EFFECTIVENESS IN MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) FOR REFORMS AT PROGRAMME LEVEL WITH SOME EMPHASIS ON INVOLVEMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS

(THE KENYAN CONTEXT)

by

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First and Foremost I want to thank My God, Our Lady Our heavenly Mother for protecting and bringing me to completion of this particular journey, I undertook three years ago.

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I am greatly indebted to my family and boyfriend for all the support, love, incessant nagging and enduring long absences from each other’s company. And to everyone else that has contributed, I say THANK YOU VERY MUCH!
DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to my parents (Brown and Iris Ondego) especially my father, who has instilled in me the greatest gift of all, knowing I belong, which in turn, gives me the courage and conviction to stand up and be counted in the hallowed halls of history.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Kenya’s Vision 2030 is a long-term development strategy for the country. The ultimate goal and mandate for all pillars of governance to adhere too. The bible for every man, woman and child, who call this nation its home.

The aim of is to create “A globally competitive and prosperous country with a high quality of life by the year 2030, transforming Kenya into a newly-industrializing middle-income country, providing a high quality of life to all its citizens in a clean and secure environment” (Kenya Vision 2030) Implementation of the vision will be through medium-term plans of five year cycles.

The vehicle the Government has chosen is Results Based Management. Results-Based Management (RBM) was introduced in Kenya in 2003 by the NARC Government. Several initiatives have been undertaken to institutionalize RBM in all MDAs. Due to this, there is a tremendous paradigm shift from processes to results. However, the systems in place have not only no clear guidelines of engaging stakeholders but also M&E systems in place measure only the outcomes and not how these outcomes were achieved. Thus making reporting ‘Results for Kenyans’ a tedious exercise. This study examined the impact of stakeholder engagement and the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluating in the achievement of Vision 2030.

The study was conducted at the Public Service Transformation Department (PSTD). Stratified sampling was used to draw a sample of 30 government officers, and four key informants based on their departments and accountabilities.

Both quantitative and qualitative data was collected using structured questionnaires, interview guides and direct observation. Quantitative
data was then analyzed using SPSS and presented by way of frequency distribution tables, percentages, graphs, and models. Qualitative data was collated and presented in narrative form.

The study found out there is similarities in both M&E and Stakeholder Engagement in there are systems in place. Both have established systems at the National level, (NIMES) for M&E and Public Private Partnerships there was none at the institutional level. Many of indicators for M&E are set at the top and imposed on the operational staff. Key informant interviews revealed that the existing system was not sustainable and would be an ideal point for entry of distortion and strategy dysfunction. Stakeholder Engagement has no policy or legislative framework to work from thus making the exercise look like a publicity stunt whenever Government seeks a consultative process especially when it comes to the ordinary ‘Mwananchi’ (Swahili word for citizens/people).

The study has established an urgent need to develop an institutional M&E system for tracking, measuring, evaluating and reporting the progress of results for Kenyans, a framework and policy to be created to encompass all manner of stakeholder engagement not only engagement with the private sector. This would make it easier on both the Institution that houses reform (PSTD) and the Central Government not only to gage how far or how near the country is attaining its ultimate goal of Vision 2030 but also reporting back and engagement with its stakeholders will be much easier, less tedious it would became ‘business as usual’ thus creating accountability and transparency resulting in winning the war on Corruption.
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<tr>
<td>APRM</td>
<td>African Peer Review Mechanisms</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AWP</td>
<td>Annual Work Plan</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Programme</td>
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<td>CPU</td>
<td>Central Planning Unit</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>CSRP</td>
<td>Civil Service Reform Programme</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Development Partners</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DPM</td>
<td>Directorate of Personnel Management</td>
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<td>ERS</td>
<td>Economic Recovery strategy</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GoK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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<td>HE</td>
<td>His Excellency</td>
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<td>IMC</td>
<td>Inter-Ministerial Committee</td>
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<td>IMTC</td>
<td>Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee</td>
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<td>IPAC</td>
<td>Institute of Public Administration - Canada</td>
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<td>IRMF</td>
<td>Integrated Risk Management Framework</td>
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<td>JSI</td>
<td>Joint Statement of Intent</td>
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<td>JRMI</td>
<td>Joint Review Mission</td>
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<td>KNDR</td>
<td>Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation</td>
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<td>KII</td>
<td>Key Informant Interviews</td>
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<td>KEPSA</td>
<td>Kenya Private Sector Alliance</td>
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<td>LFA</td>
<td>Log Frame Analysis</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>MMU</td>
<td>Ministerial Management Units</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Ministries, Departments and Agencies</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTP</td>
<td>Medium Term Plan</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium-Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<td>NARC</td>
<td>National Rainbow Coalition</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NIMES</td>
<td>National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Systems</td>
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<td>NMMU</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PC</td>
<td>Performance Contact</td>
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<td>PCSC</td>
<td>Performance Contracts Steering Committee</td>
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<td>PMF</td>
<td>Performance Measurement Framework</td>
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<td>PMS</td>
<td>Performance Management System</td>
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<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Programme, Planning and Budgeting System</td>
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<td>PRAS</td>
<td>Planning, Reporting and Accountability Structure</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Project Steering Committee</td>
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<td>DPR</td>
<td>Departmental Performance Report</td>
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<td>PSTD</td>
<td>Public Service Transformation Department</td>
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<td>PSRP</td>
<td>Public Service Reform Programme</td>
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<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-Based Management</td>
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<td>RPP</td>
<td>Report on Plans and Priorities</td>
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<td>RRI</td>
<td>Rapid Results Initiative</td>
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<td>SPSS</td>
<td>Statistical Package for Social Sciences</td>
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<td>TWG</td>
<td>Technical work Groups</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

Africa’s endemic poverty and pervasive underdevelopment have defied much of the development policy experiments of the last three decades. To be sure, no amount of excuses can hide the monumental failures of public policy in the past and complicity of Africans and the outside world in the process. In several aspects, the fault, to borrow the Shakespearean expression, ‘Is not in our stars but in us through several acts of omission and commission, and more so our leaders have short-changed the continent (Mkandawire Thandika and Soludo C. Charles, 1999). This has been Kenya's reality since the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) formed Government in 2003, where the incumbent president was swiftly removed on euphoria of finally having another government other than the one that had ruled Kenya since Independence. The NARC Government placed economic recovery on top of its policy agenda in order to reverse decades of slow and stagnant economic growth that had adversely undermined the well-being of Kenyans (Government of Kenya, 2003). In order to spur rapid economic growth, the new government developed an Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-07 (GoK, 2003), through which it underscored its commitment to transforming Kenya into a ‘working nation’.

Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-07

The ERS outlined the government’s commitment to improving performance and governance, reforming the public service as well shifting focus from a process-oriented to results-based approach to service delivery. The need to make the Public Service more effective, efficient and ethical in facilitating economic recovery and wealth creation led to the establishment of the Public Service Reform and Development Secretariat (PSR&DS) through Cabinet Memo No. 106 of September 2004. The Secretariat was mandated to (i) coordinate reforms of the Public Sector in Kenya, and (ii) institutionalize Results-Based Management
(RBM) in all government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) (GoK, 2006b).

The public sector reforms in Kenya have concentrated on two major initiatives, namely performance management through performance contracts and Institutionalizing Results-Based Management (RBM) in all public institutions. The implementation of RBM by Kenyan Public Service focused on Performance Contracting (PC) and Rapid Results Initiatives (RRI). Today, the Performance Contracts are signed between Government of Kenya (GoK) and every Head, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Accounting Officer of all government MDAs, through vigorous campaign, to ensure that the MDAs deliver services in the acceptable time to ‘wananchi’ (Swahili term for citizens).

