HOSTAGE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT: PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

KJELL E. LAUVIK

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SUPERVISOR: DR. LYN SNODGRASS

CO-SUPERVISOR: PROF. THOKO MAYEKISO
DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

NAME: KJELL ERIK LAUVIK

STUDENT NUMBER: S211183695

QUALIFICATION: DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (DPhil)

TITLE OF THESIS: HOSTAGE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT: PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE OF INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

DECLARATION:

In accordance with Rule G4.6.3, I hereby declare that the above-mentioned treatise/ dissertation/ thesis is my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for assessment to another University or for another qualification.

SIGNATURE:

DATE: 09 January 2014
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Abstract

It is broadly accepted that there is a need for better security management and protocols for hostage incident management, there is currently a lack of basic empirical knowledge about the existing security management protocols with reference to existing policies, knowledge and the capability of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) to handle hostage incidents. Many INGOs have successfully managed high-profile hostage crises, but there is still a considerable level of uncertainty about the way these crises have been solved and the way their success can be seen in relation to other crises. This study aimed to understand how INGOs prepare themselves for hostage incidents, whether policies, procedures are in place, how they manage hostage situations, and also how INGO staff are trained and prepared.

The methodology adopted for this study was qualitative and comprised of in-depth interviews with sixteen INGOs and ten industry experts and a review of INGO documents, policies and plans.

The study sheds light on some of the less talked-about aspects for INGO security management in general, as well as preparedness and responsibility towards their staff. The study suggests that while most organisations have a level of preparedness in place, enhancing each agency’s respective policies may assist the organisation in better management. The study also found that there is a higher use of ransom payment than expected, and that there is an increasing willingness to engage external expertise to assisting in managing a hostage crisis.

The study makes several recommendations that may have policy implications, including pre-deployment hostile environment training, reviewing potential cooperation between INGOs and United Nations, and the use of external resources to assist in managing a hostage crisis. It also recommends a revision of existing negotiation models, as the current models are lacking in addressing protracted hostage cases. The establishment of an accurate database of incidents to allow for improved interpretation of trends and scope of hostage cases is also recommended.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Hostage is a crucifying aloneness. There's a silent, screaming slide into the bowels of ultimate despair. Hostage is a man hanging by his fingernails over the edge of chaos and feeling his fingers slowly straightening.

Hostage is the humiliating stripping away of every sense and fibre of body and mind and spirit that make you what you are. Hostage is a mutant creature, full of self-loathing, guilt and death wishing.

But he's a man, a rare, unique, and beautiful creation of which these things are no part.

Brian Keenan, on Friday, August 24, 1990 at his post-release press conference after 1,574 days as a hostage in Beirut, Lebanon.

This study is based on hostage management as a subset of crisis management within the field of conflict management, while exploring the role of international non-governmental organisations in it.

Hostage taking is covered by a number of conventions and declarations, of which the most important is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees inter alia the right to life, liberty and security of person, freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, freedom of movement, protection from arbitrary detention (United Nations, 1948).

The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages is also a key document. It was adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979, and provides that ‘everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’ and further that ‘that the taking of hostages is an offence of grave concern to the international community’ (United Nations, 1979). Later, on 18 December 1985, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution against Taking Hostages by a 15 to 0 vote. United Nations (UN)
conventions require that each country use its own legal system to put into effect and enforce the agreement. However, UN resolutions are merely agreements on a specific set of goals or principles. Hence, conventions are legally more binding than resolutions, since resolutions do not imply a commitment to enforce the resolution. Nevertheless, the UN has no direct power to force a nation to abide by any of its agreements (Enders and Sandler, 2006, p. 121). Other international instruments are also in place, such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which states that ‘hostage-taking constitutes a war crime’ and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 both state that hostage taking a breach of the protection of victims of war (United Nations, 2005).

The history of hostage taking is also studied in a chronological order, starting from over 2000 years ago and how it has evolved in the 21st century. Next, the trend of hostage-taking in various countries and the days in captivity have been compiled to better understand how, over time, this has become an effective measure for perpetrators, be it organized criminals or terrorists. The categories of hostage-takers are also explored in the scope of this study in light of their motivations and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) classifications, including: escape from legal action in case of a crime gone wrong or family dispute; promoting terror; gaining political support from the INGO and detachment of the same from enemy state. Other categories have also been cited, such as those of Fuselier (1981, p. 10-15) and Gray (1981, p. 14-18), who categorise hostage-takers into mentally unstable people, or those wanting monetary gains. No matter what category, motivation of the hostage-takers may change over time, and so can the goal.

Hostage taking is not a new phenomenon, but has been used as a tactic for exerting geopolitical and domestic power since ancient times (Hammer, 2007, p. 39) when it was a common and legitimate strategy of government diplomacy. The Roman Empire used hostage taking to ensure the conquered populations did not rebel against the occupation (Poland and McCrystle, 1999, p. xi), and perhaps the earliest recorded hostage incident is described in Genesis 14 of the
Old Testament of the Bible, where Lot was taken hostage (Soskis and Van Zandt, 1986, p. 423-435).

In more recent times, hostage taking has increasingly been used as a tactic to achieve political aims, such as the abductions at the Munich Olympics in 1972, the 1980 Iranian Embassy siege in London, and a number of abductions of foreigners in Lebanon in the late 1980s. Hostage taking as a tactic has been popular among terrorists groups in Europe, especially Ireland and Italy, in Central and South America, and the Middle East. In particular second generation terrorist groups have adopted the tactic of hostage taking. While such groups can trace their origins to national freedom or political causes, they have later lost their ideological orientation, but often maintained the rhetoric, and have since become criminals under cover of a political cause (Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, 2001, p. 119). In the past decade, the tactic of hostage taking has continued at an amplified level, such as the events in the Moscow Theatre siege in 2002 (Anderson, 2009, p. 102), and the Beslan School siege (Anderson, 2009, p. 74).

While a number of terrorist groups consider hostage taking and kidnapping as part of their mission (Yun, 2007, p. 23-26), others are involved only in order to gain financial support (Auerbach, 1999; Murphy, 2004). This is supported by Maceda (2003), Murphy (2004), and Ramachandran (2005), whom shows that terrorists have gained substantial financial support through hostage taking.

Management of a hostage crisis, a core topic of this study, is also examined in detail. A hostage incident usually carries significant impact on the ability or interest to deliver humanitarian assistance, as such assistance is often suspended until the incident is resolved (Stoddard et al, 2012). Hence, the programmatic impact is wider than that of the individual(s) taken. In many ways, the impact of a hostage crisis can have a higher impact on INGO programme delivery than the death of a staff.

If the hostage situation ends up with negotiation, there are different strategies which can be used by the negotiator to plan the process. It is important to map the conflict, and outline and identify the negotiation components like establishing rapport, gaining time, calm the situation down, and obtain
information. These are essential to have in place, no matter what strategy is chosen to resolve the crisis. All major known models have been described in detail and their application and limitations outlined. Following this, the psychological effects of captivity, both short and long-term, have been explored.

The use of kidnap and ransom (K&R) insurance is a topic not often openly discussed in the INGO world, but needs to be understood nonetheless. Private entities, including individuals, corporations, and INGOs pay millions of dollars in ransom money every year, and a large number of insurance providers sell specialised K&R insurance policies to reimburse ransom payments (Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 2012). K&R insurance has its pros and cons, like any policy. The opponents of K&R insurance argue that ransom payment has led to a criminal industry where many elements profit from extortion of international corporations through hostage taking, and that insurance companies are financing this industry by paying ransoms to hostage takers.

The research has been designed keeping in mind all facets of the hostage management phenomenon globally. The following section focuses on the problem statement of the research.

1.1 Problem Statement

Although it is broadly accepted that there is a need for better INGO security management and protocols, there is currently a lack of basic empirical knowledge about security management protocols with reference to existing policies, knowledge and capability of INGOs to handle hostage incidents. Hence with this background, research will be carried out to understand how INGOs prepare themselves for hostage incidents, whether policies, procedures are in place, how they manage hostage situations, and also how INGO staff on an individual basis are trained and prepared. If these factors could be better understood, successful strategies could be developed for INGOs to improve the management of a hostage ordeal, with the very realistic prospect of meaning the difference between life and death.
Some NGOs lack adequate resources to manage a hostage crisis; despite working in high volatile areas and knowing that incidents are imminent and highly possible. The response of INGOs to such incidents is what makes the core problem of the study. The problem statement for the study is as follows:

The number of hostage-taking incidents in INGOs has seen an upward trend over time. While the motives and goals may be different for each incident, the sheer scale and consequences of this phenomenon has made the existence of a protocol for handling such a situation, imperative. Many INGOs have such procedures established which encompass multiple facets, e.g. adequate resources like incident managers; the funding to support them, and also the training given to them for dealing with incidents, but others do not have such a system in place.

1.2 Research Questions

The following research questions were explored through the selected methodology:

- What capacity do INGOs have in terms of human and financial resources to manage and contain a hostage situation?

- What are the levels of training and knowledge of hostage incidents and survival with which INGO staff are prepared when they are deployed in environments prone to hostage situations?

- What policies and procedures do INGOs have in place for hostage incident management?

- What do INGOs consider to be sufficient duty of care towards staff for preventing and managing hostage incidents?
1.3 Statement of the Study’s Aims and Objectives

The study was aimed at understanding how INGOs prepare for and deal with hostage incidents. The past decade has seen a significant increase in number of hostage incidents and hostage incidents are becoming a matter of utmost concern for many INGOs.

The objectives of the study comprised delving into some specific aspects of the hostage management function. The objectives of the study were as follows:

- To determine what resource capacity INGOs have for dealing with hostage incidents.
- To assess what kind of training and knowledge INGO staff are equipped with before they are deployed in volatile environments where hostage taking is likely.
- To analyse what policies and procedures INGOs have in place for hostage incident management.
- To determine what INGOs consider to be adequate duty of care towards staff for preventing and managing hostage incidents.

1.4 The Significance of Study

The researcher chose this particular topic and worked on it both formally and informally so as to help in the development of successful strategies for INGOs in improving hostage management situations. In order to achieve this, the researcher transcribed interviews and identified themes from the patterns coming from each participant. The researcher’s own database of hostage cases shows that humanitarian workers were held in captivity for more than 6,000 days in total in 2012 a fact that substantiates the scope of the problem. In the absence of a global watchdog group, many kidnappings are unreported, and therefore it is difficult to estimate the exact global rates. Auerbach (1999, p. 435) believes that
only 30 per cent of kidnappings on a worldwide basis are reported and that ‘in
some countries, the reporting rate is as low as 10 per cent’.

The literature survey shows an increasing trend in humanitarian workers’
abduction rates (Stoddard et al., 2006; 2009) and that NGO workers who operate
in war areas are subjected to increased intentional violence (Rowley et al.,
2008). This calls for some action to be taken in response to these abductions.

Such an increasing trend in a dangerous phenomenon like hostage taking poses a
great threat for aid workers globally. In order to put a stop to them or even
curtail the number of incidents, it is important that such a research be conducted
and some light is shed on the preparedness of the many INGOs around us. There
should be a comprehensive and documented compilation of reality and this study
aims to provide just that.

This study will touch upon the policies and procedures for hostage incident
management, including:

- The human and financial resource capacity to manage and contain a
  hostage situation.

- The training and knowledge provided to the INGO staff in environments
  where hostage situation is likely.

- The duty of care INGOs consider sufficient towards their staff in order to
  prevent and manage hostage situations.

This study further covers INGO hostage management strategies to a great extent
and will help many prospective aid workers make informed decisions, especially
when working in highly volatile areas.

1.5 Definition of Key Terms

The word ‘hostage’ is derived from the Latin word *hospes*, which means
‘hospitality’. Hence, it is understood that there is a relationship between the
hostage taking concept and the origin of this phrase. This term reflects the
recurrent political and military utilisation of hostages in ancient times, when one
or more hostages would be handed over by political authorities as an assurance of trust in the observance of obligation (Strentz, 2012, p. 3).

This concept has evolved immensely in both meaning and matter since the term originated (Faure, 2003, p. 469). Today, a hostage is someone who is captured or held as security for the accomplishment of a certain condition (Oxford Dictionary, 2013), and a hostage event is an incident in which one or more people are captured against their will by a group or by individuals, generally by force, after which the hostage takers make demands (Giebels, Noelanders, and Vervaeke, 2005, p. 241-253).

Hostage taking has also been described as ‘a way of setting up a bargaining position that cannot be as conveniently or well achieved by other means… [it] is a naked power play’ (Cooper, 1981, p. 1). Gary Noesner, the former head of the FBI Hostage and Crisis Unit, gives another definition whereby

A hostage incident is carried out by a suspect involved in determined behaviour for the accomplishment of certain results that signifies substantive gain for the suspect. In this context, hostages serve as true bargaining chips that can be traded for something (Hammer, 2007, p. 39).

Tom Hargrove, a former hostage held by Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - FARC) in Columbia for 334 days, defined a hostage succinctly as ‘the deliberate creation and marketing of human grief, anguish, and despair’ (Lopez, 2011, p. i). The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979, states

Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (hostage) in order to compel a third party, namely, a state, an international intergovernmental organisation, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offense of
taking hostages within the meaning of this Convention (United Nations).

There exists a scientific difference of meaning between the terms ‘hostage taking’ and ‘kidnapping’. James M. Poland (1988, p. 137) differentiates kidnapping and hostage taking by defining the former as ‘[seizing and] restraining the victim to some secret location and making demands’, while hostage taking entails a direct argument with officials of a government or an organisation at a known location while the victims are kept secure in that location. These definitions do entail some problems and Poland acknowledges that the distinction is often not very clear.

Attempts have been made within the NGO community to reach common definitions in the security field. Anna Dick’s paper Creating Common Security Terminology for NGOs examined security documents from a total of 32 organisations, and it contributes successfully towards providing such commonalities. Dick’s is the definitive work in defining security terminology among NGOs. As security documents are generally sensitive within an organisation, complete anonymity was maintained in the collection of data. It is therefore not possible to determine whether the INGOs participating in this research took part in Dick’s research. The definitions below are those that are identified in Dicks’ research (2010, p. 17-20) and adapted as relevant to this study:

- **NGO**: A non-governmental organisation, according to the United Nations, is ‘any organization which is not established by a governmental entity or international agreement’ (Iriye, 2002, p. 2). According to the World Bank (1992), NGOs are defined as ‘many groups and institutions that are entirely or largely independent of the government and that have primarily humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives’.

- **INGO**: An international non-governmental organisation, the conventional requirements of which being that is has members and financial support from at least three different countries and the intention to cover operations in as many.
• **Conflict:** Defined in accordance with Pruitt and Kim (2004, p. 8) as a ‘perceived divergence of interest, a belief that the parties’ current aspirations are incompatible’.

• **Hostage taking:** An incident which is carried out by a suspect involved in determined behaviour for the accomplishment of certain results that signifies substantive gain for the suspect.

• **Abduction:** The act of an individual or group of people taking someone unwillingly without providing any demands. The process of abduction precedes detention (Dick, 2010, p. 18).

• **Detention:** An individual or group of people holding the detained person involuntarily with no intention to harm, as well as with no clear condition to release the hostage (Dick, 2010, p. 17).

• **Kidnapping:** Kidnapping is used for monetary gain or other concessions, generally referred to as ransom (Dick 2010, p. 19).

• **Terrorism:** It has been impossible to reach a global definition of terrorism, so this study will use the word ‘terrorism’ based on the following common denominators:
  - Intended to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population.
  - Utilised for furthering political or social objectives.
  - Directed towards the civilian population, and not security forces.
  - A crime.
  - In the form of either a threat or force.

Using this description of terrorism, we find that it is never accidental; all terrorists have a cause, motive, or reason for their acts, and all terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. It should be noted that this excludes any particular political belief or religion as a factor in the definition of a terrorist.
• **Negotiation:** For the sake of this study negotiation is defined as ‘a communication process whereby the parties through a process of give and take, and collaborative problem-solving, seek a mutually acceptable solution’ (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Folger et al., 2001; Mayer 2000).

### 1.6 Summary statement

The all-encompassing question for this study was ‘What makes up international non-governmental organisations’ preparedness for and response mechanisms to hostage situations?’ The objectives of this study were to make valuable contributions to the way INGOs develop their policies and practices, and to make some recommendations for hostage managers.

Overall the researcher is confident that the attempts to find information were successful and shed light on the present security management methods. While most organisations have a level of preparedness in place, going into further details on the policies may assist organisations in better management. The researcher also found that there is a higher use of ransom payment than what was expected, and that there is an increasing trend and willingness to engage external expertise in assisting in managing a hostage crisis.

While the data collected is a small sample, it is nevertheless significant since this is the first time an attempt has been made to combine and integrate all factual information in order to make the above-mentioned determinations.

The study is divided into six chapters. Each chapter is organised along relevant topics and sub-headings.

• **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION** – This chapter provides the introduction to the study. It outlines the background (context) of the study, the research problem, the objectives of the study, the research questions, the significance of the study, the theoretical framework, the research methodology, the scope of the study, and the structure of the study.
CHAPTER 2: INGO OPERATIONS AND SECURITY MECHANISMS
– This chapter explores relevant literature and introduces the operating environment, regions in which active INGO operations are in progress, and the relevance to NGO security mechanisms put in place to operate there.

CHAPTER 3: HOSTAGE MANAGEMENT – This chapter explores three distinct aspects of hostage management; introduction, definitions and history, hostage taking as terrorism, and managing a hostage crisis. This chapter also explores the literature on international instruments and frameworks surrounding hostage taking, drawing conclusions about their relevance for INGOs.

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY – This chapter describes and explains the research methods utilised in the study. These consist of the approach, methodology, plan, and data collection technique employed, bringing together into a coherent whole the procedures followed in the research project.

CHAPTER 5: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS – This chapter explains the findings of the study, providing an extensive analysis of the responses of each of the participants in the study for comparison and discussion.

CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY OF STUDY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS – This chapter provides a brief overview of the study, with a summary and discussion of the pertinence of the findings for hostage management for INGOs. The importance of the research is explained, and recommendations for future research studies in the field of hostage management are provided.
CHAPTER 2: INGO OPERATIONS AND SECURITY MECHANISMS

2.1 Introduction

The literature review will explore works that are relevant to understanding the development of, and the interpretation of, the findings of this study. The scope of this study, hostage management for INGOs, spans several disciplines and sub-topics. For this reason, the researcher found it necessary to divide the review into two chapters, each focusing on a specific topic. This chapter will introduce the operating environment, regions in which active INGO operations are in progress, and the relevant to NGO security mechanisms put in place to operate there.

The review will survey the literature and previous studies in order to analyse, synthesise and evaluate knowledge on each of these specific topics. This process was designed to increase the knowledge of the researcher, provide background and context for this study, and offer perspective for the research. As such, materials on existing conceptual frameworks, theories, techniques, processes, styles and instruments related to the topic under research will be reviewed, allowing the researcher to identify the literature that makes important theoretical contributions to the field. A large quantity of documents have also been reviewed, and a list of these can be found in Appendix 2.

The literature review for this chapter accounts for accredited scholars’ and researchers’ publications on the NGO operating environment; it aims to enhance knowledge and understanding of researchers’ perspectives on the topic by offering a historical perspective of NGOs, discussing the current situation as it relates to security, and summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments presented. In order to promote understanding of the security mechanisms used by INGOs to manage the security of their staff, assets, and programmes, the researcher will present the literature available on NGO security and, for comparison, the security of other international organisations.
Particular attention will be paid to traditional security approaches, such as the acceptance model, and whether they are still relevant approaches to security management. The researcher will also survey literature on risk management, as this appears to be an increasingly common approach taken by NGOs. Finally, the review will examine potential challenges to effective security management and security coordination.

Before starting the review, the researcher will lay out the theoretical framework that guides this study.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Darlington and Scott (2002, p. 46) states that to propose theory design, the researcher must have a thorough understanding of the theory. This study is within the field of conflict management, and managing a hostage crisis can be described as conflict resolution in a crisis situation (Vecchi et al., 2005, p. 533-539). Wilmot and Hocher (2007, p. 117) defined conflict as ‘the perceived blocking of important goals, needs, or interests of one person or group by another person or group’. These definitions of conflict are certainly most relevant for hostage cases as well. A hostage situation is certainly a crisis, and a crisis is the result of a conflict gone wrong. It is therefore clear that a hostage crisis falls under a conflict resolution framework.

Further in conflict theory we find that a crisis is a situation that an individual perceives as presenting impossible hindrances to achieving their desired goals (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1977). Further, the individual may have the feeling that the hindrances or obstacles are too great to be controlled through normal problem-solving methods (James and Gilliland, 2001).

A number of factors influence whether a situation is perceived as a crisis, including experience in crisis management, coping mechanisms, and public perceptions. Rosenbluh (2001, p.35) found that the reaction to conflict can either be constructive or destructive. In a hostage case, the behaviour is always destructive in the early stages.
2.2.1 Conflict at macro and micro levels

Modern conflict theory has gained increasing importance in theoretical studies, and the concepts, models and theories are diverse and found across all the social science disciplines. Conflicts differ in their scale and significance and can range from a simple angry verbal exchange between individuals to the violent ethnic clashes witnessed worldwide. An important distinction can be made between focusing on the macro conflicts, such as wars and revolutions, and the micro conflicts, such as conflicts within smaller groups and between individuals (Snodgrass, 2005, p. 14).

- Macro conflict involves not just two but multiple groups or organisations. Thus, it generally occurs in the societal level and focuses more on the interrelationships of the social processes, the social structures and their interrelationships. Often several micro level conflicts could lead to macro level conflicts.

- Micro conflict is on a much simpler level. It mainly focuses on the behaviour of individuals or groups. In other words it is the study of small scale structures and processes in the society. This study is positioned in a very narrow scope within the field of conflict resolution, and is at a micro level, exploring conflict between smaller groups; the INGO and the hostage takers.

The study is based on three theoretical areas; crisis management, conflict resolution, and negotiation theory. These three areas will be explored further below:

2.2.2 Crisis management frameworks

Crisis management scholars tend to approach crisis management from a single discipline, and only a minority approach it from a multi-discipline perspective. Crisis management, including hostage management, intersects with several conflict management and resolution disciplines, such as psychology, communications, public policy, reputation (image) management, risk management, public relations, strategic management, ethical issues,
international relations, relationship management, mass media management, and stakeholder management.

This study visualizing hostage crisis management through the lens of a particular viewpoint, and the study builds upon the work of several crisis management scholars. Pearson and Claire (1998), arguably the most cited scholars in crises management literature, strongly support the multi-discipline approach but recognise that ‘it could lead to a chaotic approach with several different disciplinary voices talking in different languages to different issues and audiences’. This multitude of topics and issues is most certainly the case with hostage management, so the researcher has followed the approach of scholars like Shrivastava (1993, p. 23-25) that analyse from a single disciplinary setting.

There are several types of crisis management frameworks that have been explored as part of this study. The earliest models defined a crisis according to types. Marcus and Goodman (1991) identified three types of crises in their research: accidents, product safety and health incidents, and scandals. Pearson and Mitroffs’ (1993) framework identified altogether seven crisis families: financial or economic attacks, occupational health diseases, environmental accidents, terrorism, damage to reputation, IT attacks, and defects such as recalls, product defects, and computer breakdowns. Myers (1993) likewise offered a framework of crises consisting of natural disasters, environmental events (aircraft accidents, contamination events, explosions), and incited incidents (arson, sabotage, vandalism). Coombs (2007) offered the most recent framework and classified crises as follows:

- **Attacks on organisations:** This can be hacking, negative rumours, product tampering, workplace violence, and terrorism. All of these are attacks that originate from outside the organisation.

- **When things go wrong:** These are situations such as when products have to be recalled, key staff leaving the organisation, accidents, and logistical challenges.
• **When the organisation misbehaves:** This is the organisation failing to address known potential problems, such as not mitigating known risks, sub-standard job performance, system failures that leads to accidents, and regulatory violations.

This study follows the framework of Coombs, where hostage taking is categorised as an attack on the organisation from the outside. However, the most useful framework for this study in terms of crisis management is an approach that accounts for the various stages of a crisis. Modern frameworks began to emerge in the 1990s and generally followed a staged approach to analysing the crisis. Smith (1990) developed a three-stage approach; a pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis format. For this study, this will be preparedness in terms of policy and practices, how to respond to a crisis, and how to provide post-release assistance to former hostages.

### 2.2.3 Conflict resolution framework

Perhaps the most extreme form of conflict resolution an INGO may be involved in is managing a hostage crisis. As governments tend to not provide concessions, it is often left to the INGO to negotiate a solution. M. K. Kozan (1997) describes three conflict management models – harmony, confrontational, and regulative ones which are practiced in societies of different cultural background. Hostage negotiation fits well within Kozan’s confrontational model. This model is based on conflict conceptualization by dividing it into sub issues. Kozan believes that ‘a sense of reasonable compromise aids resolution despite a confrontational style’ (1997, p. 338). A confrontational conflict solving model means governing conflicts by norms of mutual concessions and compromises, and an increased role of preventive instruments of dispute resolution; better communication, and stronger norms of collaboration.

Two features of conflict theory are directly relevant to hostage management. The first is that conflict involves a level of incompatibilities. Geist (1995, p. 46) defines conflict as ‘disagreements, differences of opinions, divergent interpretations, struggles for control, and multiple perspectives’. This is most certainly the case in a hostage crisis. The second feature is the involvement of
interference from another party. Folger, Poole and Stutman (2009, p. 7) see conflict as ‘the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals’. It is the combination of these two factors, incompatibilities and interference, which produce a conflict situation that in turn produces a cognitive appraisal of the perceived threat and an affective reaction. To resolve the conflict, the process must ‘revolve around the perception of threat and the emotional realities’ (Hammer and Rogan, 1997, p. 10-12).

INGO hostage cases are almost entirely well planned abductions, indicating an instrumental focus. In other words, it is a rational action with the aim of delivering substantive demands. In a crime-gone-wrong, family dispute, or a siege, the hostage case is often dominated by expressive behaviour, which is often about venting emotional opinions, and with no clear goal. Figure 2.1 further illustrates this behavioural continuum.

Figure 2.1: The behavioural continuum model


However, even instrumental cases will have a high level of emotions, especially during the chaos of the early stages of the incident (Romano, 2002). This means that both hostages and hostage takers can experience a crisis which needs suitable measures to manage the situation.
2.2.4 **Negotiation framework**

A hostage crisis is organised around a set of interlinked paradoxes, all of which have to be resolved for the hostage crisis to end. To better understand the paradoxes in crisis bargaining, they will now be described in greater detail.

**Competitive paradox**

The first paradox to be resolved, and in essence the underlying paradox especially in political abductions, is the competitive paradox (Donohue and Hoobler, 2002, p. 149). The competitive paradox is a product of ‘high interdependence and low affiliation’ (Bercovitch et al., 2008, p. 440). The paradox is that to achieve their goal, the parties must increase their interdependence by initiating dialogue, while at the same time ensuring distance by being threatening. In other words the hostage takers need the INGO to achieve its objectives, but will often threaten to take the life of the hostage to achieve this. This is a complex stage of negotiation, and where communication could break down with inexperienced hostage incident managers, as both parties attempt to assert their rights and achieve their goals. The only way, however, to reach agreement is through increasing expressions of trust and affiliation, and reduce interdependence. Research exploring the linguistic style of hostage negotiation found that for a crisis to be resolved peacefully, the hostage takers and hostage negotiators had to be synchronous (Taylor, 2008, p. 265-266); there has to be cooperation.

**Paradox of dispossesson**

The next paradox is that of dispossesson, or the less one has the less one has to lose. The paradox is that the hostage taker is simultaneously powerful and powerless. The hostage taker is powerful through the value put on the hostage’s life, but powerless in the sense that hostage taking can be seen as an act of desperation; the hostage takers are so powerless that they have to resort to taking hostages.

If the hostage taker feels there is nothing to lose, then the negotiator loses all potential leverage. The only way for the negotiator to regain leverage is to identify something the hostage taker values, and the negotiators can control the
balance the power. Only when both parties value something can they negotiate in good faith.

**Paradox of detachment**

This paradox holds that the parties are both detached and attached at the same time. They are attached in the sense that they are forced together to solve a difficult situation, but detached in the sense that they have their own objectives and at times may have to act indifferent to the outcome.

**Paradox of face**

Scollon and Scollon (2001, p. 48) address the paradox of face. This is a major issue in hostage negotiations, and several models of negotiations specifically list saving face as a key component. The paradox lays in the fact that if either party shows too much involvement, they are likely to feel the interdependency threatened. However, with a lack of involvement, the party will often feel their counterpart has managed to restrict their involvement. Scollon and Scollon therefore state that ‘there is no faceless communication; any communication is a risk to face’ (2001, p. 49). Another side of the paradox of face is that the more ruthless your reputation, the more ruthless you will have to be. This is seen in cases where a group of hostage takers has previously killed a hostage. In these cases, serious threats are not often needed; the hostage takers have the attention of the negotiators.

**Paradox of irrationality**

This paradox is complicated in a hostage case. Machiavelli once said that ‘anyone compelled to choose will find greater security in being feared than loved’ (Barnett, 2004 p. 695). To be irrational, or at least to appear irrational, enlarges the seriousness of the threat. The threat to kill an innocent hostage can appear so irrational that only an insane person could do it. In essence, the more delirious the person making the threat, the more serious the threat; the more delirious the victim, the less serious the threat. However, once the hostage taker has convinced the negotiation team that he is irrational, the need to appear so disappears.
2.2.5 Emotions and hostage crisis

A crisis situation is often very emotionally laden, and a hostage situation is no different, involving 'subjects that are motivated primarily by emotional needs and exhibit mainly expressive behaviour' (Noesner and Webster, 1997, p. 13). In a hostage crisis, both the hostage takers and the hostage negotiators experience a heightened level of emotions and stress, and one could argue that hostage negotiation is ‘an entirely emotion-laden event that is created through the interaction of the parties involved’ (Rogan, 1997, p. 25). In short, conflict dynamics coupled with a hostage crisis creates a pattern of contentious behaviour of high emotions mixed with face issues (Rogan, 1997, p. 26). Scholars agree that emotions, especially deep-seated emotions, are more of an obstacle to resolution and reconciliation than material interests and traditional frameworks of negotiation (Maiese, 2006; in Snodgrass, 2012, p. 1).

Much of a hostage negotiator’s success depends on their ability to explore and understand what emotional influences the hostage takers have. Because of this, emotions is a key element that can determine how the negotiation will end. The most important point in negotiating for the life of a hostage is to decrease emotions to a degree that allows rapport to be established and through that increase the rationale of the hostage takers. Reducing emotions makes communication easier, develop legitimacy of the negotiator, and can help in establishing a positive relationships. It is unlikely that significant progress can be made when emotions are elevated on both sides of the negotiation.

Traditional instrumental bargaining and problem solving approaches may not work in hostage cases, and this study explores existing models for hostage negotiation, especially with emphasis on emotion and face issues. In one study of 137 hostage cases, the hostage takers made no demand at all in twenty-five per cent of the cases (Head, 1990, p. 50). In these cases, negotiation models such as the principled negotiation model developed by Fisher and Ury (1981) are inefficient. The basic strategy of this model is that you can separate the people from the problem and in this way get parties to focus on issues, negotiate interests and collaborate to achieve a ‘win-win’ outcome all the while managing the ‘people problems’. The approach is underscored by the rationalist or rational
choice model of costs and benefits which assumes that humans makes rational, conscious decisions and can employ logical, problem solving strategies to address all problems (Snodgrass, 2012, p. 1). However, when dealing with a hostage crisis, the people are most often the problem, and can therefore not be separated from the issues. As seen above, a hostage case is full of paradoxes, and managing emotions becomes a key to resolving the crisis.

Snodgrass states that ‘social conflict does not exist without emotion because to be involved in conflict, especially destructive conflict, is to be emotionally charged, and emotionally driven’ (2012, p. 2). She continues to list four reasons emotion and conflict are linked, and the researcher will explore how these are also relevant for hostage cases.

- **Triggering events elicit emotions:** Hostage taking will release a high level of emotions. The hostage takers will experience a level of power; they control life and death of another human. The INGO will experience anger and sadness, and the hostage a level of despair and fear. In the initial contacts between hostage takers and the INGO, the levels of emotional intensity can lead to escalation if not managed.

- **Emotional experience frames the conflict:** Certainly, the hostage takers, especially in political or terror driven cases, will use the hostage to right a perceived wrong. The INGO, on the other hand, will likely feel moral superiority, as they are in place to deliver assistance to a population or state. Both parties will likely feel they hold the ‘moral high ground’, and insist their demand be met.

- **The emotional-relational component:** A hostage case has a strong emotional-relational component through the contacts between the hostage takers and INGO crisis managers. As seen in the paradox of dispossession, the hostage taker is simultaneously powerful and powerless, and emotional communication conveys this. Key relational elements of status and power are elicited where disputants sense their power *vis-à-vis* the ‘other’ (Bodtker and Jameson, 2001: in Snodgrass, 2012, p. 1).
A sense of identity: Emotional experience requires a sense of self which relates to the core concept of identity for both individuals and groups. This is linked to the issue of ‘face’. ‘Face’, is the self-image of the hostage taker, and to resolve the crisis the negotiator must attempt to identify and address the face needs of the hostage takers. This may lead to recognition that face has been respected, and a subsequent de-escalation of the situation.

Similarly, Moisie (2009) lists three primary emotions core to confidence in what he describes as clash of emotions; fear, hope, and humiliation. Fear is the absence of confidence, hope is an expression of confidence, and humiliation is the injured confidence of those who have lost faith in the future. All of these emotions must be recognized and managed in a hostage crisis. It is therefore not surprising that emotions have been increasingly recognized in hostage crisis, and this is reflected in the negotiation models through time. The earliest models were based on the principled negotiation model developed by Fisher and Ury (1981), where emotions do not play a substantial role. The later hostage negotiation models have emotions and especially ‘face’ as the core of reaching a positive solution to the crisis.

2.2.6 The history of hostage negotiation

It is important to stress that while some level of negotiation is involved in most hostage cases, it remains but one of the options in a hostage scenario. Other options include payment without negotiation, ignoring the demands, and a ‘tactical option’: a rescue attempt.

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the vast majority of the literature in this area is focused on identifying negotiation strategies or the various psychological orientations of those involved. This segment will examine the background of hostage negotiation and the various models that have either influenced negotiation tactics or have constituted the framework for the negotiation tactics in use.

It was an unusual love story that gave birth to the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) hostage negotiation team, the first
formal hostage negotiation unit in the world. Would-be robber John Wojtowicz wanted cash to cover his boyfriend’s sex-change surgery when he burst into a Brooklyn bank on 22 August 1972. He ended up holding the bank employees hostage, but the police noticed that ‘he was not ready to die [...] he was looking for a way out’ (Kemp, 2012).

Harvey Schlossberg, at the time a recent graduate with a Ph.D. in psychology, noted the officers’ techniques in brokering a deal to protect the bank workers and became convinced that there was a way to talk a person out of a hostage situation, eliminating the need for tactical force and saving lives. The NYPD was interested in Schlossberg’s proposal, influenced by a disaster that had occurred a year earlier when the Attica prison riots left 34 dead. Two weeks later, the world would stop to watch the horrifying events unfold in Munich, (West) Germany, where Israeli Olympic team members were taken hostage and later killed. This spurred the formal development of a set of guidelines for dealing with hostage negotiations. Schlossberg established a working relationship with Lt. Frank Bolz in order to identify an approach to conversing with people threatening to harm themselves or others (Kemp, 2012).

The massacre at the Munich Olympics in 1972 had a profound impact on the world and on future police operations against terrorists. The failed, poorly coordinated rescue attempt by the German security forces was the impetus for many countries to establish elite units to handle such situations, which were recognised as beyond the reasonable expectation of skills of an ordinary police officer or soldier. German police sharpshooters opened fire and the terrorists threw hand grenades into the helicopter holding the Israelis. Eleven Israeli athletes, one police officer, and five terrorists were killed.

The German police were subjected to stark criticism of the failed rescue attempt (Simonsen and Spindlove, 2009, p. 184-185; Purpura, 2006, p. 60). It was also noted that the police did not have sufficient options in terms of negotiating. Upon the hostage takers’ rejection of the offer from the German police, the police had no alternate ‘plan b’. The need for a technique or strategy in managing crisis scenarios in an organised manner to save the lives of the
hostages was clearly exposed and emphasised by this incident. The NYPD hostage negotiation approach developed by Schlossberg was implemented by the Federal Bureau of Investigation by 1974. Once the methodology had been established, the FBI expanded it and conducted hostage negotiation training for FBI Special Agents. Both state and regional police officials were subsequently trained in the same way (Strentz, 2012, p. 3).

Soskis and Van Zandt (1986, p. 423-435) illustrated that the necessity of useful crisis management methods in terms of hostage scenarios had been realised by global law enforcement organisations after observing the Munich hostage incident. As a result, law enforcement started to explore novel methods to manage hostage crises. Lanceley (2010), and McMains and Mullins (2001) explained that global law enforcement agencies began to introduce various approaches on hostage negotiation for the purpose of hostage management.

Johnson (1978, p. 797-803) points out that it is clearly not in the best interest of those who have been taken as hostages to have someone negotiating for them on the basis of manipulation. Rather than trying to manipulate, negotiators should handle incidents from the point of view of management. Negotiators must recognise that they are working with unique individuals and with joint sets of goals, and that while people generally do not mind being managed, they definitely resent being manipulated.

This awareness has formed a basis for the negotiation approach, and the methodology has continued to develop. McMains and Mullins (2010, p. 5) posited that hostage negotiation has reached its current level due to the analyses and studies that have been conducted over the past thirty years by various knowledgeable negotiators, psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and clinical social workers.

### 2.2.7 Generic components of hostage negotiations

While it is recognised that each case is different, crisis intervention and negotiation follow a fairly systematic pattern. Many negotiations are carried out with at least one side of the negotiation in what can be described as a state of crisis, which means that normal thinking and functions are disrupted. Decisions
and activities that would appear easy to carry out under normal circumstances, can in a crisis be much more difficult due to emotional or affective level. Consequently, establishing an environment where a person can cope through is perhaps the most important element of a crisis intervention (Roberts, 2005, p. 66). To reach this environment, the negotiators must establish rapport with the hostage taker. This is often achieved by delaying issues, referred to as buying time, and obtain information to gain the best possible negotiation strategies and tactics (Romano and McMann, 1997, p. 1-3). Each of these elements are briefly discussed below:

- **Establishing communication and developing rapport:** In negotiation, a skill called active listening is essential. The reason for active listening is to be able to reflect the hostage taker’s emotions, and therefore be seen as being understanding. If this can be achieved, rapport becomes solid, and the hostage taker can be influenced towards a positive outcome of the crisis.

- **Buying time:** Time is very important for the negotiator (Romano, 2002, p. 12). Time has an impact on all involved, and will normally reduce the high emotions often seen in the earliest stages of a hostage case. Negotiators refer to buying time as verbal containment, with the objective of engaging the hostage taker in discussions.

- **Defusing intense emotions:** Discussions between negotiator and hostage taker takes place on two separate levels. The obvious one is the verbal level, or the words spoken. The second level is the emotions behind the words. How the hostage taker feels is influencing his behaviour, so actively listening for emotions is very important.

- **Gathering intelligence:** In a crisis situation information is always insufficient. The crisis manager will seek information on the chances of the hostage being harmed, medical condition, and as much information about the hostage takers as possible.
2.2.8 Conflict mapping

One way to describe relationships in conflict is to use a method called conflict mapping. This is a technique used to describe a conflict graphically, placing the parties in a conflict in relation to each other as well as to the problem (Fisher, et al., 2007, p. 22). Conflict mapping can form a useful tool during a hostage crisis, especially in hostage cases that are protracted, in some cases lasting for more than a year. As actors come and go and dynamics change, conflict maps act as a ‘framework that expand our thinking about conflict, challenge our assumptions and … [they] are readily and practically usable’ (Snodgrass, 2005, p. 14). The map becomes a visual guide that allows alternative approaches to be tested as ‘we can more easily see to what extent conflict is caused by the structure i.e. organization setting and resources and to what extent it is caused by the individuals i.e. values, communication and conflict handling styles’ (Snodgrass, 2006).

Mapping in the 2008 Somalia hostage case

The figure below (Figure 2.2) shows the lines and flow of relationships which were in existence during the hostage taking of a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff in Somalia in 2008, a case which the researcher was actively involved in.

The figure shows the parties to the conflict, the sources of conflict, and the dynamics of the relationships. The hostage was originally abducted to be executed, but the hostage takers instead decided to ask for ransom. The fact that the hostage takers were willing to kill from the start made it a very delicate negotiation process. Both before and during the period of captivity other UN staff were executed by Al Shabaab, again emphasizing the criticality of the case.

Parties

The main parties indicated on the map are the hostage takers, the hostage taker negotiator (Zubair), UN hostage negotiators, the family of the hostage, the family liaison, Al-Shabaab, the Islamic Court Union, and UN headquarters. All of these parties are depicted on the map by different size circles and colours,
reflecting their relative significance (power) and by connectors which indicate
the nature of these relationships.

Figure 2.2: Conflict mapping of Somalia hostage case


**Relationship Dynamics**

The hostage takers had a professional negotiator on their end who called himself
Zubair. It became clear that Zubair was working for the hostage takers, and not
with them. There was obvious tension between the negotiation cell and Zubair,
as Zubair needed ransom to be paid.
The hostage takers were Al-Shabaab, but this was not an ‘official’ Al-Shabaab abduction. There was clearly a significant influence from Al-Shabaab towards the hostage takers however, as the negotiation cell had intermittent contact (through intermediaries) with Al-Shabaab leaders which were aware of the case but not willing to assist in securing a release.

The negotiation cell had a strained relationship with the spouse of the hostage. Naturally, the spouse wanted the hostage released immediately. The negotiation cell had a family liaison, a psychologist, working with the spouse, and they had a very good relationship between themselves. Hence, the negotiation cell used the family liaison as the intermediary with the spouse, and the specialist function proved invaluable in this case.

The spouse of the hostage also had very good contact with the clan elders of the Sheikhal clan; that of both the hostage and the spouse. The clan elders again had access to elements in Al-Shabaab, so this was an avenue to influence decisions of the hostage takers. Likewise, the negotiation cell engaged religious leaders in the Somali community to declare hostage taking as a negative, and asking for the release of the hostage.

The negotiation team naturally enjoyed good relationships with the UN headquarters in New York, as well as UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, and through these large networks could reach out to the Somali diaspora, which again could exert influence over the process.

In the end, the largest influencer was that of the Islamic Court Union, of which the negotiation cell had managed to get access to the top leadership. These leaders intervened and demanded the release of the hostage, which subsequently happened after 67 days in captivity.

Using mapping in this case was useful, as it clearly laid out relationships, and prompted the negotiation cell to explore alternative approaches. New influencers could be sought, and equally important, it highlighted avenues that should not be approached as it could increase risk to the hostage.
2.2.9 Negotiation strategies

Various strategies can be used to reach the objective. Should the INGO concerned have some a policy that allows for negotiations, it should have distinguishable negotiable and non-negotiable demands in its policy. It could be argued that, to a degree, all demands can be negotiated. However, most negotiators will assess demands based on the safety and feasibility of conceding to the demands, the consequence if they are not met, and the benefit of meeting the demands.

As stated above, anything can technically be negotiated, but the following guidelines are generally seen as the norm by hostage negotiation professionals (Miller, 2005, p. 277-281):

- **Negotiable demands**: These include food, drinks, cigarettes, and environmental controls, such as heat, air conditioning, electricity, plumbing, blankets, and so on.

- **Non-negotiable demands**: These include illegal drugs, weapons, release of friends or relatives in prison, or the exchange of hostages.

- **‘Grey area’ demands**: These may depend on the special circumstances and judgment of the negotiating team, and include alcohol, money, media access, transportation, or freedom.

The items listed above are rarely relevant in a prolonged INGO hostage case, so an INGO should establish its own parameters.

A strong feature of any hostage negotiation is a struggle for control between the hostage takers and the negotiator. Both sides will try to use their positions to gain an advantage. This typically means that the hostage taker will threaten the life of the hostage, often using very threatening language, such as ‘time is running out for this hostage’. The use of threats is an indication that hostage takers with material goals, take hostages to use as leverage (Borowsky, 2011, p. 3-6). The researcher has therefore reviewed the most common approaches to negotiation.
**The Principled Negotiation model**

This model is perhaps the earliest model of negotiation to gain broad acceptance. The ‘Principled Negotiation’, was developed by Fisher and Ury in 1981 and expanded upon by Fisher, Ury, and Patton in 1991. The model focuses on an ‘interest-based’ approach to resolving a conflict, and promotes four fundamental principles:

- Separate the person from the problem.
- Focus on mutual interests instead of individual positions.
- Generate options for mutual gain.
- Insist on using objective criteria to judge the effectiveness of the agreement.

![Figure 2.3: Principled Negotiation model](image)

*Source: Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991)*

The principle of separating the person from the problem is based on the fact that people tend to become personally and emotionally involved with the problem, and therefore see the problem as a personal attack. The next principle rely on the
premise that good solutions focus on the interests of the negotiating parties, rather than their positions. If the focus stays on position, there will always be a ‘losing side’ to the negotiation, but if the focus is on interest, the chances of finding a solution that is satisfactory is higher. The third principle aims to generate options for the parties, so that both sides of the negotiation can benefit. The last principle focuses on setting out objective criteria so progress can be measured and an effectiveness of a potential agreement can be evaluated.

This model provided an early framework for hostage negotiators, but it has some limitations in a crisis setting. The primary weakness is that the model assumes that both sides to the conflict wants a solution and that the parties are rational. The high state of emotions on all sides of the negotiations makes it practically impossible to separate the people from the problem, which forms the core recommendation of the model.

**The ‘Getting Past No’ model of negotiation**

Ury (1991, p. 147-153) built upon the ‘Getting to yes’ model when he developed a five-step model specifically for difficult negotiations, including that of hostage negotiation. The first step, ‘Don't react—go to the balcony’, is aiming to have the negotiator move from a role as a participant in the process to an observer. The aim is to have the negotiator free of any heated emotions, such as anger, and this is best achieve by some emotional distance.
Figure 2.4: The ‘Getting Past No’ model

Source: Ury (1991)

The second step of the model is ‘Stepping to their side’, which is the negotiation equivalent of ‘walking in their shoes’. Stepping to their side will allow the negotiator to provide the perception of working together to solve the crisis. The use of active listening skills, described in more detail later in the chapter, is the best tool available to achieve the perception of a joint effort through the use of tools such as mirroring, paraphrasing, emotional labelling and summarising.

‘Change the game’ is the next step and is focused on reframing demands from the hostage takers, so to avoid rejecting them, at least at an early stage of negotiation. At this step open-ended questions are used to keep the hostage takers talking and explaining different options and alternatives.

The fourth stage of Ury’s model is all about making it easy for the hostage takers to agree to the negotiator. At this stage as many ideas as possible are generated together with the hostage takers, making them an active contributor towards resolving the situation. At this stage options geared towards saving face is also introduced to increase the likelihood of a successful resolution of the crisis (Mullins, 2002, p. 63-64).
The fifth and final stage is ‘Make it hard to say no’. This takes step four forward by finding reasons for the hostage taker to say ‘yes’ as in step four, but also begin to put reasons in place for why saying ‘no’ is difficult.

This model is an improvement for crisis managers over the ‘Getting to yes’ model, but especially step four and five rely on rational parties to the conflict. Step five should only be engaged if the parties have established rapport, and emotions have normalised.

**The Crisis Bargaining model**

Donohue, Kaufmann, Smith, and Ramesh (1991, p. 133-154) developed a model specifically for crisis bargaining. This model focuses on the type of bargaining that takes place, and distinguishes between crisis (distributive) and normative (integrative) bargaining. The crisis bargaining model incorporates the idea of both relationship (expressive) and substantive (material) issues being addressed at separate stages in the model.

This model is perhaps useful in kidnap for ransom cases, as the model start by building rapport and discuss matters such as power, trust and status between the negotiator and hostage take, and that only when these matters have been resolved, and rapport has been established, can more attention be placed on substantive issues to resolve the problem. In essence, crisis bargaining is about relationships while normative bargaining is more focused on resolving material issues.
Figure 2.5: The Crisis Bargaining model

Source: Donohue, Kaufmann, Smith, and Ramesh (1991)

Donohue et al. (1991, p. 133-154) suggests the hostage negotiator should attempt to shift the hostage taker from a predominately expressive stand to a more substantive position, but recognise that this may not always be possible.

The Crisis Bargaining model focuses less on specific techniques and more on adapting the style of negotiation to the appropriate needs of the perpetrator.

The S.A.F.E. model of crisis negotiation

The S.A.F.E. model (‘Substantive demands’, ‘Attunement’, ‘Face’, and ‘Emotion’) was developed by Hammer and Rogan (1997, p. 39-53) and quickly gained popularity among negotiators. The model was developed after research into behavioural science, and mixed with practitioner’s experiences.
Figure 2.6: The S.A.F.E. model of crisis negotiation


The S.A.F.E model is designed to de-escalate and resolve crisis situations by using a number of negotiation and communication strategies to influence the hostage taker to a positive resolution to the crisis.

The first element makes reference to ‘Substantive demands’, where the instrumental interests of the hostage takers and their needs are identified. The S.A.F.E model indicates that when the subject is in a substantive demands frame, the negotiator’s goal is to bargain or problem-solve with the subject to achieve a peaceful surrender. The second frame, ‘Attunement’, refers to the relational trust which has been established between the subject and the negotiator. The S.A.F.E. model states that the negotiator’s goal in this frame is to engage in cooperative behaviour to build trust and liking (without compromising safety or security concerns). This frame is in other models referred to as rapport building. The third frame, ‘Face’, refers to the projected self-image of the subject. The model proposes that, in this frame, the negotiator attempt to validate the face needs of the subject in order to promote face honouring and therefore de-escalate the situation.
The final frame, ‘Emotion’, refers to intense, negative emotions that compromise an individual’s ability to cope with the stress of a crisis situation. The goal of the negotiator in this frame is to help the subject cope with emotional distress in a way that permits the negotiator to re-assess the situation and then influence the subject towards a cooperative resolution.

Rogan and Hammer (1997, p. 39) posit that the S.A.F.E. model offers a comprehensive approach for assessing, evaluating and developing effective response strategies to subject behaviour in crisis incidents. They propose that the model be incorporated into the toolbox utilised by crisis negotiation teams.

**The Behavioural Influence Stairway Model**

One of the most recent models of crisis negotiation is the Behavioural Influence Stairway Model (BISM) developed by Vecchi, Van Hasselt, and Romano (2005). This is the model currently favoured by the UN. The BISM is a model of behaviour change grounded in the principles of active listening; it was adapted from a model developed by the FBI (Vecchi et al., 2005, p. 533-539).

![Figure 2.7: The Behavioural Influence Stairway Model (BISM)](image)

The BISM highlights the importance of the relationship-building process undergone between the negotiator and the subject in order to achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis situation (Noesner and Webster, 1997, p. 13-18). This relationship has been found to be a key element for the successful resolution of both sieges and hostage situations (Vecchi et al., 2005, p. 535-536). The BISM shares parallel concepts with models of motivational interviewing, with emphasis placed on skills such as empathy, rapport and active listening in order to facilitate behaviour change. In line with this, the BISM consists of four elements, those of active listening skills, empathy, rapport, and behavioural influence. Progression from through the stages occurs through utilising these skills (underpinned by active listening throughout) with the aim of building a relationship with the subject in order to facilitate behaviour change. The key element of active listening has been shown to facilitate behaviour change and crisis resolution (Lanceley, 2004; Noesner and Webster, 1997) and hence justifies this underpinning. Research indicates that when this process is undertaken effectively the probability of positive behaviour change increases, rendering it a building block for the successful resolution of the crisis situation (Vecchi et al., 2005).

The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Communications

The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Negotiation was devised by PJ Taylor (2002, p. 7-48), who highlighted the complex nature of negotiation focusing on levels of interaction, motivational emphases, and behaviour intensity within negotiations. The model was compiled by examining qualitative data from nine resolved cases of hostage negotiation with results of analysis via non-metric multi-dimensional scaling solution, revealing clear empirical support for the cylindrical nature of communication behaviour. The model proposes three general levels of interaction behaviour during negotiations; these begin with avoidance, progress to distributive, and finally move to integrative. This concept is analogous to the crisis vs. normative bargaining conceptualisation proposed by Donohue et al. (1991, p. 133-154) and Donohue and Roberto (1996, p. 209-229).
Taylor’s model proposes that the negotiator aim to move the subject through these levels progressively in order to direct subjects away from non-active participation (avoidant) interaction and towards a degree of cooperation which may be based on self-interest (distributive) through to eventual normative and cooperative communication (integrative) that will result in reconciliation of the parties’ respective divergent interests. The model also proposes the existence of three different motivational emphases within negotiation behaviour, classifying these as instrumental, relational, and identity themes. The first theme refers to behaviour linked to the subject’s instrumental needs, which can be described as tangible commodities or wants. The second theme refers to behaviour linked to the relationship or affiliation between the negotiator and the subject; the third theme refers to the negotiating parties’ concern for self-preservation and ‘face’ (Goffman, 1967, p. 36).

Finally, the model proposes the existence of a third variable within negotiations, which Taylor refers to as the intensity of negotiation behaviour. This concept relates to the degree to which intense behaviours appear within negotiations; research indicates that a speaker’s attitude towards a concept under discussion is revealed as deviating more from neutrality with more frequent use of strange examples, intensive swearing, and frequent and substantive changes in intonation. Similar research has shown that the appearance of such intense
behaviours has a detrimental effect on negotiation, increasing the tendency for conflict and for negotiation break-down (Lewicki et al., 2010, p. 84).

The strength of Taylor’s model lies in its conceptualisation of negotiation behaviour as inter-related communication components rather than as discrete, mutually exclusive categories. As such, the cylindrical model avoids the limitations of early, static style-based frameworks for negotiation; it enables both researchers and negotiators to consider the changing pattern of communication behaviour across the entire negotiation process (Taylor, 2002, p. 44-48). Taylor’s model provides a detailed micro-level analysis of crisis behaviour and provides a detailed and unique insight into the multi-dimensional existence of negotiation behaviour.

**Structured Tactical Engagement Process (STEP) model**

The Structured Tactical Engagement Process (STEP) model devised by Kellin and McMurtry (2007, p. 29-51) provides a framework for both understanding and influencing a hostage taker’s behaviour in order to reach a peaceful resolution by adopting principles from the Transtheoretical Stages of Change Model (Prochaska and DiClemente, 1986, p. 3-27). Kellin and McMurty propose that a crisis situation has to go through four stages in order to reach successful resolution. The stages consist of ‘Precontemplation’ (Step 0), ‘Contemplation’ (Step 1), ‘Preparation’ (Step 2) and ‘Action’ (Step 3), with the final stage resulting in behavioural change that leads successful and peaceful resolution.

The authors affirm that a variety of skills and techniques can be utilised in order to help guide subjects through these four stages. The initial stage of any negotiation is characterised by the ‘Precontemplation’ stage, whereby the subject is unwilling to acknowledge that either the situation or his or her behaviour needs to change. The subject tends to be uncooperative and unrealistic at this point in the negotiation and it is the role of the negotiator to steer the subject away from this stage and into the ‘Contemplation’ stage whereby he or she can begin to contemplate a change in behaviour or situation.
Research has implicated the role of rapport in facilitating behaviour change (Miller and Rollnick, 2002, p. 5), and application of this finding to the negotiation procedure indicates the benefits of the formation of a connection between the subject and the negotiator. As this connection grows, the subject is less likely to be defensive and more open to suggestion (Kellin and McMurtry, 2007, p. 34-36); behaviour change thus becomes more likely.

![Figure 2.9: The Structured Tactical Engagement Process (STEPS) model](Source: Kellin and McMurty (2007)).

Once rapport has been established and the subject has moved from Step 0 to Step 1 (Precontemplation to Contemplation), the subject is likely to become aware that his or her behaviour and the current situation both need to change, but he or she is not quite sure how to go about implementing this change. It is, therefore, the negotiator’s job at this stage to gently affirm the need for a peaceful resolution while increasing the subject’s confidence to move into Step 2 (Contemplation to Preparation). Once the subject is committed to working with the negotiator and his or her confidence has increased, the subject moves to the penultimate phase of Step 2. At Step 2, the subject has identified that there is a problem and that his or her behaviour needs to change, and the subject begins to consider and possibly commit to a resolution. During Step 2, the negotiator’s role becomes more proactive and directive with the key role being
problem-solving in order to develop an appropriate exit strategy. The negotiator
must then try to maintain a degree of motivation and confidence in the subject in
order for him or her to progress to the final step (Preparation to Action). During
this final stage, the subject should be carrying out the agreed-upon plan for
peaceful resolution of the situation. It is vital that the negotiator remain
supportive and directive throughout the final step, until resolution has been
achieved.

