the CSOs became officially active participants with the CCL in mediating the political impasse between the government and the opposition parties. Interviews with the two SADC officials from the SADC Organ did not yield any substantive responses on the extent to which, and how the CSOs were involved during the 1994 and 1998 missions. Their responses focused on the post-Masire CCL mediation as reflected by such statements as “[a]s we speak, the CCL is engaged with the mediation process” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). One of the officers emphasised the partnership between the SADC and the CCL as a commendable move. He reflected that “[c]urrently the Organ Troika is collaborating with the CCL to facilitate the dialogue between the parties. Of course they are making headways in that some of the processes which contributed to the conflict such as the review of the constitution are being addressed. Therefore, these are the matters that SADC is facilitating on” (Interview with R 1, 28 May 2010). Implicit and explicit in the evidence from the interviews is that upon realising the significance of CSOs in preventive diplomacy, the SADC accordingly endorsed their (CCL) peace initiatives and have deployed a team from the Diplomacy Unit and the SADC Troika to work with them. In a way, the endorsement was a commendable move by the SADC as it to some extent gave the process political weight and clout (Field notes from interviews with R 9 and R 22, August 2010). Although the process is still on-going, most of the participants hailed the CSOs for stabilising the situation and steering dialogue towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict among the political
stakeholders in Lesotho (field notes from interviews; August 2010; July 2011). As the CCL Coordinator expresses it, “SADC with its political authority was unable to decrease the political tensions among the political stakeholders but the church managed. Though no substantial benefits, the opposition have received, but the political stability in this country is now normal. In other words the church managed to normalise the political stability in this country” (Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010). He also acknowledged the recognition by the political parties in Lesotho that the CCL was the most appropriate CSO which wields the moral authority to mediate among the conflicting political parties. That regional organisations should tap in the expertise of CSOs and other internal experts is also alluded to by Azar (1990a: 37) that “[t]he possibility of resolving protracted social conflicts is enhanced by improved knowledge of the history of the dispute, of the needs and interests at stake, and an appreciation of the participants’ emotional investment in the outcome.”

On the basis of the above the respondents from the CSOs called upon the SADC to always integrally tap and utilise the local CSOs (internal structures’) skills and experiences whenever they are engaged in mediating regional conflicts. This is vitally important because they are in a better position and context to understand the origins, nature, emotions and dynamics of the particular conflict more than external actors. As Jentleson (2000: 12) puts it “...by both location and activity, NGOs often are the first...actors to become aware of conflicts in their early stages." Therefore CSOs are better placed for effective preventive diplomacy as it “requires the ability to sniff trouble in its early stages and then take steps to avoid it” (Jentleson, 2000: 11). Among other things, a combined force by the regional organisation and CSO would present a strong multi-sectoral multi-functional and multi-faceted engagement for positive results in the attainment of sustainable peace. This collaboration in preventive diplomacy is vividly captured by Lund (2002: 177) that “[o]ne of the lessons is that multiple actors and their respective policy instruments and political influence are needed to steer any given unstable country towards peaceful progressive change...What is ideally needed is for many actors to join others in collaborative assessments and country-specific conflict prevention strategy development...This is one practical step that could help to spread a culture of prevention.”

In the post-Cold War era NGOs have become increasingly and actively involved in both direct and indirect peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives. The United States Institute for Peace has acknowledged that NGOs have helped fill the void through private diplomacy when regional organisations are still constrained by bureaucratic intricacies and processes (Menkhaus and Ortmayer, 2000). Lund (1996: 7) acknowledges “the low profile but increasing contributions to conflicts prevention and management... and track two diplomacy” by NonGovernmental Organisations such as development organisations; humanitarian relief and refugees organisations; private foundations watchdog groups advocating human rights, intellectuals and institutions engaged in research on democracy building, research and training on conflict prevention, management and resolution. Their role is, among other things, to “…facilitate political and social interaction by mobilising groups to participate in political, social and
economic activities. [Their] role also includes providing checks and balances on government power, monitoring human rights abuses” and advocating on human rights issues in their diverse manifestations and effects (Barclay 1999: 32).

In view of the above, regional organisations should empower CSOs in their respective member states in terms of institutional building, training in conflict mediation and resolution skills and provision of technical, human and financial resources and support. This would go a long way in ensuring successful collective conflict prevention, management resolution regionally and globally. Illustrating this point Barclay (1999: 314-315) notes that the reconstruction, recovery and development of any nation emerging from conflict “...need closer collaboration between regional organisations, the international community and national authorities in government, private sector and civil society. It is essential that representatives of these organizations who work within the country towards ultimately achieving the same objectives cooperate in sharing information...These would facilitate the mutual reinforcement of efforts by the state, the region and the larger global community.” That being the case, one of the research participants gave thumbs up to the SADC-CSOs partnership in conflict mediation and resolution if their collaboration in addressing the post-2007 election dispute is anything to go by. He opines that “[m]ay be we are beginning to see, this kind of relationship between SADC and the CSOs evolving. And I hope it does, because...after the withdrawal of Masire, they [SADC] actually officially accepted the CCL as an important factor” to the extent that they were invited at the SADC Summit of Head of States in Windhoek (Namibia) in August 2010 (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). The government of Lesotho has also expressed optimism on the CCL facilitation of dialogue between political parties in Lesotho. They report that the CCL is currently supervising dialogue by Lesotho political parties and promoting a culture of peaceful resolution of conflicts without sacrificing basic principles of good governance and respect for the rule of law in the process (Lesotho Government Response to the Eminent Person 2010). Commenting on the pivotal role which NGOs play in conflict prevention, management and resolution, Lund (1996: 8) concludes that they are “able to play many roles that governments are unable or unwilling to perform, NGOs are becoming (explicitly or tacitly) more significant partners for governments and international organisations in preventing conflict.” This is essential because there is no single entity with the monopoly of knowledge on how best to resolve conflicts as they come in diverse forms and can therefore never be “straight jacketed” (Machakaire, 2011).

On the basis of the above perspectives, there is no shadow of doubt that civil society is crucial in regional peace operations. Therefore, regional organisations such as SADC should strive more to incorporate civilian elements such as human rights, religious, humanitarian, refugee, electoral units and labour organisations in their mission structures so that they are in a better position to influence a broader spectrum of society in the conflict context in which they operate. Such inclusive missions would help coordinate the partnership and efforts between regional organisations, CSOs, the UN agencies, donor agencies, the conflicting parties and the host government. This collaboration of local
and international non-governmental organisations and donor agencies would clearly enhance the peacebuilding capacity of regional organisations (Deconing 2004).

8.7 Challenges Faced by the SADC during the Lesotho interventions

One critical topic which was touched on in the conduct of this research study was to examine the challenges, problems and difficulties encountered during the SADC missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007. Studies on conflict have shown that conflicts are quick to emerge while it is a mammoth and intricate task to mitigate their effects and resolve them once they have erupted. In the view of Nathan (2010: 1), conflict mediation “like the conduct of warfare is complicated, volatile, unpredictable and risky.” Several factors are responsible for the complexities of transforming a conflict-ridden nation to peace and stability. The following are some of the factors: the harm and damage incurred by warring parties; hardened attitudes and resolve by parties to defeat the opponent; entrenched win-lose dichotomy between the belligerents; negative labelling of each other and incompatibility of the warring parties’ conflict goals, the warring parties understanding and interpretation of the conflict; the context and content of the conflict; the number of parties involved in the conflict; identification of an acceptable venue to all the parties; their willingness or unwillingness to negotiate the resolution of the conflict and generally the extent to which the mediating body is acceptable and considered neutral by all the warring parties. The mediating entity has to contend with all these challenges in addition to studying the conflict situation to master both its surface and deep, underlying causes in order to devise the appropriate measures to resolve it.

Furthermore, the mediating body is faced with the problem of whether they have identified the real sources of the conflict, the appropriate remedial measures and whether the warring parties would embrace their approach and strategies for addressing the root causes of the conflict. The UN and different regional organisations such as ECOWAS, OAS, ASEAN and NATO to mention but a few have had their share of the challenges posed by efforts to mediate intra- and inter-state conflicts in their respective regional zones. Restoring peace and stability in conflict-ridden countries especially in Africa has been elusive and dauntingly challenging (Adedeji 1999). Owing to this, Africa has been engulfed by numerous civil wars, some of which have become frozen wars. The case of Somalia is a living example. Since the withdrawal of the UN peace-keeping force, the conflict is raging on and Somalia is virtually a collapsed state. The poorly resourced African Union peace-keeping force has miserably failed to transform the conflict in any substantive way. In some cases, different regional member states would support different warring factions, further complicating the conflict and making it difficult for the regional body to function as a neutral actor in the conflict.

The task of mediating conflicts is challenging because regional cooperation through intervention in member countries for conflict resolution is replete with problems of distrust, intra-regional divisions, sovereignty issues and paucity of
resources to sponsor the peace-keeping and post-conflict peace building initiatives which are geared towards preventing the recurrence of conflict in the particular country (Adedeji 1999).

Against the foregoing background, respondents were asked to reflect on the challenges which the SADC encountered during the three preventive diplomacy missions in the Kingdom. The challenges faced by the SADC as expounded by the different participants range from operational, institutional, policy and economic, political and implementation constraints.

8.7.1 The Challenge of Quenching Violence and Restoring of Order

Firstly, the SADC had to deal with volatile conflicts to restore order for peaceful resolutions of the disputes. In 1994 and 1998 Lesotho was on the verge of plunging into full-scale civil war as the opposition, in collaboration with the military and the monarchy had paralysed the government of the day. The post-2007 elections were also characterised by violent attacks on the LCD government officials, an attempted assassination of Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili and heated disagreements over the allocation of parliamentary seats within the mixed member proportion electoral system. The SADC had the mammoth challenge of restoring the government, disarming the mutinous soldiers and appealing to the opposition parties and their supporters and the monarchy to calm down for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. The SADC was enmeshed between hostile camps to bring the rival political stakeholders together for a mutually beneficial settlement of the conflicts. The SADC suffered accusations and counter-accusations by the different rival camps. For example during the 1994 and 1998 missions the SADC was accused by the opposition of favouring the government of the day against the opposition. A large number of opposition participants in this study accused the SADC of giving an unfair advantage to the government during its intervention operations. According to one respondent “...the latitude given to the opposition in terms of negotiations on the way forward was a little bit wanting” (Interview with R 11, 16 June 2011). As the BAC respondent puts it “[w]hen we complain about the government and then the government is the player and the judge, it becomes difficult” (Interview with R 5, 04 August 2010). Said differently during the SADC interventions, “the government negotiated as the government not on the same par as the opposition parties. And that type of attitude makes it impossible for mediators to come up with reasonable solutions and recommendations. In other words, there should have been something which should have been done to neutralise the political power of the government” (Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010).

In both cases the SADC had the dilemma of recognising the government of the day which the opposition were struggling to topple. As the BCP official pointed out “[t]he intervention was merely to install a government that the opposition was saying no, this was improperly in place. So SADC was not able to map out a way forward that would satisfy the opposition” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). This put them in a situation of being accused as pro-
government and anti-opposition. For instance, the MFP interviewee accused the SADC for talking “to the guilty man privately” and when he defies them, they justify by saying “well the man is the Prime Minister. After all we have to give him an opportunity” (Interview with R 15, 07 July 2011). What further embittered the opposition parties was that the report of the Langa Commission, whose release the SADC delayed had alleged to fraudulent practices which marred the credibility of the results and the resultant government. The Mail and Guardian; 9-15 October, 1998; (cited in Makoa 1998: 18) observed that the report, in its original form (before being doctored) “questioned the legitimacy of the LCD government and called for re-elections under an interim government of national unity. But when South Africa and Botswana troops were sent into Lesotho, their stated aim was to reinstate the supposedly legitimate and elected LCD government.” In light of that, “it would certainly be wrong to hail the intervention as a positive development for it was meant to protect the status quo—that is to nourish and perpetuate this political morbidity” (Matlosa, 1998: 22). This is more so because “it is not completely clear at the time the decision to launch the intervention was made, SADC was wholly convinced that the LCD had not rigged the elections” (Southall, 2001: 161).

The Coordinator of the CCL advised that on the basis of such perceptions, the opposition felt the SADC was an organisation which interfered in the domestic affairs of Lesotho to reinstate the government without necessarily addressing the real issues and interests of the discontented masses. The view that the SADC was for the defence of the status quo was largely projected by the MFP, BCP, the BAC and the BNP respondents. The latter reasoned that the SADC “is a clique which is there to protect each other among the rulers.” He went on to illustrate that when people rise against the government of the day in the SADC region that is when the SADC comes in. But when it is the government massacring its people, as was the case in Zimbabwe, the SADC remain indifferent and passive. He therefore argued that “[i]n Lesotho it’s the same thing that happened. All these things that the LCD government has been doing against us, even ignoring agreements that have been signed; we tried to speak to SADC; we wrote to SADC, we sent emissaries to SADC. They just kept a blind eye as if nothing has happened...But once we start to rise against Mosisili, then you see them coming in rushing into the country” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). The opposition respondents maintained that the government’s intransigence in spite of the commendable effort which the Masire-led peace facilitation had made in resolving the post-2007 election dispute emanate from the government’s firm knowledge that the SADC would not engage against one of theirs. According to the Coordinator of the CCL, the problem “…is the reluctance to exact political pressure on the government to make sure that now the political impasse is resolved. In other words, SADC is now very diplomatic on this issue..”. Faced with such a situation, Masire’s “problem was that he was begging the government...Simply, he was nursing the feelings of the government by having to meet the Prime Minister alone begging him to cooperate” (Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010). However, the government viewed Masire as pro-opposition in his findings as he constantly accused the government of non-cooperation and frustration of the mission.
8.7.2 Failure to invite Opposition Parties during its Summits

The SADC also had to contend with the accusations that during its Summits of Heads of state, in which reports were given on the status of the crises in Lesotho, the opposition were never invited in spite of the fact that they were an integral aspect of finding a lasting solution to the problem. The opposition maintained that the fact that they only invited the government is evident enough that the SADC was biased in favour of the government as a stakeholder. The BAC official recommended that “[i]f there is a conflict, the conflicting parties must be treated equally [and] fairly, that is when you are going to satisfy conflicting parties. And whenever, there is a SADC summit, they don’t have to call only the government which is in conflict with opposition parties. They must call the opposition parties so that they hear two sides of the story...You cannot take one side ...and be able to make...a fair judgement or decision. They must always have the conflicting parties together... They should be objective in their approach; [Then] they can easily be in a position to draw consensus” (Interview with R 5, 04 August 2010). In light of the above, the BAC leader suggested that the SADC should form the opposition forum through which it could engage the opposition parties as stakeholders in the search for a durable solution to the Lesotho political impasse.

8.7.3 Government accusation of SADC as Pro-opposition

On the other hand, the SADC also faced the challenge of being accused by the government of siding with the opposition during its operations. For instance, during the 1994 intervention the SADC decision that the King should reverse the palace coup on condition that the government should reinstate King Moshoeshoe II, and disband the commission of enquiry set up to investigate Moshoeshoe II’s relations with previous governments was reluctantly accepted by the BCP government. The SADC Troika facilitated the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement between the monarchy and the Mokhehle government. In line with the Memorandum of Agreement signed between the BCP government and the monarchy Act no 10 of 1994 on the reinstatement of the former King was enacted and the King was reinstated on the 25 January 1995. Section 2 (1) of the act provided that “[u]pon the abdication of His Majesty King Letsie III from the office of King of Lesotho, His Majesty Moshoeshoe II shall assume the office of King of Lesotho” (Lesotho Government Gazette; in Makoa 2002: 11). It was the conviction of the SADC Troika that addressing the friction between the government and the monarchy would provide a panacea to the incessant political unrest in the country. As such they held that “[t]he question of the monarchy appears to be a very important traditional question and one that goes to the very heart of the Basotho society and underlies its present problems... hence the need to address it” (Report on Presidential Visit to the Kingdom of Lesotho; 1994: 13).