A performance contract is a management tool for measuring performance against negotiated performance targets. ‘It is a freely negotiated agreement between the government acting as the owner of a government agency and the management of the agency (Greiling, Vol. 54 No.7, 2005). The Contract specifies the mutual performance obligations, intentions and responsibilities between two parties. Similarly, it addresses economic/social and other tasks to be discharged for economic or other gain. PCs also organize and define tasks so that management can perform them systematically, purposefully and with mind of achieving results. The expected outcomes of the introduction of the performance contracts include improved service delivery, improved efficiency in resource utilization, institutionalization of a performance-oriented culture in the public service, measurement and evaluation of performance, linking rewards and sanctions to measurable performance, retention or elimination of reliance of public agencies on exchequer funding, and enhancing performance.
During the initiation phase the Performance Contracts were introduced on a pilot in sixteen State Corporations, thirteen of them from the late 2004 to mid 2005. The remaining three were implemented from January through December 2005. In the evaluation stage the sixteen Corporations recorded an increase of 282 percent in pre-tax profits over the previous period (2003/04) and an increase of 14 percent over the set targets. “The lessons learnt from the pilot phase were incorporated in the introduction of performance contracts in all MDAs the following financial year. In order to prepare MDAs for implementation of PCs, a series of sensitization workshops targeting key stakeholders including Permanent Secretaries, Chairpersons of State Corporations, Chief Executive Officers, Chairpersons and Chief Officers of Local Authorities and Heads of Departments have been conducted since 2004.” All these reform initiatives were being coordinated by the then Public Sector Reform and Development Secretariat (PSR&DS).

Other tools which have been introduced in Kenya to measure the effectiveness of RBM include the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES), Performance Appraisal System (PAS) and Rapid Results Initiatives (RRI). BSC uses a set of “carefully selected set of quantifiable measures derived from the organizations strategy to communicate to employees and external stakeholders the outcomes and performance drivers by which the organisation will achieve its mission and strategic objectives” (GOK 2005). PAS “links government institutions and the public servants by developing a purposeful results-oriented direction which sets the scene for developing the strategic objectives of government and defining individual tasks” (Manning N and Hunt John1996).

NIMES is a set of thirty-one indicators cutting across all sector of the economy against which GoK measures the extent to which it has improved service delivery to its citizens. RRI has been used as an approach of fast-tracking the
achievement of strategic objectives of government institutions by setting short but challenging goals to be achieved over a period of one hundred calendar days.

Before the institutionalization of Results-Based Management (RBM) in the Public Service, the emphasis was on inputs, conformity to laws, regulations and procedures rather than on outputs, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Performance contracts and RRI have led to a huge hype within the public sector about a paradigm shift from approach (processes) to accomplishments (results). By focusing evaluation on negotiated performance targets, it is expected that MDAs will put in place structures, systems and processes which will ensure that these results are achieved.

Although goals, targets and results are mutually negotiated between the Government and the relevant MDA, there is no stakeholder involvement at this stage. Existing literature overwhelmingly suggest that this style of management can trigger employees' unethical behaviour of distorting the system or financial figures to report favourable results in the short-term. Thus resulting in negative public perceptions due to the sharp contrasts on what is on paper and the actual results that have been achieved. Existing literature also suggests that results-orientation without due regard to processes can lead to sub-optimization and stifle innovation.

The experience with RBM is full with examples of this kind of behaviour distortions. These assertions interrogate the role of both stakeholder engagement in M&E initiatives in assessing the progress of reform initiatives.

Kenya, in its quest to institutionalise RBM, developed several M&E tools to measure the effectiveness of RBM. These include the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Systems (NIMES), Performance Contracts (PC) and Performance Appraisal Systems (PAS). A glance through these systems, one is left to wonder how effective and
sustainable these systems are. The systems only measure and report on outcomes based on past activity, there is no consultative process; these are all inward based systems. Additionally, the indicators for measurement are highly generalized giving an impression that they may not be suitable for tracking progress of the reform agenda at the institutional level.

The expression and slogan used by Government to reiterate its commitment to transformation which in effect encompasses its reform agenda is the much publicized ‘what gets measured gets done’ and ‘Huduma Bora ni Haki Yako’ (Swahili for Quality Service is your Right). Although this is a credible principle in theory, practically it gets terribly lost when the stakeholders it is meant for do not relate to the results or when whatever is being measured is wrong in the first place. Since RBM and reform initiatives accompanying it are new to Kenya, it is imperative to measure the effectiveness of the existing M&E systems and how much stakeholder involvement is included in reporting, curbing strategy dysfunction and distortion behaviour during monitoring, evaluation and reporting of results.

1.3 Objectives
1.3.1 General Objective
The general objective of this study was to establish the effectiveness of stakeholder engagement in M&E at PSTD and to assess its suitability for curbing distortion behaviour during monitoring, evaluation and reporting of results at both Institutional and Programme Level.
1.3.2 Research Questions
This study was guided by the following research questions:

1. Do the monitoring and evaluation systems in place involve the various stakeholders in managing reforms to identify weaknesses and take corrective action?
2. Are the M&E systems credible and how far do they enhance stakeholder engagement in the reform programme?
3. Are the existing M&E systems, if any, amenable to strategy dysfunction and distortion behaviour?

1.4 Significance of the study
This study on the effectiveness of stakeholder engagement in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) will be of great importance in two fold:

First, the information generated by the study will help the government in developing better points of view, concepts and approaches to determine what should be done and how to go about the sustainable implementation of the performance contracts and rapid results initiatives.

State Corporations (SCs) and other MDAs will be able to obtain current information on the challenges and risks of performance contracting and RBM to build on their resource base. Employees will gain knowledge on RBM and most importantly will dispel the culture of hoarding information remove the mindset of individualism and suspicions that seems to have dogged previous regimes. Thus, imparting a culture of transparency and transforming the government into a citizen-centric organization.

Likewise, this study will provide more information to the general public, private sector and development partners regarding performance contracting and RBM which will enhance their understanding of the same.
Lastly, it will provide current literature regarding public sector reforms, stakeholder engagement, performance contracting and RBM in government institutions to researchers and scholars.

1.5 Scope of the study
This study was conducted at the Public Service Transformation Department. The study focused on technical officers of all cadres. These included programme assistants, programme officers, technical advisors, Rapid Results (RRI) coaches, Results-Based Management (RBM) coaches, Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Directors and Directors. These officers were drawn from the 4 major divisions of PSTD, namely Programme Management Division (PMD), Liaison Unit, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP),
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the review of related literature on the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of RBM initiatives, frameworks involving stakeholders. First, the review explored the timing and frequency of M&E and reporting of reform programmes including how the stakeholders are involved from various parts of the world. Then literature on how the M&E systems have affected the credibility of various reform programmes followed. This included an in-depth study of the tools and instruments for measuring reforms, the extent of stakeholder involvement in measuring and evaluating the reform agenda, and the dissemination of findings of such M&E. The researcher also reviewed how interrelationships between various institutional M&E systems and national systems promote linked government. The likelihood of strategic dysfunction and distortion behaviour resulting from the flaws in these M&E systems has also been assessed.

2.2 Timing and accuracy of Monitoring and Evaluation
There is a growing movement within the development community that a results or performance orientation in government is an important aspect of public sector management. This brings about an evolution from concentration of process to results and transparencies. This would be an avenue for improving the performance of government in terms of the quality, quantity and targeting of the services which the state produces. In support of this objective, a number of countries are working to ensure a results-orientation through not only building or strengthening their M&E systems but also the attainment of said results being participatory.