2.2.10 Active listening

Most of the later models above use the term ‘active listening’ as a key concept
for managing change in the hostage takers. Listening is not a passive approach,
as research shows that active listening is the most effective tool to influence
change in behaviour. The idea is that listening actively to someone introduces
change in attitudes toward themselves and others, as when people are listened to
sensitively they ‘tend to listen to themselves with more care and to make clear
exactly what they are feeling and thinking’ (Newman et al., 1987, p. 24). Figure
2.10 shows a model used in UN communication training explaining active
listening.
2.3 The INGO Community

The researcher faced challenges in interpreting previous research with regard to determining which data were relevant to INGOs and only INGOs. This stems from the fact that the many member organisations of the NGO community refer to their staff with different titles, which makes it difficult to define exactly who is an aid worker. Relying on media sources exposes this issue, as media often mix a number of terms, such as the terms ‘foreigner’ and ‘aid worker’. In one example the headlines about the Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) kidnapping case in 2005, where four volunteers within Iraq were abducted, referred to the four people as ‘peace workers’, ‘aid workers’, and ‘human rights activists’ (Fast, 2010, p. 365-389). For the sake of the data presented in this literature review, it is assumed that the INGO data correlates with that of the broader category of ‘aid worker’ and that it is thus representative in describing trends.

While we can refer to such a thing as the ‘INGO community’, it nevertheless represents a group of individual or loosely connected INGOs, with the vast majority holding their own security policy and practices. The sheer number of INGOs, as well as the diversity of their mandates, roles, and structures, is such that few studies have captured data representative of all INGOs. There has been only a limited amount of research focused on NGO security in general, and most of it addresses primarily the differences between NGO and UN agencies; the research thus fails to provide adequate explanations as to the process by which aid organisations adopt one security posture or another. However, literature directly related to the security management of INGOs has developed gradually as violence against these organisations has increased.

The first major work on this subject was published in 2000 by Koenraad Van Brabant in the form of a security manual (Van Brabant, 2000). Since the appearance of Van Brabant’s work, most of the literature on humanitarian security has been oriented towards practitioners. As a result, it is generally

The safety of humanitarian workers is inextricably connected to their mandate and directly affects workers’ ability to assist the beneficiary population, which ranges from displaced populations, children in need of assistance, and students to trafficked women and starving populations. This is particularly true in complex operations, where security decisions made by INGOs largely shape the way they operate and interact with their surroundings.

Because of their mandate of delivering assistance, humanitarian workers are often forced to operate in areas with high vulnerability. The *raison d’être* of any aid organisation is to assist a given beneficiary population, so in some form or another, access to beneficiary populations is an essential condition. There can be no assistance without at least some direct contact and relation with beneficiary populations and individuals. An INGO delivering assistance to refugees cannot simply sit in an office removed from its beneficiaries, as its staff are often obliged to work in remote areas. While a safe and secure means of operation is always sought, security restrictions may hamper the delivery of protection and assistance to the people the INGO is seeking to help. By operating in isolated areas and/or high-risk environments, an organisation’s staff members, assets, and reputation, as well as their donors’ investments, are placed at risk (ECHO, 2004, p. 46).

Humanitarian workers increasingly find themselves in the midst of internal disputes or in fragile or failed states where they could be targeted in the course of their activities. Groups specializing in targeting aid workers operate mainly in post conflict countries where the central law enforcement authority can be weak, corruption is common, and the social fabric of the nation has unravelled to a considerable degree. We may call these groups ‘anomic terrorists’, as they attempt to thrive and operate in an environment of lawlessness or anomie with
weakened central control (Bjørgo, 2005, p. 23). It is in these same environments that many international NGOs operate.

In addition, aid workers and military forces are increasingly found to be operating in the same spaces (ECHO, 2004, p. 7). An increasingly common strategy for the military is to try to engage with the local population through ‘hearts-and-minds’ programmes, in which they trade goods and services as part of force protection or counter-terrorism strategies (Fast et al., 2011, p. 24). Consequently, local populations may have difficulty differentiating between military forces and aid organisations, both of which may be engaged in delivering developmental and humanitarian assistance. This can erode the perception of neutrality and impartiality of NGO workers, compromising their status and hence increasing the likelihood of their being targeted in such areas (Bickley, 2010, p. 63). It is therefore not surprising that both published studies and anecdotal information reveal that operating in conflict zones leads to increased casualty rates of NGO workers as a result of intentional violence against them (Rowley et al., 2008). An overview of the complexity of the INGO operating environment is offered later in this chapter in the form of detailed descriptions of the highest risk countries.

2.4 NGO Guiding Principles and Codes of Conduct

Many humanitarian organisations rely on their guiding principles as a key element of their overall security posture against threats such as robbery or aggressive attacks. These principles can be found in the General Assembly Resolution 46/182 as well as in the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. This code of conduct has been signed by 515 aid agencies, and states:

- The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. This right is referred to as the ‘humanitarian imperative’.
• Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone; aid is impartial.

• Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint; the provision of aid is neutral.

• Signatories shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy; the provision of aid is independent.

2.5 NGOs as Actors

Though NGOs are similar to a degree, the term NGO resists definition to some extent; these organisations vary in terms of size, purpose, organisational structure, and resources. For instance, a small local NGO named Widernet, situated in Iowa, USA, provides a digital library to developing countries in Africa. Its motive is to vanquish the digital gap between the developed and developing countries even though its staff and volunteers are limited. On the other end of the spectrum is World Vision International, which functions like a multinational corporation in order to implement its projects in more than 100 countries throughout the world. It is important to understand and classify the differences among NGOs before setting out to analyse them.

2.6 Definition of NGOs

The term non-governmental organisation (NGO) entered common parlance in 1945 after the end of World War II when it was used in the United Nations Charter to clearly distinguish between governmental and private organisations. The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which services the 3,735 non-governmental organisations enjoying consultative status with the United Nations, defines an NGO as ‘any international organisation which is not established by a governmental entity or international agreement’ (Iriye, 2002, p. 2). According to the World Bank (1992), NGOs are defined as ‘many groups and institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government and that have primarily humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives’.
Naturally, academic scholars have also endeavoured to define NGOs. Clarke (1998, p. 38), defined NGOs as ‘private, non-profit, professional organisations, with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public welfare goals’.

Professor Peter Willetts of the University of London argues that the definition of NGOs can be interpreted differently by various organisations and depending on situational context. Willetts defines an NGO as ‘an independent voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis for some common purpose other than achieving government office, making money or illegal activities’ (Willetts, 2013). He posits that though ‘there are no acceptable definitions of NGOs, there are three general characteristics which enable exclusion of some organisations from being considered as NGOs’. The first of those stipulates that political parties or government agencies should not be considered NGOs; NGO-running institutions should not be directly associated with any government organisations, nor should NGOs indulge in seeking political support from or through their activities. The second characteristic is the production of any profit, as NGOs are not profit-making companies. The third characteristic is engaging in criminal activity; criminal groups do not belong to any government or private companies, and yet they cannot be considered NGOs (Willetts, 2013). Additionally, all INGOs participating in this study meet the above definitions.

### 2.7 Types of NGOs

Though there are various kinds of NGOs, they can be classified according to their organisation, geographical location, and main purpose. According to Willetts (2013) ‘NGOs are local, provincial, national, regional, and global depending on their areas of project coverage’. The difference between local and national NGOs is that the former includes organisations that have community-based programmes and focus on smaller regions, while the latter covers an entire country.

Since the projects of international NGOs, like regional and global NGOs, cover more than one country, they are often referred to as INGOs. It was as recent as the 1990s that many INGOs came into existence. Some of them cover more than
100 countries in the world. Before the 1990s there were mostly national NGOs, as many of them did not operate on an international level. The NGOs’ activities and their relations with the government may differ depending on the level of the organisation. Since INGOs often get more projects, they generally have more resources than local NGOs, including resources for security. They can also work directly with the governments from many countries.

Abby Stoddard argues that ‘[t]here may in fact be no satisfactory way of categorizing NGOs according to their philosophy, and there are potentially unlimited ways of carving up the community according to which of the humanitarian principles and values are emphasised, and in what operational context’ (2003, p. 28). However, for the sake of this research, NGOs will be categorised by means of their main purpose. NGOs are divided into two categories by the World Bank: operational NGOs and advocacy NGOs. Operational NGOs design and implement development-related projects. For example, Save the Children, which is an operational NGO, is one of the largest and oldest NGOs with various development-related projects in more than 120 countries. The motive of projects such as this one is to improve the socio-economic conditions in developing countries. NGOs belonging to this category deliver services such as health care, educational programmes, and micro-credit for the communities (Lewis, 2009, p. 152).

The defence or promotion of a specific cause or policy is the major objective of advocacy NGOs. Generally, NGOs which only focus on advocacy work do not engage in any direct field operations. Human rights for example are guaranteed under international law, but working to ensure that they are respected and taking up the cases of those whose rights have been violated can still be a dangerous activity. Human rights NGOs and their staff are often the only force standing between ordinary people and the unbridled power of the state. They are vital to the development of democratic processes and institutions, ending impunity and encouraging the promotion and protection of human rights. Amnesty International, which is also an NGO, belongs to this category. Over the past few decades, it has attempted to change the pattern of human rights in many countries.
2.8 NGOs’ Goals and Objectives

Besides the different types of NGOs, their primary focuses may cover diverse areas including social development, financial development, reinforcement of existing assistance, and political advice or advocacy roles (Ahmed and Potter, 2006, p. 78). The extraordinary performance of NGOs may also be explicitly seen in disaster situations. For instance in January 2010 when an earthquake severely damaged Haiti, NGOs were the very first international actors to assist the sufferers of this disaster. They delivered a great deal of food, clothing, along with other assistance for affected people. Another demonstration of the extraordinary performance of NGOs was identified when a tsunami hit mostly parts of Asia in December 2004. Aid workers were deployed to India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka to deliver food, first-aid, and shelter for victims. The performance of NGOs in emergency conditions is regarded by many as the most effective method to deliver humanitarian relief (Cerny and Durham, 2005, p. 12).

NGOs not merely provide one-time relief, but will also take part in enduring humanitarian and development projects. Social and economic development projects of NGOs tend to be associated with the long-term projects in developing countries. To improve social and economic conditions in these developing countries, NGOs most often have several significant projects with regards to education, public health, social development, community development, and water sanitation (Ahmed and Potter, 2006, p. 39). One of the better examples of this category of NGOs is Catholic Relief Services. This is one of the better and largest US-based NGOs, which offers services including emergency response, public policy, education, agriculture, food security, water sanitation, health service, HIV and AIDS precautions, and peace-building. Their long-term projects may last for more than 20 years.

Other NGOs are functioning to amend governments or any other political groups. Such NGOs are typically advocacy or influencing groups with the aim of creating adjustments in the policies of governments. Historically, such groups have been confronted with challenges from many countries because of improper articulation of the standards of human rights (Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler,
1998, p 4-7). Gradually, several countries have learned to work together with NGOs and respect their initiatives. The goals of human rights NGOs generally cover four main domains of human rights activities like advocacy, standard setting, monitoring accord with international norms, and enforcement (Smith, Pagnucco, and Lopez, 1998, p. 379-412).

2.9 NGOs’ Organisational Structure and Budget

NGOs have commonly relied on funding from donor agencies, multilateral lenders, charitable institutions, and government ministries for their own administration as well as for conducting programmes. Some INGOs have annual budgets of several hundred million US dollars, including World Vision ($1.1 billion USD in 2012) and CARE US ($700 million USD in 2012). Much INGO funding originates from governments, and such funding allows NGOs to undertake important work in many areas, including health and welfare, environmental protection, culture, sport, and recreation. Consistent and transparent funding of NGOs helps to ensure services are delivered cost-effectively through the most suitable providers. It can also help to develop the strength and capacity of a community.

There are numerous of explanations why NGOs tend to be preferred providers of aid (Good Practice Funding, 2013):

• Many NGO services are cost-effective. They frequently have less expensive structures and usage of a voluntary workforce.

• Because NGOs are independent, they are generally better placed to reach individuals in marginalised communities. Therefore, they may have a greater relationship with a target group compared to a government agency.

• NGOs are usually not bound by the same restrictions as the public service and therefore have the capacity to be a little more flexible and innovative.

• NGOs might have specialist local knowledge or expertise which is not available to government agencies.
• NGOs help bring people together in constructive relationships. They work directly with communities to accomplish shared goals.

• The non-profit nature of NGOs ensures funding is targeted to delivering effective services.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD) has estimated the total development aid for 2010 at over $500 billion (Zumkehr and Finucane, 2013, p. 4). While NGOs have no intention to generate income like for-profit organisations do, they do generally have the same pattern to that of for-profit organisation when it comes to their organisational infrastructure. The main distinction between for-profit organisation and NGOs would be the source of income. The principal sources of an NGO’s income are typically members, private organisations, governments, foundations, and foreign sources. To increase funds for NGO activities, NGO leaders often struggle to sustain their infrastructures for marketing, fund raising, strategy management, accounting, and evaluation systems. Also, while NGOs and for-profit organisations often have similar organisational structures, NGOs tend not to produce any tangible products, as for-profit organisations generally do. During the last few decades, the sheer numbers of NGOs has drastically increased which has subsequently increased the competition among NGOs for funding. In accordance with Lindenberg (2003, p. 250-253), donors now require higher financial accountability and more tangible evidence of programme impact. Furthermore, because it is sometimes challenging for smaller NGOs to sustain efficiency, larger NGOs have taken benefit from economies of scale in marketing, operations, and services.

Donors naturally wish to see their assistance allocated to operations instead of administration. However, spending funds for maintenance and administration is unavoidable. Costs might include overhead for a workplace, marketing and advertising costs, and salaries for personnel. When an NGO grows, it might spend a more substantial proportion of their income on operations.

Research by Jean S. Renouf (2011, p. 245-257) outlines the main INGOs and features a summary of international aid agencies with key organisational
information, such as the year of foundation, whether each INGO has a wide or narrow mandate and provides information regarding aspects of operations, annual budget, sources of funding, and numbers of staff. The list also indicates whether each organisation is a signatory of the Code of Conduct with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and provides the sources of the information collected. Table 2.1 indicates the ten countries in which donors offered the most aid in 2012.

Table 2.1: Top ten countries for donor aid (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Economic aid ($ billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>23.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>12.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>11.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MapsofWorld.com
2.10 INGO Operating Environments

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees often operates alongside INGOs in specific environments. A security training module called Accountability and Due Diligence in UNHCR’s Operational Security Environment, designed to inform senior managers of the security risk management practices of the organisation, opens with the following statement:

Working for UNHCR in high risk environments is a dangerous business. Security concerns are ubiquitous in today’s field operations, and investments in staff security can sometimes compete directly with the needs of refugees and IDPs for scarce available funds. In UNHCR’s world, the higher the security threat, the more likely it is that the organisation will be required to operate important humanitarian programmes. The same forces that push refugees and IDPs from their homes are often the ones that pose threats (or provide cover for others) against humanitarian aid workers (UNHCR, 2013, p. 2).

Trends in security incidents are now studied well enough that the overall situation can be perceived. While the reasons behind these trends are harder for experts to agree upon, the results are clear: the situation is worsening.

It has been established that the past several years have seen a rise in the number of aid worker casualties. Additionally, civilian aid personnel are now more frequent victims of violence than uniformed peacekeeping troops (Stoddard et al., 2009). The tactics employed by the perpetrators are becoming more sophisticated and increasingly lethal, and it has been determined that the attacks are targeting a broader category of aid workers.

This is perhaps not surprising considering the locations in which INGOs operate. In the 10 countries with the highest number of attacks against aid workers between 2002 and 2011 (see Figure 2.11), the 16 INGOs participating in this research had a 75% overall presence in these countries. None of the ten countries had fewer than 8 of the 16 INGOs present. The presence could have
been higher, but some agencies had been forced to leave Darfur after the government of Sudan denied them permission to operate.

Figure 2.11: Total incidents by country (2002-2011)

Source: The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012

Although it can be challenging to generalise different operations, most operating environments with high degrees of insecurity share the regular attributes of active conflict and large parts of the country beyond the effective control of a governmental authority or law enforcement (Stoddard, et al., 2009, p. 4). Additionally, these countries are relatively high on the listing of failed states in the period under review.

Humanitarian space is now more complicated following the end of the Cold War; the security environment of humanitarian space has also changed, particularly following the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September, 2001. This attack resulted in what has been referred to as the ‘War on Terror’. As the Humanitarian Policy Group stated in 2003, ‘the war on terrorism constitutes a framework within which national and international policy, including humanitarian aid policy, will be defined and implemented’ (Stoddard, 2003, p. 1). The consequences of the 11 September attacks on aid agencies were numerous, including an additional politicisation of public funding aid allocation to an increasing assimilation of aid agencies into the broader Western agenda. This in turn resulted in the multiplication of actors implementing relief
assistance, including private companies and military forces providing humanitarian assistance. As outlined by Donini, Fast, Hansen, Harris, Minear, Mowjee, and Wilder,

To confirm that humanitarians need to be wary of politics, even as they do their work in highly politicized settings is nothing new. What is new in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras is that the stakes are much higher because the extent of need has proliferated, the awareness of need has become more instantaneous and more global, and humanitarian action has become a multi-billion dollar enterprise (2008, p. 3).

Another common explanation of the rise in security incidents is the fact that aid agencies are targeted as they are viewed as collaborating with foreign armed forces or are considered as part of the UN’s integrated approaches. Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver elucidate:

A theory often cited for the apparent rise - and one that is believed deeply by certain aid organisations who have suspended operations as a result - is the securitization of aid by western governments in the global counter-terror campaign, which has created a political association of aid organisations with this Western agenda. Another explanation has militants choosing aid institutions as soft targets, for the purpose of sparking conflict or general disorder. Others refute the importance of the targeting issue, insisting that the majority of violent incidents are crimes of opportunity having nothing whatever to do with politics of humanitarian action and everything to do with its material resources (2006, p. 36).

This is supported by Benedek, Daase, van Duynne, and Vojin (2010, p. 230), who explain that many INGOs are either associated with the UN by funding and programme delivery or are perceived as being linked to the UN, and that INGOs hence receive threats by proxy. Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard agree, positing that:

Maintaining a credibly neutral image has become difficult due to the dual nature of the UN as both a political actor and a humanitarian actor, UN aid agencies have more difficulty projecting a neutral image than many other humanitarians.
The UN’s political role in many of the most-contested environments has placed it squarely in the Western camp, where it is viewed as a legitimate and prominent target (2011, p. 16).

This problem is unlikely to disappear soon. UNHCR states that ‘a major priority for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is to strengthen its partnerships with non-governmental organisations (NGO). The agency sees such partnerships as the best way to ensure that the basic needs of refugees and populations of concern are met’ (UNHCR, 2013).

In 2008, some 25 per cent of UNHCR’s total expenditures were channelled through 636 NGOs, including 162 international agencies and 474 national ones (UNHCR, 2009). This means that INGOs are, like the UN, also increasingly working in environments of higher risks, and therefore have a higher frequency of incidents. As a result of increased attacks on aid workers, humanitarian agencies have been forced to take other measures to protect their security besides relying on only the principles of humanitarian action. It is now more widespread for humanitarian NGOs to consider precautions through the use of protection and deterrence tactics (Eckroth, 2010, p. 11-12). While for-profit companies may only go to risky areas only when it is necessary, NGOs are in the business of working in places where there are serious problems; aid workers are therefore operating necessarily in the kidnapping hot-spots around the globe. The next chapter will discuss the background and reasons for hostage taking and kidnapping of NGO staff globally in detail.

Staff security in insecure working environments impacts many NGO operations (Sheik et al., 2000, p. 321). Studies have shown casualty levels from malicious acts among the NGO community to have risen within the last two decades (King, 2002; Van Brabant, 2001). As stated previously, the change of security for the humanitarian community can be traced to the end of the Cold War, when violent conflicts increasingly started as civil wars or insurgencies within states instead of erupting between nation states as was common throughout the Cold War era (Kaldor, 2007, p. 20-29). Subsequently, NGO workers are finding themselves doing work in operating environments with diluted accountability and weakened
military structures; additionally, operating environments often lack demarcation or territorial lines.

One study stated that around three hundred seventy-five aid workers died during active duty between 1985 and 1998; approximately seventy per cent of these were victims of intentional violence that involved guns along with other weapons, while seventeen per cent of casualties were results of automobile accidents (Sheik, 2000, p.321). Unintentional violence made up seven per cent, and eight per cent of deaths occurred from disease or natural causes (Dick, 2010, p. 4). From the largest study of humanitarian security thus far, data from the period 1997-2005 was collected from the International Committee of the Red Cross, ten UN aid organisations, domestic chapters of the Red Cross/ Red Crescent and forty-six NGOs. The research discovered that nearly one in three deaths of aid workers occurred within ninety days of the workers reaching their workplaces, and that approximately twenty per cent of all deaths occurred inside the first month (Stoddard et al., 2010). This can be a clear indication of the importance for humanitarian workers of acquiring a sufficient understanding of the operating environment before deploying into it.

Attacks on humanitarian workers do not constitute a new phenomenon. The first killing of a United Nations staff member on duty happened as early as 1948, when Commandant René de Labarrière, a French Military Observer in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, was killed when the jeep he was driving hit a mine. According to a United Nations press release issued that day, Labarrière was investigating an alleged violation of the provisions of the Arab-Israeli truce in the Afula area of Palestine (United Nations, 1948). Though such incidents have always been an unfortunate part of humanitarian work, more recent times have witnessed several high-profile events with devastating outcomes.

On 7 August 2010, it was reported that medical team composed of about 10 aid members from a faith-based NGO were killed by Afghan militants. This is recorded as the single most serious incident following the 2006 incident when a team of 17 aid workers from the NGO Action Against Hunger (ACF) were killed at Muttur, Sri Lanka. Globally, around 260 aid workers were murdered, captured
or fatally wounded in 2008 alone (Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico, 2009, p. 9). Figure 2.12 clearly illustrates the rise in numbers of victims:

Figure 2.12: Total attacks and victims – Killing, injuries, and hostage taking (2002-2011)

Source: The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012

As can be discerned in Figure 2.12, Figure 2.13 illustrates that the attack-to-victim ratio has remained relatively consistent. This is contrary to most perceptions of higher casualty ratios.

Figure 2.13: Attack-to-victim ratio (2002-2011)
Violence against aid workers and workers’ deaths in traffic accidents are unfortunately commonplace and it is widely agreed upon that these particular incidents constitute a significant threat towards aid workers on a global level. Reports compiled from a study conducted from 2006 to 2009 reveal a substantial rise in violence against aid workers (Stoddard et al., 2006; 2009). Overall, the rate of targeted attacks upon aid workers of all sorts (i.e. NGOs, UN agencies and the ICRC) increased from 4 per 10,000 in 1997 to 9 per 10,000 in 2008 (Childs, 2013, p. 66-69).

There is little from the literature concerning the specific reason behind each method of attack, but Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 7-9) theorize that the growing number of international organisations (IOs) and INGOs within a given sector increases uncertainty over project or programme future, competition over donor funding, and the use of competitive tenders and renewable contracts generates incentives to take higher risks. Basically, when there are additional INGO staff in the same space, they usually are willing or asked to take a higher level of risk by operating in volatile and dangerous environments, to ensure future funding. By operating with a higher risk threshold, they typically tend to be more vulnerable as targets. Once this is combined with the findings of Stoddard, Harmer, and Hughes in the 2012 Aid Worker Security Report (2012, p. 6-7), the some possible explanations emerge. Stoddard et al. found that all of the countries with the highest aid worker murder rates experienced active internal armed conflict during all or part of the period of time under analysis. There were also correlations between aid worker violence and low levels of political stability, high ‘state fragility’ scores, institutional weakness of the regime, and low degrees of ‘rule of law’. Conversely, there was no correlation between aid worker killings and the general homicide rates in host countries. This finding implies that violence against international aid operations is not suggestive of the general crime environment, but exists as a separate phenomenon that may be more connected to a failed or failing state apparatus as well as the dynamics of war. Consequently, aid workers might have to operate with little if any
extension of state authority to advise or protect them, especially in the more physically remote areas requiring humanitarian assistance.

In the aforementioned Aid Worker Security Report for 2012, Stoddard et al. offer a statistical summary of incidents from 2000 to 2011. Even though the numbers go up and down from year to year, it is clear that over time there has been a consistent increase in both the number of incidents and in the number of victims. Table 2.2 is adapted from this report.

Table 2.2: Major attacks on aid workers – Summary statistics (2000 – 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of incidents</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total aid worker victims</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total killed</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total injured</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total kidnapped*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International NGO staff</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Victims survived or not yet determined; those killed while kidnapped are counted under ‘killed’ totals.

Source: The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012

These reports have resulted in the acceptance that humanitarian work is becoming increasingly insecure. Research conducted by Sheik, Gutierrez, Bolton, Spiegel, Thieren and Burnham from 1985 to 1998 has established that planned and deliberate violence accounts for about 68 per cent of the deaths of aid staff whereas traffic accidents are only to blame for 17 per cent of the deaths (Sheik et al., 2000, p. 166-168). Consequently, the necessity of security for aid groups has gained increasing attention and sparked more debates; many organisations making the effort to devise more complete security principles and routines in an effort to establish a humanitarian space where aid workers {are capable of carrying out} their responsibilities with an acceptable degree of risk.
The protection of humanitarian workers has progressed significantly in the past decade, however, there is still room for improvement. This is likely to be a continuing issue, as hostage takers are consistently moving in parallel to ensure increasingly spectacular and devastating attacks against their adversaries (Taillon, 2002, p. 58). Attacks against aid workers have gone up significantly since 2006, with a particular rise in kidnapping. As security incidents increase in numbers, having access to and management of security information becomes all the more important. The significance of cooperation in sharing information, expertise, and planning, in addition to the necessity for training of staff is commonly agreed upon; the chances are greater for it to occur when a community or group share a similar threat perception. As a result of the evolution and increasing sophistication of attacks against aid workers, humanitarian delegations are becoming better at sharing information. Indeed, Christian Aid, in a recent survey reviewing the extent of security collaboration involving the UN and NGOs in the field and the implementation of the Saving Lives Together (SLT) framework, identified information sharing among the highest priorities for coordination amongst all types of NGOs surveyed. From the 205 respondents from 72 organisations that participated, 88 per cent of those from international NGOs and 61 per cent of those from national NGOs reported that their organisations permitted information sharing. It seems that many have realised the advantages which closer collaboration provides to their mutual security. Significant barriers to information and resource sharing do however persist (Micheni, 2009, p. 10), with formal collaboration on security issues remaining rare. In instances where mechanisms are available, these are often ad hoc and dependent on personalities involved; consequently these are rarely sustained (Stoddard et al., 2009).

Another challenge is that definitions of security incidents can differ between countries when it comes to languages and contexts. With the wide range of INGOs, there is also a number of reporting mechanisms. No uniform model or standard for reporting exists in the INGO community, so an event might or might not be regarded as an incident dependent upon where it takes place, its intensity, and its type, along with its victim(s) and those who write the subsequent security report. In Table 2.2, Stoddard, Harmer, and Hughes record
only individuals who survive the kidnap ordeal as ‘kidnapped’, whilst in 2009 they stated that ‘kidnapping is counted here only if the victim was held for over 24 hours, and incidents are only recorded if they lead to a death, abduction or serious injury’ (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 2). Defining security terms within the NGO community is to a degree lacking, and is considered an important area for improvement as it is important for a functioning security management approach (Sheik et al., 2000). With the assistance of NGO security reports which offer the prevailing definitions for security terms (Sheik et al., 2000) and which further afford the researcher means of examining and comparing terms and definitions, this chapter aims to look at those security terms.

The next segment of this chapter will attempt to illustrate the parts of the world with the highest security risks, using United Nations security levels as of 16 April 2013. While there are other potential sources for risk mapping, the researcher believes that the United Nations with its large humanitarian and development programmes, and as a funding and operating partner with many NGOs, represents the most accurate risk environment profiling for INGOs.

2.11 The UN Security Level System

The UN Security Level System (UNDSS, 2012) draws on a Structured Threat Assessment (STA) which offers a standard methodology for selecting and inputting numerical values into an automated system which in turn provides a Security Level. The aim of the Security Level System is to offer an objective account of the security environment of a particular area or location where the UN must operate. It achieves this using a structured analysis of the prevailing threat in an area or location, and it is conducted in a way that promotes objectivity. This gives the UN, and therefore INGOs, with a consistent threat-measuring tool which builds system-wide reliability on determining Security Levels.

The Security Level System contains six levels and is designed as a security management tool for the global UN System, as it provides security decision makers with a snapshot of the existing security environment in a specific geographic area or location and could be employed to make comparisons and set
priorities (UNDSS). Further, the UN security level system is not a predictive tool, but one based upon current and historical information. It describes threats across a variety of categories as they appear in a particular geographic area or location at the present moment, and it achieves this by considering five families of threats, all five which are relevant to INGOs’ operating environments:

- **Armed conflict**: Describes organized violence by groups fighting each other. The UN, like other non-involved parties, would most likely be indirectly affected by this threat.

- **Terrorism**: Refers to violence by individuals or groups against civilians or other non-combatant targets. The United Nations could be either indirectly or directly affected by this threat.

- **Crime**: Describes illegal activities undertaken for economic or personal gain. It does not have to involve violence. The United Nations could be either indirectly or directly affected by this threat.

- **Civil unrest**: Refers to organised demonstrations or unauthorised disturbances to public order, e.g. rioting and looting. It may or may not involve violence. The UN could be directly or indirectly affected by this threat.

- **Hazards**: Includes natural events, such as earthquakes and extreme weather or human-caused incidents such as large-scale industrial accidents, which can lead to destruction, injury or death (UNDSS).

Each general threat category is also evaluated using three characteristics which are the key components of all threats:

- **Intent**: The intention or disposition of a threat to cause harm.

- **Capacity**: The ability of a threat to cause harm.

- **Inhibiting context**: The qualities which exist in the environment which might act as incentives or deterrents to a threat. These are not mitigating measures developed by the UN.
2.12 Operations in High Risk Zones

The researcher has highlighted in this section only those countries with levels 4, 5, and 6 (Substantial, High, and Extreme) in the UN Travel Advisory as of 16 April 2013 (UNDSS, 2013).

The researcher has aimed to group the countries under review in a logical manner and according to similar security environment and threats. This means in some cases that countries are grouped without regard to their typical regional description. An example of this is Afghanistan, which often is described as West or Southwest Asia. From a security environment perspective, it would be unwise to separate Afghanistan from Pakistan, which is often described as belonging to South Asia.

2.12.1 South America

Colombia has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world, and political and social unrest continues to plague the country. This has led to a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and in November 2011, the number of IDPs in the country stood at more than 3.8 million (UNHCR;
Colombia, 2013). Assistance for the IDPs and poverty reduction programmes are the focus for many of the 18 INGOs working in Colombia (Friends of Colombia, 2013).

Small towns and rural areas of Colombia can still be extremely dangerous due to the presence of illegal armed groups and narcotics trafficking gangs (US State Department; Colombia, 2013). Hostage taking, while reduced, remains a threat in Colombia, and most abductions are criminally motivated rather than political. The ceasefire announced by the FARC in 2012 as part of the peace process has ended at the time of this writing. This may result in an increase in the terrorist threat (Australian Government; Colombia, 2013).

2.12.2 North Caucasus

Military operations in Georgia have ceased, but tensions remain high in some locations. The humanitarian community, including more than 40 INGOs (The World Bank; International NGOS, 2013), are assisting over 500,000 refugees from Georgia and internally displaced people inside Georgia (UNHCR; Georgia, 2013). Most travel advisory sites advice against travel to the region, and the Australian Government ‘strongly advise[s] you not to travel to the North Caucasus’ (Australian Government; Georgia, 2013).
Algeria is a country of transit for mixed-migration movements towards Europe, which has a large population of refugees from Mali and Syria. The majority are being hosted by families along the border and are being assisted by the Croissant-Rouge Algérien and 20 additional INGOs. Along with the recent influx of refugees, Algeria has hosted 165,000 refugees from Western Sahara for several years in four camps and one settlement in the south-western province of Tindouf (UNHCR; Algeria, 2013).

Since 2008, over 25 Westerners have been taken hostage in the Sahel, including tourists, NGO workers and diplomats of several (primarily European) nationalities. The group which has claimed responsibility for these particular attacks, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), operates throughout the majority of Algeria including its southern area and has also abducted foreigners in neighbouring countries. The Australian Foreign Service specifies that ‘credible information suggests that terrorists are intending to kidnap Westerners within these areas’ (Australian Government; Algeria, 2013).

Mauritania’s security has experienced the conflict in Mali. Resulting from Western involvement in counterterrorism efforts, terrorist groups have declared their intention to attack Western targets in Mauritania as well as the region, and it is likely these groups will attempt retaliatory attacks against Western targets of opportunity, including INGOs. Al-Qaida, its affiliated organisations, as well as other terrorist organisations have formerly conducted kidnappings of Westerners for ransom and suicide bombing attempts in Mauritania (UK Foreign Office; Mauritania, 2013). Australia warns its citizens that ‘a stream of credible reporting suggests that terrorists may be planning to kidnap Western tourists, mine workers, oil workers and aid workers in Mauritania’ and that ‘possible targets include clubs, restaurants, embassies and high commissions, international schools, international hotels, and expatriate housing compounds’ (Australian Government; Mauritania, 2013). A minimum of 12 INGOs are operating in Mauritania (UNHCR; Mauritania, 2013). The present situation in Mali does not come as a surprise, due to the humanitarian and development challenges the country has faced. Mali was in the bottom five countries on the Human Development Index for 2009. Islamic groups, including Ansar al-Dine, the
Movement for Oneness and Jihad (MUJAO) and Al-Qaeda in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remain involved in the region, and have declared their intention to attack Western targets through the entire Sahel. Hostage taking for ransom is Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s primary income source, and at the time of this writing around 20 Westerners being held hostage by Islamist terrorists in North and West Africa. Victims of kidnappings have included tourists, NGO workers and diplomats of a variety of nationalities, primarily European. These attacks have sometimes resulted in the murder of hostages. In addition to hostage taking, there have also been a number of recent bomb attacks in Gao, Kidal and In Khalil. Further attacks are likely in the region (UK Foreign Office).

Despite the security environment, more than 20 international NGOs continue to operate in Mali (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013).

Having recently emerged from a historic revolution of the Arab Spring, Libya is going through a delicate post-conflict transitional period. Continued confrontations between armed militias, the growth of instability in the eastern part of the country, and the escalation of inter-ethnic and tribal conflicts pose significant challenges for both the new government and the approximately 15
INGOs currently operating in Libya. A series of attacks targeting the international community in Benghazi have led organisations to reduce their presence in eastern Libya, but the international community continues to assist 700,000 people of concern (UNHCR; Libya, 2013).

There is a risk of hostage taking in Libya and foreigners often present valuable targets. Such abductions are more likely in sparsely populated border areas. While AQIM uses northern Mali as a primary operating base, its members have proven themselves capable of travelling long distances to carry out abductions, including in neighbouring countries. Criminal gangs have also carried out kidnappings for terrorist groups in return for financial reward (UK Foreign Office; Libya, 2013). It is in this environment that the humanitarian community, including 15 INGOs (UNOCHA, 2013) are assisting over 100,000 refugees and IDPs (UNHCR; Libya, 2013).

While the overall security situation in Egypt does not render it a high-risk environment, there are notable exceptions in Egypt’s Governorates of South Sinai, including Sharm el Sheikh, and North Sinai. These governorates have a heightened risk of hostage takings of foreigners and explosive attacks. Interestingly, the Australian Government advises their citizens to take up insurance against hostage taking if travelling to the area (Australian Government; Egypt, 2013).

After years of civil war in Sudan, millions of Sudanese still struggle with food insecurity and poverty. Many of the more than 80 INGOs (UNOCHA, 2013) operating in Sudan are assisting refugees and IDPs, where the population of concern includes 2.3 million IDPs, some 140,000 refugees, 7,000 asylum-seekers, and an estimated hundreds of thousands persons at risk of statelessness (UNHCR, Sudan, 2013).

Aid workers from Western countries have been the targets of hostage taking in the Darfur region. Since 2009, there have been several kidnappings of NGO employees and peacekeepers in Darfur and the bordering areas of Chad and the Central African Republic (US State Department; Sudan, 2013). In addition, the UK Foreign Office reports of an increased risk for hostage taking in Khartoum,
and statements by terrorist groups have called for a ‘jihad’ in Sudan, specifically mentioning Western interests (UK Foreign Office, *Sudan*, 2013).

After years of civil war, and after gaining its independence in July 2011, South Sudan confronts major political and socio-economic challenges. Millions of South Sudanese still struggle with food insecurity and poverty (World Vision; *South Sudan*, 2013). The mass arrival of returnees from Sudan and elsewhere in Africa has added to the pressure on the South Sudanese government, and the international community now assists over 500,000 IDPs and 100,000 refugees (UNHCR; *South Sudan*, 2013). Security challenges for the more than 50 INGOs (Star Tribune, 2013) in South Sudan are many. The border areas, however, pose the most serious risks, The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) being active in the western regions of South Sudan, especially in the states of Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal (Australian Government; *South Sudan*, 2013).

### 2.12.3 Central and Southern Africa

Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranked 173 out of 177 nations by the UN Human Development Index. Since Guinea-Bissau gained independence from Portugal in 1974, the country has been beleaguered by coups, political assassinations, and a civil war. Approximately 15 INGOs operate in the country, and two have been active in successfully removing mines, which remain

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Map 2.4: High risk environments in Central and Southern Africa
the highest threat to staff (US State Department; *Guinea Bissau*, 2013).

Ivory Coast received USD 19 million in humanitarian aid in 2010 (Global Humanitarian Assistance; *Ivory Coast*, 2013), and although the situation is gradually returning to normalcy after the violence that followed the 2010 presidential elections that divided the country politically, persistent security challenges still discourage all citizens who fled abroad from returning. There remain close to 50,000 internally displaced persons (UNHCR; *Ivory Coast*, 2013) in Ivory Coast; the international community, including more than 30 INGOs, is assisting them (UNOCHA, 2013).

The regions of Dix-Huit Montagnes and Moyen-Cavally in western Côte d'Ivoire bordering Liberia that remain the highest risk situation for INGOs because of inter-communal tensions and the presence of armed militias in those regions. There have been cross border attacks in areas bordering Liberia and Ghana since June 2012 (Australian Government; *Ivory Coast*, 2013).

Nigeria struggles with a high level of poverty, as one in four people do not have enough to eat (Oxfam; *Nigeria*, 2013). There are at least 13 INGOs working in Nigeria (Commonwealthofnations.org; *International NGO*, 2013). As the most populous country in West Africa, Nigeria plays a critical role in shaping the region’s geopolitical agenda. There is a general threat of crime, but the most serious threats are from terrorism and hostage taking. There is also a chance of retaliatory attacks following the French intervention in Mali. In 2011 an extremist group based in northeast Nigeria known as Boko Haram (The Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad) claimed responsibility for many attacks, including the bombing of the United Nations office in Abuja which killed 21 staff. Boko Haram members have admitted to killing and wounding thousands of people during the past three years. Another group that has emerged over the past years is Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa), or ‘Ansaru’. It emerged in 2012 and is motivated by an anti-Nigerian government and anti-Western agenda. The organisation is broadly aligned with al-Qaida. Groups such as Boko Haram and Ansaru are also behind many recent political hostage takings. Hostage taking in south-eastern Nigeria is typically financially
motivated, unlike the more politically motivated kidnappings in the northeast, with the victims being held for ransom (Australian Government; Nigeria, 2013).

The Central African Republic received USD 56 million in humanitarian aid, and a total of $218 million in aid, in 2010. Additionally, the price of multilateral peacekeeping operations totalled $256 million (Global Humanitarian Assistance; Central African Republic, 2013). The country still bears the marks of many years of political and military crises. By mid-2012, approximately 65,500 individuals were internally displaced and more than 150,000 Central Africans had found refuge in neighbouring Chad and Cameroon (UNHCR; Central African Republic, 2013). Furthermore, poor infrastructure poses logistical and administrative challenges to humanitarian operations, including that of a minimum of 13 INGOs (World Food Programme, 2013). Armed rebel groups, bandits, and poachers present real dangers, and the Central African government is not able to ensure the safety of visitors, including aid workers in the majority of the country.

The security situation within the Central African Republic has also deteriorated since December 2012. On 24 March 2013, armed rebels reportedly captured the capital city Bangui after taking control of several towns in northern and central regions. Incidents of theft and robbery occur regularly and armed gangs are well-known to operate in the outlying parts of Bangui (UK Foreign Office; Central African Republic, 2013). CAR had the third highest murder rates of aid workers during the period 2006-2011 having a total of 85 murders (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4). The Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) presence in eastern CAR also poses a specific safety and security threat. Foreigners, including aid workers, have been targeted by the LRA for kidnappings, violent crime, and killings. The security situation is particularly dangerous in border areas (Australian Government; Central African Republic, 2013).

The Democratic Republic of Congo is struggling to recover from a civil war from 1996-2003 as well as recent rebel conflicts, that have reduced government revenues and national output. As of 2009, the DRC ranked 176 out of 182 countries on the United Nations’ Human Development Index. To support, the international community has provided USD 2 billion in aid, of which $456
million was humanitarian aid in 2010. The peacekeeping operation in the DRC is the largest in the world with nearly 18,000 peacekeepers deployed in the country, costing $1.4 billion per year (Global Humanitarian Assistance; Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2013).

In April 2012, fighting broke out in the province of North Kivu following the formation of the M23 rebel movement causing several local NGOs to suspend or reduce operations due to the unstable security situation (Australian Government; Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2013). However, more than 100 INGOs continue to operate in the country (UNOCHA, 2013). The Democratic Republic of the Congo also had the world’s tenth highest murder rates of aid workers during the period 2006-2011, with 15 murders in 28 overall security incidents indicating a high level of violence (Stoddard et al., 2013, p. 4).

Burundi ranks 178 out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index. As outlined by a joint profiling report by the Burundi government, UN agencies and NGOs, some 78,900 IDPs in Burundi require sustainable solutions. Muggings at gun- and knife-point, bag snatching, pick-pocketing, burglary, car break-ins, and armed car hijackings have been reported. In Bujumbura, the UN has specifically designated the highway from the port to the southern end of the city as ‘not recommended’ due to banditry. There are also sporadic clashes between government forces and National Liberation Front (FNL) and other armed groups (The UK Foreign Office; Burundi, 2013). There are at least 45 INGOs operating in Burundi (UNOCHA, 2013).

Kenya hosts the largest refugee camp in the world, Dadaab, with around 500,000 refugees. Recently, the security situation within the Dadaab area is now high-risk and dangerous with a number of incidents such as the abductions of aid workers and fatal attacks on refugee leaders and Kenyan security forces. These events have resulted in more restrictive security measures, curtailing humanitarian accessibility to the camps. Still, almost 100 INGOs are registered to operate in Kenya (Margiti.com; NGOs in Kenya, 2013). Mugging, kidnapping, carjacking and armed robbery occur particularly in Nairobi, Mombasa and other large cities (UK Foreign Office; Kenya, 2013). The threat of
hostage taking is high for aid workers. Armed groups from Somalia have taken aid workers hostage along the border with Somalia. On 29 June 2012, four foreign aid workers of Norwegian Refugee Council were kidnapped from the Dadaab refugee camp near the border with Somalia, and a Kenyan national was killed in the attack. The aid workers were later freed in a rescue operation. On 13 October 2011, two Spanish aid workers were kidnapped from the Dadaab refugee camp. In July 2009, three aid workers in Kenya were kidnapped by Somali militias and taken into Somalia (Australian Government; Somalia, 2013). The motivations for these particular kidnappings are unclear, however the perpetrators took all the hostages into regions of Somalia controlled by al-Shabaab, a terrorist organisation with links to al-Qaeda.

On 1 October 2011, a French national was kidnapped from a private residence on Lamu Island, a popular tourist destination on Kenya’s north coast. She died while in captivity in Somalia. On 11 September 2011, a British national wife and husband were kidnapped, and the husband murdered, from a coastal resort close to the Kenyan-Somali border. On 16 October 2011, Kenya initiated military action against al-Shabaab, declaring self-defence. Kenyan troops crossed into Somalia using the stated purpose of pursuing al-Shabaab in south-eastern Somalia. Al-Shabaab responded to the Kenyan incursion into Somalia by threatening retaliation against civilian targets in Kenya, and succeeded on September 2013 with the coordinated Westgate Mall attack.

In Ethiopia, recent droughts and declining natural resources are making poverty a common problem. With over 35 per cent of Ethiopians living beneath the poverty line, Ethiopia ranked 171 out of 182 countries on the Human Development Index in 2009. Additionally, the refugee population in Ethiopia has nearly doubled in the last two years, due mainly to the influx of over 100,000 Somalis in to the Dollo Ado region and to a stream of Sudanese refugees entering the country in the region around Assosa. A steady and significant number of Eritreans have also entered Ethiopia’s Afar and Tigray regions. The total number of refugees hosted by Ethiopia has reached 370,000 (UNHCR, Ethiopia, 2013). In total, 43 INGOs operate in the country (UNOCHA, 2013). While Ethiopia is normally stable, domestic insurgent groups, extremists
from Somalia, as well as the heavy military presence alongside the border with Eritrea pose risks to security and safety. In May 2011, gunmen associated with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) attacked a car from the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), killing the vehicle’s driver, wounding one occupant, and kidnapping two other WFP employees. The kidnapped employees were later released (US State Department; Ethiopia, 2013).

Somalia’s many years of civil war and chronic drought have left huge numbers of people fighting poverty and hunger. The past few years have been especially cruel to Somalia, as 2011 witnessed an unprecedented famine affecting countless Somalis, in addition to military interventions by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in support of governmental forces fighting insurgents, which resulted in a stronger support of al-Shabaab, and intensified fighting. The conflict between the government and armed groups in 2012 also created political and security vacuums which often negatively impacted civilian protection. The security environment in Somalia is very challenging, having an alarming degree of criminal activity by armed militia throughout Somalia. There have been murders, armed robbery and a number of incidents of kidnapping of aid workers. Terrorist attacks have occurred against international relief organisations including Westerners throughout Somalia, including Puntland and Somaliland. Between 2006 and 2011 there were 95 attacks on humanitarian staff, and there were 18 such attacks in 2011 alone (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4). In every year since 2008 we have seen violent kidnappings and assassinations of local and foreign staff working for international organisations, including the use of suicide bombing against targets.

2.12.4 Middle East

Turkey is in the rare situation of being both a donor as well as a recipient of aid, and over 20 INGOs are presently operating in Turkey, most of which are assisting refugees from Syria. There have been violent attacks throughout Turkey in recent times, and there is a continuing threat of terrorist actions and violence against Western staff and interests all over the country. Additionally there is a threat of kidnapping, with a British national kidnapped by the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Diyarbakir in June 2012. The same group had previously kidnapped road construction employees in May 2012, in the eastern province of Igdır (UK Foreign Office; Turkey, 2013).

Recent years of sustained unrest in Syria has displaced countless people and has had a dramatic impact on one of the largest urban refugee populations in the world. As of January 2013, estimates of the number of Syrians who had fled their properties for safer regions of the country ranged from 2.5 to 3 million (UNHCR; Syria, 2013). Clashes between government forces and armed opposition groups are continuous, and they have dramatically impacted living conditions even in the main cities of Damascus and Aleppo. No part of Syria should be considered immune from violence (US State Department; Syria, 2013). Places frequented by foreigners have been previous targets and techniques of attack include shootings and bombings; including suicide bombs and vehicle bombs. Due to the security situation, many organisations cannot operate, and only seven INGOs are fully operational (Al Jazeera, 2013). Kidnappings have occurred both for financial and political gain, and have been motivated by both criminality and terrorism. Some terrorist groups have claimed responsibility for kidnappings, such as a number of recent kidnappings with victims including Westerners (UK Foreign Office; Syria, 2013).
The overall situation in Iraq features a number of security, political and economic challenges. However, due to the very high degrees of security surrounding aid workers, casualty rates in Iraq are less than those in Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; they resemble levels in Haiti (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4). More than 80 INGOs can be found in Iraq (Commondreams.org, 2013), and the country received USD 2.2 billion in aid in 2010, of which $185 million was humanitarian aid (Global Humanitarian Assistance; Iraq, 2013). Security in Iraq has improved somewhat over the last years but the threat is still extremely high. Foreign nationals living and working in Iraq continue to be at risk of being kidnapped. Most kidnapping activity is undertaken by criminal elements for ransom, but a substantial number of kidnapped foreigners are murdered (US State Department; Iraq, 2013).

Yemen has a large presence of INGOs, with a total of 57 in operation (UNOCHA, 2013). The country received USD 664 million in aid in 2010, of which $111 million was for humanitarian assistance (Global Humanitarian Assistance; Yemen, 2013).
Violent crime against foreigners is rare in Yemen, but the threat level is extremely high due to the twin dangers of terrorism and political instability. This is reflected in research on NGO security, with 37 aid workers murdered between 2006 and 2011 (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4). Terrorist organisations carry on being active in Yemen, especially in Yemen’s restive south, including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which now controls significant territory, particularly in Abyan governorate. The threat of kidnapping in Yemen from terrorists, armed tribes and criminals is regarded as very high. There is a substantial possibility that anyone initially kidnapped by a tribe or criminal group could be subsequently sold to AQAP (US State Department; Yemen, 2013).

2.12.5 South Asia

In excess of 100 INGOs operate in Afghanistan (Afghanistan-analyst.org; NGOs, 2013) inside an extremely challenging security environment. Remnants of the former Taliban regime as well as the terrorist al-Qaeda network, along with narco-traffickers and various terrorist and insurgent groups that oppose the international community’s presence continue to function in different parts of

Map 2.6: High risk environments in South Asia
Afghanistan. Methods of attack include bombs (roadside and other), suicide bombs (either on foot or by vehicle), indirect fire (rockets and mortars), direct fire (shootings and rocket propelled grenades), kidnappings and violent crime (UK Foreign Office; Afghanistan, 2013). This is reflected in research that showed Afghanistan to have the highest rate of attack against aid workers in the world, counting 160 attacks between 2006 and 2011 (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4). In excess of 50 INGOs are registered to operate in Pakistan (UNDOC, 2013), even though carjacking, armed robberies, house invasions, and other violent crimes take place in many major urban areas, deliberate attacks on aid workers remain the most serious concern.

Pakistan ranked fourth highest when it comes to attacks against aid workers between 2006 and 2011 (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4), examples of which include the attack on an international aid agency in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa on 10 March 2010, the bombing of World Food Programme office in Islamabad on 5 October 2009, and the killing of a US aid worker on 12 November 2008 in Peshawar. Five foreign humanitarian workers have been taken hostage in Pakistan since July 2011, and kidnappings may be motivated by desires for either financial or political gain (UK Foreign Office; Pakistan, 2013).

India continues to experience terrorist and insurgent activities that might affect aid workers directly or indirectly. Past attacks have targeted public places, including some frequented by Westerners, such as luxury and other hotels, trains, train stations, markets, cinemas, mosques, and restaurants in large urban areas (US State Department; India, 2013). Although India has the highest number of national NGOs in the world, more than 30 INGOs also assist (UNDOC, 2013).

More than 100 INGOs are working in Afghanistan (Afghanistan-analyst.org; NGOs, 2013) in an extremely challenging security environment. Remnants of the former Taliban regime and the terrorist al-Qaeda network, as well as narco-traffickers and other terrorist and insurgent groups that oppose the international community’s presence continue to operate in various parts of Afghanistan.
Methods of attack include bombs (roadside and other), suicide bombs (either on foot or by vehicle), indirect fire (rockets and mortars), direct fire (shootings and rocket propelled grenades), kidnappings and violent crime (UK Foreign Office; Afghanistan, 2013). The above is reflected in research that showed Afghanistan to have the highest rate of attack against aid workers in the world, counting 160 attacks between 2006 and 2011 (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4).

More than 50 INGOs are registered to work in Pakistan (UNDOC, 2013), and while carjacking, armed robberies, house invasions, and other violent crimes occur in many major urban areas, deliberate attacks on aid workers remain the most serious concern. Pakistan ranked fourth highest in terms of attacks against aid workers between 2006 and 2011 (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4), examples of which include the attack on an international aid agency in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa on 10 March 2010, the bombing of World Food Programme office in Islamabad on 5 October 2009, and the killing of a US aid worker on 12 November 2008 in Peshawar. Five foreign humanitarian workers have been taken hostage in Pakistan since July 2011, and kidnappings may be motivated by desires for either financial or political gain (UK Foreign Office; Pakistan, 2013).

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### 2.12.6 Southeast Asia

Thailand is a generally peaceful country, but tension and violence exist near borders in some areas and, on rare occasions, in large cities elsewhere. Bomb and grenade attacks have been taking place without any discernible pattern, including in places visited by expatriates and foreign travellers. There have been recent attacks in the main cities of Thailand, including in Chiang Mai in 2010 and in Bangkok in February 2012 (UK Foreign Office; Thailand, 2013). For
several years, the far south of Thailand has been experiencing almost daily incidents of criminally and politically motivated violence including incidents attributed to armed local separatist groups. More than 50 INGOs operate in Thailand.

The Philippines have few security concerns outside of the southern island of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group, Jema’ah Islamiyah, and groups that have broken away from the more mainstream Moro Islamic Liberation Front or Moro National Liberation Front, have carried out bombings resulting in deaths, injuries, and property damage (US State Department; Thailand, 2013). Kidnap victims are sometimes held in captivity for long periods of time before being released, while others have been killed by their captors (Australian Government; Thailand, 2013). Thirty-seven INGOs are registered as operating in the country (UNOCHA, 2013).
2.13 NGO Security Handbooks

While there are hundreds, if not thousands, of active INGOs in the world today, the researcher has only been able to find four INGOs with their own comprehensive manual or handbook for security. These are World Vision, CARE International, Save the Children, and Mercy Corps, and each will be discussed individually below.

World Vision has long had its own manual, and as of 01 June 2013 the manuals were available as a mobile phone app for general staff with a management version compiled for managers. Andries Dreyer, Director of Global Security Training, stated:

Making the security manual mobile provides yet another way to ensure that staff can access the information they need when they need it. We need to make sure that they know exactly what to do when they encounter situations that could affect their safety. We need to have a culture of preparedness so that people keep in mind what they need to have and to know in order to be prepared. If you have a smartphone, downloading these apps right now is something that you can do to help ensure that you are prepared later (McAllister, 2013).

In addition to World Vision, both CARE International and Save the Children have very comprehensive security manuals. Mercy Corps also provides a Field Safety manual that provides specific information relevant to staff security. Protection International has also issued a very comprehensive generic manual designed for human rights defenders.

Some other international organisations, specifically the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), have security manuals that are used by many INGOs; Koenraad Van Brabant’s 2010 book, Operational Security Management in Violent Environments, is also in use by many INGOs.
2.14 INGO Responses to Insecurity

Since 2002, Abby Stoddard and Adele Harmer’s extensive research has made an important contribution to widening and deepening the collective knowledge associated with humanitarian security management. Stoddard and Harmer’s publications tackle a variety of sub-topics associated with the field of humanitarian security and have been widely distributed inside the aid community, leading to increasing awareness around the issue and shaping discussions around it.

The reaction to security concerns across the INGO community has been somewhat schizophrenic. On one side, some argue for much more ‘protective’ and ‘deterrent’ measures, while other people reason that ‘acceptance’ strategies offer valuable and efficient alternatives (Van Brabant, 2010, p. 55-57). Some agencies have developed sophisticated security analysis and reporting tools, policies, and procedures, while some continue, regardless of the risks, to function without standard or even established protocols or security management strategies. Most INGOs work tirelessly to discover the right balance between ensuring the security of their staff and achieving operational requirements, which is a considerably more urgent task today than it was in the past because of the repeated attacks on INGO staff and organisations (Murphy, 2004, p. 122).

Reports and research specifically studying the topic of attacks against international aid staff concur that the situation has worsened. A report by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) notes that ‘between 1992 and 2005, 229 United Nations civilian staff members have been killed as a result of malicious acts’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2005). Further, during the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005, UNDSS ‘received information detailing the deaths of 65 international and national staff of international, non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations as a result of malicious acts’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2006). Although there is no single definitive study that provides an authoritative quantity of humanitarian aid worker deaths, there exists general consensus that the absolute numbers of aid workers killed by violence are increasing (King, 2002; Van Brabant, 2001).
This poses critical troubles both for benevolent aid organisations as well as their donors as the ‘high amount of these kinds of security incidents weakens the efficiency of the operation and performance of the United Nations, reduces the personal safety and well-being of staff and compromises the security of field installations’ (UN, 2001). If the United Nations with its power and support apparatus suffers operationally, one can expect that the same is the case for INGOs.

Providing and maintaining effective security measures in dangerous environments can be an expensive business. Regardless of the indication of a systematic improvement of security among the INGOs, it is not known just how much INGOs invest in security, since there is no set formula for deriving risk management costs for an overall programme budget. One approach that has been identified is the allocation of an arbitrary percentage of the overall programme budget to risk management costs, typically not exceeding 5 per cent. However, if we were to apply this formula to the total Official Development Assistance (ODA) for 2010, it would report that aid implementers could have had access to $25 billion for risk management expenditures in that year. This is a sum which would be neither realistic nor justifiable (Zumkehr and Finucane, 2013, p. 23).