While it might have been undertaken by the SADC Troika in the spirit of give and take to find an integrative solution, it bred bitter feelings within the ranks of the BCP government which felt that the SADC was sympathetic to the monarchy. The feelings of the government were forcefully asserted by the BCP respondent that “[t]he question here would be how did we view that move by that intervention? ....it was just a SADC thing or it was just a thing of
neighbours who may be sympathetic to the Palace. I would say it that way eh because in their negotiations, they never said it was wrong in the first place for the King to have staged a coup in order to twist the arm of the government...Infact they worked towards putting in place exactly what the King wanted; the reinstatement of his father...a law was passed for the restoration of Moshoeshoe II to the throne...But some of us who already were witnessing that at the time felt that no, surely this is just eh an exercise of friends doing favours for each other” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). Southall and Petlane (1995: xii) expressed the compromise thus: “[d]ismayed by the implications of the overthrow of democracy in even so small a state as Lesotho, the governments of Botswana, Zimbabwe and-most importantly post-apartheid South Africa compelled a re-instatement of the duly elected BCP, albeit with instructions to the latter to address itself to outstanding constitutional issues particularly the question of the monarchy as well as to matters concerning the military.”

Another respondent felt that while a solution had to be found, the SADC should not have made the restoration of King Moshoeshoe II to the throne a condition upon which King Letsie had to give power to the democratically elected BCP government in 1994. He argued that King Moshoeshoe was not dethroned by the BCP government and therefore they were not obliged to reinstate him. He stated that “I agree that that was an issue to be discussed but not the condition...That is where really even though for the sake of peace, I accept what the SADC did, but truly speaking the government was supposed to be returned unconditionally...I think we swallowed a very bitter pill...There was no fairness in that...But unfortunately politics is also about power. So if somebody who has power demands something, you just settle for a compromise not because eh there is truth in what is being done” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010).

Similarly, the LCD government found fault with the recommendations made by the SADC post-2007 election disputes mediation team. In the view of the government, Masire was fronting for the opposition. In response to Masire’s report to the SADC that he was retiring the mission because the government was uncooperative, the government of Lesotho noted that while the Eminent Person initially conducted the task with diplomatic commitment “[a]s the process unfolded, serious difficulties began to show; and there was a perception, rightly or wrongly, that the Eminent Person’s Mission was not conducting its business in an open and transparent manner, which induced a sense of bias and partiality on the part of the mission. A simple, but significant example is the way information flowed regarding the Mission’s visits to Lesotho. In many a case, the Government would learn through the grapevine of the opposition circles that the Eminent Person was planning a visit to the country; and in most cases this would later turn out to be true, with the Government ‘honoured’ with a very short and belated notice of such a visit. At times the ruling party (LCD) would not be invited to or notified of meetings.”
The acrimonious contention between facilitator and the government emerged from Masire’s suggestion that the formation of alliances by the LCD and NIP and the ABC and LWP contravened the mixed member proportion (MMP) electoral model leading to the distorted allocation of proportional representation seats in parliament. The allocation of seats unfairly benefited the parties which formed alliances to the detriment of the parties which went into elections as individual entities. This actually violated the intentions and purposes which proportional representation aims to achieve. The BNP participant commended Masire that, “…at least [he] did say openly, no, I know where the problem is; and that thing hurt the government so much, but it was the truth” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). In the words of the dialogue facilitator “[t]he core issues were really that the ruling party (LCD) and the ABC had not obeyed the rules the same MMP was established for. That the parallel candidates were set with the view that the party that did not do well in the constituency elections would get something from proportional representation…Both of them linked with parties that they knew would not win elections and therefore could only come up in the proportional representation…they were joined and voted in the constituencies as one party instead of two different parties. And when it came to proportionality, the LCD helped their smaller party, the NIP and then ABC also helped their smaller party, LWP. And therefore the bigger parties won because the smaller parties helped them in the constituencies and the smaller parties won disproportionate number of seats because their votes were swelled by the votes of the bigger parties…Other smaller parties which had not joined the two coalitions did badly” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011).

The Lesotho dialogue facilitator had also suggested that the expert who recommended the MMP electoral model in Lesotho be invited to give an informed view on what went wrong so as to break the impasse but the government objected to all of Masire’s suggestions on the grounds that the High Court in Lesotho had ruled that there was nothing unlawful in the formation of alliances during the 2007 elections. On the response letter referred to above, the government of Lesotho vehemently opposed Masire’s recommendations. It categorically stated that “[t]he correct position is that Government had to act responsibly as the custodian of constitutionality in the Kingdom. The perspective of the Government was premised on a fundamental principle, viz. Respect for judgments and decisions of the courts of law, and Lesotho’s institutions of democracy, such as the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), and its integrity and competence…The courts have spoken on the matter of the validity or otherwise of allocation of the proportional representation seats, having held that there was nothing unlawful with party alliances which had been formed for purposes of contesting the general elections of February, 2007…Thus for the Government, there could not, conceivably, be another ‘court of experts’ to come to Lesotho and give another ‘judgment’ over and above that of a court of law in Lesotho” (Lesotho Government Response to SADC Eminent Person; 2010: 3 and 4).

One of the interviewees lamented the LCD government’s refusal to allow the facilitator to invite the MMP expert who would have brought in expert insights towards the resolution of the post-2007 election dispute. He observed that “Sir Ketumile Masire more than anything else was hindered by some authorities in Lesotho. They did not allow him to
bring the experts to clearly advise whether or not the application of the model was properly done. And without the answer on that one, we cannot up to now say the allocation of seats was right. One would expect that all political parties would have accepted that the experts were brought in to tell us exactly what has transpired so that any decision that is taken is informed by experts. But in the absence of that, up to now we still have gaps and I don’t see any possibility of going forward” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). The rift between the Eminent Person mission and the Lesotho government hampered any progress resulting in Masire terminating the mission mid way in 2010. Accusations and counter-accusations flew between the Lesotho government and the facilitator. While Masire blamed the government’s uncooperative behaviour, the government felt that “[t]he Eminent Person, who essentially was to facilitate the dialogue, [had] decided to descend into the arena of technical disputes between the contesting parties, and to make findings over and above as well as against those of the court of law. It is strongly contended that this is not the role of a facilitator, but that of an arbitrator and/or adjudicator...The Government of Lesotho views this attitude in a very serious light indeed, as it is clearly yet another instance where the Eminent Person joins opposition parties in their complete disregard, and indeed disrespect, of the institutions of State that buttress the rule of law and democracy in Lesotho (such as the judiciary, the legislature, and the IEC)” (Lesotho Government’s Response to Eminent Person 2010: 6 and 10).

Consequently, the SADC was faced with the challenge of dealing with an uncooperative government in trying to find a lasting solution in the Kingdom. According to one respondent who participated in both the 1994 and 1998 missions “[t]here had to be a number of interventions from external organisations to try and motivate the government of Lesotho to sit at a round table with all the concerned parties” (interview with R 12, 16 June 2011). Worse still, the SADC seemed powerless to pressure the government to bend to some of the recommendations which would have gone a long way in resolving the political impasse. In light of this, one of the interviewees argued that “[t]his body [SADC] is made up of all the countries in the SADC and then if one SADC member, just because it doesn’t want to relent, or give in, and then choose to be nasty when SADC advises, it means SADC has to be stronger” (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011). For example during the post-2007 mission the SADC had to contend with an increasingly widening rift between the opposition and the government of Lesotho. Each blamed the other for the collapse of the mission. The Lesotho government felt Masire was overriding the ruling of its High Court and the Independent Electoral Commission regarding the outcomes of the 2007 elections mainly to placate the opposition parties. These perceptions were triggered by the facilitator’s comment during the mission that the High Court had “decided not to decide” on the petition placed before them by the MFP. The SADC remained passive when the Lesotho government frustrated the SADC mission arguing that “instead of facilitating dialogue and agreement on the Memorandum of Understanding, the Eminent Person found it easier and expedient to apportion blame exclusively to the Government and the ruling party.” To show the deepening rivalry which was unfolding between Masire and the government, when the CCL took over the process, the government of Lesotho gleefully reported that “...the Christian Council of Lesotho
(CCL) has picked up the baton of dialogue which fell from Sir Ketumile Masire's hand. They are currently supervising dialogue by Lesotho’s political parties and promoting a culture of peaceful resolution of conflicts without sacrificing basic principles of good governance and respect for the rule of law in the process” (Lesotho Government Response to the Eminent Person; 2010: 5). The point here is that the SADC remained indifferent and powerless when their delegated mediator was subjected to such humiliation by one of their member states.

8.7.4 Perceptions that the 1998 Intervention was Illegal

Secondly, while none of the participants questioned the legitimacy of the 1994 and 2007, the SADC had to contend with excruciating questions over the legality of the 1998 mission as discussed earlier in this chapter. Controversy abounds as to whether it was authorised by the SADC or was a South African invasion. According to de Coning the most significant challenge faced by the SADC during the 1998 military intervention was the lack of transparency and clarity around the decision to authorise the mission. Numerous critics intimate that the intervention was not legal in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which specifically states that regional blocs such as the SADC should only undertake peace operations with the prior authorisation of the Security Council. According to Southall (2001: 167) “[t]here is little doubt that peace-keeping is essentially a UN responsibility, that it should be endorsed by the world body, and conducted in accordance with the international ethos of the UN Charter.” Since SADC had not sought such authorisation, it could not claim the UN’s endorsement (Southall, 2001). Therefore the intervention in Lesotho has always been “portrayed by its critics as illegitimate and partial to the LCD” (de Coning, cited in Southall, 2001: 167). No doubt then that the opposition parties were opposed to the military mission as a South African invasion to safeguard the LCD government which attained power through fraudulent elections. The SADC had to contend with the prevailing perceptions that the intervention was not a SADC mission but a South African incursion which blatantly contravened international law, encroached and violated the sovereignty of Lesotho. Justifying the legality of the mission was a mammoth challenge to the SADC, more so because it was, from the onset not sanctioned by the UN Security Council as prescribed in the UN Charter. In such a situation the SADC faced stiff resistance from Basotho opposition and the LDF especially in 1998 as evidenced by the high casualties and the massive destruction of property in Maseru. The SADC grounds that the intervention was in accordance with the guarantee of Lesotho’s stability assigned to South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe in 1994 and that they were invited by the legitimately elected government were not accepted by the opposition because in all the instances (1994, 1998 and 2007), the opposition was questioning the legality of the government due to the flawed elections/electoral process which brought it to power. Effectively, the SADC had to contend with protecting its tainted image among the opposition parties in Lesotho.

Given the prevalence of such perceptions, the opposition fiercely contested the legality of the mission as mandated by the regional body. Southall (2001: 167) argues that “even if the intervention followed from noble motivations, its
imperfect legality was always likely to undermine its success by providing a moral basis to the LDF and the opposition for resistance." The view widely held by the opposition respondents was that the 1998 mission was a South African incursion driven by economic motives. This view is aptly captured by Makoa (1998: 23) that “South Africa was spurred into this action more by its own interests than the reasons that it has provided...the intervention is more akin to conspiracy than to what it purports. Clearly a South African project, the military intervention is a contrived affair meant to intimidate government opponents and to defend investment projects such as the Lesotho Highland Water project...The SADC that is being touted by South Africa and Botswana is a smokescreen meant to win legitimacy for an essentially indefensible act.” What sparked more piercing questions on the legality of the mission as stated earlier was that the intervening forces from Botswana and South Africa hoisted two different flags on entering the Kingdom. Worse still, the agreement which permitted the intervention was signed between South Africa and the government of Lesotho rather that the SADC which is purported to be the authorising body. It was in view of this situation that De Conning, (1998: 2) concludes that “...it was unclear who took the decision? When the decision was taken? Where it was taken? And, what that decision was. It was unclear if there was any formal SADC decision that authorised the Lesotho intervention. If such a decision was taken by SADC, it is unclear if it was authorised by the SADC Summit in Mauritius, at the Ministerial meeting, or at a meeting of Chiefs of Staff. Assuming for a moment that SADC did approve the intervention, what was the mandate approved by the SADC for the mission? It was not clear therefore as to where the decision to intervene was taken.” In light of the above, de Coning (1998: 4) concluded that “what the confusion over authorisation does point to...is lack of clarity over what the correct authorisation procedure for SADC missions are? It emphasises the need for a clear and transparent authorisation process in SADC that will make it easier for all involved to immediately infer credibility on a decision taken after a pre-designed authorisation process has been followed. As the Lesotho intervention proved once more, clarity around how decisions of this nature are taken is crucial to the credibility of multinational missions.” What further exacerbated questions on the legality of the SADC military mission is that the OPDS and MDP protocols, the instruments on which the intervention was purportedly premised, had not been formally ratified by the member states (Molomo 1999, Southall 2001).

On the other hand the SADC had to contend with the government of the day whenever compromises which seem to accommodate the opposition had to be made. For example, during the 1994 intervention, the BCP government had hard feelings regarding the SADC compromise calling on the government to reinstate King Moshoeshoe II. They felt the SADC was unfairly sympathising with the monarchy against them as a democratically elected government. During the 1998 mission, the ruling LCD had serious misgivings about the Interim Political Authority (IPA) in which the opposition and the government were collectively involved in governing the country prior to the holding of fresh elections. In the view of the government, the IPA was an imposition by the regional body which forced the LCD to share power with the opposition that did not want to accede to defeat in fair and free elections. Hence, the
Similarly during the 2007 Masire-led dialogue facilitation, the LCD government felt Masire’s recommendations were geared towards assisting the opposition into toppling a democratically elected government. On that premise the government frustrated all of the facilitator’s recommendations much to the chagrin of the SADC. In the words of the MFP respondent, the Prime Minister “snubbed the whole process...He did not bother to attend meetings” (interview with R 15, 07 July 2011). The dialogue facilitator “did his level best but he could not move an inch because the government was so arrogant and you know they even insulted him” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). In view of this bickering between the government and the opposition parties, Petlane and Southall, (1995: xvi) noted that the sticking challenge to SADC “will be the development of a culture of political tolerance in Lesotho; a recognition by all major political actors that their opponents cannot be eliminated and a movement beyond the view of politics which sees the winner as taking all.”

8.7.5 SADC Operational Flaws
Thirdly, the SADC intervening troops confronted numerous operational challenges. The issue of lack of sufficient intelligence on the status of the dispute and the level of resistance which the intervening forces should be prepared for have been raised by several commentators on the Lesotho SADC interventions especially the 1998 military mission. Basupi (2007: VI) indicates that the SADC intervention forces were ill-prepared and unable to anticipate the magnitude of resistance they encountered in Lesotho “due to poor information gathering capabilities.” Consequently, SADC forces, especially the South African troops met formidable resistance from the LDF and opposition supporters who deemed them as invaders. According to one participant the intervening troops operated in a polarised, volatile and highly charged atmosphere and Basotho from different political parties were highly agitated against each other and they were equipped with lethal weapons (paraphrase from interview with R 12, 14; June 2011 and R 10, 23 May 2011). Another respondent based at the SADC Headquarter pointed out that “[t]here was resistance, massive resistance. As a result of the resistance, a lot of weapons were taken out of the armouries...arms just went all over and got into the hands of people who were not soldiers. So we had more than just armament of the mutineers and everybody else including the civilians themselves...” [Consequently] “the intervention force found it very difficult to carry out its mandate of disarmament.” On account of the chaotic situation as described, “it became very difficult to account for all the weapons; hence it took many years to fully disarm the whole society; it took efforts beyond Operation Boleas itself...There may be some weapons that may not have been recovered as a result of this process” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). If this is true, this is a haunting challenge for the SADC in view of the fact that Lesotho is consistently prone to post-election violence. As such the SADC should brace itself for violent post-2012 elections as Basotho may employ some of the uncovered weapons and cause havoc in the country once more. In
view of the above poor operations by the SADC Sejanamane, (1996: 82) argues that “[i]n a peace and security perspective, the Lesotho crisis, has shown that there is no satisfactory formal conflict resolution and peace-keeping mechanism in Southern Africa.”

### 8.7.6 Lack of Sufficient Intelligence Information

To add insult to injury, according to Basupi the intervening troops were not combat-ready as there was no proper planning and rehearsal by the intervening forces before deployment. For example “there were complaints that the army had been sent into Lesotho ‘blindfolded’... and the ‘wrong people’ had been dispatched to Lesotho on the basis of inadequate planning, preparation and information” (The Star; November 1998, cited in Southall, 2001: 166). There was also lack of coordination between the BDF and the SANDF during the operation. Consequently, the BDF arrived a day after the SANDF had been solely engaged in street battles with the LDF and opposition supporters. This hiccup resulted from inadequate aerial photographs and intelligence liaison between the BDF and the SANDF (Southall, 2001). Heitman (1998: 5) also observed that the flawed performance of the SADC troops emanated from faulty intelligence reports on the Lesotho crisis as the “assessment was somewhat over-optimistic and resulted in a force too weak to handle the operational requirements especially the level of resistance on the part of the LDF elements.” This resulted in the deployment of a small contingent comprising 600 SANDF and 200 BDF soldiers to confront a 2000-strong LDF bolstered by agitated opposition protestors (Southall 2001, Basupi 2007).