Existing literature overwhelmingly support the assertion that indicators measured are just as important as the timing of M&E. This means that it is imperative to get the measurement correct but also this is all done in such a way that when said
information is needed it is readily available. Some of the countries which have institutionalised RBM through the use of effective M&E systems include Chile, Canada and New Zealand.

Chile boasts of a well-functioning M&E system and one that is home-grown. Thus while the government has drawn on the lessons from international experience, including benchmarking with other countries, it managed quite successfully to develop systems that are customized to the nature of its environment. The Government of Chile adopted a RBM system in 1994 in order to improve public management (Lienert, 2003; Mayne, 2004). Today, Chile performs six main types of M&E. These include ex ante cost-benefit analysis for all government projects; regular collection of information on 1600 performance indicators for all government programs; annual Comprehensive Spending Reports; Government Program Evaluations; rigorous impact evaluations, and Comprehensive Spending Reviews (World Bank, 2002). Chile has also developed a set of indicators to ensure that its reform programme is evaluated on three fronts: the evaluation of public programmes; the evaluation of impacts, and the comprehensive evaluation of costs (Rohm, 2003). Bourckaert, Verhoest and De Corte (1999) observe that indicators for measuring programme performance are difficult to identify. It is therefore important to clearly define an appropriate system of indicators to measure and monitor programme performance. For example, the Federal Government of Canada developed a system of over two thousand societal indicators to measure Results for Canadians across all sectors. Many of these indicators were duplicated across different sectors. When such a seemingly large and unsustainable system flopped, the government embarked on strengthening the major indicators and doing away with duplicated ones (Cunnen, 2006). Mayne (2001) argues that the new set of indicators showed the government’s commitment to sharpening its citizen focus in designing, delivering, evaluating and reporting on government activities. Molander, Nilson and Schick (2002) observe that in contrast to other RBM implementing governments, New Zealand does not rely on a complicated set of indicators to measure the
outcomes of its reform programme. (Kristensen, 2002) agree that reporting progress on RBM initiatives in New Zealand was fairly straightforward. Departments reported annually on effectiveness in reducing inequalities, including the amount of expenditure and its effectiveness. Each department provided a full set of financial statements to its minister and to the Treasury on a monthly basis. These statements were done on an accrual accounting basis. By 2002, with the possible exception of Australia, no government has moved directly to an outcome focused approach to RBM other than New Zealand (Kristensen, Groszyk and Buehler, 2002).

The suitability of indicators for measuring results is equally difficult to determine. The governments of Canada, Chile, Tanzania and New Zealand however agree on several attributes of effective results measurement indicators. These are relevance, clarity, economy, monitorability and adequacy (Idea International Institute [2003], Lienert [2003], Kusek and Rist [2004], Treasury Board Office [2007] and Roehm [2003]). Kusek and Rist (2004) stress that if any of these criteria is not met, indicators will suffer and be less useful.

In Chile, for example, an Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) ensured that the evaluation objectives were consistent with Government policies; the logistical support to undertake the evaluation was available, and conclusions were taken into account by ministries (Lienert, 2003). Good quality data is needed on performance indicators. The choice of indicators is not easy. The indicators had to be specific, measurable, and relevant to measure results. Qualitative indicators, such as institutional development, were very difficult to measure. Chile also identified a need to relate indicators to the budget, so that review of performance could translate into actual resource allocation. There was also a need to identify linkages between products and services, performance indicators and the budget (Jones, 2006). While the Chilean system was complicated by the mix of its 1600 indicators, the New Zealand model was simple and lean. Schick (1998) argues that the simplicity of the New Zealand model created
“extraordinary cohesion” which has survived changes of political and electoral regimes. However, Kibblewhite and Ussher (2000) observe that the system lacked attention to outcome measures and escalated performance results due to over-concentration of financial outcomes. They assert that other outcome measures were rarely featured in evaluations and seemed to be evaluated on an ad hoc basis with a few exceptions.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) indicators ought to play a key role in performance measurement systems. Developing the right measures can be a challenge but should be done from the perspective of experimenting, realizing that time will often tell which measures prove useful and robust. Getting the right measures is not done once and for all, but is a journey of trial and error. Of course, the quality of the measurement done is important.

2.3 Credibility of Monitoring and Evaluation
The structural arrangements of an M&E system are important from a number of perspectives. One is the need to ensure the objectivity, credibility and rigor of the M&E information that the system produces. Some governments such as Chile rely on external audit committees to perform this function; Canada relies on the national audit office (Mayne and Wilkins, 2005); Australia relies principally on internal ministry audit units, while other countries such as Columbia rely on central ministry checking for the data provided by sector ministries. Other countries such as Argentina, have no audit strategy (Zaltsman, 2006).
On the evaluation side, issues of objectivity and credibility are particularly important. Chile deals with this by contracting out evaluations to external bodies such as academic institutions and consulting firms; moreover, the evaluations are commissioned and managed by the finance ministry rather than by sector ministries, and the process of seeking bids and awarding contracts to conduct the evaluations is entirely transparent. The downside of this approach, however, is a lack of ownership of these evaluation findings by the sector ministries, which do not make much use of the evaluations commissioned by the finance ministry; that may not be so great a problem in Chile, however, where the powerful finance ministry is able to use evaluation findings not only to support budget decision-making, but to impose management and program changes on the sector ministries (World Bank, 2005).

The sustainability of an M&E system is directly affected by its credibility. In turn, the credibility and acceptance of the M&E system and the results that it generates determine how useful the system becomes. Many authors agree that M&E should be conducted by independent institutions using indicators developed through a consultative process between government institutions and relevant stakeholders (World Bank [2002], Kusek and Rist [2004], Treasury Board Office [2007]). The major challenges of developing a credible M&E system are measurement (Boyne and Law, 2005), use of preset indicators (Binnendijk, 2002) and effective stakeholder engagement. According to Boyne and Law (2005), measurement affects the effectiveness of performance indicators. They identify the most important issues in measurement as measuring many of the outcomes of interest to governments, acquiring the needed measurement skills, and making appropriate use of evaluations and other periodic studies. Nevertheless, they observe that some types of programmes and services are more amenable to measurement than others. (Ittner and Lackner 2003) identify the major shortcomings of measurement: not linking measures to strategies, not validating causal links and measuring incorrectly. There is need to setup a performance framework (Diamond, 2005) and to focus on outcomes while avoiding over-
quantification (Perrin, 2002). Measures have a limited half-life and measures that remain unchanged are the most susceptible to corruption, such as distorting behaviour (World Bank, 2002).

Perrin (2002) observes that using preset indicators to measure the outcomes of a programme is another serious challenge. He argues that preset indicators, especially those prescribed by a development partner, may solicit negative reaction by the people or the users of the information. This loss of ownership kills the credibility of the M&E process. However, he proposes that determining the extent to prescribed set of indicators is relevant to specific M&E needs may restore credibility and hence rebuild ownership. Binnendijk (2002) notes that the extent to which the programme contributes to the targeted outcomes is quite a challenge. The problem is that there are often other factors other than the programme that contribute to the observed outcomes. Indeed, the outcomes may occur without the programme. Binnendijk (2002) and Perrin (2002) point to the need to ensure that in addition to monitoring measures, evaluations play a role, at least in part to get a better handling of attribution.

This issue is often presented as a major objection to using performance measures, and the danger is indeed real. If sensible use of performance information is encouraged and supported by the right incentives, the danger will be lessened. Performance indicators should be reviewed and updated regularly to ensure they remain relevant, useful and are not causing perverse behaviour or other unintended effects. And the use of a set of measures rather than only one can often reduce these problems (Mayne, 2005).

