Consolidation of Democracy and Political Culture: An Analysis of Young Elites and the Media, the Case of Kenya

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Abstract

Democratisation and commitments to transitions to democratic systems has gained momentum as a currency, a necessity, with regard to socio-political and economic development for Africa. In the period following the end of the Cold War in the late 1980’s, there was heightened concern over the pseudo-democratic political establishments in Africa whose negative impact on their economies was blameable for a marked lack of public goods. Political scholars and agencies of Industrialised countries attributed this to stagnation on democratisation process, where consolidation stage of African democracies remains elusive. Kenya is a case and point.

This study seeks to contribute to the ensuing debate of crafting versus preconditions to democratic consolidation in Africa. It takes the position that it is the political elite who are the principal agents in designing institution based democracies upon which other socio-economic developments can stand. By focusing on Kenya the study seeks to show that, up to the present moment, the cycle of Kenya’s unconsolidated democracy has been prevailed over by elites’ weakness to commit to deepening democratic values.

A sign of hope is therefore in the potential and promise in the emerging young elite in crafting a consolidated democracy in Africa. By focusing on a generational change in leadership, one sees the possibility for Africa to embark on a clearly mapped out and self designed path towards democratic consolidation, led by a younger generation of professional elites. These are not weighed down by post-colonial nationalistic ideals. Their potential and level of commitment to democratic consolidation however needs to be examined. Increased pressures of Westernisation as an after effect of globalisation may have altered/impacted the young elites’ political consciousness and dedication to the African locales. This study thus posits that in order to gauge their inclination to crafting a consolidated democratic landscape of the continent, their political culture must be put under scrutiny.

By examining the political culture of the Kenyan young elite this study concluded that more needs to be done to inspire political participation and involvement in this generation. There is general feeling of contentment with the status quo with all its flaws and unchanging poor democratic practises. More has to be done to sever the old undemocratic mentalities and replace them with fresh ideals through
widespread civic education, by using effective instruments like the media and avenues like a reformed school curriculum.
Chapter 1

Introduction

After five decades of robust and constant scholarly engagement and political experimentation with democracy and its intended outcomes in Africa, the distress signal to this unending condition was aptly expressed as “Africa trapped in a cyclic motion”; a cycle in which economic, social and political development are restrained by stagnation in the democratic game. The aspirations and expectations of many in the continent since the advent of the wave of democratization have not been realised, leaving a sore imprint and an almost immutable pessimism in the minds of many who still battle with the very basic exigencies of survival. In fact, this continues to fan flames in the debate on the compatibility of Western liberal democracy and its inappropriateness for the continent. A thought provoking observation by Huntington in response to the West’s influence on Africa’s democratic development that calls for close attention posits that non Western cultures are not inherently incompatible with Major Western cultures. Therefore, one foresees the realisation of consolidated African liberal democracies presided over by an emerging young elite that is more receptive to Western ideas of liberal democracy.

Decades into what Huntington describes as “the third wave of democratization”, Africa’s record in as far as democratic transitions go has persistently remained volatile, and largely negative due to the regimes that it has yielded. The transitions move from authoritarian regimes to “uncertain something else”. The ‘new’ post transitional regimes have been termed as “democracies with adjectives”, low intensity democracies, pseudo democracies, illiberal democracies, patrimonial democracies, unconsolidated democracies etc (Collier and Levitsky 1997 in Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor 2003).

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1 This is quoted from an interview with Kenyan students on the state Kenya’s democracy where, one said that the same failures seem to regenerate themselves irrespective of the new ideas attempted by new political players.
2 Huntington 1997:9
3 Waves according to Samuel P. Huntington denote a group of transitions from one type of regime to another that occur within a specified time period that outnumber, significantly transitions in the opposite direction at the same period. The third wave of democratization in Africa’s context dates back to the 1945 post World war II period and stretch until late 1980’s and early 1990’s.
4 O’Donnell and Schmitter’s interesting observation of the unintended outcomes in the process of Transitions from Authoritarian rule towards democratic consolidation in the developing world (1996: )
None of these adjectives captures the character of most African democracies like Zakaria’s (1997) description of “illiberal democracies”. Zakaria (1991:3) asserts that the West’s obsession with balloting has erroneously been equated with democracy, especially in Africa’s post 1990 spread of multiparty politics. The argument holds that in the growth industry that is illiberal democracy, the fundamental requisites for constitutional liberalism (which in the West is democracy), e.g. free and fair elections, rule of law, separation of powers and the protection of liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property, are extinguished. Constitutional liberalism which historically emerged in the West as a tradition borne of a culture that respects rules which guarantee the protection of an individual’s autonomy against state, or social coercion and at the same time limiting government power with laws has yet to be entrenched in non Western cultures vis-à-vis African cultural milieu.

As such, explanations to the above pessimism point at the difficulties in the prospects for liberal democracy in Africa; difficulties of matching the preconditions for democracy with the practice of democracy in poverty stricken, non-industrialised, debt ridden, politically unstable, foreign dominated and marginal economies in an increasingly complex and competitive global system (Ihovnbere 2003:287). Since such explanations are not new to studies on African democracy, many turned to experiments that emphasise on striving for liberal democratic practise by focusing on the crucial preconditions, i.e. economic growth which in turn may impact on political culture.

Given the association between democracy and equality, it is argued that democracy will work because a the above mentioned set of preconditions which include a substantial degree of economic development which involves higher levels of urbanisation, literacy and education, increases the population in the middle and working classes. This reduces conflict among this better organised mass, which is capable to unite to agitate for change by forging unions and parties for better representation, encouraging rule of law and tolerance (Huntington 1991:39).

However, the view that “Africa [is] scrambling for existence” persists given that the practise of liberal democracy carries on in an altered form. The above mentioned

5 These as discussed further in the chapter are interconnected societal factors which include high degree of literacy and education, higher levels of urbanisation resulting from a substantial degree of urbanisation, and cultural factors that emphasise of personal dignity- the individual.

6 Based on Lipset Seymour’s view that the more well to do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy.
predictions choke because of lack of deliberate effort to spread the principal ideas of individual liberty, constitutionalism, cultural freedom and political democracy. As Bratton and Van De Walle (1997) observe, much of the gains envisioned in the advent of second liberation never took root, and some have reversed. Sorensen (1993: 51-52) sums it up by noting that obstacles to consolidation of liberal democracy are because of weak foundations, Africans are as poor now as they were at independence, states have failed to institutionalise for effective rule: multiparty systems which are quick fixes into liberal democratic governance are surviving and what remains is democratic coating on personal rule. The outcomes, prolonged state decline, corrosion of the effectiveness and legitimacy of the public realm, exacerbating cleavages of ethnicity and religion (Young 1996:61).

In the face of absence of some of the Western derived preconditions for democratization in Africa, one is left to turn to what remains as a crucial factor for democratization - Leadership; the political elite and their political culture. Huntington (1997) has argued that democratic development occurs when political leaders believe they have an interest in promoting it or a duty to achieve it. Certainly, there has not been a shortage of supply of educated elite in Africa’s leadership since the first wave of Africa’s democratization. But here lies an enigma, what inhabits their political culture that gives life to unconsolidated or illiberal democracies? Judging from the words of the young students quoted earlier, are these elite the designers of this unreeiling cycle of democratic stagnation?

Optimism in the midst of this dim outlook comes in the proposed generational leadership change. Here too, another element of this cyclic motion of democracy’s failure rears its head. During the post independence first generation, post first wave generation of African leaders i.e. the Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta Leopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda era, arose their young promising successors. This is specific to instances where the old guard happened not to declare lifetime presidency like in the case of Malawi’s Hastings Kamuzu Banda. This era had President Moi of Kenya, Hosni Mubarak and Frederick Chiluba in Zambia as examples. Expected or not, some of these apprentices to the post independence leaders and some of the fresh untutored elites in governments led by second liberation leaders like Chiluba and including those in Kenya’s current leadership fail, as evidenced in their rehashing of the same old political ideas established by their predecessors, which plague the present political landscape.
The generational leadership remedy which is gaining currency among some scholars as a solution to the prevalent unstable democracy, parochial political culture of ethnic superiority and nationalistic thinking, suggests a different angle. It posits that African democracies have a greater chance of consolidating and even catalysing the growth of other elements such as economic and social development with the younger 1980’s generation. This reasoning further argues that this generation of leaders promises to open possibilities to cultivate a constitutional liberal tradition, out of a political culture uninhibited by ethnic cleavages and heavy nationalistic ideals. This is a generation that was spared the heavy regime of national building given that the majority were infants during the time when nationalism, unity and calls for national cohesion for economic development (as was the case of Kenya in the 1980’s “Nyayoism”\textsuperscript{7}), was being meted to the masses.

As one scholar observed, this generation envisioned for Africa’s emancipation has developed the kind of social skill needed to govern the modernising multiracial, multiethnic multiclass society; this is a generation comprising of young engineers, accountants, economists etc.\textsuperscript{8} If the generational change elite will be transacting a new political franchise for Africa, it is therefore prudent to probe their political culture to determine the quality of political elite in the making.

It is unthinkable that this generational change of leadership and power will transpire instantaneously in a vacuum, there needs to be a degree of observation, interest and participation in the political arena on the part of the young elite, if they are indeed to understand and devise the necessary radical changes needed to put their locales on a path towards democratic consolidation. This probe is necessary because the above defined generation exists as constituents in a postcolonial Africa impacted by globalisation, with the advantage of modernised knowledges and rapid

\textsuperscript{7} Nyayoism is coined from President Moi’s inauguration rallying call made in Swahili “Fuata Nyayo” – which translates to “follow the footsteps”. This call which evolved into the “Nyayo philosophy” for nation building grew from Moi’s assertion that he would follow in the footsteps of the founding father of the nation of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta, to a philosophy that emphasised on love peace and unity. Accompanying the rallying calls for social cohesion was a message on economic development with emphasis on agriculture. Its most memorable feature was the aggressive nature with which it was imparted through the media in the form of patriotic songs and poems in which Moi’s name was made synonymous with “Nyayo”. The consequence of this was a latently and later overt deeply entrenched personality cult of the president and his ruling party.

\textsuperscript{8} Xolela Mangcu argues that for South Africa’s (and indeed Africa’s) democratic rule to stabilise freedom struggle and postcolonial mentalities held by present political elite need to dissipate; This is only possible with the 1980’s culturally mixed and politically insulated generation.
exchange of information satisfying a crucial precondition that is instrumental to growing a democracy i.e. education\(^9\).

One would conclude that there is a high expectation and optimism in the change of political trajectory in this group, considering that there is more free and unrestrained cross national cultural exchanges, mediated reality, and a burgeoning global consumerist culture that a majority in this generation identifies with; It is expected to create a less parochial more liberal individual existing in the era of informization\(^{10}\).

This study which focuses on the future of consolidation of democracy in Africa, with Kenya as its empirical referent, concerns itself with a generation change in leadership in relation to the recently past, present and emerging elites in Kenya’s democracy. This study drew inspiration from Diamond’s observation that “there has been, strangely, little attention to the political culture of the elites in new democracies and little thought on how to measure it” (Diamond1999:66). This study sought to ascertain the extent to which the continued shallowness of Kenya’s democracy will be impacted by the political culture of the next generation of elites, and their commitments to crafting the necessary conditions for a consolidated democracy. Although democratization leading to consolidation of democracy remains a debated subject, it is a very crucial avenue for exploration if clarity is to be realised on how to reap maximum benefits from democratic governance in Africa.

1.1 Consolidation

This section gives an overview of the phenomenon that is consolidation which is discussed in depth in chapter 3. To this point there is no consensus on consolidation due to the complexities that surround the process of democratization, and especially in diverse cultures e.g. in Africa. Encarnacion (2000:479) observes that the abstraction, complexity and messiness of the process of consolidation force

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\(^9\) Huntington (1997:9) sees the influence of Western ideas of liberal democracy adopted by other cultures in the global cultural exchange as a positive development.

\(^{10}\) The concept of informization as presented by Hardt and Negri describes a characteristic of globalisation where, increasingly, the modes/processes of production have changed from the primary sector Agriculture and mining, to industry in and now in postmodernization (era informational economy), service jobs. Across the industry plateau i.e. Health care, education, finance etc. are these jobs which highly mobile and involve flexible skills; they are products of knowledge, information effect and increased global communication.
some level of scholarly anonymity to the subject because it lacks obvious thresholds that indicate its progress, and even completion.

A consolidated democracy is viewed as one where a complex system of institutions, rules and patterned incentives and disincentives become the “only game in town”\textsuperscript{11}. It is envisioned as one that will endure, when the democratization process has been buttressed by broadly accepted and legitimate institutions, deepened popular participation; it entails reducing possible weaknesses emerging from the democratization process and problems arising from institutional dynamics (Lipset and Stepan 1996:15). Consolidation can also refer to the process by which a given set of democratic constitutional rules become broadly accepted and become routinized (Haggard and Kauffman 1994:6). It is political institutionalization; it is the process by which democracy is broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is unlikely to breakdown (Diamond 1994:15).

These brief definitions of democratic consolidation primarily focus on political institutions and norms of behaviour. Huntington’s explanation of a consolidated democracy as one that goes through terms of peaceful contested elections wherein the incumbent group hand over peacefully after defeat fails based on evidence drawn from the regime changes within the continent (Huntington 1991:266-267). These definitions, as has been observed, cannot hold due to the analytical base they stand on, obtained from Dahl’s characteristics of a procedural democracy \textsuperscript{12} and empirical referents provided by case studies in countries like Spain; but it remains flawed because it cannot encapsulate the entirety of the process in most places.

O’Donnell further argues that these definitions fail because of the idealization of their yardstick, which is basically generally applied as a comparative measure of the institutions of all newly formed polyarchies\textsuperscript{13}. This having been said, an alternative view to the debated concept of consolidation emerges in the form of democratic endurance (O’Donnell1996:34-51, Linz and Stepan 1996: 15-51)

\textsuperscript{11} This widely quoted phrase formulated by Linz and Stepan (1996) is adopted by many as a verbatim definition when approaching democratic consolidation.

\textsuperscript{12} Robert Dahl’s (1989) exposition of a procedural definition of democracy is seen as being sufficient when situated within a Western cultural setting the procedures and problematic to other cultures, especially those severely socially diversified.

\textsuperscript{13} Polyarchies from Dahl’s conception are procedural where some essential preconditions have to be in place for the system to function, these defines some attributes of democratic practise i.e. free and fair elections highly inclusive level of participation, a level of civil and political liberties e.g. freedom of speech and press and meaningful and extensive competition among groups and individuals for political office. O’Donnell’s argument is that some of the existing definitions for democratic consolidation are idealistic comparisons of the extent in which these attributes are present in newly formed procedural democracies.
Endurance viewed in the lens of Bratton and Van de Walle’s (1997) study of African democracies shows differently. Generally, although presently reversals from advances towards the democratic path are significantly low in Africa, and more specifically in Kenya, the democratic regimes realized remain shallow: a shallow regime has been defined as one “which has not made much of a difference to ordinary people (Harrison 2000:81); in other terms illiberal democracies. On the other hand there is the idea that consolidation is marked by democratic endurance where elections are held regularly and institutions remain in place. While most African countries maintain such institutions, they remain powerless and lack legitimacy among the significant population groups.

Consolidation of democracy in Africa has also been said to fail as a result of the absence of the earlier mentioned necessary minimal architectural preconditions, which form the basis for Western democracies i.e. economic capacity brought about by high literacy, education and thus industrialization. These conditions are credited with breeding a generation of educated and committed elites who enjoy credibility from their literate citizenry. Second, is a historical background of democratic development infused with and buttressed by culture, Christianity and ethnic homogeneity. Democratization in Africa is more complex as, the cultural diversity coupled with the absence of these conditions and, significantly, poverty continues to be a hindrance for democratic stability. Of the above listed conditions, the role of the elites is singled out as of utmost importance to this study.

1.2 Unconsolidated Democracies

Burton, Higley and Gunther’s (1992: 4-7) conceptualisation of unconsolidated democracies and the inverse consolidated democracies draw the actions of the elite to the centre. Unconsolidated democracies according to their conceptualization are a category of their own separate from “patrimonial pseudo democracies”\(^{14}\) and “stable limited democracies”\(^{15}\). As defined hereunder in the next section, unconsolidated

\(^{14}\) Pseudo democracies are distinguished by a strong single party regimes, de facto if not officially. Elections are held but there is very little competition and heavy mass intimidation, that the masses just represent a public formalisation of the dominant elites’ political interests.

\(^{15}\) These regimes are characterised by regular publicly contested elections, executive power passes peacefully between contesting groups, but this is an exercise solely dominated by elites’ activity. Participation by the masses is however substantially limited, they are alienated from involvement in wider democratic process of government.
democracies are caused by the actions of the elite, who are charged with the responsibility of stabilizing and improving the quality of democracy.

1.2.1 Elite (Mis) Behaviour

Elites lead partly by example (good or bad); when they are contemptuous of the rules and norms of democracy their followers are most likely to be as well (Diamond 1999:66). Huntington (1996:9) observes that threats for third wave democracies will not come from military generals or revolutionaries, but from political leaders who win elections, take power and manipulate the mechanism. This implies political attitude and behaviour.

Consolidation as Diamond (1999:66) argues takes place in two dimensions, norms and behaviour, at three levels. These dimensions are mainly in relation to the behaviour of the elites who occupy the highest levels in organisations, government institutions for example political activists, economic leaders etc. Because of their disproportionate power and influence, elites matter most for the stability and consolidation of democracy.

The actions of the elite within the state and the linked spheres have been held as Africa’s major impedance to democratic consolidation and consequent economic development, in the aftermath of strongman democracies into the era of African renaissance and good governance. Schraeder (1995:63 in Harrison 2002:93) sums it up by observing that

“The contest over political ascendancy in Africa still largely takes place among the same group of constants; a very small elite (whether military or civilian), that generates favours and political self preservation over policies and political structures truly designed to benefit the disempowered majorities of most independent countries”

Burton, Higley and Gunther’s (1992:6-9) conceptualization of democratic consolidation summarises all the above observations on consolidation and elites in a manner that is pivotal to the aims of this study i.e. the behaviour of the elites. They note that consolidated democracies can be thought of as encompassing specific elite and mass features; most significantly that the elite factions and groups share consensus about rules, norms and codes of political conduct and the worth of institutions. These elite are unified by formal and informal networks that enable them
to influence decision making and thereby defend and promote factional interests (Burton, Higley and Gunther 1992:4).

1.3 Young Elite and Crafting a Consolidated Democracy

Huntington (1991:144) observes that students are the universal opposition; they oppose whatever regime exists in their society. This feature is certainly captured in the spirit of generational leadership change. This study which focused mainly on the behaviour of the young elite mainly in tertiary institutions sought to ultimately examine commitment to crafting or designing a future consolidated democracy. The notion of crafting as advanced by most scholars implies the strengthening and gradual development of mutually reinforcing conditions in some very fundamental institutions or parts of a democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996:7, Encarnacion 2000:495).

This study examined firstly, the youth’s political culture in their participation in democratic practises like voting in the present political society. Secondly, their political consciousness and activism in civil society, their attitude towards ethnic alignments, observance of norms and the rule of law, and their commitment to shaping the future economic society in the country by seeking to establish themselves and their professional careers in the country.

From this study, the consolidation of democracy is viewed differently. A consolidated African democracy will be reached when these young custodians of democracy show a self determined commitment to promulgate inter ethnic, religious and cultural civic exchanges; in their attitudes to own their political terrain by protecting democratic institutions and safeguarding democratic values in their ailing constituencies, which they have competitively wrestled from their predecessors within the rules of the game.

1.4 Context of Study: Kenya’s Democracy

Kenya is the preferred empirical referent for this study for specific reasons. Firstly, among the prominent African polities which gained their independence during the initial wave of Africa’s liberation in the 1950-1960’s, Kenya provides a suitable case for the study of consolidation of similar African democracies. This is on the backdrop of initial post independence steady economic growth and political stability,
which crumbled upon transition to multiparty democracy, in the absence of any form of major political conflict.

Secondly, Kenya wields massive potential for economic growth buttressed by political stability engineered by a wide selection of capable elites. However, the continuing unconsolidated state of Kenya’s democracy evidenced by dilution of democratic values i.e. rule of law, the encroachment by the state of the fundamental liberties and on the whole an economic disarray and increased poverty, compounded by Western debt, after 15 years of liberal democracy begs for investigation. Evidence for this is drawn from the struggle to transite from single party democracy to multiparty politics during President Moi’s tenure.

The gross disregard for democratic values necessary for deepening democracy, and sabotage to democratic institutions e.g. freedom of the press, a weak and scared judiciary and a compromised significant section of the legislature and widespread corruption, all characterized Moi’s two terms. Upon Moi’s exit following fiercely contested elections in 2002, the expectations of many were let down when the new ruling elite under President Mwai Kibaki inherited some of the existing malpractices. These include corrupt deals, dilution of judicial powers and scuttling of Kenya’s constitutional review process which aimed at trimming presidential powers for increased accountability on the part of the executive.

Over and above the elite who ascended to the president’s seat, the political mainstream boasts of a substantial intelligentsia aligned with both the major political parties and are members of parliament, leaders in the civil society and in influential segments of government. Their academic accomplishments range from lawyers, doctors, engineers, economists and political scientists. This elite includes Paul Muite, Raila Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka, Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi just to name a few, who are either graduates of the Kenyan institutions of higher education or were initially trained at home and pursued postgraduate study in universities abroad.

Finally, Kenya bears all the elements of an African democracy that are regarded as impediments to the consolidation of liberal democracy. These include an extremely diverse social milieu that breeds ethnic and religious cleavages in multiparty democracies, poverty and a significant level of illiteracy.
1.5 Objectives of Study

The makeup of Kenya’s political elite profile has been a cause for concern to many significant political groups especially within the civil society. This was recently highlighted following an all African youth development forum held in Nairobi, Kenya. In an editorial titled “Politicians Wanted”¹⁶, there is genuine concern that the average age of the governing elite sits at the 68 year mark for the past decade. Evidently, there is no noticeable entry into the political arena from the younger generation especially those coming out of tertiary institutions; and those who do enter into mainstream politics seem not to effect substantial changes towards consolidating Kenya’s democracy.

