FROM ABUNDANCE TO BONDAGE-AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSES OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN ZIMBABWE FROM 1995 TO 2005

By

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU-African Union
SAP- Structural Adjustment Programme
SADC- Southern African Development Community
MDC- Movement for Democratic Change
ZANU-PF – Zimbabwean African National Union – Patriotic Front
IMF – International Monetary Fund
WB – World Bank
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
ABSTRACT

This study investigates the main causes of the present political crisis in Zimbabwe with particular reference to the crisis as a direct result of a crisis of authority or governance. The economy and the political environments in the former Rhodesia have been in a healthy state until the early 1990s when the ruling ZANU-PF had its rule under siege when the economy dwindled and the opposition became rife.

The broad questions that the study sought to answer were: What have been the primary reasons for the political crisis in Zimbabwe between 1995 and 2005? What role has the political elite played in the country’s development? What contribution did the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme make to the economic development of Zimbabwe? Are there any other important factors that have played a role in the development process of Zimbabwe?

As a way of investigation, this study uses qualitative research techniques to make a clinical examination of the main causes of the political crisis that has reduced the formerly self-sustaining and democratically highly rated country to a pariah citizen (state) of the world. A number of primary sources have been used and have had their responses/input supplemented by relatively reliable secondary sources that gave authenticity to the argument of the research.
This study makes a ten year review of the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe, as this is the period whence the political crisis became apparent and restricts its investigation of the causes of the political crisis to this period albeit some of these reasons are connected to the past i.e. the period from 1980 to 1995. Since this is a deductive scholarly account, the study tests the theory of organic crisis as an explanation for state collapse in Africa with particular reference to Zimbabwe.

Finally the study reveals that the major causes of the political crisis in Zimbabwe are the colonial legacy which seems to have had its negative on the politics of the country just ten years into democracy; the crisis of governance which led to political and economic decay as the ruling party tried by all means to solicit political support; the Lancaster House agreement and the land question which are related to the question of colonial legacy and among the primary reasons Zimbabwe has reached political impasse; the crisis of elites which this directly links to the political crisis; structural adjustment programmes and corruption and fraud.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY.

From the early days of slavery to the recent times of liberal democracy, the African state has always been on the fringes of economic, political and social transformation. It is not arguable that the African continent has been riddled with inter-state war, ethnic war, civil war, famine, disease and other inhuman situations. Zimbabwe, part of the most impoverished region in Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, has not survived the curse of the “unreliable” African leadership and “shaky” African governance phenomena.

It was in 1961 that a constitution that was in favour of white minority rule was formulated without the consultation or the approval of the black majority of the country. In 1965 the minority government unilaterally declared Rhodesian independence, but the UK did not recognise the act and demanded more complete voting rights for the black African majority in Rhodesia as the country was then referred to (CIA, 2005).

UN sanctions and a guerrilla uprising finally led to free elections in 1979 and independence (as Zimbabwe) on 18 April 1980. Robert Mugabe, who in 1980 became the nation's first black prime minister, has been the country's only ruler (as president since 1987) and has dominated the country's political system since independence (CIA, 2005). The elections in 1980 were as a result of the Lancaster House conference that was attended by all the warring parties in the country’s power politics. It was at the same
conference that a new constitution for the new Republic of Zimbabwe was adopted (Sithole, 1990:458).

Besides the crisis of political leadership, which could be the main reason for the collapse of the state in Zimbabwe, the beginning of the economic problems of the country may be traced to the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) by the International Financial Institutions who, following an ideology known as neoliberalism, imposed these on African governments thus making these countries heavily indebted to them (Shah, 2005).

In spite of Zimbabwe’s adherence to the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, which was supposed to drastically deregulate the economy as well as lend money (and indebt) to an economy that seemed, according to the IMF and the World Bank, overprotected and inefficient, all the programme’s targets were missed by huge margins (Bond, 2000).

The political turmoil in Zimbabwe began in the late 1990s when the educated and urban residents became unhappy with little or non-performance of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front government. This did not come as a democratic expression in the eyes of the “sole” ruler of the country, Robert Mugabe. He could not take criticism hence he embarked on tactics such as farm evictions, urban dweller evictions (Operation Muranbatsvina), alleged vote rigging as well as state media monopoly, denigrating the opposition that emerged from a disgruntled and discontented labour movement.
The Human Rights Watch organisation was particularly critical and had this to say: “Zimbabwe is in the midst of a profound political and economic crisis. Parliamentary elections held in 2000 and presidential elections in 2002 were marred by political disturbances and violence between the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The government has routinely used repressive legislation and other violent means to suppress criticism of its political and economic policies by civil society activists and the opposition” (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

Making things even worse for the already struggling country was its expulsion from the Commonwealth. The decision to expel the country from the organisation was taken in 2002 after the organisation’s observer group, the Commonwealth Observer Group, reported that the 2002 presidential elections were not free and fair as they, “were marred by a high level of politically motivated violence and intimidation. Even after this incident, Mugabe never gave up but instead lambasted the organisation as one under the control of white “racists” (Human Rights First, 2003).

As a result of the human rights violations in Zimbabwe, the European Union foreign ministers took a decision at their meeting in Brussels to impose sanctions on the country’s ruling elite as well as pull its election observers out of the country. In addition, the UK foreign secretary Jack Straw said that these sanctions would include a ban on travel to the EU, a freeze on financial assets held in the EU and an arms embargo (BBC News, 2002).
The chaotic land redistribution campaign which began in earnest in 2000 caused an exodus of white farmers, crippled the economy, and ushered in widespread shortages of basic commodities with which people would easily survive. Ignoring international condemnation, Mugabe allegedly rigged the 2002 presidential election to ensure his re-election to power (CIA, 2005).

Further isolating Zimbabwe from the global financial system was the IMF’s decision after review of the country’s overdue financial obligations to the organisation, to declare the country ineligible to use general resources of the organisation and further removing the country from the list of countries eligible to borrow resources under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRDF) (IMF, 2001). As a result of this review and declaration the IMF advised the country to adopt and implement a comprehensive economic recovery programme in return for the cooperation of the fund (IMF, 2001).

Out of frustration and the need for benevolent counterparts, Mugabe adopted a “Look East” policy as his Western counterparts had ostracised him for the human rights violations in his country. His first port of call in the east was China. The two countries signed an agreement worth US$4.5 million that was meant to assist Zimbabwe in developmental programmes in the economic and technical areas (People’s Daily Online, 2003).

Amidst criticism and driven by the will to monopolise the media, the parliament of Zimbabwe passed a stringent new media bill, called the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Bill (All Africa.com, 2002).
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The objective of this study is to investigate the causes of the political crisis in Zimbabwe. Although Zimbabwe has been a breadbasket of the Southern African region for a good number of years, it is interesting to ascertain why the country finds itself in a trap of political and economic crisis that has led to it being counted among the poorest countries of the Sub-Saharan region. Consequently, the study seeks to shed light on the the impact of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme that was adopted in the early 1990s, as well as other significant factors such as the land question that the political crisis might be directly or indirectly a consequence of.

Political, economic, environmental and social issues will be analysed, thus leading the researcher to making recommendations that could serve as a solution to the prevailing crisis in the country. As part of providing a solution to the problem, the following section provides the research questions.

1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions will guide the study:

- What have been the primary reasons for the political crisis in Zimbabwe between 1995 and 2005?
- What role has the political elite played in the country’s development?
- What contribution did the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) make to the economic development of Zimbabwe?
- Are there any other important factors that have played a role in the development process of Zimbabwe?
1.4. RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

This study stems from the necessity to contribute to the scholarly debate on the causes of state collapse in Africa and further suggest solutions to this phenomenon. This study seeks to revive the apparently dwindling scholarly discourse on state collapse in Africa with scholars focusing on the positive developments on the continent e.g. economic development under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, conflict resolution, etc. Specifically this study seeks to investigate the causes of the political crisis in Zimbabwe with special reference to the period between 1995 and 2005. In the post-colonial era, there has been debate about leaders of liberation movements not wanting to relinquish power after years at the political helm. Some writers have come up with very interesting theories in trying to analyse this phenomenon. The theory of state collapse and the crisis of orthodoxy are some of the theories that have been used to explain the above. It appears useful to explore the relationship between the crisis of leadership within the political elites and the failure of the state in general, that is, the collapse of the state. In exposing the relationship between the crisis of elites and the collapse of the state specifically in Zimbabwe, the study posits an early warning to other countries that are on the verge of collapsing as a result of the crisis of leadership. Furthermore, the study seeks to advance knowledge on the causes of conflict and conflict resolution strategies in Africa.

1.5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The crisis in Zimbabwe seems to have started as a result of the crisis in the political leadership of the country, which became even more apparent in the period that this study seeks to focus on i.e. the period between 1995 and 2005. In pondering the
causes of the political crisis in Zimbabwe, this study makes use of the theoretical category of organic crisis, as espoused by the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci.

Antonio Gramsci, as explained in Jones (2006) an Italian political theorist, reveals that the *crisis of authority* or the *crisis of the state* looms when the ruling class loses the consent of the masses, or when there is a mobilization of large subordinate classes against the ruling class. When the detachment of the masses from the ruling classes takes place anything is possible and violent solutions are likely to be proposed. It is at this point that the ruling class uses violence and other coercive measures to maintain its control of the state thus quelling opposition.

The theory of organic crisis is articulated in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks:

> At a certain point in their historical lives, social classes become detached from their traditional parties. In other words, the traditional parties in that particular organisational form, with the particular men who constitute, represent and lead them, are no longer recognised by their class (or fraction of a class) as its expression. When such crises occur, the immediate situation becomes delicate and congerous, because the field is open for violent solutions, for the activities of unknown forces, represented by charismatic "men of destiny"(Hoare & Smith, 1971: 189).

Reuben Mogano further explains this theory:

> An organic crisis refers to a situation where the dominant hegemony is disintegrating and the masses' ties to the dominant and traditional ideologies are broken. In other words "organic crisis" is basically a crisis of authority (Mogano, 1993:4).

The *theory of state collapse* is the other theory that has been used to give theoretical guidance to the researcher in attempting to explain the political crisis in Zimbabwe. In trying to explain the theory, Thurchin quotes Goldstone (1991):
The core of the theory of state collapse, as it is currently formulated concerns the relationship between population growth and fiscal stability of the state. Briefly, population growth in excess of the productivity gains from the land leads to persistent inflation and rising real costs, which outstrip the ability of the state to increase tax revenues. Rapid expansion of population also results in an increased number of aspirants for elite positions, putting further fiscal strains on the state, and intensifying intra-elite competition and factionalism. Increased rural misery, urban migration, and falling real wages lead to frequent food riots and wage protests; expansion of youth cohorts contributes to the population mobilization potential; and elite competition and popular discontent fuel ideological conflicts. As all these trends intensify, the end result is state bankruptcy and consequent loss of military control; elite movements of regional and national rebellion; and a combination of elite-mobilized and popular uprisings that manifest the breakdown of central authority (Thurchin, 2003: 25).

Empirical and documentary evidence has been given to give flesh to the theory in relation to the political situation in Zimbabwe.