Stakeholder engagement at all stages of programme implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting is also important for the overall acceptance of the outcomes of the programme. Stakeholders include the employees driving the programme and those performing the evaluation, development partners, civil
society and the citizens from whom the programme is intended to generate benefits. There is a scanty pool of literature on stakeholder involvement in M&E on the reform agenda. When thinking about stakeholder involvement in M&E, one wonders whether performance measurement is a driver for making public service delivery more efficient, or if it is just an anodyne or placebo for winning public support (Greiling, 2006).

According to Jones (2006), RBM was initially a voluntary undertaking in Canada. Therefore, it met little resistance from the staff of participating institutions, though resources were wasted attempting to implement RBM across a wide range of ministries. Another challenge was how to set up incentives so that programme managers could accept and readily use RBM. Personal financial incentives were not recommended. In lieu, institutional incentives were strongly encouraged. For example, institutions enjoyed budgetary flexibility and the possibility of savings from one budgetary period being reported to the next period, among others (Jones, 2006). A survey commissioned by Community Aid International (CAI) revealed that there is no form of stakeholder engagement during M&E of the reform agenda in Kenya. The study also found out that stakeholders, especially citizens, were not involved in design of programmes, setting of M&E indicators, periodic evaluations and reporting of programme results (Community Aid International [CAI], 2007).

To put government on check, private sector and the Third Sector have taken the initiative of asking citizens what they think of services offered by government. The initiative, dubbed The Citizen ScoreCard Project provides citizens with an opportunity to express their views on the performance of the government of the day and local authorities based on the selected thematic areas. According to CAI (2007), the project also acts as a mirror for the central government and local authorities as it provides a channel for them to get feedback on their performance from the citizenry. It aims to enhance accountability and responsiveness of government and local authorities to the needs of the citizen. This initiative,
although not yet fully institutionalized represents a good starting point for engaging citizens as the main stakeholders in programme M&E.

2.4 Relationship between institutional and national M&E systems

Perrin (2002) observes that with the proliferation of data and information that is possible and the variety of interests of users, how best to report performance information is not straightforward. This is particularly the case when outcomes are being reported on, since there is often uncertainty surrounding the measurement of the outcomes and the extent to which the outcomes are linked to the programme in question. In addition, public reporting is increasingly seen to include issues of how an organization goes about achieving its aims, and the ability of an organization to continue to operate and improve. Experience in measuring and reporting on these matters is not widespread. It is critical that National M&E offices reporting on performance information amalgamate the M&E findings of all institutions that work in its jurisdiction. And there are no widely recognized standards for such reporting; each jurisdiction publishes their own (World Bank, 2002).

Although its RBM initiatives were largely successful, the Government of Canada did not introduce sufficient incentives for compliance earlier on in the process (Idea International Institute, 2003). Also, it did not link resources to specific outcomes. And the link between institutional M&E systems and national M&E systems remained obscure. This brought to the fore the question of whether these initiatives would be sustainable in the long run. Another challenge was to establish linkages between national budget allocation and the objectives set in the strategic plans. Translating strategic orientations and outcome/impact targets into activities with inputs and outputs proved to be an uphill task (Mayne, 2005).

A World Bank evaluation of the New Zealand experience underscores the importance of linking institutional M&E to the national M&E framework. The evaluation established that effective collaboration between intuitions and the
central government yields tremendous improvements in financial discipline, prioritization of public expenditures and technical efficiency of outlays (World Bank, 2002). Campos and Pradhan (1997) cannot agree more. However, the system-wide implementation faced some drawbacks. First, immense difficulty was faced in the harmonization of institutional indicators to inform the indicators used at the national level (Molander et al, 2002). Second, institutionalizing and enforcing the national M&E framework entailed enormous transaction costs that have not been fully assessed in the overall costs of implementing the RBM system (Idea International Institute, 2003). Third, the reform agenda was almost derailed when cross-cutting issues like environment, gender, youth and social responsibility were brought to the fore (World Bank [2002], OECD [2004], OECD [1997], Bale and Dale [1998]). Lastly, and perhaps the biggest challenge, was the effectiveness of evaluating individuals and institutions based on data which is prepared and audited internally by the same institution.

As mentioned earlier, reporting at the national level was a major weakness in M&E of reforms in almost all the countries for which literature was surveyed (OECD, 2004). Even in cases of full compliance from government institutions, the feedback process is just as weak. Many reports are produced solely for the purpose of triggering the release of funds. Performance monitoring has remained to be a major challenge. Inadequate cascading of targets, non-transparent grant allocation mechanisms, and poor routine data collection systems, lack of harmonization of M&E systems between different government institutions and internal power play between different ministries has made performance monitoring an elusive dream which is still far from being realized (Ronsholt et al, 2003).
2.5 Strategy dysfunction in M&E of Reforms

The classic problem in using performance measures is that by selecting a few specific indicators with accompanying targets, managers and staff focus on improving those numbers, perhaps to the detriment of what the programme is actually trying to achieve (Binnendijk [2000], Perrin [2002], Diamond [2005], World Bank [2002]). Distortion behaviour, commonly called strategic dysfunction, may include misusing performance measures (Perrin, 2002), goal displacement, organizational cheating (Bohte and Meirer, 2000), using the wrong measures or measuring the wrong indicators (Boye and Law, 2005). These factors limit the sustainability and credibility of the measurement systems used. With the proliferation of data and the variety of interests of users, how best to report performance is not straightforward. In addition, public reporting includes issues of how an organization goes about achieving its aims, and the ability of the organization to continue to operate and improve. There are no widely recognized and universally accepted standards for such reporting; each jurisdiction publishes their own. Efforts to harmonise and simplify reporting requirements have met with limited progress and daunting challenges (Boyle, 2005; OECD, 2003). A number of guides on public reporting have been developed with an array of advice on good practice, for example, CCAF (2002), Mayne (2004) and the Global Reporting Initiative (1999). Again the more reporting focuses on outcomes the greater the challenges become, since there is more of a need to report a performance story, rather than simply report numbers. OECD asserts that there are numerous measures for containing strategic dysfunction during M&E. Undertaking programme evaluations is one way to establish the link between the actions of a programme and their outcomes. An evaluation can also try to establish the counterfactual i.e. what would have happened without the programme. Undertaking such an evaluation requires considerable skills and finances, with results not always guaranteed. Nevertheless, when attribution is an important issue with considerable uncertainty, an evaluation is likely the best way to go (Mayne, 2001).
The M&E system should be able to respond to evolving needs, objectives and/or policy directions. It should also utilise knowledge of the external environment and the larger context both nationally and internationally to anticipate and meet service needs. Striking the delicate balance between these factors will ensure that the system withstands the pressure of distortion and strategy dysfunction (Treasury Board Office, 2007).

2.6 Conceptual Framework
Kenya is a classic case for both learning and consideration. The country has a National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES) underpinned by the country’s goals and priorities as outlined in the Kenya Vision 2030 (Ministry of Planning and National Development [MoPND], 2007). NIMES forms the core of the National Performance Management Framework (NPMF). Since M&E forms the central activity in performance management, it is expected that it is accorded the most attention. However, the MoPND (2007) acknowledges that little attention has been paid to M&E not only at the institutional level but also at the national level.