1.6 Rationale

Although this ambitious task proposes to examine a definite future directional change, a trait before its time, it is based on the view that that political culture is gradually developed. If the young (1980’s) generation is to assume leadership marked by freshness into the definitions of African democracy as envisioned, certain qualities of a different elite must be in place and evident from the present. One needs take them to task on their evaluation of the current political elites’ behaviour, performance and political culture. The second stage would be to probe the young generation’s interest in political process, commitment to participation and action. With this, it is possible to draw the prospects of shaping a post second liberation political culture that grows into a tradition that will develop into a home grown model of consolidated African democracies.

The focus on young university students and graduates as the elites in this study draws on the generally held assumption that, a university education is supposed to impart a knowledge that is tied together with critical thought. Irrespective of the particular area of specialization, a university education is thought to construct skilled individuals whose ability for critical analysis grows as they engage with other disciplines within the broad spectrum of academia in the learning institutions. In addition to that, there is a higher expectation for a university graduate to acquire a

¹⁶ Eliud Miring’uh “Politicians wanted” In the East African Standard September 14th 2006.
well redounded understanding of global issues in a world where strict state and national boundaries are extremely porous.

Based on the theoretical frameworks provided above, of what a consolidated democracy is, it is not enough that a democracy is consolidated when the behaviour, attitude and constitution guarantee the mere existence or endurance of democratic institutions with no threat of reversals from fears of conflict. For Kenya to advance from the extremely shallow democracy it is, towards consolidation, there is a need to search and route out the problems of unconsolidation by focusing on the elite.

This study therefore, primarily seeks to:

A) Ascertain the impact and contribution of the future custodians, the young elite of Kenya’s democracy; on the quality of political culture at present.

B) Bearing in mind that elites occupy the highest stations of influence, their behaviours and attitudes towards democratic norms can yield an improvement and deepening of democracy; whereby democratic consolidation can be crafted. This study therefore sought to ascertain whether the young elite carry in them the commitment as well as the mantle and desire to craft, to map out paths to deepening Kenya’s democracy. It was an examination of their ability to adopt traditions of constitutional rule and potential to develop a participatory political culture which respects democratic institutions.

C) Finally, the study will include a section on the impact of the media on the younger generation of elites in the forming of political attitudes and shaping of behaviour. It will try to ascertain whether a link exists between media influence on participatory culture and interest in local politics. This will be an attempt to draw a causal link between producers of cultural goods and discourses (media) and the subsequent political behaviour.

The core question of this study is guided by the following assumptions

1) Since KANU ruled for more than 30 years into independence, and the old party guard is still active in commandeering the party either actively or by proxy means that the youth are complicit in letting the old party system remain unchanged. even today. This complicity is either by way of indifference towards political issues or a numbing of political consciousness which includes no participation, or simply, a lack of interest in politics.

2) The youth are complicit by way of upholding the prevalent divisive political attitudes underpinned by ethnicity especially in the multiparty era.
3) Lastly, the few who have made minor or large contributions to the political process have obsequiously acquiesced to the training of the old guards, especially in the case of the current president was an integral part of the previous KANU regime that assumed power at independence.

1.7 Media and Political Culture among the Youth

Although it has been argued by media scholars that the media plays a comparatively minor role in the shaping of society, there is evidence and reason to believe that the media has the ability to propel political and social action. Evidence can be deduced from the consequence of the radio hate messages transmitted by radio during the 100 days of genocide in Rwanda.

Lazarsfeld and Merton (1996:18-30) point out a few ways in which the media impacts society that are relevant to this study. They note that the media confer status on public issues, persons and organisations in that when entities, and in this case political elites, have their status raised when they command favourable media attention. This goes to legitimize certain policies, persons and groups. The media also has a negative effect of narcotising society in the instances where the media bombards the audience with a lot of information leaving the audience no chance for a critical approach to issues. Lastly the media supplements the political movements by feeding propaganda to the audience.

This arena is given special attention in this study of elite behaviour, based on the observation that the young elite operate in an information-driven environment and their reality and opinions are constantly met with a barrage of media constructed opinions. This study pays special attention to democratic consolidation and the political culture of the youth elite, by looking at the extent to which there is media impact or contribution in fomenting political action or apathy.

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There is increasing evidence that in a number of African conflict situations, radio and television have been used to inflame murder as was the case in Rwanda with Radio Television des Milles Collines (RTLM) and more recently in the Ivory Coast.
Chapter 2

2. Approach and Methodology

As indicated in the previous chapter, this is an exploratory effort looking into the political culture of the Kenyan youth, especially at tertiary level (for the purposes of the study, tertiary refers to university). The study sought to ascertain whether the anticipated generational change of leadership can produce one of the answers to the consolidation of Kenya’s democracy. This was done by looking at a correlation between political attitudes and behaviour of the young generation of educated elite prepared in tertiary institutions against factors necessary for deepening a democracy. The question is simply whether the young elite possess the requisite attitudes and tools to craft a consolidated, high quality or improve the Kenyan democracy.

The assumption posits that a significant show of difference in their attitudes from those prevailing in the current general population would be a clear indication of possibility of change towards a deeper democracy. On the contrary if their political attitudes and behaviour currently show a weakness in commitment to political process, i.e. disinterest, apathy or indifference, one can conclude that a generational change in leadership will not yield anything unless this generation is well equipped in training from a younger age than that of the sample gathered for this study.

Diamond (1994: 5-12) presents strong case for the role of civil society in a democracy by arguing that it provides a strong foundation for democracy in various ways. These include generating opportunities for participation and influence, shaping political minds by offering training opportunities for skills in the political arena, disseminating democratic values and attributes and for the generation of elite being examined, use of the media as a component of civil society in constructing minds that respect and seek to deepen democratic values.

This being a behavioural study of young elite in relation to consolidation of democracy, the foundations for the approach adopted here draws from Higley and Gunther’s (1992:7) advice that interviewing of the elite used in conjunction with an opinion data survey and careful monitoring of statements made by the elite’ can provide insights into consolidation.
2.1 Combined methods -Qualitative and Quantitative

This is a behavioural study that combines both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. It is primarily a qualitative study that is combined with the quantitative for data collection and analysis methods. It is a combination of the qualitative and the quantitative in an inductive quest defined as triangulation. Creswell (1994:174) notes that triangulation is a combined method study where the researcher uses multiple methods for data collection and analysis; these methods might be drawn from “within methods” approaches such as different types of quantitative data collection strategies e.g. (survey and experiment), alternatively “between methods” drawing on qualitative and quantitative data collection procedures e.g. (survey and in-depth interviews).

Triangulation was preferred for this study because of the different strengths that both the qualitative and quantitative approaches bring. As Mouton and Marais (1990:91) observe, by employing these different methods of data collection in a single project, one is able to some extent, compensate for the limitations of each.

The strengths of a qualitative approach lie in the following aspects. In a study such as this one a hypothesis may be undeclared but only stated in the form of a research goal (Mouton and Marais 1990:161). This is unlike a purely quantitative study where a test is carried out prior and after the study to test a definite hypothesis. The fact that the researcher is involved in a multi-method focus involving an interpretive naturalistic approach to the subject matter, meaning; studying subject matter in their natural settings and attempts to interpret and make sense of the phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln 1994 quoted in Creswell1998:14).

These meanings interpreted as Creswell (1994) points further are grounded in philosophical assumptions. Because this is a human behaviour study, it is imperative for one to take into account the sociological and anthropological factors that impact the subject of study. Furthermore, for the researcher what is real is that which constructed by the individuals involved in the research situation (Cresswell 1994:4).

The strengths of a quantitative approach lie in the observation, data capturing measuring and analysis methods. In a study such as this an empirical data collection and observation is necessary for measurement of trends of the category or categories of the research subject. Mouton and Marais (1990:162) observe that concepts can be operationalised in terms of measuring instruments and strives
towards denotative meanings. They further add that observation of data is scalable. This means that there is a constant quest to eliminate bias.

2.2 Study Design

Due to the use of combined approach, this study employed a non-experimental design based on the fact that it is a behavioural study and subject behaviour can change in time affecting the measurement of the variables. Thus, a cross sectional design\(^\text{18}\) also termed as a quasi-experimentation or quasi control design is preferred. According to Johnson and Josslyn (1995:134) data analysis rather than experimental manipulation is used to draw conclusions about the effect of the independent variable; it has the virtues of allowing observation of phenomenon in their natural settings. Manheim and Rich (1991:114) add that cross sectional designs give you “a snap shop of a moving target”. This design is also used in cases where a quantitative study is to be undertaken but very little control can be exercised on the variables (Johnson and Josslyn 1995:143 and Manheim and Rich 1981:82).

In this study which is an inquiry into the political culture of the emerging educated elite entailed the measuring of attitudes and feelings towards Kenya’s multiparty democracy, political structures, the incumbents and their role in it. It measured six factors which are linked to political culture based on the researcher’s previous knowledge of the political behaviour of this population group.

Each of the factors carried a minimum of five questions and a maximum of seven some of which were eliminated during analysis judged on their general contribution to the factor as a whole. These factors measured included political awareness, attitudes towards future developments in Kenya’s political leadership and system (i.e. self role in the Kenya’s democracy), attitudes towards participation, attitudes and feelings towards the performance of the past and the incumbent political elite, attitudes and feelings towards the structures on which democracy operates (political parties, civil society, etc) and attitudes towards strong ethnic identity.

\(^{18}\) Johnson and Josslyn- Political Science Research Methods (1995:134)
2.3 Sample

The sample in this study was randomly selected. This is what is termed as a “simple random sampling”, where every individual/element in the population stands an equal chance to be selected Johnson and (Josslyn 1995:177, and Creswell 1994:120). The population in this study constitutes of Kenyan who fall under the category youth within the population. However, there was a need to define a scope for the youth category for this study. This was determined to be a person of the age range 18 to 35 years.

For the principle purpose of the study, the random sample was further stratified. A stratified sample has specific characteristics that may reflect the true characteristics of the population intended for the study (Creswell 1994:120). It was basically a disproportionate stratified random sample of the youth category. The stratification was on the level of education and gender. To improve the reliability of the findings, the sample was not selected from the same geographical location. The university students were selected from the Kenyan contingent in three universities in South Africa. The youth with no university education was randomly selected from Kenyans living in South Africa and the larger number drawn from Nairobi Kenya.

The rationale that behind the sample selection aimed at ascertaining whether the education and literacy at tertiary level had a major or significant impact in shaping the political culture of dependable future elite capable of crafting Kenya’s democracy towards consolidation. Education (Western form of education) is regarded as one of the main preconditions for consolidated liberal democracies. Therefore university education is expected to produce a quality of elite equipped to shape and guide a democracy with marked difference from any other individual.

The second level of stratification, i.e. gender, sought to ascertain whether there exists a significant difference between the political cultures of females compared to males in Kenya. The assumption made was that females at this level seem to be more apathetic to political affairs as opposed to their male counter parts. This maybe attributable to pre-existing gender stereotypes for roles that still linger. This is especially true with the evidence that there is still much fewer women legislators in the Kenyan parliament, while demographically and democratically speaking, women comprise the larger number within the voter population. This study sought to
ascertain the impact and contribution by both genders and their views in crafting Kenya’s democracy.

2.4 Coding

Although this study employs a non experimental design, the codes labels used are borrowed from those used in experimental studies. This is because the study involves the measurement of more of, or less of particular behavioural characteristics between two principal independent variables in the youth category, i.e. young people with a university education and those without. The other variable is gender.

Therefore for the principle variables, the students with a university education are coded as Experimental Group because their political culture was the centre of the question of the study, while the students without a university education are labelled Control Group which suggests that there is expected to be a difference in their political culture that can be compared to that of the Experimental group. The gender variables are coded with the first letter F for female and M for Male.

2.5 Operationalization: Instruments

This study employed mixed instruments for data collection necessitated by the combined research methods. This included the use of survey. The purpose of a survey is to generalize from a sample to population so that inferences can be made about some characteristics, attitude or behaviour (Babbie:1990 quoted in Creswell 1994:118). Manheim and Rich (1991:113) note that exploratory surveys help one to acquire information that can be helpful in formulating research questions and hypothesis especially when little is known about a phenomenon considered worthy of study.

The cross-sectional design or quasi experimental design employed in this study meant that the survey information was collected at one point. An anonymous questionnaire design was the preferred instrument for data collection for this study for the following reasons; firstly, it reduces the chances of negative reactivity from the respondents especially to the presence of the researcher. Secondly, anonymity of the respondent ensures a positive reaction in that honesty in responses is increased. Thirdly, because of the scale being employed, the accuracy of data analysis was
improved as opposed to interviews which will rely heavily on interpretation and the researcher’s perception.

The questionnaire was designed by the researcher. It was delivered to the participants both by email and by volunteering assistants to the researcher. On the cover page was a letter guaranteeing participation by anonymity. The questionnaire had three sections the first one being a biographical data section, the second section was a five point Likert scale, with questions which restricted the participants options for response. The third section contained five open ended questions.

2.5.1 Scale

As this is a behavioural study, an examination of attitudes in complex concepts like democratic consolidation and the presence or absence of indicators of democracy, this study employed a multi-item measuring tool; the preferred one being the Likert scale. This scale was selected for this study for the following reasons;

a) In its simple structure it does not deter or discourage a respondent especially in this case where the study employs a random sample.

b) Although it is criticized for its over-simplification, lacking in accountability for intervals between the responses to the items being measured (i.e. over aggregation of results because not all dimensions of the item being measured are considered), it is possible to counter this flaw by repeating the questions severally to reach a fairly reliable aggregate.

c) Despite its simplicity and the charge that in the process of measuring, one may not see a relation between items being measured, this scale is suitable for this study because the component items being measured are attitudes in relation to one core concept of democracy.

d) Analysis of the data collected from the Likert scale is not regarded conclusive. This being a combined methodology study the result provided by the Likert scale was supported by data collected through qualitative methods.
2.5.2 Focus group and In-depth Interviews

Interviewing has been defined as “conversation research”; it is preferred because of conversation is the basic communication mode for human interaction (Kvale 1996:5) Manheim and Rich (1991:134) note that it is simultaneously one of the worst and yet best research data collection methods; its richness lies in the fact that the researcher is able to observe the participant’s body language and reactions which are also a form of communication loaded with meaning.

This study set up a focus group where all the participants were interviewed on the same questions that appeared on the questionnaire. This was necessary to ascertain the reason informing the restricted responses on the Likert scale section of the questionnaire. More interviews were conducted to capture data in chapter 6. These were recorded by writing and on tape recorders.

2.5.3 Analysis

Due to the combined-approach nature of this study, the data collected using quantitative methods was analysed using descriptive statistical analysis. Descriptive statistics have been defined as “mathematical calculations that attempt to capture precisely and efficiently the contents of a frequency distribution” (Johnson and Josslyn 1995:308-309). Mouton (1990:44) notes that using descriptive statistics require that a researcher make conclusions on a list of frequencies and means (univariate statistics) but goes further to by making estimates and postulating relationships between variables in several ways which include correlations, analyses of variances, factor analyses etc. i.e. (bivariate and multivariate statistics).

The study employed some components of bivariate and multivariate statistics for analysis. The study was measuring the relationship between two main variables i.e. the political culture of the youth in the categories of education and gender. This being a non experimental study where measurement was taken at the same point and time, the analysis on the relationship between these variables was mainly based on ordinal level measure. An ordinal level measure shows a “more or less” of a quality being tested (Johnson and Josslyn 1995:311). This means making major conclusions on the means and median. This was mainly used to provide an general indication of how the groups both scored on the scale of 1 to 5 in the six factors of
political cultures being measured, showing from a neutral position where each group more or less feels.

2.5.3.1 Multivariate Descriptive Statistics

The study employed bivariate and multivariate statistics to measure the core elements that may make or break the reliability and validity of a researcher’s findings. These include statistical significance measured by a P level. Specifically, the p-level represents the probability of error that is involved in accepting observed result as valid, that is, as "representative of the population" It represents a decreasing index of the reliability of a result. The higher the p-level, the less one can believe that the observed relation between variables in the sample is a reliable indicator of the relation between the respective variables in the population. Although considered as intuitive and sometimes an arbitrary measure for reliability of result in a non experimental situation, it was necessary in checking the relationships in this study because of the size of sample involved.

2.5.3.2 Factor analysis

Factor analysis was undertaken on the various questions that constituted each of the six factors or dependent variables of political culture measured. Factor analysis techniques are used to reduce the number of variables and to detect structure in the relationships between variables, that is to classify variables. In the context of this study, some of the questions that were included as part of each factor were retracted from the factor cluster if the factor analysis score fell below +-. 0.5 mark. They were reduced based on the judgment that that they were not highly correlated or significantly correlated to the factor being tested. These were removed so as not to compromise the reliability of the overall mean score in that particular factor.

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20 Information sourced from Statistica Manual (the computer soft ware used to analyse data for this study)
2.5.3.3 Variance

As this is a behavioural study, the independent variable the sample selected is bound to have unexpected random effects which will affect the ultimate score or mean. This are accounted for by calculating variance and standard deviation. These are indicators of dispersion from the true mean of the normal distribution curve of observed characteristics within a population (Johnson and Josslyn 1995:315). In this study the variance model used for study was the Anova design which is used for repeated measures design in experimental research designs. It was used on the assumption that the responses from the two groups may have covarying random effects (in this case strong or weak feelings) on some of the questions being asked over a period of time. However this can also be affected by the size of the sample.

2.5.3.4 Sampling error and Confidence level

Considering that this study based its findings on a sample, it is necessary to ascertain what the sampling error is to determine whether the findings are reliable in that the selected sample’s findings a representative of the population being studied. Johnson and Josslyn (1995; observe that sampling error exists whenever a researcher relies on a sample. But because one cannot collect data from the whole population a minimal sampling error is desirable. The sampling error is therefore closely connected to the confidence level. The smaller the error at a +/- 3% error is desirable and a 95% confidence level is targeted.

2.5.3.5 Confidence Interval

Similar to the standard deviation and variance, this study undertook to measure the confidence intervals on the responses given by the sample on the tests. The confidence intervals (limits) for the mean provide a range of values around the average response where one expects the “true mean” (feeling of the participants) is located with a given level of certainty. In this study, the confidence level was measured to ascertain where the attitudes of the majority of the young elite lie and is represented on graphs.
2.6 Overview on Chapter 3

As already noted in chapter 1, the various views in the ongoing debate on consolidation of democracy are discussed in detail in chapter three. The discussion will mainly pay attention to the role of the political elite, both incumbent and emerging in the consolidation of democracy.
Chapter 3

Literature Review

There has been a growth in the amount of literature that constitutes some of the pivotal debates within democratisation and even more with greater focus placed on the democratic consolidation in non Western countries. Scholars continue to argue for, and explore the possible inroads through which democratic consolidation can be advanced in places like Africa, where democratization is hit by complications.

Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:234 present in practical examples the experimentation of the assortment of definitions of consolidation in Africa, it is asserted that debates over the consolidation of democracy in developing nations are often discourses about the meaning of consolidation itself Further, a critical view on this debate provided by Encarnacion’s five text review on consolidation begins with an admission that “scholarly reticence in examining democratic consolidation stems from the abstraction, complexity and messiness of the process itself, which lacks empirical thresholds that indicate its progress, much less its completion” (2000:479).

However, there are already available and extensively quoted conceptions or yardsticks for democratic consolidation provided by Huntington (1991) and Linz and Stepan (1996) discussed hereunder. These have been labelled as "minimalist" (O’Donnel 1996:37) or “middle range” (Encarnacion 2000:480). These criticisms point at their imprecision and abstraction and ‘bloatedness’ of terms used to define a complex human driven process, despite their attempts to inject an analytical element that can make democratic consolidation measurable.

Huntington’s (1991:266-267) conception of the “two-turn over test” argues that a democracy can be considered as consolidated if the post transition regime calmly hands over the reigns of power through competitive elections to another group (preferably the opposition) after completion of two terms of rule. Inadequacy in Huntington’s two turn-over test is exposed by Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Ihovnbere (2003), Zakaria (1997) and Diamond (1999). In their observations of the continuing trend in African democracies where change over of power in the “second independence”21 era, multiparty democracies have yielded enduring, existing

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21 Crawford Young notes that the beginning of Africa’s third wave of democratisation was heralded as the second independence for Africa (1996:60)
democracies, which are not threatened with reversals to authoritarianism. These, however exist in a culture of continued dilution to almost all democratic values and practises. They encroach on almost all democratic institutions except the conducting of elections, albeit unfairly. This test fails for being trapped in what commentators term as the West's obsession with multiparty balloting (Zakaria: 1997) the “electoralist fallacy” or what Claude Ake terms as the crude simplicity of multiparty elections which allows for some of the worst autocrats to parade their democratic credentials without reforming their regimes (as quoted in Young 1996:61).

The flaw of the turn over test is first and foremost evident in the gross assumption implied in the concept. The assumption is that of cultural uniformity, in that Huntington refuses to take into account the uniqueness of democratic process in non Western cultures. In this case, positing that a democracy is consolidated after a second turn over of power, takes for granted that the polity is a democratically mature liberal democracy in which all requisite values and norms e.g. rule of law, civil liberties and all the liberal democratic values and norms are upheld in the run up to the election. Furthermore, it assumes that holding competitive elections is a sufficient sign for a consolidated democracy, not mentioning if they were fair. Ihovnbere (2003:292-293) observes that extreme nudging from the West and some of its institutions e.g. the IMF, has obliged most African countries to conduct multiparty elections, which are less than fair and in the end sustaining the same undemocratic elites in power.

Kenya’s democracy provides a fitting example of the above phenomenon. Kenya satisfied the two-turn over test in 2002 when the long time single party era regime, KANU, was voted out in a third general election since Kenya’s advent to multiparty politics, and entered a new regime under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). The democratic record with regard to observing democratic values and norms and respect for institution of the current government under the NARC government has worsened. In instances similar to those of the autocratic single party era under KANU, the media has been openly attacked by the present state using its

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22 For long there has existed an erroneous perception that the conducting of multiparty elections is a sufficient indicator of a democratizing polity and even as an indicator of move towards consolidation.
coercive machinery; opposition politicians have been harassed to the extent that the government refuses to register new political parties that are considered a threat.\footnote{NB. These incidences as will be discussed at length in the next chapter are on the increase. One of Kenya’s major daily newspapers “The Daily Standard” was raided on the 3rd of March 2006 by a gang of men wielding guns and dressed in military uniform. They torched all the newspapers that were just out of print ready for distribution for that day. A simultaneous raid was executed on the sister Television station to this publication where they vandalised equipment forcing the station to go off air for a whole day. The minister of internal security was later to admit that it was the government and that they would not hesitate to do it again on anyone who challenged the state.}

Linz and Stepan’s (1996:5) conception is summed up in a phrase; that a political situation can be considered consolidated when “democracy has become the only game in town”. This combines behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional dimensions to democratization.