### 8.7.7 Poor Co-ordination of Intervening Troops

Worse still, there was failure to coordinate a simultaneous entry of both the SANDF and BDF into Lesotho. One participant noted that the operation was not properly planned as the assumption was that it was just going to be a brief encounter and the SADC troops would then move out. He took issue with the fact that there was no other personnel mechanism in place such as the police and humanitarian officers to maintain law and order. The participant posited that “[i]t was not even foreseen that as they engaged the military then some parts of the populace would start going into issues of looting. There was nobody who made sure that Maseru was not burnt down” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Southall (2001: 165) holds the view that “Maseru need not have been left so dismally unprotected from the rioting” had adequate planning been done. In the view of Southall (1998: 4) “[t]he burnt out shell of Maseru’s main street says it all” regarding the flawed planning and execution of the mission. The participant even insinuated that the delayed arrival of the BDF might have been due to irreconcilable differences between the two forces on how best to carry out the operation. He stated that “[t]here were major differences between the BDF and SANDF regarding the intervention and operations in Lesotho. Even the delayed arrival of the BDF had nothing to do with logistical issues. It was due to the differences on how the operation was to be conducted” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). One BDF retired officer also indicated that lack of coordination was also present in the disparity of benefits to the participating troops. He noted that Botswana and South Africa had different
remuneration pegs for their troops. This situation is a blow to the credibility of the mission as a SADC operation because if it was so, the regional organisation should have determined a standard remuneration for the intervening forces.

This participant also raised the issue that if the SADC had efficiently planned the intervention they should have been very cautious about sending South African troops into Lesotho considering their history of rivalry and animosity. He posited that “[h]ad proper planning been done, there would even have been understanding that the mere presence of the South African military force in Lesotho will cause an uprising from...the populace...” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Southall maintains a similar perspective that it was not wise that the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was led by an Afrikaner (Colonel Hartslief) because “it was always likely to be construed as an invasion force.” He further pointed out that “had the SANDF awaited the BDF, the operation would have appeared more like a SADC operation, rather than a South African one with a SADC fig-leaf” (Southall, 2001: 165).

In light of the above, the SADC, as a regional body tasked with maintenance of regional peace and security faced stinging criticisms as being ill-prepared and incapacitated for regional military interventions to restore order. Southall (2001: 166) maintains that “it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that those who approved the military logistics for this operation gifted their critics with sufficient ammunition to query their competence.” The MFP participant posited that “SADC has poorly performed. It needs to improve its art of intervention. Or if not, it has to decide whether they would intervene militarily straight away or if they want to negotiate a settlement. Then they better sharpen their skills” (Interview with R 15, 7 July 2011). On the basis of assumptions that the SADC operation was based on inadequate information, one participant suggested that the SADC should always send fact-finding missions before intervening rather than just dash in militarily (paraphrased interview excerpt with respondent R 5, 04 August 2010). Southall (1998: 4) is also of the view that “[a]n efficient operation could have provided the framework for a long term solution to Lesotho’s perpetual political crises. While there would have been numerous objections concerning the international legality of such an intervention, its evident military success would have muted criticism. Perhaps SADC would have even earned plaudits for defending democracy.”

However, on the contrary, the Commander of the South African contingent, Colonel Hartslief contended that the difficulties and the concomitant flaws in launching the operation emanated from “the ‘fog of war’ rather than inadequate intelligence or strategic planning...” (in Southall, 2001: 165). Despite this feeble defence mechanism, many questions remained as to whether the South African military was ready for international and regional peace-keeping missions.
8.7.8 Challenges of Dealing with a Politicised Lesotho Security

Fourthly, during the 1994 and 1998 interventions, the volatile political atmosphere was further fermented by the highly politicised and partisan security apparatus in Lesotho. Since the 1970’s the security apparatus became deeply embedded in the Leabua Jonathan BNP government to the extent that they resisted the BCP (Mokhehle) and LCD (Mosisili) democratically elected regimes in Lesotho. Molomo (1998: 5) posited that “[t]he Lesotho military, having successfully intervened in politics at least twice, cannot be said to be firmly under civilian control...The BNP, in its twenty-seven years of rule had entrenched itself especially in the military such that successive governments had a legitimacy crises.” The political situation was aggravated by the Leabua Jonathan regime which, in its bid to consolidate its hold on power “armed the Basotho National Party’s Youth League...an action which virtually turned the youth League into some kind of a parallel military force” (Molomo, 1998: 5). Hence, in 1994 and 1998, they colluded with the military to launch coups against the said governments.

The SADC missions had to contend with military resistance especially during the military encounters of 1998 when the military-cum-monarchy coup paralysed the government. Thus without backing from the security establishments and under threat from the establishments which are supposed to defend the state, the BCP and LCD governments of 1994 and 1998 crumbled. King Letsie III was able to dissolve the governments in the two instances due to the “tacit support of the military, an active encouragement of the opposition BNP and royalist forces” (Weisfelder, 1997: 35).

The scenario above depicts a volatile situation akin to full-scale warfare. That is, the SADC troops had to confront the LDF an institution that was established to ensure peace and security in the country but was now the source of instability in the country. According to Petlane and Southall (1995) this shows how the politicised military was determined to hijack democratisation in Lesotho. In both the 1994 and 1998 missions the SADC faced serious challenges of restoring trust between the government and the security establishment. In all the instances, the security forces were suspicious of the BCP and LCD governments and the opposition parties exploited the volatile situation to their advantage.

The confrontation between the SADC and mainly the South African National Defence Force culminated in huge casualties, looting and destruction of property in Maseru. The scenario is better captured by Furley and Roymay, cited in Basupi (2007: 36) that “[t]he SADC troops were seriously under-strength, most likely because of poor intelligence about the level of resistance anticipated, and entered the country prepared for a best case rather than a worst case scenario. Instead of securing the capital and preserving peace and stability, as were the mission’s intention, SADC troops became tied up in a protracted battle with mutineers giving opposition supporters the opportunity to plunder, loot and burn the city centre.” Furthermore; there was evidently no coherent coordination of the operations of the BDF and South African national Defence Force (SANDF) troops.
The SADC also faced the challenge of retraining the highly politicised military to be a professional army to defend democracy, law and order and it was a mammoth task. During the Leabua Jonathan regime, the system that used to operate in the security apparatus was membership to the party (BNP). A majority of the participants pointed out that the security establishment in Lesotho had for a long time been a highly a politicised force right from the Leabua Jonathan BNP government to the Lekhanya military junta permeating to the BCP and LCD governments in 1994 and 1998 respectively. This created a problem to the SADC training team from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe which was tasked with retraining and re-orientating the LDF from a partisan security establishment to a professional army which would defend democracy. One retired BDF officer who was involved in the process stated that “…it was a very big challenge to try and show them that for a proper military institution; they have to divorce themselves from the political alliances” (Interview with R 12, 16 June 2011). The challenge for SADC was to try to remodel the Lesotho Defence Force into a neutral, apolitical and professionalised army (Field notes from interview with R 12, 14 June 2011). It was a very challenging task for the SADC to retrain an army which had been entrenched into partisan politics and had at some stage tested power after a military coup in 1986. It goes without saying that there was some form of resistance to the democratisation process in Lesotho and the military still cherished wielding political power over the civilians. In fact it is on record that the LDF was evidently reluctant to relinquish power unconditionally to give way to democracy and civilian rule in 1993. The military attempted to manage the transition by setting rules which would protect their political space in the new democratic dispensation. In the view of Matlosa (1995: 120), “it seems as if their withdrawal from political office (not from politics) was rather a face saving strategy against internal and external pressure than commitment to multiparty democracy.”

8.7.9 Poor Communications about the Missions

Fifthly, the SADC faced the challenge of lack of proper information on the intervention. The SADC failed to communicate the intention and mandate of the mission as a SADC operation. The source of information to the agitated Basotho became the media which projected the operation as a South African invasion. The SADC therefore had to deal with the damaging misinformation as projected by the media to the wide Basotho populace. The media was awash with headlines such as ‘South African intervention in Lesotho;’ ‘the incursion that went wrong’ and ‘a city ruined by a bungled intervention’ all of which created a negative image for the regional body. Commenting on this lack of clear communication by the SADC and the government of Lesotho, Basupi (2007 and de Conning (1998) observe that failure to communicate to the public about the mandate of the mission led to the intervention forces suffering the painful dilemma of being perceived as a South African invading force as opposed to the way it perceived itself as a SADC peacemaking force. Such damaging perceptions no doubt impacted directly and adversely on the ability of the combined task force to convincingly communicate the reasons for their presence in Lesotho to the people. According to Basupi (2007: 40) the SADC intervening force suffered from three critical challenges regarding its relations with the media. In his observation “there was lack of a clear strategic guidelines; there was no cohesive
corporate communication strategy; and external communication tended to be reactive rather than proactive.” The media also questioned the hastiness with which the military intervention was launched. This gave weight to accusations that the SADC has failed to lay foundations for non-violent resolution of political conflicts in Lesotho (Southall, 2001). Debating this issue in parliament, the then leader of the Freedom Front Constandt Viljon pointed out that the military action should have been launched after “a specific pre-warning that in case this...will not be met by the internal people in Lesotho, force would be used. The use of force without notice is bad” (cited in Molapo, 1999: 3). These further raised questions as to whether “the intervention was undertaken as a neutral third party force, or whether it was undertaken on behalf of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy government.”

With such unanswered questions hanging around the intervention, Basotho got more agitated and infuriated by the presence of the South African troops. The misunderstanding led to the people burning “everything else rather than being taken over by South Africa...the information that was being spread was that South Africa was taking over the country” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Worse still, for the integrity of the SADC, the South African troops blundered by hoisting their national flag upon entering the Kingdom inadvertently giving credence to the misinformation that South Africa was invading the country. Southall (2001: 167) noted that the perceptions of a South African invasion were further fuelled by the “…already growing resentment throughout the region at what was increasingly perceived to be South Africa’s new hegemony. [And] “[t]he dubious legality of the intervention and Lesotho’s de facto status as an encircled and powerless dependency inevitably encouraged perceptions of South Africa as a bully.”

8.7.10 SADC Failure to Enforce Intervention Resolutions

Sixth is the conspicuous failure by the SADC to enforce compliance and execution of its recommendations and resolutions mainly by the LCD government. This lack of enforceability of its resolution prescriptions has damaged the efficacy of SADC as a regional peace-making organisation. It was experienced in the DRC, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar and in Lesotho which is the main case in this study. The NUL academic indicated that “[t]here is evidence, in the case of Lesotho; some of the directives that were provided were not implemented. The other cases in point are Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has definitely resisted all the SADC initiatives to a democratic regime. Ravalomanana is still facing Rajoilina in Madagascar. So there is the authority problem” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). In the case of Zimbabwe the ZANU-PF regime ignored the SADC recommendations on the agreed operation procedures of the Government of National Unity with the MDC formations as prescribed in the Global Political Agreement in 2009. Similarly, Rajoilina also resisted calls by the SADC to open the political space for an inclusive democratic dispensation which would accommodate all opposition political entities in the country.
Numerous participants in this study raised this issue as one of the major shortcomings of the SADC as evidenced in its missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007. During the interviews, several participants accused the SADC of failing to exert political pressure on the government to implement or comply with some of the recommendations that would ensure attainment of sustainable peace and security in the Kingdom. In all the three missions, the government has been labelled as the spoiler as it either negotiated in bad faith or ignored the recommendations of the negotiation process. One of the frequently mentioned shortcomings in the SADC mediations was that the government negotiated as the government not at par with the opposition. The SADC failed to neutralise the power of the government to be accommodating of the opposition as a way of resolving the incessant political turmoil in Lesotho. For example, after the 1998 mediation, the SADC put up an inclusive IPA as a governing authority in which all the political parties were involved. But, as evidenced, the government consistently frustrated its operations, (for example by failing to avail adequate resources) and dragging its feet in making the constitutional amendments to expedite the holding of the 2002 elections in a fair and peaceful political space. The NIP respondent observed that the IPA operated at a snail pace in as far as implementing the resolutions was concerned. He stated that “in the IPA, they spent very long time disagreeing” (Interview with R 3, 03 August 2010). The LPC respondent indicated that the IPA operations were resisted because the LCD government was opposed to the IPA through which it had to share governance with the opposition parties when they believed they had been duly elected in a free and fair election. He added that “it was not easy because the LCD was opposed to the imposition of something which in its view was unjustified” (interview with R 6: 08 August 2010).

The LCD was reluctant to fully participate in the deliberations of a body which they deemed competitive to parliament in which they were a majority. “For the LCD, the IPA is an unwelcome imposition. The LCD claims-with considerable justification-to have won the 1998 election fairly and squarely, just as the BCP (from which it emerged) swept to its unambiguous victory in 1993. Consequently, it view(ed) the challenge of the Opposition Alliance to its popular legitimacy as emanating from undemocratic elements (in its view, covertly backed by the monarch and sections of the army) which because they have lost power are mounting a vigorous rearguard action to secure undeserved privileged and continuing influence” (Southall, 2000: 5). For example, the failure of the IPA to amicably agree to the new electoral system (MMP) was essentially because they deemed it an imposition by the SADC arbitration. On the other hand, the LCD viewed the SADC intervention as providing fertile grounds for the marginalisation and eradication of the monarchy and the army as competing political factors for power in Lesotho (Southall, 2000). Therefore it was “almost inevitable that the terms of the settlement will be hotly debated by the LCD and its opponents” (Southall; 2001: 168). For example, the opposition parties also strove to project their own political agenda within the IPA. They saw the IPA as a forum through which they would participate in governance and enhance the political standing of their respective parties in the Lesotho political space (Southall 2000).
Consequently, the SADC had immense difficulties to reconcile the two political camps and exert pressure, especially on the government to negotiate in good faith. There are allegations that the LCD was more often than not absent from the IPA gatherings presumably to hamper its functioning. The political bickering between the government and the opposition on the mandate of the IPA and electoral reforms delayed the holding of the elections which were scheduled for 2000. They were ultimately held two years later in 2002 (Southall; 2000, 2001; Santho 2000). Based on this situation one participant from the Royalty urged the SADC to always stand firm in backing its mediation teams and pressure the recalcitrant party to tow the line for the sake of peace and stability in the region. For instance, in the case of the 2007 mission, the SADC delegated Eminent Person clearly indicated that the 2007 elections were fraudulent as a result of the LCD and ABC alliance coalitions with the NIP and LWP respectively. The facilitator further suggested that the MMP expert be invited to clarify whether the electoral model was procedurally implemented, all of which was resisted by the LCD government with SADC watching passively and dismally failing to back Masire’s recommendations on their merit. The participant from the Royalty observed that while the SADC facilitated dialogue between the different political parties, “…when it comes to implementation and arm-twisting the government, it has been a very insurmountable task for the SADC to do” (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011).

The BAC participant also noted that “[w]e have had a mission sent by SADC. They agreed that the model was defrauded; but SADC is failing to make a decision that is against the government…Masire did a very wonderful job but he was frustrated by the government” (interview with R 5: 04 August 2010). The ABC Youth League official also joined the chorus when he stated that “the intervention by SADC to address the Basotho crisis, it seems SADC has failed to use its strong position. [And] Now it means many people especially the opposition may not view SADC as an important body…SADC is not doing its job” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). As such, without the SADC backing the 2007 SADC mediation crumbled while the political fermentation brewed on until the CCL took over the process. With the SADC as a regional body having failed to put the political weight and muscle on the negotiating parties (the government) to oblige, the BAC respondent painted a bleak picture for the CCL mediation effort as it did not have the legal authority to exert pressure. He maintained that “if the Chief Executive of the SADC is not able to decide; what about ordinary people that have got their mandate as individuals; It’s tough” (Interview with R 5, 04 August 2010). This bleak situation for the CCL mediation process is also envisaged by Respondent 2. He states that “[a]s we speak the same CCL is also having the same stalemate. It looks like it will go up to 2012 elections without that being resolved” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010).