The National Performance Management Framework for Results (NPMF) provides the basis for institutionalizing RBM in the Public Service. The framework provides results-focused and cohesive strategic management for the Public Service in the achievement of national goals and priorities. It also provides for the institutionalization of RBM through the using strategic planning, performance contracting (PC) and the rapid results approach (RRA) across the entire public service. Among others, the framework also prescribes tools for monitoring performance at all levels within the public service. M&E is identified as key and central to the management of performance in the Kenyan public service. The NPMF stipulates institutional roles and responsibilities and inter-organizational linkages to facilitate improved service delivery. However, it is silent on the M&E roles of these organizations and how this M&E links with NIMES. Incumbent in the framework is the recognition that institutions conduct M&E which should feed
into the national M&E system (NIMES). Apart from M&E against set indicators at
the institutional and the national level, performance audits, ministerial
performance reviews (MPER) and medium term expenditure frameworks have
also been conducted. Also key in M&E are sector working group audits and
value-for-money (VFM) audits. Despite the existence of a comprehensive
National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES), M&E has not
been fully operationalized in government institutions. Moreover, the linkage
between the institutional systems and NIMES still remains largely obscure (GoK,
2005). No clear indicators are set.

This negates the cardinal RBM principle that monitoring, evaluating and reporting
progress on targeted outcomes is important for maintaining the reform
momentum and leveraging lessons learnt to achieve the desired impacts. However, these outcomes must be translated into a set of numerically
measurable indicators (Kusek and Rist, 2004). NIMES measures progress
against thirty-one indicators which measure how well the government if doing to
improve the lives of Kenyans (MoPND, 2007). However, the framework for
cascading these indicators down to the annual workplans and performance
targets of each institution is not clear. Further, it is not clear how the various
organs charged with monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of RBM in Kenya ensure
that the results are attained from soundly operating processes. This yawning gap
can be exploited by unscrupulous officers for distortion or strategic dysfunction
(Allan and Susan [2006], Risher [2005]). It is important to assess how this
disconnect impacts on the effectiveness of M&E of public sector reforms in
Kenya, which in turn shows a disconnect with stakeholders on the reform agenda
as a whole.
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the research design and methodology that was used the study. The chapter is organized into sub-sections stating with research design followed by the target population, the sampling design that was adopted to identify the sample elements from the target population. Thereafter, data type and data collection methods, data analysis and the research procedures used are explained in that order.

3.2 Research Design
The study adopted survey design in order to facilitate the collection of information from a selected group of management team and senior officers in PSTD. Survey design was used to collect data from an identified group of persons with the objective of determining the current status of that group of persons with respect to one or more variables. This design was adopted as the suitable research design since it facilitated the collection of original data necessary to realize the research objectives. The survey design was appropriate in collecting useful data that can be quantified and reported as a representation of the real situation or characteristic in a study population.

3.3 Target Population and sample design
3.3.1 Population
The target for this study was all middle level and senior civil servants in the PSTD who are charged with the responsibility of driving reforms in Kenya. There are forty-three programme officers in this category.

3.3.2 Sampling Design
3.3.2.1 Sampling Frame
The sampling frame was obtained from the Public Service Transformation Department. The sampling frame consisted of all technical officers at PSTD.
There are seventy-five technical officers in different cadres, namely, programme assistants, programme officers, technical advisors, Rapid Results (RRI) coaches, Results-Based Management (RBM) coaches, Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Directors and Directors.

3.3.2.2 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

Two-stage stratified sampling was used to select the sample for this study. First, officers were selected based on their departments of the Department. Second, officers from each department were divided into strata depending on their respective portfolios. A total of 50 officers were interviewed. The number of respondents from each cadre in a department was determined proportionately depending on the number of officers in the cadre. Each head of the three departments was categorized as a key informant.

A sample of fifty officers was selected for the study. The researcher envisaged that taking this sample would be more accurate and efficient than a complete census since it would provide a representative view on the subject, minimize research fatigue and save on research time.

3.4 Data Collection Methods

Both primary and secondary data was collected. Majority of the data collected was quantitative. However, a small proportion of the data was qualitative. Primary data was collected using a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was developed based on the research questions in Section 1.3.2. The questionnaire contained closed-ended questionnaires with check boxes for the respondents to tick their responses. Data was also collected by way of observations and interviews with the key informants. These observations and conversations formed the source of qualitative primary data.

On the other hand, secondary data on stakeholder engagement in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) was collected from the corporations and government
departments’ reports (including annual reports, strategic plans and work plans), government official reports/documents, financial reports, internet/websites, among other sources. The reports and government documents reviewed were those used since the year 1991 when public service reforms were first introduced in Kenya.

3.5 Research Procedures
The research instruments used in the study were developed based on the research objectives. The dry-run, ten copies of the questionnaires were administered to technical officers in the Liaison unit where the researcher is based as a programme assistant. The feedback from these officers was used to improve the wording and structure of the questionnaire. Valuable feedback was also obtained on the flow of the questionnaires and the contextual structure of the questions.

The study begun by a review of annual reports, strategic plans and work plans from PSTD including documents when reform was under the Office of the President. Then a finalized copy of the questionnaire was administered to the officers selected for this study through drop and pick later method. The questionnaires were administered to all the selected officers ranging from the directors to the RRI coaches. Observations were done during the Joint Review Mission (JRM) with Development Partners (DP) between November 12th and November 16th, 2008 and the Mid-Term Review of the Institutional Capacity Building Component with World Bank and the Beneficiary Ministries from 18th October- 20th October 2009.
3.6 Data analysis methods

The questionnaires were coded, formatted and analyzed using SPSS. The software was used to generate various descriptive statistics such as percentages and frequency distributions. The data are presented in tables, pie-charts and column bar graphs. Information collected from key informant interviews and observations was collated and analysed qualitatively.
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the findings of the study on the effectiveness of M&E for reforms at programme level with emphasis on involvement of stakeholders in Kenya. The first part of this chapter deals with the response rate and the background information of the respondents. The second part displays the findings presented according to the research questions that informed the study. The data was statistically analyzed using Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) software and the results are presented by way of descriptive statistics such as frequency distribution tables, percentages, charts and graphs. In this chapter, the findings are presented under the following headings:

4.2 Response rate
A total of fifty questionnaires were sent out. Thirty-three of these were received back in good time for analysis. This represents a response rate of 66 percent. The response rate is shown in the pie-chart below.

Figure 4.1: Response Rate
4.3 Background information of Respondents
The background information covered by the study was respondents' name, designation, department, respondents' role in monitoring and evaluation and whether they were aware of the existence of an M&E system in the Public and Development Secretariat (PSRDS). Of note is that, out of the 33 completed questionnaires, none of the respondents indicated their names, designations or departments. This gives an indication that government officials are still afraid of victimization. In the face of reforms, it is expected that government officials will be adequately empowered to speak out their ideas provided these ideas are consistent with the reform agenda.

The rest of the background information is as reported in the sub-sections that follow:

4.3.1 Role in Monitoring and Evaluation
The data obtained from the field on the role of the respondents in M&E was analyzed and the results are as depicted in Table 4.1

Table 4.1 Role of Respondents in M&E in the Public and Development Secretariat (PSRDS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role in M&amp;E</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No role in M&amp;E</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducts M&amp;E of own Department</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conducts M&amp;E in other Departments</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct M&amp;E for the whole Organization</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not Know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data in Table 4.1 show that 27% of the respondents played no role in M&E while
33 percent did not know their roles. The remaining 39.4% conducted M&E at different levels in the organization (12% conducted M&E in their own departments, 15% in other departments, and 12% for the whole organization). These findings show that monitoring, evaluation and reporting may be done by a selected department where the duties of M&E are delegated to select team. It may also indicate that each department has a team of M&E personnel.

4.3.2 Knowledge of existence of M&E system

The study also sought for information about whether the respondents were aware of the existence of any M&E systems in their organizations. The findings are as summarized in Figure 4.2 below.