Behaviourally, in the sense that, no significant national, political, institutional social and economic actors spend significant resources seeking to undermine the democratic system by conspiring reversion to undemocratic existence, by creating a non-democratic regime or turning to violence to secede from the democratically elected government.

Attitudinally, in that, the opinion of a strong majority in the polity holds the belief that the democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life; simultaneously the undemocratic forces are quite small in relation to pro-democratic forces.

Finally, constitutionally, a democracy is deemed consolidated when governmental and non-governmental forces throughout the territory are subjected to habituated resolution of conflict within the specific democratic laws, procedures and institutions mandated by the democratic process.

The criticism levelled at Linz and Stepan’s (1996) minimal definitions of democratic consolidation points out the glossing over of numerous complex socio-cultural factors and components that contribute to the quality of democracy, what has been termed as deepening of democracy. This is especially significant with regard to African democracies. Although Linz and Stepan’s (1996) framework is generally accepted as a good starting point in approaching democratic consolidation, they admit to the limitations of their definition by introducing the dimension of “quality” of a consolidated democracy. They propose that an urgent intellectual and political task is to think about how to improve the quality of most consolidated democracies. This provides an indication that advancement to the study of consolidation is necessary.
Diamond’s (1999:65-75) definition highlights more salient characteristics that reflect directly on a study of consolidating democracy in a place like Africa. He notes that, it is easier to observe the phenomenon that is consolidation in its inverse; i.e. signs of fragility, instability and basically non-consolidation. He begins by noting that consolidation first, on the part of the elite and subsequently the masses, can be observed where democracy enjoys robust legitimacy or loyalty to democratic rules; i.e. a shared normative behavioural commitment to the country’s constitutional system. He makes a distinction that this goes beyond the basic defence of the constitution, i.e. defending it from being overthrown as seen in the middle range definitions, but adds that it entails defending norms, limits and procedures.

The above significantly defines some of the core components that constitute political culture. Some of the notable key words e.g. behaviour, norms as related to traits like loyalty, commitment to a democracy have already been mentioned in Linz and Stepan’s (1996) definition of a consolidated democracy. However, the way these are used in Diamond’s (1999) approach to consolidation of democracy (that points at political culture as linked to quality of democracy) is slightly different as will be shown further down in this chapter.

Political culture has been defined as “the aggregate of learned, socially transmitted behavioural patterns characterising government and politics within a society; it connotes a psychological dimension of behaviour, beliefs, feelings and evaluative orientations (Robberts 1971 as quoted in Mak’Ochieng)\(^2\). Almond and Verba (1989:13-14) provide more aspects of political culture; at the onset, they note that the political culture of the nation is the particular distribution of patterns and orientations towards political objects among the nation. They further distribute and specify these orientations into modes which are the cognitive orientation i.e. knowledge of the system and its roles, affective orientations i.e. feeling about the system, its personnel and performance, and lastly evaluational orientations i.e. judgements and opinions which involve value standards and feelings.

Hauss (2006) ties all the above definitions of political culture to participation in political process, feelings of legitimacy of the regime where there is wide acceptance, and a third more recent dimension which stresses on the role of social capital: the assertion is that it is important that attitudes of tolerance, and coexistence and

\(^2\) This quote is extracted from Mak –Ochieng Sparse role for Kenya’s Media During the Reign of Daniel arap Moi(2006:74)
agreement within a polity be established in institutions that build trust and cooperation. From all the above views on political culture, it follows that Diamond’ (1999) approach to a consolidated democracy (which emphasises on quality) pays attention to behaviours and attitudes of a nation, and in the context of this study, leadership.

3.1 Consolidation in Segments

Encarnacion’s (2000) review provides a fundamental trajectory by which consolidation of democracy can be enhanced by introducing two opposing frameworks through which to understand democratic consolidation; these are i.e. Aggregation" and "Disaggregation. These conceptions of democratic consolidation are drawn from conclusions reached in a review of different theorisations into democratic consolidation.

Elements of aggregation can be seen from the already discussed “minimalist/middle range” definitions of consolidation. Encarnacion (2000 488-489) notes that a crippling problem to the aggregation approach is its inability to deal with the issues of analytical interpretation and implementation. This approach glosses over internal dynamics of the process of democratic consolidation. By adhering only to the procedural indicators and preconditions to a polyarchy, (e.g. free political competition, participation by universal suffrage in elections, minimal pressure from discontent voices as opposed to acceptance of current rule by the majority as a sign of legitimacy etc), it thus misleads by imposing these elements as democratic consolidation without looking into specific components of democratization.

The disaggregate approach on the other hand breaks down the base structure of a whole democracy indicators of the few elements of consolidation provided by Linz and Stepan (1996) and broadens Huntington’s (1991) conception of democratic consolidation. Disaggregation as advanced by Philippe Schmitter argues that what

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25 Encarnacion divides the arguments from texts reviewed on consolidation into two opposite conceptions. The “aggregate” conceptualisation as advanced by Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandourous and Hans Jurgen Puhle, is criticised for aggregating political behaviour, beliefs and expectations of what is considered a majority opinion, or politically significant groups and the absence of a significant antisystem as sufficient framework for determining when democratic consolidation is realised. This is at the expense of social, cultural and behavioural nuance within the polity that impacts on the developments of democracy.

26 Philippe Schmitter “Organised Interests and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe” As quoted in Encarnacion (2000:491)
consolidates in post-transition is not democracy per se, but a bundle of diverse institutions or partial regimes that link citizens to the public authorities" (Encarnacion 2000:491). These are fragments of a political democracy that are termed as regimes e.g. the pressure regime (civil society) the representation regime (political society and ruling elite) and the clientelistic regime (which includes the ruling elites and their cronies). These, Schmitter argues, make the study of consolidation more viable and even measurable.

3.2 Diasaggregation and Fragments

One cannot speak of fragments of democratic consolidation in segments separately from crafting as will be seen hereunder. Linz and Stepan (1996) and Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) from a practical standpoint, emphasise the fundamental interrelated arenas, areas or segments of the democratic whole that need to be designed or developed for the democratic consolidation process. These arenas as already briefly mentioned above include a valuable and autonomous political society, a vibrant civil society, an effective bureaucracy which Bratton and Van de Walle note as a major fault in Africa’s states whose institutional legacies are inherited with all their weaknesses, especially the judiciary and the legislature, and lastly an institutionalised economic society.

By examining these political fragments (regimes) one is drawn to a deeper valuation of the quality of democracy; it is because these are fragments of political life which combine to either hinder or aid democratic consolidation. It addresses the question as to “what institutions and actors matter most in the consolidation of democracy?” (Encarnacion 2000:492). This question leads to an in-depth assessment of democratic quality by looking at each fragment closely in relation to the debate of preconditions versus crafting of democracy and consolidation of that democracy. This question is especially desirable in a study such as this; situated in Africa where the contingent preconditions of democratic development in Europe\(^\text{27}\) are absent in Africa, and where the heterogeneous cultural makeup of this continent require a separate set of home grown building blocks.

\(^{27}\)Democratic development in Europe is attributable to some preconditions e.g. literacy, education, historical development of democratic governance and social struggle for political realignments, religion i.e. Christianity, and homogeneity of culture.
These would include serious considerations for deliberately entrenched population cohesion imperatives that reject social cleavages, constant regional consultation for economic and governance matters. In order to develop a political culture to a democratic tradition, it would require reenergised civil education drives at all levels led by an autonomous civil society and political society. As such the fragmented regimes approach to democratisation and consolidation should be at the centre of crafting of consolidated democracies.

3.3 ‘Crafters and Crafting Fragments’- The Elite

While political parties constitute the basic element of democratic institutional apparatus, and a principal vehicle for democratisation and consolidation (Rugalabamu1998:16, Encarnacion 2000:492), it is the political elite, the party leaders who are at the core of democratic dynamics. Diamond (1999:66) defines the elite as top level leaders and decision makers, organization leaders and political activists; they matter most for the stability and consolidation of democracy, not for their behaviour but also for their belief. Bratton and Van de Walle’s (1997:235) assertion that “democracy is not possible without democrats” reinforces the view that the political culture of the elite sets the tone for the quality of democracy which will be cultivated among the masses.

In their text which focuses on elites and consolidation of democracy, Burton, Higley and Gunther (1992:8) give a broader definition of elites as

“Persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to effect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. Elites are the principal decision makers in the largest or most resource rich political, governmental, economic military, professional, communications and cultural organizations and movements in a society… they are made up of people of people who may hold widely varying attitudes towards the existing social, economic and political order”

As seen in chapter one, Huntington (1997:10) aptly describes the elites and their impact on democratic process, with specific emphasis on elites who obstruct the consolidation trail: He notes that democratic development occurs when political leaders believe they have an interest in promoting it or a duty to achieve it. Furthermore, the threats for third wave democracies will not come from military
generals or revolutionaries, but from political leaders who win elections, take power and manipulate the mechanism (Huntington 1996:9).

Mirroring the above definitions, the Kenyan elite starting with the previous long serving president Daniel arap Moi, his ministers (including the present president Mwai Kibaki who had served in a ministerial capacity in Moi’s government as a member of Moi’s ruling party KANU and defected to the opposition in the euphoria of Kenya’s transition to multiparty politics), share a lot in personal and career profiles. Moi and his single party regime prominent for its patrimonial qualities, is known for his involvement in big business investments which also involved his sons. These facts that are being opened to public scrutiny in the post Moi era reveal high level corruption and far reaching political patronage, involving close friends and politicians who enriched themselves using government machinery. President Kibaki’s government which was constituted of a coalition of parties from the former opposition section, led by elites ranging from businessmen, civil society leaders, academics and engineers has also drawn a lot of criticism for inheriting and seeking to benefit from some of Moi’s regimes malfeasance.

3.3.1 ‘Crafting Fragments’

Encarnacion (2000:495-497) notes that the focus in the study of democracy and consolidation in non European settings, for instance in Latin America is no longer on the socio-economic and structural constraints. It is driven by the notion that democratic consolidation can be crafted/designated and promoted, and has shifted to the political domains (regimes) under the control of political elites; i.e. political parties, electoral systems, parliaments etc. This study which concerns itself with the behaviours of the elite in relation to consolidation thus takes the view that democratic consolidation can be crafted. Crafting implies a developmental process, a gradual emergence of fragments led by the elite that is capable of becoming more inclusive and accountable (Encarnacion 2000:495).

As earlier been mentioned in the definition of political culture, the attitudes and behaviours of the elite become central in the democratic consolidation process. This is because they impact on institutions (segments) and values of democratic process.

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28 As will be seen in detail in the next chapter, Moi’s and his closest political allies suffered disgraceful exits from power blighted by a mineral export subsidy corruption case named the “Goldenberg” scandal.
which in turn determines the reactions from the masses. Burton, Higley and Gunther's definition of elites is reinforced by Diamond and Encarnacion who capture the principal characteristics of these actors. Diamond (1999:66-72) notes that, at the level of elites and organisation, it is easier to observe manifestations of disloyalty to democratic values and norms, when such elite seek power or to influence policy through illegal means e.g. fraud or force, abuse of constitutional liberties and opposition rights, refusal to honour duly elected leaders, and blatantly false depiction of democratically loyal opponents as disloyal. Fragility can also be seen in the readiness to cover up their antidemocratic actions.

Burton, Higley and Gunther (1992:8) go on to explain the elites’ ability to affect political outcomes in two dimensions. The first one is “regularly”; in that their individual points of view and possible actions are seen by other influential persons as important factors to be weighed when assessing the likelihood of continuities and changes in regimes and policies. The second one is “substantially”; in the sense that without their support, or opposition, an outcome salient to their interests and locations would be noticeably different. Based on this view then one can begin to draw a sharper definition of democratic consolidation. It implies quality. Diamond’s definition of a consolidated democracy which links to Burton, Higley and Gunther’s (1992) emphasises quality of democracy shaped by the elites. Diamond (1999:67) adds that “democracy can be consolidated only when no significant collective actors challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions regularly or violate its constitutional norms and laws”.

The term ‘regular’ gives the clearest indication to what consolidation entails; consistency in behaviour and attitudes on the part of elites towards the democratic norms and rules, constitutional rules. The masses are most likely to take a cue from the elite’s political actions. Substantially, the elite can alter the direction of the political climate in a democracy in one event, e.g. through ethnic cleansing, to move to instability, ruining the economy and causing severe disunity and strife in the social milieu. From these observations, the elite’s contribution thus can not only radically change the course towards consolidation, but can regularly impact on the stability of any course the democracy will take.

29 Linz and Stepan Break Down of Democratic Regimes 28-38 quoted in Diamond 1999:67
For instance, Kenya’s post multiparty democracy era was and still is blighted by ethnic rifts which initially saw clashes where some ethnic groups, especially the majority were targeted and killed in the run-up to the first and second general elections. The parties e.g. KANU, Ford and Democratic Party which were led by influential elites from particular ethnic groups saw their supporters fight to death as the populations took heed to the animosity and the bitter rhetorical exchanges between the respective party leaders. This led to internal migrations within the country\(^{30}\). Even now regular incitements and disregard of the rule of law cause the same clashes and the elites still command unwavering support.

The extent to which this quality can be measured is in saying that a democracy is consolidated when the elites’ undertaking in the practice of democracy act consistently with the aspirations for democracy; especially in terms of how inclusive and how disadvantaged groups experience citizenship (Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2003:15). In this regard Encarnacion (2000:495) adds that questions over consolidation will arise if multiple gaps are evident between the democratic rules and political behaviour. As much as the crafters/elites involved in the mainstream fragments of the state should take the blame for the unconsolidated state of their democracies, the “pressure regime” or the civil society ought to be been drawn to the centre stage of the democritisation and consolidation process in the second independence in Africa.

Diamond (1994:3-17) paints a clear picture of the role of the civil society in crafting a consolidating democracy alongside the political society and the bureaucracy. He notes that a civil society swerves a democracy by opening other channels other than political parties for the aggregation and articulation of interests. It is a crucial arena for the development of other democratic attributes such as tolerance, moderation and respect for opposing viewpoints. On top of all this, contributions to democratic consolidation from this fragment are the revelation that the civil society is a recruiting and training ground for new political leaders. These new leaders or crafters who join the elite ranks are the youth, and most likely those acquiring training at tertiary institutions.

30 The immediate period following Kenya’s transition to multiparty politics in 1991, state sponsored violence was meted out on major ethnic groups (like the Kikuyu) which had coexisted peacefully with the ethnic group from where the president and his support base originate. These were labelled as “Land clashes” which saw a large number of the Kikuyu forcefully driven off Kenya’s rift valley areas which have been associated with Kalenjin and Nandi dominance.
3.4 Quality of Elites, a Product of Preconditions?

On the evidence of unaccomplished and or inept elite weakening African democracies, there is a need to revisit the merits of preconditions for democracy in relation to leadership in Africa. Firstly, Arthur Schlesinger\textsuperscript{31} puts it on record that ideas of liberal democracy are European ideas and not from any culture except by adoption. These preconditions which are products of a long historical process involved economic development that comprised of higher levels of urbanisation, literacy and education. With a shift in modes of production to technology driven economies, the growth of a large middle class that could agitate for change and restructure governance, a political culture that protected the individual, the minority and disenfranchised the Lords and aristocracy in favour of rules took hold. All this undergirded by heavy Christian ideology. This structure bred a learned elite who sprouted from the midst of the enlarging middle class meaning they were politically and culturally a part of designing this democratic structure.

Dwelling on preconditions in the African context as argued by Kaplan, is like condemning Africa to eternal political bondage under bad rule by individualised illiberal regimes Robert Kaplan (1994) as quoted in Ihovnber (2003:297). This is because these will never work unless Africa Westernises its democratic systems as demanded by Western donor countries. The leaders will therefore continue to maintain shallow democracy to satisfy minimal conditions for their international auditors. Given that these preconditions are not practical one tends to agree with Terry Lynn Karl’s assertion that what has been considered as prerequisites for democracy, may be better conceived as outcomes of democracy Ihovnber (2003:297). Patterns of economic growth, more equitable income, higher levels of literacy and education and increased social communication and media exposure can be results of a stable democracy.

Based on that line of thought then, proponents of good governance in Africa are not off the mark. The quality of elites that come into power in Africa have the opportunity to craft the necessary frameworks and building blocks which can rise above parochial mentalities bound in nationalist and ethnic inclined sensitivities. They can cultivate the contingent political culture, the climate on which tolerance, inclusion,

\textsuperscript{31} As quoted in Huntington 1997:6
participation accountability and social cohesion work towards realising political stability. This impacts on economic development and in turn calming the difficult conditions e.g. poverty and inequality that create tensions which eclipse all political progress.

### 3.5 Types of Elites

Burton, Higley and Gunther (1992) provide three categories of elites with regard to consolidation of democracy; these are based on the structure and functioning of elites, and the extent of value consensus. Structural integration involves the relative inclusiveness of formal and informal networks of communication and influence among these groups of elites or individual persons and even factions. On the other hand, value consensus involves the “relative agreement among elites on formal and informal rules of political conduct”.

One of these categories is the disunified elite where the structural integration and value consensus are minimal, communication and influence networks do not cross factional lines. Here there exists deep distrust and politics is a zero sum game. The political arena is characterised by disagreement on the rules of the game and the worth of existing institutions. The elite in the opposing factions see the existing regime as a vehicle by which dominant factions promote their own interests; therefore to protect and promote their interest, they must cripple or topple the regime and the elite that operate it. The other category is the consensually unified elite, in which the structural and integration networks overlap and value consensus is mutually inclusive. It is characterised by overlapping interconnected communications and influence networks and most elite therefore have substantial access to government. The elites have consensus on the rules of the game and they see worth in the existing political institutions. These regimes are marked by relative stability.

Kenya’s elite oscillate between these two categories; however, the balance tends to lean towards the disunited elite. The elite in power are constantly seeking to marginalise their opposition while the opposition, whose access to government is choked, seeks to unseat the regime that has used its network to benefit elites along ethnic allegiances. This was in play since the Moi era where the KANU regime sought to punish all the opposition party elite by denying them access to government facilities. For example, opposition MP’s were denied access to the public broadcaster and instruments that aid development like motor vehicles, earth moving equipment
and trucks for road construction, whilst including ministry deployed requisite expertise needed to drive and monitor development projects in opposition zones or constituencies.

There was almost permanent disagreement on rules including incredulity towards the judiciary and the constitution. Incredulity towards the political institutions is ongoing with the current regime, which during Moi’s tenure, sought for a constitutional review to curtail presidential powers in their capacity as the official opposition. Now, NARC seeks to maintain the presidential powers untouched amidst a robust challenge by the current opposition faction which is constituted by the previous ruling party, KANU. This tussle has weakened the government because of a high turnover of ministers who are getting dismissed for criticising the president for reneging from his initial promise of a constitutional reduction of executive powers.

3.5.1 New Elites

Graham Harrison in his discussion of political identities in Africa and the elite (2002:115-119) observes that the social category of the youth constitutes an arena of identity politics. In this category there are subsets which include the unemployed and university students. He adds that the youth have been at the forefront of violent anti-state protest in Africa. Student protests have grown in Africa alongside those of the unemployed and underemployed. However, despite their involvements with the political pressure fragment and their strong antigovernment protests which impact on the other social regimes including the economic, consolidating democracy becomes stiffer with part of the youth’s politics being to gain access to the very networks of patronage or clientelism.

Conclusion

Diamond’s definition of democratic consolidation, infused with the contribution of the elite’s action in their democracy arenas, provides a clearer summary of consolidation with relation to the quality of a consolidated democracy. He notes that “democracy can be consolidated only when no significant collective actors challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions regularly or violate its constitutional norms and laws”. This definition accounts for vagueness of the minimal definitions of
consolidation by situating the process of consolidation within the behavioural realm of elites and evading the electoral fallacy trap, which is seen in enduring democracies, and lastly by offering a working formula by which to gauge the performance and contribution of the elites in their sections towards deepening democracy, in complex democracies like the ones in Africa.

Burton, Higley and Gunther (1992:30) observe that although an ideal consolidated democracy cannot be realised, a democracy can be considered consolidated or as having achieved consolidation when elite consensual unity exists within a regime that is fully democratic, i.e. adheres to the procedural definition of democracy. The shared conceptions of a consolidated democracy provided by the above commentators highlight that consolidation contributes to stability by reducing the intensity and expression of conflict. By adhering to common sets of democratic norms in the behaviour of the elite reduces uncertainty about what constitutes proper political behaviour leading to a routinization or habituation of the earlier mentioned attitudes, towards the constitutional, especially, in resolution of conflict within the set democratic frameworks.

By focusing on the elite’s political culture—behaviour, attitudes, and their adherence to institutional rules and laws within various interrelated arenas of a democracy, one is able to account for the persistent shallowness of multiparty democracy in most African constituencies. It is also possible measure the elite’s contribution in sustaining the faults that impede consolidation and how the baggage of such behavioural flaws is inherited by the younger elite who seek to assume or wrestle power from their predecessors who have trained them.

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32 Shallow democracy as seen in the previous chapter has been defined as how far the actual practice of democracy is consistent with the aspirations of the democracy.
4. An overview of Kenya’s Political Developments

Kenya’s political arena generally evokes ambivalence, especially among those who have lived long enough to witness the country’s democratic transition from bad to something else. Ndewgwa (1997:559) calls it a protracted transition to a liberal majoritarian rule where assumption of political power usually obtains from ethnic identity for mobilization, legitimacy and authority.

Kenya’s pseudodemocracy during President Daniel arap Moi’s autocratic rule transited to something of an enduring multiparty democracy where ethnic thrust determines political change. The fatigue that burdens the minds of the Kenyans who have experienced political transitions can be attributed to a residual element in Kenyan politics; that is, the recycling in the brand of the political elite and rehashed political rhetoric. As it stands the country’s democracy remains shallow with regard to
the quality of democracy as is reflected in the rampant disrespect for democratic institutions by the elite, disregard for democratic rule, sustained ethnic cleavage and bad governance. What raises a substantial amount of concern though is the disaffection among the younger (especially educated) generation towards the political as is seen in their distance from active participation in political matters.

4.1 Kenya’s Democratic Transitions and its Elite

The storm that blew prior to Kenya’s independence i.e. in the 1940-1950’s was invoked by a multitude of indigenous liberation movements, prominently labour unions and the Mau Mau. The reaction from the colonial government was forceful and the leaders of the movements were arrested and incarcerated, bringing to prominence the political elite e.g. (Jomo Kenyatta, the Kapenguria inmates) and others like Oginga Odinga.