Worse still, while the SADC has endorsed the CCL mediation and pledged to collaborate with it in breaking the political impasse, the regional body has not provided sufficient personnel, material and financial support to the mission. The Director of the SADC OPDS conceded to the reality that the SADC faces immense paucity of resources to back its peace-keeping efforts. In his words “…the challenge is financial resources to sustain our mediation
process. We depend on international cooperation partners which is not very good” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). The respondent also illustrated that although they have the human resource in the form of Eminent Persons and Panel of former Heads of State for the mediation in regional conflicts they still lack the capacity to swiftly place them on the ground in conflict situations. He explained that “the disadvantages are [that] we don’t have eh structured systems where we can activate immediately when things happen to get them there” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010).

8.7.11 SADC Lack of Expert Mediators

In the same vein, there is the challenge that the SADC has no pool of expert conflict mediators who are trained in the art of conflict prevention, management and resolution. It has therefore relied heavily on former presidents and Eminent Person under the assumption that they have the diplomatic skills of managing and resolving conflicts which not all of them posses. In a paper presented at a Seminar on International Mediation at the University of Botswana, September 2011) Nathan asserted: “International mediation has suffered from an acute lack of professionalism, expertise and rigour... The field of international mediation has placed no emphasis on training and education, on developing doctrines, strategies, and operating procedures, on setting and maintaining standards on appointments based on clear criteria and proven ability, and on learning from past experience in order to improve performance and avoid mistakes in the future. In short, international mediation has been regarded as synonymous with diplomacy rather than as a specialised activity.” As the LCD respondent puts it “[t]he tendency is that because you have been a former President or Prime Minister, you are being seen as enough that you can drive the process while the process might be even more complicated than that” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). This position, in this case was indirectly directed to the post-2007 SADC peace mission whom the government staunchly resisted as pro-opposition. The CCL Co-ordinator also noted that the Lesotho political impasse might have been more complicated for Masire. He surmised that “…this means that he did not [fully] understand our political culture and complexity of our politics” (Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010). It was in light of this that the participant from the Royalty suggested that the SADC “has to rebuild its personnel in their Eminent Persons who could really take care of the modus operandi when it comes to negotiations… It has to make better Eminent Persons who can come and…capacitate its negotiators; make them stronger, more learned and more diplomatic…They can be more serious if one party does not adhere” (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011).

The LCD official is also of the opinion that while it is necessary to delegate reputable former presidents, “at the same time you need to back them up with a very strong team of experts; the people who know more about issues like conflict management, peace-building processes and staff like that” (Interview with R6, 19 August 2010). In their study of protracted social conflicts in Lebanon and Israel, Burton (1990a, 1990b, 1990c and Azar 1990a, 1990b emphasised the need to engage a panel of experts selected from scholars and practitioners who are specialised in
conflict analysis to facilitate conflict resolution through track two diplomacy. According to Azar (1990a: 35) an appropriate panel of facilitators should be “a group of interdisciplinary colleagues who have been involved in tracking and studying conflict situations...; schooled in conflict analysis, management techniques, or human behaviour... Most important is the knowledge about protracted conflicts (especially the social-psychological factors involved) and cross-cultural experience and sensitivity.” The Panel of mediators would then mediate and hold mediation workshops with the warring parties with the aim of transforming the conflictual perceptions to attitudes of willingness to cooperate, compromise and collectively resolve their common problems.

One of the participants recommended that the SADC should not only sharpen the skills of the mediators but “must [also] improve the skills that go in negotiations of and the SADC population itself. The people who are being affected by these negotiations must be prepared to take heed of what will be said they should do” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). This is very important considering the fact that for any mediation resolutions and recommendations to be successfully implemented the consumers of their contents and outcomes should be party to their decisions and design. These perceptions are based on the fact that in Lesotho the SADC mediation process was impeded by striking differences by the political parties to the extent that one of the research participants recommended that SADC should educate its political leaders on the rigours of politics. He observed that “[i]t looks like our politicians (here I am looking at the government and opposition) lack civic education on politics...They need to be capacitated in politics because they are leaders, but now really, they are as good as they are followers...SADC should ensure that atleast people who are political leaders should be empowered in terms of political knowledge...to understand their responsibilities and accountabilities as political leaders,[This is] because in most cases one will realise that the leaders are part of the problem instead of being part of the solution ... due to their political ignorance” (Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010). Respondent 19 noted that the hostile political space in Lesotho dates back from the 1970s and the political parties have failed to embrace politics of cooperation. He also noted that this might indicate that Lesotho was not adequately prepared for the democratisation process which took root in the 1990s. In other words political leaders should also be assisted and strive as leaders to embody politics of tolerance, cooperation, compromise, consensus and respect of majority decisions as expressed in elections and other structures of governance. As the LPC respondent observed “it is important to have a culture of politics of consensus...and the leadership of SADC should do well to encourage that” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010).

However, during the interview, the facilitator of the Lesotho dialogue who also participated in the 1994 and 2007 missions in Lesotho indicated that they engaged the different Basotho political stakeholders with the goal of promoting and enhancing politics of consensus among them for the benefit of peace and tranquillity in the Kingdom. For example during the Troika, they appealed to both sides to recognise each other through a compromise in which the King was to restore the BCP government while the latter was to reinstate King Moshoeshoe II to the throne. The
Troika also advised the government to mend its sour relationship with the military sector. The facilitator posited that “we talked to the various stakeholders individually and later we called them together and the conclusion was eh, they should take the responsibility for peace in Lesotho and therefore learn to live together in peace. And that could only be strengthened by every party; to ensure that whatever, they do is according to the law...rather than take arms” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). Therefore, the fact that the Basotho political entities have not yet embraced the politics of cooperation may be a result of protracted hostile and conflictual interaction between the political parties. As respondent 19 observed “...it is not easy to really remake politics after a long time of conflict...There has been serious conflict that has not been able to heal the hearts of our political personnel and landscape...Along the way, there has been a lot of damage to our politics of give and take...” (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011).

The clarion call therefore is for the SADC to build capacity to back conflict mediation entities. In light of this the CCL Coordinator appealed to the SADC “to provide technical and financial support to the mediation [process] because...the CCL has no financial resources as the mediation was not budgeted for. Secondly, it has no expertise, that is why a request was made to SADC that now since you have been handling this issue, you might be in a position to give your support team to assist us” (Interview with R 9, 20 August 2010).

Therefore, to many opposition political parties and other participants in this research, in spite of its political authority, the SADC has failed to resolve the political tensions among the political stakeholders in Lesotho. Makoa (1998b) argues that while the interventions managed to remove the immediate threat to the government, they yielded few, if any, prospects for political stability and democracy in Lesotho. During the interviews the NUL academic indicated that SADC faced formidable political problems after the interventions as “…they left the nation deeply divided; people did not trust them. And equally the government did not trust them. So they were facing the problem of confidence building” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). Similarly, the BAC participant and another participant from the Royalty noted that based on the Lesotho missions, the SADC has lost integrity. It is on the basis of this loss of trust that the BNP and the MFP respondents staunchly vowed that under no circumstances would they ever allow any future SADC interventions in their country. The fact that all interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 failed to gain the confidence of all the warring parties does not augur well for the prospects of the regional organisation as a neutral body. In all three instances, the SADC was accused of being biased, either towards the government or towards the opposition parties. Given this situation, it may be concluded that the SADC has failed the test of third-party conflict facilitation. According to Azar (1990a: 36) “an important characteristic of facilitators is that they must be able to remain fair and neutral during the process and resist getting drawn into the dispute itself. Facilitators must afford recognition to both parties and act so to increase the level of trust between them and the participants.” Evidence from this study has revealed that SADC is still lacking on this score.
Because of the failure to address the political animosity between the different political parties some of the participants anticipated violent eruptions during the oncoming elections in 2012. As Southall (1998: 5) puts it “Lesotho must now live the consequences of the failure of its political institutions and of South Africa/SADC’s bungled interventions.” In its 1994 Report, the SADC Tripartite Task Force of Masire, Mugabe and Mandela recommended thorough dialogue between political stakeholders, mainly political parties, the monarchy and the military to avert future disputes. They stated that “[i]t is clear that until or unless the broader underlying political issues are addressed, there can be no guarantee that such confrontations will not erupt again” (Report of the SADC Tripartite Task Force 1994: 13). The BAC, the BNP and the LCD respondents were not very optimistic that the coming 2012 elections would bring peace and stability in the Kingdom. Reflecting the volatile political atmosphere in Lesotho, the BNP participant lamented that “the state is very volatile...I don’t even know what will happen in the 2012 elections. But I can tell you with the situation as it is now, I doubt if we are going to have a peaceful election until such time that the LCD government is out. Everybody wants it out and we shall make sure that it goes out hook or crook; it will go out. This time, we are prepared for anything” (Interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). They therefore dismiss the regional body as a ‘talk shop’ a ‘tea club’ a ‘paper tiger’ and a ‘closed book’ which has dismally failed in tackling and finding a lasting solution to the Lesotho political crisis. The BCP leader compared the SADC to the continental body (AU) as a total failure in addressing regional/continental conflicts. He indicated that “SADC has been non-effective...May be that is why even...continently the AU is the same thing. Surely we only have to look at what is happening in North Africa to know that even the AU is as toothless and useless as SADC...I don’t want to mention the case of Zimbabwe. It is deplorable what is happening in Zimbabwe. SADC was never able to do a thing” (Interview R 17: 08 July 2011).

However, to the contrary some of the participants were optimistic that the SADC–CCL collective efforts would deliver a peaceful election in 2012. For example respondent 19, noted that “[i]ts a process, a political healing, it really takes time”.we are really confident that in our next elections there could be a balance of power...that would may be pay dividends for a better Lesotho and better relations with all sister countries within the SADC” (Interview with R 19, 07 July 2011).

8.7.12 Failure to Address Lesotho’s Structural Economic Problems
Finally the other major challenge faced by the SADC during and after the Lesotho interventions was that it appeared that the regional organisation concentrated its analysis of the conflicts solely on the political arena thereby ignoring one of the root causes of the Lesotho crises. As indicated in the previous chapter Lesotho is very underdeveloped and economically dependent on South Africa for its economic survival. Thus the deep underlying source of friction in the country which inevitably permeates the political realm and explodes is the underdeveloped economic status of the Kingdom. Azar (1986) observes that there is a correlation between violent conflicts, underdevelopment and uneven distribution of wealth. Several experts on conflict prevention, management and resolution are unanimous on
the reality that any attempts to resolve a conflict without addressing the root causes of the conflict are doomed to fail and the conflict is bound to recur. This is because inappropriate strategies would be directed to the symptoms rather than the real causes of the conflict. Burton and other basic human needs theorists have argued that any resolution strategies which address the surface issues of the conflict will definitely fail to find a lasting solution to the conflict or transform the conflict zone. In the view of Mitchell (1990: 162) “for a conflict to be genuinely resolved, the underlying issues must be brought to light, analysed and then dealt with in a mutually satisfactory way that involves the fulfilment of basic needs to achieve a win-win outcome. Otherwise the solution is likely to be merely temporary.” In light of this Azar (1990a: 18) notes that “[a]ttempts at settlement or control of a crisis that do not tackle the deeper dynamics underlying the crisis will be temporarily successful at best. Moreover, the intractable and entangled nature of issues in protracted social conflicts involving the struggle over communal needs reduces the efficacy of third-party assistance.” According to Azar (1990a: 2) this is because “…unmet psycho-political and socio-economic needs lead to dysfunctional cognitive and behavioural patterns that are not easily remedied by ordinary methods of diplomacy or the use of force.”

It has emerged from this study that the SADC missions missed the dire economic situation of Lesotho as the root source of the recurrent conflicts in the Kingdom. ” In one of the papers on the recurrent instability in Lesotho Makoa (2002) advises that debates and research on the endemic conflict in Lesotho need to focus on the economic characteristics of the Basotho nation-state “and its capacity to mediate or manage conflict and, and to perform distributive functions expected of the state.” It appears its weak economy lacks the ability and institutional capacity to sustain a coherent political structure in the Kingdom. It lacks the “capacity to generate the national consensus essential for political stability and social harmony” (Makoa 2002: 5).

Makoa further holds that most of the Basotho earn a living as migrant labour in the South African mines and industries since the country cannot provide employment opportunities to its citizens. Therefore, “[t]his suggests that for the majority population in Lesotho the state is neither a facilitator of accumulation nor a factor in economic life. If it cannot influence the economic activity of the bulk of its population or maintain itself, can the state be a force for unity? In other words, it cannot rally its citizens around a particular political course or programme. As a result, it can only become the focus of political power contestations” (Makoa 2002: 16). The state becomes a step ladder for control and/or access to the available meagre economic resources. This has resulted in ugly and sometimes bloody contestations of election results as experienced in all the Basotho elections since 1970. Southall and Petlane (1995) depict the bitter contest between the BNP and the BCP during and after the 1993 elections as falling within the ambit of this struggle. In other words, in the view of the BNP, the BCP’s capture of political power would seem to herald their (BCP) drive to use the state as a vehicle for accumulation. The BNP felt displaced from state power hence wealth control and accumulation” (Southall and Petlane 1995: xiii).
Given this scenario, one of the interviewees posited that one of the daunting challenges facing Lesotho “is the state of the economy. So we are likely to see more disturbances because of the state of the economy. And the government, the ruling party is not seriously addressing that problem of the economy. So there is a lot of discontentment within the country. Unemployment is a great problem in this country” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). In the view of other participants, one of the major shortcomings of the SADC intervention strategies in Lesotho was the failure to consider the adverse effects of the country’s underdevelopment on the Basotho populace and the body politic. Makoa (2002: 14) maintains that “one of the most glaring features of the Basotho nation-state is its inability to accumulate and redistribute wealth among its people.” Therefore, in his view “the problem really was not simply a political conflict. To solve the problem of Lesotho, SADC ought to address the economic problems” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). Inspite of the fact that the regional body’s original goal was economic integration and economic growth and that in its founding treaty and protocols, it acknowledged the significance of economic growth as a catalyst for political stability, peace and security, the organisation has failed to infuse an economic assistance package to conflict-ridden member states. One respondent posited that “[n]owhere does it entail plans to enhance the individual [member] countries’ capacity to deal with the economic problems; to support their own population” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). That being the case, the LPC participant concluded that “the development of the economy in Lesotho is very critical. So SADC, I think has a role to play in that” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010).

In view of this serious shortcoming of the SADC in the case of its Lesotho interventions, Santho advises that “[i]t is important to give serious attention to the multi-faceted aspects of addressing the challenges of poverty, youth employment and development that Lesotho faces in the short, medium and long term period. The bedrock of sustaining democracy is a national development strategy that provides sustainable livelihood for all Basotho.” It is a fact that Lesotho’s economy remains constrained in terms of resource endowment, trade, job creation and employment opportunities and income generation and requires both micro and macro economic re-orientation fully backed by the regional bloc (Matlosa, 1993). In other words, the SADC should strive to assist Lesotho to address its debilitating economic challenges, if it is serious about finding a lasting solution to the political crises in the Kingdom. An economically viable Lesotho would ensure reduced dependence on South Africa and a fair distribution of resources and wealth to its populace and thereby minimise political agitation and disturbances in the small landlocked country (Matlosa 1993).

The point is that while the SADC succeeded in identifying and addressing other structural sources of the Lesotho conflicts in the form of reforming its FPTP electoral system to a Mixed Member Proportionality (MMP) and retraining and depoliticising its security forces, the regional body failed to address its structurally defective economy into a
vibrant economy that could cater for the survival and existential needs of its people. In fact, instead of economic assistance, the South African government is said to have required the Lesotho government to pay for the services rendered and the damages caused during the 1998 turmoil. No doubt, this further worsened the already dwindling Lesotho economic woes. The recurrence of the Lesotho conflict after the 2007 elections may be indicative of the SADC failure to address the Lesotho economic troubles as the root cause of conflicts. As Lund (1996: 35) correctly notes “defining preventive diplomacy as the amelioration of poverty might indeed increase the material welfare of the areas targeted for preventive action, and this might in turn reduce their chances of violence in the relatively remote future.”