Figure 4.2: Respondents’ Knowledge of the Existence of M&E Systems

Data displayed in Figure 4.2 shows that 97% of the respondents were aware of the existence of M&E System at both National and Institutional level while the remaining 3% were not aware. This corroborates with data depicted in Table 4.1 that M&E is done by respondents in each department and who may be working with the others to monitor, evaluate and report on various activities and programmes.
4.4 Timing and frequency of Monitoring and Evaluation

In order to address the first research question of the study, information about the timing of monitoring and evaluation and the accuracy of M&E information was sought for. Questions were posed to all respondents on the frequency of M&E, timeliness of M&E, effectiveness and efficiency of systems for disseminating M&E information, relevance of M&E information, and the frequency of reporting M&E findings. Data gathered from the field was analyzed and the results are as reported in the following sub-sections.

4.4.1 Frequency of M&E

Analyzed data on the frequency of monitoring and evaluation in the respondents’ organization is as displayed in Table 4.2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of M&amp;E</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-annually</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the data shown in Table 4.2, 85% of the respondents were of the view that M&E are done bi-annually while 6% indicated that it was done quarterly. As can be seen, no M&E was indicated as being done on monthly basis, but all the respondents agreed that at least some M&E was done as no one felt that no M&E was done at all.

4.4.2 Timeliness of Monitoring and Evaluation

Gathered data on whether monitoring and evaluation was done in a timely manner was analyzed and the results are as shown in Figure 4.3
Despite the agreement that M&E was done, only 24 percent of the respondents were of the opinion that M&E was done in good time. The remaining 76 percent thought that M&E was not timely. The reasons for the delay were not the subject of this study and may form a solid basis for another detailed study.

4.4.3 Effectiveness and efficiency of systems for disseminating M&E

The findings on whether the methods and systems in place for disseminating the findings of M&E are effective and efficient are represented in Table 4.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data in the above table shows that a majority of the respondents, 61%, disagreed that the methods in place to disseminate the findings of M&E were effective and efficient while 15% strongly disagreed. About 21% of the respondents indicated that the M&E systems were effective and efficient with. These findings may be attributed to either the little involvement of the
respondents in M&E (Section 4.3.1) or the general feeling that M&E is not timely (Section 4.4.3).

4.4.4 Relevance of information obtained from M&E

Data on the relevance of information obtained from M&E is presented in Table 4.4 Relevance of M&E information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4 shows that 61 percent of the respondents who took part in the study were of the opinion that the information obtained from M&E was relevant for furthering the reform agenda. About 21% opined that it was irrelevant while 18 percent did not know. The large percentage of respondents who did not know whether the information was relevant indicated lack of coordination while using the information obtained from M&E for improving and strengthening reform initiatives.
4.4.5 Frequency of reporting of M&E information

Reporting is a critical component of monitoring and evaluation. Data on the frequency of reporting of M&E findings obtained from the respondents is summarized in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5 Responses on frequency of reporting of M&E information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-annually</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No M&amp;E done</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data displayed in Table 4.5 shows that majority of the respondents, 82%, thought that reporting was done bi-annually with 9 percent thinking it was done annually and 6% quarterly. These findings support the earlier findings in Section 4.4.1 that M&E was done semi-annually. This indicates that M&E and reporting of M&E findings are done simultaneously.

4.5 Credibility of Monitoring and Evaluation

The study was also interested in finding out about the ownership and credibility of the M&E systems. The information sought for by the study in this regard included aspects of the M&E system being measured, involvement of stakeholders in the M&E process and public confidence in the reform programme.

4.5.1 Reform Aspects measured during M&E

Data on the aspects of the reform programme measured during monitoring and evaluation is summarized in Table 4.6 below.
Table 4.6 Responses on Aspects measured during M&E

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects of reforms</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome measurement</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs assessment</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance with standards</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process evaluation</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme review</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost-benefit analysis</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data depicted in Table 4.6 show that 85% of the respondents who participated in the study were of the opinion that outcome measurement was the most common aspects of the reform agenda measured during M&E followed by programme review (70%) and process evaluation (64 percent). Other aspects indicated by the respondents include needs assessment (48 percent) and compliance with standards (30 percent).

4.5.2 Stakeholder involvement during M&E

Information gathered on whether all stakeholders are effectively engaged during M&E was statistically analyzed and the results are as presented in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4 Stakeholders involvement during M&E
As can be concluded from data shown in Figure 4.4, 58% of the respondents felt that there was no stakeholder engagement in monitoring, evaluation and reporting of results for Kenyans. However, 42 percent felt that stakeholders were adequately engaged during M&E.

### 4.5.3 Public confidence in the reform programme

The data on whether the M&E system in place enhances the confidence of the general public in the reform programme is presented in Table 4.7 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 4.7, it can be deduced that majority of the respondents, 55%, were indifferent on whether the existing M&E system enhanced public confidence in the reform programme. While 27% were in agreement that it did, 18% of the respondents disagreed that the system enhanced public confidence in the reform programme. These findings indicate that public confidence in the reform programme might still be an obscure issue which needs to be investigated.

### 4.7 Strategy dysfunction and distortion behaviour in monitoring, evaluation and reporting.

The sought for information in order to establish the possibility of strategy dysfunction and distortion behaviour occurring during monitoring, evaluation and reporting of targeted. The issues explored in this respect were ownership and responsibility for the M&E system, effectiveness of systems for addressing
anomalies during M&E and the probability of strategy dysfunction and distortion behaviour arising from inadequacies in the monitoring, evaluation and reporting system.

4.7.1 Ownership of the M&E system

Findings on whether government officers have a sense of ownership and feel responsible for the existing M&E systems are presented in Figure 4.5 below.

Figure 4.5 Ownership of the M&E Systems

Data shown in Figure 4.5 indicates that 52% of the respondents who participated in the study felt that officers possessed a sense of ownership and responsibility for the existing M&E system while the remaining 48% did not share the same view.

4.7.2 Effectiveness of systems for addressing anomalies

The study also collected data from the respondents on whether the systems for addressing anomalies detected during M&E are effective and foolproof. The obtained responses were analyzed and the results are as depicted in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8 Responses on Effectiveness of M&E Systems in addressing Anomalies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data in the above table show that while 39% of the respondents were indifferent, 24% agreed and 33% disagreed that the systems in place for addressing anomalies detected during monitoring, evaluation and reporting were effective and foolproof. About 3% of the respondents strongly disagreed that the systems were effective and foolproof.

### 4.7.3 Probability of strategy dysfunction and distortion during M&E

Findings on whether there is an apparent possibility of strategy dysfunction and distortion behaviour exhibited by officers due to any inadequacies in the monitoring, evaluation and reporting system are presented in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9 Probability of strategy dysfunction and distortion behaviour

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data in Table 4.9 clearly demonstrates that majority of the respondents, 61%, were indifferent on whether it was apparent that strategy dysfunction and distortion behaviour could arise from inadequacies in the monitoring, evaluation and reporting system. Three percent strongly agreed, 15 percent agreed, 12 percent disagreed while 9 percent strongly disagreed that there was an apparent possibility of strategy dysfunction and distortion. The apprehension exhibited in these findings may indicate the unwillingness of government officers to own up when faced with difficult realities like admitting that their own systems are not totally dependable.
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction
This section provides a discussion of the findings of this study. It gives a summary of the findings followed by a discussion of the same. In this section, the researcher concludes on the study and gives recommendations for solving the research problem.

5.2 Summary
This study sought to establish whether the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) at PSTD are effective systems in reporting Results for Kenyans and in curbing distortion and strategy dysfunction. It also sought to establish whether the M&E systems in place provide timely and accurate information for Public Sector managers to identify weaknesses in the reform initiatives and take corrective action. It assessed the credibility of the existing M&E systems and how these systems contribute to enhancing public confidence in the reform agenda. Lastly, the study queried how various institutional M&E systems link with each other and how effectively they inform the national M&E system. It also queried whether this interrelationship promotes linked-up Government. Structured questionnaires, review of existing data and individual observation were used to collect data. The data was then analysed using Microsoft Excel for percentages and frequency distributions. The findings were presented in graphs, bar charts and pie charts.