1.6. OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY.

As a qualitative case study, this study mainly makes use of interviews and textual analyses. Semi-structured interviews were used as they allow for flexibility in terms of the order of asking and the answering of questions. E-interviews were also used for respondents that cannot be reached by telephone face to face. Textual analysis included: books, journal articles, newspaper articles, electronic documents, monographs, government reports and other local international agencies’ reports. Those interviewed include, economists and political analysts or experts.

The findings of this study have been interpreted and analysed. After making thorough analysis of the data collected, the researcher was then in a better position to make generalisations. Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee (2006:163) put it clearly that, “the data
analysis process allows the researcher to generalise the findings from the sample used in the research, to the larger population in which the researcher is interested”.

1.7. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

1.7.1. Structural Adjustment Programme

“Structural Adjustment Policies are economic policies which countries must follow in order to qualify for new World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and help them make debt repayments on the older debts owed to commercial banks, governments and the World Bank. Although SAPs are designed for individual countries but have common guiding principles and features which include export-led growth; privatisation and liberalisation; and the efficiency of the free market” (The Whirled Bank Group, S.a.)

1.7.2. State

A political association that establishes sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial borders, characterised by its monopoly of legitimate violence (Heywood, 1997:413).

1.7.3. Lancaster House Constitution/Agreement

“This was the independence agreement for Rhodesia now known as Zimbabwe. It was signed on 21 December 1979. The agreement ended the white rule in Rhodesia under Ian Smith; it was signed between the Patriotic Front (PF), consisting of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government, represented at that time by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Smith” (Wikipedia, 2006).
1.7.4. Operation Muranbatsvina

A Shona term meaning ‘clear the filth’ (Human Rights Watch, 2005).

1.8. DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study is delimitated to Zimbabwe and studies a ten-year period (1995 – 2005) of the evolution of politics of the country. The study is delimitated to an analysis of the causes of the political turmoil in Zimbabwe. For this purpose it examines the political, economic and social aspects of the crisis in question.

1.9. CHAPTER OUTLINE

This study is composed of five chapters. Chapter 2 provides a review of existing literature, both theoretical and empirical; Chapter 3 comprises the research design that has been utilised to collect data and analyse it; Chapter 4 presents the findings of the study as well as the discussion and analysis of the data collected. Lastly, the summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study are presented in Chapter 5.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of the African state system from the formation and collapse of the state in general to the specifics of the political crisis in Zimbabwe. The chapter further presents a review of relevant literature that will assist the researcher in trying to ponder the main causes of the political crisis in the country. It is worth noting that this is the same Zimbabwe that in 1980, after the demise of minority rule, had the second most advanced economy in Africa that is today on the front pages as one of the worst economies in the world. Good (1997:148) asserts that the economy has been brought down by Robert Mugabe, who is obsessed with power to such an extent that he is prepared to hold on to it at all costs. Good (1997:146) goes on to say, “When an organised democratic movement developed in the late 1990s, steadily increasing its popular support, he (Mugabe) started to harass its members and meetings, tortured and killed its supporters, and ensured through various stratagems that it was denied electoral victory in March 2002”.

2.2. THE COLONIAL LEGACY

Evidence is abound that the state in Africa did not come into being only after the introduction of the western institution as we are today made to believe. If it claimed that the Africa state began when the Europeans colonised Africa, then the logical question that follows would be, “If there were no states in Africa then what would have been there?”
Ojo (2004) asserts that the pre-colonial state predates the birth of the nation as defined by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Shraeder (2000:62) cited in Ojo (2004) states that this treaty marked the beginning of the nation state system in which sovereign political entities, independent of any outside authorities exercised control over people in separate territories with officially marked boundaries. The pre-colonial African states of Axiom (100-700AD), Kush (800BC-350OAD), Ghana (Old Ghana Empire (700-1200AD), Mali (1200-1500AD) the Songhai (1350-1600AD), Benin (1500-1800AD) , Oyo Empire (1600-1850 AD), Buganda (1600-1900AD) and Kanen Borno (800-1900AD) all demonstrated some of these characteristics. The re-organisation of African boundaries during the European scramble for the continent does not render inconsequential what then states were (Ojo, 2004).

Before the country became Rhodesia (after Cecil John Rhodes) it was ruled by King Lobengula. King Lobengula was tricked by the representatives of Cecil Rhodes’ British South Africa Company (BSAC) into handing over control of the land and the people of Zimbabwe. When the trick was realized, the people fiercely defended their land from the colonialists, but by the end of the 19th century, resistance to colonization had been crushed with the help of British troops from South Africa. The BSAC ruled Rhodesia for thirty years encouraging white settlement and reducing the Africans to dispossessed cheap labour. In 1923, the British government granted internal self-government to the white settlers, but Africans had no democratic rights (Ndlovu, 1980:1)

Similar to the majority of African countries, Zimbabwe was also under the unbearable yoke of colonialism, which undermined majority rule and institutionalised minority rule by the colonialists. The country has also been entangled in the brutal fight by the
majority against the ruling minority to have the wealth shared and political and human rights enjoyed by all who live in the country. This has been the trend in colonial Africa.

Before the end of selective and minority rule, Zimbabwe was known as Rhodesia after Cecil John Rhodes, the commander of the British South African Company. Cecil John Rhodes, in the late 1800s led the British South Africa Company south of South Africa in search of rumoured mineral wealth in the Southern country (Olaleye, 2005:5).

In 1953, the British government joined Southern Rhodesia with Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) in what was described as the Central African Federation. The African people in these three territories joined together in opposing the amalgamation. In 1959 the popular resistance by the African political movements led to the arrest of African political leaders (Olaleye, 2005:5).

In 1963, this resistance led the British government to agree to break up the federation. This decision led to a second yoke of political domination of the African people in Zimbabwe, when the white minority in Zimbabwe objected to the new political arrangement and voted into power the Rhodesia Front (RF) under the leadership of Ian Smith. The RF defended white supremacy and demanded full independence from Britain and the retention of minority-rule against the African uprising (Olaleye, 2005:5).

In order to prevent Zimbabwe from “going Communist” the British government in cahoots with the Americans, in particular Henry Kissinger had sought a settlement to the Rhodesian Question. This was not possible as the constitutional proposal put forward by the two governments were not acceptable to the liberation movement. In trying to create an
illusionary multiracial country, Ian Smith solicited the political support of some chiefs and certain African leaders such as Reverend Sithole and Reverend Muzorewa for an internal settlement. However, the Reverends could not stop the guerrilla war (Ndlovu, 1980:3).

With the signing of “Rudd’s’ concessions” King Lobengula gave his land and people to the British. The abovementioned concession tricked the king into surrendering the land and mineral right of the country in exchange for 1000 rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition (100 a month and a gun boat. The last items- hardly much used in landlocked Zimbabwe were never delivered (Ndlovu, 1980:5).

2.3. THE IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE

Herbst (1990:31) says that the new regimes’ incomplete control of the state was worsened by its failure to develop a comprehensive ideology. Citing Munston (1985) Herbst points the weaknesses of the new regime:

Although the party (ZANU-PF) had fought a long liberation struggle in certain ways along similar lines to those in Vietnam, China and Mozambique, one crucial distinction was that no permanent alternative agriculture production system had been established in liberated zones. In this sense, outside the externally-based transit and refugee camps, little experience of organizing any production let alone socialist production has been gained by the party (Herbst, 1990:33).

She continues to warn that prevailing ideas are also important in shaping change. The liberation movement in Zimbabwe espoused a socialist ideology similar to that adopted by governments in most of the continents ex-colonies. Albeit the country attained its independence late enough to learn something from the African policy errors, the swing to economic liberalisation had not yet commenced. It was during the
1980s that the African crisis deepened, and that communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, leaving even more regimes dependent on aid from Western countries and institutions (Jenkins, 1997:575-576).

Whilst in exile, the liberation movement leaders knew that Rhodesia’s highly sophisticated agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors, if run competently, could provide tremendous resources, which could be used for the benefit of the impoverished black majority. After witnessing the effects of the sudden imposition of Frelimo’s revolutionary policies in Mozambique, Zimbabwe’s future leaders became aware that the nationalization and economic upheaval demanded by Mozambique-style socialism, and by much of their own rhetoric, would cause a flight of the white population and create economic chaos that would threaten the viability of strategic sectors of the economy. It was therefore clear to the new Zimbabwean leadership what they could not do. However, because their prime objective had been to win the liberation struggle, they never developed a comprehensive ideology, which would explain how the benefits available from a largely unchanged colonial economy could be used systematically to help the black population (Herbst, 1990:32).

Robert Mugabe’s address on 4 March 1980 to Zimbabweans and the world that his policy would be one of reform rather than revolution played a gigantic role in appeasing the international community and the county’s white minority. The ZANU-PF election manifesto, while referring to “the socialist transformation of Zimbabwean society”, had already pointed out that the capitalist system “cannot be transformed overnight”, and that private enterprise would have to continue for the time being. Mugabe indeed could draw conclusions from the trials of Zambia as well as of Mozambique, and was not averse to
learning from capitalist Kenya as well. The rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism that had been so boldly flaunted during the years of war now lay more lightly upon the new governments’ arm. (Wills, 1990: 478).

At the time of attainment of freedom, it was obvious that the white minority population would not be comfortable in a country that was to suddenly change hands. To many observers’ surprise, the new government bargained with the white people. The bargain was basically that the whites who are in independent Zimbabwe can stay, continuing to operate their businesses and farms, and lead the “colonial life style” that they are accustomed to for the rest of their lives. However, their children, in general, were discouraged from staying. The racial bargain was implicitly signalled by a myriad of government actions and statements, and a general atmosphere, which suggests that there is no economic future in Zimbabwe for most young whites. For the whites, the bargain was certainly the best racial policy from a Black government that they could possibly have expected (Herbst, 1990:222). Jenkins (1997: 575) asserts “history matters in the study of change. The path taken can eliminate options, because of inherited structures, institutions, ideologies, attitudes, and values (including apartheid, colonialism and nationalism)”.

The United Nations, which continues to make socio-economic development issues a major priority, stated in its 1996 Human Development Report that the following conditions, which are identical to many African economies, were not conducive to economic development:

- Jobless growth (growth which does not expand employment opportunities);
- Ruthless growth (growth associated with increasing inequality and poverty);
• Voiceless growth (growth in the absence of democracy and empowerment);
• Rootless growth (growth that withers cultural identity); and
• Futureless growth (growth that squanders resources needed by future generations (UNDP, 1996).

2.4. CHALLENGES TO STATE FORMATION IN AFRICA

Doornbos (1990:180) as cited by Ng’ethe (1995: 254) puts forth the order that at the beginning of the third wave of African state collapse, writers have tended to assume that the African state has significant common characteristics. Inter alia, these include:

- Its post-colonial status, with all the implications that it has for the evolution of civil society;
- Its prior problematic relationship as regards its territorial jurisdiction;
- Its heavy involvement in a restricted resource base (usually primary agriculture);
- Its still relatively undifferentiated yet ethically heterogeneous social infrastructure;
- Its salient processes of centralisation and consolidation of power by the ruling classes; and
- Its pervasive external dependency.