To avoid overlooking the deep-rooted sources of conflicts (as the SADC did with the Lesotho economic case), Barclay (1999) provides informative and searching questions which regional organisations should always consider in addressing regional conflicts and determining post-conflict peacebuilding measures to prevent reversion to conflicts. Regional organisations, according to Barclay (1999: 298) should strive to get answers to some of the following questions:

- What are the major underlying factors which led to the crisis and consequent collapse of governance?
- What are some of the critical problems and prospects in restoring peace to the crisis countries through regional cooperation?
- Which policies and institutional factors could deter or avoid a repetition of similar civil conflicts? What are the lessons and implications for countries in transition from crisis to recovery in terms of governance and regional cooperation?

Obtaining answers to all these questions may give the intervening entity an opportunity to find a holistic, all-embracing strategy to resolve the conflict at hand and attain lasting and durable peace.

8.8 Successes of the SADC Missions

In spite of the well-articulated challenges of the SADC during its three preventive missions in Lesotho, the organisation made commendable strides in the right direction as stipulated in its founding treaty and protocols.

Of heightened importance is the reality that the SADC interventions of 1994, 1998 and 2007 defused the violence between the government and the opposition and reversed the coups which followed the national elections of 1994, 1998 and 2007. As indicated in chapter six, in 1994 and 1998 Lesotho suffered coups orchestrated by the opposition, the military and the monarchy collective. In 2007 there were assassination attempts against the Prime Minister and his government official. Therefore, in spite of its shortcomings, the organisation should be credited for having successfully halted the violence and prevailed on all the political stakeholders to find negotiated settlement of their
differences for the sake of peace and stability in Lesotho. One interviewee from the OPDS indicated that the SADC missions were a success because they managed to stop the escalation of conflict beyond the acceptable limit as it happened in other countries (field notes from an interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). For instance, in 1994, the SADC, through its Troika of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, managed to diplomatically reconcile the warring parties through negotiations, reverse the coup, restore the BCP government and facilitated the reinstatement of King Moshoeshoe II, all of which brought about some period of tranquility in the Kingdom. Similarly in 1998, although through coercive measures, the SADC successfully halted the coup and the concomitant violence and plunder, restored the government, formed the Interim Political Authority (IPA) in which all political stakeholders were represented and monitored the reform of the FPTP electoral system to a model which was more inclusive and representative—the mixed member proportionality (MMP). In 2007, the SADC mandated Masire to mediate the post-election dispute and despite his failure to find a lasting solution to the problem, he successfully brought the belligerent parties to the negotiation table after diffusing the prevailing tensions in the country. In light of this “there are some reasonable grounds for hoping that the interventions may have paved the way towards a less fractious politics” in Lesotho as she heads towards the 2012 elections (Southall, 2001: 168).

8.8.1 Restoration of Democracy in Lesotho

Several participants attested to the successes of the SADC in reducing the tensions, restoring the supposedly democratically elected governments and promoting a climate of peaceful dialogue between the political rivalries. The LCD Official argued that all the three SADC interventions were a success in that they brought back democracy which was under serious threat. He asserted that “[t]hey were a success; to me I see them as a success. Because one just think what would be Lesotho...had it not been through the intervention of SADC...There would be no democracy enjoyed in the country” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). Even the staunchest critics of the SADC credited the SADC for diplomatically handling the 1994 and 2007 disputes. One such a participant was the BNP respondent who indicated that the 1994 diplomatic mission was commendable because the sister countries came in to bring the stakeholders for talks whose outcomes were a peaceful understanding and resolution of the conflict (field notes from an interview with R 18, 07 July 2011). The ABC respondent posited that the 1994 mission was conducted “amicably, professionally as well as politically” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). The NUL academic agreed that the SADC Troika secured a compromise between the government, the monarchy and the opposition which saved Lesotho from descending into bloodbath.

Inter-alia, as reflected in the 2007 mission the SADC promoted a culture of “dialogue between different parties and the norm that whenever there are problems, there must be negotiations. It’s something to be appreciated” (Interview with R 16, 07 July 2011). Evidence abound that the Masire-led dialogue facilitation team managed to bring calm in a politically volatile climate and the rival parties saw reason to participate in a negotiated peace settlement. Although
the SADC facilitation team did not conclude and achieve its mandate, the baton was picked by the CCL which is continuing with the negotiations. The dialogue facilitator himself conceded that “[b]y the time we got to Lesotho, people were equipped with lethal weapons. But our coming in sort of imposed a sort of moratorium but still Basotho were agitated against the other. That was a problem which we fortunately managed to put down” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). The SADC has endorsed the CCL facilitation and collaborate with it in bringing an amicable solution to the political impasse. The collective efforts of the CCL and SADC are still on going and there are positive overtures to breaking the impasse according to some of the optimistic participants in this research. One participant observed that the collaboration between the SADC Troika and the CCL in facilitating dialogue between the parties is making headways in addressing some of the factors which bred friction between them. As such, in all the SADC missions, the organisation succeeded in preventing coups, halting the escalation of violence and restoring democratically governments, an achievement for which it should be commended.

8.8.2 Interventions Saved Lesotho from Full-scale Civil War

In addition, participants observed that although the SADC intervened militarily in 1998, the mission was timely, and it successfully saved the country from falling into a political abyss. The participants who held this perspective maintain that the SADC restored a democratically elected government which was on the brink of collapse due to opposition parties, the monarchy and the military strangling of the democratic dispensation which was unfolding in Lesotho. The LCD respondent asserted that “[w]e were here [in government] for two weeks and everybody wanted to topple us. They don’t want to give democracy a chance...The people don’t want to accept the outcome of elections...We won square and fair” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). Given this precarious situation to Lesotho’s young democracy “the intervention was good in terms of restoring the democratically elected government and also encouraging debates to see where the problem is” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). All in all the SADC “participated in the political process to direct and show the adversaries...the common ground to take for Lesotho to become a peaceful country in the future” (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2011). In other words, the SADC through its interventions saved democracy in the Kingdom, and its image as a regional bloc composed of democratic governments in which there is a peaceful climate for both internal and external investment. As Matlosa (1995: 135) explains; “regional countries did not want to see the reputation of the new SADC, now inclusive of South Africa-besmirched by its inclusion of unelected governments as it sought to re-figure its appeal to investors and international donor countries in the increasingly competitive post-Cold War era.”

8.8.3 Disarmament of Protestors and Mutineer Soldiers

The participants from the military establishment also commended the SADC for successfully fulfilling its primary mandate of disarming and containing the Lesotho Defence Force and restoring law and order in the country. One of the participants stated that the SADC managed to secure most of the weapons which were seized by the civilian and
LDF mutineers during the political chaos and they were kept in Blomfontein (South Africa) to be formally returned to the Lesotho government at some later stage (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2011). The same participant summed it up as: “[i]n Lesotho the results, I believe were achieved. We pulled out in less than twelve months and we could see the developments. There was troop reduction and the mission changed from military intervention to retraining of the Lesotho Defence Force. And ultimately in less than two years the intervening forces of SADC withdrew to their respective countries after the desired objectives were achieved” (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2011). The successful disarmament of the LDF helped to restore law and order and saved the country from descending into political anarchy. Sejanamane (1996) argues that although during the interventions Lesotho’s sovereignty was compromised, the circle of violence which has characterised the country’s post- elections period was halted for a while.

8.8.4 Retraining of the Lesotho Defence Force

Among the areas that the SADC is credited to have been successful is the retraining of the historically politicised and partisan security establishment into a more efficient, professional and less politicised army. As indicated in chapter six, the Lesotho military has been deeply entrenched in the Lesotho political quagmire since the 1970s when Leabua Jonathan consolidated his hold on power by involving the military as BNP card-carrying members. This turned the military into a political instrument for the defence of the government rather than an apolitical instrument for the preservation of national peace and security in Lesotho. This politicisation of the military culminated in the military coup of 1986 and the short-lived coups of 1994 and 1998 against democratically elected governments. This was an indication of their opposition to democratic civilian rule in which they were expected to be apolitical. Two decades of constitutional crisis and politicisation of the military systematically eroded the BCP and the LCD governments’ ability to reign in the highly politicised security sector. “To the extent that the military has a monopoly, the capacity of a democratic government to exercise effective control and command over the management of force within the state apparatus is extremely limited. It became more compromised in the highly politicised Lesotho military which had also tested power from 1986 to 1993” (Matlosa 1995: 119).

As a way of finding a lasting solution to the political crisis, the SADC Troika strongly recommended concerted efforts to mend the ever-widening rift between the government and the military. The Troika Task Force noted that “[a]lthough discontent within the military establishment was the immediate cause of the...crisis in Maseru (1994), it is widely agreed that the discontent is but symptomatic of a much broader, more deeply rooted malaise within Lesotho; a malaise which is essentially political in nature” (Tripartite Report 1994: 13). Then as a post-conflict peace-building measure, the SADC embarked on a coordinated retraining of the Lesotho Defence Force into an apolitical professional apparatus oriented to defence of democracy and constitutional governance. As Southall (2001: 169) puts it “[a] more civilianised politics in Lesotho could only have been made possible by a breaking of the intimate link between the LDF and the BNP, and by attempting to render a reformed army subject to civilian authority.” In line with
this plan, the 1998 SADC mission was divided into two phases: Operation Boleas whose task was restoring law and order and Operation Maluti which focused on the retraining of the LDF.

A SADC Training Team comprising Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe as guarantors of the Lesotho democracy was tasked with undertaking the mission. The purpose of the retraining process was “to assist them to understand their participation and involvement in nation building, democracy and provision of national security” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). Another participant noted that the primary reason for the retraining was to “ensure that the Lesotho Defence Force was a well trained army which would not in future get politicised. And to ensure that the operations of the LDF were directed at peace enhancement, peace-keeping and conflict prevention during, before and after the elections” (Interview with R 11, 04 May 2011). As such the retraining was aimed at reconciling the often tumultuous government-military relations as evidenced by the friction between the two in 1994 and 1998. For example, in 1994 the BCP government accused the military of being a BNP instrument while the military was hostile and suspicious of its (BCP) intentions. For example, the LDF feared that they were going to lose their jobs with the impending integration of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) into the national army. The military was suspicious of the intended commission of inquiry against its activities in the Lesotho political arena as an attack on its integrity and a BCP government orchestrated ploy to victimise it (Matlosa 1995). With such animosity, friction festered on leading to the military-cum-monarchy coup of 1994. As Matlosa (1995: 138) puts it “…the BCP government found itself [subsequently the LCD government in 1998] in contradiction with both a civil service and an army that has been recruited and trained to serve the BNP government.”

Therefore, the retraining was focused on instilling cordial civil-military relations and enhancing their responsibilities in a democracy. In the words of Matlosa (1995: 127) the challenge of the BCP and the SADC was “to seek to resolve the continuing crisis in the civil-military relations by negotiating a lasting domestic solution with its rebellious army.” One other important aspect of the retraining programme was the establishment of a Counter Crime Unit comprising of the military and police officers. The aim was to bridge the gap between the two security apparatuses in terms of their operations as was experienced during the political turmoil in Lesotho (field notes from interviews with R 13, 16 June 2011 and R 14, 20 June 2011). In all these endeavours, the SADC is said to have been successful. For instance, the unit was involved in the disarmament programme to recover weapons from civilians and the rebellious military as a post-conflict peace-building measure. One of the respondents explained how as a result of the retraining programme Lesotho managed to build a new highly professional army that has taken its place in the region along side its regional counterparts. This is indicated by its participation in regional peace-keeping exercises. Another respondent indicated that “[f]rom the military perspective I would also say that it was a very big success in that we then began to see the high ranking officers interacting more in an international scene by sending some of their officers to train outside Lesotho which gives them exposure” (Interview with R 13, 16 June 2011).
That the Lesotho security sector was depoliticised by the SADC retraining programme was reflected by its neutrality during the 2002 elections and the disputes which followed the 2007 elections. The security sector left the contestations to the political establishments to discourse on and resolve. This is an indication of the successfully implemented post-conflict peace-building measures in that the military which was historically notorious for stifling democracy in the Kingdom remained in the barracks. This, as noted by Southall (2001: 169) indicates “in particular the extent to which SADC’s involvement [led] to the civilianisation of politics in Lesotho...” Although “only time will reveal the extent to which this restructuring will have been successful-but of necessity weaning the army away from political involvement there can be no doubt” Southall (2000) also points out that before they left, the SADC training team conveyed an ominous warning to the LDF that any future political involvement by the military will not be condoned or tolerated by the regional body. This shows how the regional body was determined to neutralise the security sector as a factor in Lesotho’s politics. This was vitally important because the experiences of many African states with regard to the involvement of the military in politics has been catastrophic. They have on many occasions “stifled democracy with their interventions, purportedly in the attempt to rectify the mistakes of the ruling class which had failed to adhere to the principles of democracy through various violations of the constitution” (Odunuga 1999: 44). The politicisation of the armed forces in many African states has deprived the continent of democratisation process, political stability and economic development. In most cases, development is arrested because the inefficiency of military rule creates an uncongenial investment climate and contributes to virtually institutionalised corruption (Odunuga 1999, Barclay 1999). Ajulu describes the Lesotho military as a “kleptocratic class-conscious that they lacked political legitimacy, they devoted themselves to systematic looting of state resources” (cited in Southall and Petlane 1995: xiii). As such, aware of the way in which the Lesotho security has been politicised, and in cognisance of how it has arrested the democratic dispensation in Lesotho since the 1970s, the SADC took the necessary concerted resolve to depoliticise it to be a security sector for the defence of national security, democracy and constitutional rule that the regional body has pledged to promote, sustain and defend. Thus history will judge the SADC intervention as having marked a turning point in Lesotho’s political space if it successfully weaned the Lesotho military from partisan involvement in politics (Southall 1998).

8.8.5 Establishment of an Inclusive Interim Government in 1998

The SADC is also accorded some measure of success for, after successfully restoring law and order in 1998; it facilitating the establishment of the Interim Political Authority (IPA), an inclusive body in which all the political parties were represented for collective governance and debating on how best to resolve Lesotho’s political problems. On the 3rd of December 1999 with the SADC facilitation, and after protracted debates between the government and the opposition parties, the IPA agreement was signed. The historic agreement paved the way for “greater inclusivity and representation within the political system....and...consolidation of “the country’s young democracy” (Santho, 2000: 3).
That is, the IPA signified a successful compromise in reconciling the government and the opposition parties to work together for the sake of peace and stability in the Kingdom. Southall (2001: 163) summarises the integrative SADC facilitated compromise thus: “SADC had brought the different parties to a genuine compromise which embodied second-best solutions for both sides to the conflict. The LCD government remained in power, but was forced to concede an early election and the establishment of the IPA as a forum for mediation about long-term electoral and political solution; and the Opposition were compelled to concede their demands for a government of national unity in favour of guarantees of an early election and the establishment of the IPA.” The Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM) also hailed the IPA agreement as “a harbinger of constructive management of conflict in Lesotho and essentially heralds a new dawn in Lesotho politics; an era of political stability and tolerance of diverse political views and options” (cited in Santho, 2000: 3). In this sense the IPA was a sort of an inclusive interim government as the opposition parties had protested election results from the flawed FPTP electoral system in which the winner takes all and the opposition, in spite of the sizeable percentage of votes did not get any substantive representation in parliament.

8.8.6 Electoral Reforms in Lesotho

Transferred wholly from the British system, the FPTP had throughout Lesotho’s history delivered a single party landslide victory and virtually a parliament dominated by one party as experienced by the BCP and the LCD in 1994 and 1998 respectively. Odunuga (1999: 44) vividly articulates how the phenomenon of winner takes all has fermented disturbances especially in Africa. He asserted that “[m]any African countries are in ferment because political power has been taken to mean ‘winner-takes all’ affair with respect not only to patronage and the prerogatives of office but also to the nation’s wealth and resources. The concentration of power in the hands of a particular group can in that sense serve only as a source of discontent in that the resulting economic deprivation alienates the government from the majority of the people.” For example, during the 1998 elections, on the basis of receiving 61% of the votes, the LCD had managed to win a majority of the 99 parliamentary constituencies. In contrast, opposition parties won 39% of the votes but obtained only one seat in parliament. “This scenario highlighted the inadequacies of the FPTP system and exacerbated political tensions among opposition supporters” (Rule and Mapetla, 2001: 114). In the view of Matlosa and Sello (2005: 12) it is the contention of the opposition that the electoral model has created a defacto one party rule in the country and “heralded the beginning of various types of violent conflicts that became the hallmark of Lesotho’s instability.”