The wave of Africa’s decolonisation that was in motion within the continent prompted the colonial government to set up a framework for handover of power to the Africans. Constitutional conferences were convened in England (Lancaster House) where debate centred mainly on greater African representation on the legislative institutions. The bicameral legislature formed after the conference had the upper house occupied by a settler majority and the lower house referred to the house of the people. These demanded political party organisation. In 1961 when Kenyatta was released he joined the Kenya African Union (KANU).

The first general elections in Kenya to be based on universal adult suffrage were the independence elections of 1963. Two main parties; KANU led by Jomo Kenyatta, and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) led by Katana Ngala dominated the elections although there were other smaller parties. As noted by Ndegwa (1997:604) it is important how these pioneering rival political parties were formed for deeper insight on analysis of the political dynamics in Kenya. How these political parties formed was critical to their ethnic composition and their reliance on activating ethnic citizenship to mobilize for votes. These parties as he further observes were formed firstly by political leaders who provided intellectual and financial patronage and drew core founders linked by personal ethnically forged ties than ideological commitment. Secondly, colonial restrictions to local areas which were generally ethnically homogenous, forced an already ideologically concurring band of elites to form parties.
KANU drew a bulk of its membership from the Kikuyu and Luo. KANU was formed in central Kenya as a reincarnation of the Kenya African Union which was a nationalist mutation of the Kikuyu Central Association. KANU was further fortified by the amalgamation of the mainly Luo led organisations e.g. Kenya Federation of Labour and multiethnic Kenya Independence movement. This was a mainly urban elite driven organisation which linked these elite to their constituents in the rural areas. KADU on the other hand was a response to KANU’s ethnic muscle; it constituted a diverse representation of minority tribes and smaller sub-ethnic political movements. Later in 1964 these two parties joined to form a massive national party which was to throw the country into a *de facto* one party state.

The merger which was necessitated by the event of dissolution of the bicameral legislature saw power in the unitary system centralise gradually around the executive. Oginga Odinga defected to form the Kenya People’s Union (KPU). This party was banned by the big KANU government. It has been proposed that at the time Kenya (like most other countries in the continent) was swept in a wave of developmental imperatives, which rode above wider democratic (liberal democratic) expectations. This trend which was popularly adopted by a majority of ideologically charged African leaders of the decolonization era emphasised on economic development for the new dispensation. There was wider consensus in the political realm in favour of single party rule in the view that multiparities would further fragment the fragile democracy along ethnic fault lines and adversely affect the much needed social integration and much needed rapid economic development. Therefore, multiparty politics were decisively outlawed.

**4.1.1 Transition Time Elites: A Continuing Legacy**

KANU rallied to unify the country by extending its reach to all the eight provinces in the country, and simultaneously spreading its nationalistic ideals across Kenya’s 42 ethnic group divide. As such KANU since then and up to the present boasts of its position as the only truly national party. President Jomo Kenyatta’s legitimacy as Kenya’s first leader generally remained unchallenged among the masses due to his role as the father of the nation. From that time onwards i.e. the

33 These two are demographically Kenya’s largest ethnic communities.
1969, 1974, 1979, 1983, and 1988 general elections were at best only contests for power and influence within the ruling party.

However, elite fractions were already imminent among the political elite in the immediate post-independence period. This again assumed ethnic lines with the majority Kikuyu facing increased political challenges by the Luo led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Martin Shikuku with regard to power configurations and alignments in the state. The main contention was the extreme clientelleistic nature of the KANU state which saw the president’s family and friends concentrate power around a very strong oligarchy.

One of the most noticeable characteristics among the majority of these political players and the ruling elite was their educational credentials. The president and a large number of his ministers and departmental heads were alumni from European and reputable African universities. The remaining few that did not wield academic accomplishments sought alliances and support from the ones who had. This was evident after Jomo Kenyatta’s death which ushered in his appointed successor President Daniel arap Moi. This new era inherited elites from the previous regime, including the Mwai Kibaki (current Kenyan president who served for a substantial period as Moi’s minister of finance), Charles Njonjo, Robert Ouko.

In the post-Kenyatta era i.e. which is President Moi’s rule, which stretched from 1978 to 2002 marks Kenya’s gradual decline to autocracy. Moi sought to consolidate power around himself through KANU. This was achieved by the deployment of all available government resources in crushing any form of dissent. Moi’s intolerance to dissidents was further evident in the clampdown on all academics, writers, and other independent voices. There were frequent detentions without trial and the banning of publications. Undeterred by the increasing repression, however, Oginga Odinga and George Anyona applied in 1982 to register a new party, the Kenya Socialist African Alliance (KASA). In response, the government put Odinga under house arrest,

34 Some may argue that it may not have been the case that such allegiances were coincidental and academic accomplishment had nothing to do with it. However, the pattern evident of the African elite preferred for leadership at the time when the colonial governments were relinquishing power was a highly educated elite. Fortuitous or not, these elite with their new ideas enjoyed legitimacy widely among the masses.

35 Mwai Kibaki was a lecturer in Economics at Makerere University in Uganda, and Charles Njonjo is University of Fort Hare Alumni. The justification in this argument is that despite a long lineage of educated individuals in Kenya’s leadership, liberal democracy has not moulded to what is expected, especially on the issue of ethnicity.
detained Anyona, and hurriedly passed the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act Number 7 of 1982 making KANU the sole legal party.

Anyone who sought for political office had to be a registered member of KANU which by the mid eighties was still prevailed upon by a very powerful Moi presidency. Following in the footsteps of his predecessor Jomo Kenyatta, a strict bureaucratic structure operated in the party politics which revolved around a small core of elites that ring-fenced itself around Moi. This group was mainly drawn from his Kalenjin ethnic group and loyalists from other minority ethnicities which needed such allegiances for political survival.

Most political elite who found favour with the president and his core enriched themselves through corrupt means, seemingly, with no fear of legal reprisals. Because of the cold war, Western powers, which today are at the forefront of preaching good governance excused such rulers and allowed malpractice to thrive. During this time, corruption spread rapidly within government circles. The Judiciary was weakened by the fact that the powerful constitutionally unimpeachable executive made it impossible for offenders to be charged. Moi provided cover for most corrupt officials within his client fold.

Moi deftly manipulated the business of the legislature, which at this point can be said to have had no real opposition; simply put, most legislators were afraid to disagree with the president’s wishes. The erosion of democracy had been devised in a short period of time as KANU prepared for the imminent change. Mechanisms in place included constitutional amendments the removal of security of tenure for the Attorney General and Auditor General saw the dent in checks and balances in the constitution as KANU used its muscle to pass laws and enact amendments upon wish (Mak’Ochieng 2006:74-75). Sycophancy punctuated most political speeches among the political ranks, a feature that soured, irreversibly, the electorate’s trust in the political elite some who still occupy power in the present government. The perfect example can be drawn from a speech made by the current president Kibaki who loudly boasted that the thought of dislodging KANU from Power can be likened to “cutting a mugumo (fig) tree with a razor blade”36

Disillusionment with the 1988 general elections brought public dissatisfaction with the one-party system reached new heights. This was mainly in the urban areas.

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36 Mwai Kibaki, current president of Kenya, and a KANU founder member then a minister for health made this claim at the outset of multiparty politics in 1991.
Serious cracks began to appear in Kenya’s monolithic political structure, and resistance by various civil society institutions, religious organisations, and individual politicians steadily increased. The Saba Saba riots of July 1990 demonstrated the unprecedented extent of public anger towards a post independence regime.

At the same time, the end of the Soviet Union and invariably the cold war seemed inevitable. Agitation for change swept globally causing political realignments. The West (flanked by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) boldly pushed for wider global democratisation towards liberal ideals. Just like most third world countries of the time, Kenya was heavily reliant on foreign funding and therefore coerced into undertaking political and economic reforms (Structural Adjustment Programs), of the Washington consensus. A complete freeze on foreign aid was imposed in September 1991. By December 1991, the government, under intense pressure repealed Section 2(A) of the constitution. This opened the way for the registration of other political parties and the first multiparty general elections since 1964.

4.2 The Second Independence and its Elite

The post 1990 era which is heralded as the second independence for most African democracies saw a revived and vibrant political scene in Kenya. With it came even worse dilution of democratic values and ideals. Among the first significant political events also was the fragmentation of KANU. A large number of KANU ‘loyalists’ defected to form their own parties, mostly along ethnic lines, and some even resigned from their government appointments (accompanied by severe vilification of Moi), to pursue new political careers in the opposition.

The first opposition party that provided the most formidable challenge to KANU from the onset was the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD). What struck as fresh life into Kenya’s politics in this party was the arrival of a new legion of young elite politicians. Apart from being constituted by seasoned (former KANU) politicians like Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenneth Matiba, Martin Shikuku and Masinde Muliro, FORD was substantially energised by the arrival of younger Raila Odinga, Paul Muite, Muite, James Orengo, Gitobu Imanyara, Kiraitu Murungi and Wamalwa Kijana.

Kenya’s turn into multiparty politics did not deter the KANU government from malpractice, in fact, it exposed the extent to which this was being carried out. In 1992
as the first multiparty elections approached, Kenya, which by now had been nursing severe economic inflation caused by a sudden withdrawal of foreign aid, evidenced blatant widespread corruption at the highest levels, epoch altering political incarcerations and the use of state coercive and propaganda machinery to destroy its opposition.

The most prominent case that blighted Moi’s presidency and continues to taint the image of the current leadership is what came to be referred to as the Goldenberg Scandal. Moi together with a few legislators and businessmen are accused of defrauding the treasury of over US. $800 million (Ksh. 60 Billion), a portion of which was being injected into KANU campaigns in the face of burgeoning political opposition. A few KANU loyalists like Mr. Cyrus Jirongo (who still is a prominent politician) seized the opportunity through KANU created schemes to enrich themselves during the campaigns.

The government exerted stringent control on the media. Legal instruments installed to lock out political literature included a requirement of registration and execution of a bond under the provisions of News and Newspapers act. This brought fear to publishers. Editors of political magazines were incarcerated without being charged, and the government threatened to ban foreign owned private media. The national broadcaster, the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) was garrisoned by KANU appointees as a campaign tool for KANU; and at the same time used as a propaganda tool for political character assassinations on Moi’s opposition. The opposition was denied access to the services of KBC television and radio.

Extreme police intimidation and adhoc amendments to laws governing public gatherings were levied against opposition leaders and supporters. The main targets of these tactics were main opposition leaders who led the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic

37 This corruption case that carries the name “the Goldenberg Scandal” became the biggest case of government sanctioned money laundering scheme that costs the Kenyan economy 10% of the country’s annual GDP. In a very elaborate plan that involved the treasury and the Exchange Bank owned by businessman Kamlesh Pattni, the government was supposedly making payment for gold and diamond export subsidies to Kamlesh Pattni’s “Goldenberg International” in a premium of 35% more, in Kenya shillings than the company made in foreign currency earnings. Up to now none of the crucial persons implicated in the scandal has been charged by the Kibaki government. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldenberg_scandal, William Karanja “Kenya: Corruption Scandal” World Press Review VOL. 50, No. 10

38 Mr. Cyrus Jirongo was the leader of a campaign movement labelled Youth for KANU 1992. He was later to emerge as a prominent businessman having made capital from the excessive campaign funds pumped into the 1992 general elections by the KANU government.
groups, from the central province and the Western Nyanza province the majority who
had defected from KANU and some who had long standing legacies as Moi’s
opposition from Kenyatta’s era e.g. Oginga Odinga.

This was accompanied by what was eventually criticised as government
sponsored violence in what was termed as the Land Clashes\textsuperscript{39}. This were prompted
by Moi’s constitutionally entrenched clause that to win the presidential office, one
needed to exceed 25 percent threshold in at least five of the eight provinces. Banking
on the fact that the opposition was founded on ethnically regionally based groups,
Moi sought to defeat the opposition using KANU’s nationwide reach, however, the
spread of the Kikuyu into all the regions of the country\textsuperscript{40} caused a problem in KANU’s
rift valley stronghold, which is also Kalenjin territory. The Kikuyu were forced out of
their homes and the government claimed it was unable to quell the fighting.

KANU went on to win the 1992 election with Moi taking advantage of a weak,
regionally and ethnically fragmented and mainly urban based opposition. KANU went
on to win the 1997 second multiparty general election with relative ease compared to
the previous one. Although KANU employed the usual underhanded techniques to
retain power, this win was largely caused by a fragmented opposition. The opposition
elites’ scramble for power turned into fierce infighting which was manifested by even
further fragmentation of parties e.g. FORD which had become Ford Asili, and FORD-
Kenya, and an offshoot of FORD- K the National Democratic Party. All these new
parties (which unreservedly and hurriedly got a government registration) were formed
by former political allies in the KANU government and the initial opposition group

After the 1997 election, the strait jacket that is two term maximum presidency
bound Moi to a definite exit. In preparation to the 2002 elections, KANU mapped out
a strategy to remain in power in the absence of a powerful Moi presidency and
leadership of the party. During a KANU national congress in 2000, Moi sought to
present the party credentials as the truly national party by making firstly, making
alliances with the Raila Odinga led NDP which commanded a sizeable electorate
from the Luo community. This offered KANU the best chance to defeat the Kikuyu

\textsuperscript{39} Prior to the 1992 and 1997 elections, Kenya experienced waves of violence meted out on the ethnic
groups which were deemed to belong to the opposite side to KANU. These were predominantly against the
Kikuyu in the rift valley area and later against pockets of major ethnic communities e.g. Luo, Kikuyu in the
coastal province. See UNHCR report “Kenya Since the Elections” \texttt{http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm?bl=RSDCOI&page=research&id=3ae6a6c2c}, Human Rights Watch

\textsuperscript{40} It is estimated that one out every four Kenyans is a Kikuyu.
dominated Democratic Party. Secondly this merger said to be the “New KANU” saw some of the powerful KANU leaders ejected by Moi to bring in a younger group of leaders, in a structure where four vice chairmen drawn from four major ethnic groups and regions were elected by acclamation.

This carefully designed structure and clever ethnic redistribution of KANU chairmen, Musalia Mudavadi, Kalonzo Musyoka, Katana Ngala and Uhuru Kenyatta meant that KANU had effectively covered its national bases. NDP’s Raila Odinga and on the other hand was given the secretary general position, and his party elite given cabinet appointments as KANU sought to choke the opposition. This merger was short lived when Moi appointed Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor from the four chairmen. This move riled Raila Odinga who staged an internal coup in the “New KANU” ended the alliance and left the party with a sizeable portion of followers and elites, most significantly, two of the chairmen. The civil society seized the opportunity to canvass for unity in the opposition ranks. Bruised by the last two election defeats, the major parties heeded these calls and signed a memorandum of understanding as the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was formed in mid 2002.

The 2002 general elections saw KANU concede defeat to a coalition of parties led by the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki. Fault lines emerged sooner rather than later as some NARC constituent member parties began to grumble against Kibaki’s increasing disregard to the MOU, especially with regard to the distribution of cabinet portfolios and senior government appointments. Turbulence reigned in the first two years in power as the elite jostled for positions, and disappointment over the failure of the implementation of election promises grew.

4.3 New Elite, Familiar Behaviour

President Kibaki ascended into power with two major promises; firstly, to complete a constitutional review process and then deliver a new constitution, and secondly, to exterminate deeply entrenched corruption in government structures with a view of reviving the country’s fledgling economy. He was soon faced by a mammoth corruption scandal involving his own elite. In what has come to be known

 Uhuru Kenyatta is Jomo Kenyatta’s son.
as the Anglo Leasing scandal42, some senior cabinet ministers carried on with fraudulent projects inherited from the KANU regime involving the purchase of security equipment and passports.

In the initial months in power he appointed the director of Transparency International- Kenya chapter John Githongo as director and advisor in the anti corruption department in the office of the president. Mr Githongo unveiled a plot to defraud the government of over US. $600 million. Those implicated constitute the president’s closest advisors and political loyalists from the opposition days. The failure by the president to act and increasing threats over the matter forced Mr Githongo into exile and the government is yet to act upon the proof provided from investigations. Kibaki sought to punish those involved in the Moi era Goldenberg affair, however after losing credibility with his own scandal, he has been unable to charge anyone implicated in that affair for fear of reprisals from some of his own elite who served in the Moi government.

The constitutional review and the ultimate delivery of a new constitution has also been a failed objective. After assuming power, the president’s closest cohorts, and especially those facing the law advised against slashing presidential powers. The overweening presidency was for long the target for Kibaki’s opposition party supported by the civil society, with regard to good governance and accountability. The review process was marred by constant interruption, government interference and frustration of the delegates as the ruling elite sought to wrestle the process from the public in favour of a government sanctioned few specialists or be handled in parliament where they command a majority. Eventually the elite group of ministers led by the constitutional affairs minister (also implicated in the Anglo-leasing scandal) managed to snatch the

42 The Anglo leasing corruption scandal is being feared that it might take the same direction as the Goldenberg affair. It is principally a national security related affair where tenders for equipment and materials quoted extremely inflated figures. The scope includes new forgery proof passports; equipment for a forensic laboratory, security equipment e.g. helicopters and boats. The treasury had made payments to the supposed tendering firms to banks accounts belonging to unknown individuals outside the country. Revelations by the now exiled secretary in the presidency in charge of anti corruption Mr John Githongo, later revealed later that some of these individuals and companies are friends to the president who were working closely to the internal security minister, minister of finance and other members of parliament. See “Under siege” http://www.eastandard.net/archives/cl/hm_news/news.php?articleid=13092&date=13/02/2005 Sunday February 13, 2005,
draft constitution from the public and the select constitutional review body, brought it to parliament, made a few amendments and put it out for a referendum in 2005.

The draft constitution was decisively rejected by the masses. The vote which was a 60 to 40 percent against the draft constitution came about mainly as a result of a de-campaigning exercise led by NARC’s own jilted partners the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in partnership with KANU. After the president reneged on the MOU, some of NARC’s coalition partners embarked on an insubordination campaign led by Raila Odinga to vote against their own government. They partnered with the KANU elite to form a new Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) which has subsequently been registered as a party to challenge the NARC government for the next general elections.

Currently, the civil society’s vigilance and increased pressure for substantial changes and accountability drew a hostile reaction from the government. The media has been under increased attack, starting with the raiding, vandalising and confiscation of equipment from a leading media house by the police. In a manifestation of an unrepentant admission from the security minister that “if you rattle a snake you should expect to be bitten” the Kenya Television Network (KTN) and its affiliate newspaper The East African Standard were put out of business for a day. The police broke some of the transmission equipment and the papers set for redistribution incinerated. The government vowed to continue harassing the media houses for their robust inquisitiveness. Moreover, the situation is exacerbated by the fact that these media houses are mainly owned by political elites or politically affiliated businessmen. In the case of the KTN the station is owned by a consortium that includes his sons as partners.

4.4 Significance of Ethnicity

Competition in the democratic game remains a game of numbers, and in Kenya’s multiparty era it significantly is a game of ethnic numbers. On the eve of an election year in 2007, the political landscape has witnessed yet another round of new political formations along ethnic allegiances aimed at the capture of political power, and at the worst, political survival.

43 The attack on the East African Standard stands out as a sign of a stagnant democracy. This scene that bears similarity to actions carried out by the KANU government opened the way for more oppressive action by a besieged state which has vowed to come down on more media centres. What remains unclear is whether this was an attack on the consortium that owns the media house or it was an effort to silence criticism.
According to Ndegwa (1997: 599-602), post colonial Kenya has seen the entrenchment of a dual citizenship, which pits state citizenship against that of an individual’s ethnic community. While in the view of competition in a liberal democracy a citizen is an individual, who is accorded rights for participation and freedom of voting, association and expression among other political activity, ethnic citizenship is more republican; i.e. one’s actions are considered within the collective, the political needs and preservation of ones ethnic community against others. This compelling argument fingers the reason for a seemingly enduring legacy of ethnic identity in Kenya’s era of multiparty politics (transmuted from the post independence era) has deepened as the stakes become higher in an open field.

The rivalry between the major ethnic groups that fought intensely at independence carries on, but now these groups need to draw the support of others for survival. It also explains why the most unlikely individuals expected to abstain from ethnic allegiances cannot, if they were to remain politically significant. The current president has disagreed and separated from a coalition with a majority of his alliance (NARC) partners from the last election, a thing that has seen yet another intense rivalry crop up between the Kikuyu and Lou communities. With them are different minority groups that have realigned to either side led as prompted by their elite with the goal of avoiding political insignificance.

**4.5 Other Challenges**

The present government has found itself in the untenable position of trying to clean its democratic practise record after making a repetition of the mistakes committed by the Moi regime at time when the present elite was in the opposition. These mistakes include restrictions on public gatherings and the use of police force to break up any opposition meetings in the capital city and stiffer bureaucratic processes and obstruction by the police to all opposition party’s seeking licences for gatherings.

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44 Ndegwa’s argument provides insight into the reason why ethnicity remains a core factor in African democracy’s; why it is understandable that with modernity and education, the cultural component of communal responsibility cannot be erased easily by the more Western styled liberal individualistic thinking.

45 The police used force to break up an opposition party rally led by the Orange Democratic Movement in Nairobi on the 19th of November in scenes reminiscent of the KANU era. See Daily Nation and the East African Standard on the references.
Conclusion

Kenya’s political developments have been mainly crafted and designed by the elite of the day. Wanton ideological shifts and changes for self-serving political ends have sidelined democratic values as these elite occupy all political space and control the most crucial public arena stunting democracy’s growth. However, there are those that argue that it is not all negative because what may seem like a danger to democracy are actually symptoms and pains of democratic growth. Increased ethnic consciousness, intolerance, and lack of accountability is seen by others as healthy despite the fact that it takes away from the expectation of a consolidating democracy.