The state formation process in Africa is said to have had to face many challenges. These challenges were:
• The crisis of identity, through which the people learn to identify themselves as citizens of the nation state rather than as members of a particular ethnic sub-group:

• The crises of legitimacy or the development of the sense, on the part of the governed, that the government in power has the right to rule;

• Development of the state capacity to enforce all decisions within its territorial jurisdiction;

• The crisis of participation or the provision of means and opportunities for the citizens to influence state decisions; and

• The crisis of distribution or the evolution of the will and the means to solve at least the most glaring aspects of social, political and especially, economic inequalities (Ngethe, 1995:253-255).

2.4.1. CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE

Ngethe (1995) says that it can be argued convincingly that the state crisis in Africa today is as a result of external factors including the shrinking base of resources under the control of the state since the trade and debt crisis was set in motion in the early 1970s. He goes on to say:

In the Africa of the 1990s it is clear that there is a “crisis of the state”. This crisis goes beyond the early considerations of overdeveloped versus empirical state and soft versus hard state. One issue that poses the greatest challenge is the role of leadership and governance in the evolution and the resolution of the current crisis. Few, if any, scholarly discussions on state formation in Africa have addressed directly the relationship between such evolution or resolution and types of leadership Ng’ethe (1995:255).
According to Ng’ethe (1995:257) governance and economic and social factors have combined to lead to the collapse of the state. Examples of this assertion include Somalia, where the inability of the state to command enough resources to pay for its own well being seems to have contributed to state collapse. When Zaire (cum DRC) reached the brink of collapse, it could not collect taxes and as a result was unable to either feed the military or its civil servants. However, this was a result of the organisation institutional failure of the all powerful leader rather than absence of a resource base.

Milliken and Krause (2003:13) add that state failure is causally linked to increased and rampant human suffering, instability and transitional threats of international organised crime and terrorism. During after the cold war, the majority of failed states were found in the third world. All forms of opposition were met with strong repressive force from the institutions of the state at the instruction of the government officials including the president of the country. The introduction of legislation e.g. the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Privacy Act (AIPPA), the Broadcasting Services Act and the Labour Relations Amendment and the Private Voluntary Organisations Acts (Mhanda, 2002:155), legitimised these repressive acts.

After the 2000 parliamentary elections and the 2002 presidential elections that were deemed unfair and illegitimate by the international community as well as other local organisations led to the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) imposing economic sanctions and travel restrictions on Mugabe and other high ranking officials in Zimbabwe (Johwa, 2005).
The political processes deteriorated even further in Zimbabwe when President Mugabe gazetted a regulation rendering most industrial activities as “essential services” and rendered strikes illegal. This led to a wide array of strikes throughout the country as workers and students protested (Bond and Manyanya, 2002:72). In the 2000 election, the devious methods of “power maintenance” won ZANU the vote. Inter alia, these techniques were – applying fierce intimidation – including murder, torture and kidnapping, disallowing voter registration in the opposition’s strongholds, refusing access to election observers in some areas, deploying police in a biased way, getting rural headman to disqualify or intimidate pro-MDC voters, refusing youth the vote, and submitting bogus votes by overseas troops (Bond and Manyanya, 2002:76).

The political crisis in Zimbabwe is manifested in many different and among others Diana Games (2005) makes mention of the signing into law of the Electoral Act which for the first time in the country’s history gives the military a legal role in national elections. The allowing of minimal time to the opposition on the state-owned media also proved to be a desperate measure by the ruling party to obliterate the opposition by all means possible. The ruling party also violated the SADC guidelines by discouraging free political activity as the opposition had to apply for permission to hold public meetings. This permission was not always granted thus frustrating the opposition even more.

As civil society has increasingly pushed for greater democracy and more participation in the decision-making process, the government has responded by tightening restrictions on the independent media and journalists and proposing legislation that would restrict the
operation of non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) including a prohibition on foreign funding for NGO’s engaged in human rights and/or governance work (USAID, 2005).

2.4.2. DEFECTIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Ayittey (2003:321) argues that the failure of Africa to develop in the post-colonial era has little to do with alleged racial inferiority and other disruptive iniquities that came up as explanations for post-colonial African development malaise, but more to do with the defective economic and political systems established by African leaders after independence.

Doornbos (2003:47) states that the collapse of a state can hardly occur spontaneously, or all at once. He goes on to say that if and where it happens, it is likely to have been preceded and initiated by complex and conflict redolent process of deterioration, decline and erosion of state functions.

The post-colonial leadership that emerged from Africa as the saviours of the African people did not do much to enhance the continent’s economic and political growth trajectory. Generally, it became evident that when the post-colonial leadership took over the political and economic reigns Africa did not improve its economic and political status on the international stage, but instead occupied the creases of development. As much as this might be true, one would argue confidently that among other reasons colonisation itself was one of the noticeable reasons that led to Africa’s stalled development.

The record of post-colonial African elites and the post-colonial state, throughout the 1960s and 1970s was one of consolidating and legitimising neo-colonial and unequal
relations-reproducing underdevelopment and backwardness. Since the continent has been riddled with turmoil—with politics becoming warfare with conditions of instability, the stench of corrupt government, waste, poverty, uncertainty, disillusionment and violence encouraging military adventurists to hijack popular struggles in the majority of African states—democracy was thrown out of the political terrain in virtually all African states (Ihonvhere, 2003:293).

According to Ayittey (2003:322-323), in many African countries the political systems established became increasingly repressive. “One man, one vote” became a one day wonder. African nationalists who waged the liberation struggle against the colonialists were hailed as heroes and swept into power with huge electoral majorities. But in case after case, they misused their parliamentary majority to subvert the constitution, declare their countries “one-party states” and themselves “presidents for life”. Opposition parties were outlawed. “Dissidents” were arrested and in some cases “liquidated”. In the light of the above, since February 2000, when President Robert Mugabe suffered his first-ever national electoral defeat over a proposed new constitution, Zimbabwe has witnessed considerable political turmoil (Bond, 2002).

According to Donovan (2002), political crisis reached appalling heights when food became scarce and only card bearing members of the ruling ZANU-PF could buy or receive donated food. Donovan (2002) further quotes Archbishop Pius Ncube, “This is forcing people to be dishonest”. The dishonesty manifested when people had to hold two political party subscriptions—one to get food (ZANU-PF) and one for political allegiance (MDC).
In its bid to help the people of Zimbabwe, the United States government has taken the following steps: It has:

- Delivered 216,840 metric tons of food relief to Zimbabwe in 2002, with additional food aid shipments underway.
- Cut off government-to-government assistance and is instead delivering humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organizations.
- Imposed travel restrictions on senior members of the Mugabe regime and others responsible for impeding Zimbabwe’s transition to a legitimate multiparty democracy.
- Repeatedly condemned President Mugabe for his circumvention of the democratic process, the manipulation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance based on party affiliation, and the violations of basic human rights and civil liberties.
- Provided Development Assistance and regional Economic Support Funds to promote democracy by increasing civil society’s ability to influence economic and political policy-making, especially in parliament and at local government levels (US Department of State, 2003).

Not surprisingly, Mhanda (2003:154) attributes the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy to the failure of the ruling ZANU-PF to adjust to the new political terrain by transforming itself from a liberation movement to a modern political party in a democratic party system that it had endorsed and entrenched in a constitution. On the same vein the party was solely preoccupied with the retention of political power at the expense of the establishment of sound micro and macro economic policies and the total economic, political and cultural
liberation of the people of Zimbabwe. This was manifested in the reckless deployment of loyal party members in strategic positions and expertise seeking sectors of government.

As business sense, common sense and the ability to delegate are supposed to be inherent in a business leader, this should be the case even with people entrusted with high political office as these instinctive attributes lead to better economic and value full government systems. In 1998, a study by the Central Statistical Office suggested that poverty had increased from 40.4 per cent in 1990.91 to 63.3 per cent by 1995/96. In terms of this Bill (Kubatana.net, 2002) a media owner or a journalist can be sent in prison for up to two years for various ill-defined offences such as:

- concealing, falsifying or fabricating information
- spreading rumours, falsehoods or causing alarm and despondency under the guise of authentic reports;
- publishing a fabricated record of personal information;
- denigrating, bringing into hatred or contempt or ridicule or to exciting disaffection against the President, the law enforcement agents or the administration of justice; rewriting a story that has already been published by another mass media service without the permission of that mass media owner.

The 1980s were characterised by centralisation of state power. Examples can be found in government’s approach to wages and labour relations, land redistribution, and health management, amongst other issues. Examples include:
• attempts by government to impose its own leadership on the trade union movement. When this was resisted, government resorted to labour relations legislation to vest power in the State.

• refusal to award title to resettled land. This meant that title was transferred from the private to the public domain. The effect was to place control in the hands of politicians and bureaucrats at the centre.

• closing down the embryonic primary health care systems that had developed before independence in some liberated areas, partly with impetus from guerrillas but largely as spontaneous developments at the village level. Employees of the Ministry of Health replaced elected village health workers, centralising power.

• centralisation of control over the economy, newspapers, banks, some industrial businesses, some mines and so on (Davies, s.a.).

Williams (2003:18) states that when the new African leaders got into power they sought to monopolies office. Their political rivalries usually had to make a choice between joining the ruling alliance or risking exclusion or even suppression. A case in hand is that of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union who realized the need to join the ruling alliance after their supporters had been violently beaten.

Like many other African countries, Zimbabwe ZANU-PF formed a one party state claiming legitimacy from their leadership of the national struggle and the need to overcome ethnic and regional divisions and to write the people in pursuit of development and even socialism. The politics spoiled undermined state revenues and intensified the competition for state offices and resources. This led to the concentration of declining
resources and political power in fewer hands and increased political repression (Williams, 2003:18)

The political crisis in Zimbabwe was further manifested by the leadership crisis within the ruling ZANU-PF. This was illuminated in November 2004 when party leaders loyal to former parliamentary speaker Emmesson Mnangagwa alleged to lead a parliamentary caucus that would see parliament order President Robert Mugabe to resign. This was heard in the High court the same year. Jonathan Moyo, former Zimbabwean minister of Information, was among the alleged conspirators. Moyo was fired from the party as well as government after he chose to contest the 2005 general elections as an independent candidate for Tsholotsho in open defiance of senior party leaders who had blocked him from standing on the ruling party’s ticket, claiming that the said constituency was reserved for a woman candidate (Mail & Guardian, 2006e).

2.5. CHARACTERISTICS OF A FAILED AFRICAN STATE

It has become apparent over the years that the state in Africa has evolved in a unique way that has led to its failure. Unlike the other nations of the first world that had witnessed a natural evolution from the early state to the modern state of today, the African state can most unfortunately only relate to the contemporary state in the worst form possible.

It is unfortunate that when the first African states became independent they never, in any considerable way, tried to redefine the “state theory” in a manner that would be uniquely for and conducive to the African different environments. The kind of leadership that the post-independence African leadership exhibited was no less
different from mass resource drainage and mass starvation of the peoples of Africa. Contrary to all popular expectations, post independence Africa was punctuated by corruption, starvation, fraud, coup de tat, mass killing and many other related atrocities.