Several participants in this research delved into the shortcomings of the FPTP electoral model. The LPC respondent stated that “[w]hat was wrong was the electoral model-the First Past the Post. That was what was wrong because a huge section of the population of voters had elected the opposition but was not represented in parliament due to that electoral model” (Interview with R 4, 04 August 2010). The participants who held this view noted that because the
opposition representation was not proportional to the percentage of votes, they cried foul that the elections were rigged. According to one participant the FPTP nature of winner- takes all gives “an impression that elections were rigged when in actual fact they were not... This is because there is a mismatch between the popular vote and electoral outcomes” (interview with R 7, 13 July, 2010). The landslide victories of the BCP and LCD in 1994 and 1998 respectively through the FPTP model triggered violent protests from the opposition on the grounds that the elections were fraudulent. But the real problem was that “[t]he plurality electoral system deny appropriate representation for minority interests...The peculiarly inadequate outcome of the election [within the FPTP system] indicated the urgent need for a reform of the electoral system towards proportional representation” (Southall, 2001: 161). On the other hand the LCD official questions why the same electoral model is functioning in Britain and Botswana and has yielded democracy while it is problematic in Lesotho. This respondent traced the problem to Basotho opposition tendency of failure to accept defeat. He argued that if the problem is the electoral system “why are you not addressing that instead of disputing the outcome of the elections” (Interview with R 6, 19 August 2010). One is compelled to concur with the above sentiments that the friction in the Lesotho body politic was misdirected in that they did not identify the source of the problem in order to apply the appropriate remedial measures. The participant viewed the problem as the opposition which always failing to accept defeat in democratic elections. In view of these perceptions, Southall and Petlane (1995: xvi), suggest that “…whatever the change to the electoral system may eventuate, we must return to the simplicity that institutions do not make democracy but people do. For democracy to take root in Lesotho there must of course be a guarantee that future elections will held and assurance that they will continue to be fairly administered and that their results will be respected by those who lose and not misused by those who win.”

Be that as it may, it was on the basis of this defective nature of the FPTP electoral system that the IPA was tasked with the mammoth task of reviewing the constitution, establishing an independent electoral commission, amending the electoral law and organising fair, free and credible elections in a period of eighteen months. It facilitated a constitutional review which culminated in the amendment of the Lesotho electoral law. One of the participants summarised the IPA’s task thus; “[t]he main mandate of the IPA was to work for the levelling of the playing field, preparing for the holding of smooth elections thereafter; preparing for some machinery that would be more inclusive in the sense that the state of having the winner takes all situation; the state of having only the FPTP electoral model, there should be put in place something that would be more inclusive of the divergent views of the stakeholders” (Interview with R 6, 08 July 2011). The protracted consultations and debates by different political parties culminated in the replacement of the FPTP electoral system with a new model: the Mixed Member Proportionality (MMP) which was supposed to provide a remedy for the defects experienced in the former electoral model. The hybrid model was expected to combine the best aspects of both the FPTP and proportional representation electoral models. That is, it retained some elements of the FPTP and introduced elements of proportionality. Respondents 7, 8, and 19 hailed the introduction of the MMP model as a panacea to the Lesotho electoral disputes. The UB academic indicated that
“addressing the electoral system was perhaps one of the biggest issues that were done to resolve problem” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). The ABC participant dubbed it “one of the best models in the world” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010). The MMP guaranteed broader participation by political parties as those small parties which did not win the majority of votes would be compensated through parliamentary representation within the proportional representation framework. The model stipulated that allocation of seats would be 80% for constituencies and 40% for proportional representation. The MMP worked towards achieving political stability because “there was some stretch of apparent appeasement; apparent security [and] peace when the parties had their representatives in parliament however small (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). To the effect that through the new MMP model, general elections would produce a fairly broad based representation of parties in the legislative, different political parties seemed to be satisfied with it (Matlosa and Sello, 2005).

Subsequently the 2002 elections were held through the new electoral model and an inclusive and representative parliament emerged from the elections. As Matlosa and Sello, 2005: 14) put it, “[t]he new system was put to the test during the 2002 general elections and keen observers of Lesotho’s political scene are agreed it has delivered a desirable outcome for Lesotho’s democracy, judging for instance by the broadly representative nature of the new parliament.” Lesotho entered a new era of a stable democracy even though the legacy of political bickering among the political parties persisted both in and outside parliament (Matlosa 1993, 1995, Southall 2001, Matlosa and Sello 2005). Commenting on the 2002 parliament the BCP leader said “[w]e had the first parliament in 2002 that sort of had the different shades of political views in the country instead of the one strong political party manning parliament” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). The elections were characterised by relative tranquility as opposed to all other elections in the country. Hailing the success of the MMP electoral model during the 2002 elections, the Prime Minister Mosisili said: “Lesotho has made tremendous and remarkable progress in democratic governance...Governance has been strengthened by the...adopted Mixed Member proportional system that has allowed a representation of at least ten political parties in the National Assembly. As a result, the country has for the first time in her political history enjoyed post-election peace and stability...” (cited in Matlosa and Sello, 2005: 1).

For this reason it would only be fair that the SADC should be commended for having successfully implemented the new electoral model that seemed to promote democracy and inclusivity in governance which had been lacking in the history of electoral processes in the Kingdom. In view of the above, it would also be fair to commend SADC for successfully implementing post-conflict building measures through the retraining of Lesotho security apparatus, prevailing over the monarchy to be above partisan politics and be a unifying unit, reforming the Lesotho electoral system and establishing a political structure - the IPA - to facilitate dialogue. More often than not, the success of post-conflict building measures determine whether the root causes of the conflict have been eradicated or not. With this in mind, Lund (1996: 94) states that “…depending on the resources available...a variety of other services which might
include hands on assistance in building institutions, alleviating distrust, promoting reconciliation, establishing channels through which to pursue negotiations, and formulating settlements” should be put in place as post-conflict peace-building measures. “In other words, one of the measures of the adequacy of preventive interventions is their richness or breath.” Kofi Annan (1998, 2000, and Boutrous Ghali (1992, 1995) were unequivocal on the significance of post-conflict peace-building measures as determinants of future peace and security in countries emerging from conflicts. Failure to put in place appropriate post-conflict peace-building initiatives means failed peacemaking missions and the country is more likely to revert to war.

However, during the 2007 elections, the LCD and the ABC formed electoral alliances with the NIP and the LWP in contravention of the MMP model. This blatant violation of the model reversed the political gains which were achieved through the 2002 elections when the model’s rules and procedures were followed by all political entities. The opposition parties, mainly the BNP, BCP and the MFP contested the allocation of seats which were distorted in favour of those parties which formed coalitions and against the smaller parties. The smaller parties lost their expected share of proportional representation to the coalition partners. The BCP participant articulated how the ruling party defrauded the new model when he said: “[t]he problem came in the elections of 2007 when the MMP was circumvented by the ruling party in that it made an alliance with a smaller party... and that sort of undermined the model because most of the 40 seats reserved for the opposition parties were taken by the same LCD, the ruling party which has taken about 60 constituencies through the FPTP model. And also some 20 or so, about half of the PR seats were also taken through the party that was nothing but the other face of the coin; of the ruling party” (Interview with R 17, 08 July 2011). The SADC post-2007 dialogue facilitator also clearly established that the post-2007 electoral disputes over allocation of proportional representation seats emanated, not from any defaults of the MMP model, but from the way the ruling party manipulated the model to its advantage through formation of electoral coalitions. In view of this, one participant noted that SADC should not be faulted for nefarious political machinations of the Lesotho political parties which led to the distortion of the model. He held that “this cannot be blamed on the SADC. SADC is not a participating party” in the Lesotho political arena (Interview with R 1, 28 May 2010).

However, there is optimism for peaceful elections in 2012. This is because the CCL, in collaboration with SADC is still engaged with the different political parties to prevent a repeat of the 2007 political uproar. They are engaging the political parties and the Independent Electoral Commission for electoral reforms and constitutional amendments to minimise the existence of any loopholes which the political parties can selfishly manoeuvre in the coming 2012 elections. The CCL Coordinator noted that when the LCD, ABC, NIP and the LWP formed electoral coalitions, they adroitly exploited ambiguity of the Lesotho electoral law, for example on the formation of alliances, the resultant allocation of alliances and the position of the leader of the opposition in parliament. Through the CCL dialogue forum, political parties are provided with the opportunity to address their concerns, debate the alliance system within the
MMP model and its implications for peace, security and democracy in the Kingdom. With this in mind, the ABC respondent asserted that “[w]e need to look at the electoral model and also the change of the constitution. That means to say that even though we have these seats allocation in parliament, but that seem to be conflicting with our constitution. And again we need to also amend the electoral law so that these kind of matters can be dealt within the law...It is a matter of political debate” (Interview with R 8, 10 August 2010).

Hopefully, with such a collective consultative effort, the elusive peace and security will be realised in Lesotho. What should remain a reality, and which should be recorded in books on the history of Lesotho, is how the SADC shaped the Lesotho political content and context through the introduction of the hybrid electoral model. It is up to the Basotho political stakeholders to show commitment and resilient resolve on implementing it for the betterment of the country and the region at large. If properly implemented, the model may provide a lasting political panacea to the turbulence which follows almost every election in the SADC region and the African continent at large.

However, Sejanamane (1996) dismisses what is considered as the successes of the SADC in the Kingdom of Lesotho. He argues that the level of success was due to the dimunitive status of Lesotho in the region. Among other things, the peacemaking strategies which were applied in Lesotho cannot be reproduced in other relatively powerful regional states such as Zimbabwe.

8.9 Lessons from the Lesotho Missions

One critical question directed to the research participants was what lessons did the SADC learn from the SADC missions? Or better still what lessons should the SADC have learnt from the Lesotho interventions? The question is of utmost importance because while the regional bloc was involved in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Madagascar, it was only in Lesotho that the SADC intervened through both non-coercive and coercive measures (1994 and 1998 respectively) and mediation by an Eminent Person (2007). The question is also vital in the sense that the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism is in its embryonic stages. As such the regional body is on a learning trajectory to be an efficient vanguard for regional peace and security. As the saying goes; “experience is the best teacher” SADC has to tap lessons from its regional engagements for the betterment of its preventive diplomacy architecture. The 1998 SADC intervention was viewed by several analysts as “a case of trial and error in the operationalisation of peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace-keeping strategies in the SADC region” (Santho, 2000: 2). It is therefore envisaged that the experience in Lesotho should have provided informative insights, lessons and experience on where they went wrong, how they would have better embarked on the missions and what their strengths and shortcomings were. Such pointed question would help the regional body in shaping, sharpening and redefining its future regional peace operation strategies. As Southall (2001: 169) observes “if the current post-intervention negotiation process fails to forge a more stable and formally democratic order, a repeat performance is
more than likely...SADC’s imprint...would provide an unambiguous legal framework and procedures under which any further intervention might be launched” if at all they critically evaluated their performance in the missions.

8.9.1 Need for Early Warning Systems and Proactive Responses

Several issues were raised by different respondents on what the SADC learnt or should have learnt from the Lesotho expeditions. Many respondents noted that the SADC was reactive rather than proactive in all of its peace interventions including Lesotho. They observed that the root cause of such a flawed response was the conspicuous absence of functional early warning and risk assessment systems which would detect crisis in member states before they erupt into manifest conflict. Such observations bred the suggestions that SADC should have learnt the significance of well-established and operational early warning systems which would help the regional bloc to nip conflicts in the bud. Experience has shown that once a conflict has erupted, it is very difficult and costly to resolve or manage. This is because “the longer that crises are allowed to fester, the harder they are to resolve. As the spiral of violence and destruction intensifies, polarisation deepens, the number of divisive issues increases, societal institutions crumble, the prospects for settling conflicts decreases, and the risks of conflict spreading increase. As the dangers, difficulties, and costs of intervention then mount, nations are more inclined to stay out or pull out of apparent quagmire" (Lund, 1996: 14). Azar (1990a: 15) observes that once a conflict has been entrenched “…the space for compromise and accommodation shrinks…and proposals for political solutions…tend to be perceived on all sides as mechanisms for gaining relative power and control.”

Established early warning systems would permit rapid preventive deployments that would defuse the conflicts before they escalate into sustained violent confrontations between the warring parties. It would justify the significance of the assumption that proaction is better than reaction and that crises can be better addressed as they emerge rather than when they have already deepened and widened (Azar 1990a, Lund 1996). The SADC, like all other regional blocs world wide took cognisance of the pivotal role that early warning systems could play in the task of maintaining regional peace and security. Hence in Article 11 of its Organ Protocol section on methods, item (b), it clearly states that “[t]he Organ shall establish an early warning system in order to facilitate timely action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict”. In the objectives of the Organ, item (f), the SADC pledged to “use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system” (Principles and Objectives of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, 1996). While the SADC acknowledges the significance of early warning as stipulated in its founding treaty and security protocols, the organisation has not yet established an operational early warning structure to detect potential conflicts before they erupt. The lack of operational early warning systems saw the SADC reactive interventions of 1994 and 1998 when Lesotho was on the brink of total civil war. The level of resistance which the SADC forces met from Basotho during Operation Boleas is indicative of how the conflict has deepend and intensified and therefore was difficult to manage. Because of the calamitous effects of
reactive interventions Barclay (1999:313) has this invaluable advice for regional organisations: “considering the long and costly process of restoring peace, it would seem more prudent and beneficial if regional organisations should specifically expand their mandate to include crisis prevention in member states.” That is to say regional organisations should develop their capabilities with the intent and purpose of understanding and identifying potential crises and direct their intervention programmes to addressing the causes before it explodes into systematic violence and armed conflict (Lund 1996, Barclay 1999).

One of the lessons the SADC learnt therefore was the need to establish early warning systems to identify potential and emerging political hotspots and countries prone to conflicts in order to launch well-planned and well-ordinated rapid response preventive missions before the outbreak of confrontations. The OPDS respondent was the first to acknowledge the significance of the lessons they obtained from their involvement, not only in Lesotho, but also in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. In response to the question he stated; “very much so... there is much that we learnt in Lesotho...We are now working on the lessons on Lesotho and we are trying to create a data base where we will use these lessons on Lesotho for future mediation processes...for us to develop some kind of technical models on how we can do better and what is it that we have not done in Lesotho” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). One of the participants from the SADC Security Organ put it on record during the interview that the SADC security unit is currently establishing a regional early warning network structure which will “on continuous basis provide early warning information on what potential dangers exist in the region. It will work together in close consultation with other mediation support structures...” (Interview with R 2, 28 June 2010). The establishment of the early warning system should be accompanied by development of appropriate preventive diplomacy structures such as the Panel of Elders, Eminent Persons, fact-finding mission teams, mediation units, intelligence networks and standing regional peace-keeping force all of which should be fully resourced for rapid preventive deployments in the conflict zones.

A SADC regional intervention based on a thorough prior assessment of the conflict situation would go a long way to ensuring successful preventive diplomacy missions. An analysis of the fact-finding data would guide the regional body on how best to intervene, what intervention strategy to employ and when to get involved. Decisions on whether to intervene or not would be based on gathered and analysed information which would determine the nature of the intervention. For example, because of insufficient information on the intensity of the Lesotho 1998 crisis, the SADC only deployed soldiers who while engaged in vicious battles with the LDF and opposition protestors could not address the pertinent aspect of maintaining law and order to prevent the plunder, looting and burning of Maseru commercial centre. The operation should have involved police units to guard the streets. As one of the respondents observed “[t]here were serious problems of planning in that operation in Lesotho. It was a purely military intervention. And we know that peace support operations cannot be an exclusively military affair. It is a matter that also involves the civilians. So that is the big lesson that we learnt. That there were limitations in terms of planning as to who should
intervene in Lesotho” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). An established early warning system, working in tandem with other regional security instruments would eliminate the blunders which the SADC troops are said to have committed in Lesotho on account of inadequate information on the nature and status of the crisis.