### 2.15 Interpreting Incident Data

The requirement for humanitarian organisations to build better security management practices to cope with staff security needs inside an increasingly aggressive operating environment continues to be recognised by both academic and strategic studies (Bruderlein and Gassmann, 2006, p. 63-93). For the execution of improved security managing practices within these organisations, research has shown that enhanced security measures for humanitarian aid workers requires closer coordination between humanitarian aid organisations at both field and policy levels. Regarding recognition of the reasons for risk to humanitarian aid employees, academics and policy researchers have historically been at variance with security managers. Remarkably, academics and policy analysts posit that intended violent behaviour poses the highest danger to humanitarian aid workers, while humanitarian organisation security managers
specify crime and traffic accidents as being the greatest danger. These divergent answers have serious behavioural results for humanitarian aid organisations and contradict different methodological methods to the creation of strategies addressing staff security (Martin, 1999, p. 4-6). Recently, there appears to be more consensus, with intentional targeting largely thought to represent the most important threat to aid workers’ safety.

However, NGO professionals have contended that findings from such research is inconsistent because they may extract information from the media. Such information rarely includes fatalities as a result of accidents, crime or illness, and it may present false quantities of deaths since the majority of attacks on aid workers occur only in a few countries like Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Sudan, making findings not applicable for the security of aid workers in general. Figure 2.14 comes from the 2012 Aid Worker Security Report (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 3) and shows the five countries with the highest recorded number of attacks against aid workers in 2011 based on data from the Aid Worker Security Database.

![Figure 2.14: The five countries with the highest recorded number of attacks against aid workers (2011)](image)

Source: Aid Worker Security Report, 2012
2.16 Methods of Attack

In 2000, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and Johns Hopkins University gathered data on terrorist attacks on volunteers and NGOs from the Red Cross, UN programmes and NGO records. Once the data was analysed, it was determined that during the period of conflicts that took place Rwanda, Somalia, Burundi, and Afghanistan (between 1985 and 1998), the numbers of deaths of NGO volunteers increased significantly (Murphy, 2004, p. 22). While the next chapter will discuss the literature surrounding terrorism more closely, the data set offers an overview for the present chapter:

- Being an aid worker can be a dangerous activity by itself, as aid workers are typically placed into volatile and unstable areas with a potential for injury or death to staff on duty.

- NGO staff and organisations are increasingly attacked by terrorists and rebels for numerous reasons, as those previously mentioned in this chapter and further explored in the next chapter.

The research also illustrated that ‘most deaths were due to intentional violence (guns or other weapons), with many connected with banditry’ (Murphy, 2004, p. 22). In a separate study of data that is representative of death, hospitalisation or medical evacuation of staff from eight European and eleven North American NGOs between September 2002 and December 2005, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Center for Refugee and Disaster Response gave the following findings (Gidley, 2006):

- About sixty per cent of the reported deaths were because of planned and intentional violence.

- Sixty-five per cent of intentional violence, including gunfire, attack, and rape, occurred while NGO workers were on the road to or from work, excluding while being in homes or offices.
• Most cases did not involve theft, which can be another indication of intentional violence being the goal. This represents a difference from the previous study that revealed that banditry was prevalent.

• Sixty-five per cent of intentional violence were against national staff, and intentional violence was to blame for seventy-one per cent of deaths overall.

• In fifty-six per cent of recorded incidents, small weapons were used.

Hostage taking incidents where the victims were killed, (as well as the more usual outcome of victims being released alive), remained the quickest growing type of attack affecting aid workers. The Aid Worker Security Report, released late October 2013, states that ‘the number of kidnapping incidents has quadrupled since 2002, with an average increase of 44 per cent each year’. The report also demonstrated that kidnapping is considered the most frequent form of major attack against aid workers, with kidnapping victims surpassing the number of victims of shootings, serious bodily assault, and all types of explosives. Kidnappings comprised nearly a quarter of all major attacks on aid operations in 2012, and an even bigger percentage of aid worker victims (36 per cent) (Harmer et al., 2013, p. 5). This again emphasises the necessity of this research into management practices of INGO hostage cases.

Armed groups are able to use the hostages for political leverage, as a propaganda tool, or to demonstrate control over a specific territory or in relation to the authorities. Aid workers are of course not the sole targets for hostage takers, however they are generally ‘a visible and soft one’ (Egeland et al., 2011, p. 26-31). The fifth chapter of this study will further discuss reasons that aid workers may become targets of terrorists. Other threats, such as armed break-ins and violent road banditry, dropped off during the period under scrutiny as organisations instituted tighter and more protective security measures and restricted movement in some areas.
2.17 Duty of Care

There exists a legal grounding for ethical and moral imperatives in connection with staff security and safety among INGOs. Though ethical and moral questions have primary importance, INGOs in addition have a legal obligation to provide a duty of care that covers staff security and safety. Thus, security and safety are not merely personal, subjective matters of preference or conscience, but an obligation anchored with the organisation’s leadership, potentially shared by its top executive (Kemp and Merkelbach, 2011, p. 50-54).

The concept of duty of care easily transfers to the topic of the present research, hostage management for INGOs. Most hostages are taken because the hostage takers are hoping to obtain concessions from the organisation that the victim works for, and not because the individuals themselves have done anything wrong. In all cases, however, the hostage takers want to extract something from the organisations or the outside world. They are unable to get what they need from the hostages, so it is not the hostages themselves who are the key factor; they simply permit the hostage taker to make a statement (Bolz et al., 2001, p. 33). The organisation, rather than the person, must therefore accept the vast majority of responsibility for engaging mechanisms to safeguard their staff.

Humanitarian aid activities are performed by people for people. The effectiveness and success of humanitarian aid initiatives depend especially on the contribution of well-prepared staff able to operate in inhospitable and dangerous situations. Operating in emergencies places great pressure on staff. Therefore, NGOs cannot disregard the duty of care that they have towards their staff, national and international, and NGOs should recognise their responsibility in guaranteeing the physical and psycho-social well-being of each employee, before, during and after working with the NGO (Piziali, 2009, p. 8).

The concept of duty of care can be taken from what the courts have called ‘foreseeability’ in vicarious liability suits. An incident such as a hostage-taking could be considered a foreseeable occurrence under vicarious liability statutes and case law, particularly if the organisation are operating in a country or area which has a known potential for hostage taking. Essentially, as an organisation
constitutes a potential target, it is under some obligation to safeguard its employees and property (Bolz et al., 2001, p. 33). When employees work abroad, duty of care should mean risk management measures beyond the normal safety and health requirements of an environment to which the employees are familiar. Assigning missions to travellers and expatriates introduces greater security risks, and employers have legal and moral responsibilities that extend duty of care as far as the dependents of international assignees (SOS International, 2011). Breaching duty of care can provide rise to legal action alleging negligence and could lead to damages or in the criminal prosecution of the employer.

The legal responsibility may well be tested in a lawsuit filed in May 2011 in Manhattan Federal Court, United States of America. In the suit, a former staff member Flavia Wagner sued Samaritan’s Purse, the NGO she worked for when she was taken hostage, and Clayton Consultants, the private security company that negotiated her release. The claimant had been deployed to the Abu Ajura area in Darfur in May 2010 ‘despite the fact that other non-government organisations “had prohibited their employees from travelling in that area” because of the threat of kidnapping’, and she was subsequently abducted (Ax, 2011). Wagner accused the organisation of ‘failing to train its security personnel adequately and of wilfully ignoring warning signs that abduction was a threat to foreigners’ (Shifrel, 2011). The lawsuit further claimed:

While Samaritan's Purse possessed the resources to extricate plaintiff from her captivity quickly, it instead embarked on a plan designed to protect its own financial and political interests... in the end, Samaritan’s Purse, its insurer and Clayton got precisely what they wanted—a minimal ransom payment. Defendants achieved that objective only at the expense of plaintiff's health and well-being (Shifrel, 2011).

### 2.18 Security Strategies

Many INGOs base their core security model on the NGO ‘Security Triangle’ of risk reduction methodology. Essentially, the model proposes that there are three
primary means of reducing the risks faced by NGOs and their staff: ‘acceptance’, ‘protection’ and ‘deterrence’ (Van Brabant, 2010, p. 55-57). Each element is discussed in detail in the following sections.

2.18.1 Acceptance

The humanitarian community has readily adopted the acceptance element of the security triangle. Acceptance is a strategy aimed at convincing people in the community of deployment, including adversaries, that an organisation is doing something good for the community and that it should not be targeted as an attack on the organisation would have a negative impact on the community at large. Acceptance is ‘founded on effective relationships and cultivating and maintaining consent from beneficiaries, local authorities, belligerents and other stakeholders’ (Fast et al., 2011, p. 1-19). The acceptance approach tries to reduce risks, as well as to allow local actors to manage the risks in support of the organisation, after receiving approval from official or de facto authorities to carry out the activities of the INGOs. This in turn is could become a method of reducing or removing potential threats to be able to access vulnerable populations and undertake programme activities. In low-risk environments one often finds a high level of effort directed towards the acceptance strategy.

While this seems to be a natural approach that goes along with delivering assistance, it does have a number of weaknesses if an organisation becomes overly reliant upon it. For one, the strategy largely depends on the confidence level of the recipients in terms of the functions of INGOs and their perceived objectivity. Specifically, as discussed in the video The Price of Anything by the Security Management Network (2012), the acceptance strategy has slowly lost some of its effectiveness due to the increase in the number of humanitarian actors. With so many actors out there, the local population, armed groups, and parties to a conflict cannot differentiate between them all. What has been referred to as ‘humanitarian space’ has shrunk over the years, and the identities of parties operating in the same environment have become blurred in the eyes of local populations. It is increasingly common to see several distinct entities providing humanitarian assistance, including entities that have traditionally been one of the parties to a conflict. For instance, armed forces currently carry out
duties and responsibilities traditionally provided by NGOs in ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (VENRO, 2013). This can severely limit the effect of acceptance as a security strategy in many operations.

Acceptance alone may not be a sufficient security strategy, as seen in the increasing number of targeted attacks against humanitarian aid workers. By 2008, the fatality rate for international aid workers had surpassed that of UN peacekeepers. The rate of non-fatal incidents among aid workers increased similarly, as there were 113 kidnap victims between 2000 and 2004 compared to 429 between 2007 and 2011 (Childs, 2013, p. 64-72).

While the acceptance approach has been a potential shield against the risk of political kidnapping, economically motivated kidnappings present a new challenge to INGOs. They now face greater risks from economic kidnapping, so it is therefore increasingly challenging for them to depend on the instruments that were effective against political kidnapping. Economic kidnapping questions the unique status of INGOs. Without political ideologies to impact the way they work, and without reputations to defend, criminal kidnappers are less inclined to grant INGOs immunity from kidnapping (Briggs, 2001, p. 4-5). In addition to acceptance, then, most INGOs also make use of the protection and deterrence security approaches, each of which is described below. The context of the work, the values, and the capabilities of the organisation all play a part in determining the implementation of these approaches (Van Brabant, 2010, p. 55-57).

2.18.2 Protection

The protection side of the security triangle is the one most people associate with security; in other words, hardening measures. This can entail strengthening or fortifying the compound of the organisation, typically with high walls, razor wire, strong gates, bars on windows, and anti-ram devices, as well as hiring security guards (Gaul et al., 2006, p. 10). While community acceptance focuses on the minimization of threats, the protective approach does not influence the extant level of threat. Protective measures only reduce the risk of attack by making the organisation less vulnerable and they cannot soften the threat as the acceptance strategy does. Over-reliance on the protective strategy can be costly.
and, in some cases, prohibitively expensive. It can also carry high cost in terms of staff welfare, as the ‘bunker mentality’ can lead to higher levels of stress among the employees by imposing restrictions on normal activity as well as freedom of movement (Dick, 2010, p. 17-20).

2.18.3 Deterrence

The efforts made to prevent individuals from performing violent activities against INGOs come under the category of deterrence. The deterrence strategy prevents a threat from being realised by ensuring that a serious consequence would result should an attack occur, and that a would-be attacker is aware of this. In essence, it is a counter-threat, such as supporting military actions, legal, economic or political sanctions, or withdrawing agency support and staff. Non-government organisations usually possess very low capability of deterrents, outside of programme suspension (Bollettino, 2008, p. 265-267). To a point, armed escorts have been used more frequently by the humanitarian community as a deterrent against ambushes, and it is therefore of essence that each agency have a clear idea about the association of the humanitarian organisation with armed forces (Dick, 2010, p. 17-20). The employment of armed guards is not without controversy. In an editorial for a journal called Together, Charles Rogers, then Chief of Corporate Security for World Vision, presented several instances of ethical issues raised by the employment of armed securities by NGOs (Brabant, 2000, p.2).

It is argued that if an NGO appoints armed security, it could ‘raise the bar’. It could increase the danger to unarmed agencies, as NGOs not using armed guards might then be perceived as easy targets. It is therefore understood that by adopting a specific security approach an NGO could influence the security of the other NGOs (Gaul et al., 2006). The organisations’ chances of being attacked may also increase as a result of appointing armed security, as it could undermine the motto of the organisation that supports societal peace and hence affect the effectiveness of the acceptance strategy.
2.19 Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk Assessment in the Context of INGO Security

The INGO community has gradually adopted well-structured procedures for information distribution and synchronized security approaches. Formerly, the United Nations frequently performed a lead role in synchronizing both service and protection during insecure scenarios (Muggah, 2003, p. 152); the INGOs themselves have now largely taken over this task. Though the independent nature of INGOs provides benefits to them in some settings, in an unsafe scenario it can become a liability. Threats made against one organisation could be a danger signal to every INGO. The opinion of the local population regarding other INGOs may be changed by the response of one organisation to any violence or attack against it. For example, if an INGO should choose to continue or suspend operations in a given operating environment in response to an incident, there could be a temporary change in the work of other INGOs, such as them having to cover for the activities previously carried out by the NGO that withdrew. As a result, there could be a change in the security situation such as an increased risk to those other INGOs (Gaul et al., 2006).

2.19.1 Security, risk and risk management

The concept of risk has over the past decades permeated security studies, as well as the international aid community, and is now increasingly used to improve security of INGO staff. The objective of this section is to briefly describe two major approaches to risk in relation to security and to explore the potential of risk management. Embracing a rationalist tradition, the concept of risk has evolved as a basis for decision-making under conditions of uncertainty (Bernstein, 1998; Daston, 1995; Hacking, 1990). Risk analysis works as an instrument in decision-making by evaluating future actions in terms of risk. As Luhmann (1993, p. 13) has argued, risk is conceptualized as ‘a controlled extension of rational action’. Risk analysis is an estimation of future threats, an estimation that builds on the premise that risks can be classified, quantified and to some extent predicted and that rational behaviour can help to manage or
perhaps even eliminate risk (Adams, 1995; Bernstein, 1998; Ewald, 1992; Power, 2004).

The modern tradition of risk, however, is contested by Beck’s theory of risk society. According to Beck, late modernity is characterised by society’s inability to insure itself against risks that, on the one hand, exceed the calculable and, on the other, have catastrophic effects that cannot be compensated. According to Beck, the 9 September 2001 terrorist attacks escaped rational predictions and, as such, have displayed the limits of modern insurance technology (Beck, 2002; 2003). Within the field of international relations, this has given birth to a research agenda on ‘reflexive security’ that focusses on the management of the new and constructed risks that transcend national borders (Rasmussen, 2002; 2004). In risk society theories, hazards and insecurities are viewed as inevitable structural threats that can only be solved through cosmopolitanism, based on the negotiation of certain norms (Beck, 2005; Boyne, 2001).

An alternative approach addresses risk as an instrument of governance rather than an organising principle of life. This method is based on the work of Michel Foucault, and risk is here considered a means for sorting reality, as ‘a way of representing events in a certain form so they might be made governable in particular ways, with particular technologies and for particular goals’ (Dean, 1999, p. 177). This approach has inspired analyses of risk in a variety of disciplines such as international relations, criminology, insurance, and surveillance studies (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Garland, 2001; Lyon, 2003; Ericson, Doyle, and Barry, 2003).

Two strategies have been described within the approach described by Dean. Baker and Simon (2002, p. 4) describe ‘risk spreading’ as the ‘wide variety of efforts to conceive and address social problems in terms of risk’, such as financial risk management, social security, police and national defence services, and environmental policies, among others. ‘Risk embracing’ on the other hand is described as the strategy that shifts the risk responsibility from the institutions to the individuals and corporations, aimed at constituting subjects that are made responsible through their management of risk (Baker, 2002, p. 33-51). Security can therefore be seen as a combination of these two strategies.
2.19.2 The INGO community and ISO 31000 Risk Management

The INGO community is gradually changing to a risk management approach to security. In May 2011, the Security Management Initiative (SMI) published a landmark discussion paper entitled From Security Management to Risk Management. The authors argue convincingly that the international standard, ISO 31000: 2009 Risk Management - Principles and Guidelines, provides a ‘better fit’ than contemporary models utilised within the aid community, and that adapting ISO 31000 standards to suit the INGO community’s specific needs would not only enhance the duty of care to staff on mission but also contribute to the growing professionalisation of humanitarian assistance (Merkelbach and Daudin, 2011, p. 54).

Rich Parker, an expert on INGO risk management, believes that the INGO community has been slow to adjust to ISO 31000, and that those INGOs with an integrated security management system in place are either guided by the Humanitarian Practice Network, by one of the regional inter-agency forums, or have developed their own framework in isolation (Parker, 2012, p. 2).

2.19.3 INGO security cooperation

An important characteristic of hostage taking is that it could happen to employees at all job levels of the organisation; thus, organisations needs to have personnel protection plans which are not restricted to executive-level staff (Likar, 2011, p. 49). Cooperation between organisations is particularly crucial at this stage, since information and intelligence may be shared, permitting the best use of resources. The establishment of NGO security coordination offices in Afghanistan (Afghanistan NGO Security Office - ANSO), Iraq (NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq - NCCI), Gaza, Somalia, and Sudan in recent times has facilitated the collection and dissemination of security incident reporting and security warnings. These coordinating bodies release incident data, but do not necessarily analyse the data beyond simple summaries or basic trends and patterns; they do not have the time and even the mandate to take action (Fast, 2010, p. 3).
There are signs that INGOs are becoming better at sharing information. Indeed a recent survey conducted by Christian Aid to evaluate the extent of security collaboration between the UN and NGOs in the field and the implementation of the Saving Lives Together (SLT) framework, identified information sharing among the highest priorities for coordination amongst all groups of NGOs surveyed. Additionally, of the 205 respondents from 72 organisations that answered the survey, 88 per cent of these from international NGOs, and 61 percent of national NGOs reported that their organisations permitted information sharing (Micheni, 2009, p. 10).

The importance of cooperation in sharing information and expertise, planning, as well as the need for training of staff is commonly agreed, and is more likely to take place when a community or group share the same threat perception. This is likely to be a continuous issue, as hostage takers are evolving in methodology and consistently improving their methods to ensure increasingly spectacular and devastating attacks against their adversaries (Taillon, 2002, p. 58). A lack of proactive intelligence sharing and planning increases the attackers’ capabilities and gives their methods of attack a higher likelihood of success. Data from ITERATE, a database on international terrorism intended to determine the type and success rate of terrorist attacks, shows that terrorists were successful 76 per cent of the time with hostage-taking missions (Harvey, 1993, p. 76).

2.19.4 Exposure and vulnerabilities

The extent of exposure of a specific organisation to the threat is largely determined by the vulnerability of that organisation. The responsibilities and activities of the agency and the aid workers greatly affect vulnerability, so there is often a direct linkage between the vulnerability and the mandate of a particular organisation. It is also a common misperception that international staff face a higher risk than national staff; this may not always be the case. In fact, the opposite may be true in some circumstances as a result of the following (Gaul et al., 2006, p. 10):

- Local criminals may consider national aid workers’ relationship with the international community as ‘traitorous’.
• They may think that these workers are rich as they are perceived as enjoying high salaries.

• They may think that there will be lesser consequences for kidnapping national staff than for kidnapping international staff.

There has also been a recent shift towards ‘remote management’ of operations in some of the most violent contexts, where deteriorating conditions have forced international agencies to manage their programmes remotely. Despite more activities for national staff, the same shift has not been seen in investment in security for national staff. A few of the larger and better funded INGOs have started to make this shift, but overall progress in security equitability for national staff has been slow and, for national NGO partners, progress has barely begun (Stoddard et al., 2011, p. 20-21).

Ethnicity, religion, and gender may also determine a staff member’s level of vulnerability to violence. For instance, in Mindanao, female Muslim aid staff have been sent to specific areas of violence in order to control the level of threat and minimise the vulnerability to violence.

The following factors may also influence the vulnerability to violence:

• The satisfaction of employees with security measures.

• Interpersonal abilities of employees.

• Perspective of the local population regarding employees and salaries. This factor is related to community acceptance.

2.19.5 INGO security training

Security training can be a challenge for many INGOs. A recent study showed that more than 70 per cent of respondents stated that their organisation valued security training highly, but 44 per cent admitted that their organisation did not have sufficient resources for security training (European Interagency Security Forum, 2010). Most of the larger INGOs have their own internal security training section, or at least an individual in charge, but many operate in isolation
to a large extent. While some INGOs use professional training organisations such as the NGO RedR to deliver specific training, most of the INGOs utilise their own employees to various extents.

Security training should differ according to the role and level of employees. To prepare for the possibility of hostage cases, two categories of staff require training, that of potential hostages and of potential hostage crisis managers.

Many researchers (Muller et al., 1996; Regini 2002; Fagan, 2003; Van Hasselt and Romano, 2004; Van Hasselt et al., 2008) mentioned that in order to fill the gap that exists between learning and the real world, hands-on training should be given to aid workers. This is true for both categories identified above, and scenario-based training can be helpful to prepare and evaluate aid workers (Van Hasselt et al., 2005). The idea behind simulation and scenario-based training is that the skills and knowledge obtained during training can be drawn upon if necessary during real and critical events.

Other groups whose situations can be compared to that of aid workers, such as journalists, have introduced training more systematically. Anthony Feinstein, a Canadian psychiatrist and author of Dangerous Lives: War and the Men and Women Who Report It, stresses the significance of mental preparedness and exactly how essential it truly is for journalists to comprehend the risks and the potential the signs of psychological distress before going to war. Feinstein conducted a seven-year-long study which highlighted that training and preparedness are key in tackling the possible emotional repercussions of being in life-threatening situations (Gornitzki, 2007).

2.19.6 Being proactive

Educating the potential crisis management team, and especially potential negotiators, is essential. Fagan (2003, p. 87) and Regini (2002, p. 14) mentioned that the organisation should teach the team about the context of their work with the help of available literature in the field. Regini, (2002, p. 13-14) mentioned that basic crisis management team training should include familiarisation with hostage taker personality type, suicide assessment, official problems, and psychology as well as the influence of mass media. Greenstone (1995, p. 281-
282), Noesner (1999, p. 6-12) and Vecchi (2002, p. 1-6) all insisted that joint training is useful for tactical and negotiation teams. This should be done so that every team can understand others’ competence in responding to the critical situations. Excellent communication and success follow if the group members value the commitment and principles of the teams and the approaches adopted to solve the critical incidents. While the recommendation above was made for the law enforcement context, strong parallels can be drawn to crisis management between headquarters and the field.

2.19.7 After-action analysis of critical incidents

Regini (2002, p. 13-18) posited that those involved in hostage negotiations should analyse past critical situations in order to learn from the achievements and failures of others. They should analyse the various situations, responses and activities of the hostage takers as well as the approaches followed by the negotiators and law enforcement authorities to gain knowledge in this area. Information that represents the intensity of feelings and pressure to resolve critical incidents can be obtained from audio and video recordings, as well as written records.

It is important that the training provided to aid workers be specific to their operational environment and context. Muggah (2003, p. 152) observed that the aid community often failed to take into consideration the difference in the level of danger to the international and regional aid workers. Similarly, we could find a difference in the level of danger to male and female aid workers affiliated with a single organisation. There is also an imbalance in training on offer for national and international staff. This is due to the belief that the local staff members will face a lower level of threat, given that they can manage with the regional languages, that they may be able to predict the local security threats well in advance, and that they know how to tackle those issues (Muggah, 2003, p. 154). As discussed above, such beliefs may misguide those responsible for staff security training; in fact these views may also be outright mistaken. Hence, the lack of a systematic and articulated training approach to improving the security of staff through skills enhancement is of concern (European Interagency Security Forum, 2010).
An organisation’s vulnerability to violence may also be influenced by the context of its job and the value of its possessions. It is therefore necessary for INGOs to review security regulations and processes as well as to link with domestic actors while assessing the organisation’s vulnerabilities (Gaul et al., 2006, p. 10).

### 2.20 Obstacles to Effective Security Management and Security Coordination

In accordance with Barth, Eide, Kaspersen, Kent, and Von Hippel, (2005, p. 4-8) several reasons have been highlighted through the literature on humanitarian aid organisations as to the reasons they have not adopted adequately robust security management systems and why they are unsuccessful when it comes security coordination. Donini (2004, p. 38-40) stated that one major hindrance to improved security management is an overly narrow focus on operational readiness for field operators. As a result, management loses focus on strategic-level thinking about security and crisis management. Staff turnover can also produce a barrier between the experienced staff and newer staff of the organisation that have little if any previous institutional knowledge.

Donini further argues that important variations in the capacities and mission of NGOs, lack of confidence or misunderstandings between NGOs and the UN concerning humanitarian principles, mutual fears about agency autonomy, competition over donor funds, and aid organisations’ wish to be in the spotlight are some of the additional obstacles to effective security coordination between humanitarian organisations.

#### 2.20.1 Impediments to security coordination

**Humanitarian principles and politics**

Based on the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence, assistance to beneficiaries has generally been delivered by humanitarian aid organisations in a traditional manner. The scope of such organisations’ work has expanded over the post-Cold War period since they became participants in post-conflict peace-building processes. The concept of impartiality has also been under
criticism ever since the Rwandan genocide of 1994 saw humanitarian aid organisations delivering help to people mixed up in the genocide yet still participated actively in violent conflict. As outlined by Donini (2004, p. 38-40), the strain between the support lent to humanitarian principles on the one hand and participation in the peace-building process on the other hand has resulted in an identity crisis. This issue still persists in Iraq.

Humanitarian aid organisations at this time must make a decision between serving as subsidiaries of donor governments and playing a less important role within the international scene. NGO mandates have moved beyond assistance and protection to incorporate conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peace-building, and good governance. A challenging situation prevails in Iraq as aid organisations must choose either to work with the occupying power or to risk being unable to fulfil their humanitarian mission. The capability of NGOs to keep their independence and neutrality is further complicated because of the ‘War on Terror’. Hence, it can be hard for NGOs to substantiate their claims of neutrality and impartiality in this globalised world.

**Coordinating agencies**

To be able to coordinate the introduction of common standards and provide a common forum for the discussion of problems that impact the aid community, it utilises umbrella organisations. The Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is the main coordinating body when it comes to the UN. Several of its members are heads of UN agencies, representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and NGO coordinating bodies like InterAction, and representatives of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). InterAction fills the function of coordinating body for the NGOs that operate in the United States. When NGOs act as implementing partners for the UN, with the assistance of bilateral arrangements or together with the United Nations, humanitarian aid organisations might also work closely together. These coordinating organisations not merely assist in clarifying the practices which can be accepted with regards to working together with military forces and private security forces, but in addition helps in identifying the minimum operating security standards (Inter Agency Standing Committee, 2013).
Though attempts were made at institutionalising coordination through these coordinating organisations, little evidence shows the outcomes of such efforts as having lent additional security coordination at the field level. Some of the obstacles to coordination at the field level are the disparate missions of agencies, competition for donor funds, conflicts between short-term objectives (humanitarian aid) and long-term objectives (development programmes), and the number of philosophies which come into play when working with the military and private security forces. In countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, these challenges to inter-agency security coordination are palpable. In each case, there is a choice for aid organisations. They can choose whether or not to act in collaboration with the UN or nurture their own personal relationships with their beneficiary communities (Bolletino, 2006, p. 8).

**Desire to maintain organisational autonomy**

Most NGOs are independent-minded organisations. This can be proven through the fate of the formal procedures introduced by the UN that were meant to fit NGOs into a coordinated security system. In 1996, NGOs worldwide refused to sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which was presented by the then United Nation’s Office for the Security of Coordinator (UNSECOORD). MOU signatories were expected to supply the UN with security authority in the field. NGOs were not comfortable with this.

Today, the Saving Lives Together initiative serves to enhance coordination and cooperation between the UN and NGOs, however, there is still friction on the subject of autonomy where security is concerned. Likewise, to be able to maintain agency autonomy, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) refused to sign up to the Sphere project (Tong, 2004, p. 176-189), an inter-agency combined project that holds signatories accountable to standards in some areas including food security, water sanitation, health services and shelter. MSF’s refusal to sign stemmed from its unwillingness to lessen humanitarian aid to a collection of technical standards, and from a fear that Sphere would scale back MSF’s capability to remain flexible. Such flexibility, it was argued, is essential for NGOs to react effectively to humanitarian disasters.
Competition over scarce resources

Competition over donor funds and a wish to be the centre of attention create an environment that is not ideal for cooperation (Bolletino, 2006, p. 9). Organisations that take the lead in order to deliver humanitarian aid to a beneficiary community always have strong incentives. Capturing the media spotlight for willingness to provide assistance in high-risk environments could make an organisation’s requests for donations more compelling. It may therefore be worth delivering help with a greater security risk to the organisation.

The humanitarian action is threatened by the competitive aid environment, forcing organisations to pay attention to institutional imperatives. Since collaboration incurs costs, organisations are unlikely to take part in collaborative initiatives unless they can identify a body that is prepared to cover such costs. As a way to overcome this challenge, the job of coordination should be reconsidered to pay attention to the creation of organisational cultures that encourage improved inter-organisational trust and information-sharing.

2.21 Conclusion

This review has shown that it is difficult to describe the INGO community as a uniform group, as there are too many diverse mandates, structures, policies, and practices. With no uniform definition of an NGO in existence, each INGO is typically defined according to which of the humanitarian principles and values are emphasised, and in what operational context.

Despite reports of a total development aid for 2010 at over $500 billion, it is difficult to estimate how much of the funds INGOs spend on security. What is clear, however, is that staff safety continues to be of great concern due to the repeated attacks on INGO staff and organisations. In fact, as the “humanitarian space” is shrinking, it is likely that INGOs will have an increased vulnerability to attacks. Security concerns are therefore omnipresent in today’s field operations, but while INGOs in the past were relying on the guiding principles as a mean of security, there has been a need to adapt security procedures suitable for today’s operating environment.
In the next chapter, the literature review will investigate a core topic of this research: hostage management. Although it is broadly accepted that INGOs need better security management and protocols, there is currently a lack of basic empirical knowledge about the existing security management protocols with reference to existing policies and knowledge. The current capabilities of INGOs to handle hostage incidents are also unknown. The chapter will attempt to identify why the number of aid worker abductions has risen drastically in recent years.
CHAPTER 3: HOSTAGE MANAGEMENT

3.1 Introduction

The first part of this chapter aims to foster an understanding of the hostage phenomenon. In order to do so, it will present the literature available on definitions of hostage taking and examine the difference between hostage taking and kidnapping. Particular attention will be paid to the definitions used by INGOs. This chapter will also explore the literature on international instruments and frameworks surrounding hostage taking, drawing conclusions about their relevance for INGOs. Finally, the review will examine the degree to which INGOs operate in the world’s ‘hostage hot-spots’.

Whilst it is nearly impossible to cover all of the material relating to this subject, the researcher has reviewed leading writers’ and theorists’ discussions on the subject of hostage taking and kidnapping, with an emphasis on INGO application of policy and theory. Much of the research on hostage negotiation and the psychology of hostage survival derive from the United States, particularly from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation on negotiation and from the US military on survival. Hostage management as a field originated with the FBI’s Dr. Harvey Schlossberg, and much of the writing and thinking around the topic of hostage taking has continued to emerge from the above-mentioned institutions. Furthermore, many of today’s hostage management practitioners and academics have backgrounds as FBI or US police negotiators.

3.2 Definitions

The word ‘hostage’ is derived from the Latin word hospes, which means ‘hospitality’. Hence, it is understood that there is a relationship between the hostage taking concept and the origin of this phrase. This term reflects the recurrent political and military utilisation of hostages in ancient times, when one or more hostages would be handed over by political authorities as an assurance of trust in the observance of obligation (Strentz, 2012, p. 3).
This concept has evolved immensely in both meaning and matter (Faure, 2003, p. 469) since the term originated. In current parlance, a hostage is someone who is captured or held as security for the accomplishment of a certain condition (Oxford Dictionary, 2013), and a hostage event is an incident in which one or more people are captured against their will by a group or by individuals, generally by force, after which the hostage takers make demands (Giebels et al., 2005, p. 241-253).

Hostage taking has also been described as ‘a way of setting up a bargaining position that cannot be as conveniently or well achieved by other means... [it] is a naked power play’ (Cooper, 1981, p. 1). Gary Noesner, the former Head of the FBI Hostage and Crisis Unit, gives another definition whereby ‘a hostage incident is carried out by a suspect involved in determined behaviour for the accomplishment of certain results that signifies substantive gain for the suspect. In this context, hostages serve as true bargaining chips that can be traded for something’ (Hammer, 2007, p. 39). Tom Hargrove, a former hostage held by Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - FARC) in Columbia for 334 days, defined a hostage as ‘hostage. The deliberate creation and marketing of human grief, anguish, and despair’ (Lopez, 2011, p. i).

The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979, states that:

Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (hostage) in order to compel a third party, namely, a state, an international intergovernmental organisation, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offense of taking hostages within the meaning of this Convention (United Nations, 1979).
There exists a scientific difference of meaning between the terms ‘hostage taking’ and ‘kidnapping’. Poland (1988, p. 137) differentiates kidnapping and hostage taking by defining the former as ‘[seizing and] restraining the victim to some secret location and making demands’, while hostage taking entails a direct argument with officials of a government or an organisation at a known location while the victims are kept secure in that location. These definitions do entail some problems and Poland acknowledges that the distinction is often not very clear.

Attempts have been made within the NGO community to reach common definitions in the security field. The paper ‘Creating Common Security Terminology for NGOs’ (Dick, 2010, p. 17-20) examined security documents from a total of 32 organisations, and it contributes successfully towards providing such commonalities. Dick’s is the definitive work in defining security terminology among NGOs. As security documents are generally sensitive within an organisation, complete anonymity was maintained in the collection of data. It is therefore not possible to determine whether the INGOs participating in this research took part in Dick’s research. The definitions below are those that are identified in the paper as relevant to this study:

3.2.1 Detention

The term ‘detention’ has been defined by four INGOs in their security reports. The four definitions are quite similar and all focus on an individual or group of people holding the detained person involuntarily with no intention to harm, as well as with no clear condition to release the hostage (Dick, 2010, p. 17). Of the four organisations, one observed that detentions were found to be common at security check points, while another organisation observed that there may be many a reason for detention, including lack of satisfaction with a specific activity or agency (Sheik et al., 2000, p. 321).

The basic definitions for detention provided in the dictionary used for Dick’s study, the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, may not be suitable for the present research, as these establish ‘the detainer’ as a member of the security forces, while non-governmental organisations frequently function in domains in
which the government might not be the accountable authority. It is therefore necessary to apply an expanded definition which allows for a non-official person to be the detainer capturing or holding individuals (Dick, 2001, p. 17).

### 3.2.2 Abduction

A definition of abduction was provided by five organisations in Dick’s study. The term was described as the act of an individual or group of people taking someone unwillingly without providing any demands. Of the five, three categorised detention and kidnapping as abduction until a demand was made. Organisations did not provide any definition for detention with specific relation to the taking of hostages, but security guidelines discussed abduction as ‘the instant period after the holding of employees’. The definition of the word ‘abduction’ in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary emphasises the physical taking of a person involuntarily; this sets it apart from detention, in which a person is held for a longer period of time. Therefore, the process of abduction precedes detention (Dick, 2010, p. 18).

### 3.2.3 Kidnapping

While most of the organisations surveyed by Dick discussed kidnapping and the measures to be taken if a staff member should be kidnapped, only four organisations defined the term ‘kidnapping’. Generally, kidnapping is used for monetary gain or other concessions, generally referred to as ransom (Dick 2010, p. 19). Out of the four organisations, one noted that it is difficult to determine whether an incident should qualify as a kidnapping, a detention or a hostage situation unless and until a demand has been made. The definition of kidnapping in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary does not mention the aspect of threatening harm; it does, however, include the aspect of demanding money in exchange for freeing the kidnapped party.

### 3.2.4 Hostage situation

The term hostage or hostage situation was defined by five organisations participating in Dick’s research. All five defined a hostage condition as one in which a person is seized unwillingly by another person or by a group which proceeds to make demands, mainly from family, authorities, an organisation or
other related groups, to be met in exchange for the release of the hostage (Dick 2010, p. 19). The conditions frequently specified by the captors for release of political hostages include:

- **Getting attention for a political cause:** The hostages will not be released until the hostage takers have gained attention for a political view. This was often the primary demand made by the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Colombia, which, according to País Libre, a Colombian foundation for victims of abductions, abducted more than 3,000 people between 2000 and 2007 (País Libre, 2013).

- **Hostage release in exchange for the release of political prisoners or other hostages, or guarantees for an individual being held by authorities to avoid prosecution:** This has been seen as recently as 2012 in Mali, where two Islamists were freed in Mauritania in exchange for three European hostages (BBC World).

Dictionary definitions are similar to those of INGOs and reflect the concept that hostage release is conditional and based on the satisfaction of a particular demand.

As seen above, there is a technical difference in the definition between hostage taking and kidnapping. In order to minimise confusion, this paper will refer to hostage taking and kidnapping interchangeably, as both terms are used in United Nations and INGO operations as well as in previous research in the field.

### 3.3 Types of Hostage Incidents

At the onset of a crisis, it is important to identify which type of a crisis event is occurring. A significant portion of the FBI’s training for commanders is based on this issue (Noesner, 1999, p. 8). It may appear a simple matter, but it can be more complex than it first appears, and the response and likelihood of success may be dependent on correct identification.

Politically motivated hostage takers, especially terrorists, have been identified by some authors as the most difficult with whom to reach an agreement (Soskis
and Van Zandt, 1986, p. 423-435). Several authors distinguish ad hoc negotiations, (e.g. those directed at releasing hostages or ending a hijacking), from political negotiations (often conflated with concessions). The former are perceived as problematic but sometimes unavoidable, while the latter remain counterproductive and dangerous (Wardlaw, 1989, p. 164; Clutterbuck, 1985, p. 232-248). There are a number of reasons for this, and they are predominately linked to the hostage takers’ firm objectives and ideology. In many cases hostage takers or terrorists motivated by politics or religion make demands that are expressive rather than instrumental. In these cases, the hostage taker may simply be giving vent to hate, anger or desire for vengeance rather than aiming to achieve clearly defined tactical goals.

As seen in the theoretical framework, INGO hostage cases are almost entirely well planned abductions, indicating an instrumental focus. In other words, it is a rational action with the aim of delivering substantive demands. In a crime-gone-wrong, family dispute, or a siege, the hostage case is often dominated by expressive behaviour, which is often about venting emotional opinions, and with no clear goal. However, even instrumental cases will experience considerable emotionality, especially in the chaos of the incident onset (Romano, 2002). As a result both hostage-takers and victims vulnerable towards to slipping into a crisis, that can require intervention using a suitable crisis management technique. Alexander and Klein (2009, p. 17) agree, and state that motives can be separated into the ‘expressive’ (i.e. an attempt to voice and/or publicize a grievance or express a frustrated emotion) as well as the ‘instrumental’ (i.e. an attempt to get a particular result such as the payment of ransom). In reality, it is almost always difficult to identify any single motive, especially when the event is terrorist-inspired. Material motives, such as ransom money, could be portrayed as political, moral, or religious, but then allowed to be “negotiated down” to ransom payments. Ransoms could also be used to finance political and religious activities. Some insurgency groups also sell hostages to other groups for their own purposes.

Where demands are political there is a framework to manage individual cases, and that framework is known by all concerned. Since the demands in political
cases tend to be for changes in legislation or prisoner releases, they have a
tendency to be resolved inside the diplomatic arena and not by an INGO. 
Economic kidnapping, unlike political kidnapping, is motivated by a wish for 
profit and must be analysed in different terms. And although political 
kidnapping can be rational or objective when it comes to motives and goals, the 
potential risks political kidnappers are prepared to take for their causes tend to 
be more extreme and more unpredictable compared to those that economic 
kidnappers take in quest for money. It can thus be argued that the majority of 
INGO hostage cases, as economically motivated, are ‘rational’ when it comes to 
their motives and goals.

Though there is overlap between the groups that execute economic and political 
kidnapping, the two crimes have different motivations and the dynamics that 
govern them are distinct. A complete familiarity with the differences is 
important in order to meet the new challenges posed by economic kidnapping 
(Briggs, 2001, p. 4-5).

Hostage takers with ‘expressive’ motives are particularly unpredictable. If their 
hatred or desire for vengeance is strong enough there is nothing the authorities 
can do but try to reach the hostages before they are murdered (Wilkinson, 2006, 
p. 119). In addition, many terrorists see negotiation as a betrayal of their cause 
and their group belonging, and loyalties prevent them from making independent 
decisions. In addition, the usually careful and thorough planning behind such 
abductions, the high level of commitment, and the achievement of a position of 
real or perceived power make for an environment less conducive to resolution 
(Bahn, 1978, p. 3-7). The groups behind political hostage takings attempt to 
reach their ultimate political goals by first carrying out more immediate and 
focused activities, such as hostage taking, and thereby raising the human cost for 
an NGO to remain in their area of operations and deliver their programme 
activities (Libicki et al., 2007, p. xiv).

In certain conditions, people abduct their own family members or friends. In the 
case of an INGO, they may abduct their colleagues. The hostage event can be 
described as a person or group of people detained by another person 
involuntarily in order to force a third party to comply with substantive demands
Such substantive demands cannot be provided or achieved without the hostage, so the hostage is not the target, but a bargaining tool. An example of such a scenario could be a former employee taking a staff hostage, while demanding his job back, as was the case of the infamous Manila bus hijack, where disgruntled former senior inspector Rolando Mendoza of the Manila Police District (MPD) hijacked a tourist bus carrying 25 people in an attempt to get his job back. His anger was not with the hostages, but towards the mayor and the police department. However, he felt he needed the hostages to ensure sufficient leverage to be reinstated.

3.4 Legal Frameworks and International Conventions against Hostage Taking

Hostage taking is covered by a number of conventions and declarations, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which guarantees inter alia the right to life, liberty and security of person, freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, freedom of movement, protection from arbitrary detention (United Nations, 1948). Depending on circumstances, the situation of persons taken in captivity by terrorist hostage takers amounts to a violation of virtually every right listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages is the only binding treaty addressing terrorist hostage taking (United Nations, 1979). Though the Convention has only 39 signatories, it has a further 170 parties that binds a State to implement the Convention. Since hostage-taking is sometimes considered a modus operandi of terrorists, other instruments on (specific aspects) combating terrorism adopted by international, regional or national bodies apply to terrorist hostage-taking situations. It states that:

In so far as the Geneva conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims or the Protocols Additional to those Conventions are applicable to a particular act of hostage taking, and in so far as States Parties to this Convention are bound under those conventions to
prosecute or hand over the hostage taker, the present condition shall not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of armed conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols thereto, including armed conflicts mentioned in article 1, paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol 1 of 1977 (United Nations, 2005).

Various global, regional or intergovernmental bodies have also adopted resolutions and decisions requesting the criminalisation of terrorist hostage-taking. However, the various instruments neither unequivocally address the legality of payment of ransom to terrorist hostage-takers nor provide for the rights and entitlements of all categories of individual and collective victims of terrorist hostage takers (Heinz, 2012, p. 11).

On 18 December 1985, the UN Security Council Resolution Against the Taking of Hostages was adopted by a 15 to 0 vote. UN conventions require that a nation use its own judicial system to implement and enforce the agreement; UN resolutions, on the other hand, are simply agreements on a particular set of principles or goals. Hence, conventions are more binding than resolutions, since resolutions do not imply a commitment to enforcement. Nevertheless, the United Nations has no direct power to force a nation to abide by any of its agreements (Enders and Sandler, 2006, p. 174). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court states that ‘hostage-taking constitutes a war crime’ and the aforementioned Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 consider hostage taking a breach of the protection of victims of war (United Nations, 2005).

Following several decades during which hostage taking featured regularly on the list of examined issues, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted numerous resolutions including Resolution 2005/31, which condemned hostage taking and urged all thematic special procedures to continue to address, as appropriate, the consequences of hostage taking. Other resolutions on hostage taking include:

Res. 2003/40 of 23 April 2003; Res. 2001/38 of 23 April 2001;
Hostage taking is not a new phenomenon. It has been used as a tactic for applying geopolitical power for over 2000 years (Hammer, 2007, p. 39), when it was a common and rightful policy of government diplomacy. Hostage taking was a tactic used by the Roman Empire to ensure the conquered populations did not rebel (Poland and McCrystle, 1999, p. xi). As McMains and Mullins (2010, p. 5) explained, the Israelites and their adversaries also had the tendency to imprison each other in order to reduce the man power of opponents and to force those opponents to surrender. One can consider historical hostage incidents such as the kidnapping of Helen of Troy and the abduction of Julius Caesar in 51 BC, resulting from the need for money, as additional examples. In order to obtain money or merchandise from others, pirates also took hostages in the post-biblical period.

Perhaps the earliest recorded hostage incident is described in Genesis 14 of the Old Testament of the Bible, in which Lot is taken hostage (Soskis and Van Zandt, 1986). The kidnap and successful release of Abraham’s nephew Lot, with the help of the armies of four kings, involved many elements of hostage management: the abduction, negotiations with other kings, and the eventual hostage rescue, which involved 318 soldiers helping Abraham to save his nephew. This is the earliest evidence of the use of force to save the life of a hostage.

Later examples and milestones in the history of hostage taking show that King John II of France was captured and kept hostage by the English. He was not released until a ransom was paid. Later in the fourteenth century King Leopold of Austria took Richard the Lionheart hostage and held him for 14 months until
England paid his ransom. Despite having been a common tactic since the beginning of time, hostage taking has enhanced societal anger, frustration and feuds, often leading to loss of life rather than solving a problem (Greenstone, 2005, p. xiii).

The English phrase ‘to kidnap’ was first recorded in 1682 with reference to the practice of taking, or ‘napping’, children, or ‘kids’, for use as slaves (Lauvik, 2008, p. 109). In more recent times, hostage taking has increasingly been used as a tactic to achieve political aims. Examples include the abductions at the Munich Olympics in 1972, the Iranian Embassy siege in London in 1980, and a number of abductions of foreigners in Lebanon in the late 1980s. These large events led directly to the development of more sophisticated management practices. In particular, the Munich Olympic massacre exposed a number of vulnerabilities from a structured management point of view. McMains and Mullins (2010, p. 2) highlighted the influential nature of that incident in pointing out that the fundamental concepts in building a contemporary police hostage/crisis negotiation were introduced by Dr. Harvey Schlossberg and Lieutenant Franz Bolz of the New York City Police Department following the tragedy in Munich.

Hostage taking and abduction have been the choice of political terrorists since the middle of 1990s. Poland (2005, p. 137) noted that, as per statistical reports from law enforcement agencies, terrorists have taken two thousand individuals hostage over the past decade. Hostage taking as a tactic has been especially favoured by terrorist groups in Italy, Ireland, Central and South America, and the Middle East. In particular, second generation terrorist groups tend to make frequent use of abductions. Second generation groups are those that may trace their origins to political causes or ethnic or national freedom efforts but that have since lost their ideological orientation, (though not necessarily the associated rhetoric), and have become merely self-indulgent criminal terrorists (Bolz et al., 2001, p. 68). In the past decade, the tactic of hostage taking has continued at an amplified level, including events such as the Moscow Theatre siege in 2002 (Anderson, 2009, p. 102) and the Beslan School siege in 2004 (Anderson, 2009, p. 74).
3.6 Hostage Taking in the 21st Century

Today, hostage taking is regarded as a severe criminal offence and a human rights violation which is rebuked by a United Nations resolution and stated as a war offence under the Article 147 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibits the act of taking civilians as hostages (United Nations, 1949).

Due to the nature of hostage taking as illegal and therefore usually secret in nature, the number of recorded incidents is estimated to be much lower than the actual numbers of incidents. What is clear, however, is that hostage taking is likely to continue as a menace. Poland (2005, p. 18-19) has found that the following factors may influence the growing trend of hostage taking and abductions:

- As a result of advanced globalisation and the end of the Cold War, there has been a relaxation in national boundaries and border control. As a result, populations move more easily, and it is now more common for people to visit, work and live in foreign countries. Access to foreigners has therefore become relatively easy, and foreigners often represent attractive targets as hostages. A local community may be upset if one of their own is taken hostage, but less so with a foreigner. Further, taking foreigners hostage brings the interests of another country to bear on the hostage takers’ conflicts and issues.

- Many populations around the world, especially those in developing or conflict countries, have been isolated and prevented from enjoying the benefits of globalisation. Many areas where INGOs operate are impoverished; foreigners there are often perceived as wealthy, and they also represent an outside element in the society. These facts have led to a larger pool of groups that hostage takers can influence.

- A sequence of actions taken post 2001 by the US-led coalition forces and the United Kingdom, with the support of other NATO as well as non-NATO countries, accelerated hostage taking and abduction in many parts of the world, particularly in Iraq. The so-called ‘war on terror’, the term
commonly applied to an international military campaign which started as a result of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, has led to a push-back that can also be credited for the growing trend of hostage taking and abduction all over the world. While each side can argue its actions as a response to the activities of the opposing side, it is clear that some terrorists opted for abductions as a tactic in their attempts to take revenge on their enemies. As these forces cannot win a traditional war, they have opted for hostage taking and kidnapping in order to fight against better organised armed forces (Bibes, 2001, p. 243-258).

With the advancement of social media, it is increasingly easy to reach a large public. As a result, hostage taking and abduction cases have become very effective in delivering messages important to their cause or to put pressure on families. Van Zandt (1993, p. 32-36) explained that the media’s influence has been effectively utilised by the terrorist groups. While the hostage taking may occur in an isolated area, the news of it can reach the entire world through the media. The most prominent examples of media attention to a hostage situation may well be the Munich Olympic hostages (1972), the OPEC siege (1975), the US Embassy siege in Iran (1979-1981), the Iranian Embassy siege in London (1980), and the Japanese Embassy siege in Lima (1996-1997), all of which received high television viewer ratings.

Depending on the source, there are between 15,000 and 25,000 kidnappings and hostage takings annually. Because there is no global watchdog group, and because many kidnappings go unreported, it is difficult to estimate the exact global rates. Ann Hagedorn Auerbach (1999), in her examination of international kidnappings that occurred over a two-year period from 1997 to 1999, states that statistics concerning kidnappings are problematical. Auerbach found that many incidents were not reported and that the incidents that were reported may not have been accurately reported as a result of political reasons. She believes that only 30 per cent of kidnappings on a worldwide basis are reported and that ‘in some countries, the reporting rate is as low as 10 per cent’ (Auerbach, 1999, p. 435; Lopez, 2011, p. 86). What is clear is that there has been an increase in incidents, especially in the developing world (Epps, 2005, p.
Kidnapping is also widespread. In a check of US Department of State’s Travel Warning website on 29 December 2012, 55 countries were listed with warnings against kidnapping, abductions or hostage taking.

In 1999, 20 aid workers were abducted, while in 2009 the number was 92 (Stoddard et al., 2009, p. 9). The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012 concludes that ‘after declining in 2010, total incidents of violence against aid workers rose again, particularly kidnappings’. The verified and analysed data (Table 3.1) from the Aid Worker Security Database show that, since 2009, kidnappings have become the most frequent means of violence against aid workers, showing the steepest and steadiest rise of all tactics over the past decade. According to the data, the majority of kidnappings of aid workers (at least 85 per cent) do not end in the death of the victim or victims; rather, they commonly end with a negotiated release, with a small number of rescues and escapes. It should be noted also that the data set likely does not capture all cases of kidnapping, as some organisations and victims’ families keep the crime and negotiations secret. It is reasonable to assume, then, that there are even greater numbers of (survived) kidnappings than shown, particularly of national staff who work for the INGOs/NGOs in their countries.

Table 3.1: Major attacks on aid workers – Summary statistics of kidnapping (2000 – 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total kidnapped</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012

The researcher’s own data supports the above. The researcher has compiled, merged, verified, and analysed data from a range of open sources as well as from a few restricted organisational sources. The researcher makes no claim to have identified all hostage cases, but believes the data in Table 3.2 represents the most comprehensive data set available.
The data on days in captivity of hostage cases from 2000-2012 (Table 3.2) again show a clear upwards trend:

**Table 3.2 Database of aid worker hostage cases – Days in captivity (2000 – 2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Days held in captivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kjell Lauvik, 2013

A Control Risk analysis states that ‘most susceptible to increases in the crime have been those countries destabilised by conflict or where increases in foreign investment have not been supported by an enhanced security infrastructure’ (Control Risk, 2013, p. 83-84). Typically, these are the environments in which INGOs operate, a fact supported by the researcher’s own database.

It is also clear that a large number of INGOs are affected by hostage taking. In the researcher’s own database, compiled predominantly from open sources, 144 agencies are found to have had staff taken hostage since the year 2000. Not all of these agencies are INGOs, as the database compiles data of those carrying out what in the open sources is called aid work or humanitarian work. Based on the totality of the above data, it should be acknowledged that the prevalence of kidnapping incidents has increased (Epps, 2005, p. 128).

Because holding a hostage with the hope of exchanging the person for concessions has proved so effective throughout time, it is easy to understand why it is in use by so many different kinds of groups. While abduction and hostage taking by terrorists are considered and accepted as a major threat to stability in many places, it must be emphasised that terrorists and rebels are not responsible for all of the abductions that take place worldwide. Organised criminals who attempt to obtain money through abductions are also very active, with the blurred lines of description regarding what constitutes rebels and which are terrorists, with both acting as organised crime groups involving illegal trade of drugs and abductions to fund their terror activities (Bibes, 2001, p. 245-248).
3.7 Motivations for Hostage Taking

While taking an INGO staff member hostage typically falls under either ‘economical’ or ‘political’ motivation categories, hostage situations in society in general can occur for a number of other reasons. Understanding these motivations leads to an understanding of what law enforcement personnel are trained for and used to dealing with when managing a hostage crisis.

Globally, the majority of hostage situations are commonly and incorrectly believed to be the results of terrorist acts. They are in fact due to the efforts of mentally disturbed people to correct a perceived wrong, or to the desires of criminal gangs to seek financial gain (Lauvik, 2008, p. 118). The criminal kidnapping is often conducted by organised criminal gangs and can be concluded relatively quickly. In this case, the victim is usually released as soon as an exchange of money has taken place. The chances of surviving such a kidnapping are very high. Political and terrorist kidnappings, however, can be far more complex, and in some cases they remain unresolved for years.

3.7.1 FBI categories of hostage takers

The FBI Special Operations and Research Unit (Gleason, 1981, p. 16-18) found that people worldwide take hostages in order to attempt to accomplish the following:

- **Escape from legal actions**: These are often referred to as ‘acts of desperation’ and are more common in the Western world. Such a situation is typically a result of crime gone wrong or a family dispute. An example of this is the crime that led to the development of the modern model of hostage negotiation. In January 1973, the New York Police Department were called to a Williamsburg, Brooklyn business where four men that had vowed to fight to the death were holding twelve people hostage inside John and Al’s, a sporting goods store on a busy commercial block of Broadway, following a failed robbery. The crisis would last 47 hours and mark a milestone in the New York Police Department’s method of managing hostage situations. Rather than brute force, law enforcement for
the first time used psychology, firearm discipline, and patience to terminate the siege, techniques that would be codified inside the department’s hostage negotiating training programme that began later that year (McFadden, 1973, p. 63).

- **Furthering of a campaign of terror**: In such a case, the hostages are taken not as a commodity to be used during negotiations, but as a tool to spread fear. This can be an effective tool, as many of these hostages are killed. The hostage takers try to gain as much media attention from these cases as possible to achieve the maximum effect of fear from each incident. This type of hostage taking was used successfully in Iraq from 2003-2008. Sometimes these situations are coupled with completely unrealistic demands, such as ‘all foreign troops must leave within 12 hours or the hostages will be killed’ or ‘all prisoners must be freed by noon tomorrow’. These demands are simply attention grabbers as the real objective all along has been to kill the hostages. The killings are often documented and distributed, primarily on the internet, after they have occurred so that the hostage takers can continue to spread fear long after the incident has ended.

- **Political change**: Hostages might be selected because of their nationality or the activities or support of the organisations they work for. The demands from the hostage takers often include withdrawal of the organisation’s support for the government, prisoner release, or withdrawal of the organisation from the country. In these cases the hostage situations are almost certainly public, as the hostage takers aim to gain as much attention for their cause as possible. They also seek to cause their political opponents as much discomfort as possible through the media. The outcome of hostage situations in these cases depends entirely on the motivation and goal of the abductors.