Ogbunwezeh (2005) outlines the traits of the failed state as follows:

A state fails when:

The government is infested by military kleptocrats or hijacked by pretenders;

• There is a presence of internal conflict based on the consultation of the primordial forces. These primordial forces include the non-separation of religion and secular affairs and the elevation of nepotistic affinities over and above merit. This destroys merit and excellence; positioning the state to be hijacked by mediocrity and opportunism;

• The government is dysfunctional unto meaningless to the citizenry, as a result of its inexcusable failure in its statutory functions;

• The security services are always in league with the forces of social retrogression. The human rights of the citizens are treated with utmost disdain in this environment.

In addition to the above features of a failed state, Thürer, (1999) gives a three part description of a failed state:

The political and legal approach

• Firstly, there is the geographical and territorial aspect, namely the fact that “failed States” are essentially associated with internal and endogenous problems, even though these may incidentally have cross-border impacts.

• Secondly, there is the political aspect, namely the internal collapse of law and order. The emphasis here is on the total or near total breakdown of structures guaranteeing law and order rather than the kind of fragmentation of State authority seen in civil wars, where clearly identified military or paramilitary rebels fight either to strengthen their own position within the State or to break away from it.
Thirdly, there is the functional aspect, namely the absence of bodies capable, on the one hand, of representing the State at the international level and, on the other, of being influenced by the outside world.

The historical and developmental context

The “failed States” existing at present are essentially Third World States which have been affected by three geopolitical factors:

- the end of the Cold War, during which the two superpowers had often kept shallow-rooted regimes artificially in power, preserving them as potential allies through supplies of arms or through ideology-based power structures which kept the unity of the State intact by force;
- the heritage of colonial regimes which had lasted long enough to destroy traditional social structures, but not long enough to replace them with Western constitutional structures and an effective identity as a new State; and
- general processes of modernization which encouraged social and geographical mobility but were not counterbalanced by nation-building processes capable of placing the State on a firm foundation.

The sociological perspective

Sociologically, it is characterized by two phenomena: The first of these is the collapse of the core of government, which Max Weber rightly described as “monopoly of power”. In such States, the police, judiciary and other bodies serving to maintain law and order have either ceased to exist or are no longer able to operate. In many cases, they are used for purposes other than those for which they were intended. For example, in the Congo militias disintegrated into armed gangs of looters, military commanders set up in business on their own account using army units for their own enrichment, while State-owned economic resources were exploited for the private benefit of those in power. The second typical feature of a “failed State” is the brutality and intensity of the violence used. Eyewitness reports from Liberia speak of the whole society -- adults, young people and children alike -- falling into the grip of a collective insanity following the breakdown of State institutions Thürer, (1999:14).

The above features can relatively be used to describe the situation in Zimbabwe as the situation in the country, even though maybe in a different way, befits the above description.

2.5.1. CORRUPTION

Among other reasons that have led to the collapse of the African state is the problem of corruption. Kpundeh (2004: 121) concurs, “In several African countries the effects of corruption have translated into political instability, frequent regime changes, and
unstable economic investment environment”. This statement can be used to describe the unstable milieu in Zimbabwe and can further be referred to when one puts forth the argument that corruption is one of the problems that successfully led to the state demise in the country.

Kpundeh (2004: 121-122) further argues that, “The capacity of widespread corruption to erode the legitimacy of regimes and pose a profound threat not only to democratic systems but to all systems of government is closely linked to the fact that corruption is antidevelopmental: it diverts resources and efforts away from productive activities into rent-seeking, fosters negative incentives for investment, consolidates patronage networks as a principal form of influence of the state economic management, and suppress civil society and civil liberties.

Due to extreme corruption in within the National Oil Company there were rampant riots to avert the corruption which led to fuel shortages and the increase in paraffin prices thus leading to many people without energy as the majority of the destitute use paraffin for everyday living (New International Magazine, 2001). The deployment of Zimbabwean troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been a financial drain in an already belt-tightening country. Albeit the people of Zimbabwe and part of the international community were opposed to this deployment, the government went ahead nonetheless (New International Magazine, 2004).
2.5.2. INADEQUATE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The ineffectiveness of current and past leaders of Africa to build political institutions, mobilise democratic participation, and manage dissent and opposition with democratic grace has contributed to the erosion of democratic legitimacy. It has in turn delayed, distorted, and diverted economic development and fostered glaring inequalities.

According to a report prepared by The African Studies Centre:

What is central to a failed state is that the state apparatus is unable to uphold effective monopoly of violence over its whole territory, lacks an effective judicial system to guard the rule of law and promulgate judgements that are internationally regarded as legitimate and sound (especially in commercial matters); is unable or unwilling to fulfil international obligations (such as debt repayment) and cannot prevent various forms of transnational economic crime or the use of its territory for the perpetuation of violence (politically motivated or otherwise) against other states in the international system (The African Studies Centre, 2003).

The political crisis in Zimbabwe is not a first of its kind in the African continent but it can only be a unique case when we look at the causes of the crisis as many crises across the continent have had disparate causes that emanated from unique circumstances. Many crises in the African continent have been due to and correctly attributed to the colonisation of the African people by the French, the Belgians, the English, the Portuguese and other European nations. The English seem to be most mentioned when the debate around colonisation surfaces at whatever for a – and, as we are aware, they (the English) were the colonisers of the former Rhodesia cum Zimbabwe in 1980.
In the Zimbabwean case, the absence of good governance and institutions are often cited as the main causes for the crisis:

In short, governance encompasses a state’s institutional arrangement, decision-making process, implementation capacity and relationship between government officials and the public. The dimensions of governance are political, technical and managerial. Establishing objectives and exercising leadership constitutes the political dimension. The utilization of natural and human resources, levels of education and manpower skills and industrial capacity represent the technical dimension. The capacity to get things done involves the institutional and managerial dimensions (Sachikonye, 1998:9).

Institutional capacity for realistic and sensitive economic policy remains a major weakness. Second, there are very weak checks and balances between the different branches of government. Parliament for example has been more of a rubber-stamping institution than an important debating forum that provides a check on the excesses of the executive branch. This has been reflected in the quality of legislation put also the lack of accountability and transparency amongst the government ministries (Sachikoye, 1998:9).

2.6. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES – A PANACEA FOR DEVELOPMENT OR A TOOL FOR DESTRUCTION?

One cannot fail to identify the traits of neoliberalism in the macro-economic policy of Zimbabwe, the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme that was adopted in the early 1990s. These neoliberal policies that were as a result of the Washington Consensus, the (IMF, World Bank, the US Treasury, the US Federal Reserve and an array of political lobby groups and think-tanks) were funded by the large American banks and transnational corporations [AIDC, S.a.].
Pursuant to the above one would argue that the current crisis in Zimbabwe cannot be fairly dealt with if one does not, among other reasons, look at the economic underpinnings of this crisis. It seems as though SAPs are predicated upon the theory of neoclassical economics. Ekpo (2002) states, “neo-classical orthodoxy assumes that markets do clear and that competition with all its tenets drives an economy. Under this paradigm, the major function of the state is to ensure law and order; the state has no business in direct economic activity.” The World Bank and IMF, who are the advocates of free-market economics and the designers of SAPs, are in reality against the involvement of the state playing a major role in the economy of a country. Furthermore as one might possibly know, the major funders of these two institutions are the pioneers on neo-liberalism that goes hand in hand with free-market economics. Inter alia, these countries are the United States and Britain.

On the same vein, Walker had this to say:

One of the major reasons why the IMF and the World Bank were able to impose conditionality on borrowing country governments from 1979 onwards was the remarkable convergence of views among development economists, both inside and outside the International Financial Institutions, as to the causes of Africa’s economic problems and the appropriate response. The central dictums of the Washington Consensus were “get prices right,” and “shrink the state.” Getting prices right meant eliminating the sources of distortion of both macroeconomic prices (the exchange rate, interest rates, and wage rates) and more micro prices for goods and services (Walker, S.a.).

In trying to explain the relationship between neoclassical economics and SAPs that are its consequence, Howard had this to say:

The neoclassical micro foundations of SAPs, can be summarised in six propositions, including a focus on static efficiency, state neutrality/minimalism, distortions and marginality, a view that changes in relative prices lead to predictable outcomes, and development as a static equilibrium state. For example, the assumption of private actor optimization leads neoclassical theorists to focus on other explanations of why
economies are not operating at optimal levels. The search for blame leads to the identification of players influencing markets from outside the realm of exchanges. The reasoning leads ineluctably to the role of the state and how it affects the economy (Howard, 1999).

The adoption of the orthodox ESAP in 1991 at the behest of the IMF and the World Bank saw Zimbabwe move from state interventionist economic development to free market economic development. Of course, with civil society not consulted at the adoption of the adjustment policy this was to bring problems. The following were the key targets of the ESAP:

- Achieve GDP growth of 5 per cent during 1991-95;
- Raise savings to 25 per cent of GDP;
- Raise investment to 25 per cent of GDP
- Achieve export growth of 9 per cent per annum;
- Reduce the budget from over 10 per cent of GDP to 5 per cent by 1995;
- Reduce inflation from 17.7 per cent to 10 per cent by 1995 (Kanyenze, 2003:56)

The economic turmoil, as Davies (S.a.) states, became even more visible after the introduction of the ESAP, which had its section that dealt with social dimensions written elsewhere. They also paid less attention to the social costs of the ESAP hence only three of the eight –one paragraphs in the Policy Statement announcing ESAP are devoted to social dimensions (Davies, S.a.). Furthermore, as a result of the introduction of these ESAPs the modus vivendi of Zimbabweans crashed thus leading to the withdrawal of the state, the pricing at prohibitive levels of social services as well as the deindustrialization of the economy (Bond, 2002).
When the ESAP came to the rescue, it was assumed that a combination of economic and political restructuring programmes, under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank with emphasis on the implementation of orthodox monetarist programmes, would create an enabling environment that would promote democracy, stability, growth, accountability and development. It is obvious that when the West talks of democracy they mean liberal democracy, which in American terms is another term for capitalism (Ihonvbere, 2003:294).

Afraid of the pressures from below and recognising that the alignment and realignment of political forces would deprive them of the lucrative and comfortable but exploitative locations in their respective political economies, African leaders have been quick to accept political prescriptions from the West. In the majority of instances, they have had no choice (Ihonvbere, 2003:294). Referring to Zimbabwe, by 1997 the ESAP had failed to meet its original objectives relating to growth rate, job creation, containing the budget deficit and reducing poverty. Lest we forget, in June 1992 the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions had organised demonstrations against the same ESAP, which had begun to erode incomes, to raise the cost of living and to force firms to retrench. At this time, the national mood was that there should be “no taxation without consultation” and that “enough was enough” (Sachikonye, 1998:8).

2.7. THE LAND PROBLEM- A ROLAND FOR AN OLIVER

Land is not just a factor of production. Land and rights to land are enveloped on a host of political, institutional, and sociological networks that give it a meaning far beyond its market (economic) value (Sibanda, 1979:27).
The land crisis in Zimbabwe did not only begin in the late 1970s and in earnest at the adoption of the Lancaster House agreement. If one follows the land debate in Zimbabwe one might have noticed that the African person in Zimbabwe was stripped of the best and arable land from the early 1920s when the British granted self-government to the whites in former Southern Rhodesia (Sibanda, 1979:18).