The generational crossover of elites has seen a very adept and intelligent group of politicians who by their actions deliberately drive the country away from democratic consolidation by inheriting malaise. The country is yet to move towards a dedicated trajectory of democratic consolidation. A new chapter and elite, from the young 80’s generation is needed to complete a journey that was supposed to begin almost four decades ago. Whether this would be a remedy, it remains to be seen. However, one can hope that increased civic education and exposure to other knowledges in the era of globalisation will temper down some of the debilitating elements to consolidation like heavy ethnic consciousness, accountability and respect for a democracy by rules.
Chapter 5

Findings

What guarantees are on Africa’s horizon that the continually anticipated generational change of leadership will forge democratic consolidation, maybe a fourth wave of democratic rejuvenation and with it good governance, economic resuscitation and broad social development imperatives? Judging from previous experience, none\(^\text{46}\). Any optimism rests with the actions, behaviour and views of the emerging 80’s generation if only guided appropriately. Moreover, Diamond (1991: 269-270) observes that a fourth wave of democratization is possible despite Africa’s teething problems in the second liberation; there is space for expansion if commitment to the rebirth of liberalism (constitutionalism) advanced by invigorated institutions, skilful parliaments and international support.

As already observed the elusiveness of democratic consolidation in postcolonial Africa, and in this study, in Kenya, can be levelled against the quality of elite whose behaviour reflects on the quality of democracy at any given period. During this time, the younger entrants into the political game have proven incapable to alter the rules. The usual indictments of political apathy, dormancy, and disaffection reign. Then the questions again: Where is the next possible generation of political leaders? What are their political views and inclinations if any? Do they demonstrate any commitment to political transformation?

5.1 Political culture

If the young generation of leaders is to be taken seriously as being capable of successfully negotiating a new democratically consolidated franchise then their political attitudes, behaviour and views demand close scrutiny. Political culture is defined in chapter 2 as “the aggregate of learned, socially transmitted behavioural patterns characterising government and politics in a society; it suggests a psychological dimension of behaviour, beliefs, feelings and evaluative orientations; it refers to political orientations, attitudes towards the political system, its different parts

\(^{46}\) This is if one takes into consideration Africa’s political history and its elite. See Bratton and Van De Walle UNESCO’s General History of Africa VIII African since 1935-

Almond and Verba (1989:12) provide another dimension to political culture, which expands on the above definition. They observe that in their approach to the study of political culture, the concept 'culture' allows them to utilize other conceptual frameworks and approaches (i.e. anthropology, sociology and psychology). Because political culture has to do with human behaviour, this view is widely espoused by other commentators in the study of political culture and politics in general. Johnson and Josslyn (1995:34) observe that empirical scientific study of politics was in the past criticised for not paying enough attention to important social issues, in that a political study cannot be conducted in a value free, morally and philosophically unaware environment 47. Therefore the findings of this study on the political culture of the emerging generation of political elites takes into account the social values, moral and philosophical predispositions of the participants.

5.2 General information of the study
5.2.1 Groups- Experimental and Control

The bulk of the sample to this study consisted of Kenyan students randomly selected from three South African Universities the age range is 18-35 years. The second group of participants, also randomly selected, constituted youths who have not attained a university education but have acquired any other level of education i.e. high school, or vocational training. This sample was drawn from Nairobi Kenya and Port Elizabeth.

5.2.2 Variables

As earlier seen from the participants of this main youth category, there were two independent variables or factors being measured against the dependent variable that is political culture. These are education and Gender.

47 In their introductory section of their text Johnson and Josslyn bring out the dilemma of employing strict scientific quantitative methods to politics, which led to the post behaviouralism revolution, which ushered in a renewed interest in normative political philosophy i.e. emphasis on studying what ought to be as opposed to what is.
5.2.3 Survey data

The survey was conducted via a questionnaire which was divided into two sections. The questions on section A were formatted in a Likert scale which carried 40 questions and section B contained 5 open ended questions which focused on salient factors of political culture that needed further explication. Focus group interviews were conducted on the different categories. Separate in-depth interviews were also carried out with the focus being on the media and political behaviour.

5.2.4 Caveats

The study shies away from generalization for obvious reasons. The number of participants drawn from youth in three institutions of higher learning is not representative enough of Kenyan youth at the same level. This is because the sample is not big enough. Secondly, the institutions of higher learning taken into account here are situated in one country out of Kenya. Thirdly, the views of Kenyan youth of the same profile enrolled in Kenyan universities are not represented here.

However, despite the differences in geographical locations (including closeness to the epicentre i.e. Kenya), one counts on a uniformizing feature of globalization. Kenya being a country with a relatively advanced informational technology infrastructure, the youth at this age share a lot more in common with regard to preferences and tastes in cultural objects, patterns of access to information, social activity, and general social values. Moreover, the issue of rural versus urban upbringing which may also imply social class is not a major differentiating factor because a substantial number of Kenyan youth enrolled in institutions of higher learning are based in major towns or cities both in Kenya and abroad. As such, one would expect a fair amount of commonly shared world views shaped at these locales.

A major problem that emerged as a result of random sampling has to do with the distribution of the gender of the participants. Despite efforts to acquire an even gender distribution across the two groups, the main challenge arose in attempts to maintain a balance between targeting and maintaining a strictly random sample that is even with regard to gender. The unintended consequence of this was a low representation of females on the control group which had fewer willing participants as opposed to the experiment group that has a better representation of females. Part of this problem was the reluctance by some in the control section to participate, while
there was a marked readiness among the university students in general across the
gender divide to participate.

Thirdly, the small sample taken had a definite impact on the final findings as the
bivariate and multivariate descriptive statistics used for analysis revealed. As noted in
chapter two, a study that relies on a sample would have to contend with a samples
effect on statistical significance, sampling error, the statistical significance and
variance standard deviation which may at times put the reliability of the study’s
findings into question. However, despite the above borderline values generated for all
the above statistical reliability tests, they were found to be acceptable.

5.3 Summary of findings

5.3.1 Summary of biographical data
The tables below give a statistical summary of information on section A of the
survey questionnaire. This includes a sum of the participants according to groups, a
gender count and a breakdown of the ages represented.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Group Experimental</th>
<th>Group Control</th>
<th>Missing Data</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row Percent</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>High School</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Row Percent</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Missing</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row Percent</td>
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<td>100.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>All Grps</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table the total number of participants and their level of education who are
included in the study are 53\(^{48}\) of which 35 (66\%) of the total count are university

\(^{48}\) Some of the responses were omitted because the responses were missing some of the important data.
These percentages are obtained by dividing the row totals for the different levels of education attained by
the total number of participants multiplied by a hundred.
educated youth (experimental group) and 18 (33.9%) of the total count are non-university educated (control Group).

Table 5.ii- Summary –frequency table of participants in the variable, gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Group Experimental</th>
<th>Group Control</th>
<th>Missing Data</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Column Percent</td>
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<td>22.22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Row Percent</td>
<td>77.78%</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Percent</td>
<td>57.14%</td>
<td>61.11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Row Percent</td>
<td>64.52%</td>
<td>35.48%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column Percent</td>
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<td>16.67%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Row Percent</td>
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<td>75.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>All Grps</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above table it is clear that the sample had far less females as earlier indicated across the two groups. However a difference of 40% female and 57% Males in the experimental group can be regarded as close enough to give a reliable result representative of the genders in the youth in the university educated category. However, the same cannot be said of the control group. A 22% Female and 61% male-(45% difference) in the gender representation is very significant; it is enough to impact dispersion of the mean result in this category if used independently. But because the study used a sum of the mean result on the gender category, when the control group female count is added to the experimental female count, the difference is reduced significantly. The total female percentage moves to 33% and the male at 57% making the 24%, a reduction of the difference almost by half. This is a close enough difference to provide a reliable mean result.

Table 5.iii-Summary –participants according to the ages represented
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Group Experimental</th>
<th>Group Control</th>
<th>Missing Data</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Count</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Row Percent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Row Percent</td>
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<td>Row Percent</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Row Percent</td>
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<td>Count</td>
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<td>Count</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
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<td>Count</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Row Percent</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Row Percent</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>All Grps</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The age of the participants did not feature as an independent variable for the test on political culture. This table just gives an overview of the ages from the youth population represented in the study.

5.4 A summary of findings- Section A

The statistical descriptive analysis produced a generally weak relationship between the political attitudes and orientations (with regard to political culture) between the university educated and the non-university educated groups. The strength (weak or strong) of a relationship refers to how different the observed values of the dependent variable are in the categories of the independent variable (Johnson and Josslyn (1995:332). This means that the values of the dependent variable observed in the two categories of the independent variable i.e. education and gender showed more or less similar political culture characteristics. However, this does not translate to the results realised as being insignificant to the aims of the study as is expounded further.

Despite the inconclusive result of the reliability analysis against values of variance that yielded an overall p-value of 0.3 (30%) as a consequence of a small sample size, the result of this study can be regarded as reliable based on the results generated factor analysis to the questions that compromise each factor. The mean value for the factor analysis in the dependent variable this study was 0.56. Moreover because this study seeks for meaning and it is in the continuation of a process qualitative sense the result is therefore acceptable as a base for continued research.

49 As seen in chapter two a statistical significance of a relationship indicates whether observed in sample data could have occurred by chance. The stronger the relationship the bigger the chance that it is significant - this is referred to as the magnitude, which is if there is a strong correlation between the independent variable and the dependent variable (factor) being measured. Secondly significance can determined by the sample size which measures reliability of sample data - in that the larger the sample size the more likely the results yielded will be reliable or truthful and thus depicting the difference between two independent variables. However a small sample may have a strong relationship/magnitude with the independent variable that a large sample which can then be read as a significant result after estimates are made. The measurement of significance can be impacted by the variance in the reactions of the independent variable.

50 A p-level represents the probability of error that is involved in accepting our observed result as valid, that is, as "representative of the population, it is a measure of the above spoken reliability of the results given. This can be affected by the sample size as is the case of this study. The acceptable borderline of a reliable p value is .05 (5%).

51 Factor analysis techniques are used to reduce the number of variables and to detect structure in the relationships between variables, that is to classify variables. It attempts to detect high correlation in the contributing variables to a factor or a variable being tested. The desirable factor analysis value for each contributing variable should be closer to +/-1. See appendix for factor loadings.
The commonalities shared by the groups including gender in all the factors tested of political culture generated ordinal mean values; in that they were more or less similar in the mean result and confidence intervals. This is indicated on the confidence interval graph 5.iv. One can therefore conclude that these two groups share the same political attitudes and feelings towards Kenyan politics. As such, one can speak of a collective youth political culture, and expect a quality of elite that will be generally agreeable as towards the future trajectory of Kenya’s democracy.

5.iv Summary of Confidence interval scores between groups

The confidence interval graph shows a “central tendency” of the scores on the variable in relation to the mean score. The scores showed a 95% confidence certainty that the total mean scores across the group and gender scores were more or less in the same range. The closeness in this score was further buttressed by the findings in the B section and the interviews.

One of the main discoveries of this study was a demythification of the view that females, and especially in the present increasingly Westernising Kenya, are the more politically disinterested and disengaged group within the youth population/category. Judging on the responses received both on the score sheet, and especially on the open ended Section B and the interviews, one sees a meditation, a growing desire for
change and revolution in Kenya’s political future expressed in general across the youth category including the females. This is first deduced in the confidence interval graphs. The intervals for the Gender variable indicated a slight difference in all tests for attitudes and feelings of political culture. Furthermore, looking at the responses provided in Open ended question B section, the written responses by the female participants appeared more coherent, precise and exhaustive.

5.4.1 Individual factors of political culture
From the 40 questions in the A section of the questionnaire, six factors were tested. These are explicated below.

5.4.2 Awareness of and exposure to politics and public affairs
This question attempted to discover how much attention the youth pay toward political affairs in general, their interest and understanding of the political sphere. This is because it is expected that exposure to any form of political information would generate interest for action. Secondly, it would serve to give an indication as to the level of significance the political sphere has in their lives. This is part of what Almond and Verba (1989:14) classify as “political cognition” or “cognitive orientation”. The

52 Overlapping points indicate same score range
assumption is that most Kenyan youth will not give much attention to political events and political processes.

Both the university educated (experimental) and the non university educated (control group) indicated a relatively good level of political awareness or cognition as seen on table 5.vi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Level of Factor</th>
<th>Level of Factor</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Factor 1 Mean</th>
<th>Factor 1 Std.Dev.</th>
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</thead>
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</tr>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>Experimental</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.117647</td>
<td>0.737542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the Table 5.vi above, the modest response given by the respondent’s shows a fair amount of awareness with a total mean score of 4.02 (out of 5) from 39 responses which is 73% of the total 53 participants. Further as seen in the interval graphs 5.vii below, the responses in the groups are overlapping. The intercept points show movement in similar direction if 3 on the scale is neutral. The mean range between 3.9 and 4.0 on the scale indicates a minor difference between the groups. Thus the weak relationship on the expectation that the emerging university elite have higher political awareness shows a more or less similar feelings and attitudes towards politics in general. One can conclude that on the whole the population category that is the youth (of Kenya) is not totally disconnected from politics.

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53 The drop in percentage point of responses is as a result of the elimination of questions undertaken during factor analysis for factor 1.
It might seem as if there exists a big difference between the genders at the level of awareness. However, taking into consideration that the control group had very few female participants and the experimental group after all the omissions have been accounted for, a 37% representation female (10 out of 27 responses), the mean difference of 3.8 and 4.1 is not significant to conclude difference in political awareness.

One has to pay attention to a few responses not captured by the statistics to reach the above conclusion. Some of the questions in this factor included; It is generally important to pay attention to political events in Africa and internationally? Political developments and events in Kenya are of significance to my future? Political news is not boring, especially African politics? I have a general Understanding of how democracy operates? I do know what the civil society is? and Political news are a major part of my television and radio programme?.

Most of the participants seemed comfortable to respond to all these questions. But on the focus group interviews it was revealed that although a majority will dedicate a little time to watch political news on television and sometimes on radio, a fierce competition exists between Western and African news content. The response was that “African news and even Kenyan news can be quite depressing”. They would rather watch news broadcasts from Western broadcasters such as

---

54 The question did not however ask on the regularity with which the participants watch television news, from the discussions, the general assumption made as implied in the responses was daily news.
American Cable News Network (CNN) and British Sky News. They feel that Kenyan Television Broadcasts from the most reputable networks i.e. Kenya Television Network and Nation Television have turned to depict negative images of home, especially politics. Although there is acknowledgement of the marked improvements in journalistic quality in the process of gathering, consolidating and output of news and documentaries in the Kenyan Media, it falls short in striking the youth’s political nerve towards dedicated engagement in the deepening of democracy. Moreover, the rapidly spawning FM radio stations provide a very small slice of anything significantly political.

5.viii Distribution and dispersion range of responses to question in factor 1

X axis represents the scale values on the survey
Y axis represents the number of responses

Most participants acknowledged that they had a fair idea or knowledge of how democracy works. The dominating association they have to democracy is elections, given that in the past decade, multiparty politics in Kenya have overwhelmingly permeated all social spaces even at the family level. This is more pronounced with ongoing intense campaigning in the lead to Kenya’s general election this year. There was a major variance evident in response to the question concerning the civil society.

55 The rapid growth of the Kenyan media industry which is discussed in the next chapter has seen the emergence of FM radio stations in quick succession. These commercial stations which operate with the Contemporary Hit Radio format (CHR) are dedicated to pure entertainment, infotainment and advertising, targeted at the particular age group that is the subject of this study – Youth.
Quite a substantial number did not know what is meant by the civil society this question had a total mean of 3.41 across the gender categories which on the scale reads as “not sure”.

5.4.3 Orientations and attitudes towards future change in political leadership

The questions in this factor sought to ascertain the youth’s convictions to future involvement in political process, change and their predilections to the kind of leaders envisioned by this group. As part of political culture, Almond and Verba (1989:14) observe that one’s self role in the system can be determined by their attitudes and feelings towards it. There are various factors that impact on one’s role or affect the way they view their place in the system and desire to commit to changing the political landscape either as leader or civilian. In the context of this study the questions posited took into account the fact that the youth have the advantage of having been observers of Kenya’s democracy, the electorate and most importantly the leadership.

5.ix Mean Score breakdown for Factor 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Level of Factor</th>
<th>Level of Factor</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Factor 2 Mean</th>
<th>Factor 2 Std.Dev.</th>
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<td>Experimental</td>
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<td>Control</td>
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<td>Experimental</td>
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<td>17</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The table above reflects a picture which may be interpreted as uncertainty or distance from future involvement or lukewarm view of self in the political arena. A mark rounded off to 4.0 as a general mean does not show the expected response concerning participation in politics. The fact that the direction did not swing outrightly towards negation leaves one to conclude that the youth’s approach to politics is more
cautionary and stealthy. Once again the standard number of participants whose responses were considered was 73% (39 out of 53).

The way the groups view their place and conviction to future involvement in politics as seen in the interval graph below does not indicate a major difference, which again shows a general uniformity in the Kenyan youth’s political views. However, unlike the previous factor on awareness, the interval is much wider as seen in the graph below. The experimental group has a lower mean at 3.73 while the control group despite having a smaller sample borders on the 4 point mark.

Table 5.x Overlapping confidence interval points for factor 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vertical bars denote 0.95 confidence intervals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.9</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The assumption made for this test was that the next generation of elite’s pursuing a university education perceive their role as that of reformers of Kenya’s political landscape towards a consolidated democracy. The mixed response can be drawn from the questions that constituted this category. The main questions included

Young graduates should consider joining Kenyan Politics? Younger politicians have the ability to transform Kenya’s democracy for the better? I could consider a political career in the future? It does matter that a politician has a university degree or diploma? Multiparty politics would get better and ethnic tensions would be a thing of the past if younger educated people got into politics? The culture of eating among politicians will cease if younger graduates got into politics?

Responses from the focus group interviews drew out the reasons for mixed response. The majority agreed that Kenyan politics needs more young people and a
crop of new politicians. The major differences emerged when a connection or an attempt to connect a university education with good political leadership. While the control group seemed to have more confidence in having educated elite as seen on the graph and means, the experimental group surmised different. For example on the question of a “culture of eating”\textsuperscript{56} the control group had a mean score 2.94 mean score while the experimental group’s response bordered on the 2.0 point. This can be attributed to high dispersion in the responses which can only indicate lack of confidence in the past educated elite felt by the majority of participants in the experimental group.

In all the questions that alluded to university education and good leadership e.g. better multiparty politics and end of ethnicity, the culture of eating disappearing with a university educated elite, the general mean score began to change direction, with a 3.64 and 2.86 scores respectively. This was surprising considering the 4.38 score that was realised in the response to the question whether younger politicians have the ability of transforming Kenya’s democracy for the better.

The reasons given in the interviews for the pessimism directly point at uninspiring and poor role models in the long succession of political elites since the advent of multiparty politics. Although in general the youth are in support of multiparty democracy, there is an association of the same with negative political behaviour. From a total of 53 participants of the initial survey, 39 (73\% not the whole group) scored between 1 and 3 which is strongly disagree and not sure. There was a consensus that on the whole, the majority of political leaders view their position as a “meal card”\textsuperscript{57} and university education did not make them any different because a majority of them (especially in the multiparty era) had acquired university degrees or diplomas.

Furthermore, the above mixed feelings towards political leadership and significant factors like ethnicity to this group as will be discussed later remain an enigma. There was a feeling that ethnicity may not just diffuse with a new crop of leaders, and in fact most have a very dim view of considering a political career in the future based on the 2.74 mean score. Out of 53 participants 19 (36\%) only agree that they would consider a political career in the future.

\textsuperscript{56} This term refers to a perceived propensity for theft of public funds by politicians that runs deeply among the citizenry.
\textsuperscript{57} This is a response to the culture of eating given by one of the participants
5.4.3.1 Gender scores

The intervals on gender responses were however much closer as opposed to the general group score. As seen on graph 5.xi both groups scored a mean score ranging in the 3 region with females 3.791 and males 3.796. This score confirms the summary that there is a general caution or degree of restraint shared across the gender divide over excitement about the youth playing a very different role or more positive position by a political elite drawn from this generation youth, in future of Kenya’s democracy.

5. xi Overlapping confidence interval points for gender for factor 2

5.4.4. Attitudes towards political actions and performance of the incumbents

This question was meant as an evaluation of the confidence in the performance of the past and present leadership with regard to a stabilizing democracy. This forms part of what Almond and Verba (1989:14) define as affective orientation i.e. feelings about the political system, its roles and personnel and performance. From the introduction, it was noted that part of this study entails an evaluation by the emerging
youthful elite, of the past political elite, their performance, the performance of the
incumbent leaders, and their feelings towards the present elite’s ability to inspire
them into action. Johnson and Josslyn (1995:53) define it as political efficacy, the
feeling that individual political action does have or can have an impact on the political
process.

There may be close similarities with some of the other factors that were being
tested like participation, but this has to do specifically with belief in the current system
and an individual’s belief of achievements at the political plane and most significantly,
attitudes which have been shaped by a belief, negative or not in the incumbents. Part
of these may have come out in the previous section which dealt with future
convictions. This particular factor relates to an ongoing process where a lack of belief
in the actions of the Kenyan elite and their performance can lead to disaffection, and
specifically among the youth which creates disinterest that is commonly labelled as
political apathy.

5.xii A statistical summary of the scores to factor 3

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Level of Factor</th>
<th>Level of Factor</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Factor 3 Mean</th>
<th>Factor 3 Std.Dev.</th>
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<td>Experimental</td>
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</table>

The results on table 5.xii give a very interesting view of the group’s belief and
attitudes towards the system and especially the elite. What is evident again is the
high figure of variance which indicates that the responses were severely contrasting,
suggesting conflict in feelings. The mean score of 2.56 and a standard deviation of
0.89 and 0.98 for the experimental group shows a very differentiated feeling to the
questions and high degree of reactivity. The response was expected to produce a
mean in the low region of 2. What is surprising is the 2.73 mean score for the
university students which borders on 3 meaning not sure, while the control group maintained a 2.45 average. The slightly higher response can partly be attributed to the variance in the responses with extreme feelings emerging. The slight difference is seen in the confidence interval graph 5.xiii below

5.xiii Overlapping confidence interval points for groups for factor 3

Questions that constitute this factor invited sharp criticism, and at times caused discomfort among the participants during the interviews. The first indication of repulsion is seen the level of abstention by participants in responding to this cluster of questions. There were 12 unanswered questions, most by the university students group. What came out later was the issue that some of the students' parents are either members of parliament or their relatives are prominent political players and as such some of the questions were deemed hostile. If not, then the questions were deemed too pointed and already positioned.

The main questions for this factor included; My vote to the presidential candidate was a total waste? I regret having voted for my member of parliament? Politicians have made Kenya a worse off country to live in? Kenya’s young politicians seem not to have a clear vision for the country? Kenya’s young politicians seem to inherit behaviours and attitudes from past senior politicians? The current government has made multiparty politics worse than the previous government?