- The kidnapping of the Israeli athletes by Palestinian Fedayeen (‘Self-sacificialers’), members of Black September, at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, is one such example. Although hostages and terrorists died in a failed rescue attempt, the stated goal of Black September was to obtain
the release of 234 Palestinians and non-Arabs who were imprisoned in Israel. In addition, they wanted Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, the creators of the infamous terrorist group that bore their names, to be freed from jails in Germany. An indication that the attackers were not suicidal was that they asked for their safe passage to Egypt (Calahan, 1995, p. 3-4).

3.7.2 Fuselier and Gray categories of hostage takers

Fuselier (1981, p. 10-15) and Gray (1981, p. 14-18) identified two further global categories of hostage takers in general:

- Psychologically affected or mentally unstable people
- Criminals who take hostages for monetary gain

3.7.3 Mentally unstable hostage takers

The mentally unstable may kidnap or kill for the thrill of it, from confusion, or due to psychosis. As the category ‘mentally unstable’ is a broad one, it is here divided into four sub-categories; the paranoid/schizophrenic, the psychopath/sociopath, the inadequate, and the depressed. The following descriptions are drawn from published work by the researcher (Lauvik, 2008, p. 128-130).

The paranoid / schizophrenic

The paranoid or schizophrenic will sometimes see himself as a very important person, and will refer everything to him. Due to the nature of his mental condition, he will believe that everybody is out to ‘get’ him, and will be on extreme alert towards being fooled or harmed. This makes it very difficult to obtain trust, or even build rapport, with him. In the most dangerous cases the hostage taker believes he is on a ‘mission’, often from God or any other supreme power, and is there to carry out the ‘big plan’. Because he might suffer from hallucinations, it will seem very real to him. Paranoid schizophrenics are often of above average intelligence, and will not respond favourably to attempts to fool or trick him. If dishonesty is suspected from their side, trust will be almost impossible to re-establish.
The psychopath / sociopath

The second category of mentally ill hostage taker is that of psychopath or sociopath. Such a person will manipulate his operating environment for his own gain. He will generally show very little sympathy or loyalty to others, and will rarely accept blame himself if anything goes wrong. It is always somebody else’s fault. Because this category of hostage taker does not have the moral values that are normal in society, so he will not feel guilt or remorse towards the hostages. This mental condition is never sudden, but often starts in the early teens. Some of the symptoms of a developing psychopath or sociopath are excessive alcohol or substance abuse, selfishness, and the desire for physical pleasure. It might be difficult to identify a person with this disorder, as he will appear very articulate and cool. Any demands will be perceived as realistic, in stark contrast to that of the schizophrenic. However, the demands will always centre on some sort of personal gain for him, usually monetary. This person represents some challenges during negotiation, as he is often quite impulsive and demands immediate results and satisfaction from his demands or desires.

The inadequate

This hostage taker is sometimes seen in crime-gone-wrong scenarios. This person sees himself as a loser. He has likely shown poor judgment and problems in adapting to new situations and environments throughout his life. The hostage situation can be his desperate attempt to obtain his ‘15 minutes of fame’, and irrationally prove to somebody that he can achieve something in life. Because this person suffers from extremely low self-esteem, he will thrive on the sudden attention from media, law enforcement, and onlookers.

This category of hostage taker is in touch with reality and understands the logical consequences of his actions. It is important in these cases to find a way for him to save face, so it does not appear that he has failed again. This individual is often suicidal.

The depressed

The depressed hostage taker may also suffer from low self-esteem, and might have a decreased level of self-control due to sleep and appetite disturbance. The
depressed can sometimes take their own family members or other people known to him, such as friends or colleagues hostage. His mood changes between very irritable or angry to sad and emotional. He feels guilty for acts in the past, and often feels unworthy to live. This category of hostage taker is suicidal most of the time. In some cases the mental condition makes the hostage taker feel responsible for the suffering of people outside of his immediate environment, and in extreme cases the entire world. He then sees this situation as punishment for causing this suffering to the world. His demands are often vague and can be difficult to interpret. In some cases no real demand for the release of hostages is provided, it can be ‘just leave me alone’. This person is very dangerous, and will often harm the hostages in the belief that he is ‘doing them a favour’.

3.7.4 The criminal hostage taker motivated by money

The following extract is drawn from published work by the researcher:

Hostage taking has changed through history, and a marked shift in the profile of the victims has been seen over the past 20 years. The victims of kidnapping for ransom used to be predominately adult men with a potential for very high pay-out, such as company owners. The cases used to be relatively long (months and years), and would involve only a minimum level of violence. However, over the past few years the victims have increased in number but have a lower profile. This is probably because of the burden of holding a high profile victim hidden for a long period of time combined with increased security for potential high profile victims. Now women, children, and men of all ages are victims, and the rewards requested are at a lower level. These cases do not normally gain much media attention, and are low-profile, short-term (usually less than a month) business transactions from the kidnapper’s perspective. It has also become more common to take multiple victims rather than a single one, and the level of violence has increased, especially with the use of body mutilation (cutting off an ear or finger to make a statement of intent). This particular type of mutilation is likely to continue, as kidnappers have found
that the ransom is on average paid faster if a piece of the victim’s body is delivered together with the demands (Lauvik, 2008, p. 122-123).

Kidnapping is big business, and like any other successful business, it has a hierarchy and an infrastructure; it also involves specialisation and subcontracting. Some groups specialize in surveillance or in performing the actual kidnapping, while others have the logistics and infrastructure in place to move the victim around or to keep guard over him or her in a fixed location. This is advantageous for the kidnappers, as they can compartmentalize information and tasks, making it less likely that the police can identify all involved even if some people are arrested.

It is important to understand that most kidnapping for money is a business transaction from the kidnapper’s point of view. The kidnapper has a commodity to sell, i.e. the victim. These kidnappers are willing to negotiate, but they know how much they want and are willing to wait for it. It is a mistake to believe that they are unpredictable psychopaths; they are not. In fact, they take hostages for a living and are usually very good at what they do. They consider themselves businessmen and conduct risk and cost benefit analyses before taking action.

The business plan is relatively simple, as the kidnappers promise not to harm the victim if the money is paid. This leaves the victim’s family or company with three options:

- Pay a negotiated sum of money for the victim’s release.
- Refuse to pay.
- Hand the case over to law enforcement for a tactical solution.

How the case is managed is an individual decision, and each choice has its pros and cons. If one pays, the case may be solved quickly, but may land the payer on the ‘secure payer’ list of organised crime. That means that the payers are likely to become victims of either extortion or kidnapping at a later stage. If one refuses to pay, there is always the risk that the kidnap victim will be harmed, but
it may also contribute towards reducing the business of kidnapping. In addition, refusing to pay initially does not mean that an agreement cannot be reached at a later stage; it simply allows more time for the victim’s relatives to gather their thoughts. The tactical solution can also be risky. The police must set up a trace on the ransom and either track the kidnappers to arrest them or attempt to storm the stronghold where the victim is being held, which may very well result in the injury or death of the hostage.

### 3.8 Hostage Taking as Terrorism

There are currently nineteen global or regional treaties pertaining to the subject of international terrorism (Van Leeuwen, 2003, p. 212), but despite this there were approximately 600 kidnappings attributed to terrorist organisations between 2000 and 2007, in a variety of countries (Likar, 2011, p. 53). However, the researcher will deliberately avoid debating what constitutes a hostage taking for terrorism purposes and what does not. This chapter will review some definitions of terrorism, but it is beyond the scope of the research to define terrorism: terrorism scholars have engaged in a decades-long attempt to define terrorism, and more than 100 definitions have been catalogued (Jungman and Schmid, 1988, p. 5). These definitions are often products of people’s needs, perceptions, and convenience and are therefore subject to cultural and circumstantial influences. For instance, whereas most Westerners regard the use of civilian hostages as human shields as an immoral act, it was largely considered a legitimate tactic, and a morally justified one, by many in the Arab world when used in Iraq in 1990 to prevent bombings. The researcher recognises that the type of hostage taking discussed in the research is in some cases terrorism, or at least used as a means to fund terrorism, while in other cases it is purely for profit. However, since religious and political influences are ever-present in an INGOs work, hostage taking as terrorism is referred to in the discussion when appropriate.

Hostage taking can be considered a terrorist act when it is used to put pressure on states organisations or individuals to generate a climate of fear. Hostage taking was a preferred tactic of political terrorists such as the left wing groups
the Red Brigade and Baader Meinhof in the mid-1970s and several other groups in the Middle East from the late 1980s. It has been referred to as a ‘Weapon of Mass Effect’ (O’Shea, 2007), as taking one employee of an organisation can leverage all the power of that organisation and force changes. There can even be an impact on government policies, as was the case with the Korean hostages taken in Afghanistan in 2007. Twenty-three hostages, all missionaries, were taken, and the policy of Korean deployments and foreign missions was changed when South Korea promised to withdraw its 200 troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2007 (Lauvik, 2008, p. 108). The same happened when a Philippine national was taken hostage in Iraq; the Philippines withdrew its troops from Iraq in July 2004 (CNN, 2004).

3.9 Overview of Terrorism

Edmund Burke coined the term ‘terrorism’ in the 18th century to describe Maximilien Robespierre’s Reign of Terror during the French Revolution (Robertson, 2007, p. v). The violence that happened under Robespierre entailed the guillotining of several thousands of people, including children. Senior individuals the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention that enforced the policies of ‘The Terror’ were known as ‘Terrorists’. In stark contrast to the contemporary usage, the phrase ‘terrorism’ had a decidedly positive connotation in those days. Robespierre, the revolutionary leader, firmly thought that virtue was the mainspring of a popular government at peace but that during the revolution virtue has to be allied with terror to ensure that democracy triumph. He appealed famously to ‘virtue, without which terror is evil; terror, without which virtue is helpless’ and proclaimed ‘terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue’ (Robertson, 2007, p. v).

First, the régime de la terreur was neither random nor indiscriminate, but was very systematic and organised and was definitely deliberate in its approach. Further, the objective and justification was the same as can often be found today; the creation of a ‘new and better society’ (Hoffman, 2006, p. 2-4). The
French Revolution provided an example to future states in terms of the effective oppression of their populations, and we are still able to draw analogies today.

However, terrorism by the means demonstrated during the French Revolution existed long before the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the implementation of nation states. Before 1648, terrorism was not constrained by borders and was widespread (Campbell, 2013, p. 2). Despite its ancient roots, terrorism has only received formal academic attention for a few decades, and much of the research has focused almost exclusively on international terrorism (Robertson, 2007, p. v). This review will consider terrorism as it relates to humanitarian operations, and it will seek in particular to discover any linkage between humanitarian operations, terrorism, and hostage taking.

### 3.10 Beginnings of Terrorism

The use of terror as a political weapon is not new and can be found throughout history. More than 2000 years ago, the Romans experienced an organised terrorist group, Sicarii, also called Dagger-men. Sicarii targeted the occupying forces of the Roman Empire, but they also targeted those who collaborated with the Romans. They were driven by a belief that they could not follow their faith while living under the Romans.

During the early Twentieth century nationalism intensified across the world. Although dissent and resistance were common in several colonial states, and quite often led to open warfare, nationalist identities became a center of attention for these actions. Many anti-colonial movements found the revolutionary extremism of communism attractive for several reasons. Leaders of these wars of national liberation saw the advantage of free weapons and training provided by the communist bloc, as well as increased international legitimacy. A number of these organisations and people utilised terrorism in support of their political and military objectives. The Soviet Union’s policies of supporting revolutionary struggles everywhere and of exporting revolution to non-communist countries provided extremists willing to employ violence and terror with methods to realise their ambitions (Donnelly, 1984, p. 67).
It was during this period that hostage taking emerged as an organized tactic of terror from the rise of urban guerrilla warfare and the revolutionary ideology of George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Since the Nineteenth century, guerrilla uprisings have been endemic in Latin America; formerly, however, the guerrillas operated exclusively in remote rural areas, and their strategies and tactics depended on their capability to retreat into and hide in the jungle. Not until the theories of Brazilian communist Carlos Marighella, set forth in his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (1969), became popular did guerrillas start to operate in cities, which offered several tactical advantages, predominately easier infrastructure. The three main purposes of terrorism, according to Marighella (1969), are:

- To disrupt the workings of government and civil authorities.
- To produce a panic condition among the population.
- To advertise the terrorist’s cause.

Hostage taking, particularly when the victim is a key member of a government or business leader, accomplishes all these purposes. It provides a tactical advantage for the reason that as long as security forces are not able to locate the hostage, (which is often almost impossible even with modern tracking capabilities), the government is normally compelled to negotiate in some way with the terrorists and may acquiesce to some of their demands (Kushner, 2003, p. 194).

### 3.11 Can Terrorism be Defined?

Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, Lenin, is attributed to have said that ‘The purpose of terrorism is to terrorise’ (Giduck, 2005, p. 37). Defining the purpose of terrorism is relatively easy, but creating an overall definition is much harder. It has simply proven too difficult to conceive a definition to which all countries can agree. This should not come as a surprise; history provides numerous examples of great thinkers who debated that, under the right circumstances, unconventional tactics were not only a good way of achieving one’s objectives,
but also a moral or civic duty. Throughout history, religious leaders have
philosophised about when ‘holy terror’ is justified and when unjust warfare is
just. Likewise, many prominent military thinkers have advocated less-than-
honourable tactics as a means of achieving victory. This is the reasoning behind
the famous phrase ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’
(Campbell, 2013, p. 8). This expression is used frequently as justification for
terrorism, and it was popularised by a combination of quotes from two people.
The first is Carlos Marighella’s claim that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s
liberator’. The phrase became more common, however, after Abdel-Rahman
Abdel-Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Husseini, better known as Yasser Arafat,
passionately argued before the United Nations Security Council that his people
were ‘freedom fighters’ and not terrorists (Lauvik, 2008, p. 77).

Because a definition of terrorism is politically charged, no universally accepted
definition exists, and any definitions in use tend to rely heavily on who is doing
the defining from their own standpoint. Some definitions focus on terrorist
tactics to define the term, while others focus on the identities of the actors. Yet
others look at the context and ask whether it is military, political, or criminal.

In the 1960s the UN General Assembly initiated an attempt to reach a global
definition of terrorism. Little progress was made, primarily because many states,
predominately from states supporting an independent Palestine, were reluctant to
outlaw terrorism unless at the same time the social factors that influence the
‘causes of terrorism’ were addressed. This remains the most critical dilemma
facing a world engaged in fighting terrorism, i.e. how to concede that some of
the grievances that lead ordinary people to support terror organisations are
indeed legitimate, without at the same time condoning the violent means used to
reach their objectives.

In the 1990s the UN General Assembly once again initiated discussions about
generally defining and outlawing terrorism. The UN General Assembly’s Legal
Committee issued a rough draft of a convention which reiterated that:

Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the
general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political
purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be used to justify them (United Nations, 1996, p. 1).

The convention was not adopted, and there are still disagreements between UN member states about this draft.

Since it has been impossible to reach a definition, this research will use the word ‘terrorism’ based on some common denominators in most definitions. For this purpose, then, terrorism is considered to be:

- Intended to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population.
- Utilised for furthering political or social objectives.
- Directed towards the civilian population, and not security forces.
- A crime.
- In the form of either a threat or force.

Using this description of terrorism, we find that it is never accidental; all terrorists have a cause, motive, or reason for their acts, and all terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. It should be noted that this excludes any particular political belief or religion as a factor in the definition of a terrorist.

### 3.12 Illegality of Methods

In all cases, terrorist acts could also be considered a crime, such as murder, kidnapping, and arson. United Kingdom Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made a statement that resounded throughout the world after the attempt on her life and that of her cabinet in 1988; she responded to the assertion that the bombing in Brighton, England was a terrorist act when by declaring ‘we are not prepared to consider special category status for certain groups of people serving sentences for crime. Crime is crime is crime, it is not political’ (BBC World, 2006). She denied that violence for political ends could be defined by another name. There
are, however, some important distinctions to be made. While ordinary criminals may use what we could term terrorist tactics and may terrify their victims, this does not make them terrorists. Likewise, a single person pursuing his own cause may be a terrorist, but he may also be a lonely person with mental problems. Even individual terrorists who are clinically insane have their own reasons for committing acts of terrorism, regardless of how illogical, absurd, or invalid they may seem to the general population (Lauvik, 2008, p. 76).

What remains clear though is that the terrorist is a criminal, whether he chooses to identify himself with military terminology or with civilian imagery. The violations of civil criminal laws are self-evident in activities such as murder, arson, and kidnapping regardless of the legitimacy of the government enforcing the laws. Victimising the innocent is criminal whether it takes place under a dictatorship or a democracy. If the terrorist claims that he is justified in using such violence as a military combatant, he is a de facto war criminal under international law and the military justice systems of most nations (Campbell, 2013, p. 14).

This blur in distinguishing terrorism and crime makes it challenging to determine how many attacks against aid workers are acts of terrorism and how many results from crime. Different reporting procedures in various nations’ law enforcement agencies also bring the accuracy of the reports into question. To illustrate, Figure 2.1 is reprinted here; it is based on data from the aid worker security database and illustrates the countries in which the most attacks on aid workers were carried out over the ten-year period from 2002-2011.
It is notable that every country listed was experiencing a terrorist problem. How many of those attacks were actually political in nature (and therefore terrorist) is a matter of subjectivity and professional expertise.

3.12.1 Terrorism in countries with attacks against aid workers

Of the ten countries with the highest number of attacks against aid workers between 2002 and 2011 (in order of number of attacks: Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, DR Congo, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Palestine and Chad), most have a high ranking in the Failed States Index and active terrorist organisations in the country. Below is a description of the terrorist activities toward the aid worker community in these countries. The data on terrorism below is extracted from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) database, and the Failed States Index ranking is from the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Failed States Index of 2013.

Afghanistan is seventh on the Failed States Index of 2013. Although Afghanistan has sixteen terrorist organisations operative in the country according to the START database, the combined efforts of Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban is behind most of the attacks. An example of this is the 25 Sept 2003 attack, when a vehicle for the Voluntary Association for the Rehabilitation of Afghanistan, or VARA, was ambushed in southern Afghanistan. One aid worker was killed and the driver of the vehicle was injured. Overall, the Taliban are behind more than fifty attacks, including nineteen cases of hostage taking. The one other organisation to target aid workers is Hizb-I-Islami, which was behind the largest attacks against NGOs in Afghanistan. On 6 August 2010 they shot and killed ten aid workers from the Nuristan Eye Camp Expedition, a medical team from the relief group the International Assistance Mission.

Sudan, ranking third on the Failed States Index of 2013, does not have a large number of terrorist organisations active in the country, but rather appears to be a safe haven for groups to operate from. Although Al-Qaeda has a presence, it does not operate actively against the humanitarian community. Both the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) launch cross border operations, but are not targeting NGOs in Sudan. The last operational terrorist group in Sudan is the Ummah Liberation Army, which is the military wing of the Ummah Party, the main political opposition group in Sudan, does not target the aid community.

The Al-Qaeda associated organisation Al-Shabaab is behind most of the attacks against aid workers in Somalia. Somalia clearly tops the Failed States Index of 2013, but does not host a large range of active terrorist organisations; Al-Shabaab is too dominant and is behind at least twelve attacks against aid workers, including at least 8 cases of hostage taking. The only other group that have attacked aid workers in Somalia is al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI). On 21 March 2004, AIAI opened fire on a vehicle carrying three staff of the German Agency for Technical Assistance (GTZ), killing two and injuring one. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which seeks to establish an independent state for the Somali people in the Ogaden region of the Horn of Africa, use Somalia as a safe haven for cross-border attacks.

Pakistan ranks thirteenth on the Failed States Index of 2013. While the country has moved in the right direction on the Failed States Index, from tenth in 2010, the attacks on, and hostage taking of, aid workers have not decreased. Despite
the twenty-nine registered terrorist organisations active in Pakistan, the Taliban is the only group with proven direct attacks on NGOs, with at least seven attacks. One of the worst in terms of casualties was on 10 March 2010, when fifteen Taliban gunmen assaulted an office of World Vision, killing five aid workers, injuring seven and damaging the building.

South Sudan is for the first time listed in the Failed States Index, and enters at fourth place. The START database does not have any terrorist organisations registered as operational in South Sudan, so the relative high number of attacks on aid workers stems from criminal activity or from supporters of Sudan.

Iraq ranks eleventh on the Failed States Index of 2013, and has over fifty terrorist organisations registered in the START database. There have been several deadly attacks against the humanitarian community in Iraq, including the bombings of the UN main office in Bagdad in August 2003 which killed twenty-two people, and the bombing of the ICRC office where two staff were killed. In addition, there have been a range of hostage takings, such as when on 4 July 2004, Fadi Fidel, a Canadian citizen working for the International Rescue Committee, was abducted by suspect Mahdi Army members. He was mistreated, beaten and tortured, but eventually released nine days later.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ranks second on the Failed States Index of 2013. Despite a large number of security incidents against aid workers, there are few terrorist attacks. Some groups, such as the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) and the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) have operative bases in DRC, but their activities are directed towards their target nations. The only registered terrorist attack against aid workers in DRC is when on 21 Feb 2001, Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attacked a truck that was carrying food and supplies for the non-governmental organisation, Solidarités International.

Sri Lanka is ranked twenty-eighth on the Failed States Index of 2013, and terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka has reduced significantly after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) admitted defeat on May 17, 2009. The LTTE were behind all the registered terrorist attacks against aid workers in Sri Lanka,
with at least five attacks, including a claymore attack which killed two civilian aid workers.

The West Bank and Gaza (Palestine) does not appear alone on the Failed States Index of 2013, but as part of Israel. Combined, they are the lowest ranked on the Failed States Index of the ten countries with the highest number of attacks against aid workers between 2002 and 2011, at sixty-seventh place. The West Bank and Gaza has over thirty registered terrorist organisations, and it is often difficult to determine exactly which group is behind an attack. There have been sporadic kidnappings of NGO workers in Palestinian areas over the past years, but the hostages have always been freed unharmed, often within hours.

Chad, ranked fifth on the Failed States Index of 2013, does not have any active terrorist groups in the country, and none of the attacks on aid workers can be described as terrorism.

Upon analysis, it becomes clear that of the attacks carried out on aid workers over the period 2002-2011, all of those illustrated in Figure 3.2 could be classified as both criminal and terrorist in nature. It is only by analysing each incident that a motive for an attack becomes clear and that the reason for the attack can be identified.
3.13 Global Terrorism Database

The data from the above tables is to a degree aligned with data on terrorism from 2012. Data from arguably the most accurate database on terrorism, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) reveal that most of the countries with the largest number of terror attacks are also countries with a heavy presence of INGOs. Since 2001, START has maintained the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), an unclassified event database compiled from information in open-source reports of terrorist attacks. The GTD data set includes violent acts carried out by non-state actors that meet all of the GTD inclusion criteria (Global Terrorism Database, 2013): The violent act was conducted to obtain an economic, political, social or religious goal; included evidence of intention to deliver some message to society outside of the direct victims of the attack; and was in breach of International Humanitarian Law protecting non-combatants.

Table 3.3: Ten countries with the most terrorist attacks (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Attacks</th>
<th>Total Killed</th>
<th>Total Wounded</th>
<th>Average Number Killed per Attack</th>
<th>Average Number Wounded per Attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1404</td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>3643</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1271</td>
<td>2436</td>
<td>6641</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>2632</td>
<td>3715</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>1386</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>1787</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>13.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/](http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)
Of the above Table 3.3, only India, and perhaps Thailand, do not have a large number of INGOs operating in country. A further analysis of data shows that although terrorist attacks occurred in eighty-five different countries in 2012, they were heavily concentrated geographically. More than half, 55 per cent, of all attacks and 65 percent of casualties took place in just three countries: Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These are also three of the countries that are most highly populated with INGOs.

3.14 Why Are INGOs Targeted?

Much of the general population’s perception regarding terrorist conduct and behaviour, including during hostage taking, is derived from the media and the entertainment industry. This has led the general population, and likely also the humanitarian as well as the law enforcement communities, to accept the terrorist stereotype as accurately depicting personality traits, dedication, sophistication, commitment, and modi operandi (Fuselier and Noesner, 1990, p. 6-11). It is therefore useful to include some of the contents of Issue No. 10 of Al-Qaeda’s Al-Battar training manuals in this literature review to understand the perspective of the hostage taker and the way that Al-Qaeda’s operations are organized and conducted. The topic of this issue is how to carry out kidnapping operations. It provides several reasons for kidnapping, such as to force the enemy to concede to demands, to cause embarrassment between the government and the passport nation of the detainees, to get information from the hostages, and to obtain ransom payment. Related to ransom payment, the document goes on by stating

This happened at the beginning of the cases in Chechnya and Algeria, with the hijacking of the French plane, and the kidnapping operations performed by the brothers in Chechnya and the Philippines (SITE-Institute).

All these objectives can be achieved with an increased likelihood of success through the abduction of INGO staff.

An individual called Al-Mohager al-Islami (the Islamic Immigrant) that is prominent in posting messages on jihadi e-group forums produced and made
available a nearly 40-page pamphlet entitled The Art of Kidnapping—The Best and Quickest Way of Kidnapping Americans. The manual includes information for planning raids, the composition of support crews, general rules for these crews to follow, observation points, kidnapping suggestions, and methods of capturing Americans (Forest, 2007, p. 400).

The instructions covered in the manuals discussed above reveal that organised terrorist groups learn from experience and collate knowledge in a way similar to those they may meet as adversaries in a hostage negotiation scenario. It is wise to assume, therefore, that the strategies and operational tactics employed in hostage negotiation are likely to be known to hostage takers affiliated with terrorist groups.

Therefore, hostage taking will likely remain a tactic, technique, and procedure of terrorists to intimidate and extort people, in order to create anxiety, fear, and mayhem in support of their immediate, intermediate, or long-term terrorism objectives (United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2008, p. 3). In many ways, it has the same uses for terrorists as suicide bombing; a weapon for those whom perceive themselves to be the weakest party in a conflict to adjust this perceived or real asymmetric balance. On a strategic level, it can at least partially redress imbalances in capacities, and on a logical level, it is effective, relatively inexpensive, and easily replicable with new targets. It is also effective on a tactical level, as it relies on human intelligence and the spread of fear radiating from the event (Chaliand and Blin, 2007, p. 29).

It is paradoxical that the very human beings engaged in saving other lives increasingly risk their own. The assumption that humanitarian workers are protected by international humanitarian law as long as they act impartially is obviously overly optimistic (Eberwein, 2009, p. 3). There can be no doubt that INGOs have been targeted by terrorism, but understanding why is more complex. In the humanitarian world it is generally believed that aid workers are targeted because they represent an easy mark. As discussed in the previous chapter, because of INGOs mandate of delivering assistance they often cannot sit in a ‘fortress’, but are forced to operate in areas with high vulnerability. The raison d’être of any aid organisation is to assist a given beneficiary population,
so in some form or another, access to beneficiary populations is essential. There can be no assistance without at least some direct contact and relation with beneficiary populations and individuals. An INGO delivering assistance to refugees cannot sit in an office removed from their beneficiaries; they are forced into often remote areas. This view is supported by Hoffman (2006, p. 2-4), who noted that NGOs are targeted for tactical reasons; specifically, that the nature and operations of NGOs make them easy targets. However, if terrorist groups are rational, they must consider much more than the relative ease of carrying out an attack on a given target.

The following arguments regarding NGO staff as preferred targets are taken from a study by Craig Stapley (2009, p. 83-107) which considered information from various databases containing records of terrorist attacks on NGOs. The main source materials were the RAND/St. Andrews Terrorism Database and the RAND/MIPT (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) Terrorism Database, both of which have been compiled primarily from news publications worldwide. The database contains approximately 500 cases of terrorist attacks on NGOs from 1978 to 2000. It should be emphasised that the purpose of the study was not to create empirically testable statistics, but rather to conduct a preliminary study in the field of target selection focussing particularly on NGOs.

Stapley’s research identified five terrorist targeting imperatives relating specifically to NGOs (Stapley, 2009, p. 83-107). These imperatives are:

- That terrorist groups perceive a real or imagined association between the NGO and a political entity (whether state or non-state).

- That the NGO, or its agents, engage in political activities that bring them into conflict with the terrorist group.

- That the NGO, either actively or by virtue of being what it is, represents a threat to the social, cultural, or religious environment considered important to the terrorist organisation.
- That the NGO becomes a competitor for resources that the terrorists desire.

- That the NGO is relatively soft in terms of ease of attack, and as such, are desirable targets.

Below the researcher will explore each of the imperatives further.

3.14.1 Association

The association imperative might explain why terrorists target NGOs: terrorist organisations perceive NGOs as having an association with a political entity, whether this association exists or is merely perceived to exist. This association may be a matter of nationality, donor funding, or religion. Schaffert (1992, p. 44) captured this targeting imperative when he noted that a terrorist victim is ‘representative of a target group that is strategically involved in the terrorist’s political goals’. As long as an association can be established linking the immediate target with the larger audience, then the targeting selection is justified in the mind of the terrorist.

An association does not have to be solely with a government or a government organisation. Indeed, if an NGO is associated with the United Nations, any assumptions made about the UN in general may be transferred to the NGO; the same is true of umbrella organisations other than the UN. Eighty-four per cent of all attacks on NGOs associated with the United Nations or the Red Cross occurred in the time period following the United States and coalition invasion of Iraq in the First Gulf War. Before that time, attacks on NGOs associated with the UN or Red Cross made up 3.8 per cent of all terrorist attacks (Stapley, 2009, p. 83-107).

Stapley’s research determined that 59.7 per cent of terrorist attacks on NGOs have an associational component. After the First Gulf War, INGOs increasingly were associated with the main military forces involved in the war effort, and the perception of neutrality eroded.
3.14.2 Political activity

Terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon; therefore, political motives must help guide a terrorist group in selecting targets. Hence, if an NGO is engaged in activities that conflict politically with the terrorist group, that NGO’s staff members might become targets. While many NGOs are apolitical in the way they organise and carry out their mandates, many are not. A group engaged in political struggle might be placed in terrorists’ ‘legitimate’ target category. It is not far-fetched to imagine that an NGO that, for example, supports training the Transitional Government of Somalia could be seen as a legitimate target for Al-Shabaab. This type of situation was cited by Randolph Martin in his description of the threats to NGOs. Adding to the threat level is ‘the erosion of the accepted neutrality of aid groups, who are seen by some belligerents as partisan, interventionist and generally an undesirable presence’ (Martin, 1999, p. 5). Additionally, Stapley’s research found that about 7.6 per cent of all terrorist incidents on NGOs (thirty-four incidents) targeted groups engaged in overt political activities.

Attacks on aid agencies or humanitarian groups have led well-known and well-respected groups such as the Red Cross, various UN humanitarian agencies, and Action Aid to completely suspend operations and withdraw personnel from the regions or countries in question. Aid organisations suspended operations due to terrorist attacks seven times in the ten-year period from 1985 to 1995 (Stapley, 2009, p. 101).

It should be stressed that the effects of a political hostage taking are not always positive for the abductors. The Beslan hostage crisis on 1 September 2004 greatly damaged the international public support that Chechen separatists had earned in previous years. The incident shocked moderate separatists that had previously allowed themselves to be conflated with the Islamists. Exiled Chechen separatist Akhmed Zakayev lamented that those willing to take children hostage gave all separatists a bad name, stating ‘a bigger blow could not have been dealt on us. . . [n]ow people around the world will think that Chechens are beasts and monsters if they could attack children’ (Pape and Feldman, 2010, p. 274).
3.14.3 Competition for resources

Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 7-9) describe the conflict that has emerged among NGOs as they strive for resources in an increasingly scarce marketplace. They argue that due to the constraints forced on NGOs by the scarcity of resources, NGOs may act in ways that are in conflict with their stated missions. Drawing from Cooley and Ron, it can be theorised that terrorist organisations must also compete for resources in an increasingly competitive marketplace. In the post-11 September world, the major powers have combined to target and remove the financing pipelines that terrorists counted on for support. Further, countries that in the past supported terrorism have later reduced or removed that support due to external pressure. It can thus be theorised that as scarcity increases, so will attacks for resources, as receiving ransom money directly can be a safer way of funding an operation than to rely on outside funding.

Attacks for resources may be described as logistical targets. Drake (1998, p. 12) defines logistical targets as ‘those which are attacked in order to provide or safeguard the group’s resources’. Conducting a terrorist campaign can also be costly; while an attack solely for the purpose of garnering money is not a political act, and as such, not terrorism, combining an attack in a way that allows a terrorist organisation to further one or more of its political goals while still obtaining resources is simple multitasking.

Such attacks are the primary reason behind the hostage taking in the Sahel. Recently there appears to have been a shift in international hostage cases, whereas more and more cases turned towards monetary ransom rather than political objectives. It now appears that terrorists get involved in kidnapping and hostage taking in order to fulfil their financial requirements. This shift began at the end of the Cold War, when left wing and Marxist groups could no longer obtain funds from their old paymaster, the former Soviet Union. Curtis, (2002), Jurith, (2003, p. 158), and Billingslea (2004, p. 49) pointed out that as the funding from the Soviet Union dried up, terrorists were forced to look for other resources. Some opted for trafficking of narcotics (Bibes, 2001; Curtis, 2002; Jurith, 2003), while others turned to kidnapping and hostage taking (Memmott and Brook, 2006, p. 8; Poland, 2005, p. 18). So, while a number of terrorist
groups consider hostage taking and kidnapping as part of their mission (Yun, 2007, p. 23-26), others are involved only in order to gain financial support (Auerbach, 1999; Murphy, 2004). As stated by Maceda (2003), Murphy (2004), and Ramachandran (2005), terrorists have gained substantial financial support through hostage taking.

However, financing for the execution of future operations is not the only resource needed by terrorist groups. For an organisation to be successful, groups need safe havens and access to recruits. Acts such as hostage taking help attain coercive objectives, and thus the organisational objective encompasses the enlargement and strengthening of a group (Likar, 2011, p. 49). Even a failed attempt to take hostages or to negotiate a concession receives a good deal of news coverage. By contrast, a bomb attack is over in seconds and receives coverage only in its immediate aftermath. And while hostage taking may provide substantive concessions that enhance the terrorists’ status, cause, recruitment, and funds. Other types of terrorist events seldom result in such concessions.

3.14.4 Social, religious, or cultural conflict

In many cases terrorist groups desire to set the agenda for what a population thinks and believes and how it lives. This desire may explain the actions of fundamentalist terrorist groups. Many of the fundamentalist groups are promoting a value system, and they wish to control the beliefs of a population; the value system then becomes associated with the structures of government to include interpretations of human rights as well as the judicial structure. If an NGO introduces a culture or viewpoint different from that of such groups, that NGO may be considered a negative influence.

Often, NGOs are the vehicle by which Western culture is perceived to be transmitted. This is believed by adversaries to be the case both overtly, through organisational goals, and covertly, by means of covert messages sent by the personnel themselves. The most easily understood challenge to a belief system is perhaps religion. Terrorist groups may target religious NGOs if the terrorist groups feel that the NGOs are supplanting the religious values that the terrorist groups espouse. The SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) has attacked
Catholic missionaries and nuns, charging them with ‘spreading Christianity’. Attacks in 1992 in Afghanistan and in 1994 in Somalia also targeted Christian NGOs on the basis that they were infidels, that were polluting holy land, or that they were promoting Christianity (Stapley, 2009, p. 83-107). The NGO database records seventy-three incidents, or 16.5 per cent of all attacks on NGOs, which can be attributed to attacks on the culture, religion, or society that the attacked NGOs represent.

3.14.5 Soft targets

The final reason for which terrorists choose to target NGOs is perhaps the most widespread, and the reason that Hoffman noted when discussing this topic; it has to do with the relative ease of carrying out an attack and the security environment within which the NGOs and terrorists reside (2001, p. 7-8). Drake appears to agree, and theorises that ‘where there is a number of potential targets, attacking any of which would yield a roughly equivalent strategic benefit, there is a likelihood that the terrorists will choose to attack the softest target, as carrying out such an attack represents the least risk to the terrorists’ (Drake, 1998, p. 179).

Given the mission of most NGOs, taking measures to reduce the exposure to terrorism may work against the achievement of their goals. Religious NGOs may feel it necessary to welcome all comers to organisations and facilities. Humanitarian groups may need to work outside of cities in order to reach the neediest poor and suffering. The end result is that many of these organisations find typically prudent security measures hard to adopt. Martin (1999) notes that for many NGOs there is ‘a conspicuous lack of security among many NGO workers combined with a sceptical, if not averse attitude towards the need for security and other protective measures’ (Martin, 1999, p. 4-6).

3.15 NGOs as Terror Support

Another, darker side of NGOs and terrorism is the use of NGOs as a means for terrorists to operate. An NGO presents an almost perfect cover, and can be used as such by intelligence agencies, criminals, and terrorists. An NGO allows the
terrorist group to acquire the means necessary to survive and operate, to move
assets and staff to where they are needed, or to store assets and retain staff for
later purposes. An NGO resourcing process is both internally and externally
controlled by the terrorist group, allowing for optimal flexibility (Vittori, 2011,
p. 27). The use of NGOs as a cover is not only a means of acquiring resourcing
through donations, but also a convenient way of moving and storing those
resources. An NGO provides crucial capabilities such as a base of operations out
of its branches, especially if the organisation has a worldwide reach. NGO
branches also provide a shipping address, housing, employment, identity cards,
and a recognised reason to be at a particular location. They can also provide
access to legitimate bank accounts from which to move money (Pargeter, 2006,
p. 733-735).

3.15.1 The four jihads

At the present time, much of the terrorism directed at NGOs is initiated by
Islamic fundamentalist organisations. It is important to emphasise that most
Islamic NGOs are overwhelmingly occupied with humanitarian work. In fact,
they most often practice the three forms of jihad not associated with the sword:
the jihad of the heart, or moral reformation; the jihad of the tongue, or
proclaiming God’s word abroad; and the jihad of the hands, or good works in
accord with God’s will (Scheuer, 2006, p. 40-42). In addition, many
organisations practice all four jihads, with a militant wing practicing jihad by
the sword. Perhaps the best known example of such an organisation is
Hezbollah. The organisation was originally established to deal with an influx of
refugees from Southern Lebanon, a social cause, and Hezbollah augmented its
social services to include charities, humanitarian efforts, and social work in
general. The group’s extensive financial support has built hospitals, medical
clinics, schools, orphanages, and centres for the physically handicapped (Post,
2007, p. 165-167). The researcher observed this first-hand in August and
September 2006, when he witnessed Hezbollah handing out assistance in the
form of cash allowances to the populations before the humanitarian and
development community had begun to conduct needs assessments, let alone
provide assistance.
This is the positive side of Hezbollah, and this is the sole realistic alternative for social services in Southern Lebanon. The other side is represented by followers of Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the spiritual mentor of Hezbollah. Fadlallah had an exceptional interpretation of the where he justified hostage taking, assassination, and suicide. Fadlallah stated that death as a suicide bomber is no different than that of a soldiers entering battle knowing that they would die. He argued that there was no moral distinction between the two, and that the only difference was the time of death. To justify Hezbollah activities further, often observed in his sermons that ‘there is evil in everything good and something good in every evil’. Although he argued that the practices of suicide, assassination, and hostage taking were extremes and should only be carried out in exceptional times, he considered these to be exceptional times. This was the justification for the practice of kidnapping, although the Koran specifically necessitates hospitality towards strangers. With regards to the kidnapping of thirty-seven Western hostages in 1982, Fadlallah’s followers used the exceptional circumstances of the times to warrant violating the strict Koranic proscription of kidnapping, stating ‘just as freedom is demanded for a small amount of Europeans, it is additionally demanded for the millions of Muslims’ (Post, 2007, p. 165-167).

3.15.2 NGOs established for terror

It is now evident that several terror organisations actively use NGOs as a conduit for funding or operations. Sometimes, NGOs funnel legitimate donations from supporters to finance terrorist organisations and activities devoid of the explicit understanding of the donors. The Afghan Support Committee (ASC) is a nongovernmental organisation established by Osama bin Laden; it claims that donations to the organisation are made to widows and orphans, and then uses at least a portion of the donated money to finance Al-Qaeda operations (Nance, 2008, p. 125). The fact is, the Al-Qaeda network has used several NGOs for their advantage. Osama bin Laden first gained fame as a humanitarian by running the International Islamic Relief Organisation and assisting the 6 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Nance, 2008, p. 316).
Another example of a multi-purpose NGO is the Benevolence International Foundation, an Illinois-based charity located in Bosnia-Herzegovina and run by a Syrian holding both US and Bosnian citizenship. This organisation is said to have been involved in a range of authentic activities, mixed with terrorist activities, such as running an orphanage in Azerbaijan and a tuberculosis hospital in Tajikistan, and to assisting in the attempted purchase of uranium and providing cash for the 1998 bombing of two American embassies in Africa (Vittori, 2011, p. 41). While Al-Qaeda has been the most famous group to utilise charities for malevolent ends, it is certainly not the only one. Hezbollah controls the Al-Aqsa International Foundation, the Martyr’s Organisation (Bonyad-e Shahid), and the Mabarrat Charity Organisation, along with a host of other charities located worldwide. HAMAS controls the Orphan Care Society and the Al-Islah Charitable Society, among others (Vittori, 2011, p. 60).

The Tamil Tigers were also adept at using NGOs to advance their goals. The leading Tiger NGO was the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, which coordinated the activities of all other Tamil NGOs. The Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation was believed to be the lead conduit for funds from the US Tamil diaspora community to the headquarters and for the facilitation of Tamil Tiger procurement in the United States. Another NGO was the International Medical Health Organisation, which operated at least 15 Tiger medical centres as well as four mobile ones (Vittori, 2011, p. 80-81).

3.15.3 NGO infiltration

In addition to forming NGOs for purpose, infiltrating well-known NGOs is also effective for more operational reasons. A member of a terrorist organisation employed by a humanitarian NGO may be able to vouch for, and provide fake identification for, terrorist members; the individual might also be able to arrange shelter and transportation. NGOs often have freedoms and advantages that regular civilians do not have, such as access to ambulances to clandestinely transport weapons or other supplies, or access to refugee camps for recruitment (Vittori, 2011, p. 40). For instance, Al-Qaeda members testified that they received identification cards from the Nairobi-based Mercy International Relief Organisation as they planned the 1998 US Embassy bombings (English, 2004, p.
297-299). There have also been a number of circumstances of Palestinian terrorists acquiring employment with the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA), the United Nations agency established in 1948 to address the needs of Palestinian refugees. At least one of these employees, Nahed Rashid Ahmed Attalah, used a United Nations vehicle to transport arms, explosives, and armed activists (Schanzer, 2004, p. 102). A 1996 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report claimed that approximately one third of fifty Islamic nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) considered in the investigation had employed individuals with some sort of terrorist connections (Bergen, 2001, p. 47-48).

3.16 Managing a Hostage Crisis

This part of the chapter examines literature that has been published so far in the field of hostage incident management with particular reference to preparedness and management of obstacles related to INGOs. While it is not feasible to survey all of the material surrounding this subject, the researcher has reviewed the work of leading writers and theorists on the subject of hostage taking and kidnapping, with an emphasis on INGO application of policy and theory. The literature contains no extensive studies of hostage crisis management for humanitarian and development workers.

Much has been written by scholars and practitioners on the field of hostage taking in general. However, the vast majority of literature is focused on identifying negotiation strategies or the various psychological orientations of those involved. For instance, Rogan, Hammer, and Van Zandt wrote in 1997 that ‘hostage negotiation is rapidly emerging as a field of behavioural science application, poised to move beyond largely anecdotal accounts of effective and ineffective negotiation strategies towards increasing efforts at systematically incorporating alternative disciplinary perspectives and employing more rigorous methodological approaches for analysing the dynamics of crisis negotiation’ (Rogan, Hammer, and Van Zandt, 1997, p. 2). The topic of negotiation is of substantial but limited interest to this review, as it remains one of the options in a hostage scenario. Other options include payment without negotiation, ignoring the demands, and a ‘tactical option’; i.e. a rescue attempt.
Another significant portion of the literature on hostage incidents describes hostage-barricade situations, and not the more prolonged situations that are the target of this research. Such hostage-barricade scenarios are better described as sieges, which occur when the police surround a town or building and cut off essential supplies with the aim of compelling those inside to surrender (Oxford Dictionary, 2013). Sieges take place when the location of the incident is known and is surrounded by the authorities. This is not usually the case for hostage scenarios involving INGOs, but sieges will be reviewed as they share some similarities with at least the early stage dynamics of protracted crises.

3.17 Policy on Hostage Management

Most large international organisations, whether for-profit or non-profit, have policies in place for managing hostage cases. These are generally based on the existing norms of international law as reflected in the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979 which, inter alia, provides that ‘the taking of hostages is an offence of grave concern to the international community, that any person committing an offence of taking hostages shall either be prosecuted or extradited, and that States shall make such offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences’ (United Nations, 1979). The United Nations also puts emphasis on Security Council Resolution 579 (1985), by which the Council unequivocally condemned hostage taking, called for the immediate release of all hostages wherever and by whomever they were being held, and affirmed the obligation of all States in whose territory hostages were held to urgently take all appropriate measures to secure their safe release and to prevent the commission of acts of hostage taking in the future (UNDSS, 2006).

3.17.1 State policy on hostage management

Many states have deemed it necessary to establish clear policies and procedures for hostage crisis management. The United Nations’ International Convention
against the Taking of Hostages, for example, was opened for signatures in 1973 (and approved on 17 December 1979). The key provision of the convention is that:

Each State Party is required to make this offence [hostage taking] punishable by appropriate penalties. Where hostages are held in the territory of a State Party, the State Party is obligated to take all measures it considers appropriate to ease the situation of the hostages and secure their release. After the release of the hostages, States Parties are obligated to facilitate the departure of the hostages. Each State Party is obligated to take such actions as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offence of taking of hostages (Enders and Sandler, 2006, p. 174).

The Netherlands learned from their hostage crisis in the late 1970s when South Moluccans carried out a number of hostage sieges. In December 1975, seven South Moluccans took over a train with 50 passengers, eventually killing three of them during the course of a 12-day siege after which they surrendered. Simultaneously, a group of seven other South Moluccans broke in to the Indonesian Consulate in Amsterdam and took further hostages. In 1977, South Moluccan terrorists struck again, and again towards two targets simultaneously. This time it was attacks against a train and a primary school, demanding their own state and freedom for the terrorists that had been arrested after the 1975 attack (Hughes, 2011, p. 46).

Several gaps in the preparedness of dealing with a situation such as the South Moluccan attackers were identified, and the government put guidelines in place to set out the division of powers and to determine which organisations and persons need to be warned. The policies also deal with the principles of the actions to be taken by various government services, including a detailed checklist that sets out what must be done and when. The policy further set forth that three decision-making centres must be set up in the event of a hostage situation, those of a crisis centre at the national level, a policy centre at the local level, and a command post at the hostage site (van Leeuwen, 2003, p. 122).
The United States of America amended Chapter 55 of Title 18 of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1985, sections 2001 and 2002, to make any kidnapping with an international dimension a crime subject to federal jurisdiction. In essence, this amendment allowed the United States to claim the right to arrest anyone involved in taking any US citizen hostage, whether the crime took place within or outside the borders of the United States, and allowed US authorities to arrest suspects even outside of the borders of the United States (Anderson, 2009, p. 102).

3.17.2 INGO policy on hostage management

The policies of each INGOs vary, but the majority declare that should employees of an organisation or their immediate members of the family be taken hostage, the organisation shall likely make every effort to secure the speedy and safe release of the hostage(s). To accomplish this goal, most INGOs, in addition to states and corporations, is not going to enter into negotiations with hostage takers for ransom, but may establish contacts or begin a dialogue with them if it is determined that this might promote the speedy and safe release of the hostage(s). Such contacts or dialogues ought to be geared towards convincing the hostage takers of the inhumanity, illegality and futility of their actions as way of attaining their objectives. Many organisations have a policy that dictates that the organisation shall neither pay ransom nor make other substantial concessions to hostage takers to secure the release of hostages due to the fact that doing so would encourage potential hostage takers and thus increase the risk that other staff members might face in the future.

The argument is always that negotiating with terrorists now risks more loss of innocent life later; it encourages terrorists to believe that future hostage taking will be profitable, thus leading to more incidents. Of course, the sincere defender of terrorism makes a parallel claim, which is that a risk to innocent life now will avoid the further loss of innocent life later (Held, 2011, p. 80).

Gary Noesner, former Chief of the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit, stated:

Embracing a “no negotiation” policy may be politically correct, but if your family member or employee’s life is on the line, it’s
not so simple. In my judgment, governments should not attempt to thwart ransom payment undertaken by professionals; rather they should support the safe release of the victim first, and then follow up with a robust and relentless effort to identify, locate, apprehend, and prosecute the kidnappers. This follow up is absent in most countries where kidnappings abound. Only when faced with a higher prospect of punishment will the scourge of kidnapping be reduced or eliminated (Lowe, 2013, p. 4).

The public stand on negotiation is somewhat contradictory to the statistics provided by kidnap and ransom insurance providers, who report an increase in number of insurance policies; indeed, some such providers collect USD 150 million annually in premiums (Robertson, 2007, p. 79). All major K&R insurance providers have special insurance profiles for not-for-profit organisations and NGOs (Chubb, 2012).

In addition to INGOs, there is a long list of states that have made claims about never negotiating with terrorists and then been forced to make exceptions; these include the Israeli government, well known for its no-negotiations policy during the 1970s, France during the 22 July 1968 El Al hijacking, and the United States and Israel during the 14 June 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 8474 (Enders and Sandler, 2006, p. 174). The researcher has also personally observed that some INGOs negotiate ransom in exchange for the safe return of staff.

Data from the Aid Worker Security Database shows the ratio of kidnappings to killings of kidnapped aid workers for the years 2002-2011 (Figure 3.3):
The literature is limited in revealing the extent of policy and preparedness among INGOs. The generic security manual that European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) produced for humanitarian organisations mentions that:

In 1996 a number of members of InterAction, the US NGO umbrella organisation, signed a Field Cooperation Protocol. The signatories agreed to instruct their representatives engaged in disaster response to consult with other NGO representatives similarly engaged to try to reach consensus in dealing with a wide range of issues including security arrangements, and in particular [...] hostage policy (ECHO, 2004, p. 51).

CARE’s Safety and Security Handbook (Macpherson and Pafford, 2004, p. 69) states that, in the case of a hostage taking:

CARE does not pay ransom or provide goods under duress, but will use all other appropriate means to secure the release of the hostage. It will intervene in every reasonable way with governmental, non-governmental and international organisations to secure the rapid and safe release of CARE staff. The kidnapped person should have one goal…survival. It is vital to obey the captor’s instructions and not attempt escape. CARE and the staff member’s government will undertake securing a staff member’s release. CARE also will provide all possible support to the hostage’s family members).

The handbook goes on to provide a guide for crisis management during a hostage crisis.

World Vision states in its security manual that:

In the event of a hostage taking/ kidnapping situation, the national director will have the full assistance of the Corporate Security
Officer and the Partnership Crisis Management Team to resolve the situation. WV will not pay ransom but will use all appropriate means to secure the release of the hostage (Rogers and Sytsma, 2001, p. 126).

Mercy Corps, in its Field Security Manual, states that

> Kidnapping is a very serious security infraction. Agencies should have an institutional policy regarding negotiation or payments to kidnappers and be prepared for specialized assistance in managing this type of crime. While Mercy Corps will do everything ethically possible to secure the release of detained or kidnapped staff, Mercy Corps will not pay ransoms for the release of kidnapped staff (Mercy Corps, 2006, p. 23).

Save the Children has an extensive security manual called Safety First, which explains that ‘Save the Children will not pay any ransom to effect the release of a member of staff. However, Save the Children will use all appropriate means to secure their release’ (Bickley, 2010, p. 169).

The above sampling appears to consistently reject the idea of payment of ransom. Despite this, the researcher has first-hand knowledge and observations to the effect that some INGOs do in fact pay ransom. Using the data above in Figure 3.3, the data can be interpreted in percentage of hostages killed per year. Figure 3.4 below shows this percentage:
The data above shows an average of approximately 17 per cent of hostages killed over a ten-year period, which is significantly higher than the global norm of 9 per cent of uninsured hostages and 2 per cent of those with kidnap and ransom insurance (Chubb, 2013). The topic of ransom will be further explored later in this chapter.

### 3.18 Introduction to Crisis Management

Crises occur and, depending on the case, they could be devastating for an organisation. However, crises can be managed. Ideally, a crisis may even improve an organisation’s operations. Ten Berge (1991, p. 32) observes that ‘a well-managed crisis develops the sense of togetherness among employees’, creating a positive climate that lasts long after the crisis has ended.

#### 3.18.1 Defining ‘crisis’

Recognizing and preventing crisis situations has been the subject of significant research over the past decades. However ‘it is a mistake to believe an organisation can avoid or prevent all possible crises’ (Coombs, 1999, p. 125).
The term ‘crisis’ means different things to different organisations and people. It can represent hazards, concern, nervousness, destruction, illness, danger, hurt, and property loss in addition to several other factors. It can also have an impact much broader than that on the organisation itself. Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003, p. 86) illustrated that the regulations, quality, objectives and potential of the community can be affected by a crisis incident. They further explained that we cannot blame anyone for natural disasters, mistakes by individuals, and crisis scenarios created by nature. Man-made crises come under the category of organisational crisis scenarios, such as the Chernobyl nuclear crisis that took place due to human error.

James and Gilliland (2012, p. 9) defined crises in terms of the following circumstances:

- The individual who faces the crisis situation will always be in danger.
- Though the crisis situation generally occurs in a limited time frame, there is a chance for the development of a sequence of chronic dangerous events from this situation.
- It is difficult to solve the crisis situation.
- The competence of the crisis interveners depends upon their lifetime experience in dealing with crisis situations.
- Evolution and motivations will result from the crisis situations.
- Crisis situations cannot be handled with rapid fixes or solutions.
- Individuals face various kinds of challenges due to the crisis situation.
- While facing crisis situations people will have emotional disturbances.
There is a relationship between the ability of the crisis interveners and the resolution of the crisis.

Pearson and Claire (1998, p. 60-63) offer perhaps the most relevant definition for INGOs, which is a synthesis of several business definitions of crisis: ‘an organisational crisis is a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organisation, is characterised by ambiguity of cause, effect and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly’.

All of the above considerations indicate that a crisis is sudden and overwhelming, therefore requiring pre-planning and organisation in order to be resolved successfully.

3.18.2 Crisis management principles

A crisis raises several challenges to an organisation; it can interfere with organisational performance, create uncertainty and stress, threaten the organisation’s reputation, and permanently alter an organisation (Carson, 2008, p. 64). To minimize the negative impact of a crisis, organisations will attempt to manage the crisis to the extent possible. A hostage crisis is a specific threat in the process of being realised, and it represents a crisis for almost any organisation. However, hostage crises conform in many ways to general crisis management principles.

Williams and Olaniran (1998, p. 388) claimed that crisis management is ‘the use of public relations to minimize harm to the organisation in emergency situations that could cause the organisation irreparable damage’. Crisis management is more than an action taken within an organisation, also requiring ‘communication between the organisation and the public prior to, during, and after the negative occurrence’ (Kauffman, 1999, p. 422).

Possibly the most valuable typologies for managers concentrate on the gestation period for crises. The ones that are extremely sudden and unexpected are inherently more difficult to deal with compared to those that develop during a period of time. The aims of crisis management, as outlined by Heath (1998, p. 12-14), are to plan and provide for possible crisis events which could occur; the
pre-crisis stage; to lower or mitigate the impacts of a crisis by enhancing the response management; the crisis, and; to quickly and effectively assess the damage brought on by the crisis; the post-crisis stage.

Fundamentally, crisis management can be viewed as a key strategic issue (Clarke and Varma, 2004, p. 419) which should be addressed by senior management of an organisation as a central concern. Therefore, it could be argued that crisis management ought to be a fundamental element of the strategic planning processes that an organisation performs rather than a measure that is added each time a crisis has occurred. For such strategic thinking to occur, a crisis management team has to be selected with a clear framework for communication. Furthermore, the whole organisation must be aware of the framework or strategy. Just how a firm prepares for a crisis may be determined by its culture, may dominate the management’s actions, and is reflected in the attitudes and norms of the organisation (Ray, 1999, p. 16-18).

### 3.19 Managing a Hostage Incident

It is essential to stress that if an international NGO employee is kidnapped, this crime, by international law, must be addressed between governments. All the others who are playing a part in the crisis is involved only through the request of the host nation and the passport nation of the victim. When it is a national staff, then the nation’s law enforcement officials has the mandate. Only in unusual circumstances does an NGO find itself in a situation where the organisation has no choice but to serve as the primary negotiator (Macpherson, et al., 2008, p. 22-24).

Dubrowski (2004, p. 1202) notes that from a management perspective ‘a crisis brings about a state of emergency, which due to its acuteness requires, prompts decision making and which must be as good as possible, since corrections are usually not possible’. Decision-making thus remains a crucial part of proper crisis management, and it is perhaps one of the more difficult elements of leading an organisation through a crisis. Boin, Lagadec, Michel-Kerjan, and Overdijk (2003, p. 135) stress that ‘crisis management thus falls within the leadership domain whether leaders like it or not’.
3.19.1 The aim of hostage management

Schlossberg, generally referred to as the originator of modern hostage management, stated that ‘the primary consideration in such circumstances is to secure the lives and safety of threatened hostages, the police officers, innocent bystanders, and the criminals themselves’ (1979, p. 89-90). The American Bar Association (Jeffress, 1996, p. 138-139) reported that hostage negotiations fall within the public safety responsibilities of the police, as police duties include resolving conflict, aiding people in need of assistance, and helping people in danger.