Sibanda (1979:18) continues to say that the Land Appropriation Act of 1930 gave large amounts of fertile land to the white farmers and the less little and less palatable land was allocated to the black Zimbabweans. Due to many reasons among them the quality of land was very poor and in terms of soil and climate, and had to carry an increasing population and rising numbers of livestock which accelerated soil erosion. One other reason which is also a South African phenomenon was the migrant labour system which began as result of the land deteriorating to such an extent that even the produce from subsistence production could not sustain the black rural farming communities.

Since its inception in 1923, the land Apportionment Act had had many amendments made to it and in 1964 the land in the former Rhodesia was divided as follows: Furthermore, after the amendments referred to above the Land Apportionment Act of 1979 was replaced in 1969 when the Land Tenure Act was gazetted.

The land crisis in Zimbabwe is many a time attributed to the Lancaster House agreement, which was adopted by both the white minority group as well as the black majority of Zimbabweans in 1979. This controversial agreement constitutionally
protected the rights of the white “colonialists” especially the property rights of the minority white farmers (Raftopoulos and Compagnon, 2003:16-17).

The land question seems to be one major cause of the crisis in Zimbabwe (Glantz (2003). Raftopoulos and Compagnon (2003:16-17) state that the seizure of white owned farms, save the drought which contributed minimally to the food crisis, by the government supported war veterans led to the steep drop in food production. Even worse, as a result of the land redistribution programme large scale commercial farming which accounted for approximately up to 90 per cent of the national beef exports is expected to have declined by 70 per cent from 1.3 million in December 2001 to 400,000 in July 2002.

In 2002, the government made an about turn when Flora Buka, the minister of state for special affairs responsible for land, land reform and resettlement, confirmed that all Zimbabweans, including white commercial farmers could not apply for land. The predominantly white Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) said there appeared to be “a conducive environment to progress with their matter” (MKG, 2006).

In its report, Justice for agriculture states that a number of Zimbabwean farmers have sought their fortunes elsewhere in the region: 35 to 45 in Mozambique and about 50 in Malawi. Others left for South Africa and Botswana; 12 to 15 had even travelled to Nigeria ((Mail and Guardian, 2006a).

Seeing that the land was a central issue in the liberation struggle, the new government had to devise a plan to redistribute the land. As a result in April 1980, the government
initiated a programme to resettle 18,000 families on approximately 1.1 million hectares of land at a cost of $60 million. Half of this programme was to be funded by the British government, while Zimbabwean would pay for the remainder. Given the clear inadequacy of this programme in the country with 800,000 families facing severe land pressures, the government soon decided to embark on a much more ambitious programme. In the three-year Transitional National Development Plan published in November 1982 and covering the period 1983-5, the new government stated its intention to resettle at least 162,000 peasants, ‘subject to practical financial and economic constrains’. This was an exceedingly ambitious goal because it would have meant resettling almost 20 per cent of all peasants in the nation (Herbst, 1990:43).

Mayo & Matondi (2003:74) argue that land conflicts have a long history spanning over a century. He lashes out that many the less informed or less honest discussions today lean toward presenting the current land conflicts as a new phenomenon, despite persistent intense conflicts over land, sometimes involving violence both before and after independence. He illustrates this in table 2.3 below:

Table 2.1. A synopsis of conflicts over land in Zimbabwe since 1980.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Type of conflict</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Selection of the beneficiary of land reform.</td>
<td>Some people not taking government reconciliation policies seriously.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister’s directive creating VIDCOs and WARDCOs.</td>
<td>People unwilling to accept resettlement (minda miferu-long fields) because of fear of working for government benefit.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conflicts between new institutional structures and traditional leaders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>expressed through stream bank cultivation and natural resources poaching. Subsides on agriculture. Treatment of farm workers, poor social services (housing, education, and health).</td>
<td>Slow progress in meeting land reform targets. Subsides seen as a drain, yet government felt it had a Social responsibility to its citizenry.</td>
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</table>

Source: Mayo & Matondi (2003:75)
Since the late 1990s, there have been five means of acquiring land either proposed or implemented. The first approach entails depending on the market to purchase land on a willing seller, willing buyer basis. This was the dominant method used in the 1980s, and donors, and commercial farmers still strongly promote it while it is resisted by the government and other stakeholders. The second approach is compulsory acquisition, whereby the government gazettes land for acquisition and only pays for improvements to the land and not for the land itself, with the obligation to pay for the land being placed on the United Kingdom to compensate for its role in colonial expropriation. This approach is favoured by the government and by some segments of civil society but opposed by the commercial farmers and donors. The third approach involves negotiated sales, whereby, individual farmers and government negotiate a sale of the land or a snap of one of the farms owned by the individual farmer. Some commercial farmers supported this approach. The fourth approach relied on individual non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to devise their own way of land acquisition and resettlement in consultation with government. The final approach is land occupation, whereby individual and groups occupy private or state land and allocate themselves stands or plots (Mayo and Matondi, 2003:76-77).

It become apparent that the fifth approach was the popular one as war veterans spearheaded land occupations, while combination of different ‘levels of government, politicians and traditional leaders either support their actions or other evictions. Landholders, donors and many other groups in Zimbabwe who want stability are against occupations. Differing forms of land acquisition are also coloured by political competition. Before the June 2000 parliamentary elections ZANU-PF leaders were calling for a speedy reclamation of land from the whites and supporting the land
occupations, while leaders of the MDC called for a more orderly process of land resettlement (Mayo and Matondi, 2003:77).

The ESAP, which failed to integrate the need for land reform in its design, introduced new sources of conflict (and aggravated old ones) with direct implications for the land question. The programme reinforced an extremely inequitable land ownership structure, and it soon become apparent that the mostly white commercial farmers were the main beneficiaries of reforms promoting production for export markets. Furthermore, the ESAP had the effect of altering land use practices which created new demands for land and new sources of conflict between white and black elite with easy access to capital. Another effect of the ESAP has been to internationalise interests in the land question through the introduction of stock-owning and shareholder arrangements, introducing yet another source of conflict in the land equation and creating new allies for commercial farmers. The intrusion of foreign interests in the land question has added yet another layer of complexity in terms of national politics (Mayo and Matondi (2003:83).

When commercial farms were seized the major recipients were the members of the ruling elite. After a wave of forceful evictions, at least 150 farmers had been forced off their properties at the end of April 2002. Among others, the recipients of these unlawful takeovers were: Vice-President Joseph Msika; defence Minister Sydney Sekeramayi; Higher Education Minister Samuel Mumbegegwii; retired Brigadier and MP, Ambrose Mutinha; politburo member, General Solomon Mujuru MP and brother of Joshua Nkomo, Stephen Nkomo; Deputy Minister of Higher Education (who seized
Botharus farm, a safari enterprise of 27000 acres in Beit Bridge), Kembo Mohadi and Obriel Mpofu, a provincial governor (Good, 1997:150).

The constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No.11) of 1990 allows for land, including utilised land, buildings, and improvements to land, to be acquired for resettlement, land reorganisation, environmental conversation, the utilisation of natural resources, or the relocation of persons, whereas previously only under-utilised land could be acquired for resettlement. Specifically, Section 16 (1) of the Constitution, as amended requires:

in the case of land or any interest or right therein, that the acquisition is reasonably necessary for the utilization of that or any other land; A for settlement for agricultural or other purposes; or B. for purposes of land reorganization, forestry, environmental conservation or the utilization of wild life or other natural resources; or C. for the relocation of persons dispossessed in consequence of the utilization of land for a purpose referred to in subparagraph A or B; or (ii) in the case of any property, including land, or any interest or right therein, that the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning or the utilization of that or any other property for a purpose beneficial to the public generally or to an of the public; and (b) requires the acquiring authority to give reasonable notice of the intention to acquire the property, interest or right to person owning the property or having any other interest or right therein that would be affected by such acquisition; and (c) subject to the provisions of subsection (2), requires the acquiring authority to pay fair compensation for the acquisition before or within a reasonable time after acquiring the property, interest or right…(Naldi, 1993:589).

Section 16 (2), as amended, also aroused controversy because it seeks to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. Specifically, it provides that:

A law referred to in subsection ( ) which provides for the compulsory acquisition of land where it occurs for the first time and the substitution of "described in the proviso to subsection (l)(f), or any interest or right in such land, may- (a) specify the principles on which, and the manner in which, compensation for the acquisition of the land or interest or right therein is to be determined and paid; (b) fix, in accordance with principles referred to in paragraph (a), the amount of compensation payable for the acquisition of the land or interest or right therein; (c) fix the period within which compensation shall be paid for the acquisition of the land or interest or right
It was inevitable that these amendments, among others, would prove controversial, and they even attracted criticism from senior members of the judiciary (Naldi, 1993:588-589).

2.8. THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT

After decades of fighting and resistance, majority rule finally saw its inception in 1980 after the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement which was a compromise between the white minority and the black majority. The agreement formed the basis for the first constitution of the country that was to be named Zimbabwe after years of bearing the name of Southern Rhodesia and Rhodesia. The new government that came into power in 1980 was led by ZANU-PF which was the biggest liberation movement in the country. As this was the first time that this group of liberation movement leaders were to run a country, they were faced by many challenges ranging from inexperience with government issues to formal administration matters.

2.9. ZIMBABWE’S SOCIO-ECONOMIC COLLAPSE

One cannot adequately or comprehensively explain the political plight in the former Rhodesia without intensively looking into the socio-economic turmoil in the country. The socio-economic realities of Zimbabwe have in one way or the other propelled the political unrest and further awakened the ‘majority’ of Zimbabweans to the economic as well as the political realities.
The Zimbabwean economy suffered a setback after the seizure of white owned farms in 2002. As a result of these evictions the economy was reported to have plummeted to an extent where the Gross Domestic Product was expected to fall by $1.12 billion in 2002. This was made even worse in June the same year when Mugabe ordered some 2900 commercial farmers to seize all productive activities including some 24000 hectares of vital wheat and the cattle that they owned. As a result at least 232000 farm-workers were rendered jobless as starvation rose in the land (Good, 1997:150).

During the reform period (1997/8), the eight largest parastatals had a combined deficit of Z$11billion. The National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) (Z$5.5billion), the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) (Z$2.2billion), the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) (Z$703.1million), and the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) (Z$688.4 million) were the major loss makers. Albeit the government attributed these ignominious losses to management inefficiencies, exchange rate depreciation, inadequate pricing policies, inappropriate investments and the unfavourable macro-economic environment, it was quite obvious that even though not officially mentioned corruption was one of the causes of the losses. This led to the country having to borrow heavily to such an extent that at the end of 1998 the country had an external debt of Z$90billion (Kanyenze, 2003:59).

Amongst other things unemployment generally impacts negatively on the political and economic well being of a country and Zimbabwe as a country more especially in Africa is also affected by this assertion. The problem of unemployment is not something new in Zimbabwe that the African is now in power but it is today even worse. Zimbabwe was, during the time of the Federal government faced with the crisis of unemployment to such
an extent that the state appointed the Southern Rhodesian Labour Adviser, Mr. G.E. Sent to examine the crisis. This happened during the economic recession in 1958-59 (Clarke, 1978:6).