8.9.2 Establishment of a Standing Regional Peace-keeping Force

Another respondent indicated that the preventive missions in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and the DRC were wake-up calls for the regional body - the SADC to put its security architecture and operational tools in order. It emerged from the interviews that as a result of the Lesotho and DRC experiences, the SADC members states have recognised the significance of establishing the SADC Brigade a SADC standing peace-keeping force which is always readily available for deployment should the need arise. One participant stated that “[i]ts work in progress. SADC is busy; seized with that process of establishing the SADC Brigade” (Interview with R 7, 13 July 2010). Another participant pointed out that “…member states have pledged the resources so that as and when they are required for an operation; we can always call them and deploy them” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). If fully established and its objectives realised, such an entity would ensure standard training procedures, principles, values and operational commonalities during regional peace-keeping engagements. Trained under the same codes, norms and standard peacemaking operational ethics, the embarrassingly conflicting postures displayed by the BDF and the SANDF during the 1998 military intervention may become a thing of the past. Rather than having individual member states contributing to an adhoc peace-keeping force (as experienced in the cases of the DRC and Lesotho), they would be obliged to contribute to a standing regional force which would be legally constituted and mandated to undertake SADC peace operations. Therefore, to some extent “the crisis in Lesotho has pointed to the dangers of continuing an adhoc approach” to interventions in regional disputes (Southall, 1998: 5). One participant observed that in the previous interventions “even when we have agreed as a region that we intervene in a particular country, member states still retain the right to determine whether they can go into that operation. And it is their sovereign right to do so” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Worse still, according to Santho (2000: 3) there was “lack of clarity about when SADC states are acting in concert and when one or two SADC member states act unilaterally, or claim to be acting on behalf of SADC.”

It is envisaged that, such a regional security structure would to some extent minimise controversies around legality which often surround individual armies' interventions in other member states. Lesotho and the DRC are cases in point where the South African and Zimbabwean-led forces suffered intractable criticism of having launched the missions, not with the SADC mandate but for their selfish national interests. Interventions by a regional standby force would also reduce the costs incurred by the operation as it would no longer be shouldered by individual intervening countries but by the regional body. It would also save SADC the embarrassment of retroactive accountability on operations, some of which it was clear were clouded with controversies about their legitimacy as regional missions as
was the case of the DRC and Lesotho. One participant acknowledged the centrality of an established regional standby force and hoped member states would exert both financial, material and political will for its success. He posited that “it is encouraging that at least we know there is a SADC standby force in existence... missions. It only need to be nurtured and one would hope that the respective governments would contribute fairly well to such a standby force so that we must be seen as an entity that can take up such missions when called upon” (Interview with R 13, 16 June 2011).

It can be surmised from the responses that some of the operational blunders as experienced during the Lesotho operation such as uncoordinated entrance into the country, the two intervening forces hoisting two different flags and other operational flaws emanated from lack of a central command of the intervening forces. The supposition is that such a force would be commanded from one centre and its mandate would be that delegated by the regional body. In its operational documents and protocols, the SADC has noted that as it continues to grow, the regional body will form a single regional security entity to collectively respond to both internal and external threats to peace and security. Article 9 of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact states that through the Pact state parties shall cooperate in all defence matters and facilitate a well coordinated interaction among the the members’ defence forces through the training of military personnel in any field of military endeavour; hold joint military exercises in each other’s territory; exchange military intelligence and information on relevant matters and conduct joint research on how to harmonise their military and defence policies; defence industries and equipments; and on issues of national and regional security (Protocol on the SADC Mutual Defence Pact; 2004).

In view of this, the intent to form a SADC Brigade, accelerated by the experiences and lessons from the DRC and Lesotho, was long-term development projects of the SADC agenda in its bid for a peaceful and conflict free region. What remains to be seen is the commitment of SADC member states in terms of political will, financial resources and contribution of troops for institutional development and operationalisation of the regional stand-by brigade. As de Coning (2005: 17) notes “[t]he high performance scenario will only materialise if the development of the SADC stand-by system is a very high priority for most of the SADC member states. It is only if most of the member states choose to give this initiative its full support, including the financial and in-kind resources it would require, that this scenario can be achieved.”

8.9.3 Need to Focus on Non-coercive Measures

The other lesson the SADC learnt was that it is advisable to resolve regional conflicts through peaceful, non-coercive mediation with the belligerent parties to reach a mutually amicable solution. The lesson emanated from the fact that the SADC launched diplomatic and negotiated missions in 1994 and 2007 and the strategies did not trigger the animosity which the regional body encountered when they launched the military operation in 1998. In fact, in its
founding treaty and security protocols, the SADC pledged to engage in peaceful diplomatic, non-coercive interventions only to embark on coercive measures as a last resort. Regional organisations in their diverse formations pledge peaceful engagements in their treaties. It is important to emphasise the need for dialogue in conflict resolution. As historically evidenced most conflicts of the world have been resolved through dialogue (Odunuga 1999). It emerged from the responses of many participants that they were enraged by the 1998 SADC military intervention. Several interviewees acknowledged the 1994 and 2007 diplomatic missions and denounced the 1998 military mission. Thus “[t]he lesson here is that it is only through peaceful means that societal problems can be solved...” (Odunuga, 1999: 50). As Albert Einstein correctly observed “peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding.”

Participants from the SADC OPDS indicated that the SADC is developing its mediation structures like the mediation unit, the diplomacy unit and the Eminent Person Panel to handle the mediation process so that the stakeholders to the conflict are involved and are party to the negotiation outcomes. One of the participants concluded that “[o]ne of the lessons that was learnt through the experience was that whatever we have put in place as SADC is a result of our own historical experiences and the 1998 situation in Lesotho being one of those... It was only as a result of the lessons from Lesotho and the DRC that we started to put in place other measures...The system has improved much better now over the years...Now we have even taken to issues of mediation...Really by then the SADC had a very shaky mediation mechanism in place; very shaky” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). The participant indicated that attempts at mediation were carried out by South Africa (not SADC) through the Langa Commission and the Thabo Mbeki-led mediation but all were futile. The 1998 bitter experience, as demonstrated by numerous participants was a watershed moment in shaping the main route for the SADC in resolving regional disputes. The following excerpts from the interviews are reflective of the SADC emphasis on dialogue; “I recommend dialogue; not like in 1998 when the forces came in,” “dialogue; that is the only means of solving problems,” “don’t impose a solution...mediation can help people to find home grown solutions to their own problems,” “dialogue is the corner stone of resolving crisis,” “dialogue prevails, where all the parties sit down around a table and finally agree” “in dialogue we have seen that the SADC works very good,” “SADC should develop the capacity...in promoting dialogue” and that “SADC should learn that it is not proper...to engage military means to address political problems...SADC should make sure that political leaders are engaged in extensive talks” (Excerpts from interviews with different participants; June, July and August 2010 and 2011).

One of the participants indicated that the decision by the SADC to pursue a negotiated settlement of the crisis in Madagascar was influenced by the Lesotho experience. He stated that “[w]hen the coup was effected in Madagascar, there was an issue as to whether we should intervene militarily. The rationale decision that was taken then was no, let us give mediation a chance. So use of force is the last resort. So adherence to the founding documents of SADC
Structures have been given effect to” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). With the experiences of Lesotho, the SADC delegated the former President of Mozambique, Joachim Chissano to mediate a political settlement between the political formations in the country. Despite the numerous hurdles he encountered, a roadmap to resolve the island’s crisis is unfolding with the political parties having agreed to dialogue over the political situation in the country. The parties have formed an interim political governing structure to prepare for democratic and inclusive elections in 2012 (Chissano; 2010).

8.9.4 Involvement of all Stakeholders in Peace Missions

The SADC also learnt that peace-keeping interventions should be multifaceted and involve different societal bodies in order to be more representative and holistically address the challenges emerging during and after the intervention. Non-governmental organisations (CSOs) in their diverse formations play a vital role in unofficial track 2 diplomacy which if properly coordinated with the official track 1 diplomacy can lead to peaceful resolution of conflicts. In several international conflicts, non-governmental organisations such as the Carter Centre for Democracy; the Oslo Channel, the Community of Saint Egidio, have acted as primary intermediaries between conflicting parties to assist them to arrive at negotiated settlements to their conflicts. For instance the Community of Egidio (a Catholic organisation linked to the Vatican) played a central role in bringing the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) and Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELI MO) parties to a negotiated settlement culminating to a lasting solution in the devastating two-decade conflict in Mozambique. The efforts of the NGO were fruitfully complemented by the United Nations mission in the 1990s. Non-governmental organisations have important roles to play in areas of development, reconstruction of war-torn societies, humanitarian assistance, disarmament and rehabilitation programmes, protection of human rights, and promotion of democracy during post-conflict peacebuilding phases of conflicts.

Basic human needs theorists in a way recommend the input of CSOs through holding problem-solving workshops facilitated by social Scientists with expertise in group processes and human behaviour. The workshops are mainly (Peck 1998) designed to provide an analytical, problem solving framework for assessing the conflict and exploring a wide range of potential solutions by all the warring parties. The workshops can be helpful in transforming the conflictual attitude and perceptions of the warring parties to cooperation and commitment to finding a lasting solution to the conflict. According to Kelman (1990 the workshops can “help produce a more differentiated image of the enemy and help the participants discover potential negotiating partners on the other side... They contribute to the development of shared vision of a desired future which helps reduce the parties’ fears of negotiations as a step into the unknown, dangerous realm. They may generate ideas about the shape of a positive-sum solution that meets the basic needs of both parties...Ultimately problem solving workshops contribute to a process of transformation of the enemy relationship between the parties” (in Peck 1998: 189). Several participants indicated that the 1998 military intervention was flawed in that it only involved the military sector. The police and civilian sections were not fully
engaged to address the challenges unfolding as the military quell the violent eruptions. One of the participants stated that the 1998 Lesotho intervention was “just the military that went into Lesotho. And at the end of the day, (laughs), there were other constructions that were not done. That is one lesson” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). Several participants also reflected that the SADC has not initially formally involved the civil society organisations in the search for a peaceful resolution of the Lesotho conflicts. As reflected earlier, CSOs are pivotal in determining the realisation of sustainable peace and security in a conflict-ridden society. That the SADC endorsed the role of the CCL in facilitating dialogue among the different political entities in Lesotho after the withdrawal of the Masire-led mission is a clear indication that the SADC has learnt the significance of embracing NGOs in its peace operations. In light of this the CCL Co-ordinator has advised that the SADC “should establish conflict resolution institutions in SADC countries; local conflict management institutions comprising Non-Governmental Organisations such as the Christian Council of Lesotho” (Interview with R 9, 20 08 2010). In fact Article 23 (1 and 2) of the SADC Treaty on Non-Governmental Organisations states that “SADC shall seek to involve fully, the peoples of the Region and non-governmental organisations in the process of regional integration.” The regional body also committed itself to “cooperate with, and support the initiatives of the people of the Region and non-governmental organisations, contributing to the objectives of this treaty in areas of cooperation in order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations and peoples of the region” (SADC Treaty 1992). If the SADC could optimally utilise its experience in Lesotho to implement the tapping of the skills of CSOs in preventive diplomacy it may go a long way in resolving regional conflicts through embracing and inclusive measures. This is because in the view of Peck (1998: 185), CSOs “have the potential for tapping into a broader base of ideas and approaches...ability to bring serious problems to public awareness and exert pressure on governments to respond...”

Therefore, although the SADC was faced with a barrage of challenges in its Lesotho missions, it gained some insights and experiences on how to better traverse the route to successful preventive diplomacy and there is no doubt that, with the political will to learn and correct their mistakes, the SADC will make more organised and efficient future regional peace interventions. As the Eminent Person in the Lesotho dialogue facilitation rightly observed “[t]he preventive measures will improve with time and therefore SADC should not just give up and say because they tried somewhere, then it didn’t work, or they tried in Lesotho and it didn’t work. They should fashion their tools to be equal to the task of fulfilling the job and resulting in a situation with measures that will quell the situation” (Interview with R 10, 23 May 2011). And indeed, as another participant observed, since its preventive missions more than a decade ago “SADC has evolved a lot and it has put in place a number of measures and it is continuing to do so” (Interview with R 14, 20 June 2011). One participant concluded by saying “[t]it remains to be seen how effective the security sector is, given the new mandate of having a SADC standby force which hasn’t been put to test as yet” (Interview with R 13, 16 June 2011). The good thing is that the SADC is willing to learn from its shortcomings and put some
remedial measures in place as reflected in the above interviews. Hopefully, the organisation will improve its performance in future operations as a result of the lessons they obtained from their previous engagements.

However, Sejanamane (1996: 83) disagrees that the Lesotho case has provided a model for the regional body’s future regional peace interventions. He states that “[t]hat there is a need for some form of stability in the region is not in doubt, but how to ensure that has up to now eluded everybody.”

8.10 Conclusion

Diverse arguments and perceptions about the SADC interventions in Lesotho were raised by different participants in this study. It emerged that the SADC had both successes and challenges in diffusing the Lesotho conflicts. The study also revealed that the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism has numerous shortcomings in terms of its operations. For example, in the case of the 1998 military mission, it remains unclear whether it was really authorised by the SADC. It also emerged from the study that the SADC preventive missions failed to address the structural economic challenges in the Kingdom of Lesotho which appear to be the major sources of conflicts. The study also revealed that the SADC has learnt a lot from the Lesotho experience on how they can model their preventive diplomacy architecture for future regional operations.
CHAPTER NINE
Conclusion and Recommendations

9.1 Introduction
The aim of this study was to examine the efficacy of the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism in view of its missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho in 1994, 1998 and 2007 respectively. This chapter presents a summary and conclusions from the findings in relation to the literature reviewed and theoretical frameworks which guided the study. It also provides recommendations on how the SADC should improve the structures and operations of its preventive diplomacy architecture on the basis of its experiences in Lesotho. In addition, the chapter outlines some fertile areas for future research in light of the scope and limitation of this study.

9.2 Summary of the findings
The study examined the SADC preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho as a case study to determine the efficacy of the regional bloc in conflict prevention, management and resolution as stipulated in its treaty and security protocols. The empirical data for the study was obtained through in-depth interviews from key stakeholders such as officials from the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), representatives of different political parties, representatives of different Non-Governmental Organisations in Lesotho, former soldiers who were involved during the missions and the Eminent Person who was involved during the 1994 and 2007 missions in the Kingdom.

Data analysis drew extensively from the in-depth interviews and the literature and theories on regional integration, conflict prevention, management and resolution. The analysis hinged on the questions about the motivations, justifications, mandate, legitimacy, challenges, successes and lessons drawn from the SADC missions in Lesotho. The research findings presented the different views and perspectives from the different research participants on the above themes about the SADC missions in Lesotho. It emerged that while the SADC intervened in Lesotho in 1994 and 2007 through non-coercive and coercive measures in 1998, peace and stability remains elusive in the Kingdom. The research findings also revealed that while the ruling party regarded the SADC interventions as legitimate and within its regional mandate, opposition parties deemed the missions, especially the 1998 military intervention to be an illegal interference in the domestic affairs of the Kingdom. The opposition felt that South Africa intervened in the Kingdom to safeguard its national interest as opposed to the proclaimed motives for the defence of democracy and regional peace. Compelling arguments from different interviewees were presented and supported by literature from the study.

Evidence from the study revealed that the SADC preventive diplomacy in the Kingdom of Lesotho especially the 1998 military intervention were surrounded by questions of who authorised the mission and its exact mandate. Such
perceptions raised questions on the legality of the mission. For instance, there was no evidence of the SADC Summit mandating South Africa and Botswana to undertake the military mission on behalf of the regional body. There was also no evidence that the SADC contacted the UN Security prior to its interventions as stated in Chapter 53 of the UN Charter. This raises questions as to whether the mission was really a regional project or an adventure by the individual countries for their own national interests.

The findings also revealed that most of the interviewees advocated non-coercive diplomacy measures for regional peace-keeping efforts. It emerged that while they hailed the 1999 and 2007 SADC missions, they denounced the military intervention of 1998 as an invasion and violation of Lesotho sovereignty and territorial integrity. The participants also reflected on how the SADC failed to enforce its peace resolutions during the 1994, 1998 and 2007 missions. For instance, it emerged that during the Masire-led dialogue facilitation, the LCD government remained consistently intransigent leading to the collapse of the talks and the SADC as the mandating regional body could not prevail on the government to comply with the resolution. This led to some participants viewing SADC as a useless body whose role is to defend their regional counterparts rather than the regional citizenry.