Grubb (2010, p. 341-344) explained that in an effort to both manage the hostage taking scenario and save the lives of the hostages, law enforcement agencies in the United States started to adopt a ‘negotiate first’ strategy after realising the impact of such incidents. Fuselier (1981, p. 12) explained that this strategy resulted in the establishment of unique hostage negotiation groups with a selected negotiator, a tactical assault team (TAC), additional employees, and structured strategies. McMains and Mullins (2010, p. 10) explained that these hostage negotiation groups are operated with the motive of reducing and eradicating death among hostages.

3.19.2 Challenges to managing a hostage crisis

There are numerous challenges that could lead humanitarian aid organisations to inadequately manage hostage situations. For instance, a kidnapping can take place in one jurisdiction though the authority of law enforcement could be held, and ransom could possibly be paid, in another (Jenkins, 1990, p. 1-2). Drawing parallels to the piracy challenge helps to illustrate this challenge. The United States in 2012 captured a Somali pirate who had been active in the attack on an American ship in the Indian Ocean; the pirate was taken to New York for prosecution under American law. The pirate’s prosecution and eventual detention, should he be convicted, will cost the US millions of dollars, a sum much higher than a single ransom payment demanded by the Somali pirates. Thus, while prosecuting pirates domestically in the courts of the capturing nation could make sense when it comes to deterrence, such prosecution is actually a costlier (and logistically more challenging) option (Sterio, 2009, p. 3-
8). An obvious parallel is seen with hostage situations, particularly in transnational cases. An additional complicating factor is the multitude and a number of actors that may be associated with potential ransom payments. According to research and case studies, these may include members of the family, NGOs, multi-national businesses, insurance providers, government entities and third party intermediaries. On many occasions, individuals, families and private businesses might want to deal directly with the hostage takers from fear that harm will come to the hostage(s) in the event the authorities are notified (The Financial Action Task Force, 2011, p. 26). However, the fact that a hostage scenario is a changing process that could last from a couple of hours to many years underlines the significance of mobilising a qualified team to control this type of situation (Eguren and Caraj, 2009, p. 175).

A particular challenge in managing a hostage case in which negotiation or contact is involved is that there is little in common between hostage takers, who have abducted staff whom they do not know, and the team managing the situation, whose colleagues have been taken but whose actions should be carried out according to the law. The moral gap separating the two entities makes the process more difficult, as traditional ‘empathy techniques’ are not particularly effective.

A further complicating matter is that in many cases there is little actual contact between the hostage takers and the team managing the case. Firstly, the question of negotiating with terrorists is a dual decision that begins as a simple matrix; i.e. the hostage taker’s decision as to whether to negotiate and the crisis management team’s decision as to whether to negotiate. Further, the hostage takers will normally try to reduce exposure to the extent possible. Even though they may have a temporary stronghold, they are still subject to some level of host government’s authority which may influence the group’s behaviour and ability to operate (Faure, 2008, p. 179-200).

A third difficult factor is that any group, organisation or movement is likely to contain many types of individuals, and not all group members may be hostage takers; the categories are hermeneutic and not hermetic (Reuveny and Thompson, 2010, p. 248). Cooper (1981, p. 1) posits that ‘there are no natural
categories of hostage takers [...] they tend to reflect the discipline and training of those who construct them’. Likewise, hostage takers with criminal accomplices often work in separate cell structures, with each cell responsible for a different part of the abduction. For example, one cell snatches the subject, another cell guards and takes care of the subject, and a third cell handles the ransom negotiation and turnover of the victim (Likar, 2011, p. 49).

To further complicate the scenarios, crisis conditions, coupled with a conflict dynamic of perceived incompatibilities and interference between hostage takers and those who have received demands, often create a situation that challenges a hostage taker’s ability to cope with the dangerous demands of the event. Without the correct management of the crisis, an escalation rather than a reduction of the conflict may occur due to increased relational mistrust, sensitivity to saving face or self-image concerns, and information processing errors (Hammer, 2007, p. 39).

3.19.3 The benefits of preparedness

As is true in any crisis, the better prepared an organisation is for a hostage event, the more likely it is to be able to manage it optimally. The crisis that is commonly considered to have fuelled the development of modern hostage management, the massacre at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, was an unfortunate example of a hostage crisis mishandled at nearly every turn. First, the German authorities were so focussed on image that they had minimum security in place, and many of the guards were civilians with very little training. Second, there was no preparedness or policy in place to guard against the eventuality of a hostage event, despite the fact that Europe was at the height of the tension that resulted from terrorism associated with a left-wing agenda.

Third, once the hostages were taken, chaos ensued. The media were allowed to film almost unhindered, and East German television broadcasted live as police snipers approached the stronghold (Kerr and Clarke, 2011, loc. 390-392). Then, when it came time to negotiate, the German authorities first delayed, and then offered to exchange the hostages for an unlimited amount of money. This offer was rejected (One Day in September, 1999).
And last, when the German authorities decided to attack, they also showed a remarkable lack of preparation and coordination. Members of the attack force were selected according to whether they had handled weapons before. Not a single member of the assault force had advanced weapon training. After about two hours of gunfire exchange, a terrorist threw a hand grenade into the helicopter with the hostages and killed all on board. Eight years later, by comparison, the hostage rescue at the Iranian Embassy in London took 17 minutes from beginning to end.

Parallels can be drawn to the INGO world. Many INGOs, like the German government at the time of the Munich disaster, are also very image conscious, as image forms a fundamental part of their security strategy; to be seen as humanitarian and neutral. Hence, their security posture may be low. In addition, funds for security may have to compete with those intended for the operation, and security may at times lack priority.

An example of how poor preparedness affected an INGO is when Sharon Cummins, from Ireland, and Hilda Kawuki, from Uganda were abducted from their residence in Kutum, Darfur on 03 July 2009 while working for GOAL, an Irish INGO. After their release on 18 October 2009, Cummins was critical of GOAL’s management of the case. In a documentary aired on RTE on 21 December 2010 Cummins explained that, six weeks before the abduction, GOAL had received a threat that foreigners would be abducted in the area of operation where GOAL worked.

In the end, after 107 days in captivity, Sudanese and Irish negotiators managed to work with local tribes to release the hostages unharmed. After a medical check-up, they were walked straight into intense media spotlights. Cummins explained: ‘It was tough, having cameras stuck in your face after all the trauma, with skin infections, not having washed your hair for 107 days, with the extreme stress, still hungry. I could have done without that’. She was distressed for months afterwards. GOAL offered counselling ten days later, but their own policy states that counselling should be provided immediately upon release. Cummins concluded:
Ultimately, it was GOAL’s responsibility to look after our security; I expected them to make the right decision. GOAL let us down badly. I believe they had adequate information to make decision and respond appropriately to pull us out. They need to have accountability in security management. I would hate for someone else to go through what I went through because of the negligence of another aid agency. I feel betrayed by GOAL. I realize I was a cog in the wheel, I was working in one of the most dangerous places in the world, and there was very little regards to my personal safety (RTE, 2010).

There was a significant amount of negative focus on GOAL after the airing of the documentary; in both hostage management and security communities, this event is seen as a perfect example of how not to manage a crisis. In both case studies above, preparedness could have mitigated the negative outcomes of the hostage crisis, both on individual and organisational levels.

3.19.4 INGO planning for hostage incident management

As established above, the main objective of managing a hostage incident is to discover the ideal solution for everyone involved, including hostage takers. For this to be a success, planning and preparation have primary importance.

A crisis management plan is created to prepare and implement a timely, prudent, and efficient reaction to a kidnapping, for an extortion attempt, or to the threat of kidnapping or extortion directed against the organisation’s employees, families, or their guests, facilities, operations, assets or reputation. The crisis management plan is the cornerstone for the NGO’s response and functions as the institutional guideline when emotions and stress are greatest (Macpherson et al., 2008, p. 22-24). It can be hard to ascertain and measure crisis preparedness in an NGO. In the paper Creating Common Security Terminology for NGOs, Anna Dick examined security documents from a total of 32 organisations and discovered that ‘although only two organisations described a crisis in this context, and only four organisations defined crisis at all, most organisations understood a crisis situation to be related to an ongoing, direct threat to the life
of a staff member’ (2010, p. 11). Hence, one can assume that most organisations have undergone some level of crisis preparation.

Of the INGO security manuals that the researcher has reviewed (CARE International, World Vision, Human Rights Defenders, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, and the generic ECHO security guide for humanitarian workers), all of them contain relatively detailed crisis guidelines which are especially comprehensive in relation to kidnapping. This further indicates that INGOs have a level of crisis management plans in place.

### 3.19.5 The three stages of hostage management planning

As outlined in the theoretical framework of this study, hostage management planning, like any crisis planning, can be divided into three components; those of pre-incident, incident, and post-incident.

**Pre-incident**

The pre-incident stage involves all the planning, anticipation, and ‘what if’ modelling and intelligence-gathering that can be done in advance. Plans are in themselves important documents, provided they are relevant and up to date. However, emphasis must also be placed on conducting on-the-ground assessments that provide the information in the plans, assessments that hence form a key component of the preventive strategy. Threat assessments, in which groups and individual adversaries are identified, are also essential, as is a proper vulnerability assessment. A vulnerability assessment identifies specific locations, routines, procedures or people that may become targets due to gaps in the security mitigation for the organisation or staff (Erickson, 1999, p. 347). Much can be done with pattern analysis. One study shows that, seasonally, the concentration of kidnappings was during the winter and spring months. Even days of the week can be analysed. Thursday and Monday stood out in the same study with the most total kidnapping-based attacks, followed closely by Friday and Tuesday (McGovern, 2010, p. 84). Each threat environment has different patterns which it is important to identify and analyse.

In addition, at the pre-incident stage, management must obtain information about each staff that includes emergency contact numbers, relevant medical
history, and special instructions in case of emergency. Having this information readily available not only enhances the personal safety of the employee but also makes it easier to support the family of an employee who is abducted (Katz and Caspi, 2003, p. 199).

**Incident**

Media management will likely be at the forefront during an incident. Most mainstream news organisations impose standards that rule out graphic images from hostage takings, but the perpetrators of incidents might disseminate those images through the Internet and other new media sources to audiences that are smaller but are considered high-value, including potential recruits. The hostage takers also know that videos on YouTube or other online venues can reach substantial audiences regardless of the amount of attention paid to these items by traditional media outlets. Videos showing the executions of kidnap victims have sometimes been viewed online millions of times. The video of the beheading of Nicholas Berg, an American businessman taken hostage in Iraq, was posted on the Web on 11 May 2004; within 24 hours it had been copied onto other sites and downloaded more than 500,000 times (Seib and Janbek, 2010, p. 35). However, if media is properly managed, such incidents can assist greatly in reducing the likelihood and impact of future incidents.

**Post-incident**

Post-incident planning is concerned with handling events in the aftermath of a hostage-taking; it deals with physical and psychological injuries, and the need to get operations back to normal as quickly and safely as possible (Bolz, Dudonis, Schulz, and Riemann, 2001, p. 34). Further, a post-incident analysis must take place. It is quite common to treat a hostage incident as a one-off occurrence for the organisation, and the challenge is to design the organisation in such a way that it constantly learns from past incidents. If a group is successful in abducting one target, then it is likely that the tactic will be repeated against new targets. Hence organisations need to develop processes by which they learn rapidly from past incidents inside and outside their operating environment, thus ensuring they are prepared for any eventuality (Suder, 2006, p. 201).
3.20 Mitigating the Risk of Hostage Taking

One of the major obstacles for INGOs is a narrow focus on operational readiness for field operators rather than thinking about crisis and security management on a strategic level. Other obstacles include lack of training, inadequate attention paid to developing risk assessment, high rates of staff turnover resulting in a disconnect between levels of staff expertise, and finally, a lack of the tools needed to understand and prepare for threats in the operating environment (Bolletino, 2006, p. 14). All these can have a significant negative effect on the organisation, according to theories of the social trust approach. This approach maintains that a staff’s trust in the organisation is built on an understanding of that organisation’s goals, motives and actions in relation to the staff’s values. If it appears that the organisation takes hostage threats seriously, the staff will trust the organisation to appropriately manage the risk. However, it is easier to destroy trust than to gain it, or as Wittgenstein said ‘Der Zweifel kommt nach dem Glauben’ (doubt comes after belief). When the individual staff cannot control the level of risk is, trust becomes the most important factor. When people perceive themselves to be at risk, they follow only the advice of those they trust (Covello et al., 2001).

As Bodie and Merton (1999, p. 257) argue, risk is ‘uncertainty that matters’, and for uncertainty to matter it needs to be taken into account. One way of achieving this is by performing a risk assessment exercise. A risk assessment is designed to identify the several types of vulnerabilities of a company, institution or individual, and it is instrumental for the formulation of a risk management strategy. The outcomes of such assessments are generally plotted with regards to the likelihood of an event in comparison to the impact this kind of event might have on the company or the person. This plotting will then be utilized to identify levels of risk, based upon which decision makers must either decide on a risk aversion strategy or embrace the potential risks by having a risk management plan.

Being protected from abduction is really a question of degree, and INGO employees can sometimes be unrealistically optimistic in their appreciation of
risk levels. Unknown information affects the risk estimate, as does the effectiveness of existing risk mitigation measures. This makes it an exceptionally dynamic process, one in which knowledge and data are critical. Once the risk assessment suggests that there exists a high likelihood of kidnapping for a person or corporation, protective measures are necessary to tackle the risk.

Denial of the real risk levels can be a psychological defence mechanism deployed to keep unpleasant truths at bay (De Becker, 2002, p. 23). The consequence is that low probability risks, such as hostage taking, are often treated as practically zero risks. While it is true from an individual’s perspective that the likelihood, but not necessarily the risk, of being taken hostage remains low, from an organisational perspective the likelihood of an undesirable event among a large group of staff is much higher (Sunstein, 2005, p. 160).

There are generally two possibilities open for the risk manager: averting the risk or embracing it. Averting a kidnap would entail suspending operations and evacuating personnel; embracing kidnap risk may include preventive steps like maintaining the anonymity of company agents in risky regions, making sure that their movements are unpredictable, providing them with physical protection, such as armour and armed escorts, a definite strategy for protecting and filtering information, and restrictions on non-essential travel. However, groups specialising in hostage taking operate mainly in politically unstable countries where the central authority is commonly weak, private and public corruption is endemic, and the social fabric of the nation has unravelled to a considerable degree. We might refer to them as ‘anomic terrorists’, as they make an effort to operate inside an environment of anomic or lawlessness and thrive in failed states or in nations with weakened central control (Bjørgo, 2005, p. 23). This is the same environment where many international NGOs operate. One way of mitigating the consequences of a hostage incident would be to have clearly prepared plans and procedures for handling the crisis, such as development of a strategy in case a hostage situation occurs. Reactive measures when it comes to a medium to very high risk of kidnap would probably include some type of insurance, either self-insurance through savings and investments to cover a
ransom and hostage recovery service in addition to financial loss, or kidnap and ransom (K&R) insurance coverage, along with crisis communications plans.

Kidnapping prospects are therefore those individuals who, constituted as a population in the process of identifying and managing kidnap in terms of risk, require the employment of very specific strategies aimed at ensuring their protection, one of these being investment in K&R insurance.

3.21 Hostage Negotiation

It is important to stress that while some level of negotiation is involved in most hostage cases, it remains but one of the options in a hostage scenario. Other options include payment without negotiation, ignoring the demands, and a ‘tactical option’: a rescue attempt. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the vast majority of the literature in this area is focused on identifying negotiation strategies or the various psychological orientations of those involved.

While international consensus condemns the act of hostage taking, opinion is sharply divided over the legality of forceful rescue missions by the hostages’ national state. The ‘right to rescue’ or ‘defence of nationals’ justification for the use of force engenders strong support from some and strong condemnation from others, but it receives only brief commentary in academic literature. Eichensehr (2007, p. 452) argues that Article 51 of the UN Charter carefully limits right to use force to rescue their nationals held and in danger abroad as part of the states’ inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. As a type of self-defence, forceful actions to rescue hostages are subject to the magnitude, necessity, immediacy, and proportionality requirements for all forceful self-defence actions and must satisfy these requirements in order to be legal. Eichensehr expands upon this assertion by outlining two major arguments in support of the lawfulness of a right to rescue. First, the humanitarian premise of a right to rescue is consonant with the goals of the international legal system. Thus, rescue actions must adhere to a strict proportionality standard, avoiding civilian deaths, and must also follow the principles of international humanitarian
law, including never deliberately targeting civilians or in the course of attempted rescues.

The trend of hostage crime moving from individual offences to large-scale events such as the hostage rescues at the Munich Olympics, the Iranian Embassy in London, the Beslan School, and the Moscow Theatre means that more police resources, greater expertise, and better coordination of resources and efforts are now required (Forst et al., 2011, p. 194). Hostage rescue is today a highly specialised skill practiced only by elite forces in most countries. This is because the risk of casualties is so high from all three sides: those of the hostage takers, the hostages, and the rescue team. The massacre at the Munich Olympics in 1972 had a profound impact on the world and future police operations against terrorists (Simonsen and Spindlove, 2009, p. 184-185; Purpura, 2006, p. 60).

The German government’s response to its disastrous failure to defuse the hostage situation at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games was to create the specialised anti-terrorism commando unit GSG 9, which established a formidable reputation after the successful recapture of the hijacked Lufthansa airliner in Mogadishu in 1977 (Van Leeuwen, 2003, p. 120). The French police equipped itself in 1972 with a Brigade de Recherche et d'Intervention (BRI) (replaced in 1985 by the RAID), and in 1976 the French Ministries of Defence and the Interior set up the first service designed to respond directly to the shock caused by violent actions: the Groupement d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) (van Leeuwen, 2003). Several nations, including France, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, the United States, and, more recently, Peru, have demonstrated their hostage rescue capacities through successes achieved in the public eye. That said, the great majority of special hostage rescue operations have ended in partial or complete failure (Forest, 2007, p. 400).

### 3.22 Psychological Effects of Captivity

Although the history of kidnapping and hostage taking is a long one, it is only relatively recently that there has been a systematic attempt to understand the effects, both long-term and short-term, on individuals and their families. Fortunately, hostage takings and forcible confinements are still relatively rare
phenomena within the INGO world. When they do occur however, they can cause enormous psychological harm to the victims.

3.22.1 Short-term psychological effects on hostages

In the majority of hostage incidents, the lives of the hostages are at risk. This is an essential point; it is not the property, status, or belongings of people that are at risk, but their very lives. Some psychological effects of detention will emerge immediately upon capture, and the first feeling is usually fear for one’s life. Most hostages think the that the intention of the captor is to kill them (Broder and Tucker, 2011, p. 265-266), and the hostage takers will likely actively promote this thought, as it can improve the chances of concessions being made. The hostage taker likely also feels the need to behave in an aggressive, emotional, frightening and angry manner in order to make it appear that the situation is under his or her control and to force the hostage to respect his or her orders. This leads the hostage to believe that the captor will kill them (Phillips, 2011, p 849).

The predicament of the kidnapper is often that he or she must convince the people from whom concessions are sought that he or she is capable of killing the victim (Best, 1982, p. 107-128; Crenshaw, 1998, p. 7-24). Given this, the hostage taker needs the hostage to believe that he or she is going to die unless demands are met. Violence in captivity serves this purpose. However, kidnappers also employ violence to control the victim. Van Brabant (2000, p. 55-57) suggested that victims were beaten to weaken their will and deter resistance or escape. Manipulating the victim with violence might facilitate a form of learned helplessness (Alexander and Klein, 2009, p. 17). The above suggest that violence is calculated for effect. In a recent study in which 181 kidnapping cases in 32 countries were examined, cruelty was found to be systematic and varied in the degree of intensity and focus. Kidnappers directed their attacks on the body or the psyche of the victim and did so in a strategically calculated manner. This suggested that violence toward a victim is not random but that it rather represents a highly systemised form of torture (Phillips, 2011, p. 845-869). Yang, Wu, and Huang (2007, p. 324-339) found that upon securing
the victim, an offender’s primary concern becomes controlling the victim, with emphasis placed on manipulating the victim’s psychological state.

Psychological effects of captivity were identified by Oots and Wiegele (1985, p. 1-32). They pointed to the feelings of hostages such as anxiety, fright, tentativeness, and fear. Furthermore, Hillman (1983, p. 157-165) identified that hostages could feel existential fear, sensory input burden, and an overwhelming sense of helplessness. If held in a group, some of the hostages may be injured or killed by the captors, which makes the others fearful of not surviving. The hostages also adjust to the extreme environment, and feel disconnected with the real world. Instead, they exist in a condition in which their emotions, thoughts and actions are, at least by design, controlled by another person. Normally people are able to plan their day to day activities in an orderly world. When they are taken hostage, people lose control over their actions and feel that they are in an insecure place. They may feel that the world has turned into an erratic and volatile one. The hostage feels concern for his or her life, the duration of the hostage situation, and also worries about loved ones (Fletcher, 1996, p. 232-240).

Many hostages also identify real or perceived risk of bodily harm. Hostages believe that they are going to be sexually violated, or that they will suffer forever with loss of face, amputations, or other physical injuries. This fear has found some grounding in research. In a study that examined 33 hostage takings/forcible confinements that occurred over an eleven-year period (December 1989 – December 2000) it was found that 36.6 per cent of women were sexually assaulted. Sexual assaults occurred only against women and 22.5 per cent of offenders sexually assaulted their hostages. It was also found that a hostage taking is more likely to become sexual if the hostage taker is known to have used sexual violence in the past. Thus, if the hostage taker involved in a particular operation has a history of sexual violence towards hostages, the assumption should be made that a sexual assault is imminent. In this case the normal procedure for resolving a hostage taking (stall and negotiate) could inadvertently provide a greater opportunity for the hostage taker to sexually assault the hostage. Policy should therefore encourage acting more rapidly when
there are reasonable grounds to assume that the hostage will be sexually assaulted (Mailloux and Serin, 2002, p. 2-9).

For some surveyed the fear of bodily harm was equal to or higher than that of death. An immediate, and in some case long-term, loss of the feeling of security was also common among respondents. People generally consider that the world is a safe and secure place and that they possess some control over their circumstances and actions (Broder and Tucker, 2011, p. 265-266). This stance is often altered, even remaining so after release.

Another common psychosomatic effect is the feeling of guilt. The hostage may feel guilty towards his or her family or, as an INGO staff member, towards the beneficiaries who may not get the assistance they need as a result of the situation. Gilmartin and Gibson (1985, p. 46-48) pointed out that the stress encountered by hostages can create a physical reaction as well. Some hostages were highly affected with high blood pressure and elevated heart rate, as well as deficit in muscular control. Nudell and Antokol (1990, p. 56-66) pointed out that during a hostage situation the hostages may lose bladder control, vomit, feel dizzy, and experience abnormal breathing rate or asthmatic reactions. Some hostages may also experience heart failure or stroke.

Lanza (1986, p. 95-107) pointed that some hostages may experience hallucinations. One study (Siegel, 1984, p. 264-269) found that more than twenty-five per cent of hostages may have hallucinations and confusion, obsession with body imagery, trouble with eyesight, sensitivity to light, tunnel vision, geometric patterns, tactile-kinaesthetic hallucination, dissociation and audio hallucination.

Apart from the main existential psychological reactions, some additional feelings common among hostages include total sense of susceptibility; extreme feelings of danger; profound feelings of helplessness and hopelessness; deep feelings of defencelessness and powerlessness to fight and escape; sensory overload; and lost sense of self-worth and respect for others.

As the hostage situation goes on, the earlier stress is reduced, and the hostage can start to manage the situation (Broder and Tucker, 2011, p. 256).
3.22.2 Long-term psychological effects on hostages

At the stage of release, one might think that much of the stress the hostage is feeling turns to anticipation. However, the resolution stage creates greatly enhanced stress for the hostage. In the resolution stage, the hostage may have settled into a routine and have adjusted to the situation, which again will be dramatically changed. The increased stress affects both captors and hostages, and it is not uncommon for levels of violence to rise just prior to release.

Even after the release, the hostage may feel treated like a criminal by law enforcement, especially if an armed intervention was used to secure freedom as these are often chaotic, and it is standard procedure to secure all people, hostages and hostage taker, until it is clear who is who (Broder and Tucker, 2011, p. 265-266). The normal immediate reaction to release is elation and optimism, but this may be accompanied by emotional labiality, with periods of excitement and loquacity alternating with withdrawal, exhaustion, and bewilderment. New anxiety-related symptoms are very common in those released from a brief ordeal; these were reported in 94 per cent of 168 Dutch hostages within the first four weeks of release, falling to two-thirds thereafter (Fletcher, 1996. p. 237-240).

Van der Ploeg and Kleijn (1989, p. 153-169) followed 138 former hostages and their families for six to nine years, at which point 12 per cent of former hostages and 11 per cent of family members were regarded as still requiring professional help. Although negative effects decreased over time, anxiety, tension and sleeping problems were still common, and psychosomatic complaints increased in both former hostages and family members.

For long-term hostages the demands of re-entry into society are heavy and prolonged and, in some respects, similar to those of individuals released from any long-term imprisonment. The ‘settling down’ stage is associated with a range of psychological, emotional and somatic problems, and suicide has been reported during this phase especially in those who endured prolonged torture. Over the first year following release, optimism tends to wane, and feelings of perplexity, lack of involvement, and loneliness increase.
The psychiatric treatment of released hostages and their relatives does not differ substantially from the psychiatric treatment of other victims of trauma, although management is inevitably affected by intense media, public and political interest (Fletcher, 1996, p. 237-240).

### 3.22.3 Stress on stakeholders

Hostage taking forces a strong burden, especially psychologically, on all the people involved in both the crime and the management of the incident, including hostages, hostage takers, security forces, colleagues, and managers. Victims of hostage situations therefore include more than just those who are taken. The families of those involved are victimised, as are the hostage incident managers who assist during the crisis. Even the public at large can be considered victims because there is more for them to fear and because new regulations or procedures may be instituted, making everyday living more difficult. Hence, not every victim of a hostage incident is always immediately recognisable (Bolz et al., 2001, p. 34). Figure 3.5 shows the lines and flow of relationships which develop in the aftermath of an incident.

![Figure 3.5: Flow of relationships during a hostage crisis](image)

If there is a loss of life it will naturally create a major stress for representatives of the organisation, but even observing the absence of a colleague and feeling helpless to assist can cause severe stress on colleagues of a person taken hostage. There is a plethora of current research that provides evidence regarding stress to emergency workers (Somodevilla, 1986, p. 395-398; McMains, 1986, p. 365-368; Nielsen, 1986, p. 369-374), police officers involved in critical shootings (Reese, Horn, and Dunning, 1991; Solomon and Horn, 1986, p. 383-393), and military personnel involved in warfare (Mullins, 2008, p 63-81).

It is typical for relatives and friends to experience marked anxiety and anger immediately after a kidnapping. Prolonged hostage situations may precipitate serious financial difficulties, depression and substance misuse. Some relatives and friends shun campaigning, believing that enough is being done to secure release and feeling concern that raising a hostage’s profile might increase his or her value as a captive. Others put considerable time and energy into campaigns, publicising the hostage’s plight in order to raise awareness and keep the situation on the political agenda. Either stance may contribute to post-release readjustment difficulties, as some blame themselves for not having done enough, and others are loath to give up new-found prominence (Fletcher, 1996, p. 232-240).

3.22.4 Stockholm syndrome

The Stockholm syndrome will only be peripherally reviewed, as it is a rare occurrence and is not fully relevant to the management of INGO hostage cases.

The Stockholm syndrome takes its name from the aftermath of a 1973 robbery-gone-wrong in Stockholm, Sweden. It essentially refers to an emotional response from hostages that increase their chances of survival, at least in its earlier stage. On 23 August 1973, Jan-Erik Olsson, a 32-year-old career criminal, entered the Sveriges Kreditbank. Armed with a submachine gun and with rock music blaring from a boom box radio that he was carrying, he fired a burst of bullets into the ceiling and announced in English, ‘the party has just begun’. Four bank employees (one man and three women) were trapped and held captive in the bank’s vault as customers fled. The hostages were held in the vault of the bank for more than five days (Simon and Blum, 1987, p. 194-200). The police quickly
acceded to Olsson’s demand that his confederate, Clark Olofsson, who was in prison, be brought to the bank. The two held the police at bay with their hostages imprisoned in the 11-foot-by-14-foot vault for 131 hours in conditions that have been described as ‘horrible’ (Slatkin, 2012, p. 1-4).

The hostages were reportedly abused repeatedly and threatened with death during the siege. They were displayed at the vault door with guns held under their chins and wire nooses around their necks as surety against a police assault, but none of the hostages was actually assaulted while in captivity. After their release, the police were shocked to find that all four hostages showed marked empathy towards the two captors as well as enmity towards the police (Olin and Born, 1983, p. 18-24). A clandestine police microphone in the vault revealed the nature and extent of the interactions between the hostage takers and their hostages. It is clear that there was consensual sexual touching between Olsson and one of the female hostages (Slatkin, 2012, p. 6). Furthermore, the former hostages refused to provide information about the captors and spoke publicly on their behalf, even going so far as to collecting money for their defence case. One former hostage went on to be engaged for marriage to Olsson (Simon and Blum, 1987, p. 198-200).

The Swedish incident does not appear to be an aberration. Other examples of similar behaviour were reported in the same time period, the Patty Hearst and Gerald Vaders cases being the most frequently cited. As the hostage situation evolves, a deeper than normal bond may start to develop between hostage and hostage taker. The hostage may possibly develop sympathy towards the hostage taker or his or her cause, and may want to learn more about the hostage taker on a personal level. Strentz (1980, p. 137-150) defines the condition simply as a ‘nonvoluntary and unconscious positive bond between captive and captor that develops in response to the trauma of victimization. In a true manifestation of the phenomenon, hostages do not perceive the incongruity or irrationality of their feelings toward the hostage-takers in a self-critical or insightful way’.

Olin and Born (1983, p. 18-24) listed the following tell-tale symptoms of Stockholm syndrome:

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• The victim has positive feelings for the captor.

• The victim shows fear, distrust, and anger towards the authorities.

• The captor displays positive feelings towards the victim.

Another important factor is the time taken by both hostage and captor for interaction. More time will increase the chance of rapport, and this can gradually develop to the Stockholm syndrome. For the post-release treatment, it is important to understand that the hostages have only a specific mental bond with their captors (Simon and Blum, 1987, p. 194-200).

However, in the years since the Stockholm syndrome was first reported, questions have arisen about its frequency and the centrality or importance of its occurrence in hostage situations.

Slatkin (2012, p. 7) revealed frequencies of occurrence indicating approximately 10 per cent for positive feelings by hostages toward their captors and 28 per cent for hostage-takers’ positive feelings toward their captives. Both figures were well below earlier reports of frequencies above 50 per cent. Hence, it appears that the Stockholm syndrome may have received much greater attention by academics, trainers, negotiators, and the tabloid public than it might have warranted.

3.23 Kidnap and Ransom Insurance

Kidnap and ransom (K&R) insurance is a sensitive subject in the humanitarian world, and no literature deals directly with this theme. Anecdotal evidence suggests that crisis management and kidnap and ransom insurance vary considerably regarding their application to national staff of INGOs, although the issue is generally not openly discussed (Egeland et al., 2011, p. 26-31).

When an organisation takes out K&R insurance, a condition of the policy is that its existence not be revealed. If the organisation does reveal the existence of coverage, the insurance can be cancelled. A dramatic example of what can happen when information on K&R insurance holders is disclosed is the series of
kidnappings between 1984 and 1989 of 40 members of the Colombian Jewish community that held K&R insurance policies. These kidnappings occurred after factions of Colombia’s guerrillas managed to infiltrate the insurance files by means of an agent among the file-keepers (Lobo-Guerrero, 2007, p. 315).

3.23.1 What does kidnap and ransom insurance entail?

Insurance is not a new phenomenon, but rather an old form of privatisation of security that has been documented as going back to the early modern period, when slaves and merchants were insured in their persons and in their capacity to generate revenue (Lobo-Guerrero, 2007, p. 315). Private entities, including individuals, corporations, and INGOs pay millions of dollars in ransom money every year, and scores of insurance companies sell K&R insurance policies to reimburse those entities for ransom payments (Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 2012). K&R insurance is a form of security practice that illustrates the attenuation of the inside/outside and public/private distinctions featured in the literature on the privatisation of security (Bigo, 2003). It is, however, also an example of the privatisation of security itself: it cannot be analysed within the traditional scope of the nation-state, though it does interact with the latter. K&R insurance belongs to the category of special risks insurance and is therefore subjected to special forms of underwriting. It deals with a very specific type of population that requires particular forms of ‘future’ protection.

Lloyd’s of London was the first to offer K&R policies, but today they are just one among many who offer this specialty insurance. A standard K&R policy has five main components, four of which encompass reimbursement of money lost as the result of a kidnapping. These four components are reimbursement of any ransom paid; reimbursement for expenses related to securing the release of a kidnap victim or resolution of extortion threat; reimbursement of expenses relating to securing the release of a detained or hijacked victim; and reimbursement of money lost when being delivered as ransom.

The fifth, non-reimbursement component of a K&R policy provides access to security consultants for preventative measures as well as access to individuals

Although the ransom component of the insurance tends to draw the most attention, it must be pointed out that the insurance also provides for the immediate deployment of skilled negotiators who can become the backbone of the organisation’s field response. These can represent the INGO with governmental or institutional counterparts. If there are no governments involved and the organisation is forced to become the primary agent to win a staff member’s freedom, these representatives can take the lead.

Such experts become essential advisors to INGOs that do not have their own specialist staff, but they also support the family of the victim if the family should decide to pay ransom. While many INGOs have a policy of non-payment, the same rarely if ever applies to family or other external entities. Without professional crisis management services, victimised families often make tactical errors in their responses to demands. When the first ransom demand is made, the counteroffer of the family is very important to guarantee the safety of the victim. If the counteroffer is too low the kidnappers might, in rare instances, threaten to inflict bodily harm to show the family that they are serious. On the other hand, if the family pays the amount demanded without making a counteroffer, it is possible that when the ransom is paid the criminals will either demand much more instead of releasing the victim or release the victim but consider the entire family as future targets, knowing there is more money to be made (Menezes, 2012).

3.23.2 The emergence of kidnap and ransom insurance

As kidnapping for political or criminal gain has become more prevalent, multinational companies and NGOs increasingly purchase K&R policies (Wong, 2004). According to Mark Hall of Air Security International, a supplier of protection services, ‘there is probably anywhere between 8,000 and 10,000 kidnap and ransom situations globally on an annual basis’ (Hall; in Easen, 2004). Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, more than 430 foreigners have
been abducted in that country (Slevin, 2006) and at least 40 have subsequently been killed (Poole, 2006).

The wave of high profile kidnappings in Iraq has led to significant media coverage and attention. An online advertisement brochure from one established insurer reads ‘most kidnap are carried out in order to obtain a ransom, and in most cases a ransom is paid. Rescues are rare, largely because the authorities in most countries recognize that the safety of the victim is paramount’ (Chubb, 2013). Aimed at senior executives at Fortune 500 companies the brochure continues by highlighting the added value of the insurer’s product, direct access to a world-leading security management consultancy, stating:

The average percentage of deaths following a kidnap is 9% [7% are rescued, 15% are released without payment, 2% escape, and in 67% of cases a ransom is paid]. In cases involving Control Risks [a London-based market leader in crisis response], less than 2% of people are killed (Chubb, 2013).

Many companies are managing the risk of kidnapping by purchasing insurance. The London-based Foreign Policy Centre estimated in 2001 that ‘economic kidnapping is one of the fastest growing criminal industries’ and ‘that kidnappers globally take home well over $500 million each year—and rising’ (Briggs, 2001, p. 1). According to Chubb Insurance (2013), ‘sales of K&R insurance policies have jumped sharply since Sept. 11, 2001. Applications for K&R insurance are up 20 per cent from two years ago [2002] due to an increase in terrorism awareness. […] Corporate policies range between $1,500 and $5,000 a year for $1 million of coverage’. Coverage of up to $5 million can be arranged under certain circumstances.

3.23.3 Pros and cons of kidnap and ransom insurance

The issue of K&R insurance is argued quite strongly from both pro and con stances. In their simplest distillations the positions are the pro-ransom stance, which advocates use of all means available to limit immediate threats of violence and death, versus the anti-ransom stance, which advocates use of all means available to limit acts of hostage taking over a longer term.
The most relevant literature to examine these stances comes from the field of piracy, specifically the recent trends in piracy off the coast of Somalia. Maritime industry practitioners assert that paying ransom is the only tool available once a ship has been hijacked. Paying ransoms, they claim, minimizes risks of escalated violence, revenue liability, and environmental disaster. Those individuals and states opposed to paying ransoms believe that each ransom payment fuels and perpetuates the menace of piracy and that the eventual outcome of this escalation would likely be military intervention.

Despite the staff trauma, logistical difficulties, and resulting expenses, the UK High Court has noted the positive aspect of ransom payment, in that it is not aware of a case in the past with Somali hijackings where the ship and crew and cargo have not been released. To date, Somali pirates have not made a practice of torturing or killing crews of hijacked vessels. This would seem to be a logically necessary component of the kidnap and ransom model. Because Somali pirates are in the business for money alone, it is in their interest to make sure hostages survive.

From a moral perspective, the researcher has been told by INGO staff involved in managing hostage situations that it is easier for organisations to pay ransom in cases with pure monetary motivation, but more complex when it is a political case. Distinguishing between the two can, at times, be difficult. The abductors may use a social cause as justification though their main objective is simply a criminal act for profit; additionally, in some cases the abductors have dual objectives: they want to highlight a social injustice, but the abduction is also a means to gain financial benefits. This was likely the case with the abductions that led to the War Measures Act in Canada in 1970. Then Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s televised statement explaining the War Measures Act perfectly illustrated this problematic dynamic:

[I]t has been demonstrated now to us by a few misguided persons just how fragile a democratic society can be if democracy is not prepared to defend itself, and just how vulnerable to blackmail are tolerant, compassionate people. […] The governments of Canada and Quebec have been told by groups of self-styled revolutionaries
that they intend to murder in cold blood two innocent men unless their demands are met. The kidnappers claim they act as they do in order to draw attention to instances of social injustice. But I ask them whose attention are they seeking to attract. The Government of Canada? The Government of Quebec? [...] What are the kidnappers demanding in return for the lives of these men? Several things. For one, they want their grievances aired by force in public on the assumption no doubt that all right-thinking persons would be persuaded that the problems of the world can be solved by shouting slogans and insults. They want more. They want the police to offer up as a sacrificial lamb a person whom they assume assisted in the lawful arrest and proper conviction of certain of their criminal friends. They also want money. Ransom money (Montefiore, 2008, p. 158-159).

The opponents of K&R insurance argue that an entire criminal industry surrounds the extortion of multinational corporations through kidnap for ransom; a criminal industry that insurance companies are financing by paying ransoms to hostage takers. One respected journalist wrote in an article: ‘in an unintentional conspiracy, the terrorist, the victim, and the insurance companies have found a level at which they are all prepared to work. The kidnappers get their cash, the victims have insurance, and the insurance companies get their premiums’ (Auerbach, 1999, p. 435).

The reality is that as long as it is legal, each organisation will have to identify their needs based on their risk profile. If the organisation does not have a strong financial or donor base, and no trained hostage incident managers, they are more likely to need insurance as a mitigating measure. However, a large organisation that can afford to deploy trained hostage managers for months at a time may not have the same requirements.

3.23.4 Monetary and political gains: Kidnapping for ransom

The objective of a hostage taking for monetary ransom is simple: profit. Ransom demands can be overwhelming with more than 14 countries recording cases of
USD 25 million or more (Clements Worldwide). Kidnappers usually settle at between 10 and 20 per cent of the original demand, except in the case of the former Soviet Union, where the mafia is extremely reluctant to negotiate and uses excessive violence to achieve its aims (Petersen International Underwriters, 2012). According to Qaiser (2012, p. 1-5), during the period 1990-2002, of the ransom payments paid and known to Lloyd’s of London Syndicate in respect of foreign nationals kidnapped, 40 per cent were between $100,000 and $500,000, and 12 per cent between $2 million and $5 million.

However, when ransom becomes political rather than financially motivated it increases the complexity of the situation, especially if terrorism is involved. Extremists certainly understand how to gain interest in their agenda. This is achieved through different tactics and methods, but common denominators include the degree of violence used, the symbolic value of the target, and the level of sensationalism of the attack. Terrorists frequently target individuals because of the symbolic value they represent (Terrorism-Research.com, 2011). INGOs can often represent this symbolic or real value through nationality, perceived wealth, or religion. The fact is that hostage taking and kidnapping have been shown to be very successful means of extracting concessions from targets. One study found that hostage taking offered a 79 per cent chance that all members of the terrorist team would escape punishment or death and that in 40 per cent of cases terrorists obtained concessions from the target (Clarke, 2006, p. 55).

### 3.23.5 Ransom to fund terrorism

Hostage taking for monetary ransom as a means of financing terrorism has been identified by law enforcement agencies worldwide as a significant source of revenue for violent extremist groups. Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is estimated to have collected at least USD 65 million in ransom payments since 2005. It has been reported that the average ransom payment for the release of a hostage taken by AQIM between 2008 and 2009 was USD 6.5 million (The Financial Action Task Force, 2011, p. 26).

Dan O’Shea, the former coordinator of the Hostage Working Group at the US Embassy in Iraq, stated:
A decade removed from the Al Qaeda initiated hostage-beheading terrorism campaign in Iraq in 2004, has evolved into the kidnapping for ransom model fuelling the jihadist resurgence the world is seeing on display in Africa today...Western nations have secretly paid millions in kidnapping ransoms to AQIM and affiliates to release some of the 50 expatriates. These ransom payments estimates range from $40 to $65 million. (Lowe, 2013b, p. 5).

For an organisation to function effectively, it needs manpower and money. And to obtain manpower and money, the public must be made aware of the organisation; media attention is required. This concept is referred to as 'the Magic Triangle’, and was first noticed in response to the activities of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, sometimes referred to by its French acronym, PLFP. It argues that a successful terrorist group, as with any business, organisation, or government, relies on dynamic interaction between three essential elements: manpower, money, and communications media. In each case of abduction, the media exposure leads directly to either more money or more recruits, usually both (Bolz, Dudonis, Schulz, and Riemann, 2001, p. 34). Evidence of this can be found in the Philippines, where over the years, the different rebel and terrorist groups used historical grievances of the Muslim communities in Mindanao to garner support from the Moro population. Heinz claimed that ‘Abu Sayyaf’ s membership skyrocketed from a few hundred to over a thousand after its first major kidnapping payoff as the prospect of moneymaking enticed new recruits’ (Heinz, 2012, p. 11).

According to the magic triangle model, the usual distinction between terrorist and criminal organisations is really a continuum, with purely financial motives at one extreme and purely ideological or political objective at the other. Most terrorist groups have had to move toward the middle of the continuum, embracing both criminal activities and attendant violence to sustain their ultimate objectives (Treverton, Matthies, Cunningham, Gouka, and Ridgeway, 2008, p. 24).
A Taliban spokesperson stated that ransom payments were used to fund operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan and to train and recruit operatives for attacks overseas:

“[I]t was a God-sent opportunity”, said Mullah Hezbollah, 30. “It has helped us to multiply our stockpile of weapons and explosives to wage battle for at least a year or so. We were really concerned when we received orders to launch Operation Nusrat, because we had hardly any funds to buy weapons to carry out such a major offence. Thanks to the ransom payments, however, the operation proceeded with “full vigour” (Ansari, 2007).

Further, even if ransom is not received in high amounts, acts such as hostage taking help to attain coercive objectives, and the organisational objective encompasses the enlargement and strengthening of a group. Generally, groups take action against soft targets to ensure their success and to build confidence among the group’s membership, thereby helping them bond. Forcing members to participate in violent actions also lowers defections from the group and reinforces their cohesiveness (Likar, 2011, p. 57). Even a failed attempt to take hostages or to negotiate a concession will receive a good deal of news coverage. By contrast, a massive bombing is over in seconds and receives coverage only in its aftermath. Hostage taking may yield concessions that augment the terrorists’ prestige, cause, recruitment, and resources. Other kinds of terrorist events seldom result in a concession Hostages can also provide the hostage takers with prestige and turn them into political actors. In addition, more than three-quarters of political hostage situations globally end in some level of success for the hostage takers (75.7 per cent, or 1,350 of 1,784 of all hostage missions ended in the terrorists securing one or more hostages) (Enders and Sandler, 2006). Therefore, as long as we place a high premium on human life, hostage takers will continue to take hostages (Jenkins, 1975, p. 1).

To counter this, the African Union (AU) in 2009 leaned on existing international instruments proscribing the financing of terrorist in adopting an unequivocal Decision to Combat the Payment of Ransom to Terrorist Groups. The Decision strongly condemned ‘the payment of ransom to terrorist groups for hostages to
be freed” and asked the international community ‘to consider the payment of ransom to terrorist groups a crime’ (Heinz, 2012, p. 12).

3.23.6 Legality of ransom payments

Since the events of 11 September, politicians and policymakers have become increasingly aware of the important role insurance plays in reducing vulnerability and promoting preparedness and prevention in the current war on terror. Policymakers have come to appreciate the role that insurance plays in securing vital economic interests, while at the same time the insurance industry has begun to recognise its reliance upon government security policies.

There have been repeated attempts throughout history to prohibit the payment of ransom. Colombia probably took this the furthest by enacting the Anti-Abduction Act of 1993, which criminalised the negotiation or payment of ransom. The Act went so far as to declare:

“Any person who, “knowing that money is going to be destined to pay a ransom for the release of an abducted individual, participates in the transaction thereof”, is considered to have aided and abetted the kidnapper, and faces up to five years in prison’ (Meadow, 2008, 760).

The Act also criminalised the procurement of K & R insurance:

“[W]hoever participates in an insurance contract the purpose of which is to guarantee payment of a ransom in possible abduction cases, or who participates in the negotiation or intermediation of the ransom demanded thereof” faces up to two years in prison (Meadow, 2008, p. 760).

Although the Colombian legislation declared ‘insurance contracts intended to cover the risk of payment of ransom to be null and void’, the legislative treatment was unsuccessful because portions of the Colombian legislation prohibiting ransom payments were declared unconstitutional.
United States President Obama issued Executive Order 13536 on 13 April 2010. The Order appears to make criminally punishable any act of providing financial aid directly or indirectly to any person or entity classified as a ‘Specially Designated National’ (SDN) by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), or to any person or entity that is determined by the Treasury and State Departments to have engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia. It is important to stress that it covers Somalia alone. The Order does not mention the word ‘ransom’ in the text, and some read it as having very little effect on ransom payments to pirates other than to the two listed in the SDN group enumerated in the annex of the Order.

The storm of controversy surrounding United States Executive Order 13536 is interesting because it is not the first such prohibition internationally, though it may be the first such proclamation issued by any nation.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1844 (2008) is one of the most important of the resolutions regarding financial support, including ransoms, provided to individuals or entities that would seek to disrupt stability in Somalia. It reemphasises UNSCR 733 and also introduces additional restrictive measures. Acknowledging the effects of piracy on the region, UNSCR 1844 expresses concern at all acts intended to prevent or block a peaceful political process. It also notes the role piracy may play in financing embargo violations by armed groups. Based on these issues, the Resolution forbids payment of funds, financial assets, or economic resources to certain individuals or entities. UNSCR 1844 therefore is a very early indicator that the UN’s position is anti-ransom.

Resolution 1844 was followed a few months later by UN Security Council Resolution 1846. UNSCR 1846 acknowledged and expressed concern over escalating ransom payments fuelling the growth of Somali piracy. This concern was again reiterated in Resolution 1897.

On 26 April 2010, the European Union Council passed Regulation 356/2010, which essentially implements the principles of UNSCR 1844; it is also similar to US Executive Order 13536. The regulation imposes specific restrictive measures
directed against certain natural or legal persons, entities, or bodies in view of

On 18 February 2010, the English High Court held in Masefield AG v. Amlin
Corporate Member Ltd. that the payment of ransoms to Somali pirates is not
contrary to public policy. Such a clear assertion that ransoms are permissible is
unique when compared to other international laws, but an examination of how
this fits with other UK positions shows that the policy may be just as restrictive
in some situations. The British Foreign Office states:

Although there is no UK law against third parties paying ransoms,
we counsel against them doing so because we believe that making
concessions only encourages future kidnap s. This is why the
government does not make or facilitate substantive concessions to
hostage takers (House of Commons, 2013).

Even the US, perhaps with the exception of payments in Somalia, concedes that
the prohibition of ransom is valid only for government entities. While the US
government ‘strongly urges American companies and private citizens not to
accede to hostage-taker demands,’ it does not prohibit payment of ransoms by
private entities. The US State Department warns:

U.S. private organisations […] must understand that if they wish
to follow a hostage resolution path different from that of U.S.
government policy, they do so without U.S. government approval.
In the event a hostage-taking incident is resolved through
concessions, U.S. policy remains steadfastly to pursue
investigation leading to the apprehension and prosecution of
hostage takers who victimize U.S. citizens (US Department of
State, 2013).

The statement above reflects the State Department’s recognition that no law
currently requires private organisations to comply with US ‘no concessions’
policy. Hence, unless paying ransom violates the law in the country of
abduction, those payments do not violate US federal law.
While many support prohibiting ransom, there are also numerous arguments against doing so. A prohibition on the payment of ransoms could be seen as an obstacle to hiring staff for high-risk zones. If staff are not assured they will be reasonably looked after in the event of a hostage case, they may be deterred from deploying to a high risk environment.

Some think that prohibiting ransoms will not deter piracy. Despite a potential prohibition, INGO management may simply decide that paying a ransom for staff release and incurring any prosecutorial liability is a better option than allowing employees to be harmed. Similarly, perhaps because the Philippine government is aware of the limited effectiveness of these defensive strategies, it remains permissive of ransom payments to release hostages. According to a report in Xinhuanel (2010), as a policy, the Philippine government neither negotiates nor pays ransom to kidnappers, but it gives ship owners a free hand in negotiating for the release of abducted Filipino sailors (Meadow, 2008, p. 742-776).

### 3.24 Conclusion

This review has shown that while individuals and groups have engaged in hostage taking for a very long time, the motivations and methods of operation have changed over time. In fact, there are so many different modi operandi around the world that it is difficult to find a general pattern. Planning and execution, kidnappings vary from the extremely detailed and professional to that of crimes of opportunity. It is also clear that whatever the initial reason for taking the hostages, the motivation of the captors may change over time.

This chapter has also shown why NGOs may be targets for terrorist operations, and how NGOs can be misused by terror organisations. The chapter further examined the various models of negotiation that have influenced hostage negotiation as well as the general components of a negotiation strategy. Literature relevant to the psychological effects of captivity, both on the hostage and on the stakeholders, was reviewed, including the Stockholm syndrome. Lastly, the chapter examined literature related to the use of kidnap and ransom insurance and discussed what such coverage provides.
The aim of this review was to examine published and non-published materials on existing conceptual frameworks, theories, techniques, processes, styles and instruments of other researchers related to the topic under research. This allowed the researcher to identify the noteworthy literature and which had made important theoretical contributions to the field being studied. It also allowed the researcher to identify gaps in the literature, the most significant being the lack of ample literature on long-term hostage management. The research methodology is the topic of the next chapter, which will describe the methodology, plan and data collection technique employed. It will thus provide what Payne and Payne (2004, p. 150-151) described as a ‘grander scheme of ideas orientating researchers’ work’.
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and explain the research methods utilised in the study. These research methods consist of the approach, methodology, plan, and data collection technique employed. The research methodology will aim to bring together into a coherent whole the procedures to be followed in the research project.

The collection of information in this study is qualitative and makes use of semi-structured interviews. The procedural foundation of the study, as well as the motives for deciding upon the chosen methodology, will be discussed in the present chapter. The chapter also reflects on the justifications for the use of the selected techniques and their strengths and limitations; it discusses ways of ensuring data quality and the authenticity of the research findings, as well as examining ethical issues. Lastly, it briefly discusses the modes of data interpretation and analysis.

4.2 Research Design

Qualitative readings find meaning in human conduct through understanding experience and can therefore not be entirely founded upon, or sufficiently analysed using factual data. Explanations derived from data analysis are, in the case of this research, worth only a fraction of the interpretation and re-interpretation of significant human experiences (Kvale, 1992; McLeod, 1997). In other words, a qualitative study attempts to understand human behaviour through association; it does not begin from a completely new source or some indisputable ‘findings’, but proceeds from the standpoint of everyday perceptions of humans and happenings (Kvale, 1992; 1996, p. 17-18). The conduct of people is therefore inextricably connected to their awareness and actions (Romanysyn, 1971). Whereas quantitative research focuses primarily on methods and tools for gathering information in theoretical assessment, a qualitative investigation is important to this study because it is more dependent
on the skill, language and character of the interviewers and interviewees (Berg, 1995; Welman and Kruger, 2001). This is reflected in the researcher’s perceptions regarding the nature of reality and what there is to know about it (ontology), the researcher’s perceptions of where he stands in relation to reality (epistemology); and the researcher’s perception of how he can explore reality (methodology).

An interpretive paradigm was suitable for this research for a number of reasons. An interpretative paradigm supports the belief that reality is constructed by subjective perception and that predictions cannot be made. Such a paradigm is therefore suitable for small scale research, as is the case here, especially given that the researcher’s main interest was in the social construction of meaning. In hostage management, people’s actions are very much based on their interpretations, in which the relevant objects and actions in the situation are taken into account and defined. Further, in a crisis situation such as a hostage case, people make decisions and act in accordance with their subjective understandings of the situations in which they find themselves. This represents a core of the interpretative paradigm (Littlejohn and Foss, 2008, p. 159).

Ontology is the science or theory of being. It concerns the question of how the world is built; i.e. ‘is there a “real” world “out there” that is independent of our knowledge of it?’ (Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p. 18). Two basic distinctions can be made here: firstly, there is the view that a real world that is independent from our knowledge and that life is built upon its foundations, hence the expression foundationalism. The alternative view is, naturally, an anti-foundationalist view which entails the belief that no real world exists but that the world is, rather, socially constructed and human perspective is dependent on a particular time or culture (Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p. 18). The researcher identifies himself as a relativist, or interpretist, and therefore as an anti-foundationalist. The researcher believes that he does not exist independently of his interpretation of the data, and he therefore finds it impossible to remain fully objective. The researcher approached the present research with some prior insight about the topic, but felt it to be insufficient for the development of a fixed research design due to the complex, multiple and unpredictable nature of what is perceived as reality. The
goal of research into hostage management is to understand and interpret human behaviour rather than to generalise and predict causes and effects. Hence, it is important to understand motives, meanings, reasons and other subjective experiences which are bound by time and context (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988, p. 508-521).

Epistemology ‘is a theory of how human beings come to have knowledge of the world around them’, or ‘a philosophical grounding for establishing what kinds of knowledge are possible—what can be known—and criteria for deciding how knowledge can be judged as being both adequate and legitimate’ (Blaikie, 2007, p. 13-18). Epistemology, then, is the theory of knowledge, and the researcher’s epistemological position reflects his ‘view of what we can know about the world and how we can know it’ (Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p. 18). As is clear from the brief discussion of ontology above, the researcher is anti-foundationalist, and the epistemology reflects this. The present research topic focuses on the specific and concrete, and the researcher is seeking to understand the specific context of the problem. Knowledge and understanding in research can only be obtained by having the same frame of reference as the participants; consequently, any such knowledge sought in a research project is subject to the participants’ reality (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 1-37).

The methodology for this research was derived from the above understandings of ontology and epistemology. Qualitative research explores questions such as what, why, and how, rather than how many or how much; it is primarily concerned with meaning rather than measuring, with exploring to understand why individuals and groups think and behave as they do (Keegan, 2009, p. 12). This was key in the researcher’s choice of methodology. The field of hostage management is so loaded with biases, emotions, and external pressure that quantitative data would not have sufficed to achieve the desired depth of understanding of the views of the sample group. Because an individual’s history, background, culture and tradition cannot be fully comprehended by means of explanation and mathematical data analysis alone (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000; Henning et al., 2004), it was important to use a qualitative method that could incorporate the researcher’s long experience of working alongside INGOs in
highly complex security settings; it was also essential to have the ability to interpret some of these organisations’ cultures of security, especially with regard to issues of autonomy within the security structures. This was of particular importance when interpreting answers to questions regarding issues of cooperation with other agencies and host governments.