Statistics from the Government of Zimbabwe show that as at 1995, female formal sector employment stood at only 2% of the national population, while their male counterparts constituted 10% of the same. Unemployment rates are higher in urban areas, due to rural-urban migration. Those self-employed in agriculture in rural areas, mainly women, remain behind whilst men seek employment in urban areas. The table below provides illustrative unemployment data from two of Zimbabwe's major cities (Harare and Bulawayo) and the country's largest urban township.

Table 2.2: Unemployment in Major Urban Centres.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Centre</th>
<th>Percentage Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chitungwiza</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNDP, 1997

Furthermore, Bond asserts:

Inter alia, the political events of 1997 that saw the war veterans run wildly with big smiles on their faces led to the spurring the economic avalanche in a country that had an inflation rate that rose from 15% in September to 45% in eighteen months. In 1997 Robert Mugabe silenced approximately 50 000 liberation war veterans, who were on a campaign to challenge his legitimacy as President of the party and the state, by offering them ZS50,000 each accompanied by a monthly pension of ZS2,000. This resulted in state-wide unrest as this was at the expense of the majority of those who were not liberation war veterans. Because of these payouts, sales taxes (income tax and petrol tax increase) were imposed to help recover the costs (Bond, 2000).
The table below illustrates how Zimbabwe has declined in virtually all aspects of socio-economic well-being:

Table: 2.3. Zimbabwe Statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People With HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange Rate</td>
<td>$1 = Z$1</td>
<td>$1 = Z$2.5</td>
<td>$1 = Z$1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of People Facing Starvation</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>7.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People Living in Poverty</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Annual Growth</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Expectancy (in years)</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>41.35</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In his research report, Sachikonye (2005:6) alludes to the deterioration of some key social indicators in Zimbabwe where, in recent years, the country’s human development index (HDI), which picked as 0.621, declined to 0.551 in 2000. The country slid from 111th in 1990 to 130th in 1998 and then to 147th in 2003 in the global HDI rankings. Life expectancy at birth is estimated at 43 years for the period 2000-2005 as compared to 61 years in 1990 with about 33% adult population HIV positive.

The decline in the country’s economic opportunities has been minored in negligible foreign investment inflows, low export earnings and a shortage of foreign exchange, fuel and other key inputs. In sectors such as manufacturing, there is capacity underutilization. The relative contribution to Gross Domestic Product of various sectors was 18% by
agriculture, 18% by industry, 4% by mining and 60% by services. As a result of the manner in which the fast-track land reform was implemented, the country saw a significant decline in agricultural output between 2000 and 2004. Not only was food production but also there was a considerable decline in tobacco and other crop exports (Sachikonye, 2005:6-7).

As the politics and economic situation in the country were on the brink of collapse, the social conditions were as well missed. New Hope Zimbabwe, a local NGO providing community assistance to the needy, stated that it had recorded 500 cases of severe malnutrition every week in Epworth, one of the capitals’ poorest suburbs. Nation malnutrition statistics are hard to access in Zimbabwe. However, according to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), there is a strong association between severe malnutrition and HIV/AIDS. About 70% of children admitted to hospital for severe malnutrition are also HIV positive (Mail & Guardian 2006c).

Contrary to the Central Bank Governor Gideon Gomo’s forecast in January 2006 that inflation would peak over 800% in March before receding to below 500% in June of the same year and declining to double digits next year, economist saw no reversal in the trend that has sent living conditions plummeting with inflation at a second high of 913.6% in March 2006 (Mail & Guardian, 2006d).

In trying to save the economy, the ZANU-PF government launched an economic recovery plan called the National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP). Not surprising, Jonathan Moyo described the programme as ill fated not only because it is too similar to its failed predecessors, but also because it does not address core of Zimbabwe’s
deepening crisis: ZANU-PF’S triple trap and its consequences which have left Mugabe like a spider trapped in its web. Moyo defines the triple trap as the combined crippling effect of Mugabe’s failure to make way for a successor Zimbabwe’s growing international isolation and its collapsed economy (Mail & Guardian, 2006h).

According to the NEDPP, the state wants to raise US$2.5 billion mainly from the sale of failing state enterprises, reducing inflation and stimulating between 1% and 2% economic growth over the next six to eight months in an economy that has consistently registered negative economic growth over the past six years, during which it has shrunk by more than 35% (Mail & Guardian, 2006h).

It is saddening to note that in diplomatic circles especially at the UN the AU and the SADC Zimbabwe has moved from a divisive talking point to an object of pity. The international question now in where the economic meltdown will lead to a political meltdown. Even in countries that the government has identified as friendly such as Malaysia, India, China, Iran and Indonesia, there are indications that may have lost interest either to do business or to help Mugabe as they have come to Harare and found a collapsed economy (Mail & Guardian, 2006f).

The country in 2005, was completing its sixth consecutive year of economic decline, while Sub-Saharan Africa recorded an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 3.4%. Zimbabwe’s failure to address fundamental economic problems means that G.D.P is expected to decline by a further 5.2% in 2004 (USAID, 2005).
2.10. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

This chapter has discussed the socio-economic and political dynamics that have led to the political crisis that became noticeable in the early to mid 1990s only to deteriorate in the mid 2000s. Evidence is abound as discussed, that there has been a decline in the economic activity and viability that had given the country its economic and political stability from the days of independence. As a result of this decline the country was plunged into a political crisis as the ruling elites wanted to maintain power by all means possible. Disorder, corruption, mal-administration, censorship, arson, and other undesirable measures were adopted to keep the ruling elites afloat. These measures led to the mobilisation of the masses under the auspices of the Movement for Democratic Change against the government and to try to usher in a new political order.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an outline of the research methodology that has been used throughout this study. It consists of the following sections: research design, sampling, validity and reliability of documents, procedures for data collection, participants and ethical considerations.

3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN

This case study focuses on Zimbabwe from 1995 to 2005 although it looks at the historical development of events before and after independence where necessary. Yin defines a case study as:

An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. The case study copes with a situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, relies on multiple sources of evidence and as a result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 1994:13).

The case study has given guidance to the researcher to collect analyse and interpret data towards a better comprehension of the causes of the political crisis in Zimbabwe. This study reviews relevant literature that gives a clear directive to the study. Qualitative research techniques have been used throughout this study. This study is a descriptive type of research, which according to Babbie and Mouton is the type of research where “the researcher observes and then describes what was observed. Because scientific observation is careful and deliberate, however, scientific descriptions are typically more accurate and precise than casual ones” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:80).
Documents such as legal documents, books, newspapers and other documents at the researcher’s disposal were used to collect qualitative data. Additional qualitative data was obtained through interviews with experts on Zimbabwean politics and economics. Expert interviews have been of significance in this study as experts normally represent a group of people who are experts in a given field e.g. political economy, state failure, etc. In order to give a wide berth to deviation from the research question the researcher provided an interview guide.

Flick (2006:165) states that the interview guide has a much stronger directive function with regards to excluding unproductive topics. On the same vein, Flick (2002:77) quotes Meuser and Nagel (2002), “The work, which goes into developing an interview guide, ensures that researchers do not present themselves as incompetent interlocutors. The orientation to an interview guide also ensures that the interview does not get lost in topics of no relevance and permits the expert to extemporise his or her issue and views on matters”.

Non-scheduled interviews became a useful tool in terms of getting the general perspective of the experts, as the only interruption from time to time was only to give directive to the respondents and not to influence their perspective. Telephone interviews were also used for those respondents that were far but had their contribution of utmost importance to the research.

Bless and Higson-Smith bear testimony to the advantages of the non-scheduled interviews as they, in their book, Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: an
African Perspective, write, “Those interviewed are free to expand on the topic as they see fit, to focus on particular aspects, to relate their own experiences, and so on. Usually no time limit is fixed to complete an interview”. (Bless and Higson-Smith, 1995, 107).

3.3. SAMPLING AND PROCEDURE

The researcher has purposively selected respondents from, political experts or analysts and business people who have knowledge about the political situation in Zimbabwe. These people were interviewed over the telephone as well as electronically with the aid of the e-mail. Stratified sampling method has been used to obtain a greater degree of representativeness in as far as the respondents are concerned. Babbie and Mouton (2001:191) define stratified sampling as, “a method for obtaining greater representativeness – decreasing the probable sampling error”.

Apart from the document study that is extensively articulated in Chapter 2, the following categories of respondents were interviewed: politicians (3), academics (4), business people (4), economists (2) and political analysts (4) or experts were interviewed. A total number of 17 people from different sectors were interviewed. The sample was purposively selected and was representative of all the groups of people that are conversant with the politics and economics of Zimbabwe.

In trying to ensure that the participants gave as much information as possible, open-ended questions were used to guide the interviewer. Virtually all the participants were given 30 minutes each to answer the questions. The participants were able to answer all the questions in a thorough manner within this time.
3.4. METHODS FOR DATA COLLECTION

Face to face e-mail and telephone interviews, as defined above, were used to collect data from the relevant people. For some of the respondents that I could not be able to reach due to their busy schedules or other reasons I have made use of the telephone. The telephone interviews lasted no less than 20 minutes, as I believe that this time would afford the respondents ample time to give justice to the questions posed. Creswell (2003: 185) accentuates that interviews are of advantage as participants can provide historical information as well as allow the researcher control over the line of questioning. In cases where the respondents could not be reached by telephone due to many reasons ranging from tight schedules to respondents spending most of their time traveling, the interview schedule was sent to them by e-mail. With optimum use of the library the study also made use of books as well a variety of journals were used to get the opinion of other scholars on the subject in question.

3.5. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF DOCUMENTS.

Since documents are written by people with different motives and some written with objectivity and subjectivity, it is of utmost importance that documents be checked for validity and reliability. Validity of the documents studied is usually increased by the fact that documents are often first person accounts of events or feelings experienced by the author. These documents have the propensity of having face validity (Bailey, 1994:317). Bailey (1994:319) says of reliability,” …reliability may be checked either by similar documents at two or more points in time (instrument reliability) or by comparing the results of two or more researchers at the same point in time (analyst reliability).
In addition to the document study, interviews were used to collect qualitative data. Additional qualitative data was obtained through interviews with key players in international political economy e.g. economists, political analysts and other individuals who are conversant with the politics of Zimbabwe. Non-scheduled interviews, which are explained by Bless and Higson-Smith (1995:107) as interviews, “that consist of asking respondents to comment on widely defined issues”, were a useful tool in terms of getting the general perspective of the respondents, as the only interruption from time to time was to give directive to the respondents and not to influence their perspective. Telephone interviews were also used for those respondents that were far but had their contribution of utmost importance to the research. In addition to the above, face-to-face interviews which are defined by Babbie and Mouton (2001:249) as “interviews where the researchers send the interviewers to ask the questions orally and record respondents’ answers” were also conducted with great success.

Bless and Higson-Smith bear testimony to the advantages of the non-scheduled interviews as they, in their book, Fundamentals of Social Research Methods: An African Perspective, write, “Those interviewed are free to expand on the topic as they see fit, to focus on particular aspects, to relate their own experiences, and so on. Usually no time limit is fixed to complete an interview” (Bless and Higson-Smith, 1995: 107).