The data also revealed that while the SADC experienced operational hurdles, it managed through the three missions to bring the warring political entities to dialogue, restored law and order, democracy and peace in the Kingdom. The participants indicated how the SADC managed to establish the Interim Political Authority which co-ordinated electoral reforms, re-training of the highly politicise Lesotho security establishment after the 1998 mission. To date, the SADC is in partnership with the Council of Churches in Lesotho and other non-governmental organisations in negotiating a peaceful settlement of the post-2007 electoral disputes and preparations for fair, free and credible election in 2012.

9.3 Recommendations for improvement of the SADC Preventive Diplomacy Mechanism

It also emerged from the research findings that the SADC drew some lessons from its preventive diplomacy missions in Lesotho. Several participants noted that the SADC needed to developed early warning systems to establish potential crisis spots for proactive responses. Evidence from the three missions in Lesotho and in other cases such as the DRC, Zimbabwe and Madagascar revealed that the SADC was reactive in its response to regional conflicts and this resulted in thorny challenges as reflected in the previous chapters. Participants indicated that the SADC should have established early warning and risk assessment systems to co-ordinate when and how to respond.

It was also evident from the data that the SADC does not have a clearly established standard intervention policy to coordinate its preventive missions. It emerged that individual member states can intervene even when there is no clear mandate from the regional body as was experienced in Lesotho and the DRC. That the SADC also lacks a clear intervention policy was reflected by its retroactive legitimisation of the DRC mission while it was surrounded by
controversy. It is from such shortcomings that the SADC needs a clearly constituted and operationalised intervention policy code which binds the organisation and all member states. Such a policy would ensure a smooth operation of the envisaged SADC stand-by force.

Among other things, the SADC should expedite the establishment of its regional stand-by force to avoid the adhoc operations by individual member states in regional peace-keeping missions as experienced in the DRC and Lesotho. The SADC Brigade would see a force trained on standard military ethics and codes to defend regional peace and stability. The situation as it is now is that individual member states have different security and defence policies and this creates numerous challenges when the troops are hastily deployed for peace-keeping missions. The differences experienced during the operations of the South African and Botswana troops in Lesotho are a case in point. An ever-ready and well-prepared regional force would go a long way to achieve durable regional peace and stability. Such a force should be supported by political will and material resources from member states for it to have any substantive impact in the region.

The research findings also indicated that the SADC need expert mediators in its preventive diplomacy interventions. It emerged that the SADC depends on former Heads of state as mediators. The issue is that while the former presidents can rely on their stature to prevail over the mediation, they need expert support from people trained in conflict mediation and negotiations as well as psychologists who understand how the human mind works. During the interviews, several participants revealed necessity of such experts within the SADC security organ to provide expert guidance to mediation processes. The expert team would also assist in identifying the structural sources of conflicts which if accordingly addressed would eliminate chances for the recurrence of conflicts. For instance, it emerged that one of the root causes of conflicts in Lesotho was economic underdevelopment and failure by the successive governments to equitably distribute wealth to the people. However, in its post-conflict peacebuilding measures SADC did not assist in the economic realm. Instead, they focused on the political sphere hence peace and stability will remain elusive in the Kingdom. Experts on conflicts converge on the fact that for any intervention to bear fruits, it should be informed by identification of the underlying sources of the conflict at hand.

The SADC security mechanism also needs to embrace the post-Cold War definition of security which is not restricted to the defence of the state but is inclusive of human security. In its missions in Lesotho the SADC seemed to be locked in their classical militaristic definition of security. In light of this, the SADC failed to detect that the root causes of the conflicts in Lesotho was not political but a defective economy which is heavily dependent on South Africa. A definition of security which pledges to advance the needs of the people, promote democracy and democratic governance, human security, human rights, freedoms and justice, equitable distribution of national wealth, economic growth and food security and human welfare would be a lasting mitigating factor to regional conflicts. In view of this,
SADC needs established and well-resourced structures to fight social ills such as poverty, underdevelopment, undemocratic governance, corruption, illiteracy and disease. It is clear that most of the countries in the region are candidates for such ills which no doubt breed incessant conflict. Basic human needs theorists and the Marxists maintain that a situation where the people are deprived of their existential needs will never enjoy peace and stability.

9.4 Recommendations for Future Research
As indicated in Chapter One, this study had limitations in terms of scope and methodology. For instance, it was a case study of the SADC preventive diplomacy in the case of Lesotho. Data was only collected through in-depth interviews and literature on regional organisations and conflict management. As such, there is no doubt that its findings cannot be exhaustive of the broad range of regional organisations and their experiences in regional conflict prevention, management and resolution. It is important to note that the SADC was also involved in the DRC, Zimbabwe and Madagascar. In view of this it would be necessary for empirical research on the SADC preventive missions in these countries. This is more so because each conflict situation has its own peculiarities which should be considered in determining the efficacy of the regional bloc on consideration. What we are saying is that the challenges which the SADC encountered in Lesotho would not be similar to the ones it encountered in Zimbabwe, the DRC or Madagascar.

It would also be necessary for future research to embark on comparative studies, for example of the SADC and other regional organisations in regional preventive diplomacy missions. Such studies would broaden the scope by bringing experiences from other regions and provide rich data from which a holistic understanding of the operations of regional organisations could be drawn. The failures and successes of SADC in fulfilling its regional mandate would be benchmarked through such studies.

Another fertile area for future research would be the role of the SADC Panel of Eminent Persons in regional conflict prevention, management and resolution. The SADC has relied on former Presidents, for instance Sir Ketumile Masire (Botswana) in Lesotho and Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique) in Madagascar. Research on their operational mandates, challenges and how best they can be empowered and supported would go a long in enhancing regional peace and stability. Data from this study revealed that the Masire-led Commission in the Kingdom of Lesotho was not only under-resourced but it was not sufficiently supported by the regional organisation in terms of enforcing its resolutions.

Finally, studies need to be conducted on the role of civil society organisations in conflict prevention, management and resolution. It emerged from the literature that non-governmental organisations have played a prominent role in different conflict set-ups, and regional organisations should tap into such potentials during their preventive missions.
Some participants in this study revealed that the SADC did not formally involve the civil society organisations during its missions in Lesotho. As such a study focused on the extent to which the SADC involve the civil society organisation in its structures and operations is imperative.

9.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented a summary of the research findings and recommendations on how the SADC should improve the operations of its preventive diplomacy mechanism. The study revealed that while the SADC had made commendable strides in the development of its security mechanism, it still has a long way to go as revealed by its operations in Lesotho. It also suggested other areas for future research on the SADC security architecture. Such studies would add to the existing literature on the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism and how best it could be improved for a peaceful SADC region.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Map showing SADC member states
Appendix B

Fig. 1: SADC ORANOGRAM:

SADC Summit of HoS and Government

Troika of SADC
Council of Ministers
Standing Committee of Officials
Integrated Committee of Ministers

SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation

Troika of SADC Organ
Committee of Ministers

Inter-State Defence and Security Committee
State Security Committee
Defence Committee

Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee
Public Sec Committee

Various Sub-sub-committees

Secretariat in Gaborone

Executive Secretary

Admin & Support Services
Finances
Legal Affairs
Internal Audit
Knowledge & Information

Dept of Strategic Planning, Gender & Policy Harmonization

Directorate 1
Trade, Indus, Fin, Invest & Mining

Directorate 2
Food, Agriculture & Natural Resources

Directorate 3
Infrastructure & Services

Directorate 4
Social & Human Dev & Special Programmes

Directorate 5
Politics & Diplomacy

Directorate 6
Defence & Security

SADC National Committees
Appendix C

Objectives of the Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS)

1. The general objective of the Organ shall be to promote peace and security in the region
2. The specific objectives of the organ are to;
   a) protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state conflict and an aggression;
   b) promote political cooperation among State Parties and the evolution of common political values and institutions;
   c) develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance policy collectively in international fora;
   d) promote regional coordination and cooperation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end
   e) prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict by peaceful means;
   f) consider enforcement action in accordance with international law and as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed;
   g) promote the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the African Union and the United Nations respectively
   h) consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats;
   i) develop close cooperation between the police and state security services of State Parties in order to address’ (i) cross border crime and promote community based approach to domestic security
   j) observe, and encourage State parties to implement United Nations, African Union and other international conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states;
   k) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and coordinate the participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations and
   l) enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance.
Appendix D

Interview Schedule

(What is your perception of your government/organisation/ political party role regarding the SADC interventions in Lesotho? In your view (or the view of your government/political party/organisation) were the SADC preventive missions of 1994 and 1998 in Lesotho justified? Please give reasons for your answer.

1. What role did your government/political party/ organisation etc play during and after the interventions?

2. Some critics have argued that the 1998 SADC military intervention in Lesotho was motivated by the small size, weak politico-economic and unique geographical position of the country in the SADC region. What is your view (the view of your government/political party/organisation) on these perceptions? (Some political commentators hold that the (SADC) South African-led military intervention in Lesotho cast doubts (raise questions) on the sovereignty of the Kingdom in relation to South Africa. What is your comment?).

3. What challenges were faced by the SADC during and after the preventive missions of 1994 and 1998 in Lesotho?

4. What post -conflict-intervention measures were put in place after the Lesotho interventions (How effective were the post-conflict peace-building measures?)

5. Would you say the Lesotho preventive missions (1994 and 1998) were a success or failure? Please give reasons for your answer.

6. The SADC was involved in both the 1994 and 1998 preventive missions in the Kingdom of Lesotho and the organisation employed non-coercive and coercive measures respectively. Which of the two intervention mechanism would you recommend for future SADC preventive measures? Please give reasons for your answer.

7. Has the SADC preventive mission in Lesotho provided any valuable lessons for future regional preventive measures in the region? (What lessons were learnt (should the SADC have learnt) from the Lesotho preventive missions?)

8. What recommendations/suggestions would you make on the structural/institutional/policies and operational modalities of the SADC preventive mechanism in view of the Lesotho intervention of 1994 and 1998?)
9. Anything else you would want to say about the SADC preventive mechanism in Lesotho or the region in general? (What would be your last word/input on the SADC preventive machinery?)
APPENDIX E

Interview Schedule: Lesotho Dialogue Facilitator

1. As a member of the SADC Troika during the 1994 SADC intervention in the Kingdom of Lesotho, could you please take me through the sequence of events which motivated the SADC intervention?

2. In your view were the SADC preventive missions of 1994 and 1998 justified? Please give reasons for your answer.

3. Would you say the 1994 and 1998 SADC preventive missions in Lesotho were a success or a failure? Please give reasons for your answer.

4. What is your opinion on the perception that the eruption of violent conflict in 1998 and 2007 might be a reflection of a failed non-coercive preventive diplomacy in Lesotho?

5. What is your view regarding the 1998 SADC military intervention in Lesotho? What peace building measures were put in place after the 1994 and then the 1998 preventive missions? Would you say these measures were effective in preventing the recurrence of conflicts in the Kingdom?

6. The 2007 elections in Lesotho were followed by violent protests by the opposition parties and you were appointed the SADC peace facilitator. In your view what are the core issues which give rise to violent conflict which has followed almost all elections in the country?

7. What challenges did you encounter as the facilitator of the Lesotho peace process?

8. On the basis of the Lesotho experience would you say the SADC has a coherent and efficient preventive diplomacy mechanism?

9. What recommendations/suggestions would you make for future preventive missions on the basis of the Lesotho experience? Is there anything else you would like to say generally about the SADC preventive mechanism and operations in the region in general?
Appendix F

Interview Schedule: Former soldiers (Retired)

1. In 1998, the SADC (SA and Botswana) intervened militarily in the Kingdom of Lesotho (Operation Boleas). What do you motivated the military intervention?

2. In your view was the SADC military intervention necessary/justified? Please give reasons for your answer.

3. Some political commentators have argued that the 1998 military intervention in Lesotho was not mandated by the UN, the AU or the SADC. What is your opinion of these arguments?

4. South Africa and Botswana as SADC members were opposed to military intervention in the DRC in 1998. Why do you think they opted for military action in Lesotho?

5. There are perceptions that the military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 was motivated by the small size, weak economic-political and unique geographical position of Lesotho in the region. What is your view on these perceptions?

6. The Botswana intervention force (contingent) did not meet much resistance or confrontation in Lesotho in 1998 as compared to the South African force. What do you think was the reason for such a difference?

7. What was the mandate of the SADC intervention force in Lesotho?

8. What challenges/difficulties did the SADC intervention force face during the preventive mission?

9. What peace-building measures did the SADC put in place after the Lesotho mission of 1998?

10. How effective were the post-conflict peace initiatives in preventing the recurrence of conflicts in Lesotho?

11. In what ways did the SADC involve the Lesotho Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) during and after the intervention to resolve the conflict?

12. In your view was the SADC military preventive mission a success or failure? Please give reasons for your answer.
13. What lessons were learnt by the SADC security mechanism from the Lesotho preventive mission of 1998?

14. What recommendations/suggestions would you make on the structural/institutional/policies and operational modalities of the SADC preventive mechanism in view of the Lesotho military intervention of 1998?

15. Is there anything else you would want to say about the SADC preventive mission in Lesotho or the region in general?
Appendix G

Interview Schedule: SADC OPDS officials, Independent Experts (Academics; Political Scientists/Commentators)

1. SADC intervened in the Kingdom of Lesotho in 1994, 2007 and 2007. In your view were the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho justified? Please give reasons for your answer.

2. Article 11(a), (b) and (c) of the Protocol on the Politics Defence and Security (OPDs) pledge to use peaceful means in resolving both intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Article 11 (a) of the Protocol also pledges to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the SADC members states. Why did the SADC opt for military intervention in the 1998 Lesotho?

3. Some political commentators maintain that the military intervention (1998) was not authorised or mandated by SADC neither by the African Union nor the UN as expected. What is your comment to such views?

4. Critics have also argued that the SADC military intervention in Lesotho raised questions regarding the sovereignty of Lesotho in relation to South Africa. What is your opinion?

5. It is on record that South Africa and Botswana were opposed to military intervention in the DRC. What factors do you think motivated their decision for military action in the case of Lesotho?

6. Some critics hold that the 1998 SADC military intervention in Lesotho was motivated by the small size, weak politico-economic and unique geographical position of the country in the SADC region. What is your stance to such perceptions?

7. In what ways did the SADC involve the Civil Society Organisations during and after the 1994, 1998 and 2007 missions?

8. What challenges were faced by the SADC during and after the preventive missions of 1994, 1998 and 2007?

9. What peace-building measures did the SADC put in place after the preventive missions to prevent the recurrence of conflicts? How effective were these post-conflict-peace-building measures?

10. What would you say were the successes and failures of the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho?
11. The Lesotho elections of 2007 were followed by protests by opposition parties over the electoral procedures and allocation of proportional representation seats in Parliament. Can this be an indication that the SADC peace-building measures were not effective in curbing the recurrence of conflicts in the Kingdom?

12. Following the 2007 post-election disputes the SADC mandated Sir Ketumile Masire to facilitate dialogue between the government and the opposition parties. What challenges were encountered by the mission?

13. Has the SADC preventive missions in Lesotho provided any lessons for future preventive measures in the region? What lessons did SADC learn from the Lesotho experience?

14. What recommendations/suggestions would you make on the structural and operational strategies of the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism in view of the Lesotho missions?

15. What are your final thoughts on the SADC preventive diplomacy machinery?
Appendix H

Interview Schedule: Representatives of Non-Governmental Organisations in Lesotho

1. SADC intervened in Lesotho following the post-1993, 1998 and 2007 electoral disputes. Were the interventions justified/ necessary?
2. In what ways did the SADC involve the Civil Society Organisations during and after the missions?
3. What role did your organisation play in bringing peace and stability in Lesotho?
4. What challenges were faced by the SADC during and after the preventive missions?
5. Were the SADC preventive missions a success or failure? Please give reasons for your answer?
6. On the basis of the Lesotho intervention would you say the SADC has an effective preventive diplomacy mechanism?
7. The Christian Council of Lesotho took over the mediation after the collapse of the Masire-led mediation. What support do you get from SADC?
8. How effective was your partnership with SADC towards resolving the political impasse in the Kingdom?
9. What challenges did your organisation face in trying to find a solution to the disputes in Lesotho?
10. What do you think should be done in order to find a lasting solution to the Kingdom’s conflicts?
11. What recommendations/suggestions would you make on the structural and operational modalities of the SADC preventive diplomacy mechanism?