As the researcher himself is a hostage incident manager and has actively participated in several cases, his insight into the topic allowed some level of interpretation that, in his opinion, would best be aligned with qualitative methods. Further, the researcher is trained in the same methodology of negotiation as are several of the participants, allowing interpretation of nuances that could best be achieved using the selected methodology. This is crucial as human behaviour is of prime importance in the interpretation of experience, taking into account an individual’s social tradition as well as position in, and connection to, the larger world (Henning et al., 2004; Kvale, 1973; Romanyszyn, 1971). The researcher benefitted from inside knowledge as to how many INGOs think of hostage management, especially on the topic of payment of ransom. This understanding was valuable to the present research, as there are some sub-fields of hostage incident management that are challenging to research using official data and survey methods in a quantitative way, such as kidnap and ransom insurance (for which admitting to having a policy may render the insurance null and void) and duty of care in actual cases. The use of qualitative techniques instead offered the opportunity to make a distinct contribution to the literature by elucidating the contexts (Noaks and Wincup, 2004, p. 12).

Elliot, Fischer, and Rennie (1999, p. 215-229) promote researchers’ rights of hypothetical standpoints and individual expectation. On initiating this study, the researcher expected to find significant contrasts between the perceptions and views of INGO security chiefs and workforce and those of specialists. In offering thorough analysis and interpretation of the data collected, the researcher has attempted to explain the lived experience of the interviewees. By means of careful interpretation of respondents’ reports, the investigator has also made an effort to demonstrate the significance of their experiences. Hence, the choice of a qualitative approach was the appropriate one for the present study.
4.3 Study Population and Sampling Selection Procedure

4.3.1 Type of sampling

Mouton (2001, p. 110) asserts that one of the main reasons for sampling is to obtain a sample that represents the possible target population. The researcher believed the most suitable type of sampling for this research to be non-random sampling (also known as nonprobability sampling) and, specifically, purposive sampling. Through this method, Yin (2010, p. 37-41) states that the researcher gathers information from ‘those that will yield the most relevant and plentiful data for the research’. The researcher’s main aim in choosing a purposive sampling strategy was to gather information from enough people to ensure the sufficiency of the data and, more importantly, to begin to interpret, explore and understand the research topic. The researcher agrees with Holloway’s (1997, p. 142) suggestion that ‘generalisability is less important than the collection of rich data and an understanding of the ideas of the people chosen for the sample’.

Since the researcher discussed sensitive topics in the gathering of the information for this research, it was not possible to select participants using systematic sampling procedures. Information about hostage cases is typically kept within a very small segment within each organisation, and very seldom shared outside the organisation. The likelihood of getting a relevant sample group using another method, such as systematic sampling, was therefore assessed by the researcher as very low. Furthermore, the researcher aimed to identify subjects that demonstrated the most typical characteristics or attributes of the population under study (Vos, 2002, p. 201-202), and those that are informative (Neuman, 2003, p. 213). In other words, the goal or purpose for selecting the specific samples was to yield the most relevant and plentiful data for the research (Yin, 2010, p. 88). The researcher therefore, in accordance with Kumar (2010, p. 179), approached only those people who, in the researcher’s opinion, were likely to have the required information and likely to be willing to share it. The researcher was therefore looking for attributes such as role in the organisation, years of experience, whether the INGO hold any prominence in the
community, and their willingness to discuss the sometimes sensitive topic of the study.

4.3.2 Study population

The World Bank defines a non-governmental organisation as a private organisation that pursues activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development. An international non-governmental organisation has the same mission as a non-governmental organisation, but it is international in scope and has outposts around the world to deal with specific issues in many countries (World Bank and NGOs, 2007).

According to the reports of Union of International Associations, there are 26,789 active INGOs in operation (Union of International Associations, 2013). This number is staggering and is clearly beyond the realm of this study. To establish a realistic target population, the researcher used Skjelsbaek’s (1971, p. 420-442) parameters stating that ‘the conventional requirements are that an INGO must have members and financial support from at least three different countries and the intention to cover operations in as many’. In this study, furthermore, the researcher included only INGOs with operations in ten or more countries. This permitted the research to focus specifically on those INGOs with global systems in place to address hostage management should it become necessary.

The number of INGOs present varies greatly with different operations. Using the ‘Who does What Where’ (3W) database of the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) to sample some of today’s most prominent humanitarian and development operations (UN OCHA, 2012), the researcher found between 40 and 160 INGOs present in various countries.

The researcher found that many of the INGOs identified were small as regards staff numbers and were narrowly focused on a specific objective of the total operation. An example is provided by INGOs offering assistance and aid in Afghanistan, such as Afghan Aid, Care of Afghan Families, Danish Assistance to Afghan Rehabilitation, and the like. Even though these organisations are registered as international, they have a very narrow scope. The total number of
large international NGOs falling within the definition and parameters set for this research is likely in the range of 25-50.

4.3.3 Sample size

Through purposive sampling, the researcher selected 16 INGOs, covering the entire spectrum within the parameters set for the research in terms of size, location, and mandate as discussed above. From each of these 16 INGOs, the researcher identified staff in strategic positions who were willing to discuss hostage crisis prevention, preparedness, and response. These then became, according to Weiss (1995, p. 17), a ‘panel’ rather than a ‘sample’ as they were uniquely able to be informative due to their expertise in the area.

The researcher believes that the sample group identified was large enough to ensure the discovery of most or all potentially important perceptions around the issue being researched; at the same time, the group was not so large that data became repetitive or superfluous. Because the participants were selected through judgemental sampling, and were experts in the chosen topic, the number of participants needed was smaller than the number that would have been required had the researcher used random sampling (Jette, Grover, and Keck, 2003, p. 224-236). The researcher did not find expanding the sample group to be either required or desirable, as the collection of additional data would be unlikely to shed further light on the issue being researched (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 67).

The participants held key roles in their organisations. Fourteen were among the top three in their organisation’s security structure, while two were their organisations’ top executive. The INGOs they worked for had operations in a wide range of countries and activities. The smallest participating INGO operated in ten countries, the minimum requirement for this study, and the largest in more than a hundred countries. Activities spanned across the range, including poverty reduction, development, human rights advocacy, medical and health, refugees and IDPs, education, disaster assistance, food and water, and livelihood activities.
In addition, the researcher identified ten leading industry experts, including insurance providers, hostage negotiators, former hostages, a psychologist, trainers, and NGO security experts able to provide information and data beyond what INGO staff in general could reasonably be expected to know with regard to hostage management. Not all of the experts had knowledge relevant to each of the questions in the interview; they only provided advice in the fields of their expertise. Those experts were based in seven countries: Malaysia, Norway, Somalia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yemen.

### 4.4 Data Collection

The researcher identifies with the interpretivist research paradigm. His fundamental assumptions are that reality is constructed by those participating in the study and that knowledge comes from human experience. His approach to obtaining knowledge is therefore to become part of the situation by understanding the views of participants (Hathaway, 1995 p. 554).

As described by Maykut and Morehouse (1994, p. 123), ‘the qualitative researcher’s perspective is perhaps a paradoxical one: it is to be acutely tuned-in to the experiences and meaning systems of others—to indwell—and at the same time to be aware of how one’s own biases and preconceptions may be influencing what one is trying to understand’.

The researcher, while sharing the characteristic, role, or experience under study with the participants, takes note of Rose’s (1985, p. 77) warning that ‘there is no neutrality. There is only greater or lesser awareness of one’s biases’.

#### 4.4.1 Data collection instruments

One of the primary data collection tools in qualitative interpretivist research is the researcher him- or herself. Much of the data is generated through interviews and then interpreted, considered, reviewed, and concluded. That said, information-gathering tools are crucial in all studies as they determine a number of decisive factors: the way in which the required information is to be retrieved, the dependability and validity of the information to be gathered, and the very results of the research. As Wiersma (2000, p. 3) rightly emphasised, ‘the
procedure of information gathering needs suitable administration and management as the information will allow suitable conclusion to be arrived at regarding the investigative difficulties encountered’.

For the collection of data for the present study, interview schedules as well as secondary data collection were used. According to Saunders et al. (2007, p. 150), ‘documentary secondary data are often used in research projects that also use primary data collection methods’. These data were used to triangulate findings based on other data such as written documents and primary data. Triangulation involves the practice of viewing things from more than one perspective, and the principle behind this is that the researcher can get a better understanding of the topic that is being investigated if he/she views it from different positions (Denscombe, 2010, p. 348-349).

According to Mathison (1988, p. 14), ‘triangulation has provided an important methodological issue in naturalistic and qualitative approaches to evaluation [in order to] control bias and establishing valid propositions because traditional scientific techniques are incompatible with this alternate epistemology’.

This research specifically used data triangulation, or the use of contrasting sources of information. The researcher made every effort to corroborate the interview data with other sources of information to verify the validity of findings on the topic through information triangulation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 5). Specifically, documents and observations provided some back-up for the content of the interview, and assisted in determining the accuracy of the interview data. In addition, interview content was checked against other interviews to observe the level of consistency. Researcher collected secondary data from academic publications, journals, newspapers, government publications, policies, annual reports, videos, and company websites. A list of documents reviewed is found in Appendix 2.

The decision to utilise these two data collection tools was based on their ability to supplement one another; in other words, each tool provided access to distinct viewpoints, offering details and responses that could not have been gained from the other.
4.4.2 Interviews

One means of information collection practiced in this study was the discussion tool. In the context of research methods, an interview or discussion is described as ‘a chat between the person who conducts the interview and the participants with the intention of drawing out particular data from the participants’ (Moser and Kalton, 1971, p. 271). It is a relationship in which the person conducting the interview asks participants questions intended to elicit responses relevant to the study (Kvale, 1996; Naoum, 2006). The interview pertains to the participants’ experiences, outlooks and visions concerning the organisation or circumstances being researched. As such, it comprises ‘perfect speech circumstances featured by a procedure not restricted by dominance where the gathering concerned in building of implication exchange dialogue without compulsion’ (Stringer, 1999, p. 36).

An adaptable tool of the semi-structured discussion was utilised for the interviews performed as part of the present research. Compliance with the partially planned discussion manual, or the interview schedule, allows researchers the freedom to devise additional questions based on the information obtained from the replies of the participants in the interview. Among other advantages, qualitative discussions provide researchers with the opportunity to acquire information from the participants’ outlooks, beliefs, interests, anxieties, gestures, and tones of voice (Babbie and Mouton, 2006; Bogdan and Biklen, 1998; Bryman, 2001; Gay and Airasian, 2003; Krathwohl, 1998; Kvale, 1996; Naoum, 2006; Rubin and Rubin, 1995). Partially planned discussions also give researchers the opportunity to control the extent of probing and the pace of the interview; furthermore, as active participants in the interview process, researchers are able to ascertain that the interviewees are suitable for the purposes of the study.

Nevertheless, the interview process does contain problems and drawbacks; for instance, the way in which questions are asked may impact the participants’ responses. Babbie and Mouton (2006, p. 289) stated that ‘very frequently, the manner in which the questions are put forward slightly influences the replies one receives’. In other words, ‘the researcher’s suppositions and standards influence
the inquest and turn out to be a part of the discussion [...] there cannot be an unbiased investigation [...] the researcher happens to be a respondent in the discussion and one who enquires into that same proceedings’ (Stringer, 1999, p. 15).

Additional problems may hamper the interview process itself. Discussions taking place at the local and international levels and involving, for instance, measures to be taken in hostage negotiations may be too sensitive to be shared with the researcher. In this study, the researcher found it necessary to assist some of the participants to achieve an appropriate balance between focusing on the questions posed and expressing their views on related matters.

Each interview in this study was scheduled for one hour to allow time for any unanticipated situations, whether technical or related to the discussion, which could arise during a partially planned interview. All interviews were conducted remotely through Skype™. Skype™ is a Voice over IP (VoIP) service that allows free video and voice calls to anyone else who has the program, as well as inexpensive calls to mobile phones and landlines worldwide. In 2011 Skype™ boasted over 600 million users; it is a suitable tool for reaching participants in a cost-effective way (BBC). For the research, Skype™ in essence acted as a telephone, and was used for practical reasons. It was not feasible for the researcher to make special trips to each of the many countries in which participants lived in order to conduct face-to-face interviews within a reasonable period of time for a short-term investigation; Skype™ offered flexibility of location for each interview and was suitable due to the cross-sectional technique selected for this research. While a longitudinal study gathers data over an extended period of time (it may extend over years), a short-term investigation may only take weeks or months. Unlike a cohort study, in which successive measures are taken at different points in time from the same respondents, a ‘cross-sectional’ study is one in which different respondents are interviewed at different points in time over a shorter period (Cohen et al., 2007, p. 211).

With the consent of the participants, the discussions were recorded digitally using the Replay Telerecorder for Skype™ software; they were subsequently transcribed by the researcher for suitable information coding, classification and
examination. The transcriptions were made without the subjects’ names to ensure confidentiality (Bryman, 2001; Patton, 1990; Schurick, 1998; Taylor and Bogdan, 1998).

The researcher gained valuable information from both participants’ verbal replies and other communicative elements, together with the researcher’s own interpretations of the subtle cues present in participants’ voices and tones of voice at the time of the discussions. From these inferences, the researcher subsequently rebuilt the conversations and the details of certain events, assumptions, notions, views and challenges that arose during the discussions (Babbie and Mouton, 2006; Bryman, 2001; Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Patton, 2002).

4.4.3 Interview question development

The semi-structured interview used in this study contained questions in six sections and targeted ten experts as well as staff from 16 INGOs who were in strategic positions to discuss hostage situation prevention, preparedness, and management. Hence, the interviewer was able to communicate with people who possess in-depth knowledge in a specific field, up-to-date information in that field, and the ability to link their experiences with the themes of the interview. De Vos, Strydom, Fouche, and Delport (2005, p. 296) explained that semi-structured interviews are especially suitable as an information collection method where an issue is controversial or personal, as was the case with this research.

Below follows a description of these sections:

- **Section 1: General characteristics** – This section aimed to explore general views on trends in hostage taking, such as increases or decreases in numbers of cases, level of brutality, casualty rates, and any possible shift between political and economic hostage taking.

- **Section 2: External assistance** – This section considered kidnap and ransom insurance. As discussed in Chapter 3, payment of ransom is only one element of K&R insurance policies; another element is that of expert assistance in case of an incident. The researcher hoped to gain insight
into both the extent of use of K&R insurance and into perceptions surrounding its use.

- **Section 3: Preparedness and policy** – In this section the researcher aimed at exploring the extent of the participants’ organisational policies on hostage management and discovering whether participants were prepared to manage cases from both a procedural and a resource point of view. Another important element was determining participants’ stands on punishing the hostage takers, which is argued by opponents of ransom payment to be the only effective solution.

- **Section 4: Managing the crisis** – This is the section with the most questions in the interview, and it aimed to explore how INGOs manage a case, and their views on some specific topics relevant to case management.

- **Section 5: Individual staff preparedness** – In this section the researcher aimed to obtain insight into INGO staff levels of individual preparedness in the event of hostage threats. This is relevant both in their training and in the sense of how much they are told about the risks in their operating environments.

- **Section 6: Miscellaneous** – This last segment of the interviews was a very important one. The researcher aimed to explore whether a minimum standard could be defined when it came to the duty of care for staff in managing a hostage crisis. This section further gave participants a chance to address any topic not covered in the interview.

The full interview schedule has been included in Appendix 1.

**4.5 Validity of research instruments**

To ensure reliability in qualitative research, assurance of trustworthiness of the data is crucial. Seale (1999, p. 465-478) states that, while establishing quality studies through reliability and validity in qualitative research, the ‘trustworthiness of a research report lies at the heart of issues conventionally
discussed as validity and reliability’. When testing qualitative work, Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 250) suggest that the ‘usual canons of “good science” [...] require redefinition in order to fit the realities of qualitative research.’ Reliability can be assessed by posing the following three questions (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2009, p. 29):

1. Will the measures yield the same findings on other occasions? The researcher believe this is the case. The researcher has continued as a practitioner for the duration of this study, and have made observations indicating that the study is repeatable with similar findings.

2. Will similar observations be reached by other observers? Research that have been conducted in parallel with this study have brought forward similar findings. In particular, this is the case with The Aid Worker Security Report, released late October 2013, which support many of the findings through independent research.

3. Is there transparency in how sense was made from the raw data? The researcher used the common methodology of themes, and the themes were derived from the interviews using the Dedoose software.

4.6  **Pilot study and interview modifications**

At the end of the exploratory phase of the present research, a pilot study was conducted. According to Everitt (2003, p. 163), a pilot study refers to ‘...investigation designed to test the feasibility of methods and procedures for later use on a large scale or to search for possible effects and associations that may be worth following up in a subsequent larger study’. Saunders et al. (2007, p. 29) recommended conducting a pilot study for an interview before subjecting it to the target population. The main purpose for conducting a pilot study is to ensure that respondents will face no obstacles or problems with respect to the interview process. The feedback obtained from the pilot study is used to modify and improve the interview schedule before beginning with actual data collection. According to Saunders et al. (2007, p. 29), a pilot study enables the researcher to ensure the validity of the interview schedule.
The pilot study for the present study interview schedule was conducted on 02 and 03 May 2012. Fink (2003, p. 46) argues that a minimum of ten respondents are to be interviewed for the pilot study of the interview schedule, but the researcher found a pool of six respondents, 4 INGO and 2 experts, to be sufficient due to the relatively small total sample size. The respondents, after completing an interview as scheduled, were in addition questioned with respect to the following issues:

- **Question clarity** (Fink, 2003, p.46). The questions were clear in general, but question 4: “What are your thought around pros and cons of utilizing a commercial entity in managing a hostage crisis for NGOs” could be misunderstood to mean taking over and control the process, so subsequent questions were stated as “assist in managing”.

- **Question relevance** (Fink, 2003, p.46). All questions were deemed relevant for INGOs, but some experts found INGO questions difficult to answer. This was anticipated, and not changed for later interviews.

- **Overall layout of entire schedule** (Bell, 2005, p. 148). Participants expressed that the interviewed followed an easy and logical path, so no changes were made on this point.

- **Time taken for completing the schedule** (Bell, 2005, p. 149). This issue required the greatest modifications. The researcher had scheduled 30 minutes per interview, but the norm was over 50 minutes. This required rescheduling of a few interviews, and a warning to future participants that the time required would be longer than first anticipated.

Hence, the researcher made some minor modifications and improved the scheduling of the interviews in accordance with the feedback obtained at the end of the pilot study.

### 4.7 Data analysis

Qualitative research methods are extremely varied, multi-faceted and nuanced (Holloway and Todres, 2003, p. 347-350), and thematic examination can be
considered as an initial means for qualitative research. Such thematic analysis is a relatively common approach, and can be applied to most topics. It is particularly effective when small samples are used and themes are rigorously explored, as was the case with this study. As Dawson (2005, p. 120) explained, thematic analysis is highly inductive as themes ‘emerge from the data and are not imposed upon it by the researcher’. In using this approach, the researcher looked to combine data collection and analysis. The researcher specifically followed Aronson’s (1994) pragmatic definition of thematic analysis by following these five processes:

1. Collecting data from interviews.

2. Transcribing the conversations.

3. Identifying themes from patterns within the transcriptions. The researcher identified these themes by ‘bringing together each of the research participants’ components’

4. ‘Piecing [themes] together to form a comprehensive picture of the collective experience’. Thereafter, themes were bound together and reduced so as to reflect any findings in brief summaries such as statements or paragraphs.

5. Building a valid argument for developing the themes through reading relevant literature and formulating thematic statements that link to any excavated findings.

Holloway and Todres (2003, p. 347) recognised ‘thematising meanings’ as a specific and basic skill required for carrying out all qualitative studies. Boyatzis (1998, p. 86) defines thematic examination for this purpose not as a precise means but as an instrument to utilise for various methodologies. Likewise, Ryan and Bernard (2000, p. 769-802) consider thematic symbols to be part of a procedure carried out in ‘main’ research conduct, like grounded theory, rather than a precise method in itself.

One of the advantages of thematic examination is its adaptability. Qualitative research means can be classified into two groups. In the first group, one can find those themes attached to, or branching from, a certain hypothetical situation.
These include, for instance, dialogue examination (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2008, p. 58) and interpretative phenomenological examination (Smith and Osborn, 2003, p. 113). There is relative consistency in the practice of this methodology, and in general one formula directs examination. For other methods, such as grounded hypothesis (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), dialogue examination (Burman and Parker [eds.], 1993; Willig, 2003), and account examination (Murray, 2003, p. 111-131), there are several expressions of the methodology from within the main hypothetical structure. Secondly, there are methodologies that are fundamentally free of presumption and can be used across a wide range of hypothetical and epistemological methods (the latter referring to studies of the nature of knowledge, its presuppositions and foundations, and its extent and validity). Although it is frequently termed a pragmatist and experimental methodology (Aronson, 1994; Roulston, 2001), thematic investigation is in fact placed squarely in the second group, and is well-matched with both the essentialist and constructionist theories in crisis management research to be taken on subsequently. A thematic study, when adopted, is an adaptable and helpful research instrument that offers a strong and thorough yet multi-faceted explanation of information.

Thematic systems regulate the drawing out of: (a) lowest-order principles obvious in the manuscript (Basic Themes); (b) groups of fundamental ideas clustered jointly to sum up more conceptual values (Organising Themes); and (c) super-ordinate ideas summarising the main descriptions in the manuscript as an entity (Global Themes).

The researcher carried out a narrative analysis using the qualitative analytical tool Dedoose. After each interview had been separately analysed, the data was cross-analysed to base theoretical developments and conclusions. This cross-analysis again used Dedoose to condense meanings through word clustering (Khan and VanWynsberghe, 2008) and allowed the creation of the themes. The researcher used Dedoose as it offers a powerful range of tools specifically designed for qualitative data analysis. As with most computer-assisted qualitative analysis software (CAQDAS) packages, the approach is code-based. The fact that no software needed to be installed and that the program was fully
web-based was an advantage for the researcher due to his extensive travel schedule.

Once the themes had been identified, the thematic systems were symbolised as web-like plans showing the outstanding topics at each of the three stages and demonstrating the correlation amongst them (see figure 4.1).

![Figure 4.1: Themes - adapted from Attride-Stirling, 2001](image)

The use of thematic grouping is a process used extensively in qualitative research and similarities are effortlessly established, for instance, in grounded assumption (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 111). The process of thematic systems does not attempt to identify the origin of opinions or the conclusion of rationalisations; it merely offers a way for breaking up text, thus reducing ambiguity and striving to find meaning in the text. The three classifications of themes can be explained as shown below (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 385-405):
• **Basic Theme:** This is the main or lowest-order thesis that is obtained from the written information. It is like assistance, like a declaration of conviction secured about an essential concept and adds to the meaning of a super-ordinate thesis. In order for a Basic Theme to make common sense further than its direct connotation it requires to be interpreted in the background of certain other Basic Themes. Jointly, they stand for an Organising Theme (Attride-Stirling, 2001).

• **Organising Theme:** This is a middle-order premise that systematises the Basic Themes into groups of comparable matters. Organising Themes are groups of meaning that sum up the main suppositions of a cluster of Basic Themes, so they are extra conceptual and additionally informative of what is happening in the manuscript. Nevertheless, their function is in addition to improve the denotation and importance of a wider topic that connects numerous Organising Themes. Like Toulmin’s guarantees, they are the values on which a super-ordinate claim is founded. Therefore, Organising Themes concurrently combine the key notions projected by numerous Basic Themes and scrutinise the chief suppositions inspiring a wider premise that is particularly noteworthy in the texts in its entirety. In this manner, a cluster of Organising Themes comprises a Global Theme (Attride-Stirling, 2001).

• **Global Theme:** Global Themes are super-ordinate premises that include the chief images in the information in its entirety. A Global Theme is similar to an assertion that is a closing ideology. As such, Global Themes are clusters of Organising Themes that jointly offer a disagreement, an arrangement or a declaration concerning a certain matter or truth. They are large-scale themes that sum up and make sense of groups of lower-order themes distanced from and sustained by the information. Therefore, Global Themes inform us as to the general meaning of the texts in the context of a particular study. They are, together, a summing up of the chief themes and an informative presentation of the texts. Significantly, a cluster of texts might well give more than one Global Theme, based on the intricacy of the information and the investigative objectives; nevertheless, they are lesser numerically than the Organising and Basic Themes. Every Global Theme is the centre of a thematic system;
consequently, an investigation might end in several thematic systems (Attride-Stirling, 2001).

4.8 Ethical considerations

Blumberg et al. (2005, in Saunders et al., 2007) define ethics as the moral principles, norms or standards of behaviour that guide moral choices about our behaviour and our relationships with others. Research ethics, then, refer to questions of formulating and clarifying research topics, designing research and gaining access, collecting, processing, storing and analysing data, and writing up research findings in a moral and responsible way.

Thus, in any study it is necessary to follow ethical guidelines to ensure compliance with the researcher’s responsibilities to fellow researchers, respondents, the public and the academic community. Although the present research is concerned with extending the sum total of knowledge in society, respondents were reminded that they were free to withdraw from the study at any time, and assurance was provided to respondents with regard to data confidentiality. Furthermore, respondents were given the full right to decline to answer a question or a set of questions. In addition, assurance was provided that identification information would not be included in the printed dissertation or typed manuscript.

A central feature of social science research ethics is the principle that participants should be fully informed about a research project before they agree to take part (Oliver, 2010, p.28). This principle is known as informed consent, and such was obtained and recorded for each of the participants, INGO staff and experts, through a signed consent note returned via email or fax. The participants observed in the study were provided with the information related to the research purpose and the objectives of the research. The practice of providing information related to the research to the participants in prior also served the purpose of enabling the researcher to improve the validity of the research instrument.

The researcher took the following ethical precautions:
• The researcher sought, and was granted, clearance for the study by the ethics committee at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University.

• All participants were briefed and returned a signed consent form as a condition for participating.

• Before commencing the interview, participants were reminded that the interview would be recorded, that the responses would be kept confidential to the degree possible, and that they did not have to talk about anything they did not want to, and that they may end the interview at any time. This was of particular importance to the expert participants that were former hostages. Lastly, the participants were again asked whether they were willing to participate.

• Personal information such as name, phone number, address and email was requested from each respondent, but the researcher ensured that the study was conducted in such a manner that respondents could be confident with respect to their anonymity and privacy.

4.9 Dissemination

Fuller and Petch (1995, p. 88) provide four reasons for dissemination that the researcher supports: to inform others, to ensure that research is used, to meet obligations to participants, and to clarify recommendations and interpretations. The researcher also fundamentally agrees with D’Cruz and Jones (2004, p. 169) in that dissemination is ‘not something we should hope to achieve simply by writing up our findings’. In fact, the researcher believes that dissemination may begin before a dissertation has been completed: as the researcher continues to actively work within the humanitarian environment, and specifically as a trainer within security, he has informally discussed aspects of the research within the context of workshops, seminars, and presentations throughout the research.

Upon accepted completion of the research, the findings will be distributed to relevant NGO security bodies, as well as to the hostage management community, with the hope that the research findings can directly influence work practice in
the field and contribute towards keeping humanitarian and aid workers safer through increased knowledge and understanding.

The researcher will continue to work within the field of study itself, and therefore use the findings in a practical manner in his day-to-day work, hoping that the work can continue to have an impact many years after the study has ended. The researcher has also identified further gaps in knowledge that may be explored in the future.

4.10 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the research methodology of the study, explained the sample selection, described the procedure used in designing the research instrument and collecting the data, and provided an explanation of the method of data extraction. In addition, this chapter has outlined the ethical aspects considered in the study; the manner in which data was validated during the analysis and presentation of the findings; and, briefly, the method of data analysis and presentation.

The chosen research strategy was appropriate for accomplishing the original goals of the study but proved to be extremely challenging. Laying the methodological and conceptual groundwork for a holistic understanding of the complex social process of managing a hostage crisis is, clearly, not a trivial task. While the study did succeed in answering the research questions posed at the outset, the researcher believes that an equally important contribution of the study is the foundation provided for subsequent research on INGO crisis management procedures in general and on hostage management in particular.
Chapter 5: Presentation of findings

5.1 Introduction

The study was aimed at understanding how international non-governmental organisations prepare for and deals with hostage incidents, as recent years have seen a significant increase in number of hostage incidents and is becoming a matter of utmost concern for many INGOs. ‘What makes up international non-governmental organisations’ preparedness and response mechanisms to hostage situations?’ was the overarching question that guided this study. The researcher hoped to gain a better understanding of these elements in order for the research to aid in the development of successful strategies for INGOs to improve their management of hostage situations. To achieve this, the researcher adopted a qualitative approach to the research and the data was collected through the use of semi-structured interviews, later transcribed, and subsequently themes were identified from patterns. Where relevant, the researcher has included verbatim responses to support the discussion of the findings.

The coding process was designed from a thematic examination of patterns within the transcriptions of the interviews. The researcher carried out a narrative analysis using the qualitative analytical tool Dedoose, cross-analysing the data after each interview to search for theoretical developments and conclusions. This cross-analysis again used Dedoose to condense meanings through word clustering, thereby allowing the identification of the themes. As Dawson (2005, p. 120) explained, this type of analysis is highly inductive as themes ‘emerge from the data and are not imposed upon it by the researcher’. Thereafter, themes were bound together and reduced so as to reflect any findings in brief summaries such as statements or paragraphs. Hence, thematic systems regulated the drawing out of: (a) lowest-order principles obvious in the manuscript (basic themes); (b) groups of fundamental ideas clustered jointly to sum up more conceptual values (organising themes); and (c) superordinate ideas summarising the main descriptions in the manuscript as an entity (global themes). The researcher has presented these themes into tables, diagrams, and graphs for ease
of reference, acknowledging that the sample group is smaller than desired to fully reflect quantitative data. The findings presented are the result of the researcher’s interpretation of the analysis, so while the researcher has used tools such analytical software, the interpretations are still fully owned by the researcher.

The aim of the coding was to organise the data for analysis and thus to determine participants’ views of hostage management, their specific response mechanisms to such crises, and whether INGOs have sufficient policies, resources and knowledge in place to address a hostage crisis. Finally, the researcher introduced the thematic analysis that categorised participants’ responses based on their unique experiences into conceptual schemes based on the research questions. Hence, this chapter analyses the data collected in the study and discusses how the data speaks to the four key organising interview questions discussed in the methodology chapter.

Qualitative analysis is guided not by hypotheses but by questions, issues, and a search for patterns. The researcher has, when possible, made comparisons between the findings outlined in the literature review and the findings from the present research study. In doing so, the researcher used both the participants’ general responses and verbatim quotes with the aim to explain the findings in order to confirm them and assist in placing them in context. Similarities and differences are identified between basic, organising, and global themes, and that of the existing literature.

A significant overlap in the themes and opinions emerged among the INGO participants and the expert participants. Where differences emerged, they were mostly a matter of the emphasis and salience of certain themes. For this reason, the themes are presented together and are compared and explained where necessary.

5.2 Participant profiles

In this section, the researcher provides background information on the demographics and professional characteristics of the research participants
described. The demographics present the viewpoint of the general characteristics of the respondents and, with regard to the experts, their professional perspectives.

In total, 26 interviews were conducted. Through purposive sampling, the researcher selected 16 INGOs, covering the entire spectrum within the parameters set for the research in terms of size, location, and mandate as discussed above. From each of these 16 INGOs, the researcher identified staff in strategic positions who were willing to discuss hostage crisis prevention, preparedness, and response (Table 5.1 below).

Table 5.1: Distribution of the sample of experts by role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Frequency (f)</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director of security</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Manager</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Security</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Security Advisor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Focal Point</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total              | 16            | 100            |

The number of staff employed globally by the 16 INGOs totals approximately 105,000 staff, and they operate in a number of fields and mandates (table 5.2). Several INGOs list more than one core activity, so the frequency surpasses the number of INGOs surveyed.
Table. 5.2: Distribution of the sample by primary activities of the INGO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Frequency (f)</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty reduction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee &amp; IDP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster assistance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food &amp; Water</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sixteen INGOs also varied in size and structure. The smallest participant organisation operated in 10 countries, while the largest in more than 100 countries (Table 5.3)

Table 5.3: Operational countries of the INGO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries of operation</th>
<th>Frequency (f)</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91-100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-50</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition, the researcher identified ten leading insurance providers, trainers, and NGO security experts able to provide information and data beyond what INGO staff in general could reasonably be expected to know with regard to hostage management. Not all of the experts had knowledge relevant to each of the questions in the interview; they only provided advice in the fields of their expertise. Those experts were based in seven countries: Malaysia, Norway, Somalia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yemen. The expert participant profiles are listed below in table 5.4. Some participants have multiple areas of expertise, so the tally supersedes the 10 experts in the study.

Table 5.4: Distribution of the sample of experts by areas of expertise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Frequency (f)</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case management</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family liaison</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-release assistance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security policy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security training</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage survival</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 29 100

The four key questions discussed in the methodology chapter, with their basic, organising, and global themes, will now be individually discussed with reference to the relevant literature and quotes from the participants in order to support the findings. Participants’ words are presented in italics.

### 5.3 Trends in hostage taking

It was important for this research to confirm whether the participants’ responses regarding trends were aligned with those discussed in the literature. This was necessary in order to interpret the data on preparedness and policy with greater
The researcher found it likely that if an agency had consciously registered an increase in number of abductions, the likelihood would be higher than that organisation would have policies and preparedness measures in place. Likewise, the trend, if any, of political and financially motivated abductions could influence the management approach to a hostage situation.

As stated in Chapter three of the literature review (Introduction to the Hostage Phenomenon), there may be as many as 15,000 to 25,000 kidnappings and hostage takings annually. Because there is no global watchdog group, and because many kidnappings go unreported, it is difficult to estimate the exact global rates. Ann Hagedorn Auerbach, in her examination of international kidnappings that occurred over a two-year period from 1997 to 1999, stated that statistics concerning kidnappings are problematical. She found that many incidents were not reported and that the incidents that were reported may not have been accurately reported for political reasons. Auerbach believes that only 30 per cent of kidnappings on a worldwide basis are reported and that ‘in some countries, the reporting rate is as low as 10 per cent.’ (Auerbach, 1999, p. 435).

What is clear is that there has been an increase in incidents, especially in the developing world (Epps, 2005, p. 128). It also is clear that many countries are considered risk countries when it comes to abductions. In a check of the U.S. Department of State’s Travel Warning website on 29 December 2012, 55 countries were listed with warnings against kidnapping, abductions or hostage taking.

The increase in the number abductions appears clear also in the reports of the INGO world. In 1999, 20 aid workers were abducted, while in 2009 the number was 94 (Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico, 2009, p. 9). The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012 concluded that ‘After declining in 2010, total incidents of violence against aid workers rose again, particularly kidnappings.

The researcher’s own database of aid workers taken hostage supports the above. The researcher has compiled, merged, verified, and analysed data from a range of open sources as well as a few restricted organisational sources, showing a clear upwards trend, increasing from 709 days in 2000, to 6010 days in 2012.
5.3.1 Incidences of hostage taking

With regards to the first interview question in the study, related to trends in abduction, most participants responded that there was an increasing trend. They reported that 150-200 kidnap incidents take place each year and that the incidence of abductions of NGO workers increases by 10-20% every year. Nineteen of the 26 participants responded on this topic, and the vast majority, 17 participants, or 89 per cent of respondents to the question, felt there was a numerical increase of INGO abductions globally. Only two, both INGO participants, felt there was a reduction or an unchanged trend. There were some strong views expressed on this increasing trend:

One INGO participant stated: “The trends are increasing dramatically. The trends are certainly increasing and getting to a point where the rate of kidnapping is becoming quite alarming.”

Another concurred: “I think we all agree that the trend is rising and we are still the lowest hanging fruit”.

A third INGO participant was more analytical, and explained that “there certainly is an increase but I am not too sure, if you have to put it into perspective and look at the increase in the number of staff that we have in the fields, whether that ratio is equal”.

Participants expressed a firm belief that there is an increase in number of abductions, and that ‘the problem is increasing’ in scope. The researcher interpret this to mean that the participants are conscious of an increasing problem, and that hostage cases are discussed, at least to a degree, between agencies.

The view of an increase is supported by statistics from both research into aid worker security, and the researcher’s own database of events. The fact that humanitarian workers were held in captivity for more than 6000 days in total in 2012 substantiate the scope of the problem, and again underscore how topical this research is and why further research should be conducted. The Aid Worker Security Report, released late October 2013, supports this finding and states that ‘The number of kidnapping incidents has quadrupled since 2002, with an average increase of 44 per cent each year. Kidnapping has become the most common type of major attack against aid workers, with kidnapping victims surpassing the number of victims of shootings, serious bodily assault, and all types of explosives. Kidnappings comprised nearly a quarter of all major attacks
on aid operations in 2012, and an even greater percentage of aid worker victims (36%) (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, 2013, p. 5). Also the United Nations has experienced an increase. In the September 2013 report of the Secretary-General on Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel, the systematic increase in abductions is described: ‘The marked increase in abductions of United Nations personnel since 2010 is a serious concern. In 2012, 31 United Nations personnel were abducted, compared to 21 in 2011, 12 in 2010 and 22 in 2009’ (United Nations, 2013, p. 4).

Stoddard et al. (2006, 2009) demonstrated an increasing trend in humanitarian workers’ abduction rates and Rowley et al. (2008, p. 39-45) that NGO workers who operate in war areas are subjected to increased intentional violence. Taillon (2002, p. 58) also showed that hostage taking is a continuous issue and that devastating attacks are on the rise. Data collected by the National Counterterrorism Center (2006), Perin (2005), and the Willis Group (2004) also show increases in kidnapping rates.

5.3.2 Motivations for hostage taking

Participants also shared observations on trends related to motivations for hostage taking. Of the 13 participants that offered observations on trends related to political and financially motivated abductions, 11 (85%) believed that the trend was towards financially motivated abductions. Only two participants saw the trend as shifting towards politically motivated hostage taking.

![Figure 5.1: Participants’ views trends in abductions](image-url)
While the vast majority of the participants indicated a trend towards political hostage taking, it must be acknowledged that there is a ‘grey zone’ in defining motivations behind hostage taking for terrorism, as often the hostages are taken for ransom, but the money received is used for activities related to terrorism. While in these cases the ultimate motivation for the hostage taker may be political, the situation may be solved by paying ransom money.

One of the experts explains: “Over the recent years, there has been a shift away from killing for political expedience or political advantage and more to a kidnapping for ransom.” An INGO participant concurred: “Now it’s becoming more like a business. So our aid workers are being taken and sold for money.”

Another participant further explained the change in trends by stating: “you would start to see big increases probably around from 2003, right, during Iraq when kidnappings were sensational as were the abductions of Margaret Hassan\(^1\) and contract workers and other NGOs which were done obviously for very ideological and political reasons. I think the shift is certainly to criminality.”

The abductors in the Sahel, predominately Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), may in some cases use a social cause as justification for hostage taking, but their main objective is simple profit. It can be extremely difficult to differentiate between the two, and in some cases the abductors have dual objectives; they want to highlight a social injustice, but the abduction is also a means to gain financial benefits.

One participant explains: “They always put a front forward that it might be political but if you scratch the surface even a little bit, then you will see there is always a monetary motive behind it. So I would say, for us right now, it’s almost 99 per cent monetary driven.”

An expert agrees: “They are out there to get their own source of funding to feed their political agenda so there is lot of cross fraternization between the criminal groups and groups which have a more political agenda, militant groups, so one resort to the other, or there is merging of those groups.”

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\(^1\) Margaret Hassan, who worked for CARE International, was taken hostage while on her way to work in Baghdad on 19 October 2004. On 16 November 2004, CARE International issued a statement indicating that the organization was aware of a videotape showing Hassan’s murder. On the same date, Mrs Hassan’s family stated that it believed her to be dead after being sent a video apparently showing her murder. Al-Jazeera reported that it had received a tape showing Hassan’s murder but was unable to confirm its authenticity. The video showed Hassan being shot with a handgun by a masked man. Her remains have never been recovered.
The fact that participants clearly identified a trend towards financially motivated hostage taking can partially explain why INGOs increasingly use ransom payment as a tool in managing a hostage situation, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Hostage taking of INGOs, as well as the United Nations staff, was predominately politically motivated in the past, and an offer to pay ransom would not necessarily have strongly affected the outcome of the case. Where hostages in the past predominately were used to put direct pressure on a state or organisation, hostages today are increasingly used as a funding mechanism for other activities. In the post-September 11 2001 world, the major powers have combined to target and remove the financing pipelines that terrorists counted on for support. Further, countries that supported terrorism in the past have frozen that support due to outside pressure. It can thus be theorised that as scarcity increases, so will attacks for resources, as receiving ransom money directly can be a safer way of funding an operation than to rely on outside funding. The ransom money keeps the organisations active, fund training, planning, feeding, weapons, and accommodation.

It is the researcher’s opinion that the data supports this view, and this has a direct implication for how a case is managed. In politically motivated hostage cases, where demands can be exchange of political prisoners, troop withdrawal, or autonomy issues, the INGO does not have any authority or significant influence over a sovereign state, and therefore in reality does not have the resources to deliver such demands. However, if the abduction is purely of economic, the demands may be within the scope of the INGO to deliver.

The findings of this study differ at first glance from that of the Aid Worker Security Report for 2013, which states that ‘...it can be difficult to determine the motives. However, reports in the aid worker security database, AWSD, reveal that, of the incidents where motives are known or can be reasonably inferred, aid worker kidnappings skew towards motives that encompass political intentions, as opposed to purely economic incentives’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 8). The researcher believes this does not contradict the findings in this study. In this study, financially motivated means that payment of money as ransom can resolve the matter, whether this is for ultimately political use, such as arming
fighters, or for personal or criminal gain. For it to be described as ‘political’, the demands must be political in nature, such as prisoner release or independence issues.

The literature reviewed for this study acknowledges this trend. Billingslea (2004, p. 49), Curtis (2002), and Jurith, (2003, p. 158) all pointed out that as the funding from the Soviet Union dried up in the 1990s, terrorists were forced to look for other resources. Some opted for trafficking of narcotics (Bibes, 2001; Curtis, 2002; Jurith, 2003), while others turned to kidnapping and hostage taking (Memmott and Brook, 2006, p. 8; Poland, 2005, p. 18). Furthermore, while a number of terrorist groups consider hostage taking and kidnapping as part of their mission (Yun, 2007, p. 23-26), others are involved only for gaining financial support (Auerbach, 1999; Murphy, 2004). As stated by Maceda (2003), Murphy (2004), and Ramachandran (2005), terrorists have since at least 2005 gained substantial financial support through hostage taking/kidnapping. Abductions where money is the main motive are the primary reason behind the hostage taking in the Sahel (which covers parts of—moving from west to east—The Gambia, Senegal, southern Mauritania, central Mali, Burkina Faso, southern Algeria and Niger, northern Nigeria and Cameroon, central Chad, southern Sudan, northern South Sudan, and Eritrea).

It is also notable that what starts out as political hostage taking may become one of financial motivation should that be the direction in which the management wants to take it. This is, in essence, the method used in the crisis bargaining model introduced by Donohue, Kaufmann, Smith, and Ramesh (1991, p. 133-154). The model works on the basis that the initial stages of negotiation tend to focus on relational issues, such as power, role, trust and status between hostage managers and hostage takers. Once these issues become resolved, more attention or weight is placed on substantive issues in order to resolve the problem. In essence, crisis bargaining is about relationships, while normative bargaining is more focused on resolving material issues. For organisations with insurance against ransom payment, the crisis bargaining model described above seems a logical one to follow in order to ensure the release of staff.
Political hostage taking can be an effective tool for a group. Lapan and Sandler (1988) demonstrated this in their study, explaining that terrorists believe that if they capture a sufficiently valuable hostage, the government will renege on its no-concession pledge.

5.4 Policies for hostage incident management

Policy emerged as the first Global Theme, with four Organizing Themes beneath it; kidnap and ransom insurance, whether to pursue justice, post-release assistance, and management of family of staff taken hostage.

The literature review was limited in revealing the extent of policy and preparedness among INGOs. The generic security manual produced by the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO, 2004) for humanitarian organisations mentions that ‘in 1996 a number of members of InterAction, the US NGO umbrella organisation, signed a Field Cooperation Protocol. The signatories agreed to instruct their representatives engaged in disaster response to consult with other NGO representatives similarly engaged to try to reach consensus in dealing with a wide range of issues including security arrangements, and in particular […] hostage policy’ (ECHO, 2004, p. 51).

Hence, a number of interview questions were developed to explore this topic.

5.4.1 The importance of policy

To manage hostage crises appropriately, adequate plans and procedures should be established. Usually, situations of hostage taking are unexpected; INGOs therefore need to be prepared for such situations at any time. Having clear policies helps INGOs face such circumstances in a systematic way which again may increase the chances of securing a safe release of the hostage. Participants contended that preparedness is the primary step for planning followed by policies developed for guiding people in times of crisis. Policies must be applicable during the time of crisis and should be flexible enough to be implemented according to the abduction scenario. Such plans and policies accelerate decision making and provide a clear approach and method.
The potential consequences of not having policies and procedures in place are perhaps best exemplified by the mismanagement of the hostage crisis at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games (Calahan, 1995, p. 3-4; The True Story: Olympic Massacre, 2007; One Day in September, 1999; Strentz, 2012, p. 3).

Chapter Two established that while we can talk about the ‘INGO community’, that community does represent a group of individual or loosely connected INGOs, with the vast majority holding their own security policies and practices. Despite this, the participants showed uniformity when it came to the importance of having policies in place for managing a hostage crisis. All 26 participants stated that having clear plans and policies in place was important to successfully resolve a hostage case, and only one INGO participant felt that his or her organisation did not have adequate policies or plans in place at the time of the interview. Thirteen INGO participants confirmed that they were confident in their overall organisational preparedness.

This is in line with the NGO security manuals examined for this study; they all placed emphasis on policy and procedures. Mercy Corps, in its Field Security Manual, states that ‘Kidnapping is a very serious security infraction. Agencies should have an institutional policy regarding negotiation or payments to kidnappers and be prepared for specialized assistance in managing this type of crime.’

The expert category of participants also supported the necessity of clear policy and procedures. According to one expert participant: “Absolutely vital. It doesn't matter the size of the operation, where they are located, it is a must do. Contingency planning and of course the more complex the higher risk areas locations where they are trying to operate their programs, more important it becomes.”

Another expert also saw policies and plans as essential: “I think that it's too numerous to mention, you know huge advantage, so first of all, I would mention the policy, it sets the tone for the culture of the company; that everyone understands that there is a risk awareness culture, you know, everyone understands that there has to be a balance between safety and risk awareness and also doing the job they need to be doing, delivering in the way that they need to deliver. But if there is a kidnap incident, then everybody knows exactly what the plan is, they have been drilled in; how to react, how to set up the structure for dealing with the crisis management team and incident management team.”

The policy and procedures are not only important for the management, but also for the hostages. A participant that was a former hostage explained how his
knowledge about how his organisation’s work towards the safe release of hostages allowed him to keep his spirits and morale up during his captivity:

“I do remember when [person] said something like, ‘most kidnappings last two months’, and then I also remember you saying that no matter what happens, [organisation] won’t give up on you. So I knew that there is probably something out there, you know, some team working on my behalf, and although I don’t have information about the externals about, you know, what was done on my behalf, I could feel that there was something going on for me.”

One INGO participant admitted there were some gaps in the policy: “We do have a policy for abduction and the crisis management plan; who is doing what, what to do and not to do for hostage crisis in general, but the policy may be something we would have to work more on.”

The 2013 Aid Worker Security Report states that ‘every agency working in unstable environments can reasonably expect to experience a kidnapping at some point, and it is part of their due diligence to grapple with what this will mean in practice. Are they truly prepared to accept this as a high-likelihood risk? Do they have policies and procedures in place for dealing with it when it occurs?’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 10). The participants in this study unanimously supported having clear policies and plans in place regarding hostage taking, and the researcher believes this is a field that has greatly improved over the past decade. Such plans and policies accelerate decision making, and provides a clear approach method, so they form an essential component of both preparation and response. Through the interviews it became clear that the participants had established such documents, and that they were actively rehearsed in some cases. Only one INGO participant felt they did not have adequate policies or plans in place at the time of the interview, but they were about to implement the policy soon thereafter. Based on the above, it appears that the INGO community has gradually adopted well-structured procedures for information distribution and synchronised security approaches. While the United Nations frequently performed a lead role in synchronising both service and protection during insecure scenarios in the past (Muggah, 2003, p.152), this has gradually changed and the role has been undertaken by the INGOs themselves, and having such clear policies helps the INGOs face such circumstances in a systematic way which again increases the chances of securing a safe release of the hostage.
Whether to negotiate

Whether or not to negotiate becomes a cornerstone in any organisational policy regarding hostage situations. All 16 INGO participants mentioned negotiation during the interviews. In some instances, the participants were direct and open about the fact that negotiations take place.

An INGO participant made this clear: “In the instance of Afghanistan, we negotiated the release without making any payment.”

Another supported negotiations as an option: “Besides that, I think we need to have a proper crisis management team; we need to have a negotiation team because negotiators, I feel, are the expert, and it is not everybody’s job to negotiate with the hostage takers or the kidnappers.”

Some participants indicated in-house capacity: “I believe we cover our own cost and as far as negotiation stuff, in fact I do the negotiations.”

A review of INGO security policies and manuals found that the policy of each INGO naturally varies; in general, though, most INGOs state that should staff members of an organisation or their immediate family members be taken hostage, the organisation shall likely make every effort to secure the speedy and safe release of the hostage(s). To achieve this goal, most INGOs, as well as states and corporations, will not enter into negotiations with hostage takers for ransom, but they may establish contact or start a dialogue with them if it is concluded that this would promote the speedy and safe release of the hostage(s). Such contact or dialogue should be aimed at convincing the hostage takers of the inhumanity, illegality and futility of their actions as means of attaining their objectives.

CARE’s Safety and Security Handbook (Macpherson and Pafford, 2004, p. 2) state that “CARE does not pay ransom or provide goods under duress, but will use all other appropriate means to secure the release of the hostage. It will intervene in every reasonable way with governmental, non-governmental and international organizations to secure the rapid and safe release of CARE staff. The kidnapped person should have one goal…survival. It is vital to obey the captor’s instructions and not attempt escape. CARE and the staff member’s government will undertake securing a staff member’s release. CARE also will provide all possible support to the hostage’s family members”. The handbook also goes on to provide a guide for crisis management during a hostage crisis (2004, p. 69).
World Vision states in their security manual that “In the event of a hostage taking/kidnapping situation, the national director will have the full assistance of the Corporate Security Officer and the Partnership Crisis Management Team to resolve the situation. World Vision will not pay ransom but will use all appropriate means to secure the release of the hostage” (Rogers and Sytsma, 2001, p. 126).

Mercy Corps, in their Field Security Manual, states that “[kidnapping] is a very serious security infraction. Agencies should have an institutional policy regarding negotiation or payments to kidnappers and be prepared for specialized assistance in managing this type of crime. While Mercy Corps will do everything ethically possible to secure the release of detained or kidnapped staff, Mercy Corps will not pay ransoms for the release of kidnapped staff” (Mercy Corps, 2006, p. 23).

Save the Children has an extensive security manual “Safety First”, and explains that “Save the Children will not pay any ransom to effect the release of a member of staff. However, Save the Children will use all appropriate means to secure their release” (Bickley, 2010, p. 169).

The interviews confirmed the presence of policies. On participant stated: “It is clearly written in our security policy, so we have a clear statement that says that we don’t pay ransom, that we focus on negotiation, that we have a crisis management team that kicks in and all that.”

Based on the above, there appears to be consistency among INGOs both in allowing for some level of dialogue or negotiation and in rejecting the idea of payment of ransom. The issue of whether to allow for payment of ransom, therefore, shows itself to be another cornerstone of an organisation’s policy. Ransom as a resource will be specifically discussed later in this chapter.

While only one participant admitted to not having adequate policies or procedures in place to effectively manage a hostage case, there were indications in the data from the interviews that the policies on managing hostage incidents in the INGO community do not go into sufficient detail. Examples of policies seen as lacking include the issue of how to manage national staff hostages as
well as the duration of assistance post-release. These topics are discussed in detail later in the chapter.

**Pursuing justice**

Pursuing justice emerged as an organising theme for this study. A topic in the hostage management community, and to a degree in international politics, is how to stop the current practice of paying ransom for hostages by making sure that hostage takers are apprehended and brought to justice. The theory is that by doing so, there would be a strong deterrence to commit further abductions; the risk would be higher.

The chart below (Fig. 5.2) shows that the vast majority (76%) of participants that responded to this question do not feel that pursuing justice after the release of a hostage is likely.

![Pursuing justice likely vs. not likely bar chart](chart.png)

**Figure 5.2: Participants’ views on pursuing justice**

The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979 provides that ‘the taking of hostages is an offence of grave concern to the international community, that any person committing an offence of taking hostages shall either be prosecuted or extradited, and that States shall make such offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences’. While it is clear, then, that international legal instruments exist to punish hostage taking, the reality differs.

An expert participant offered insight as to why this may be the case: “That is an area often forgotten. People are normally so relieved in most of these incidents that they somehow come to a successful resolution that people come out”.

Only five participants thought that pursuit of justice for the hostages after their release was likely to be initiated and actively pursued by the organisation, while
thirteen admitted it was not likely that they would pursue justice. When asked to explain why, seven of the thirteen (54%) listed security concerns for the remaining staff in the operation as the primary concern.

“That can be a bit tricky because our heavy reliance in terms of security mitigation measures is acceptable, we try to promote that. We try to get more accepted in the communities we work in because that’s our main protection layer. So if we stop doing that we might be aggravating more people and that would put our programs at the risk, so I don’t think we should do that.”

This viewpoint was echoed by another participant: “I do not think we should pursue that, that is of course related to whether we are to continue operate in the area or not. If we are, that can pose additional risk towards us and increase the threat level.”

While the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages stipulates that “any person committing an offence of taking hostages shall either be prosecuted or extradited, and that States shall make such offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences”, research has shown that nearly 80% of hostage takers escape punishment or death (Clarke 2006, p. 55).

Pursuing justice is a situation that offers special constraints for INGO, especially humanitarian agencies. The researcher imagine all former hostages and INGOs with victims would want those responsible punished. However, this research has shown why in reality it is much more complex and complicated. Many INGOs work in failed states or conflict zones, with often sub-standard law enforcement, without resources to conduct a long investigation. And even with good law enforcement, INGOs may have to continue operations in the same environment after the release of the hostage. While a corporation may be able to relocate if the security level increases, that is not necessarily the case for an INGO. A refugee agency cannot be away from the refugees, and a water and sanitation (WATSAN) agency cannot be away from the population it is there to assist. Most INGOs are in place to assist in life saving or to preserve basic human right issues, and will only suspend operations as an absolute last resort. However, if they actively pursue justice after the release of the hostage, they may in fact increase the risk towards the other staff working in the operation. It is at this stage more important to preserve the safety of the existing staff in the future than to follow up on a case that has ended with the safe release of a hostage. This combined with the sense of relief and celebration that usually
follows the freedom of a former hostage, the reality is that very few actively pursue justice of the hostage takers.

Despite this, many believe that punitive action is key in stopping the hostage taking. The views of Gary Noesner, former Chief of the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit, are expressed that governments should ‘support the safe release of the victim first, and then follow up with a robust and relentless effort to identify, locate, apprehend, and prosecute the kidnappers. This follow up is absent in most countries where kidnappings abound. Only when faced with a higher prospect of punishment will the scourge of kidnapping be reduced or eliminated’ (Lowe, 2013, p. 4).

An expert participant supported this view: “These things often spiral upwards in a number of incidents. Demands are being made, whether it’s financial or political or status. And they will escalate and numbers of cases escalate till there is something that will break the spiralling upwards and the best method of doing that is to arrest and bring justice to the hostage takers. Of course, reality is that in most cases it doesn’t happen.”

An example of a state that have implemented measures to reduce kidnapping is Edo state in Nigeria, which has made kidnapping a capital offence to act as deterrence. Edo state had in the last few months before changing the law recorded kidnapping of prominent Nigerians, such as the wife and daughter of a Supreme Court judge, a prominent lawyer, teachers, medical doctors, and even politicians. Governor Adams Oshiomhole stated on 18 October 2013 that

“I have just signed into law a bill amending the Kidnapping Provision Law 2009 as amended by the state House of Assembly which now prescribes death penalty for anyone who is involved in any form of kidnapping. Having signed into law the death penalty, let me assure the good people of Edo State that as reluctant as one wants to be in matters of life and death. I am convinced that the overriding public interest dictates that we invoke the maximum penalty available in our law on those involved in the act of kidnapping. Anyone sentenced and convicted, I would sign the death warrant.” (Ibileke, 2013)

In addition, Gary Noesner, former Chief of the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit, stated:
In my judgment, governments should not attempt to thwart ransom payment undertaken by professionals; rather they should support the safe release of the victim first, and then follow up with a robust and relentless effort to identify, locate, apprehend, and prosecute the kidnappers. This follow up is absent in most countries where kidnappings abound. Only when faced with a higher prospect of punishment will the scourge of kidnapping be reduced or eliminated (Lowe, 2013, p. 4).

**INGO policy coverage for abducted family members**

Another organising theme under the global theme of Policy is the degree an INGO should assist family member that have been abducted. When the INGO participants asked whether their policy on hostage taking included insurance coverage and assistance for family members of abducted employees, eleven INGO participants (69%) stated that their organisations had a relevant policy in place while one stated that this topic was not included in current policy. However, of the eleven that had a policy coverage for family members, ten covered only family of international staff deployed abroad.

One INGO participant explained: “I think there's a big difference here between national staff and the expat staff for most NGOs, whether they will openly admit it or not.”