3.6. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Throughout this study, the researcher has completely adhered to the ethical considerations of social research. The privacy and confidentiality of the respondents’ data was guaranteed before the research was conducted as well as after the completion of the study. Not even at a single moment were the respondents coerced to comply
with the requirements of the research against their will. Furthermore, the anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed at all times.

3.7. DATA ANALYSIS

The data collected for this study has been analysed qualitatively. Rock (1982) as cited in Mouton (1996:166-167) in relation to qualitative social enquiry assets that symbolic interactionism accentuates three fundamental features of social life. The first trait states that people can make reflexive use of the symbols they employ i.e. they can interpret and unravel the meanings of events without reacting to them; the second one states that people are symbolic objects to themselves as they constantly construct, judge and modify themselves as social entities and the third trait states that perspectives and plans emerge from the interplay between a socially constructed self and a socially constructed environment. He asserts that selves are lent an additional structure by their location in time.

The researcher has used symbolic interactionism which is mainly concerned with four levels of analysis i.e. first is the ways in which the self renders its environment socially significant, is transformed by such a rendition and construes the environment anew; second is the way in which social worlds are built by negotiated perspectives that continually redefine reality; third is the manner in which social worlds influence one another and make new constellations of meaning possible’ and lastly is the relationship between such worlds and the larger, overriding symbolism that lends coherence to society (Mouton, 1996: 166).
In addition, the researcher’s qualitative analysis focuses on four areas viz. first is understanding rather than explaining social actions and events within their particular settings and contexts; second is remaining true to the natural setting of the actors and the concepts they use to describe and understand themselves; third is constructing, with regard to the social world, stories, accounts and theories that retain the internal meaning and coherence of the social phenomenon rather than breaking it up into its constituent components and finally to contextually give valid accounts of social life rather than formerly generalisable explanations. (Mouton, 1996: 167).

3.8. SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

The chapter outlines how the researcher has gone about the study from the gathering of the necessary information to the analysis of the information collected. The better part of the chapter gives justification for the research design that the researcher has used i.e. the qualitative methodology. The study mainly utilised documents and interviews to come to its logical conclusion. The internet (e-mail) as well as the telephone was used as the main instruments for primary data collection. Prominent and competent individuals were interviewed. These included scholars and individuals who have written extensively on the political economy of Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the method of analysis that the researcher has used to analyse the information at hand has also been discussed i.e. qualitative analysis in general and thematic analysis specifically.
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS.

4.1. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented the research design that was followed when the researcher was making his enquiry. This chapter now presents the analysis and interpretation of the data that was collected as empirical evidence to answer the research questions posed earlier in chapter one. In this chapter, the researcher interprets and analyses the data using the thematic analysis that is commonly known as the systematic and interpretative analysis of data. This chapter is discussed around five themes: the colonial legacy, crisis of governance, the Lancaster House agreement and the land question, the crisis of elites, structural adjustment programmes and corruption and fraud as well as South African quiet diplomacy. These themes have been derived from the literature that was reviewed in chapter two as well as the documents that explain the theory of organic crisis as it is the basis for this study. The analysis is quite significantly predicated on the primary information sourced from the respondents.

4.2. RESULTS OF THE STUDY

The respondent’s responses to the research questions can be summarised as follows:

4.2.1 What have been the primary reasons for the political crisis in Zimbabwe between 1995 and 2005?

The respondents were unanimous in asserting that the Zimbabwean crisis emanated or was as a result of political reasons such as the failure of political leadership; economic reasons such as the adverse impact of neoliberal policies (SAPs) as well as social reasons such as the failure to integrate war veterans into society.
4.2.2 What role has the political elite played in the country’s development?

It is apparent that there was no well articulated policy for the country after independence hence there was a considerable economic breakdown in the late 1980s. The betrayal of people’s aspirations by the ruling elites was one of the causes of the peoples “rebellion against the state. This was manifested when the people, represented by various civil society organisations were not consulted when the SAP was being made.

4.2.3 What contribution did the Structural Adjustment Programme make to the economic development of Zimbabwe?

All respondents were agreed that the SAP failed the people of Zimbabwe in many respects among which was the demise in social services provision as the plan privatised some of the state owned enterprises thus making access to social services expensive. In general SAPs contributed significantly to the economic decline in Zimbabwe which can explicitly be linked to the political crisis.

4.2.4 Are there any other important factors that have played a role in the development process of Zimbabwe?

It seems as though Africa as a whole under the banner of the African Union has failed the Zimbabwean people as it did not do much but relatively support Mugabe in his quest to place the blame on imperialist forces. Again closer to home the Southern African Development Corporation (SADC) also did not have the courage and will to bring about stability in the country but continued to support a regime that had lost its legitimacy in the face of famine and political impasse. To make matters worse South
Africa, which is regarded as a “saviour” in Southern Africa at least, failed to act decisively in trying to bring about stability in a country that virtually depended on her for major supplies like electricity.

4.3 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

4.3.1 THE COLONIAL LEGACY

The research reveals that one cannot adequately explain the problems of Africa in general and those of Zimbabwe specifically without referring to the legacy of colonialism that today defines Zimbabwean political economic and can be correctly be directly linked to the politico-economic malaise that defines the country today. The uneven development along racial lines which has been the norm in Zimbabwe for a great many years still has its casualties in the majority of the black people in the country who even today are still trying to find their feet in country that seems to have abandoned its own people in the midst of political crisis. As much as the policies of the colonial regime can be blamed and could not be rectified overnight the responsibility of delivering the Zimbabwean populace from the scourge of poverty and economic decay has been and will always be the responsibility of government.

In 1980 when the “black” majority took over after years of a bloody liberation struggle, hope and the potential for wealth production and sharing among the previously disadvantaged was to be the order of the day-at least as promised by the incumbents. This was not to be as the country’s economy stagnated in the early 1990s and only to plunge even further into the twenty first century, which has been dubbed as the African century. Mayal (2005:37) affirms that after the end of the Cold War a
few leaders such as Mugabe did not cease to blame their colonizers for their troubles even though it was virtually ten years of majority rule.

4.3.2 CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE

If one of the underpinning characteristics of democracy is good governance then Zimbabwe has become a bad example of democracy as the research reveals that the country has been characterised by bad governance more especially at the time when the ruling party was threatened by the establishment of the MDC. As evidenced by the responses from the interview process, mal-administration and the undermining of the rule of law became a norm in the country as the “division of power line” became blurred and was justified by the threats to judiciary and the audacity by the government to publicly defy judgments made in courts of law.

One of the most undemocratic tactics employed by the ZANU-PF government at the time of dissatisfaction by a considerable fraction of the population was the control of the press. This became apparent and fear-rousing when independent newspapers were harassed and journalists were chastised, detained or deported in the case of foreign journalists.

When, in 1998, Mugabe sent some 11000 troops to the Congo and as people in the circle of his close acquaintances became rich from the diamonds from the Congo, the war veterans complained that they had not been compensated for bringing freedom to Zimbabwe. Mugabe was forced to compensate them thus straining an already strained economy even further.
Furthermore, the country went into further crisis when squatters took over hundreds of white owned farms only to watch them become derelict. Due to the lack of coordination in the land redistribution programme, white farmers were forced out of their farms and these were thereafter occupied by ZANU-PF party members, war veterans and other squatters.

**4.3.3 THE LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND THE LAND QUESTION**

Similar to the legacy of colonialism, the land problem has always been a cause of disagreement in many African countries where indigenous people had been dispossessed of their land. In Africa land has a very significant meaning as he who owns most land is also revered in society and held in high esteem as they would be regarded as rich. This means land is synonymous with economic prowess. Literature documents considerable evidence of how the land question brought about political unrest in Zimbabwe.

In trying to bring about peace in Zimbabwe, the British assisted in setting up the Zimbabwe conference on reconstruction and development in 1981. At that conference, more than £630 million of aid was pledged and a considerable sum of this was to assist with the redistribution of land. The first phase of land reform in the 1980, which was partially funded by the United Kingdom, successfully resettled around 70,000 landless people on more than 20,000 km² of land (Wikipedia, 2006).

The research reveals that the British did not keep their promise and as a result the redistribution process became frustrated and slow. It is this growing frustration that led to political unrest as people had waited for far too long for a promise that was made some years ago to be fulfilled. This was to be expected.
As much as the land redistribution process began in the early 1980s, it was very slow for the majority of the people who had waited for decades to have their land back to them, as they were the rightful custodians. Legislation after legislation was passed to try to hasten the process but this also was met by resistance from the white farmers who felt threatened that they now had to give up some of their land for the resettlement of black Zimbabweans.

However, as much as this land redistribution process was meant to mainly benefit the poor, research reveals that the process was marred with corruption as some of the farms were given to government officials and their friends at the expense of the indignant majority.

The worst came when, out of desperation, the government condoned the coercive seizure of land by war veterans who occupied formerly white owned farms without any plans to revive the farms and increase production. This obviously had a negative impact on the economy and the already delicate political landscape as the economy depends so much on agricultural production. The responses from the respondents were unanimous in as far as agreeing that it was due to this ‘revolution’ that the economy of Zimbabwe took a hard knock that led to stagflation at first and later to total collapse of the economy.

4.3.4 THE CRISIS OF ELITES

It is evident that the organic crisis or the crisis of elites as espoused by Gramsci earlier in this study was in more ways than the beginning of the worst for Zimbabwe. Albeit the research does not apparently suggest that the crisis of the ruling class was the beginning of the political crisis in Zimbabwe, it does suggest however that the greatest political crisis began in the late 1990s into the early 2000s when the elites
tried by all means possible to regain their support which seemed to be dwindling by the day. Left unchecked this support would be susceptible to exploitation by the opposition, which was a broad church that accommodated all ideologies and people from all walks of life. The elite crisis was further exacerbated by the belief at least by Mugabe and his counterparts in the ruling party that the MDC “and its base may not allow the Mugabe the compromises facilitating many other African president’s departures” (Moore, 2006:121).

This is manifested by the selective distribution of government services and other food relief paraphernalia. Again the compensation of war veterans with billions of dollars as well as the hastening of the land redistribution programme which became a major contributing factor to the economic collapse in the country was seen as a desperate measure by the elites in the ruling party to regain the support of the hoi polloi. The internal conflict within the ruling party is interpreted as the crisis among elites who had for some time seen eye to eye when there were fewer problems to solve in the midst of political and economic bliss.

4.3.5 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES

When the neo-liberal SAP was introduced in Zimbabwe it was meant to revive and almost ailing economy that could easily compete comfortably in the global metropolitan economy and ultimately bring about wealth and constant economic growth. At its embryonic stages, the SAP did promise to become a panacea to the economic problems of the country as well as a beacon of hope for the poor. As the SAP was ‘authored’ and funded by the IMF and the World Bank, as one would expect, the state had to play a minimal role in the economy and reduce on social spending.
This did not work in a country that was only eleven years into democracy and still had a considerable number of people dependent on government grants and affordable or cheap state subsidized social services e.g. health services, education, etc. the economic frustration actually began when the SAP could not meet its targets which were to:

- achieve GDP growth of 5% during 1991-95;
- raise savings to 25% of GDP;
- raise investment to 25% of GDP;
- achieve export growth of 9% per annum;
- reduce the budget deficit from over 10% of GDP to 5% by 1995;
- reduce inflation from 17.7% to 10% by 1995 (Kanyenze, 2003:56).