The issue of presidents and wasted votes did evoke some degree of anger. The total mean of 2.5 indicated that the majority did not believe that the vote was a waste.
The responses provided in the interviews indicated that during Kenya’s 2002 general election, the main issue was the removal of the previous president (Daniel arap Moi). The failings of the current president Mwai Kibaki after four and a half years in office thus cannot compare to that pressing need of unseating the previous rule in 2002.

Those who felt strongly that they had a wasted votes said that their responses were based on the performance of the president in his tenure up to now. Most participants were of the view that their vote has made a difference, however with a mean score of 2.74, there seems to be obvious discontent with the system as will be indicated by other similar themed questions to follow, these include the question on the vote to the MP and views on the worsening state of Kenya’s multiparty politics.

The majority of the interview responses suggested that although the country has not deteriorated completely, the disappointments by the performance of the MP’s in view of the developmental promises made and the euphoria that rode high prior to the elections that culminated with the ejection of KANU from its 40 year tenure in power. Even stronger sentiment was expressed in way of evaluation of the young political elite (“Young Turks”) with regard to their vision and agenda for Kenya. The feeling was that the behaviour and actions for the politicians is not any different from that of their KANU and multiparty era predecessors.

This view was supported by 35 out of 53 participants (66%) whose mean score of 4.13 concurred that that the younger politicians seem to inherit or copy behaviour from their predecessors. The participants’ main concern was the similar desire for political power for monetary gains, and the disappointment that the younger generation of elite was not as robust and vigilant in seeking for changes to the status quo on the issue of a gradual slope, evident in the erosion of democratic values.  

5.4.4.1 Gender scores

The mean score difference in the gender variable adds to the conclusion that attitudes towards the elite and the system needed more than a score sheet to capture the reactions. This is because the Female score of 2.93 (with the highest standard deviation value of 0.93) to the male score of 2.51 indicates an almost neutral position.

58 These attitudes/feelings towards on the subject of political elite and their discussed here are further tackled in the upcoming section on findings from section B of the survey which has more responses in open ended format.
The males remain fairly within the expected score. (See graph 5.xiv). And to add to this puzzle, most of the participants who abstained in the survey sheet as earlier noted were female. This is not enough to conclude that females were opting to remain neutral or they were extra sensitive as opposed to the questions to the males. Although the standard deviation may also be affected by even fewer responses which ultimately affect the total female score, the scores from the few remaining are very varied, where scores swung from 5, to 1 in some of the questions.

5.xiv Overlapping confidence interval points for gender for factor 3

From the interview responses, there was a general feeling that not all politicians are bad; there are few good examples that can be selected from a multitude of legislators. The majority of the participants across the gender line however did concede to the fact that they did not feel motivated to vote for the current legislators despite having attained the universal suffrage age.

5.4.5 Attitudes towards the principal structures on which democracy operates

This factor sought to discover the youth’s feelings towards the political system, its principal structures and the amount of legitimacy of the multiparty system and some of its component political parties currently enjoy with this group. Almond and Verba (1989:14) describe this factor as testing the structures principally involved in
The input process in the political system. The scope is wide because it entails political parties, the media, and interest groups (a majority which constitute the bulk of civil society). The survey questions deployed for this test had a narrower scope which dealt first with the multiparty system itself and political parties. The media and civil society are dealt with in the next section of this study.

The reasons for focussing on the system in general and political parties are, firstly, a substantial number of these youth were born at a politically significant a period when Kenya was experiencing the early reflections of a transition from single to multiparty politics. Although the participants might have not know what was transpiring by virtue of their tender age, at the point which they became politically cognisant, the after effect of President Moi’s regime was still fresh; and up to now regime comparisons still linger and permeate the socio-political space with a definite taste. Secondly, their political world has been effectively bombarded by party politics. This is the political circus that they were raised in and accustomed to; and furthermore “political parties constitute a basic element of democratic institutional apparatus” (Rugabalamu 1998:16)

5.xv A statistical summary of the scores to factor 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
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<th>Level of Factor</th>
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<th>Factor 4 Std.Dev.</th>
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<td>3.060000</td>
<td>0.760409</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The reasons for focussing on the system in general and political parties are, firstly, a substantial number of these youth were born at a politically significant a period when Kenya was experiencing the early reflections of a transition from single to multiparty politics. Although the participants might have not know what was transpiring by virtue of their tender age, at the point which they became politically cognisant, the
after effect of President Moi’s regime was still fresh; and up to now regime comparisons still linger and permeate the socio-political space with a definite taste. Secondly, their political world has been effectively bombarded by party politics. This is the political circus that they were raised in and accustomed to; and furthermore “political parties constitute a basic element of democratic institutional apparatus” (Rugabalamu 1998:16)

Despite the close mean interval in the groups as seen above, the scores to the individual questions which constituted this group reflected some notable difference in some aspects. The first question in this cluster was “It is important to be registered with a political party?” Heavy scepticism seems to emanate from the university educated group. The control group mean score stands between 3.56 and 3.7 while the experimental group mean is 2.88. A continuation to this pattern is reflected in the question; “I am a registered member of a political party?” the total mean from both groups is 1.68 from 53 participants which means none of the youth in this survey belongs to any party as a registered member.
Distribution and dispersion range of responses to questions in factor 4

The histogram shows a breakdown of how the individual answers were scored and the dispersion. There is no much difference as most responses are concentrated in the 2.0 to the 3.9 area with an exception of a spike in the experimental group with 1 person scoring a 5.

The other responses in this test which seemed to provide more insight into the youths’ distanced perspective to the system and political parties are drawn by the following questions. *Party or no party it makes no difference, political leader and candidates are sufficient? Multiparty democracy has further widened divisions in the Kenyan Nation along tribal, class or religious lines?* The responses produced a mean score of 3.9 from 53 out of 54 participants, while the second question generated a mean score of 3.6 from the same number of participants. From the interview responses, the general feeling is that the youths identified with the personalities (elites) more than they did with the particular party the elite represented. Secondly, parties were associated with negative political events especially political violence (both verbal and physical).

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59 The histogram shows a breakdown of how the individual answers were scored and the dispersion. There is no much difference as most responses are concentrated in the 2.0 to the 3.9 area with an exception of a spike in the experimental group with 1 person scoring a 5.
60 The term tribal as used in the Kenyan context denotes a population classification or categorization on basis of commonly shared language. Thus Kenyans will speak of tribalism as meaning discrimination along language with wider associations of a subculture.
5.4.5.1 Gender scores

The female scores on this test were slightly lower compared to that of males. The mean scores were female 2.90 while the males scored 3.0 which indicates, as already mentioned, a general pattern of distance from the system and its structures across the youth category.

Of course the above responses show features of a constitutional based electoral system. However, what is clear here is that most participants seem not to recognise the important role of political parties beyond the campaign period and how a government of the day is subsequently constituted in the post electioneering period. When asked if they knew anything about the party manifestos for the parties where their choice candidates represented; even those participants whose kin form part of the political elite had a very slight idea of what is contained in a party manifesto.

The conclusion to this test was that disinterest describes the attitude towards the input structures of the system. This bears marks of what is generally referred to as apathy. The significance of political parties as a basic significant component in the multiparty democratic system in Kenya does not seem to register on the majority within this group. This can be read either as sign of ignorance on the part of the youth the democratic process or worrying disinterest in the current parties which may not be

---

Because the constitutional based electoral system allows for the electorate to vote directly for candidates as opposed to the proportional system which restricts voting to representative bodies (e.g. political parties), most of the youth have no loyalty or do not see the need to align themselves with political parties.
paying attention to communicating or reaching out to the next generation of elite on issues of democratic process and democratic consolidation

5.4.6 Attitudes towards general participation in the political process

This factor attempted to test the level of commitment to act and involvement in the political process currently. Processes which include voting, and active participation in civil society for change. The features in this test are described by Almond and Verba (1989:18) as the “participant political culture”, in which the members of a society seem to be explicitly oriented towards the system and processes. This test bears very close themes with the previous one and one may wonder at the rationale of separating the two.

The main reason for separating these tests was basically this, although the youth might associate and identify themselves with some political party polices and candidates from a distance, voting is a landmark activity. The act of getting into a polling station requires a sense of agency, commitment and motivation. That is the only way for one to lay claim at political significance, it is memorable and there is no association by distance. Secondly, if a youth has shown the interest to vote, then there is a great probability that they have encountered interest groups in the civil society, and the expectation would be that a university educated student affiliates themselves, or identifies with some of the campaigns and initiatives propelled by the civil society.

5.xix A statistical summary of the scores to factor 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Level of Factor</th>
<th>Level of Factor</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Factor 5 Mean</th>
<th>Factor 5 Std.Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2.866667</td>
<td>0.983371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.116667</td>
<td>1.164500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Experimental</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2.755556</td>
<td>0.893280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.550000</td>
<td>0.950120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.007407</td>
<td>0.982119</td>
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<td>Control</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3.200000</td>
<td>0.282843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group*Gender</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.100000</td>
<td>1.283225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group*Gender</td>
<td>Experimental</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.420000</td>
<td>0.990847</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results were quite telling because out of a possible 53 participants who participated in the survey (minus the obvious eliminations undertaken during factor analysis), 41 were eligible to vote, only 19 out of the eligible voters participated while three are omitted by virtue of missing biographical information on the age column. The mean score on this particular question 2.6. While this was not the only question that constituted this particular test it stood as the most significant. What was surprising on this test was the responses provided to the other questions that are in this cluster.

On the question “My vote is significant for the necessary changes I want to see in Kenya?” There was a resounding yes reflected in the mean score of 4.11 drawn from the total of all participants including those whose response had been initially omitted on account of missing biographical data. On the other questions; I am interested in the campaign for better democracy and governance led by the civil society? And, my vote made a difference in Kenya’s political arena? The responses were mixed. On the former question, the mean score was 4.01, while on the on the latter the mean score was 2.79 which borders on not sure.

A total mean score of 3.06 (from Control group 3.21 and Experimental group 2.91 as seen in the confidence interval graph 5.xx) leads one to conclude that the future elite’s participation in Kenya’s politics is overcast by a cloud of pessimism in view of democratic consolidation. The positive mean scores generated by the two questions on significance of their vote and their civil society support for campaigns for democracy can be interpreted as quick answers to actions that might not demand commitment. Once again, acting from a distance, seems desirable because the phrasing of the questions does not imply commitment, it is more of a suggestion.

The above interpretation was availed during the interviews, which also answered for the 2.79 score on the last question over whether votes made a difference. A sense of despondency marked most of their responses in as far as participation is concerned. The majority held onto the view that as long as the political sphere continued to conduct its affairs in the way that they have observed, as one participant said “there is no need of waking up at six thirty a.m. to go to a polling station”. They saw no hope or possible avenue through which a young person can inject him/herself into Kenya’s political space to effect substantial change, except
those that are opened through political patronage\textsuperscript{62}. A significant number indicated that they would opt to venture into business careers and not invest time in politics.

\textbf{5.xx Overlapping confidence interval points for groups factor 5}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{confidence_intervals.png}
\caption{Overlapping confidence interval points for groups factor 5}
\end{figure}

\textbf{5.xxi Histogram of distribution of scores for factor 5}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{distribution_histogram.png}
\caption{Histogram of distribution of scores for factor 5}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{62} More of this as earlier indicated will be followed up in the B section which details accounts from open ended responses to the survey.

\textsuperscript{63} The Histograms show a general response range where the majority of participants scored between 1 and 3.5.
5.4.6.1 Gender scores

The interval in the gender responses depicted a weak relationship again showing a very slight difference with the male responses. The mean scores of 2.64 for the Females and 3.01 for the males can be interpreted in several ways (see graph 5.xxii). Firstly, females are participating and experiencing similar challenges and therefore holding the same views as the male youth. Secondly, the low mean score in the females chart may also be as a result of a low number of participants. The conclusion may be that, generally, this category which is the next generation of leaders is presently disinterested in investing substantial amount of time in political matters.

5.xxii Overlapping confidence interval points for gender for factor 5

The low score on attitudes towards participation can mean that the future elite in institutions of higher education are not yet thirsty enough to desire political change. Despite the obvious obstacles set up by the incumbent elite whose poor example has been sighted as a discouraging factor to participation, the youth seem not to have the agency to transcend over the political landscape in existence. The reason provided by given one participant that the youth have fear or they are cowards as may just be a sufficient answer for the moment.
5.4.7 Attitudes and feelings towards ethnic identity

This test was specifically aimed at discovering the youth’s attitudes towards a destructive component in the African political sphere i.e. ethnicity. It was a test to measure the extent to which ethnic orientations, identity and loyalty is significant within this group. The destructive nature of ethnicity in Africa has been extensively discussed by political scholars. Ethnicity, as defined as a sense of peoplehood, has its foundations in combined remembrances of past, experience, and in common inspirations, values, norms and expectations; as a subjective basis for collective consciousness gains relevance to the political process when it spurs groups formation and underpins political organization (Chazan et al. 1992:106)

Ndegwa (1997:600-601) adds that ethnicity in Kenya’s Postcolonial history has spurned a dual citizenship where ethnic communities draw legitimacy and authority form its ability to provide for its members in time of need. This operates on a moral economy of reciprocation. Individuals then find themselves shifting identities and roles whenever it suits them if ethnic support was needed. The profound sense of gratification that individuals draw from this membership provides a base and platform for political mobilization if one so wills (Rothschild 1981:27). The political landscape in Kenya’s multiparty democracy is such that ethnicity is an undeniable force heavily perpetuated by the political elite for their own survival. This has had the inadvertent consequence of dividing the nation along language categories and shared historical pasts, and even trickling down to the younger generation.

This test therefore sought to discover whether the above mentioned links do form the youth’s identities, especially among the university educated elite.

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64 This is still being expressed among the major groups (the Kikuyu, Meru, Kamba, Embu Luhya, and Luo) that remain significant players in Kenya’s political arena since independence; furthermore, the participants in the interviews, although randomly selected were mainly from this groups and expressed the same sentiments.
### A statistical summary of the scores to factor 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Level of Factor</th>
<th>Level of Factor</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Factor 6 Mean</th>
<th>Factor 6 Std.Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>12</td>
<td>2.354167</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>2.592593</td>
<td>0.863658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.145833</td>
<td>0.588317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>2.685185</td>
<td>0.862110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group*Gender</td>
<td>Control</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2.250000</td>
<td>0.707107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group*Gender</td>
<td>Control</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>2.375000</td>
<td>0.756913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group*Gender</td>
<td>Experimental</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>2.125000</td>
<td>0.603807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Experimental</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.867647</td>
<td>0.888809</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As one would assume, with the advantage of a more Westernized education and elements of globalisation and increased social mobility inculcated in the youth since their early childhood, strong ethnic consciousness is expected to be a dud or a dissipating factor. This group of participants is expected to have almost non because of their current location away from home base. The total mean score for all the participants is 2.51 with the control group scoring 2.35 and the experimental group 2.59. as seen on the interval graph 5.xxiv and histogram 5.xxv

![Overlapping confidence interval points for groups- factor 6](image-url)
Again, the weak relationship between the control and the experimental groups as generated by this test can be read as the general attitude towards ethnicity; a non significant factor. The responses drawn from the interviews carried a general consensus. The questions which constituted this test included *Ethnicity is important when casting my vote? Despite what everyone says, the ethnicity of the president and his closest associates matters? It would be dangerous to vote presidents from particular tribes*? *It does not matter what tribe/ethnic group the politicians come from, the problem lies with the masses?*

The scores to these questions were however quite interesting when looked at separately. The standard deviation once again was on a high figure because of the variation in the responses provided. On the question of whether one’s ethnicity will influence their vote, 3 participants out of 53 admitted that ethnicity is an issue when they are casting their vote. However on the second question of whether the ethnicity of the president and his associates matters 27 out 53 (50.9%) agreed that it matters. 13 out of 52 – 24% (because one abstained) from the total of 53 agreed that it would be dangerous to vote for presidents from certain ethnic groups. The response to the last question on whether the problem of politicized ethnicity lies with the masses was puzzling because the participants did not agree; thus pointing an accusatory finger at the leadership, the crafters. The mean score for this question was 2.64.

5.xxv Histogram of score dispersion for groups factor 6

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65 See explanation on tribe on pg 19
Interview responses to this factor were very short because the participants did not perceive ethnicity as a significant issue in their lives. One of the main arguments presented especially by the university students was the fact that they engage in interethnic love affairs should be a clear sign. Educational centres in most urban areas bring children from diverse ethnic backgrounds, a trend that leaves the young Kenyans to accept each other without ever having known each others ethic origins. The main complaint over ethnicity was that their parent’s generation, which includes a significant majority of politicians, seems to perpetuate it.

**5.4.7.1 Gender scores**

The intercepts seem to show a general direction from the slight difference in the interval of the mean score. The females scored a mean of 2.14 while the males had a mean score of 2.61. However the female response shows a consistency in their views (see histogram 5.xxvii) based on the low score on the standard deviation of 0.58 while the male’s response was strongly mixed with a standard deviation of 0.86.

**5.xxvi Overlapping confidence interval points for groups- factor**
The general pattern of reactions to the issue of ethnicity drawn from this test leads to the conclusion that the destabilization of democracy may not be so much an issue in the future if the youth’s attitude towards ethnicity is different from that of their parents’ generation. This change in attitude maybe as a result of extenuating circumstances like modernization and globalization, but these circumstances may just positively serve to temper down one of the main obstacles to democratic consolidation in Kenya if the next generation of elite considered entering the political game.

5.5 Section B- Findings on open ended questions

This section as already explained was intended to extract broader explanations to some of the attitudes and feelings towards some of the main factors being measured about Kenyan politics and democracy. Unlike the previous A section, the tool changed and the questions were open ended. The participants had a two part choice (agree and disagree) upon which they were expected to give an explanation for their choice. The section had only five questions for the simple reason that most participants had expressed reluctance to participation if most of the questions were.
open ended. Therefore a brief open ended questions section encouraged responses from a larger number of participants.

A second and major difference in the two sections is the approach to analysis. While the first section relied on descriptive statistical methods to analyse scores on a five point Likert scale supported by focus group interviews, this section has tables presenting percentages to some of the responses and then provides the answers as they were written by the participants.

The factors being measured in this section were similar in theme to those in the previous section. However, this section in a way provides a summary to the object of this study by looking at the brief answers to questions on interest in politics, attitudes towards participation and future involvement in Kenya’s politics and gives ideas for recommendations at the end of the study.

5.5.1 Interests and dislikes

The first two simple questions were geared at ascertaining the extent of interest towards Kenyan politics, and the particular areas which are of concern to the next generation of political elite. This is by looking at how many areas of politics the youth are most likely to pay attention to, and those areas that raise concern.

Question one- “If Kenyan politics attract your attention, tick what elements of Kenyan politics interest you the most”. Question 1.b was inverse to question 1.a, If Kenyan politics repel you, what elements annoy you the most? The choices given were (i) political parties, (ii) Politicians, (iii) Parliament, corruption and governance, (iv) the Judiciary (v) other specify.

The frequency table displays the elements and combinations as they appeared in questions 1 and two.

---

There is a reason as to why the tables are different. The numbers of combinations in the interests seem to have significant, and one would expect that interests not be limited to one or two specific areas of politics. On the other hand the dislikes seem to be focused on particular elements, if a situation arose where a significant number of participants were repelled by a combination of more than two elements then that would be a reflection of repulsion towards politics in general. In the study the combinations for dislikes that spread to more than two elements were less than 3. The responses on table two seem lesser in total number compared to question 1; this is because more participants abstained.
5.xxviii Summary of frequencies to responses on question 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% out of 46</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iii</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i-iii</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i-iv</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii-iv</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.xxix The frequency table displays the elements as they appeared singly and in combinations for question 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% out of 46</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iii</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the fifth choice that provided for “other”, on question 1, there were only five participants who included an extra element that interests them. These are Kenya’s image internationally, Kenya’s economy, especially the stagnation of it, the dynamics now evident since the advent of multiparty politics, and lastly two of the participants were interested in the government’s free education programme. The fifth choice “other” on question two had only one new element; government communication.

It is clear that the fundamental concern of this study was at the heart of the responses taking from the result displayed on the tables 5.xxvii and 5.xxix. Most feel strongly about governance and especially corruption which has damaged the image of Kenya’s parliament for the past fifteen years. What is very clear is the connection
in element three which tops both lists and element ii (politicians) which follows closely. The reason for this is provided by participants in question 2 question.

The low interest in political parties noted earlier in the previous section is again made clear here. Element iv which is political parties managed a 12 votes (26% percent from a total of 46 participants in this section with no participant abstaining). One can draw the same conclusion that either there is a very low appreciation for political parties among the emerging elite or they have not yet found an attractive enough invitation to look into party politics given the negativity that surrounds Kenya’s party politics; which is the main reason that was given during the interviews. The view was that political parties seem to divide people along ethnic lines and they lack the required stability to deliver on any promises. Either that or despite their reasons, the youth still do not see the importance of political parties in a multiparty democracy, which would be an indictment to their knowledge of the political game, reinforcing the conclusion seen earlier in section A 5.5.4.

5.5.2 Attitudes and feelings towards politicians

Feelings towards the political incumbents are the subject of question 2 as a follow up to the question on elements of dislikes to Kenya’s politics. The question posed was; Politicians have made Kenya a worse off country to live in. If you agree/disagree briefly state why? From the table 2.1 below, the majority agreed and they gave one commonly shared reason.

---

68 Kenyan political parties continue to thrive in disrepute because of constant internal strife, instability and their gross disregard of their own constitutions and manifestos. This continues in 2006 prior to the 2007 general election.
The above chart shows the general response to question two across the groups and gender.

2.1.1 Summary -frequency table for Gender responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENDER</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEMALES</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALES</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Grps</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0 = disagree
1= Agree

The majority of participants sighted corruption and self-centredness which breeds greed. Other responses provided different views from these two. These include,

“Politicians have contributed to further polarization of the people along ethnic lines, Instead of working together to improve the way things are by implementing good policies”

“They fight against each other causing more national disunity”

“They wait to give people relief food and repair roads almost election time so that they can get re-elected, and they continue to view politics as a meal card”

Although there were a few participants (3) who disagreed and said that there is an exception the rule that Kenyan all politicians are bad sighting a few good individuals, the overwhelming majority have a negative attitude towards the political elite. One can conclude that one reason why participation and the political culture of the emerging elite remains wanting is because of poor role models, whose actions are a deterrence.
5.5.3 Importance of education in politics

Question three sought to ascertain the attitude and feeling among the youth towards the importance accorded to education and its association to politics in Kenya. Given that the multiparty era of Kenya’s democracy has seen an influx of university educated political leaders yet the democracy has remained shaky, and unappealing, one needs to ascertain if education still possesses credibility as a remedy to political leadership woes and political stability in general.