The majority of the participants indicated that the family of an international staff member, in a family duty station, would be covered as stated because the organisation had placed them in the location of the threat.

Another participant was quite clear on this topic: “If a dependent of an international staff member is kidnapped, you have full responsibility because you placed them in that situation, so from duty of care perspective, you are one hundred per cent responsible for that person.”

The participant continued: “For the local staff, I think it's a totally different ballgame because they are there before, they live in that environment.”

The majority of the participants likewise agreed that the decision as to whether or not to assist abducted national staff was not as obvious. The general opinion was that it was then a matter for local law enforcement to manage, with one notable exception: if the staff was taken as a direct consequence of being employed by the INGO.
One INGO participant explained: “When it comes to national staff, it will be important to try to bring to the surface and assess whether this has something to do with the national staff’s employment with our organization and whether that is the motive or part of the motive of family or dependents being kidnapped and there, I would say that we would be obliged to offer our support to resolve that case...”

The language used during by participants in answering this question was rather hesitant, and this indicated that policies may not be as strong as they could be in identifying the exact parameters and inclusions of the assistance offered to abducted staff members and their dependents. While several participants indicated they had practices in place, typically assisting if it was the family of international staff that had followed to the duty station, this appeared to not be rooted in policy. Such incidents do take place with some regularity. As an example, on 5 November 2013, the spouse of the operational manager of a major INGO was kidnapped in Maputo, Mosambique (Lowe, 2013).

**Post-release assistance**

A key organising theme under the global theme of Policy is the degree an INGO should provide assistance after a former hostage has been released. The period immediately following the release of a hostage is important. Discussion of the topic of the post-release period may aid in determining whether INGOs have a policy in place for assisting hostages post release, and for how long such assistance last.

Thirteen (81%) of the 16 INGOs with staff represented in the present study were reported to have a policy in place for post-release assistance. It was clear that all participants understood and supported the need for post-release treatment and assistance, but the length of assistance varied significantly.

The psychologist among the expert participants spoke to the importance of assistance:

“These are sort of long-term; you can imagine longer term work on this. However, immediate assistance is actually helping them with this transition. The post hostage assistance that they need to get afterwards is also the assistance to transit from being in captivity to kind of life in freedom again. Reconnecting with their social network; their family members, their friends, their work environment and things like this. So helping them in kind of like return their lives back to normal, the longer the hostage situation lasted the harder it may get.”
Many former hostages have described the difficulties they face in returning to their former life. In the documentary ‘Beirut Hostages’ (2009), Brian Keenan related the fact that, for the first six months after his release, he would walk into a person’s home and sit down on the floor—because for more than five years, he had not sat in a chair. He went on to explain that he did not seek any new friends, but rather wanted isolation to contemplate his identity and his life.

One of participants in this study that is a former hostages also agreed with the need for post-release support: “I went through about five months of therapy in [location withheld] and it's not something that I first wanted to do but then I did it because I was advised that, you know, I should or I may want to seriously consider it and I started having some dreams that weren't very good, so I did it and I’m a full believer in it for people who have been through experiences such as mine. I am a full believer in such a therapy.”

The one participant from the INGO that did not have a post-release policy in place stated that “we do not really have procedures for that in place, we have some considerations. But no, it is not really well defined yet.”

Perhaps the largest identified gap in the policies by the participants regarded the duration of post-release treatment. When the participants were asked for how long the assistance in their organisations are in effect, the answers varied significantly from one to twenty years; participants also indicated that there may well be a policy gap among the INGOs on this topic.

One INGO participant described the challenge: “When to stop this all and when they should return to their work? Actually, honestly I do not have a clue.”

For comparison, most kidnap and ransom insurances provide two years of post-release assistance. The researcher believes this is an area that can be improved, for the better of both hostages and agencies. Hostages would benefit from knowing they and their families will be looked after sufficiently, and the agencies will have clear legal limitations in their support post-release.

Former hostages are under immense emotional stress and may require psychological and medical intervention after release. Fletcher (1996, p. 237-240) demonstrated that even after the point of release, where one would think that much of the stress the hostages are feeling is regenerated to feelings of optimism and anticipation, there is still a period of much enhanced stress for them. The normal immediate reaction to release is elation and optimism, but this may be accompanied by emotional stress, with periods of excitement and loquacity alternating with withdrawal, exhaustion, and bewilderment. New
anxiety-related symptoms are very common in those released from a brief ordeal. A 1980 study by Stöfsel found that 94% of 168 released hostages displayed new anxiety-related symptoms within the first four weeks, falling to two-thirds after four weeks.

Van der Ploeg and Kleijn followed up 138 hostages and their families for six to nine years, at which point 12% of hostages and 11% of family members were regarded as still requiring professional help. This reveals that for long-term hostages the demands of re-entry into society are heavy and prolonged. The 'settling down' stage is associated with a range of psychological, emotional and somatic problems, and suicide has been reported during this phase. Hence, assistance may be long-term.

5.5 Procedures in place for hostage incident management

While policy is important in determining how an organisation responds to an incident, procedures are essential in determining how teams or individuals respond. Hence, procedures emerged as a global theme in this study. The theme has four organising themes; how to manage first contact with hostage takers, the development of a hostage reception plan, the level of information sharing with the family of abducted staff, and INGO crisis management preparedness.

Even with policies and procedures in place, it is found that an actual hostage crisis event presents unanticipated challenges.

As expressed by one participant, “The thing is we found that no one is ever as prepared as they think they are. So even with all our preparations and everything, every time we have an incident, we always find a few holes in it.”

5.5.1 First contact

The first organising theme under the global theme of Procedures is how to manage the first contact with hostage takers. At the onset of a crisis, the situation may be unclear for the organisation and at times chaotic. If this first stage can be managed effectively, it may indicate that the organisation has proper procedures in place for the entire event. Decision making is a crucial aspect of crisis management, and one of the first chances in a hostage crisis to
make an operational decision with potential impact on the safety of the hostage is during the first contact with the hostage takers. Some INGO staff interviewed for this study indicated that their organisations had established procedures for staff in general to deal with the first contact; the procedures reflect an effort to obtain as much essential information as possible without jeopardising the safety of the hostage, as well as to establish a non-hostile response.

Most participants (88%) in the study considered the management of first contact with the hostage takers to be crucial, and a few contended that training should be provided to staff in the field. The first contact from hostage takers is normally made to the office from which the hostage works, so the contact would be at a local level. It should be clarified that contacts may not necessarily be through telephone; they may also take place through media or through intermediaries, to mention two methods of contact. A few participants considered first contact less important, with one respondent feeling that the second contact was more important than the first due to the expected chaotic engagement during first contact.

![Figure 5.3: Participants’ views on importance of first contact](image)

When asked how important it is for staff to manage the first contact from the hostage takers correctly, no one, among either the INGO participants or the experts, believed it to be unimportant. Fifteen INGO participants, 94%, answered that it was important to get the first contact right, and eight experts agreed.

One participant described the importance of first contact in this way: “It is crucial. The life of the colleague is in the hands of the hostage takers, so the way out of this crisis is by talking to them. You have only one chance to make your first impression. So the golden hour as they call it and rapport-building is of the essence; so therefore, we have made
quite elaborated guidelines because we do not know when the first call is going to come in.”

One expert participant put it simply: “As they always say, you never get a second chance to make a first impression.”

If managed properly, the first contact also contributes towards the long-term strategy for securing the safe release of the hostage. If little is known about the hostage takers, this contact becomes the first opportunity to gain any valuable information that can be built into the management strategy.

One INGO participant sees the first contact as a tactical opportunity: “Establishing first contact with the hostage takers is naturally very important because unless we know who are they and what are they wanting, what are their demands, we cannot negotiate with them.”

Despite the general consensus that the first contact is important, the INGO participants described varying levels of preparedness to face this first challenge.

One INGO participant considered his or her organisation to be prepared: “It’s critical, and we do have some protocols in place. When you get the call, we have an emergency action plan, there is a list of questions to ask, information to obtain, what to say and what not to say.” Another, however, admits that his or her organisation may not be as prepared as it should be: “Not everybody is prepared to deal with that first contact in the organisation.”

This procedure shows a gap between what participants know, that first contact is important, and what has been implemented. For an INGO operating in sometimes more than 100 countries, it is unreasonable to expect all staff to be trained in managing a cold-call, or unexpected call, from a hostage taker, but checklists can be made available for staff in key positions that are the most likely to receive such a call.

Studies related to criticality of managing the first call have not been conducted but there are indications that an able communicator should be appointed to handle the first call from the hostage taker and that effective communications and negotiations have been proved fruitful in rescue operations (Auerbach, 1999; Strentz, 2006).

5.5.2 Hostage reception plan

As important as it is to have proper plans and policies to confront the unexpected, there must also be proper plans laid out to receive the hostages when they are released. The hostage reception plan is a plan that is put in place to deal with the immediate aftermath of the release of a hostage, and became the
second organising theme under the global theme of Procedures. Such a plan typically includes potential release scenarios and locations, safe havens for the former hostage, communication issues such as calls to family and dependents, logistical issues such as repatriation or evacuation, media management, medical checks, and more immediate practical issues such as food, clothing and hygiene. This plan needs to be based on several factors, such as the likely mental and physical state of the former hostage, the security situation at the location of the release, the quality of medical facilities, the distance to family members, and the availability of transport.

All 26 participants agreed that a hostage reception plan is important, and 14 of the INGOs (88%) stated that they had such plans in place during a hostage crisis. The participants who were likely best positioned to judge the importance of such plans—the former hostages and the psychologist—are quoted below on this issue.

A participant that is a former hostage, stated: “It is important to plan because some of these things can go wrong, so it’s not just the basic food, clothes, medicines, medical check; it’s going to be also cash, passport, visa and psychological support.”

Another former hostage agreed and said: “I wanted to get out of that situation as quick as possible, so I was very happy that there was a plan in place for me to do that.”

This is in line with what a psychologist participant stated: “I’m talking here about the smoothness of the steps that somehow the former hostage feels things are well planned, organized and taken care of somehow and there are no kind of instances which would cause any additional anxiety to the person. So that is important.”

Another participant described the importance of the reception plan on several levels: “And interestingly enough, after the initial surge of activity, there is often not a lot to do; there is a lot of waiting. And good reception planning can keep our staff occupied in a positive way. In the planning, it is good for the mind to be focusing on when he, she or they come out. Fundamentally, do they work according to plan? No, they don’t. They never do. But, they are absolutely vital about how you respond.”

As experience in managing hostage crises increase in the INGO community, INGOs have increased their preparedness. The findings from this questions shows that this element of the preparedness is in place, and is considered important.

This view was echoed in the 2013 Aid worker security report: ‘While most risk-mitigation procedures have not changed significantly over the past decade, what
has changed is the management of the agency’s response to a kidnapping. Placing a priority on this indicates acknowledgement of the growing threat, as well as the documented high costs, and critical impact it can have on a relatively well-prepared organisation, let alone an ill-prepared one.’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 10) Buth (2011) supported these assertions, when he contended that as a part of incident management there must be a hostage release plan which should include a gatekeeper to protect the former hostage from immediate exposure to media, arrangements for the victim to contact and meet his or her family, provisions for clean clothing, medical intervention, and arranging for appropriate meetings with the government agencies and press.

Macpherson, Persaud, and Sheehan (2008, p. 22-24) confirms the participants’ positions. The focus of managing a hostage incident is finding the optimal solution for all involved. For this to be successful, planning and preparation is of importance. Unanimously, literature points to the advantage of having clear guidelines to follow during a crisis. The crisis management plan is designed to prepare and implement a timely, prudent and effective response to kidnapping, an extortion attempt or the threat of kidnapping or extortion directed against the organisation’s employees, families, and/or its guests, facilities, operations, assets or reputation. It is the foundation for the NGO’s response and serves as the institutional guideline when emotions and stress are greatest.

Specifically, Bolz, Dudonis, Schulz, and Riemann (2001, p. 34) states that post-incident planning is concerned with handling events in the aftermath of the hostage-taking; it deals with emergencies, physical and psychological injuries, and the need to get operations back to normal as quickly and safely as possible.

5.5.3 Informing the family

It can be complicated deciding the degree of information sharing with the family that is appropriate and tactically sound, so this emerged as the third organising theme under the global theme of Procedures.

All 26 participants agreed that the family needed to be informed, and for some participants this appeared to be important also from a negotiation and management perspective.
One participant explained: “I think unless the victim is kept informed intimately throughout, they can undermine the effort by negotiators by unhelpful comments in the press, I think I have seen this on occasions particularly in the UK, where next of kin was critical about what the government is doing. I think if the family is promptly briefed without delay as to what procedures are in place, that would be helpful.”

This was echoed: “It’s absolutely key that we get families on our side straightaway because they can be a lot of damage to the process if you don’t get them on board.”

A third participant concurred: “We think that, trust between us and family is very important, and if the family members are to move on their own interface, so in the case of media it is crucial and make sure that professional advice and guidance is available.”

However, when asked whether the family should be consulted on tactical and strategic decisions on managing the case, the participants were divided. This is illustrated in Figure 5.4:

![Figure 5.4: Participants’ views on the level of interaction with family of hostage](image)

Those in favour of both sharing information and consulting mostly argued that it would make the management of the case easier.

N04 explained: “The school says you cannot lose the confidence from the family. If you lose that once you will not gain it back so I think that it’s really important that you keep them updated at all times and that you have them as part of your CMT [crisis management team], you make daily talking points to the families.”

N02 further expanded on his or her NGO’s practice in such cases: “The family should know all the time what we know. We should build a relation with the family so that they feel sure that we are not hiding anything, that they are updated and also consulted in the sense that we are doing this and this and we usually do inform.”

The participants that favoured an approach of generally sharing information, but not consulting on tactical aspects (46%), interestingly argued from the
perspective of improving the management of the case. Most participants averse to consulting on tactical issues argued that the family would not be in a position to provide optimal decisions or advice.

One participant explains: “That is a sensitive question. Well they need to be kept informed. But they don’t have a need to know everything that’s going on and it depends on the family and who the family representatives are at some level but it’s our policy not to share the strategic planning with the family in detail because if it leaks, it could undermine the successful outcome and, you know, families are like organisations. We’re all dysfunctional at some level and amidst of a crisis, dysfunction rises to the surface and we cannot allow that dysfunction to undermine a successful outcome.”

Likewise, an INGO participant stated that: “The part of consulting the hostage’s family about some certain routes to go or avenues to explore during the negotiation, I don’t think it’s a good idea because these people are not trained to do that, and also they are not a neutral party, they are affected by what’s happening to their family member and that might impair their judgments.”

One participant, to the point, summarised: “No, we don’t. We utilise the personal knowledge of the hostage itself, but tactical, no way.”

The comments of the experts averse to seeking tactical advice from the family mirrored those of the INGO participants.

An expert participant warned against informing and consulting too much, as it is impossible to guarantee that information provided to the family is not leaked, which can inadvertently end up harming either the negotiation process or the well-being of the hostage:

“You cannot guarantee that by passing that information, it won’t harm or injure other person still concerned, and that maybe other person’s concern not in direct conflict with the situation, so it might be another hostage on the road from another hostage situation whereby you start informing people that you know your hostage is being killed. […] Another hostage in another situation could be killed because you made that decision.”

Other participants likewise emphasised the emotional state of the family and the resultant perceived lack of objectivity in decision-making:

“I think the family are going to be in pretty emotional state, so ask advice and listen to it, but listen to it very objectively because what you hear is probably, it might not be what you can apply. They are all going to be terribly emotional, they can talk a lot about the personality of the captive and that could be useful to you, but as to advice as to what to do, no I don’t think so.”

An expert participant agreed: “No, I would not do that. Tactical and strategic advice in such situations from the families would be stressed by emotions mainly.”

Given the above, a potentially difficult part of any hostage crisis is to determine
how much information to provide to the family, and that managing the family of
an abducted staff member is a key component in the overall hostage
management. Providing family liaison and support is vital in the resolution of a
crisis, ensuring that the INGO can lead a coordinated response, information is
effectively managed, and the agency’s duty of care obligations to the staff
member and their family are fulfilled. It is clear from both the literature and the
interviews performed as part of this study that the family is victimised as well.

Each INGO will have to establish procedures that stipulates to which degree the
contact with the family should be. For example, the NGO CARE has documented
the need for support to the family in its security manual, which states that CARE
will ‘provide all possible support to the hostage’s family members’ (2004, p.
69). However, this study reveals clearly the importance of having a dedicated
member of the crisis response as the family liaison, offering a single route for
information exchange between the crisis team and the family. This study also
establishes that the knowledge of the family being taken care of can greatly
assist the hostage during captivity, as this is one of the primary concerns of a
hostage while in captivity.

It is clear from the literature review that hostage events place enormous stress
on the family, and that there is need for assistance. Diego Asencio (2011, p.205)
described his family’s suffering throughout his captivity in Colombia in 1980.
He wrote:

‘There was another curious condition manifesting itself during my
captivity that I believe cries out for greater research by
psychologists. Certainly, every crisis manager should be aware of
it. For want of a better term, I would call it the Victim and
Victim’s Family Syndrome’.

This is in line with terminology used by the United Nations, the FBI, and New
Scotland Yard; the family is referred to as the ‘victims’, while the person
abducted is referred to as the ‘hostage’. Asencio continued by explaining why
the family may experience such high level of emotions:
Although not subjected to the same physical danger as the victims themselves, these families are psychological and emotional casualties of terrorist acts. The family has no way of directing its anger at the terrorists who are simply inaccessible as the focal point of such feelings. There is also no socially acceptable means of expressing grief—no funeral, no ceremony, or other rite—since the victim is simply missing and the state of his well-being unknown.

Thomas Hargrove, who was held hostage for eleven months in 1994-95 by Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - FARC) in an interview with BBC, agreed. He said: ‘In this complex scenario, I had the simplest role. All I have to do is survive, and survival is the most simple instinct. I knew I was alive, they never knew for sure.’

Kristen Mulvihill, the wife of hostage David Rohde, described her exhaustion, writing:

I often feel I have no room for anyone else’s emotion. I am constantly barraged with well-meaning but often tearful inquiries about David. Calls from friends and family once a comfort now feel like an added responsibility. I do not know what to tell them. I have hit full saturation. It’s all I can do to keep myself composed, let alone comfort someone else (Rohde and Mulvihill, 2010, p. 132).

Bolz, Dudonis, Schulz, and Riemann (2001, p. 34) found that when a hostage incident takes place, it affects not only the workers directly involved, but also their families and friends. Increasingly, INGOs are recognising that their obligations to their field staff also extend to families who, though directly affected by events, have sometimes been overlooked in the midst of crisis responses. Providing family liaison and support can be vital in the resolution of a crisis, ensuring that the agency can lead a coordinated response, information is effectively managed, and the agency’s duty of care obligations to the staff member and his or her family are fulfilled.
Previous findings identified that concern for the well-being of the family is prominent in the mind of a hostage, and knowing that they are taken care of contributes to a more positive attitude. In a 2012 study of the human cost of piracy (Hurlburt and Seyle), ‘My family being distressed by worry about my well-being’ was rated as the number one concern, while ‘Being killed’ was the sixth greatest concern. ‘My relationships with my loved ones getting difficult’ and ‘My family experiencing financial hardship because my salary is stopped’ were also high on the list of concerns, so being able to take care of the family has an obvious impact on the mental state of the hostage.

5.5.4 Crisis management preparedness

A substantive organising theme under Procedures is the crisis management procedures for the organisation, and identifying INGOs’ levels of preparedness to manage a hostage crisis was a key objective of this research. Four basic themes emerged under crisis management preparedness, identifying the role of four key actors in managing the crisis; the role of the organisation’s security personnel, the role of the organisation’s executive officer in the operation of the crisis, the role of the host government, and the role of the passport nation.

Some INGOs have better crisis management structures in place for managing hostage crises than others. One INGO participant said:

“We trained our own pool of hostage incident managers working in our organisation; we have identified good crisis managers. We have the list on standby so we can pull about 30 people that are trained by Scotland Yard. Exactly what they have in the UN. So we have got it internally and we have invested in that.”

One expert participant describes the perceived INGO preparedness levels: “I think most NGOs now have some sort of crisis management structure in place to deal with whatever it might be; flooding, or fire, or it could be whatever, not necessarily a kidnap instance, but they have some sort of crisis management structure to deal with unforeseen incidents and some of them are quite elaborate and non-power intensive I would say, some of them have adapted to the police structure of Gold, Silver, Bronze, you know, and have very big manuals to go by. Our experience is that when a kidnap incident comes in, these structures are far too large, and especially if you don’t take four weeks here, if you take an average kidnap, it is going to run six months, you can’t have that much staff tied up 24/7 for six months...”
All INGO participants referred to their crisis plans, or similar phrases, and this indicated to the researcher that a structure was in place. Some participants had a clearly defined structure for managing a hostage case, but from most participants it appeared to be a generic crisis management structure. As established in the research, a crisis is sudden and overwhelming, and therefore needs pre-planning and organization to be resolved successfully. It is the researcher’s belief that most INGOs now have a level of preparedness in place to manage a generic crisis. Most participants also specifically mentioned a hostage incident plan, indicating a specific contingency in place for such a crisis.

The theoretical framework of this study outlined Coombs (1999, p. 125) theories which stated that ‘it is a mistake to believe an organization can avoid or prevent all possible crises’. The literature offers plentiful definitions of what constitutes a crisis, but Pearson and Claire’s (1998, p. 60-63) is perhaps the most relevant in this case: ‘a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organisation, is characterised by ambiguity of cause, effect and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly’.

*The role of the security officer during a hostage crisis*

The participants identified three potential roles of a security officer during a hostage crisis: to investigate or liaise; to manage the security of the operation rather than being fully engaged in the management of the crisis; or to serve as a key member of the crisis management team. Here the INGO and expert participants differed. The majority of the INGO participants, 11 of the 15 who provided an answer, or 73 per cent, named the security officer as a key member of the crisis team. As seen in Figure 5.5 below, only one of the six experts, or 17 per cent, would place a security officer in the same role. Rather, the experts preferred the security officers to manage the security of the operation rather than engaging directly with the running of the crisis. The latter is the model used by the United Nations.
The difference in opinion is likely due to the structures used. While law enforcement and professional hostage managers deploy a negotiation team specifically to manage the situation, most INGOs would rely on internal structures. Hence, the security officer would be a key member of their team.

**The role of the executive officer during a hostage crisis**

The executive officer of any INGO operation naturally plays an important role in managing a crisis, and while the roles and responsibilities of the executive officer may vary among INGOs, that person as a rule plays a key role in decision making and in driving the plans. As is illustrated in Figure 5.6 the participants in this research were divided as to the best use of the executive officer during a hostage crisis.
The main argument in favour of excluding the executive from the crisis team was that he or she is responsible for continuing managing the operation in general, with the added challenges a hostage case brings along. In addition, it was posited that the executive would be too emotionally invested in the case to offer objective advice or make objective decisions.

On participant stated: “If I think about his daily work and job and responsibilities, he shouldn’t be involved anytime in the physical process of the hostage incident management.”

Another expressed a similar view: “Somebody have to keep operations moving, somebody has to keep watching for the fallout and other security issues and operational issues and everything else for normal operations.”

An INGO participant expanded on the emotional connection to the case: “He or she should not be acting as the negotiator himself or herself because as I said there are a lot of other things, even the head may have a lot of emotional attachment and emotionally they maybe overcharged, and secondly the negotiation is again, I feel, is sort of a specialised job, there are specially trained people to negotiate with the hostage takers so he should not be involved in negotiating with the hostage takers.”

Two participants were clear on their organisations’ policies as far as the executive officer on the ground. The first stated: “We try to make sure that the [executive] does not lead the crisis because the [executive] has got responsibilities for the rest of the country, another 1000 staff members on the ground.”

The second said: “So our policy is that the [executive] does not run the crisis; he hands it over to the crisis manager who heads the crisis management team and then [executive’s] role is to keep the organisation as a whole on track and set the overall tone of the response, the policy and so on.”

One of the experts explained this from an outside perspective: “You don’t usually get the very senior person on the crisis management team simply because that person is too important to be locked into the room for thirty days 24/7, you know it’s not practical for that senior person to be involved hands on in the incident; normally the most senior person is not involved, so he can concentrate on keeping the rest of the organization running.”

The participants arguing in favour of an active role for the executive presented the following elucidations:

“This person will be the head of the IMT, Incident Management Team and therefore the head of all tactical decisions.”

“That would be to coordinate all in-house and external resources that are brought on board before managing the crisis, being a visible leader for the organisation in country.”

One expert participant supported the views of the INGO participants favouring an active role: “Head of office in the country should be the head of crisis response and crisis management team.”
The role of the host government during a hostage crisis

The government of the country where the worker is captured and held hostage is known as the host country, and the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979 is quite clear on the host government’s responsibility:

“the taking of hostages is an offence of grave concern to the international community, that any person committing an offence of taking hostages shall either be prosecuted or extradited, and that States shall make such offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences”.

Further, on 18 December 1985, the UN Security Council Resolution against Taking Hostages was adopted by a 15 to 0 vote. UN conventions require that a nation use its own judicial system to implement and enforce the agreement. UN resolutions, on the other hand, are simply agreements on a particular set of principles or goals. Hence, conventions are more binding than resolutions, since resolutions do not imply a commitment to enforcement. Nevertheless, the United Nations has no direct power to force a nation to abide by any of its agreements (Enders and Sandler, 2006, p. 174). So while it is clear that international legal instruments exist to punish hostage taking, it is unclear as to whether the host government is obliged to manage all or most aspects of a hostage case.

Overall, participants’ responses indicated that the host country should take responsibility and help the INGOs in every way possible to secure the safe release of hostages. In the interviews, the participants identified two potential roles of the host government: to either assist in the crisis management by providing information, pressure on the environment surrounding the hostage takers, resources, or to take the lead in the process of working toward release of the hostages. However, some countries may show resistance to do so, and others may not have adequate facilities or capabilities to assist.
Analysis of the data shows that the participants felt strongly that the level of cooperation with the host government depended on perceived reliability or existing working relationships. As shown in Figure 5.7, eighteen of the 26 respondents, or 69 per cent, said the level of cooperation depended on the government.

![Figure 5.7: Participants’ views on the role of the host government during hostage crisis.](image)

One participant explained the intricacies of such cooperation: "It is a very good question; it depends very much on the situation. In the end it is our crisis, it is the crisis for the family, it is the crisis for the host government but it is our crisis as well. So we must build a good relation with this host government but they are instrumental to our strategy from our perspective. So if we can use them, then we will and if we see them as a risk because they perhaps might consider armed intervention or whatever, still we must have a good contact but only to mitigate this risk factor. So depends very much."

Other participants were more negative in their view of the governments’ capacities to assist:

One claimed that "Technically it was their job to keep this from happening in the first place right…it all depends on location, and you know it’s a very tricky game."

Another counselled: “Be cooperative, not get in the way. That is really what's going to happen if they get involved, they tend to get in the way and create problems, whether it's trying to release the hostages with force or collect ten per cent from the ransom payment.”

“But we certainly believe that the host government has the ultimate responsibility for the staff on the ground. But some countries that do not have a government, like Somalia etc., we can expect little from them.”

The participants that were in favour of the government leading the process explained this as a responsibility of the host government.

One posited: “The host government, as according to the international law, has the duty of providing humanitarian actors with protection, and we are one of those who they have an
obligation towards, if we are there in an area with elected government or whatever
government of the day, then they have an obligation to solve the crisis.”

An expert participant warned against failing to co-operate with the host government: “If you ignore them and push them to one side, they will be often become upset. There may be spoilers. We must interact with them. And from our side, we need to be completely transparent and visible...We need to make sure that they understand the primary responsibility there is and we are holding them to book, they are accountable for bringing about the release of people. It is a pressure tactic and of course, it is the balance of how, who and when you put the pressure on and then take the pressure off. That is the art of good management across the state. But ignore them at your peril.”

The above data regarding the general reluctance to fully involve the host
government to assist during the crisis took the researcher by surprise. As
established in the research, the International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its
Resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979, clearly states that ‘States Parties to
this Convention are bound under those conventions to prosecute or hand over the
hostage taker’. It is therefore clear that the host government has the primary
responsibility in managing a case. This applies to the way the United Nations
manage a hostage crisis as well. Paragraph 13 of the United Nations policy on
hostage incident management states:

‘Notwithstanding the provisions of the present procedures, the
Government of the State in which the hostage-taking has
occurred, or, if applicable, the Government of the State where the
hostages are held by the offenders, has the primary responsibility
under international law to take all measures it considers
appropriate to ease the situation of the hostages, in particular to
secure their release and, after their release, to facilitate, when
relevant, their departure. Any request for United Nations
assistance in mediating an agreement to secure the release of
hostages, made either by a member State or an organization
involved in the hostage incident, must be forwarded to the Under-
Secretary-General for Safety and Security for approval.’

The researcher finds the lack of host government involvement concerning, as
most INGOs, including those participating in this study, are not hesitant to hold
host government accountable for their security if a security incident has
occurred. In other words, participants were quick to point out the role of the host government in providing a safe operating environment, but hesitant in allowing the same government to manage a situation. This can be seen as contradictory, as good security management should include prevention, mitigation, and planning elements. It may be understandable that cooperation with government in some cases can be sensitive, but the INGO has no legal right to exclude a host government from managing the crisis.

Macpherson, Persaud, and Sheehan (2008, p. 22-24) makes it clear that if an international NGO employee is kidnapped, this crime, according to international law, should be addressed between governments. Everyone else who is party to the event is involved only through the request of the host nation and the national government of the victim. If it is a national staff, then the nation’s law enforcement has the mandate. Only in very rare circumstances will an NGO find itself in a situation where the organization has no choice other than to serve as the primary negotiator.

Further, in Stoddard, Harmer, and Hughes (2012, p. 6-7) it is stated that:

[…] in the case of international organisations and their officials, the host government has a special responsibility under the UN Charter and the government’s agreements (called Host Country Agreements) with the individual organisations. These agreements apply to all types of environments where international assistance is deployed, not just conflict contexts, and cover a wide range of issues including communications, travel and transport, privileges and immunities, as well as safety and security. There are also a number of conventions and frameworks, primarily developed within UN bodies, which describe state responsibilities for aid workers.

Bruderlein and Gassmann (n.d.) concur and state that host country should take responsibility for international aid workers’ security. There are however no clear terms and conditions stated as to what kind and to what extent of security should
be provided. The level of taking responsibility and cooperation depends on the policies of the individual country and its legal processes.

**The role of the passport nation during a hostage crisis**

The nationality of the hostage plays a role in the way that the ‘home nation’ of the hostage responds to a hostage crisis. If the hostage has dual citizenship, the passport used for entry to the country where the hostage was taken will determine which nation responds to the crisis. The literature review provides little information regarding a passport nation’s role during a hostage situation, except for the in extremis option of a hostage rescue. Even here the literature is divided. While international consensus condemns the act of hostage-taking, opinion is sharply divided over the legality of forceful rescue missions by the hostages’ national state.

The participants in this research predominantly saw the role of the passport nation as taking a support function. Fourteen of the respondents (67%) that provided an answer were in favour of such a support role, including providing intelligence and technical assistance. Thirty three per cent indicated that the passport nation should pressure the host government to assist in resolving the crisis.

Figure 5.8 below shows the participants opinions on the role of the home nation during a hostage crisis.

![Figure 5.8: Participants’ views on the role of the home nation during a hostage crisis.](image-url)
One participant cautioned that the passport nation’s activities often are beyond the influence of an INGO: “Their key role is the feeding information on it, depends on the countries, some other examples we saw that some countries, they have a mandate that obliges them to go and be actively involved in negotiations, so we cannot really control the country of origin for our staff members.”

Another participant focused very much on the capabilities of support: “The home nation basically can provide such kind of information and evidence that helps to prove the life of the hostage or identify the hostage or prove the identity of the hostage not only the life. The other thing that the home nation, or any organ of the home nation, should provide support for the citizen in this case, and how it is provided and what is provided are defined international laws and the national constitutions which each country defines on a different way, but most of them consider, ‘If my citizen is taken in to hostage, I must do everything to get him or her released.’”

The answers indicate to the researcher that this element is not always clearly laid out in the policy and procedures of the INGO. Much can be gained by the support from the passport nation in terms of intelligence and technical capacity, and even in establishing adequate family liaison, so the INGO could benefit from a more systematic inclusion of the passport nation as an actor.

### 5.6 Capacity of INGOs to manage and contain a hostage situation

The previous segment of this chapter explored the level of INGOs policies and procedures in place as a foundation of managing a hostage crisis. This part of the chapter examines INGO capacity to manage and contain hostage situations in terms of financial and human resources.

#### 5.6.1 Financial resources

The third global theme in this study is Financial Resources. From this theme, three organizing themes emerged; cost of managing a hostage crisis, whether the INGO should be liable for cost, and whether insurance for ransom was an option.

**Resources required for managing a four-week hostage crisis**

An attempt was made during the interviews to identify the resources typically required to manage a hostage crisis for more than four weeks, with the hypothetical example for comparison reasons provided of two international staff
having been abducted in Darfur, Sudan. This is the first organising theme under the global theme of Financial Resources.

Hostage cases can be extremely labour intensive, and this is one of the reasons that the United Nations has a dedicated Hostage Incident Management team; it is simply not possible to absorb the crisis into the organisation’s normal management and operational structure.

An expert participant used personal experience to quantify a previous case: “In cases we started to plot and count man-hours spent on such a response. And it is huge. I remember a case in Darfur again. Two persons taken, internationals, and they were held for close to 100 days and when we counted up in man hours or person hours of how long they were taken, it was between two and three years’ worth of work. Put a cost on that and you’re talking about the hours people have to divert from their normal work, cost is coming into six figures, for an expanded operation.”

An INGO participant also mentioned a specific example to illustrate the labour-intensive nature of managing a hostage situation: “In Somalia, I don’t think that would differ much in terms of resources. We had twenty-five people working around the clock and that goes from the CMT in [Capital of organisation’s home country] to the CMT on the ground.”

A second INGO participant gave a specific figure in dollars: “I think four weeks would be at least hundred thousand dollars to bring together the team full-time doing this job. Yes, an expensive exercise I would say.”

Most respondents’ organisations seemed to have a crisis management structure set up similar to that established by the United Kingdom emergency services; it is referred to as Gold, Silver, Bronze. The Gold-Silver-Bronze command structure is used to establish a hierarchical framework for the command and control of major incidents and disasters. In such a structure, Gold Command is in overall control of the organisation’s resources to manage the incident. Gold is not on site, but in a distant control room, typically at the organisation’s headquarters, where he or she formulates the strategy for dealing with the incident. The Silver Commander is the senior member of the organisation in the country of the hostage taking, in charge of all the local resources required to manage the case. Silver decides upon the best use of these resources to achieve the strategic aims of the Gold Commander; he or she determines the tactics used. The Bronze Commander is in charge of the crisis or negotiation cell in the country.
Several participants listed their crisis management structure and explained how they would deploy to manage the case. One provided a thorough explanation built on experience from several cases:

“You know, the planning procedure stipulates that there will be a crisis management team involved that can consist between four to six people, but in reality it spirals up out of control. It becomes a crisis management team at headquarters level, crisis management team at country level, hostage incident management team at flash point, you get family support, you get communication strategies. I would say hands down, it’s up to 40 people if it is an intense life-threatening hostage situation.”

The experts agreed, and one emphasised the need for rotation after some time: “So I would also say, as we do, we need to rotate that structure every thirty days because it gets so physically tiring you know, physically and mentally exhausting that you’ll feel that you would be making bad decisions after thirty days, so we rotate every thirty days and we ensure that the structure is maintained.”

The interviews provided information that supports the notion of a hostage crisis being labour intensive. The data from the participants indicated that at least ten people would be involved one way or another to form a solid response to a hostage situation. This element is also substantially backed by the findings from the 2013 Aid worker security report where it states that ‘For many NGOs, however, particularly medium-sized and smaller ones, a kidnapping can have a crippling effect. Staff assigned to the crisis management team must be able to put aside other duties, and would ideally be rotated every few weeks. Long-duration kidnappings (e.g. several months) can place a significant resource burden on the organisation’.

**Liability for cost**

The literature review of INGO security manuals and policies (CARE, World Vision, Mercy Corps, ECHO, Save the Children) shows that most INGOs have an official policy of not paying ransom, but as seen above, a hostage case still carries significant cost even without such payment. With ten or more staff engaged in full time management of the crisis, including travel abroad for some, a case of one month can easily cost over USD 100,000. Zumkehr and Finucane (2013, p. 4) showed that NGOs have commonly depended on funding from donor agencies, multilateral lenders, charitable institutions, and government ministries for their own administration and for conducting programs. They do not, in general, generate their own money. Hence, as part of the interviews for the present study, and as the second organising theme under the global theme of
Financial Resources, a question was asked as to who should cover the cost of a hostage case involving staff from an INGO.

The cost incurred when managing an abduction situation is usually large. It is generally agreed that the NGO should cover the cost of managing hostage situation either from its own resources or through K&R if the organisation is insured. The participants in the present study explained that most INGOs cover this cost from their own resources and do not expect financial aid from external sources. Previous studies also support this view. The researcher (Lauvik, 2008) described it in his previous work as an issue of duty of care as hostage taking can be considered a foreseeable event for INGOs. Bolz et al. (2001, p. 34) projected the same view: that when an aid worker is taken hostage, the INGO itself is targeted, and hence it is the responsibility of the organisation to protect its workers. All 16 INGO participants agreed that the INGO itself should cover the cost of managing the hostage incident.

One INGO participant explained it in simple terms: “We, certainly as the implementing agency and the people are with us; we certainly take the responsibility to do that.”

Others shared similar views: “…it’s purely on us, these are our employees; they are our responsibility.”

“It is us, it is the NGO itself.”

“We should take responsibility and cover the cost ourselves, that’s how we work really.”

Two participants mentioned insurance as the payer, but since the INGO pays for the insurance, these responses are also considered to have concurred with the view that the INGO should take financial responsibility for managing hostage crises.

One INGO openly stated that this was the exact reason the INGO carried insurance coverage: to cover expenditures in the case of a hostage situation. “K&R, that’s why you have it!”

Another expanded: “So [INGO] would include those costs and then we would try and get recover those from the insurance company. And I do not know whether or not we would be successful with all of them but that is what we would try.”

One of the experts estimated the total cost of a case: “I think it’s very important. First of all, we are going to see the cost aspect which can be significant, like if you are talking about the last six-month kidnaps, depending on the average ransom payment might be half a million or three quarters of a million, and then you add on fees like our advice fees, hotels, travels or whatever logistical coordination, it would probably go towards two million. You know, the whole incident’s going to cost.”
Although two of the INGO participants (12.5%) also contended that the host nation and the home nation should cover some of the cost of managing the event, the vast majority made it clear that the liability in terms of cost to manage a hostage crisis lays entirely with them. It is considered that the NGOs therefore should cover the cost of managing a hostage situation either from its own resources or through kidnap and ransom insurance should they have such coverage. Whether to gain support through an insurance policy is a risk management question each INGO will have to make on their own. In terms of covering expenses, outside of ransom, such policy cannot be seen as contradictory to the public stand of not paying ransom, as it simply is risk transference in terms of travel expenses, overtime, and other cost occurring during the crisis.

**Insurance for ransom**
The third organising theme under the global theme Financial Resources is whether insurance against ransom payment is a viable option for INGOs. The predominately public stand by INGO of not paying ransom is somewhat contradictory to statistics of kidnap & ransom insurance providers. Overall, twelve INGOs and five experts were positive to K&R insurance, also regarding the several components apart from ransom that are covered by such policies. Only one expert and one INGO were completely against the use of K&R insurance. The overall response, as shown in Figure 5.9, indicated quite a significant deviation from the public stance and that of the policies of INGOs, with 17 responding participants (89%) positive to some use of K&R insurance, and only two against it altogether.
Several participants were positive to the overall use of K&R insurance, including ransom insurance. K&R insurance is a complex issue that is rooted in the culture and laws of the countries in which an INGO operates. One quote explained the philosophy from the INGO participant’s perspective:

“Well I mean, an NGO, whether you have insurance or not, you still have liabilities, so every organisation has to look at its own exposure whether it either has to self-insure which is you pay out of your existing budgets or you take a policy to cover those eventualities. I mean, if you are to be in the game then you have got to be willing to pay the price and if you have got to be working in these high-risk environments then you need to take appropriate measures, and either be prepared pay for it through self-insured policy which is being out of your budget or you have to get some insurance to have some underwriter cover the cost.”

A second participant is also showed pragmatism about the use of insurance: “And this is only a tool to help the organisations or just take over that responsibilities or actions. This is a transfer of risk, in other words, from the side of the organisation.”

A third gave a similar opinion: “I think that such insurances would insure life and death, possibly financial burden that one needs to have for the hostage bearer and additionally, it starts professional conduct and services, it will keep you to supporting the crisis traits and ensuring safe release of the abducted and these are the advantages I think.”

Other participants were more direct in their support of K&R insurance: “My personal opinion is for a typical NGO, if they don’t have it they have no business in this line of work.”

“In the NGO community, I think it’s absolutely imperative to have it.”

“All organisations should have, ideally, a kidnap and ransom insurance.”

“The main advantage you have, [K&R] gives you the capacity to pay the ransom if should one arise, that’s the biggest advantage.”

“As far as we can see, the advantage is it can allow the organisation to survive financially because these things can be extremely expensive.”

One participant went even further, and confirmed that they held insurance for ransom: “At this time K&R insurance is vital, if you do not have it, you will have to open your own piggybank to take out the amount of money. We roughly know what they ask for international and what they ask from the nationals. And that kind of money does not just lie around, so K&R insurance is crucial in my opinion, we certainly have it.”
One participant explained what his or her INGO had witnessed from others: “So an example of this is that in [country] recently, I have been following the beheading of [name] it was an INGO staff member, several NGOs have actually paid ransom right up front, right, which has changed the dynamics for the rest of us quite a bit, and also changed our risk level in the country. I do not know that it would work for NGOs because there is such a variation on policy whether or not ransom is paid and I think all NGOs ideally would like to say, ‘No’, they wouldn’t pay, but seeing a body without a head, I think, can change things quite a bit.”

An INGO participant explained: “We say publicly that we do not pay ransom, and the last two abductions we were involved with, there wasn’t any ransom demand made, they never came to that.”

Perhaps the biggest indicator of a difference between public stance on paying ransom and actual INGO practice is the following statement from a participating K&R insurance expert and provider: “And what we found is that the more training we do with people; some that started out by saying our policy is not to pay ransom, when you go to the table top exercise and they understand that the risks of their people and a possible torture, bad treatment of their people what is the actual moral question which is greater, actually safeguarding their people or the path of not paying a ransom which may obviously limit the amount of torture abuse that their staff might endure. They may also come around and say actually we will continue to publicly state that we don’t pay ransoms but actually we think that’s the best solution to save lives of our people.”

However, even among those positive to the insurance, some negative factors were acknowledged. Three INGO participants expressed concerns that systematic payment of ransom could increase the frequency of abductions or lead to higher ransoms.

One said: “Our concern is that it may encourage more kidnaps.”

This was supported by a second who posited: “Well insurance makes people worth more money, I think that would encourage people unless it has to be done in a way that is discreet and not known, but how can you guarantee that.”

A third believed that increase in abductions linked to payments could be seen in the field: “Our assessment of most of these security professionals working in [country] were that the incidents are going to rise and that is exactly what we saw that after that we noticed a sudden increase in the kidnapping cases or the hostage taking cases of the NGO community of both national as well as international.”

The most contentious aspect of this research is likely that of whether INGOs should pay ransom to ensure an early and safe release of the hostage. Kidnap and ransom (K&R) insurance is a sensitive subject in the humanitarian world, and no literature directly related to this theme has been found. Anecdotal evidence suggests that crisis management and kidnap and ransom insurance varies considerably regarding their application to national staff, although the
issue is generally not openly discussed (Egeland, Harmer, and Stoddard, 2011, p. 26-31). The researcher has not found a single INGO that will publicly state that ransom is paid as a matter of policy. This is likely due to two factors:

Firstly, insurance companies stipulate that revealing the fact that an INGO is a policy holder may render the insurance nil and void. Hence, INGOs cannot reveal the extent of their insurance coverage. Second, INGOs fear that if it becomes known that they pay ransom, more of their staff will be taken. This will lead to a higher risk organisationally, and increase the likelihood of death or severe injuries. When the frequency of abductions increases significantly, so does the likelihood of casualties.

An INGO will have to carry the cost of a hostage crisis, whether that be through self-insuring, where all costs are covered by the organisation, or through the use of an external policy; kidnap and ransom insurance. In a survey conducted by David Klimas in October 2013, where he explored whether a project in a complex environment has ever faced a crisis, 55% had kidnap and ransom insurance (Klimas, 2013, p 4). INGOs appear to be following this global trend of increasingly using kidnap and ransom insurance, and this was clearly revealed through this study. Not all agencies that hold such policy actually do pay ransom, but there is an increasing use of such policies. The Aid worker security report of 2013 states that

‘Understandably, ransom payments are seldom mentioned in public reports of kidnapping events, but the dataset has four reported cases where Western governments made ransom payments to secure the release of their nationals (anecdotally, there are several more). It is not reported, but generally understood, that in many cases private ransom payments have been made, from families and organisations of the kidnapped aid workers, as well as from their home governments.’

The report continues:

‘In reality, money is often paid – by families, private companies, governments, and aid agencies. Usually this is done through
indirect means, using a range of intermediaries (even bank accounts), so as to preserve the ‘official’ claims that no money exchanged hands between agency and perpetrators’.

Having a policy for hostage crisis may for some agencies ease financial planning, as the policy cost is known. Especially for smaller agencies without their own hostage management and negotiation capabilities, such insurance policies could be a very strong risk mitigation measure, as the expert advice that comes with the policy, both in preparatory terms and during the crisis itself, will strongly improve the likelihood of a successful outcome of the crisis. Smaller agencies without psychologists and stress counsellors as part of their resources may also benefit from the post-release assistance a kidnap and ransom policy offers as part of their duty of care for their staff. The participants negative to kidnap and ransom insurance feared a pull-factor should it be known that they carry insurance. However, holding the policy does not equate to paying ransom, that decision remains with the agency and its policy on managing a hostage crisis, and evidence suggest that a public policy of not paying ransom has not proven a significant deterrent’. (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, 2013, p. 12)

Interpretation of the interviews indicate to the researcher that at least 7 of the 16 INGOs have either paid ransom, or were at least willing to consider doing so should the situation dictate it. This is a position far away from the public stance of no ransom payments. The researcher believes this change has taken place for several reasons. Firstly, the trend in abductions have changed from political to that of financially motivation. While a decade ago in the majority of the cases the INGO did not have any actual influence over political demands, such as prisoner release, troop removals, or independence issues, today they can largely influence the outcome. The pressure on an organisation when one or more of its own staff are taken hostage, especially as most INGOs are involved in humanitarian issues and passionate about saving lives, is tremendous. And paying ransom, especially when done through a third party, can appear to be an easy solution. A second factor the researcher believes has contributed to an increase in ransom payment is the exponential growth of the kidnap and ransom insurance industry since 2001. And for many INGOs, having a kidnap and
ransom insurance is a good solution. A standard K&R policy has three main components, two of which encompass reimbursement of money lost as the result of a kidnapping. These two components are as follows: Reimbursement of any ransom paid or reimbursement of money lost when being delivered as ransom; and reimbursement for expenses related to securing the release of a kidnap victim. The third, non-reimbursement component of a K&R policy provides access to security consultants for preventative measures as well as access to individuals experienced in hostage negotiation, risk management and crisis response in the event of an abduction.

If we examine each of these components by themselves, they will often contribute towards a safe release of the hostage. The reimbursement of ransom paid is just that; reimbursement. It does not mean that the INGO have to pay ransom, the decision is entirely with the crisis team of that organisation. If their policy is to not pay ransom, this component can be removed from the insurance coverage, and significantly reduce the premium of the coverage.

The second component of a typical insurance is reimbursement for expenses related to securing the release of a kidnap victim. Managing a hostage case can be extremely expensive, even without ransom payment. Participants in the research acknowledged so, and estimation of managing a four-week case ranged around USD 100,000. The researcher has been involved in some cases where the negotiation team alone worked a combined 4500 hours over a 9-10 week period. Add to it flights, food and accommodation allowance, and other expenses, it becomes costly. Since an abundance of spare funds is not something the average INGO can count on, reimbursement of cost may be a suitable mitigating measure against the organisational risk of a hostage case.

The third component is perhaps the most interesting for many INGOs. Although the ransom component of the insurance tends to draw the most attention, the insurance also provides for the immediate deployment of skilled negotiators who can become the backbone of the organisation’s crisis response. These can represent the INGO with governmental or institutional counterparts, or act as an advisor to the crisis team if the organisation is forced to become the primary agent to win a staff member’s freedom. Only a very few INGOs has an in-house
capacity to provide skilled negotiators to manage a case, so having access to professionals can mean the difference between a positive or negative outcome. The researcher agrees wholeheartedly with one of the research participants who stated: “So I think, if you're a company and you want legal advice; you get a lawyer, or if you want accounting advice; you get an accountant, so it’s important to have some sort of specialized advice.” Negotiating for someone’s life is a specialist skillset, and not the time to gamble or test new approaches.

The topic of stopping ransom payment has recently been on the highest global political agendas; a discussion of several hours took place at the June 2013 G8 meeting in Northern Ireland. The G8 (Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Russia) agreed at that meeting to ‘stamp out the payment of ransoms for hostages kidnapped by terrorists’. For the first time, it was publically stated that five of the G8 nations had been ‘shifting’ on the issue while three refused to pay ransoms as a matter of principle.

![Figure 5.10: Participants’ views on viability of private kidnap and ransom insurance](image)

K&R insurance could also be relevant to cover family or dependants of staff, either through the organisation or privately. Participants were evenly divided on whether it is a viable option for family and dependents of staff, as seen in Figure 5.10 above.
Ten of the responding participants (48%) thought it to be viable, while eleven did not (52%). The experts were also divided, with three speaking for and four speaking against K&R insurance as a viable option for families and dependents of INGO staff. The evenly split responses render it difficult to arrive at a conclusive answer as to whether private K&R insurance is a viable option.

Among the INGO participants who thought that private insurance may be a viable option, none gave an absolute opinion.

One said: “I think it is worth thinking about it.”

Another was more specific: “If I do give thought to it, and if the organisation would not look after my family, I’ll certainly consider it.”

A third approached this issue from a management perspective: “Difficult to say, I think that will have to be subject to that individual to undertake, I think it is very difficult for an organisation to deny anybody to take that.”

An expert participant was more positive: “I think it is worth having for anybody who can buy it, it is just like paying fire insurance or casualty insurance for your house or your cars, in some areas you almost have to have it. I think the prices are quite reasonable.”

In contrast to the above view, seven INGO participants listed inhibiting cost as the main reason private K&R was not viable:

“I do not see that as very realistic because it is very expensive.”

“I’m not sure that it is actually something our staff could afford.”

“I think, also it's a bit too expensive for individual staff to undertake such an insurance.”

The experts agreed that cost was the most common prohibitive factor.

On expert participant said: “Bluntly speaking, no. In most cases, salary is just not high enough, particularly national staff salaries, I don’t know any examples, and I haven’t talked to any colleagues who have pursued that line privately.”

Even an insurance expert among the participants thought it would not be a realistic option: “It certainly can be considered. I think it is often restricted because of price.”

5.6.2 Human resources

As confirmed by the interviews excerpted in the preceding segments of this chapter, managing a hostage crisis can be very labor intensive. Hence, the fourth global theme in this study is Human Resources. An INGO not only needs a large
number of people; it may also need to lean on several categories of staff such as crisis management experts, negotiators, psychologists, and media managers. From this theme, four organizing themes emerged; the use of outside expertise in managing a hostage crisis, a common hostage management response, the use of psychologists, and the use of media managers.

One participant said “It's almost organisation grinding to a halt when this kind of operation is going on.”

5.6.3 The use of external assistance

The interviews aimed to explore whether the human resources described above were either in place or available at short notice for the INGOs. Further, the researcher set out to determine whether the resources were in-house or external. Whether the INGO could use outside expertise became the first organizing theme under the global theme of Human resources.

![Figure 5.11: Participants’ views on the use of external assistance to assist in a hostage crisis.](image)

One aspect of acquiring K&R insurance is that an insured INGO can obtain external expert support to assist its own crisis team during a hostage case. Of the 22 participants offering an opinion on this topic, only one INGO staff participant (5%) was negative to external assistance (Figure 5.11):
“I think it could create a problem if they don’t adhere to the humanitarian principles and if they don’t have enough experience.”

An expert participant and K&R insurance provider, said: “Understand that we deal with various NGOs, some of which have absolutely we-will-not-pay-ransom policy, some of them want to take out our advice, so you can get what they call a response stage covered only.”

Kenny (2008) presented in his study that private groups have better control over larger population and territories; it is therefore advantageous to have external private groups to intervene during humanitarian workers’ crisis situations.

Kenney (2008, p. 551-588) and Menezes (2012) discusses the component of K&R insurance that is relevant to a discussion of human resources: the expert advisor. Although the ransom component of K&R insurance tends to draw the most attention, policies also provide for the immediate deployment of skilled negotiators who can become the backbone of the organisation’s field response. These can represent the INGO with governmental or institutional counterparts. If there are no governments involved and the organisation is forced to become the primary agent to win a staff member’s freedom, these representatives can take the lead.

Literature featuring families of hostages further emphasise the benefits of external assistance. David Rohde and Kristen Mulvihill (2011, p. 100) originally liaised only with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), but then decided to engage an external expert. They wrote:

On the basis of this recommendation, we set aside our fears and decide to hire AISC. They will send a negotiator to Kabul to represent our family and to work alongside a kidnap expert from Clayton. Both teams advise us to keep ‘the bureau’, or the FBI, out of it. They are useful for some things, but cannot deliver funds, release prisoners, or provide direct negotiations when discussions involve ransom. They are strictly an information-gathering agency.

Kristen Mulvihill (Rohde and Mulvihill, 2011, p. 84) also described the effect that the pressure had on her.
At the same time, I feel completely enraged at my husband’s captors and utterly confused. If they want to make a deal so quickly, why won’t they list their demands? This is all part of a sick psychology on the captors’ part: make the family feel totally responsible and utterly without control. Demand they meet demands, but fail to name them [...] I am completely exhausted, on edge, and angry at the FBI agents in Kabul for scuttling our communications with David’s kidnappers. I pace back and forth in our small galley kitchen, then collapse on the living room sofa.

The assistance of an expert in cases such as Rohde’s can make a difference.

It should be emphasised that an external assistance team does not take over the management of the crisis; it simply provides advice and assistance to the crisis management team.

One participant elucidated: “It depends I guess, how we look at the management, so I think that the resources that a policy like this bring, as well as some of the personalities and experience, are excellent but I would never describe them as an outside group that were coming into manage the situation because at least, in all the crisis management plans and protocols that I’ve been a part of and dealt, we, as an organisation, would never surrender that to anybody whether it’s the government or a policy that we pay for or anybody else.”

Another offered an expansion: “I think the key thing is the assisting. I think, certainly from my perspective, we would never have another organisation manage the situation and that is actually not what they do; they come in and they sit alongside you—having done it twice now, and they lead you through processes, they coach you in the right direction, they bring a wealth of experience from a specific country but also generically from how kidnap nowadays is a kind of a business in most places and have a set way of working, if you like.”

The above comments from the participants are of significant import; the external expertise is described as being there not to take over the crisis, but rather to offer expert advice. Kenney (2008, p. 551-588) indicates that the experts can represent the INGO with governmental or institutional counterparts. One participant felt external service benefitted the organisation:

“I feel great benefit in it. One, they offer more than just looking at the strategy and they often have a good bit of experience far beyond what a single NGO could have. So they are aware of the statistics in the country, the trends that are in the country a lot more intimately because it is their prime business than what we could be in the countries where there is a risk.”
Another provided further information on the advisory capacity: “No professional services are ever going to deliver ransom, receive a hostage, anything like that, and I do not know that the smaller NGOs really understand that or that they prepare themselves and they manage the structures for having to allow for those processes, if that’s what their policy says.”

Several participants felt it was unrealistic to have an in-house trained capacity for the eventuality of such a low-frequency event, pointing out that insurance provided the same expertise on a retainer basis.

One INGO participant said: “Well, we put one thing upfront and that is: in order to ensure a safe release of the hostages and the well-being of our employees, we need external advice because we have not done this ever and we want someone who has done this before because it is a very tricky situation. So we need external advice and we need the best external advice, it needs to come from experience; and therefore, we say that if this is the case then we must look out for our support.”

A second spoke to the proficiencies of external experts: “I think that it’s very clear that you bring in a professional for whatever you’re doing. You would be foolish not to, you don’t go to a general practitioner to have heart surgery kind of thing you know, you always want to have the best of the best on board for something that critical.”

The expert participants in this research emphasised the special skills an external advisor could bring to the table.

According to an expert participant, “So I think, if you’re a company and you want legal advice, you get a lawyer, or if you want accounting advice, you get an accountant, so it’s important to have some sort of specialised advice. You know we might go through the whole history without having a single kidnap or only have a couple or whatever, but you can’t expect companies to have that sort of knowledge or experience from within.”