The study established that M&E is done bi-annually although some scanty M&E is also done either quarterly or annually. The methods used to disseminate the findings of the M&E are largely inadequate despite the fact that the information is relevant for furthering the reform agenda. The credibility of M&E is squarely dented by the fact that stakeholders are not engaged during the measurement of such aspects of reforms as outcome measurement, needs assessment, compliance with standards, process evaluation, programme review and cost-benefit analysis. However, there is a mild ownership of the M&E system by
government officers. The study has established that there is a weak link between institutional M&E and the NIMES. The institutional systems neither adequately inform NIMES nor are they strongly guided by it. On the whole, the existing systems do not promote linked-up government. However, the study has not established whether the existing M&E systems are amenable to strategy dysfunction and distortion by government officers.

5.3 Discussion
This findings show that PSTDS is quickly internalizing the concepts of Results-Based Management (RBM) which stress a paradigm shift from process to results which can be outputs, outcomes or impacts. The results also indicate that the shift from processes to results does not mean a total neglect for systems and processes through which these results are delivered. While needs assessment is becoming increasingly important with the introduction of an “outside-in” customer service culture, compliance to standards remains a thorny issue that public service managers still have to contend with.

The data overwhelmingly show a glaring lack of entrenched system of indicators for monitoring, evaluating and reporting. Although NIMES is a good starting point for monitoring, evaluating and reporting reforms at the national level, it is important to establish and institutionalise indicators at all MDAs. It might be adequate for reporting progress against the ERS but it is not clear whether these broad national objectives can be cascaded to institutional level. It comes out that the existing M&E systems, if there are any, are not effective for monitoring, evaluating and reporting the progress of reforms. The indicators are not well developed or communicated at the institutional level. A clear link with NIMES was difficult to establish. Baselines were conspicuously absent from the existing M&E systems. Therefore, it can be inferred that monitoring, evaluation and reporting are done on an ad hoc basis. This may be the major reason why the numerous reform initiatives are not seen since it is difficult to track and report on their outcomes.
This study has corroborated the fear that there is an over-concentration on results to the detriment of processes, systems and structures which deliver these results. This and the missing link between institutional M&E indicators and NIMES lives a gap that can be exploited for distortion behaviour and strategy dysfunction. There is a strong chance that when the pressure to deliver results grows, many officers will tend to report achievements while there is nothing on the ground. There is a general call for M&E to be entrenched in all stages of results delivery starting from inputs to processes, outputs, outcomes and finally to impacts. Owing to their low level of development and institutionalization, the existing systems of indicators is not sustainable in the long run. Citizens will soon demand to be shown what the reform agenda has achieved so far. Development partners will demand an account of how development aid has been spent. The government will need to build the trust of citizens in it. The indicators as they are now are not able to deliver any of these demands of the reform agenda. The successful implementation of RBM depends on the extent to which performance measures are linked to an existing policy or strategic framework. Ensuring that performance indicators and measurement practices are linked to strategic objectives or expected results in key to successful performance management (OECD [1997], Poate [1997], Epstein and Olsen [1996]). In this way, performance measurement is integrated within strategic planning (Epstein and Olsen, 1996) and therefore knowledge about strategy implementation is increased, and the strategy is likely to be realized (Pricewaterhouse Coopers,1999).

The experience of world-class public organizations internationally and especially in Canada suggest some general guidelines for defining indicators and measures. It is useful to begin with the end in mind – to go back to the vision and broad objectives that defined the long-term impacts the policy, programme or service was intended to produce and on whom. From here it is possible to identify short-and medium-term results that should contribute to achieving those
impacts and then indicators that fairly reflect those results (Gibson and Boisvert, 1997). In order to avoid costly duplication of effort, public institutions need to carefully examine existing data collection, monitoring, evaluation and research functions and the information they already collect. Existing structures may already be compiling data related to outcomes (Plantz, Greenway and Hendricks, 1997). Nakamura and Warburton (1998, p. 41) cannot agree more and they state, “another advantage of making use of existing information is that the personnel who have been previously responsible for the existing systems will not be likely to view the new performance measurement system as a direct threat to their jobs”. The task of developing a performance measurement and reporting system can be a daunting task for a young democracy like Kenya. It will even be harder for an institution which is less than 5 years old like PSRDS. Meier (1998) asserts that the biggest risk factor threatening the successful implementation of RBM is over-complexity. Over-complexity of a performance monitoring, evaluation and reporting system will lead to implementation problems and frustrate stakeholders. The easier it is to use and apply, the more likely stakeholders will adopt and embrace the system.

One way to keep it simple is to limit the number of indicators. Epstein and Olsen (1996) argue that three indicators which are solid measures of outcome are better than 10 which do not measure anything relevant. Too many indicators are a sign of an institution which has not taken time to prioritize its measures (National Performance Review, 1999). However, it is important to adopt a balanced set of measures that provides adequate information on which to base decisions. The measures must provide an adequate performance picture (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 1999). At a macro level, many jurisdictions have resorted to using multiple measures. For example, Alberta, Oregon and other jurisdictions engaged in macro-level planning have build composite indicators based on clusters of performance measures. By so doing, they have created a solid framework for tracking progress on soft socio-economic goals (Gibson and Boisvert, 1997).
5.4 Conclusions
The study has established that indicators for tracking the progress of the reform agenda against the ERS have been established. However, these indicators are not cascaded to institutions. At the institutional level, there are no indicators for measuring results delivery. Where there are indicators, the systems are not effective for measuring, evaluating and reporting of Results. And the systems which are in place are far from being sustainable in the long run. Therefore, distortion and strategy dysfunction are problems that may bedevil the reform agenda soon. To curb this and avoid expensive curative measures later, there is an urgent need to develop a comprehensive system of indicators against which the programme will be monitored, evaluated and reported.

5.5 Recommendations
Based on the findings of this study, the researcher recommends several interventions to enhance the effectiveness of systems used for monitoring, evaluation and reporting of the These include developing a demand for M&E, introducing incentives, developing champions to drive M&E of reforms, linking the M&E to key sectoral reforms, employing pace in building M&E systems and introducing competitive M&E of reforms for reward of outstanding reformer-organizations. There is a need to create a strong demand for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in all reform programmes. Achieving substantive demand for M&E is easier said than done. And a barrier to demand is lack of knowledge about what ‘M&E’ actually encompasses, particularly where the buy-in of key stakeholders such as government ministers or finance ministries is necessary before substantive effort will be put into creating an M&E function and funding it. So, there is frequently a chicken and egg problem: a lack of government demand for M&E because of lack of understanding of M&E and what it can provide; lack of understanding because of lack of experience with it; and lack of experience because of weak demand. The way around this conundrum is to try to increase awareness of M&E its range of tools, methods and techniques . and of its
potential uses. Demand can be increased once key stakeholders in a government begin to understand it better, when they are exposed to examples of highly cost-effective M&E activities, and when they are made aware of other governments which have set up M&E systems and which value them highly. The demand for M&E cannot be sustained without adequately developing the supply side. It is important to develop and provide relevant M&E training, manuals, procedures, etc. However, while M&E expertise is certainly necessary if reliable M&E information is to be produced, a supply-side emphasis on its own does not address the demand side of the equation. Incentives are important for effective M&E to be done well and in particular for monitoring information and evaluation findings to be actually used. In other words, strong incentives are necessary if the M&E function is to be successfully institutionalized in all government agencies undertaking various reform programmes. This observation is also consistent with the extensive literature on achieving any type of institutional reform, particularly in the context of public sector management and sound governance.