The question was ambiguous, “Politics should be an area reserved for college and university graduates only? Since the previous question had focussed on political leaders and the tone set by the questionnaire alluded to political leadership, most participants approached it with the same mind.

The participants felt very strongly to this question judging from the sharp responses given. As displayed on table 3.1 below, a total of 31 participants disagreed with both political leadership being left to university educated or diploma wielding persons alone, and political leadership being a preserve of university educated individuals.

Chart 3.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary Responses Question 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGREED</td>
</tr>
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<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.1.1 Summary - frequency table for Gender responses question 3b

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<th>Q3 1</th>
<th>Row Totals</th>
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</thead>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row Percent</td>
<td>76.47%</td>
<td>23.53%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row Percent</td>
<td>76.92%</td>
<td>23.08%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>All Grps</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row Percent</td>
<td>76.74%</td>
<td>23.26%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0 = disagree  
1= Agree

The responses included:

“Politics is not a rocket science subject, anyone who lives by social principles and understands the needs of the people can develop policies that even graduates may not understand”.

“Kenyan politics are a rich quick scheme so either way it would not matter if professional entered into politic”.

“Political leadership does not get taught through university education”
“With Wisdom comes leadership”.

“University graduates do not appreciate the demographic and historic background of the country to give unbiased political contributions,”

“Some of the better politicians are people who are uneducated, they understand the needs of the people down there (the poor and uneducated”.

The few who supported the view that political leadership should be reserved for the university educated argued that the political arena desperately needs professionals to inject new ideas, a new vision and eradicate the existing malaise. Others argued that educated leaders would bring in a professional approach to governance. The conclusion to this response is that the youth, especially the ones in institutions of higher learning, do recognise the short coming of education only despite the fact that they are aware of the professional knowledge they can bring into the game, it is not a guarantee of good leadership. A reason for this
acknowledgement is given in the responses to question five which deals with civic education.

5.5.4. Attitudes towards joining the ‘dirty game’ of politics

Question four can be read as an extension to question three. The question contributes to the test in section one that deals with the youth’s attitudes and feelings towards future involvement and engagement to change in the political arena. By using a cliché phrase, it sought to ascertain the degree of casualness that the youth have towards politics. The question was “Politics is a ‘dirty game’ so young college and university graduates should focus going into professional careers e.g. business, accounting and engineering, if you agree/disagree tell why?

Chart 4.1

Summary Responses Question 4

<table>
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</table>

4.1.1 Summary-frequency table for Gender responses question 4b

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<td>40</td>
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The responses from the table show a general disagreement with the statement. The responses given by those who disagree argue that

"It is the players who are dirty not the game".

"Politics requires fresh ideas and versatile minds because it is a dynamic game, How else will we rid of Kenya of the current ills while adopting such attitudes and thoughts."

"Politics maybe a dirty game but more graduates should be involved in it and perhaps change its face".

"Whatever profession a graduate becomes a part of, the politics of the country will have direct or indirect impact, it is therefore necessary for graduates to enter the game".

Although the general feeling is that more graduates should enter the political arena to change its face, there is a number who hold the view that politics should be left for those with money. This view proposes that -"[university educate elite] should pursue their careers, make some finances and then get into politics". One would expect that this mentality would face extinction as it has for long prevailed as the modus operandi for the single party “stomach politics” where politicians used to buy votes, cheaply, on their way to power by exploiting poverty among the electorate. The fact that emerges in this group is an indication that role model elites are needed to shape the future of Kenya’s democracy. It also reinforces the view that such ill conceived practises continue to perpetuate themselves to the detriment of consolidation of democracy by blighting competitive elections thus giving credence to the argument that young elite seem to inherit behaviour from their predecessors,

Other responses were

"There can be a chance for one saviour and history has shown repeatedly that in Kenya, the system either corrupts those with good intentions or pushes them out."

"Young graduates should not bother, politics has got no rewards and it is a waste of time its better to pursue other careers".

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69 In reference to the suggestion that politics is a dirty game not meant for university graduates.

70 Referring to the case of the director of anticorruption in the presidency who was forced into exile for exposing corruption in the cabinet
The conclusion is that the youth may have a positive attitude towards engagement in political process with the view of changing their welfare, although the pressures of consumerism associated with capitalism in an environment surrounded by poverty continue to impede the deepening of democratic values.

5.5.5 Feelings about the education of politics

During the interviews, it was evident that most of the participants’ knowledge of political matters and its nature is informed and shaped by the media. This being a study that is looking into the political culture of the youth population, it was prudent to ascertain their feeling towards the government’s efforts towards cultivating a requisite political culture through institutions, and also determine the youth’s attitude towards gaps in their political culture. Based on the answers to question five, one would be able to conclude whether the youth feel competent or equipped to engage and shape Kenya’s democracy for the future or they give themselves a false assessment which will be measured against all other responses in the study.

Question five posited “The Kenyan primary and secondary school curriculum does not present politics in a manner that will improve democracy, social tolerance and the related economic development if you agree/disagree state why? The chart 5.1 shows that a majority agreed that the school curriculum did not provide these fundamental principles that can shape the electorate from an early age.

Chart 5.1

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5.1.1 Summary -frequency table for Gender responses question 5

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<tr>
<td>FEMALES</td>
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<td>MALES</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

0 = disagree  
1= Agree

Some of the responses given include

“The curriculum is narrow, it is based on teaching elementary basics of civil developments, not utilising the historical factors that could improve democracy”.

“It does not move the youth to think about political influences in a country”.

“The curriculum is shallow because most young people have lost interest in politics and seem not to have knowledge about it”.

“All I was taught had nothing to do with democracy, again the curriculum is so shallow”.

“We were only taught basic civic education which was not sufficient, a wider scope is needed”.

“The syllabus must be updated as textbooks outline the works of the Moi regime, giving a positive outlook of a system that failed”.

“The Kenya school curriculum was meant for a one party state, political debate was not encouraged and scholars believed in KANU “ni baba na mama”.

There are those few participants who saw things differently. Their responses are presented in this study because they highlight a different problem, which is not a simple disagreement with the question statement in support of the

71 “KANU is father and mother” A propaganda phrase that was ubiquitous, driven by the state media.
education system. The feelings communicated in these statements express fatigue and disillusionment with politics and maybe ‘the system’.

“It is not necessary for the young kids to be bothered they should be let to make their own political decisions when they grow up”.

“The school curriculum has got nothing to do with politics and the curriculum should be blamed, theory is not important, the society need to change its behaviour”.

“The education system is very good; students should learn civil education for their own interest”.

Most of the responses did more that agree with the question, the participants gave recommendations to what needs to be done to transform the political culture of the youth which are discussed in the next chapter. The responses lead one to conclude that the youths do acknowledge the importance of government in shaping their political awareness. There is a general feeling of acceptance of a deficit in knowledge. The view that democracy and its pertinent features, like tolerance and accountability, should be presented at school indicates resolve to shape their political culture in readiness for the future.

Conclusion

Although the above chapter provides a fairly reliable gauge of the political culture among Kenyan youth with definite implications on democratic consolidation, it is vital to the impact of agents of socio cultural and political engineering which shape this modern society’s way of seeing. Therefore the role of the media in shaping and influencing political culture in this generation cannot be overemphasized. This is because this is a generation that take points of reference from images and discourses presented by the popular mass media. The next chapter examines the potential impact of the mass media in shaping the political attitudes of the Kenyan youth into pursuing a consolidated democracy.
Chapter 6

Media and the Generational Change of leadership: Views on the role the Media should play in shaping the political culture of the next generation

Debate over the enormous social impact of mass media can no longer be as fervid; one just needs to look at the undisputable testimony in some African democracies. The evidence is mostly grim if the distressing socio-political and economic events that are attributable to the mass media’s contribution are taken into account. The scope of accusation includes genocides, political instability and tension during electioneering, corruption, interstate and civil conflict, and advertising. While a reflex response will lay blame solely on the political elite, they can only achieve their goals through an effective instrument. Even the worst critics of the major role of mass media would battle with the question, “If the mass media play a comparatively minor role in shaping society, why are they the object of so much popular concern and criticism?” (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1999:19)

This chapter seeks to emphasise the critical role of the mass media in shaping the political culture of the next generation of elites, in their own words. The crux of the chapter is drawn from interviews with the sample under study, where the questions focus on one factor but in dual enquiry; what is the most powerful factor that exerted the most influence in cultivating a negative political culture amongst most youth? Secondly, what should be done to remedy the situation? While the chapter provides some theoretical insights drawn from media theorists and commentators, it will direct all these to media and politics, making a case for the contingent political culture for democratic consolidation. The recommendations on political culture and the media advanced by this group will be discussed in the next chapter.

72 One needs to look at the role played in controlling social action by them most influential media in the different African countries. The most memorable example is privately owned Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines which played a key role in exploding genocide in Rwanda through broadcasts which encouraged the Hutu’s to “a final war to exterminate the cockroaches”. Other examples include the use of the National broadcaster in Kenya for ruling party propaganda prior to elections and the creation of personality cults.
6.1 The media in a democracy

James Curran (1991:5) provides a basis on which the media plays a role in a democracy by linking it to Jurgen Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. He observes that the development of early European capitalism brought into existence an autonomous arena of public debate - a bourgeois public sphere driven by the economic independence and provided by the private wealth of the propertied class. The emergence of enterprises like market-based press, discussion in coffee houses, and the spread of literature in the form of novels created a new public engaged in public discussion. It was a space between the private domain and the state in which public opinion was formed and popular supervision of the government was formed. Although criticized for its argument that participation in the public sphere was restricted to the propertied class, from it can be extrapolated a model of a public sphere as a neutral zone where access to relevant information affecting the public good is widely available, where debate and discussion is free of domination and is conducted on an equal basis.\(^\text{73}\)

This idea of a public space has experienced fierce competition for the attention of masses due to exponential technological advances. Although the main beneficiaries in the present society are commercial enterprises and interests, the growth of technologies such as the internet (World Wide Web), digital television, radio capability and telecommunications has made the political arena more complex with governments seeking to remain strong competitors by exerting legislation to control dissident opinion and curtailing the reach of these technologies. Simultaneously, the masses feel empowered to challenge authorities by mobilising groups and expressing themselves from unreachable quarters.

6.2 Functions of media in public space

That social space has been utilized to the greatest extent for social organization of different interests apart from the political view of the modern world. Lazarsfeld and Merton (1996:20-24) observe that some of the social functions of the mass media include 1) status conferral where the media attach importance to persons,

\(^{73}\) See for an in-depth discussion on Habermas’ theory of Public Sphere.
organizations and movements raising the attention these individuals and groups command within the masses. They bestow prestige and enhance the authority of individuals, legitimizing their status. 2) The media enforce social norms, implied by terms like ‘the power of the press’. This function obtains when the mass media initiate organised social action by exposing conditions which are at variance with public moralities. 3) The final and very significant function of this study is one of the negative functions of the media that remain largely unnoticed; the “narcotizing dysfunction”. It is argued that “it is not in the interest of the modern complex society to have the large masses of the population politically apathetic and inert”.

However, studies have shown that a bombardment of the masses with vast amounts of information with the aim of making them aware creates a counter attitude. This may create the unintended consequence of superficial concern, where the masses show concern which in the real sense cloaks mass apathy. While they vicariously experience the sad news of other societies, the vast amount of information has the effect of desensitizing them from the events as opposed to energising them for action74.

6.3 Media functions and Democracy

This public space of information has been utilized to the greatest extent in the building of Africa’s democracies since the colonial and post-independence era mainly for government interests as a means of social influence. However, the media is mainly seen as a component of the fourth estate in a democracy, they are part of the civil society charged with several roles.

Firstly the media plays the role of a watchdog; a public watchdog. This is seen as one of the media’s principle functions, that of overseeing the state which entails revealing abuses in the exercise of state authority (Curran 1991:83, Diamond 1994:9-10). The other major role is an informational role. Curran (1994:8) notes that “this is usually portrayed in terms of facilitating self expression, promoting public rationality and enabling collective self determination.” Diamond’s (1994) discussion of the civil society includes the functions of the mass media. The main functions with regard to

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74 This observation is made by Lazarsfeld and Merton of the American society. However, this can also be observed in the attitudes and behaviours of the Kenyan youth, who because of living in a largely mediated world, they tend to live vicariously through most social events, experiencing them the same way they experience films.
information include the development of democratic attributes (such as tolerance and moderation), spread of new ideas and information (essential to the achievement of economic reform in a democracy) and encouraging participation by generating opportunities. This should include “voter education” where the media acts as an agent for voter education because of its wide reach (Wanyande 1998:98).

Another significant role of the media in democracy is agenda setting. McCombs and Shaw (1972:154) argue that while the mass media may have little influence on the intensity of attitudes it is hypothesized that it sets the agenda for each political campaign. This links closely to the observation made by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1996:20) on the media and conferral function; “the mass media force attention to certain issues… they are constantly presenting objects suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about...(Lang and Lang as quoted in McCombs and Shaw 1995:154).

While this function may appear defective and maybe fraudulent in some aspects, positive results may be realised. The generation under discussion in this study, based on their words, has an affinity to react to cultural images broadcasted via visual media like television and films. The power of immediacy in the visual medium has proved the most effective in influencing the social awareness of the youth as Philosopher Bert Olivier (1996: vi) affirms that “today’s students are more familiar with quotations and allusions drawn from movies and soapies”. The media in this function does more than set agenda or inform; it becomes an agent of socialization. It is therefore not unthinkable that incumbent crafters of democracy should take full advantage of the media to influence and transform the political culture of the next generation towards the creation of quality-consolidated democracies.

6.4 Brief View of Media in Kenya: Radio and Television

The obvious reason why these two are selected is because of their prominence and effect on the Kenyan society, especially in relation to the population group in this study. Kenya has nine television channels including the private digital service providers, and over thirty-one radio and twenty-one television stations. In the past five years, radio alone has experienced a 290 per cent increase, mostly dominated by
commercial stations which are based in the urban areas. The histories of these two media and politics have been inextricably intertwined since the pre-independence period. Radio was introduced by the colonial governments in most African countries to serve the ‘natives’. Most of these, like in the case of Kenya, are the stations set by the British colonial government (fashioned after the BBC) and were immediately restructured to fill the needs of the post-independence states in the postcolonial era (Borgault 1995:124).

Television was officially inaugurated in Kenya in 1963 just before independence. Just like radio it was foreign operated for a period before it was nationalized in 1964. These two types of media fell victim instantly to the political plans of the post-independence rulers. Radio was a convenient tool due to its reach in most African countries. Hatchen points out that due to radio’s penetrative reach; it becomes a tool for the acquisition of power (as Quoted in Kipps). The developmental logic that turned almost all of Africa’s post-independence governments to single states saw the effective use of the media, especially radio, as a propaganda tool. The KANU government during the Kenyatta era cemented its hold on the national broadcaster, by using its nationwide reach to preach personalities and KANU politics. This trend was consolidated during the regime, where the national broadcaster became the personal address system of the president and his psycophants.

Post-1990, the number of new entrants into the radio space brought in new ideas and formats, which diluted KBC’s propaganda messages by directing attention elsewhere, mainly, entertainment. The emergence of FM stations was not a threat to the KANU government’s plans, it is because up to the present moment, most of these stations (which are based in the capital city for commercial purposes) have operation licenses restricted to broadcast within a 60 Km radius from the capital city, Nairobi. This means that the current government has the advantage of preaching its message to the majority of Kenyans. The bulk of the content in these new stations is mainly advertising targeted at a younger audience among the aspiring middle class with very little if any political information. They attract a battery of young presenters mostly

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76 Kipps Donna Conference paper “African Media Reporting Conflict and Conciliation” for Africa Media Debates.
drawn from the Kenyan celebrity circles which includes musicians, actors or fashion models. Their entertainment content is mainly American, with portions of local music.

Kenyan television has also evolved through the political whirlwind with the new entrants also finding it difficult to spread nationally. Apart from KBC television the Kenya Television Network and Nation Television are the only other stations that can be received in more than three major towns nationwide, but not connecting through the areas in between these towns\textsuperscript{77}. The other stations which are confined to the city radius are able to broadcast political news, but the population numbers are not significant enough to affect the government’s plans.

Since the early days of television in Kenya, 90\% of the programming content came from abroad Bourgnault (1995:124). This was to change in the mid 1970’s. Most of the imports were entertainment mainly from the United States and with a little from Britain. Although over the years this number has gradually fallen, the proportion of local programming compared to imported programs has not fundamentally altered. Until present, the majority of these stations broadcast American programmes. The fierce competition for audience during prime time is dependent on who televises the most recent of America’s prime television. The programmes are sourced from America’s leading networks ABC (American Broadcasting Corporation), NBC (National Broadcasting Corporation), CBS (Central Broadcasting), HBO (Home Box Office) and Fox television.

Kenya’s prominent media has drawn criticism invoked by controversy over media ownership. While Moi controlled the national broadcaster during his tenure as president, his political opponents were believed to control the private media including the press. Recurrent incarcerations without trial, of journalists and media owners were common. Upon his departure from power, a consortium comprising Moi and his sons acquired ownership of the biggest television broadcaster KTN, which was attacked and is still under siege from the current government for being critical.

6.5 Media and Youth Political Culture: Their Views

The questions posed to the participants were aimed at ascertaining their feelings towards the media’s efforts at shaping their political culture and democracy.

\textsuperscript{77} KTN can be received in Mombasa, Kisumu and Nakuru. However, the small localities in between these major towns cannot receive it.
These were all in reference to the performance of Kenyan media and whether the owners have an agenda or design to target the political culture of the youth from 15 years of age up to the late 20’s.

Although the participants had already provided their answers concerning the media and politics in the survey questionnaire, the interview commenced with two questions focussed on gauging their attitudes and feelings towards political news broadcasts. The reason behind the question is that the charge of youth’s political apathy is usually accompanied by the view that this section of the population does not commit time to watch any form of national or political news or events. The questions were *Do you take time to watch news broadcasts on television?* And; *Do you watch any political documentaries or debate?*

Consistently with the responses given in the questionnaire a majority was agreeable to the first question and not very committal to the second one. However, very critical comparisons on news presentation were made between the Western news broadcasts and the Kenyan ones. The majority admitted to being regular viewers of CNN and BBC news and maybe KTN and Nation Television. The criticism was that “Kenyan news are sometimes comical” while another reasons given was that “the news can be quite depressing, everything I saw on KTN was negative, there was nothing new”. There was a unanimous disapproval and lack of confidence in the national broadcaster. There was a general disinterest expressed over political documentaries, which according to the group, are not stimulating. It became very clear that the group watches political news as a routine in their homes, but a majority pay very little attention to Kenya’s political issues.

The second general question sought to ascertain their preferred form of media for political news. This question was simultaneously probing the avenues through which political culture can be effectively influenced; *Which of the few types of media do you prefer as sources for news?*

A majority prefer television because of the impact of images and immediacy. However, because most of them are out of the country for long periods of time they rely on the internet editions of the Kenyan Newspaper. Despite the general view that television broadcasts were most appealing, clarification was made that while in the country, the medium that most are likely to go for are the daily newspapers. However, a latent fear exists that newspapers can fabricate stories in their reporting. But the reason provided as to why the majority rely on newspapers was that “they
[newspapers] give you a better perception of the truth”. Because newspapers are not restricted for time as is the case with television, reports are more detailed. Not a large majority however read newspapers, and even fewer read the politics sections.

A connection was then made between the media and political culture. The participants were asked “Do you think that the media owners and media houses are doing enough to change the political culture of the youth in Kenya, in that, does the content draw the youth’s interest in politics?” There was an agreement that much more can be done because it seems that there is a general air of dormancy; the youth opt to sit back in the face of negative political changes. Not many will go out of their way to watch or to listen to political issues. The media at present does not reach out to the youth through the bulk of the programming content being broadcasted. There lacks incentive for the youth to be drawn into politics. It was observed that there is a resistance to the politics of the day either because of the way the media is used by the politicians or the media does not really care about the youth.

It seems that the youth desire to be included. The level of politics where leaders are unreachable is alienating them. The example given was shows in which the British Prime Minister and the American President are hosted either by a television broadcaster or radio to face the youth to answer pertinent questions. Their argument points at dissatisfaction with media programming ideas.

There was a strong suggestion that the ideas being used to present the political arena to the youth are not inviting at all. Although there is FM radio which has become very popular in the country, it is not a viable medium to communicate a political message to the youth far and wide. Television is the preferred medium of choice, but the political programs should be designed and presented by the youth themselves if they are to have any form of relevance; “If we were to get politicians to attend a program which is being hosted by young guys, more young people want to watch”78. If the media houses and their owners continue to set agenda and decide what people want to see or hear, then the youth’s political culture and especially the knowledge and shaping of democracy will remain unchanged if the political news are biased depending on who owns what media house. This was the participants’ feelings towards the media ownership effects in Kenya.

They raised the concern of dormancy and failure to act politically among the youth. According to the participants this was as a result of the way the media reports

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78 Question from the Interview
the news. The youth in Kenya seem to be dormant in the face of the political changes in the country. Judging from all the examples that were given over the kind of ideas that should be put into place to political programming in order to attract or shape the youths attitude, it was possible to conclude that the Kenyan youth demand a more Westernised approach in their ideas of how political consciousness should be perpetuated. This is touched on by Borgault (1995:23-25) who notes that the [African] modern elites are products of Western education, they are literate, representing the most Western educated elements of the African society.

These modern traits depicted by these youth sighted presidential invites in American MTV (Music Television) for question time. They also mentioned advertising campaigns run by celebrity musicians in the West to communicate the importance of voting, and including very catchy campaigns by the South African government to get the youth to vote in local elections in 2005. These views are underscored by features of globalisation evident in these group of elite availed to them by the borderless media will in many ways continues to impact their political development. This means that there is a possibility for democratic consolidation as international influence and ideas of the political are assimilated (Huntington 1997:9).

The culture of participation and agency to act emerged as a concern for the future leaders despite all the shortcomings of the media to stir political action. The question asked in relation to this was, Do you feel that the media has an influence on you as a person to act in the political arena? There was no immediate response to this question. Disaffection with the negative political events that are constantly highlighted though the media but no action is taken by the incumbent elite has made the youth politically unresponsive. This was labelled an unexplainable dormancy, a refusal to act while there exists no actual cause to justify the action. One respondent argued that “the Kenyan youths are cowards”. There is a sense of contentment with the status quo because the media is now viewed as giver of opinion and it stops there. The culture of political participation by distance where the youth say if “I had the chance I would do it” seems to be also a product of all the negative events that have transpired in the country but no immediate action is taken by the incumbent ruling elite. Despite what the media will report and explode in the airwaves, very few will protest or picket.