4.3.6 CORRUPTION AND FRAUD

Corruption and fraud have come out as the top most reasons why some of the African countries today are referred to as failed states or are on the brink of collapse like in the case of the Congo during Mobutu’s time. Documentary evidence suggests that the country has been riddled with corrupt individuals who either purported clietilism or used their status as government officials to get prebends and enrich themselves. This reciprocal assimilation of elites and the sustenance of the patron-client relationship could no longer continue in the face of a vibrant civil society (represented by various civic organisations of non-governmental organisations) and vocal opposition in the form of the MDC.

The corruption that took place in state owned enterprises led to riots that further fuelled the political and economic as the resentment of the state and those upon whom the custodianship of the state purse had been bestowed. Furthermore, the deployment
of about 11000 troops to the Congo left much to be desired in terms of financial stability.

4.3.7 SOUTH AFRICA’S “QUIET DIPLOMACY”

As a regional power in the SADC, South Africa lost the opportunity of acting decisively to avert a political crisis in Zimbabwe when it was still at its early stages. The quiet diplomacy that South Africa was using to bring about stability in the country seemed ineffective as, in its midst, Mugabe continued to execute his plans that rapidly brought down the Zimbabwean economy.

The fact that the crisis in Zimbabwe affected the economic situation in South Africa was cause for concern and action to turnaround the situation in Zimbabwe. The influx of Zimbabwean refugees into South Africa was also another reason why South Africa had to intervene in the country so as stabilise the political situation. The camaraderie that binds the two liberation movements (ZANU-PF and the African National Congress) is apparently one of the reasons South Africa defended Zimbabwe against international scorn. If South Africa had strategically used the carrot and stick approach, one is tempted to draw the conclusion that the Zimbabwean political situation would have yielded a positive result.

4.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER

The chapter presented a discussion and analysis of the major causes of the political crisis in Zimbabwe as well as how the different events that took place between 1995 and 2005 gave shape to the current political environment. Analysis and interpretation of primary and secondary sources has been done to explain exactly how the state
deteriorated from being a self-sustaining economy to an economy on the brink of collapse. These causes range from the legacy of colonialism which is an Africa wide phenomenon to the Zimbabwe specific causes that elucidate the theory of the organic crisis as well as the theory of state failure. Other causes are also not unique to Zimbabwe but show a gloomy picture of the situation in a country that used to enjoy reverence as a well-functioning democracy for many years. The analysis shows that the failure the SAP that was introduced in the early 1990s is among the major reasons why Zimbabwe failed her people’s economic aspirations that would later lead to a dangerous political crisis. At the regional level South Africa seems to have contributed to the problem by not rendering much needed support to turn Zimbabwe around both political and economically. As a rider to that, the interpretation of the evidence gathered, shows that the economic decay led to the frustration of those in power as well as the establishment of a vibrant opposition party the MDC. The thematic analysis has been used to make a more detailed and systematic interpretative analysis.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. INTRODUCTION

Motivated by the spirit of development and politico-economic prowess on the African continent, the researcher embarked on this study in order to make an enquiry as to how did Zimbabwe that used is said to have been the breadbasket of Sub-Saharan Africa find itself in an unprecedented crisis in the hands of a legitimate and democratic regime. Since much work has already been done, this chapter presents the summary of the study, conclusions, implications and recommendations of this study and further makes recommendations for further study. If this study makes reference to other countries in Africa and elsewhere in the world then the recommendations that this study makes could be of great significance to the African federations of states at regional and continental level.

5.2. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

This study has from the very onset and conceptualisation sought to give evidence that the Zimbabwean political crisis has been as a result of the crisis in the elites or leadership as suggested by the theory of organic crisis as promulgated by Antonio Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks. The study further got guidance from the theory of state collapse. These theories have, as discussed in chapter two and four, have shed light on African political economy in general and Zimbabwe specifically.

Chapter two of the study presented the literature review and has brought about much needed evidence from Africa and abroad as far as the Zimbabwean political crisis is
concerned. The chapter has also discussed some theoretical works in detail so as to build a case for the assumptions made by the researcher earlier in the study. Comprehensive research was embarked upon and the researcher, having applied his mind to the literature read, made inference that the Zimbabwean crisis was indeed as a result of the political meltdown in the ruling elites who in this case were mainly members of the ruling ZANU-PF led by its longstanding president Robert Mugabe.

Chapter three presented the methodology that has been used to go about is research in trying to get answers where none could be found in secondary sources. Qualitative research methods were used to collect data. Interviews were the main primary source of data collection that was used. With interviews done, the researcher summarised the respondents’ responses so as to build one view where respondents have agreed unanimously on one issue. The thematic analysis has been used as the method of analysis as seen in chapter four.

The fourth chapter makes the analysis of the evidence gathered and further makes the necessary conclusions as illuminated by the information gathered both from primary and secondary sources. The analysis is divided in themes to make the study easier for anyone to read. One will notice that the themes have been derived from literature read, documents, primary sources as well as the researchers’ earlier assumptions e.g. the crisis of elites though the theory, as espoused by Gramsci, speaks to that.

5.3. CONCLUSIONS WITH REGARD TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Since this study was to answer a set question with the aid of different tools of research, the researcher believes that such questions have already been answered in a
satisfactory manner. Since these are discussed in detail in chapter four and as concluded with the aid of primary information from the respondents, hereunder is a brief summary of the findings:

5.3.1 What have been the primary reasons for the political crisis in Zimbabwe between 1995 and 2005?
The Zimbabwean crisis seems to have been as a result of political reasons such as the failure of political leadership as well as failure of SAPS.

5.3.2 What role has the political elite played in the country’s development?
The ruling elites who have enjoyed tremendous support since independence fell out of favour of a significant part of the electorate as they reneged almost since 1980 from the promises of better socio-economic well being.

5.3.3 What contribution did the Structural Adjustment Programme make to the economic development of Zimbabwe?
When the SAP resulted to even further economic decline, the political landscape changed as people became concerned about their dwindling livelihoods.

5.3.4 Are there any other important factors that have played a role in the development process of Zimbabwe?
African countries that could bring about change in Zimbabwe did not do as expected and instead looked on from afar e.g. South Africa was expected to help bring stability to the country that its instability relatively meant instability at her own shores.
In short, the African continent has for centuries been the pariah continent of the world riddled with disease, famine, wars, ethnic conflicts and a crisis of government. Zimbabwe is one of those African countries that have had a good start after the end of colonialism and a few decades down the line plunged themselves into crisis. Some of these countries are the democratic Republic of Congo, countries in the horn of Africa and Somalia which is a typical example of a collapsed state. Zimbabwe has as a result of the crisis of the elites or the crisis of authority found itself in the midst of misery to such an extent that she has been referred to as a state on the brink of collapse. Actually this research also makes that conclusion.

It is apparent that when a state does not make effort to combat destructive practices like corruption, clientilism, nepotism and fraud, which are some of the ingredients for state collapse, it is easy for the state to find itself having to deal with a crisis that would have otherwise been averted. When the ruling party took note of their evaporating support which could dangerously lead to the changing of the guard, the ruling party employed undesirable measures to quash the opposition and regain popular support. These measures included harassment of the opposition, censorship, undermining the rule of law as well as selectively re-distributing assets such as land.

As much as the MDC seemed to be a force to be reckoned with in the politics of Zimbabwe it is evident its nature or design became its own enemy. The fact that this party was a broad church only united by the desire to get rid of the ZANU/PF government was by and large its Achilles tendon. Since the party had no single ideological inclination it found itself in a huge quagmire even before it had fulfilled its mission. Due to this predicament the ruling party still could not be defeated at the
polls albeit some election analysts have attributed the party’s victory to vote rigging and intimidation.

It is without doubt that the people of Zimbabwe were discontented with the slowness of service delivery including the lack of economic growth that resulted to the rise in unemployment figures and the number of destitute people. As much as this was as a result of the failed SAP that was advocated by the IMF and the World Bank, the Zimbabweans put the blame on the government of the day. These developments changed the political landscape in Zimbabwe considerably.

5.4. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY

Given the political significance of this study, the researcher saw it appropriate that he mentions the implications of this study for the Southern African region as well as the continent in its entirety. The implications hereunder have been derived from the information gathered earlier in the previous chapters particularly from interviews. These are:

5.4.1 Federal Organisations

If the situation in Zimbabwe is not solved within the bounds of the legal framework as provided by the Zimbabwean constitution and the prescripts of the AU or the SADC, then Africa will be seized with similar problems in future. These institutions will not be worth the monies and energy exhausted in their creation. African state federations like the SADC and the AU need to ‘have teeth’ and act decisively as their inconsistency on problem solving could lead to their incessant weakness and ultimate decay.
5.4.2 Leadership change

Since it is apparent that the notion of *presidents for life* is not working for the African continent, how better then for African countries to make constitutional reforms that would avert this phenomenon. If the crisis of leadership has brought Zimbabwe to an impasse, does this not mean in could also bring another country to the same level of negative development? If the answer is yes then African countries need to act with the utmost caution when it comes to issues of succession, more especially in countries with a long history of liberation movements like South Africa which seems to be riddled with a leadership succession crisis.

5.4.3 Economic reforms

The Zimbabwean crisis is evidence that when the politics is not right, it is highly possible that the socio-economics of a country can be adversely affected. Is it not high time that Africa designed her own economic development models? The answer to this question is *yes*. If the Western models for economic development do not work in Africa then the Africans themselves should invest heavily on alternative models for the sake of their own future economic development.

5.5. AREA FOR FURTHER STUDY

Since the causes of state collapse in Africa and other regions of the world have been researched on, albeit not adequately, it would be appropriate for scholars to consider doing more research on how this phenomenon can be prevented before it creates instability and havoc more especially in Africa. With specific reference to Zimbabwe one would expect more research to be done in trying to find a lasting solution to the political and socio-economic ills of the country as these have the potential of
snowballing into other countries in the region e.g. the land crisis could spill over to South Africa which also seems to have similar problems around land redistribution.

5.6. CONCLUSION

This research has demonstrated that the Zimbabwean crisis is a result of the crisis of leadership and has exposed other contributing factors such as corruption, the ESAPs, the colonial legacy, etc. The study also concludes that the political and economic crisis could have been averted long before it reached catastrophic levels had the leaders been willing to make compromises and focus on the future the country as a whole much earlier. It has now become clear that if Zimbabwe is to join the rest of the world in weaving the global economic tapestry (globalisation) and be a great player in world affairs today, then there is a need to right a lot many wrongs that relegate them to the fringes of the global village. If Zimbabwe is a player in the democratic or democratization arena then she should play by the rules and not invent new ones or defy existing ones. And if Zimbabwe is following another form of governance then she should not pretend to be a player in the field of the democracy game as she will be penalised as having broken the rules of this game. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the gains made by the formation of the Government of National Unity with ZANU-PF and two MDC factions sharing power. We hope that this positive step will take Zimbabwe forward and offer Zimbabweans a better future.
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