Despite the majority of participants favouring external assistance as an option, six INGO participants and three experts expressed concerns with the external assistance providers’ profiles and their level of understanding of the INGO world.

One participant explained his or her concern: “This external company, this external entity must have an appropriate profile. So there are some commercial entities that have some specialists on board to have previous NGO experience and are very well familiar with the ways of working of NGOs.”

Another participant’s statement supported this: “they need to understand the dynamic of the NGO, they need to understand the NGO approach to security, which to a great extent is acceptance, and you are familiar with that. Yes, a commercial company does not necessarily do that.”

The overall view of the participants was that it was acceptable and even
encouraged to seek outside expert assistance, but that the external entity should have a deep understanding in NGO operations and culture. This to best shape the advice to the crisis management team of the NGO.

5.6.4 Common hostage management response

The United Nations has, since the late 1990s, operated a pool of trained Hostage Incident Managers to deploy and assist in securing the safe release of hostages throughout the world. More than 100 staff are trained, but not all of these are deployable at any given time for operational reasons.

Given the essential nature of human resources in such critical situations, it is clear that for hostage incident managers to be directly involved with an abduction scenario, they must have adequate training; furthermore, training must be periodically refreshed.

Having a pool of trained hostage incident managers, a roster, available has allowed the UN to remain fully self-sufficient with respect to managing a hostage crisis. The system avoids using insurance for ransom payment, allowing the UN to stay true to its policy of not paying ransom for the recovery of abducted staff. The researcher aimed to explore whether a similar arrangement would be possible within the INGO community, and asked the participants if they could see a way for the NGO community to establish a roster of trained Hostage Incident Managers to be deployed on a cost-share basis in a crisis. This became the second organising theme under the global theme of Human Resources.

Twenty-one participants answered this question, and seventeen of these (81%) believed it could be possible (Figure 5.12).
Studying the data from interviews performed in the present research reveals that even the participants who were positive to such a roster harboured some concerns.

One participant pointed to the challenge in information sharing, and stated: “I haven’t thought of that before but I guess it’s a possibility and there are some different forums where NGOs meet on security issues and share information and so on, but that would be going an another step in to climb up operational and sharing the thoughts with, I feel that would be quite tricky to manage.”

A second identified another potential challenge: specifically, that of financing such a roster. “Yes, it is possible that the NGO community agrees to establish such a service to be activated in case of extreme danger but biggest concern here is cost, so for me it can be, but actually the problem is more financial for small NGOs like us, it may be discussed in the near future.”

Those participants with a negative view toward the possibility of establishing a roster echoed the concerns of the participants with a positive view.

An INGO participant echoed Fast (2010, p. 365-389) in describing a community of very different agencies: “The NGO community isn’t one community, we all know that. Anytime we try to get something together, organising the collective, right now there are just multiple barriers that we put in our own way.”

Another simply stated: “Honestly, I don’t [think it is possible]. I think it’s all about trust and we have different policies.”

The literature review offers no specific response to this question, outside of the fact that INGOs, as well as the range of their mandates, roles, and structures, are
so many in number and so diverse that few studies have captured data representative for all INGOs. With the multitudes of mandates, the competition for donor funding, and the range on insurance options available for INGOs, the researcher believes it can be difficult to invite other members of an INGO in to manage or assist in what would likely be perceived as an internal matter.

While the participants were mixed in their opinions about the idea of establishing an INGO roster, many had identified a potential alternative solution: the already existing United Nations roster which they believed could become available to INGOs through the Saving Lives Together (SLT) agreement. The Saving Lives Together initiative serves to improve coordination and cooperation between the UN and NGOs, but there is still friction on the topic of autonomy for security. The framework reads:

SLT is a series of recommendations aimed at enhancing UN and NGO security collaboration in the field. Under the SLT framework, the humanitarian community contributes to the collection, analysis and dissemination of critical security and safety information. Information and analysis is made available to humanitarian security managers in the interest of our mutual safety and all decisions made, on the basis of, or with consideration to, such information remains the responsibility of their respective organisations (United Nations, 2013).

Objective 1 of the framework is: ‘Convening broad-based forums for field security collaboration and information sharing, including NGO/IO engagement with the UN Security Management Team’.

Altogether, nine INGO participants (56%) mentioned Saving Lives Together as an alternative, or answered positively when prompted to offer an opinion on the option. Figure 5.13 illustrates this.
Figure 5.13: Participants’ views on using Saving Lives Together for hostage management

One participant explained: “I was kind of asking why should the NGO having a separate setup, because if you look at the Saving Lives Together framework, the initial thinking in 2004 when this was presented by the UN coordinator, the security support to NGOs was one of the main issue and that we could draw from the resources of the UN.”

Several others responded similarly:

“My first thought was, I don’t know why the NGO community couldn’t do it if the UN already does it, but why don’t we just put it under the Saving Lives Together framework and use it as one of the resources that we go back and forth with.”

“However, I would say that under the concept of this Saving Lives Together, UN probably is better trained, better organised and better placed to deal the situations like that and the NGOs also can benefit from their resources and their facilities on cost share basis and I think this is going to be more cost effective as well.”

Two participants expressed reservations about the SLT initiative. “I would not do it through Saving Lives Together…”

“I am not sure it is an ideal situation. I do not support it; I think the NGOs in the field need to become self-sufficient to some extent at least around things that are important…”

It can be costly for a large INGO to hold kidnap and ransom insurance coverage, and the researcher believes this could be a contributing factor to the large group of participants in this study that mentioned the framework for security cooperation between NGOs and United Nations, the ‘Saving Lives Together’ framework, as a potential avenue for assistance in a hostage crisis. United Nations train at least 20 new hostage incident managers annually, and have more than 100 active trained managers. Having such a pool of trained managers
available has allowed the UN to maintain fully self-sufficient, and stay true to
the policy of not paying ransom for the recovery of abducted staff. The majority
of participants, 9 of 12 that commented on the framework, were positive to a
strengthened cooperation. This would act as the deployment of an expert from
the insurance provider; one or two members from the pool of trained hostage
incident managers would deploy as advisors to the NGO crisis team. The 2013
Aid worker security report cautions against relying extensively on outside
assistance: ‘Outside expertise in crisis management and negotiations can
undoubtedly be helpful, but it is likewise important for agency staff to be well
trained and prepared for such events’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 9).

If such cooperation between the INGOs and UN were to take place, the UN
would not act as negotiators, and would not take decisions, but simply provide
advice. There are naturally both legal and financial concerns surrounding such a
cooperation, but it could reduce the cost of managing a hostage crisis from the
NGOs perspective, and United Nations would gain even further experience and
expertise in managing these often protracted hostage cases.

5.6.5 The use of specialist functions in managing a hostage crisis

The researcher aimed to determine whether the INGOs sampled had in place two
specialist functions that assist in managing hostage cases: a psychologist and a
media manager. Broder and Tucker (2011, p. 265-266); Phillips (2011, p 849);
indicate clearly that the psychological impact of being taken hostage is
significant. Hostage taking places a heavy burden, especially psychologically,
on all the people involved in both the crime and the management of the
incident—including hostages, hostage takers, security forces, colleagues,
managers, and families. Victims of hostage situations therefore include more
than just those who are taken.

One way to describe relationships in conflict is to use a method called conflict
mapping. This is a technique used to describe a conflict graphically, placing the
conflicting parties in relation to each other as well as to the problem (Fisher et al., 2007, p. 22).

The role of psychologists
The third organising theme under the global theme of Human Resources is the use of a psychologist during a hostage crisis. In the event of an abduction, a psychologist can have multiple and important roles to play: helping the hostage crisis management team to deal with the stress, assessing the psychology of the hostage taker, and providing appropriate counselling for the hostage post rescue. Most organisations have access to psychologists who are specially trained to handle hostage cases. Most of the respondents in this study agreed that the need for a psychologist in the hostage management is fundamental.

All 16 INGO participants agreed that a psychologist or mental health worker was required as part of the overall case management of a hostage situation, and all ten experts agreed. The participants varied in their opinions as to how best to use such a resource, and the responses included:

- Assisting the family as liaison or with psychological support.
- Profiling the hostage takers. In this case the psychologist or stress counsellor would listen in on the negotiation and assist the hostage incident management team with tactical and strategic advice based on observations about the hostage takers.
- Assessing the hostage. Through observation, the psychologist would focus on the well-being of the hostage.
- Assisting the hostage incident management team in managing their stress levels and in the design of reception plans.
- Assisting other staff involved in the operation to manage stress and other emotions resulting from the abduction.

The data from the interviews conducted for this study showed (Figure 5.14) the most important roles of a psychologist to be assisting family and the hostage incident management team:
While the point on assisting family was expected, the role in assisting the hostage management team in managing the crisis registered surprise with the researcher. The stress and pressure on the team working to secure a safe rescue of a hostage is often overlooked, but the participants seemed very much aware.

In the interviews, the statements in favour of using an internal or external psychologist or stress counsellor were strong.

One INGO participant stated: “Psychologist or a stress counselor is a must in my understanding.”

According to another: “Well, I think we cannot over-emphasise the need of having a stress counselor or psychologist to be part of the hostage incident management team.”

A third was unequivocal: “That as well is extremely important one. One of the big lessons learned from the kidnapping we had was that we need to put it in early, we need to have it almost from day one.”

The expert participants were in accordance with the need for the assistance of a psychologist, but one pointed out it had to be the right person for the job:

“... and this comes from experience, it is important for me that the right sort of psychological help is there and it is important that whichever psychologist is chosen, if not an experienced or trained negotiator but one that fully understands the field negotiators are working.”

Figure 5.14: Participants’ views on role of psychologist during hostage crisis
If a psychologist is used, his or her work during the hostage case is predominantly to assist the family of the hostage and to monitor the hostage incident management team. The psychologist is perhaps the ideal family liaison, as they are professionally skilled in managing extreme emotions, as can be the case with family of a hostage. It is important that the crisis team has a close contact with the psychologist, but each crisis structure and resource capacity will dictate where this person is best placed during the crisis. There may be some advantages in having a psychologist sitting with the negotiation cell, as this person could then be used for other purposes, such as managing the stress of the crisis team itself.

In line with the majority of responses obtained in this research, Regini (2002, p 13-18) confirmed that a crisis management team should be able to assess the psychology of hostage takers. The literature is quite explicit as to the impact a hostage event can have on the hostage’s family, as discussed earlier in this chapter. There is also an emerging recognition on the stress that is put on the hostage incident management team, with evidence in the literature reflecting disturbing stress to emergency workers (McMains, 1986, p. 365-368; Nielsen, 1986, p. 369-374; Somodevilla, 1986, p. 395-398), to police officers involved in shooting (Reese, Horn, and Dunning, 1991; Solomon and Horn, 1986, p. 383-393), and to military personnel involved in warfare (Mullins, 2008, p 63-81).

One expert participant expressed the importance of a psychologist to aid staff as well as the crisis team: “And also to look after the existing staff because there are enormous stresses and strains. Stressors as they like to call them don’t they? That team who are responding, specially the one who is having to do the talking as the number one responder, I don’t think it’s a luxury item, I think, it should be seen as one of the core components of the professional spot.”

A psychologist in the expert group, as could be expected, supported the role on several levels: “I think it is actually a profile and that can probably contribute at different levels. One is certainly depending of course on the openness of the person and kind of readiness of this professional also to be open to different signs to different developments that are going on.

I think that the training background that we have, we have the capacity of observation already, interpersonal level, intercommunication level, process levels so from our perspective, when I was a part of the crisis cell for example, I would be very much part of the discussions that were going on.
So that is from that perspective, I also think for the purpose of maintaining the link with the family, knowing what is happening within the crisis cell simply helps giving the grounds to reassure the family that the maximum is being done.”

**The Role of a media manager**

The fourth organising theme under the global theme of Human Resources is the use of a media manager during a hostage crisis. The presence of a media manager may be useful for the hostage incident management team on several levels. The United Nations takes this role very seriously, as lack of media management may result in harm to hostages. The guidelines read:

> Due to the fact that premature or erroneous disclosure of information related to a hostage incident can place the lives of hostage(s) in jeopardy, cause severe emotional distress to the families of the hostages and negatively affect the activities of the Organization, information concerning the hostage-taking shall only be disclosed by a duly authorized official of the Organization (United Nations, 2012, p. 2).

Furthermore, the guidelines continue, ‘The purpose [...] is to ensure that all media resources are coordinated in accordance with the media strategy.’

As with the question of including a psychologist on the crisis team, 24 participants supported the involvement of a media manager, while only one believed it to not be necessary. The participants that was not positive to a media manager stated:

> “Don’t feel strongly about it. I think the HIM has to provide the substance in terms of media communication. They have to agree on what can be released, what can be said.”

In contrast, the other experts were in strong support of including a media manager. One explained why: “For different reasons, again very valuable, and I’d imagine it would be foremost in the minds of the senior management of the organisation particularly sort of wider risk management and decision on to how to handle the organisation’s reputation, credibility, but also to ensure that the message is put out in the public domain consistent and do not adversely affect the sort of negotiations or the actions towards release that happen in the operational field level.”

An INGO participant supported the use of media management experts: “Again I think it’s imperative and in our new revised guidelines, since we don’t have communication people at all our programs, that’s someone that we will definitely send to the CMT locally to deal
the local press as well as having here in the communication department to work with the media strategy.”

A second provided a concise statement on the subject: “Absolutely essential, day one.”

The participants clearly expressed the importance of media management during a crisis, and most indicated that they had such resources in place. As with the psychologist, where in the crisis structure the media manager is placed will depend on plans and resources, but the media manager should contribute to plans and strategies.

Van Zandt (1993, p. 32-36) and Jenkins (1976) supports arguments for using someone to manage the media. With the advancement of social media, it is increasingly easy to reach a large public. As a result, hostage taking and abduction cases have become very effective in delivering a message. Van Zandt (1993) explained that the influence media on these activities has been utilized by the terrorist groups effectively. While the hostage taking may occur in an isolated area, the news of it could reach the entire world through media. Jenkins (1976) claimed that ‘Initial research tentatively suggests that heavy media coverage of hijackings, kidnappings and other hostile seizures carried out by terrorists increases the likelihood that similar incidents will occur in the period immediately following.’

5.7 Individual preparedness and knowledge

The researcher also aimed to explore in this study the answer to the question “What training and knowledge of hostage incidents and survival do INGO staff have access to?” From this, the fifth global theme in this study is Individual Preparedness. From this theme, two organizing themes emerged; training and the use of personal profile forms.

5.7.1 Personal training and preparation

The first organising theme under the global theme of Individual Preparedness is that of training. Romano and Rugala, in their 2011 study ‘Workplace Violence: Survival Mind-Set’ reveals that personal training and preparedness for the
possibility of a hostage situation are important to improve survival chances as well as recovery time post-release. However, security training can be a challenge for many INGOs. A recent study showed that more than 70% of respondents stated that their organisation valued security training highly, but 44% admitted that their organisation did not have sufficient resources for security training (European Interagency Security Forum, 2010). Most larger INGOs have an internal security training section, or at least an individual in charge of security training, but many operate in relative isolation. While some INGOs use professional training organisations such as RedR to deliver specific training, most utilise their employees to various extents.

From the respondents’ perspectives, pre-deployment security training is important. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.15 below:

![Bar chart](image)

**Figure 5.15: Participants’ views on the importance of training**

As seen above, 24 of the 26 participants, or 92%, deemed training important as individual preparation.

One participant expressed a clear opinion on the lack of preparedness with which some organisations deploy staff: “Well I think, according to my experience that there are far too many organisations placing their staff in situations that are completely unprepared. I mean, there’s a lot of missionary, faith-based organisations out there, I am not questioning their faith in God, but you know that at the end of the day, you just still got to be prepared. You just can’t leave it all to God.”
Fourteen of the fifteen responding INGO participants (93%) thought such training was important, and all ten experts agreed. Nine INGO participants stated that training should include a practical element of simulated hostage taking.

One participant described the value of such training: “If I had my way, that hostile environments type training, some of them are little weird but the good ones, I would send every person through it every year if I could because I haven’t found a better way to reach out to every type of person, who experiences things differently, because it all leaves an impression and they all make it to that higher level of awareness after these courses.”

Another referred to a solid organisational commitment: “Every single staff member is trained for a three-day course and hostage survival is a significant part of their training and people cannot travel without it, and it is being refreshed so I can tell you it is closing in to one hundred per cent coverage.”

There is at times strong competition between agencies for funding within the INGO world, and it is always better to prove that funding has been spent towards operations rather than overhead. Individual staff security training may have suffered from this. All participants acknowledged that individual staff training to prepare them for a high-risk environment, including being taken as a hostage, was important. However, the level of actual training delivery varied significantly. It appeared that the larger the INGO is, the more training it provides to its staff. The largest INGOs all had more or less systematic requirements for security training before staff were deployed to more risky environments. Former hostages are clear on the value of training; it is extremely important.

Not all INGOs have the capacity to have an in-house security staff, let alone a training team. And cost can be prohibitive for an NGO to systematically send staff to join training delivered by specialised NGOs or private entities in hostage survival training. There appear to be no easy solution to this problem. While it is clear that having training, for staff as well as crisis management teams, increase the likelihood of a successful outcome of a crisis, it is also clear that many organisations either do not have the resources available, or do not prioritise
security training sufficiently to offer this to all staff that could be exposed to a higher risk level.

Other groups that NGOs could compare themselves with in terms of risk exposure, such as journalists, seafarers in piracy-prone waters, and United Nations staff, all have far more systematic training requirements in place but for a few of the largest and best funded NGOs. Anthony Feinstein, Canadian psychiatrist and author of “Dangerous Lives: War and the Men and Women who Report It”, stresses the importance of mental preparedness and how essential it is to understand the dangers before journalists go to war and the potential symptoms of psychological distress. Feinstein conducted a seven-year long study, which highlighted that training and preparedness is key to tackle potential emotional repercussions (Gornitzki, 2007).

The above is in line with developments in parallel industries. The Human Cost of Piracy (Hurlburt and Seyle, 2012) imparted guidelines considered essential to ensure seafarer welfare in high risk areas. The programs and considerations mentioned include:

- Providing pre-departure education and training
- Ensuring contracts support continuation of employment status and entitlements
- Providing updated information on safety and the rights to avoid the risk
- Establishing family liaisons and humanitarian support of seafarers’ families
- Providing drills and exercises
- Understanding of who has responsibility for repatriation when a hostage is released from captivity
- Providing compensation and post-release care
In addition to the points above, it can be argued that there is a need for personal preparation of family of staff as well.

According to one participant: “Because one thing that I don’t want to have, and I think that is very common, that a lot of people working don’t tell the families enough about what they are doing good in attempt to protecting them before going to hostile environments.”

There can be no doubt that training forms an important part of preparation, and the voices of former hostages are uninform in emphasising the importance of individual preparation.

A former hostage among the participants described the impact of his training and preparedness: “I said it on my release and I still believe that any person who is going into a situation, working in a high-security situation, must have security training including hostage training, at least to know what to expect because it really allowed me to get through my experience.”

The participant continued: “You know, being taken hostage is a dehumanising experience, but a lot of it involves psychology... you have to realise that even though you’re basically dehumanised to the point of being an animal, you still have your wits about you and you have to maintain your ability to say no, you know, if you’re asked to do certain things it’s a slippery slope as I describe it, if you start going along with your captors on some things... So, if you can tell people that before sending them to the field, as I said half the battle, more than half the battle is psychological preparation and the ability to just keep on holding on in captivity... And part of that is advising people that, you know, your organisation will not give up on you...and that’s a pretty important thing, especially when you are hostage.”

Psychological preparation is only one aspect of hostage survival, but knowing how to respond to violence is another. When forced rescue is used, it is typically extremely aggressive and violent, and by design as confusing as possible to provide the hostage rescue team with optimal advantages. There are several examples through history of hostages having been killed during rescue, some of whom lost their lives because they made the wrong move. Muki Betser, second in command of Operation Thunderbolt—the Israeli operation to free the hostages on Air France Flight 139 in July 1976—explained: ‘From the elbow to the finger, you are ready to shoot. And you know your first shot has to hit him before he can hit you.’ Although 100 hostages were rescued, three hostages were killed, six terrorists, as well as 45 Ugandan soldiers protecting the terrorists. One of the hostages killed was Jean-Jacques Maimoni, who jumped in happiness upon the arrival of the army, shouting ‘Thank God we are free’, and was shot by
two in the assault team. His movement was in strong contrast to that of the other hostages, who all took cover.

One expert participant also believed training can make the difference between life and death in forced rescues:

“Often I wonder how much training Linda Norgrove had, and whether she would be alive today if she had known how to react during a forced release, if she had been trained on what to do during the hostage management training early in her career.”

5.7.2 The use of personal profile forms

Too often, plans for responding to a kidnap start at the moment of confirmation that an incident has occurred. However, individual preparation may begin much earlier. Some organisations use a form that is filled and placed in a sealed envelope to be accessed only in the case of abduction, a so-called ‘Red form’. This form includes personal details that can be used to obtain ‘proof of life’ in the form of answers to questions to which only the hostage could respond within a reasonable amount of time, and the use of such form became the second organising theme under the global theme Individual Preparedness.

As shown in Figure 5.16, eighty-five percent of the participants who provided an answer to this question were in favour of using personal profile forms.

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2 Linda Norgrove died from injuries sustained in an attempted rescue on 8 October 2010. A grenade thrown by the rescue team landed near her after she had tried to escape in the confusion.
Two INGO staff participants were not in favour of using such forms.

One stated that his or her reservations were logistical in nature: “In [INGO], the disadvantages of trying to do that corporately are just massive, it is too big an organisation to manage that kind of level of information, keep it up to date and so on which would not be possible, and to keep it confidential and all of these things that would come around it.”

Another did not see the need to go to such an extent: “We don’t go that far, we go for the proof of life form and passport information, and that’s for all staff and dependents.”

The only expert participant to speak against the use of personal profile forms stated: “I will be slightly controversial. I don’t think it helps save anybody’s life. And depending on the size of the organization, whether it is doable.”

The management of the data seemed to be the greatest concern, even for those in favour of the system. One INGO participant mirrored some of the concerns of those who were negative to the use of the forms:

“We have got a policy in place for that. It’s very difficult to maintain and very difficult to manage because the question is where you hold that documentation. Do you hold it at national office, do you hold it at regional office, do you hold it at headquarters, how do you collect the data, how do you send it in, how do you update it, staff rotate. So it is an ideal policy to have but it’s very difficult to uphold.”
Most expert participants felt personal profile forms to be useful; their reasons, however, differed substantially. One believed it would form a part of an individual’s preparation and, to a degree, provide informed consent:

“I think if that happens, obviously for the hostage incident manager it would just be invaluable help. Because you don’t need to think of proof of life questions there might be or whatsoever. On the other hand, given that this is such a rare event, I don’t know that it is practical to get this from all staff. Perhaps, in the hostile environments, I think it might be actually useful. I think in addition, when you do something like that, it’s also kind of part of preparation for the person.”

Another gave a practical reason: that having a personal profile form on file would speed up identification and repatriation in case of a hostage’s death in captivity. “A huge advantage is in hostage identification if dead bodies are returned because that speeds that process up.”

A third mentioned the core reason many organisations have such a system in place: to provide early proof of life. In addition to proof of life, proof of authority is important. Proof of authority means that the caller is in fact the one you should talk to, and not an opportunist hoax:

"I think the confidence is invaluable and that’s what’s important and proof of life forms that we talked about, not only practical in the sense that it’s good to have, for the organisation, the proof of life questions should that be needed, you get a very early call before you can get hold of a family member for proof of life question.”

The study clearly showed that having a system in place that stores personal information about staff in high-risk environments is of benefit. This information would include contact details for next of kin in more detail than normally collected, about where children go to school, blood group, and some sample proof-of-life questions. Proof of life questions are essentially questions only the hostage will be able to answer in a reasonable time, and hostage negotiators can use these both tactically and strategically. Such questions are extremely important during the first stages of contact to provide early proof of life. In essence, a question is asked, and the hostage, either directly or through the hostage takers, provides the answer. If the answer is correct, the assumption is that the hostage was alive at the time of the question, and negotiation can proceed. Of equal importance is to establish proof of authority. In high profile cases it is not uncommon for several groups or individuals to claim to hold the
hostage. Through the same mechanism the negotiation team obtains proof of authority, meaning that the caller is in fact the one you should talk to, and not an opportunist hoax. Where there are some challenges, such as continuous updating the profiles and ensuring that the information remains confidential until needed, the benefits appear to outweigh the negative aspects.

Katz and Caspi (2003, p. 199) states that at the pre-incident stage, management must obtain information about each staff that includes emergency contact numbers, relevant medical history, and special instructions in case of emergency. Having this information readily available not only enhances the personal safety of the employee but also makes it easier to support the family of an employee who is abducted.

### 5.8 Identifying a minimum standard

The last of the research objectives was to define a minimum standard, or what can be considered duty of care for an INGO with regard to managing hostage cases. Identifying a minimum standard also became the sixth and last global theme. The NGO security umbrella organisations, such as InterAction and ESIF have furthered the field of security policy, practice and guidelines significantly over the past years. Despite this, there appear to be no clear minimum standard when it comes to crisis management, including preparing for and managing a hostage crisis. For INGO managers there are two closely related concepts that are useful in understanding what managers are responsible for in carrying out their duties in relation to staff security: *due diligence* and *duty of care*. These two concepts are legalistic in nature and carry specific but variable meanings depending on the specific professional field employing the terms. For applications to management of security issues within the INGOs the legal meanings are not precise or well established, but the principles involved are important.

The participants in the current research identified four major issues, or organising themes, that should be considered in ensuring that an organisation
fulfils its duty of care towards staff with regard to hostage management. The four are, in order of counts for each:

a. Training

b. Policy

c. Plans

d. Informed consent

Figure 5.17 below shows how the participants view issues around duty of care for the organisation towards their staff.

![Bar Chart]

**Figure 5.17: Participants’ views on duty of care**

It is of great interest to the researcher that these four issues overlap closely with the specific research questions that emerged as the research progressed:

- What capacity do INGOs have in terms of human and financial resources to manage and contain a hostage situation?

- What training and knowledge of hostage incidents and survival do INGO staff in environments where hostage situations occur have access to?
- What do INGOs have in place in terms of policies and procedures for Hostage Incident Management?

The fourth question was on Duty of Care itself. The overlap again indicates to the researcher that the topics were of high relevance, and that the study has contributed to the knowledge in the field. It has become relatively clear through the study that INGOs to a large degree have policies and plans in place, but equally clear that, for some agencies, these plans and polices are too superficial, and do not specify issues in particular surrounding post-release assistance and abduction of family members.

Kemp and Merkelbach (2011, p. 50-54) quite specifically asserts that INGOs do have a duty of care toward their staff. These are not only of ethical and moral concern; INGOs have a legal obligation to provide a duty of care that covers safety and security. Thus, safety and security are not mere personal, subjective matters of choice or conscience, but represent a responsibility grounded with the organisation’s governance, potentially shared by its top executive.

One participant’s comment resonated with the weight of the legal aspect of duty of care: “When you stand in front of a jury of twelve, you can show then that you have done everything that is reasonable to keep your staff safe in line with what other organisations are doing. And that is not a cop-out. That’s the reality.”

The concept of duty of care easily transfers to the topic of the present research. Most hostages are taken because the hostage takers are hoping to obtain concessions from the organisation the victim works for, and not because the individuals have done anything wrong. In all cases, however, the hostage-takers want to extract something from the organizations or the outside world. They cannot get what they want from the hostages, so it is not the hostages themselves who are the important factor; they merely allow the hostage-taker to make an announcement (Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, 2001, p. 33). The organisation, and not the individual, therefore has the majority of the responsibility to put in place mechanisms to protect their employees.

Humanitarian aid activities are performed by people for people. The effectiveness and success of humanitarian aid initiatives especially depend on the contribution of well-prepared staff capable of operating in inhospitable and
dangerous situations. The work of an organisation operating in emergencies places great pressure on its staff. Therefore NGOs cannot ignore the duty of care that they have towards their staff, national and international, and should recognise their responsibility in guaranteeing the physical and psycho-social well-being of each employee, before, during and after working with the NGO (Piziali, 2009, p. 8).

Duty of care is what the courts have called ‘foreseeability’ in vicarious liability suits. Thus, an incident such as a hostage taking could be considered a foreseeable occurrence under vicarious liability statutes and case law, particularly if the organisation operates in a country or area with a known risk of hostage taking. In effect, such an organisation is a potential target and is under some obligation to protect its employees and property (Bolz et al., 2001, p. 33). When employees work across borders, duty of care involves risk management beyond the usual health and safety requirements of a familiar environment. Having travellers and expatriates introduces greater security risks, and employers have legal and moral responsibilities that extend duty of care as far as the dependents of international assignees (SOS-International, 2011). Breaching duty of care may give rise to legal action alleging negligence and may result in damages or in the criminal prosecution of the employer.

The legal responsibility may well be tested, as a lawsuit was filed in May 2011 in Manhattan Federal Court, United States of America, where former staff Flavia Wagner is sued Samaritan’s Purse, the NGO she worked for, and Clayton Consultants, the private security company that negotiated her release. Ms. Wagner alleges that the organisation that deployed her when she was abducted in the Abu Ajura area in Darfur in May 2010 “failed to train its security personnel adequately and of wilfully ignoring warning signs that abduction was a threat to foreigners”. The claimant was deployed “despite the fact that other non-government organizations had prohibited their employees from travelling in that area because of the threat of kidnapping” (Ax, 2011). The lawsuit further claimed that "While Samaritan's Purse possessed the resources to extricate plaintiff from her captivity quickly, it instead embarked on a plan designed to protect its own financial and political interest," and goes on to say "In the end,
Samaritan's Purse, its insurer and Clayton got precisely what they wanted - a minimal ransom payment. "Defendants achieved that objective only at the expense of plaintiff's health and well-being." (Shifrel, 2011)

5.8.1 Training

The first organising theme under the global theme of Identifying a Minimum Standard is training. Ten INGO staff participants listed training as a minimum requirement, and seven experts concurred, a total of 65% of the respondents. One expert participant held that INGOs are increasingly bound by the legal ramifications of the concept of duty of care:

“So much of our role is given by litigation, so I guess what I have seen is: the trend to get them to a certain level of preparedness or the training given first of all by public companies, the shareholders demanded that there was proper duty of care and level of preparedness and so many companies took a start and then other companies then followed to that suit... I think some sort of pre-departure training should be mandatory so that the people understand the dangers, and filling out of pre-deployment form should be standard and an understanding of what not to do, should you get kidnapped, and from there you can go on to full package, to having complete five-day course and table top exercises.”

Another participant prioritised training as a minimum requirement: “I think it's training not just of individuals but also for the managers themselves because the HEAT [Hostage Environment Awareness Training] actually just gives you certain things; it gives you an ability to understand avoidance and you get some awareness and then of course conduct during capture, but I think that you don’t want them to be kidnapped, I think that you should work quite high on the on the mitigation. That should be the minimum standards.”

Another gave a similar opinion: “We would expect that any NGOs sending out people here have given the people some training in personal security.”

5.8.2 Policy

The second organising theme under the global theme of Identifying a Minimum Standard is Policy. Ten INGO participants and five experts (58% combined) listed policy as a minimum requirement for an INGO to be considered as meeting its duty of care. One participant simply stated “to have a security policy” while another specified: “clear policy and guidelines”. Three of the ten INGO participants speaking about policy mentioned K&R insurance as a part of the policy.

The experts also referred to policy: “So having clear policy and procedures within the organisation is number one.”
The researcher believes that a clearly stipulated policy on key matters such as ransom payments, negotiation, limitation of personnel to be covered, and post-release assistance is fundamental to good hostage incident management. The policy forms the basis for planning a response, and allows staff to know how the organisation will assist in a crisis.

**5.8.3 Plans**

The third organising theme under this global theme is the development of plans. Seven INGO participants and six experts (50% combined) listed plans as a minimum requirement.

One mentioned “a crisis management manual, a specified management plan, where it is very clearly said that in the country office that who is doing what, in case of an abduction.”

A second simply said: “I would expect them to have a crisis management plan.”

An expert participant posited that the first question to ask when evaluating preparedness for a hostage case should be: “Do they have a crisis management plan and who implements it.”

As with policy, without at least a generic crisis management plan in place, the researcher believes the organisation is failing in providing duty of care towards its staff. These plans must be flexible enough to allow for the certain unexpected element, but rigid enough to allow a predictable response.

**5.8.4 Informed consent**

The fourth and last organising theme under this global theme is the development of plans. Informed consent was cited by three INGO participants and six experts, 35% combined, as a fundamental element of duty of care.

One participant described informed consent as “being realistic about what the potential risk is. That is number one and for staff to understand that they have a responsibility also and that they are held accountable for fulfilling that responsibility.”

A second offered a succinct comment: “They should be aware of imminent risk.”

An expert participant simply said: “I think they should be aware of the situation that they are going into.”

Another stated: “Let’s start off with have we prepared the staff member, employee, do they know the risk they are taking and this is not about just hostage taking, it’s about the
Informed consent, like in academic settings means that the staff of the INGOs to the degree possible understand the risks of their jobs. Even further, they understand what their employer will and will not undertake or assist with in case they or a member of their family is taken hostage. The 2013 Aid worker security report explore this topic as well: ‘Perhaps the final aspect of an organisation’s responsibilities in risk management and ensuring that the risks of kidnapping are reduced to tolerable levels, is the duty to inform staff of the risks they face: and that in turn, the staff accept a degree of risk after having been made fully aware of the extent. This is establishing ‘informed consent’. The challenge in the case of kidnapping, as one aid agency security adviser pointed out, is that people are not good at calculating low-probability, high-impact scenarios. It is almost impossible to conceive of the consequences fully – made harder by the fact that, understandably, victims of kidnappings generally tend not to share their often highly traumatic experiences in the public realm. Taking the decision to work in a high-risk environment is therefore often done with an incomplete picture of what a kidnapping incident might entail and how the individual would cope if it happened’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 11)

In the largest study of humanitarian security to date, data from the period 1997-2005 was collected from the from the International Committee of the Red Cross, ten UN aid organisations, domestic chapters of the Red Cross/Red Crescent and forty-six NGOs (Stoddard et al., 2010). The study found that nearly one in three deaths of aid workers occurred within ninety days of the workers reaching their particular workplaces, and that approximately twenty per cent of all deaths occurred within the first month. This is a clear indication of the importance for humanitarian workers of acquiring an adequate understanding of the operating environment before deploying into it (Stoddard et al., 2010); they need to have informed consent.

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter has combined information from the literature with data drawn from interviews concerned with the preparedness and responses of international non-
governmental organisations to hostage situations. Using qualitative analysis of the participants’ responses, the researcher identified findings from the data and made use of a narrative format to interpret the findings of the study. The next chapter will provide a summary of the main findings as well as recommendations and a discussion of the study’s shortcomings and significance.
Chapter 6: Summary of Study, Conclusions, and Recommendations

6.1 Introduction

As an aide to the reader, the final chapter of this thesis provides a brief overview of the study. The importance of the research is explained, and the researcher discusses ways in which the findings may have implications on policy and practices. The researcher also makes recommendations for future research studies in the field of hostage management.

6.2 Summary of the Study

The INGO community generally accept that there is a need for better security management and protocols, and the interest organisations in both United States and Europe are working systematically on this. Despite this, there is still a lack of basic empirical knowledge about the existing policies, knowledge and capability of INGOs to handle hostage incidents.

Unfortunately, due to the increasing trends, INGOs are getting more experienced in managing hostage crises, but there is still a considerable level of confusion and uncertainty about the way these crises have been solved and the way their success can be seen in relation to other crises. As there are no international hostage management standards, the study aimed to understand how INGOs prepare themselves for hostage incidents, whether policies, procedures are in place, how they manage hostage situations, and also how INGO staff on an individual basis are trained and prepared.

The literary review was extensive for this study, as the scope of this study, hostage management for INGOs, spans several disciplines and sub-topics. The most important research to aid this study has been that of Abby Stoddard and Adele Harmer. Since 2002, their extensive research has made an important contribution to widening and deepening the collective knowledge related to humanitarian security management. Stoddard and Harmer’s publications tackle a number of different sub-topics pertaining to the field of humanitarian security.
and have been widely distributed within the aid community, contributing to increasing awareness on the issue and shaping discussions around it.

In the field of crisis management, W. Timothy Coombs was an important influence, as outlined in the theoretical framework of this study. This study follows the crisis management framework of Coombs, where hostage taking is categorised as an attack on the organisation from the outside. Coombs suggests that the managers of a crisis should aim to match their crisis responses to the level of responsibility and threat posed by a crisis, and a hostage case is without doubt a serious threat for most organisations. However, the most useful framework for this study in terms of crisis management is an approach designed by Dennis Smith in 1990 that has a three-stage approach that follows a pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis format.

The contributors in the specific field of hostage management were also numerous. The research by Randall G. Rogan on emotions and hostage crises formed an instrumental part in understanding the inter-personal dynamics in play during negotiations, and Romano’s research on personal communication was important to understand the paradoxes of a hostage negotiation.

The methodology adopted for this study was qualitative in nature. It comprised conducting interviews with sixteen INGOs and ten industry experts; review of INGO documents, policies and plans; and meeting with respondents in hostage management. The qualitative method was required to gain a continuously created, deductive experience, as there are some sub-fields of hostage incident management that are challenging to research using official data and survey methods in a quantitative way, such as kidnap and ransom insurance (for which admitting to having a policy may render the insurance null and void) and duty of care in actual cases.

6.3 Conclusions of findings

INGOs are prepared at a higher level than the researcher expected, but there are still gaps identified through this study that would benefit both organisations and hostages should they be addressed. The most unexpected element of the study
was the relative common use of Kidnap and Ransom insurance. INGOs put forward a public stand of not paying ransom, but it appears increasingly common to take advantage of ransom payment to secure the release of staff. In essence, if each INGO see their Duty of Care and accountability in a Micro environment, they are responsible only to ensure the safe release of their staff as quickly and safely as possible. However, in a Macro or global setting, each action by an INGO to a degree could influence the security of other INGOs and their staff, and the payment of one INGO could lead to a more negative environment for another INGO. The solution to this problem is not within the scope of this study, and each INGO will have to examine their own ethical and legal guidelines and procedures.

There appear to be no lack of willingness of INGOs to cover the cost of responding to hostage cases, both in financial and human terms. However, it appears more complicated to invest in prevention, individual training, and crisis management rehearsals and exercises. Most INGOs have a limited capacity to systematically engage into a structure hostage negotiation process, especially with the added element of staying on top of trends and patterns that could assist in a positive outcome of the case. Hence, the INGOs use K&R insurance to gain access to experts to manage and prepare for such crises.

While most INGOs have a core policy in place for managing a hostage crisis, only some have the detailed policy that is required. Many INGOs group hostage together with their generic crisis management plan, with the added public statement of no ransom payment. However, the researcher believes both organisations, family of staff, and hostages will benefit from more extensive details in the policy, such as the duration of after care and insurance coverage of family of staff.

### 6.3.1 Contributions

The following are the main research contributions of this thesis:

**A comprehensive database of humanitarian hostage cases.** The researcher has compiled, merged, verified, and analysed data from a range of open sources as well as from a few restricted organisational sources. The researcher makes no
claim to have identified all hostage cases, but believes the data represents the most comprehensive data set available.

**Trend towards financially motivated abductions.** This study has showed that the trend for humanitarian hostage cases was towards financially motivated abductions. In financially motivate cases, the NGO can influence the outcome through payment, something not always possible in politically motivated hostage cases. This can have direct implications for negotiation models and INGO policy development.

**Increased willingness to engage external assistance.** INGOs were in general open to obtaining outside assistance to help manage a hostage case. This has in the past been little discussed, and the INGO community could benefit from information sharing and group frameworks to lower the cost of such assistance. A larger volume of NGOs approaching the insurance or security industry would likely lower the premium, while at the same time ensure a minimum standard in crisis preparedness for the subscribers to such services.

**Increasing use of ransom payment.** In the past, discussing ransom payments have been taboo, but this study has shown that it is increasingly a reality of operating in complex operations, with a large number of staff, in a high risk environment. Each INGO likely see their duty of care through a legal perspective only towards their own staff, and not towards the broader perspective of the INGO community as a whole.

**Discrepancy between stated training requirement and delivery of training.** The study has shown that there is a discrepancy between the seriousness INGOs place on training for staff in high risk environments, and the actual ability to deliver such training.

### 6.4 Limitations

Limitations are the potential weaknesses or problems with the study identified by the researcher. One potential limitation of the research was time. As the data was collected over a four month period, the data represents a snapshot dependent
on conditions occurring during that time. The researcher tried to mitigate this limitation by inviting the most seasoned experts possible to participate, thus providing a more global view. A further potential limitation of the analysis relates directly to the topic of kidnap and ransom insurance. Since the insurance stipulates that revealing the fact that the INGO is a policy holder may render the insurance null and void, the participants may not have revealed the extent of their insurance coverage. The major potential limitation of the study was that the data were gathered only from a limited segment of the entire INGO community. The participants may, therefore, not be representative of the INGO population as a whole.

6.5 Recommendations

6.5.1 Recommendations for further research

The researcher identified some topics that should be further explored through research to fill what the researcher perceives to be gaps in the existing knowledge.

Revise negotiation models

The first issue did not derive from participant interviews, but rather from the literature review combined with the researcher’s field experiences. The negotiation models that were explored in chapter 2 are mostly designed for short term cases, such as cases when someone is being held hostage by their spouse or sieges and barricade situations. While these models are generally designed to quickly establish a level of rapport with the hostage takers, they do not in themselves always take the negotiation forward from that point. The dynamics and intensity in contact between the hostage takers and the crisis management team is different in a two-day siege than a twelve-month hostage case.

The model used mostly with police and the UN is that of the Behavioural Influence Stairway Model (BISM) developed by Vecchi in 2005. The BISM is a model of behaviour change grounded in the principles of active listening; it was adapted from a model developed by the FBI. The model is designed to reach a level where the hostage negotiators can begin to influence behaviour change in
the hostage takers, with the ultimate goal of releasing them unharmed. However, the researcher found that there is little concrete action to take once the top of the stairway (the behavioural change plateau) has been reached. The researcher, albeit not an expert in negotiation theory, suggest a merging of the stairway model with that of the Cylindrical Model of Crisis Negotiation devised by PJ Taylor in 2002. This model seems to operate mostly in the behavioural influence level, and the model proposes the existence of three different motivational emphases within negotiation behaviour, classifying these as instrumental, relational, and identity themes. The first theme refers to behaviour linked to the subject’s instrumental needs, which can be described as tangible commodities or wants. The second theme refers to behaviour linked to the relationship or affiliation between the negotiator and the subject; the third theme refers to the negotiating parties’ concern for self-preservation and ‘face’. This is in line with conflict management theory of recent, and outlined in the theoretical framework of the study, stating that emotions are increasingly valued as a key component in solving the conflict.

The researcher believes the element of emotions need to be managed. Often, the hostage negotiator’s sole focus is the release of the hostage, and rightly so as an end goal. However, there will be no motivation for the hostage taker to release the hostage if he perceives the release as a “loss”. Hence, ‘face’ and emotions, in the researcher’s opinion, form a key component in ensuring the safe release of the hostage.

**Improved database of NGO hostage cases**
Without an accurate database of incidents, it can be difficult to interpret trends and scope of hostage cases. At the moment the aid worker security database (AWSD), the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events database (ITERATE), and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) database are the most reliable, but with a significant focus on terrorism, or political hostage taking. As the trends in this study points towards financially motivated abductions, many of these events may not be registered. Investment, both in financial and human resource terms, to research and maintain a database would allow sufficiently high quality data to begin developing pattern analysis, a significant element in preventing hostage
cases taking place. Further, knowing patterns and location specific modus operandi by hostage takers would possibly reduce error margins for the negotiation team. This, however, would require that the INGO community report their cases to the database.

6.5.2 Recommendations for policy

Training
The importance of pre-deployment training was emphasised by the participants, and matches that of former hostages the researcher has spoken to. Training will assist on many levels; in detecting surveillance, in identifying gaps in procedures, and in surviving a period of captivity. The researcher recommends that all staff going to an operation with a realistic hostage threat should undertake some level of hostile environment training before deployment, or immediately upon arrival to the duty station. Further, in environments with a realistic risk of abductions, refresher trainings should be organised regularly to limit complacency. This is in line with statements from aid practitioners interviewed for the 2013 Aid worker security report, which made the point that kidnappings generally happen to ‘individuals who are not following SOPs for risk avoidance – often because they have grown complacent after working in the context for a long time.’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 9)

The more synchronised the NGO staff is in their security management, the easier it will be to detect surveillance and reduce the number of abductions. Detecting surveillance offers the only opportunity to prevent the attack, after this, one is simply managing an abduction. The Aid worker security report for 2013 also mentions this as a key point: ‘Counter-surveillance is also critical: agencies must remain on the lookout for anyone who appears to be observing their facilities and staff movements. This can be aided by a strong local network of supporters and informants.’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 9)

INGO hostages have an alarmingly high casualty rate in hostage cases, 17 per cent versus the global rate of 9 per cent. There are likely many causes behind this high level, and lack of training may be one of these. Especially dangerous is the capture phase, where adrenaline runs high on all sides, and mistakes are often
punished immediately with violence. Practical training and simulations can to a degree mitigate unpredictability from the hostages’ perspectives.

At the crisis management level training is also important. Training will, to a degree, add a level of predictability to a crisis, as many elements would have emerged and been managed during the crisis. This underscores the importance of advanced preparation for managing a hostage incident, both from the perspective of the crisis team and that of the hostage. There is support in research for ensuring training for the crisis management team as part of the preparation. Romano and Rugala, in their 2011 study ‘Workplace Violence: Survival Mind-Set’ identified great disparities in responses between those who have and those who have not been trained to deal with any type of critical situations (Figure 6.1 below).

![Diagram: Startle and Fear](image)

**Figure 6.1: Untrained and trained responses**

Both groups initially react by being startled and experiencing fear. Then, they begin to diverge: the untrained panic, whereas the trained experience controllable anxiety. From that point on, the trained group members begin to recall what they should do next, prepare, and act. The untrained, however, experience disbelief that eventually leads to denial and, ultimately, helplessness.
**Saving Lives Together**

United Nations and INGOs should review the Saving Lives Together (SLT) framework to see whether providing advice to a crisis management group during a hostage case could be feasible. While there may be legal concerns, both the INGOs and United Nations could benefit from such an arrangement. The main purpose of the SLT is to ‘improve coordination and cooperation between the UN and NGOs’, and hostage management is a field where United Nations has far better experience and management capacity than most, if not all, INGOs, and can therefore contribute to improve their security.

**Kidnap and ransom insurance**

Few of the INGO participants had in-house capacity to engage directly with hostage takers through negotiation. This is a specialist skill that needs repeated practice, and more importantly, a constant awareness of trends and practices for abductions in the area of operations. It can, quite literally, be a matter of life and death to understand the finer dynamics of threats and demands. If such demands or communications are misunderstood by the crisis management the risk to the hostage can increase. Only an organisation that is fully engaged with mapping trends and practices will have a realistic chance of being aware of what it will take to ensure a safe release of the hostage. The United Nations have a few centrally placed persons that are involved in almost all cases, and therefore learn from each case. In addition, because of the large organisational structure, with influence in literary every country in the world, access to intermediaries that can influence the outcome of a case is often easier. Only a few INGOs can claim the same, simply because their respective organisations and security structures are much smaller, so a realistic alternative is to use an external expertise.

It would have to be a policy decision based on existing capacity to which level each INGO would require insurance coverage. Factors to consider include negotiation capacity and post-release assistance capacity. The post release assistance can be substantial: ‘despite perceptions of significant sums being paid in ransom, in fact ransom (when it is paid) is often the smallest expense of all the expenses covered by the policy, compared to the sizable post-release expenses, such as medical and psychological care, and litigation expenses’ and
‘K&R insurance policies cover ransom payments as well as ‘ancillary benefits’ including crisis management costs such as a negotiation advisor, rehabilitation expenses for former hostages, the costs of reconnecting family and friends, and dismemberment benefits, if relevant. Legal liability is also an important element in many of these policies, as lawsuits often follow cases where international staff have been kidnapped’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, 2013, p. 11). For an organisation without internal capacity, the use of kidnap and ransom insurance, whether the ransom reimbursement component is included or not, would aptly augment their capacity to respond to an incident as well as show a level of Duty of Care for the staff of the organisation.

6.5.3 Recommendations for practitioners

Conflict mapping
Practitioners managing a case that is prolonged may struggle to clearly identify dynamics of all the actors, and especially notice change over time. Conflict mapping focuses on actors and their interrelationships, and using such a tool can bring clarity in which relationships can be engaged and approached, and which should not be. Especially visual, or spatial, learners will benefit from having the core issues mapped out using this tool. Therefore, hostage incident managers and negotiators should gain knowledge in conflict mapping techniques.

Information sharing
The researcher recommends that the INGOs establish a forum for their hostage incident managers or negotiators where information can be shared. It is typically the same group of hostage takers, or at least groups using the same procedures and tactics, behind most hostage takings in an area. One INGO can therefore learn much from another case that has been concluded, no matter what the outcome. This provides a negotiator with a significant tactical advantage when starting the negotiation for a new case; instead of starting without any knowledge, some shortcuts can be made towards establishing rapport and the ability to influence the case towards a positive outcome.
6.6 Conclusion

The sensitivities of researching hostage management added a level of complexity to the already task of researching any field of knowledge. Hostage cases generally affect organisations in a number of negative ways, such as in the loss of operational tempo, medical expenses, and potentially death or severe trauma. Most importantly, however, a hostage case affects real people, whether that be the hostage, friends and family of the hostage, the crisis management team, or colleagues of the hostage. The stakes are high, and can literally be a matter of life and death. As such, collecting information on this topic was not an easy task. However, the findings from this study should assist INGOs to improve management of hostage cases and therefore reduce the trauma, or even save the lives, of hostages.
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Appendix 1: Interview guide

a. I want to thank you for taking the time to talk to me today. My name is Kjell Lauvik and I would like to talk to you about your views on Hostage Management for International NGOs.

b. The interview should take less than an hour.

c. I will be taping the session because I don’t want to miss any of your comments. Although I will be taking some notes during the session, I can’t possibly write fast enough to get it all down. Because we’re on tape, please be sure to speak up so that we don’t miss your comments.

d. All responses will be kept confidential. This means that your interview responses will only be shared with research team members and we will ensure that any information we include in our report does not identify you as the respondent.

e. Remember, you don’t have to talk about anything you don’t want to and you may end the interview at any time.

f. Are there any questions about what I have just explained?

g. Are you willing to participate in this interview?
Semi-structured Interview Guide – NGO staff

Demographics

Name:

What category of NGO staff are you:

|--------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|

How many employees (approx) in the organization?

How many full time security professionals (international and local)

Where does your organization work? (countries, capitals, etc)

General Characteristics

1. What trends do you see in abduction of NGO staff?
   a. (Probe: How many staff from Non-Governmental Organizations do you believe to be kidnapped or taken hostage globally per year?)

External Assistance

2. What are the advantages or disadvantages of obtaining kidnap and ransom insurance for NGOs?

3. What do you think about Kidnap and Ransom insurance as a realistic private option for staff, as well as for family and dependents of staff, working for an International NGO?

4. What are your thought around pros and cons of utilizing a commercial entity in managing a hostage crisis for NGOs?

Preparedness & Policy

5. What are the advantages or disadvantages of having a clear policy, plans and procedures in place for managing hostage cases?
   a. (Probe: Does your organization have such clear policy, plans and procedures in place for managing hostage cases?)
6. What resources (human and financial) would be required to typically manage a hostage crisis for more than 4 weeks? (Example: Two international staff abducted in Darfur)
   a. (Probe: Does your organization have such resources available in case of a hostage crisis?)

7. To which extent do you believe that your organization should take an active role in perusing legal justice against the hostage takers after the release of the hostages?

8. What responsibilities or accountability do you feel the NGO has to respond to hostage taking of family or dependents of their staff?
   a. (Probe: Does your organization have a clear policy in place for managing hostage cases of family or dependents?)

9. Who should cover the cost of managing a hostage situation for NGO staff?

**Managing the crisis**

10. United Nations has a pool of trained Hostage Incident Managers, and these are deployed on a cost-share basis in a crisis. Is there a way for the NGO community to do something similar?

11. How important is it for staff (both in HQ and in the operations) to manage the first contacts from the hostage takers correctly?
   a. (Probe: Does your organization know how to manage first contact from hostage takers)

12. How do you feel about having a stress counsellor / psychologist as a member of the Hostage Incident Management team? How would you best use such a resource?

13. How do you feel about having a media management expert as a member of the Hostage Incident Management team?

14. How would you describe the importance of having a hostage Reception Plan in place in each operation, clearly outlining the immediate steps to be taken upon release of a hostage?
   a. (Probe: Does your organization have reception plans in place?)

15. What is the key role of the organization’s security professionals in a hostage crisis?
16. What do you consider to be the key role of the executive officer in the operations (i.e. Head of Office, Country Representative, etc.) during a hostage crisis?

17. What do you consider to be the key role of the host government during a hostage crisis?

18. What do you consider to be the key role of the home nation/embassy of the abducted staff during a hostage crisis?

19. To which degree do you think the family and dependents of the hostage should be consulted and informed throughout the incident?

20. What assistance and follow-up should be provided to a former hostage after release?
   a. (Probe: Does your organization have procedures in place for post-release follow-up?)

**Individual staff preparedness**

21. What personal training and preparation should staff working in medium-high risk environments have?
   a. (Probe: Does your organization provide opportunity for your staff to obtain the necessary level of training and preparation? What percentage of staff receive such training?)

22. What are the advantages or disadvantages of having completed personal profiles to aid any hostage recovery process (proof-of-life questions, photos, descriptions, etc.).
   a. (Probe: Does your organization have a system in place to manage personal profiles for hostage cases?)

**Miscellaneous**

23. What should staff of NGOs be able to “Reasonable expect” in terms of preparation and management of Hostage Incidents (What do you consider “minimum standards”).

24. Do you have any other comments, recommendations or observations regarding Hostage management for NGOs?
Interview Guide Expert

h. I want to thank you for taking the time to talk to me today. My name is Kjell Lauvik and I would like to talk to you about your views on Hostage Management for International NGOs.

i. The interview should take less than an hour.

j. I will be taping the session because I don’t want to miss any of your comments. Although I will be taking some notes during the session, I can’t possibly write fast enough to get it all down. Because we’re on tape, please be sure to speak up so that we don’t miss your comments.

k. All responses will be kept confidential. This means that your interview responses will only be shared with research team members and we will ensure that any information we include in our report does not identify you as the respondent.

l. Remember, you don’t have to talk about anything you don’t want to and you may end the interview at any time.

m. Are there any questions about what I have just explained?

n. Are you willing to participate in this interview?
Semi-structured Interview Guide – Industry Expert

Demographics

Name:

What category of expert are you:

<table>
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<th>Former Hostage</th>
<th>Private or commercial solution</th>
<th>Stress counselor / physiologist</th>
<th>Hostage negotiator / manager</th>
<th>Hostage survival trainer</th>
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</table>

General Characteristics

1. What trends do you see in abduction of NGO staff?
   a. (Probe: How many staff from Non-Governmental Organizations do you believe to be kidnapped or taken hostage globally per year?)

External Assistance

2. What are the advantages or disadvantages of obtaining kidnap and ransom insurance for NGOs?
   a. (Probe: Do you think NGOs use K&R insurance?)

3. What do you think about Kidnap and Ransom insurance as a realistic private option for staff, as well as for family and dependents of staff, working for an International NGO

4. What are your thought around pros and cons of utilizing a commercial entity in managing a hostage crisis for NGOs.

Preparedness & Policy

5. What are the advantages or disadvantages of having a clear policy, plans and procedures in place for managing hostage cases?
   a. (Probe: Do you think NGOs in general have adequate policies, plans, and procedures in place?)

6. What resources (human and financial) would be required to typically manage a hostage crisis for more than 4 weeks? (Example: Two international staff abducted in Darfur)
7. To which extent do you believe that an INGO should take an active role in perusing legal justice against the hostage takers after the release of the hostages?

8. What responsibilities or accountability do you feel the NGO has to respond to hostage taking of family or dependents of their staff?

9. Who should cover the cost of managing a hostage situation for NGO staff?

Managing the crisis

10. United Nations has a pool of trained Hostage Incident Managers, and these are deployed on a cost-share basis in a crisis. Is there a way for the NGO community to do something similar?

11. How important is it for staff (both in HQ and in the operations) to manage the first contacts from the hostage takers correctly?

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21. What personal training and preparation should NGOs have?

22. What are the advantages or disadvantages of having completed personal profiles to aid any hostage recovery process (proof-of-life questions, photos, descriptions, etc).

Miscellaneous

23. What should staff of NGOs be able to “Reasonable expect” in terms of preparation and management of Hostage Incidents (What do you consider “minimum standards”).

24. Do you have any other comments, recommendations or observations regarding Hostage management for NGOs?
### Appendix 2: List of documents reviewed

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