This, to some of the participants, is attributable to the culture of contentment, that seems to be a by product of a combination of things. Firstly, the media churning
out a lot of political information in a manner that does not address the youth or invite them to action. Secondly, the youth switching off to the uninspiring news on politics which have been confusing to many in Kenya’s multiparty democracy and turning on to popular culture media, where the messages emphasise consumerism.

A majority of the participants noted that the political culture among the youth will remain unchanged if the media continues to sacrifice some of the programs that are supposed to educate young minds to act politically in exchange for more entertainment. The counter argument to this is that there has been an increase in the number of news slots in all the television channels and radio stations (especially the FM stations) give only half hourly news briefs. The problem evident here is that news casts are confused with programming that engages with political discourse, e.g. political debates in governance issues and civic education productions. News has gradually been assumed to be the sufficient political dose of the day. A large quantity of brief news broadcasts spread throughout the day seems to convey the idea that the society is politically socialized or deep.

Lazarsfeld and Merton’s (1996:22) argument of the narcotizing dysfunction of the media in the earlier section of the chapter thus holds in this particular case. Apart from that type of narcotizing effect is another kind of manipulation which is linked to the media owners and produces similar results. The participants noted that there is a marked influx of locally produced music being given a lot of airplay in the FM radio stations to compete with international productions in the name of supporting locally raised talent.

It was observed that the fact that the radio stations can dedicate a lot of time in creativity to develop new ideas for their music loving young audience in the urban centres, then there is no shortfall in innovation with regard to the ability to produce educative programs that can deepen Kenya’s democracy by training the young generation on democratic principles. The government on the other hand ensures that there is more of such entertainment radio stations licensed to operate in confined distances in the urban centres. This effectively shifts attention away from political development in the minds of a generation of urban based activists whose political action would otherwise produce widespread rippling effects reaching their rural counterparts.

Assisting the government in this creation of an unresponsive generation of youths are media owners in the political arena who set up vernacular FM stations
within the city radius and some few owners who establish these vernacular radio stations in the rural areas. The participants agreed that it is true that these stations will be set up for personal campaigns for the political interest group seeking office, like in the post independence era. However, these stations have the unintended consequence of alienating a younger generation and driving them away from learning valuable civic lessons, because what is perpetuated is the same political messages which have adversely affected Kenya’s democracy. Therefore their feeling was Kenya will need a fresh media age if the undemocratic practises that carry on in the political arena are to be exterminated, to avoid inheritance by the emerging generation of elites.

Conclusion

Africa’s political history has the media at the centre of it since independence. While the colonialists used the media to maintain control of the masses the local emerging elite sought to emancipate it and free the people. Evidence of the post independence era where the “media became amplifiers for the presidents”\(^\text{79}\) ushered in a new era where the media continues to fail in its role of informing and cultivating an active political culture among the Kenyan youth through masse civil education.

The Kenyan youth in the information age agree that the media is pivotal in shaping a political culture that will be able to steer Kenya’s democracy towards consolidation. They want to be accorded the role of agenda for politically inclined programming for the youth in the media; a platform which is powerful in the shaping of political consciousness. The youth’s view is that they would be happy to see a democratic space comparable to that of Britain or the United States based on what they have witnessed. According to Huntington (1996:6-9) this may be a positive aspiration because liberal democracy is a Western construct, and one of the ways diverse cultures like that of Africa can consolidate their democracies is assimilating Western democratic practises.

The media therefore has the potential to socially construct a political culture that can usher in democratic consolidation in this generation that is modernized. Although emerging from a socially heterogeneous society; Western ideas of democracy, communicated by international media and disseminated by the local media through

\(^{79}\) Alan Cutter quoted in Wilcox 1975:27
education, provides for them a meeting point with their counterparts internationally and locally where democracy can flourish with fewer social obstacles such as ethnicity and class.
Chapter 7

Recommendations and Conclusions

The work in progress on consolidation of democracy captured in longstanding debates by political scientists is yet to be conclusive, especially when faced with the challenge of complex non-Western social systems e.g. Africa. One does get the sense that consolidation of democracy in Africa remains an enigma to many, judging from Huntington’s (1996:10) observation that “a general tendency seems to exist for third wave democracies to become something else other than fully democratic”. This begs the question: if second liberation democracies like Kenya are yet to qualify for recognition as being fully democratised in the face of all the suggestions given, what are the main components that can be switched on to drive it in that direction?

This chapter concerns itself with attempting to answer that question based on the conclusions drawn from assessing the political culture of the envisioned next generation of elites. It offers recommendations based on the findings in the previous two chapters and then draws a conclusion to the study.

7.1 Democratic consolidation and elites/crafters

Democratic consolidation, as has been argued, obtains when there is a complete transition from electoral democracy to liberal democracy (Schedler 1998:89). For this complete journey there must be committed facilitators. The main driving component to Africa’s democratic consolidation in the absence of other prescribed preconditions has to be the elite. Because, as seen in chapter two, consolidation take place in dual dimension, i.e. norms and behaviour (Diamond 1999:66), Africa’s shallow and failing democracies will not be realised only by strong economic turnabouts buttressed by competitive elections. Evidence shows already that elections have failed and economics have been scuttled by the ruling elite for quite some time. The leading elite must show commitment and dedication to conform to rules, and lead the way by subjecting themselves to the confines of democratic institutions.

Huntington (1997:10) observes that democratic development occurs when political leaders believe they have an interest in promoting it or a duty to achieve it;
such elites are missing from many parts of the world. This means there is a marked lack of dedicated crafters of consolidated democracy in Africa. The suggestion that a similar dedicated group of crafters in Kenya can emerge from a generational change in leadership is realistic. However, there has to be contingent factors in place that make this envisaged generation different from the ones before. These factors may not be similar to the preconditions for a Western-styled liberal democracy. Therefore, the fact that the population group in this study is within a changeable age, growing in a modernized and globalising world, consolidation of democracy can be achieved if this generation was driven to dedicate and commit themselves to democratic values by engaging and challenging the present order.

7.2 Political Culture factors

7.2.1 Extensive, dedicated and relevant civic education

While Kenya can boast having one of the most vibrant and vigilant civil society body, their impact in relation to citizen civil education has limitations evident in several ways. Firstly, the bulk of the civil societies represented in Kenya are physically confined to the main economic centres, which are also epicentres of governance. It is understandable that it is in such locations that they exert the most influence on issues of governance, encroachment of democratic values and monitoring functions of fruits on citizenship. Another limitation is that most of their efforts are focussed on government business, monitoring checks and balances. This again cannot be faulted as they have been effective; they have provided “alternative channels other than political parties for the people’s representation and interests” (Diamond1994:8).

These limitations have denied the public and especially the youth much needed information about democracy, its values and benefits. While most of the respondents in the study admitted to knowing how democracy works in general, a majority indicated that they are disinterested in reading materials produced by the civil society. The civil society is alien to most and the only place they come into contact with civil society projects is either on the news or the streets when there are protests which are far in between. The civil society, which includes numerous donor-funded Non
Governmental Organisations (NGO’s)\textsuperscript{80} had dedicated funds mainly to AIDS and other poverty alleviation projects. The majority are also dedicated to training communities on poverty eradication initiatives. This has been underway for decades including the multiparty era, and Kenya’s democracy remains shallow.

7.2.2 Civil society in primary and secondary school civic education

If the next generation of elites is to grow with a political culture that values democracy and its benefits, the civil society should dedicate efforts to reaching out widely at a tender age and at the right centres/locales. This means teaching students starting from primary school level. The respondents overwhelmingly suggested that the Kenyan primary and secondary school curriculum is narrow and shallow in its presentation of civic education. The historical information which is saturated with KANU politics should be removed from the curriculum.

They suggested a more relevant civic education that introduces students to democracy, its typology (segments as seen in Encarnacion’s (2000) argument in chapter two) including competitive elections and the important function of political society (e.g. political parties). The fact that political parties are associated with negativity according to the findings is because this generation grew up in the advent of the multiparty era where parties were engaged in a fierce struggle for power which mostly generated conflict, if not lies.

There was a view that education should be widened to include lessons on democratic principles which includes responsibility, accountability and selflessness. Diamond (1994:8) notes this factor by pointing out that civil society can be a crucial arena for the development of other democratic attributes such as tolerance and moderation. This cannot be overemphasised if the youth generation, although not overly ethnically sensitive or inclined as seen in the findings, and their lives are constantly affected, even though indirectly, by ethnically charged multiparty politics. At a later point they are most likely to meet such attitudes after their schooling which may alter their attitudes thus developing intolerance where there was none before.

A recommendation was put forth that good governance should be part of the civil education in the face of gross malfeasance in Kenya. This would entail lessons

\textsuperscript{80} Kenya is tallied as to hosting over 1000 NGO’s of which the majority are answerable to headquarters based in Europe and America
on the value of respecting rule of law, the constitution and accountability. Organisations like Transparency International have established one of the most vibrant chapters in Kenya. They can get involved in developing sections on governance and democratic values of accountability. Otherwise the much vaunted ability for economic growth to deepen a democracy would continue to inject nothing into the democracy if the elite maintain the same practices.

7.2.3 Civil Society and educators

The other significant observation is that even the educators at both primary school and secondary school level also lack depth in their understanding of democracy and its values. The respondents suggested that the first step of training should target educators. The significance of training teachers on the nature and value of a good democracy lies with the advantage of providing role models for students. The close proximity between the educator and learner would have an almost automatic effect where the learner learns by example. Educators who are much older would also benefit if their political culture was shaped or influenced positively by factors like ethnicity.

7.3 Government incentives towards shaping political culture : Education curriculum

A high level of political goodwill from the government may be an incentive towards shaping the elite that will deepen democracy in the future. It is possible that the civil society has contemplated involvement at the school level, but it is a government-controlled domain and the uneasy relationship that exists between these two entities becomes an unnecessary obstacle. If the government of the day sees the significance of developing a politically-aware and democratically-cultured generation, then the first right step towards consolidation will have been taken.

History has shown that government intervention in the type of education taught at an early age (elementary school level) has the ability to shape a generation for an intended future. Caution must be exercised though not to communicate propaganda
as was the case with the Chinese Cultural Revolution and Nazi Germany\textsuperscript{81}. The government should envision a future where the segments of a democracy (parts that constitute a democracy) are introduced in stages at schools.

The school curriculum is sanctioned by the government; a review of the civic education to fit the political realities of the day is necessary to the shaping of a contingent democratic political culture. The government must be willing to let the entirety of the scope of what entails a liberal democracy be communicated to the youth at that age.

Although politics may not be a subject of choice for study among scholars and even parents given the necessity to engage in economically geared disciplines (e.g. engineering and medicine), there should be an incentive on the part of the government to support those who pursue it. This may mean making the subject examinable like all the others as opposed to making it an option.

Government should also provide incentives to the NGO’s that choose to undertake civic education at the schools by giving them access to the learning institutions without harassment and assisting in the publishing of the necessary study material. The educators that seek to teach civics should be given incentives in the way of remuneration because the study of civics would require constant updating due to political process and changes.

7.4 Civil society, participation and recruitment

Diamond (1994:8-9) observes that civil society provides an especially strong foundation for democracy when it generates opportunities for participation and influence at all levels of governance, including the local level; this would require the civil society to perform its function of recruiting and training new political leaders. In the previous chapter, the respondents acknowledged that there was what they identified as ‘dormancy’: a reluctance to act in the political arena. This they attribute partly to the nature of politics being practised in the country and the poor examples

\textsuperscript{81} The Chinese government under Chairman Mao had sought to embark in dual movements towards a fast tracked economic development. This meant training children loyalty to the state and belief in self (as opposed to religion) by teaching them to be tough. At the same time the government recruited from this lot industrial workers and soldiers. The children were taught how to recite from the red book compiled by the communist party.
set by the political elite over a period of time. They do not feel invited to participate because there is the fear of being despised as politically immature\textsuperscript{82}.

The civil society needs to make an effort to reach out, and emphasise again, at the school level to recruit potential politicians. These would be selected from volunteers or students who show promise and dedication to service and commitment in engaging with issues of democratic governance. In-depth training should focus on segments of democracy which means directing some of the trainees in administrative skills for public service, introducing them to the constitution, laws and functions of the arms of government. This would be coupled with teaching them on normative standards of public accountability (Diamond1994:9). The training should include exposing the young recruits to debate sessions convened by the civil society but designed by the youth with the goal of making it attractive to their peers.

7.5 The media trigger and shaping democrats

The media and democracy share a symbiotic relationship, which is in a constant state of flux, characterised by constant uneasiness. This means a free responsible media can be healthy for the development of a democracy, while at the same time this can suddenly turn to enmity if the state felt besieged. The media can also be an easily dispensable pawn for the state if the democracy is weak.

The youth unanimously agreed that the media has the spark or the much-needed ‘trigger’ to spurn them into political action. From an array of possible avenues that political actions can be fomented, the media has the most potential to invite and construct political minds. As seen in the previous chapter, this is possible in several ways. Technology has made it possible for Western media to broadcast with almost no boundaries globally.

Therefore, Western ideas of liberal democracy are accessible to the youth through programming that combines entertainment underscored by democratic values of participation accountability, and benefits of democracy to citizens (communicating equality). From their responses, it is clear that most of the young viewers aspire to that type of Western democracy where critical expression does not

\textsuperscript{82} This was a concern raised by one of the respondents who said that it would be difficult for a young Kenyan to engage a politician in the current government in debate because of the disrespect the older politicians have of young aspiring political activists. The opinions of the youth are dismissed infantile.
amount to a crime against the government. The media can be used to shape this
generation to learn to participate and express their opinions.

Constant references made to the international news broadcasts shows
underlying aspiration to shape governance. The desire for accountability from the
governing elite based on the examples depicted in the Western media should be
viewed positively; it implies a hidden urge for action and agitation. Of course there is
the argument that Africa tends to borrow from the West. In the same vein, there is an
argument that liberal democracy is a Western construct, and positive lessons can be
learned, seeing that democracy is not culture specific.

7.5.1 Agenda setting

The media owners should provide a platform on which the youth can innovate
their own programs which communicate political content, and disseminate democratic
values in forms understandable to their peers. This is a viable option that need not
cause conflict with the government of the day. It is an opportunity for the media
owners to participate in shaping the political culture of the future crafters of a
consolidated democracy. The respondents’ recommended that if the media owners
open the doors for the youth to chart their own course with regard to developing
democracy, the future will not have to contend with ethnicity and a multitude of
factors of social cleavage, their mindsets are more modernised or simply put
Westernised.

7.6 Government and the media

The narcotising effect of media can be arrested if the government does not feel
threatened. The Kenyan government may not publicly pronounce its quest to control
the dissemination of information, but by licensing many radio stations and television
broadcasters which are geographically restrained denies the youth the opportunity to
convey the information necessary to shape their political culture. This includes voter
education and the role of the citizen in the nation. The licensing of commercial radio
stations whose content is regulated and controlled not to engage in political matters
starves the youth of much needed information in the process towards consolidation of
democracy.
Therefore, the government should allow and encourage for these broadcast stations whose mainstay is entertainment to engage the youth in stimulating discourse over citizenship and their part in Kenya’s democracy. This of course requires monitoring by both private media and government monitoring organs that messages that may cause strife are not disseminated.

7.7 Conclusion

Kenya’s democracy cannot escape the adjectives it has earned e.g. unconsolidated democracy, shallow democracy and Zakaria’s (1996) illiberal democracy because it simply has not yet completed its transition journey. The indisputable evidence of this is the fact that the fundamental features of a consolidated (and consolidating democracy\textsuperscript{83}) e.g. respect for the constitution, democratic institutions and the rule of law are far from being realised. In Sorensen’s words, Kenya’s democracy is surviving, striving and multiparty electioneering is more of a quick fix to something resembling a liberal democracy; basically sugar-coating bad rule. Of course, there is a majority that would be strongly opposed to this view, with the argument that the turn to multiparty democracy is a sign of progress. They argue that it is a beginning.

That is a beginning of something else that is not a consolidating democracy. Any hints of significant gains that may have been on the horizon are completely eclipsed by the sustained unconsolidated state of Kenya’s democracy. Unconsolidation defined by Burton, Higley and Gunther (1992:8-9) is where the ruling elite are the main culprits. Evidence has repeatedly shown that the political elite in Kenya seem to have put Kenya’s democracy in a cycle where the encroachment of democratic values, choking of liberties necessary for the growth of democracy, regular disregard for the rule of law and the constitution (which is not adequately protected) have become norms.

Consolidation of democracy as defined by Diamond (1991) has to do with norms and behaviour, the behaviour of the elite in preserving the democratic values and institutions defines the quality of democracy. Norms as Dahl (1999) points out are derived from political beliefs and the actions of the political elite are guided by their beliefs. If Kenya’s democracy is indeed on course towards consolidation, there

\textsuperscript{83} My own emphasis
would be evidence of dedication and commitment to subject the overweening presidential powers to the constitution. The consequence of that would be increased accountability all round, lowering the cases of corruption and bad governance that enjoy presidential shield. There would be boldness to exert the rule of law by the judiciary. Therefore, the norms and beliefs of the Kenyan political elite show a defective political culture which has no ability to guide Kenya’s democracy towards consolidation.

Optimism amidst all gloom can be found in a generational change of leadership. This study set out to ascertain whether the emerging generation of elite in institutions of higher learning have the capacity to craft Kenya’s democracy towards consolidation. The study sought to determine if the political culture of this population group (classified as youth) has the necessary components to transform Kenya’s democracy. This particular group of ages ranging between 18 and 35 years in university was selected based on the view that literacy at this level of study produces a more equipped individual with the ability to innovate and articulate needs. The second categorisation was that of gender within the same group. The fact that this group has grown in an era where modernisation is at full throttle makes them perfect candidates to adopt and accommodate values of liberal democracy with less resistance.

The test group (experimental) was juxtaposed against a similarly-aged group (control) but lacking a University education. The test was furthered to include a gender variable to ascertain whether there is a marked difference between the political cultures of the female and male Kenyans of the same age group. Although the statistical analysis produced a less-than-reliable value in the statistical significance test, that result was not taken as conclusive in determining the purpose of the findings. This is because the study relied on a triangulation method (qualitative and quantitative approaches) and random factors that may affect the quantitative aspect of the study are compensated for by the qualitative elements of analysis.

The study remains in progress because it is in search of meaning of process. That is the process of consolidation of democracy with relation to the future crafters of democracy. Therefore the findings are foundational in moving to the next phase.

From the study it is clear that this group is capable of steering Kenya’s democracy towards consolidation. There is knowledge and potential, but their political culture shows a shortage in commitment and dedication that cannot be simply
dismissed as political apathy. With guidance and motivation, one can see a desire to engage in shaping their political future.

The measurement of their political culture concentrated on different segments of the whole that is a democracy. There is slight difference in the political attitudes of the university educated youth and those without. This may be attributed to the effects of globalisation in which cultures are standardised because of an increase in information inflow and access to information. What is significant is that the political feelings and sentiments between these groups are very similar, leading one to conclude that the only way to view this group is as a collective: the youth.

Far from the accusation of political apathy, these youth displayed a more complex problem that remains unidentified by the majority of policy makers and many of those above the age group. This conclusion is reached on the basis that they are fairly politically aware. A majority indicated an awareness of political events both locally and internationally. The most agreed that paying close attention to political changes in Kenya and especially Kenya’s democracy, which they know scantily, is important.

The youth are, however, cautious of joining the political arena for various reasons. While there was consensus that more young people are needed in the political scene, a majority are non-committal to joining politics, citing various factors. These include bad role models in the past and current political elite. This is then tied to multiparty democracy, which they associate with negative political behaviour including disunity, increased social differences along ethnic lines and a thirst for political power for personal gains.

Heavy criticism of the incumbent elite was the major highlight of the study. The group showed a lukewarm feeling towards the electioneering process based on the reason that there is usually no significant or tangible change in Kenya’s democracy and development in general in the post-election period. A majority that have attained the universal suffrage age do not vote. The scepticism is underlined by the feeling that there is no real difference between the present legislators in the multiparty democracy to those during KANU’s single party democracy.

Confidence in the political system is very low. This is again attributed to what the youth see in the political arena. While they are overwhelmingly accepting of Kenya’s multiparty democracy, there is very little regard for political parties deemed not important. While this can be read as very flawed logic in the sense of
understanding of political process, the youth are content to vote for personalities irrespective of what the party stands for. Almost none of them are affiliated to any of the Kenyan political parties.

One of the significant positive discoveries of this study are their attitudes towards one of Africa’s biggest problems to the growth of democracy: ethnicity. Despite the fact that Kenya’s era of multiparty democracy has been blighted by repeated invocation of ethnicity by some political elite for political mileage leading to a loss of lives, this group does not strongly identify with their ethnic origin. One can conclude that if this generation was to be educated in democracy and democratic values they stand a greater chance with democratic consolidation in the absence of ethnic cleavages. This is a major step forward.

7.7.1 The way forward

The unidentified complexity mentioned earlier that is confused with apathy by many is more of a disaffection and frustration. The youth refuse to participate and show disregard towards important components of democratic process like political parties because they feel alienated. They do not feel invited and their importance is diminished by the system as it stands. One would ask how then do they hope to make any difference politically if they refuse to join in the system as it is designed, there are no special mechanisms to accommodate them other than those available to every citizen?

In their words, there would be a marked difference if the media was used to reach the youth for political action. The media to them is the required trigger to shape political culture. There are major comparisons made between the presentation of political content in the Western media and local media. The view is that if the media let in innovation from the younger generation to speak to their peers a lot would change. They are aware that the media does confer status and power, they seek to wield that power to shape their future democracy. They want to be agenda setters taking advantage of this instrument that shapes, constructs and constricts social behaviour.

It may seem like a desire to emulate Western standards of democracy and democratic culture, but if liberal democracy has to take root in Africa and specifically in Kenya, Western influence is a welcome assistance. If the youth aspire to have
democracies like those they see in the West, it is an indication that they see a possibility for change and they have the design to craft the necessary change to Kenya’s democracy which they see. After all there is still not yet an African designed model that can be termed as an African liberal democracy.
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