This study has established that simply having M&E information available does not guarantee that it will actually be used to improve service delivery. This underscores the dangers of a technocratic view of M&E, as a set of tools with inherent merit, and the fallacy that simply making M&E information available would ensure its utilization. No governments build M&E systems because they have intrinsic merit, but because they directly support core government activities, such as the budget process, national planning, the management of ministries, agencies and programs, or to provide information in support of accountability relationships. Thus M&E systems are often linked to public sector reforms such as results-based management, performance budgeting and evidence-based policy-making. There should be a powerful champion who is able to lead the push to institutionalize M&E, to persuade colleagues about its priority and about the need to devote significant resources to create a government-wide M&E system. However, powerful champions do not provide a guarantee of success.
There are examples such as Egypt where the support of a group of key ministers for M&E has been substantially frustrated by skeptical mid-level officials. It takes time to develop a performance measurement system and to integrate it into a management system. Developing an effective performance management system is an exhausting task which needs constant monitoring and controlling. This requires the stewardship of this process by a capable government department. The mandate of monitoring, evaluating and reporting legally belongs to the Public Service Reforms and Development Secretariat (PSRDS). It is important to strengthen the Secretariat for it to effectively discharge this mandate if meaningful and sustainable reforms are to be achieved.

The M&E system for reforms should be made as simple as is practicable. A complicated M&E system can compromise the quality of data and, by extension, the effectiveness of the M&E exercise. This may lead to another chicken-and-egg problem: data are poor partly because they aren’t being used; and they’re not used partly because their quality is poor. Thus another lesson for the institutionalization of an M&E system is the need to build reliable ministry data systems to help provide the raw data on which M&E systems depend. The objective of the system for monitoring, evaluating and reporting reforms should not be to produce large volumes of performance information or high-quality evaluations per se. Rather, it should strive to achieve intensive utilization of whatever M&E findings exist. Utilization is the yardstick of ‘success’ of an M&E system.

The researcher also recommends that the delivery of services to citizens is improved in line with their needs; and that citizens are the major stakeholders in policy, planning and provision of services. Globally, governments have realized that it is vital to involve citizens in planning and implementation of programmes and service delivery. Having the citizens and their needs at the centre of policy-making, planning and programming facilitates sustainability and partnership and increases confidence and trust in government. This partnership helps to ensure
value for money and accountability. Also, citizen engagement can provide vital performance information to managers which they can use to improve the provision of services. Customer and citizen involvement in determining public service delivery has increased considerably since 2003. Most MDAs have involved their customers in validation of strategic plans. Standards have been set, published and disseminated, including through posting service charters at government premises and leaflets indicating procedures to follow for service. Many have operational customer care desks, suggestion boxes, telephone numbers for enquires, and are using name badges and systems for monitoring complaints. The MDAs also undertake customer satisfaction surveys using external evaluators to determine the level of customer satisfaction. Improvement in satisfaction is measured under performance contracting. Mobile offices and staff have greatly enhanced equitable service provision to marginalized areas. AWPs now include budgets to allow MDAs to meet service charter standards. Despite these improvements, many issues remain. The Kenyan public service is not yet a service delivery culture and citizens are not yet ready to demand their rights. The diagram shows four linked stages of the cycle. Each stage is then discussed in more detail. This will help Kenya immensely to stay par to the course
(i) Strategic Direction

The first stage in strategic direction is for MDAs to ensure their strategic plans are aligned to Vision 2030 and other national priorities. This review will be conducted with the support of Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 2030. The second stage considers the alignment of services to the demands of the citizens. The next stage is ensuring that each MDA has a results-based Service Charter with clearly defined and measurable service standards. A measurable service standard is a commitment by a government service provider to provide a service to citizens within a clearly defined timeframe and standard and at a specified cost. There will be a focus on strengthening existing Service Charters and developing new ones when necessary. This will then be linked to the Performance Contracts of the relevant leaders responsible for delivering the agreed standards. Citizens will play a central role at this stage through feedback and endorsement of the measurable service standards listed. Similarly, the private sector and other stakeholders will have valuable views that need to be incorporated in the development of the Charter. The roles would be clearly listed. The service charters will be made available to the citizens. MDAs will be required to display their service charters in all public places such as schools, health
centres among others. The charters would be disseminated through the media. MDAs will be encouraged to make the information accessible to the citizens on the service standards in their Citizen’s Charter.

(ii) Resource Mobilisation
The focus of the second stage of the Cycle is on development of a Service Delivery Action Plan. This document explains how a MDAs will achieve the service standards in their Citizen’s Charter and the provision of services to the citizens. The Plan will include clear work plans with linked performance targets, human and financial resource needs. The Plan will list any reforms required to enable the MDAs deliver services, how best to achieve its Citizen’s Charter service standards and responsibilities for MDAs. In addition, it will explain the necessary mechanisms needed for engagement with the citizens, such as help/information desks at service points and hotlines/SMS services. The focus of these mechanisms will be the provision of information to citizens and registration of complaints. Once drafted; MDAs will be responsible for securing the human and financial resources to implement their Service Delivery Action Plans. Each Plan would list the activities the MDAs will fund using existing resources and their activities.

(iii) Service Delivery
Stage three of the Service Delivery Cycle involves implementation of the Service Delivery Action Plan and regular performance monitoring using the Citizen’s Charter PMS. This will include procurement of equipment required for improved provision of services to citizens. Following the implementation of the Action Plan, MDAs will be required to operationalise their Citizen’s Charter PMS. This will involve collection of data and assessment of achievement of service standards. The data will be collected using scientific methods. Information from this system will be linked to the National Monitoring and Evaluation System.
(iv) Continuous Improvement

The final stage of the Service Delivery Cycle involves the assessment of actual results. MDAs will be required to make formal presentations internally and to the citizens on the performance of MDAs. It is recommended that this public review of Ministry performance and achievements be undertaken quarterly. At this meeting, MDAs will be required to present performance data from their Citizen’s Charter PMS. The overall aim of this review would be to get constructive feedback from stakeholders on efforts by the MDAs in improving the provision of services. Recommendations made and agreed on by stakeholders during the quarterly performance review meeting will be documented and listed in a Service Delivery Performance Improvement Report. MDAs will be expected to act on the recommendations as per the expectations of the citizens and avail their reports to the public.


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APPENDIX: Questionnaire for Government Officers

I. Background Information

1. Name (optional) __________________________________
2. Designation (optional) ______________________________
3. Department (optional) ______________________________
4. How would you describe your role in the M&E process of Public Service Reform and Development Secretariat (PSRDS)
   I do not conduct any M&E [ ]
   I conduct M&E of my own department [ ]
   I conduct M&E on other department(s) and/or divisions [ ]
   I conduct M&E for the whole organization [ ]
   I don’t know [ ]
5. Are you aware of the existence of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system for measuring the progress of the reform agenda?
   a. At the national level [ ]
   b. At the institutional level [ ]

II. Timing of M&E and accuracy of M&E information

6. What is the frequency of M&E at your organization?
   Monthly [ ] Quarterly [ ]
   Bi-annually [ ] Annually [ ]

7. Would you say that M&E in this organization is organized and conducted in a timely manner?
   Yes [ ] No [ ]

8. Do you agree that the methods and systems in place to disseminate the findings of M&E in your organization are effective and efficient?
   Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ]
   Indifferent [ ] Disagree [ ] Strongly Disagree [ ]
9. How would you rate the relevance of information obtained from M&E?
Relevant □ Irrelevant □ Indifferent □
Don’t know □

10. What is the frequency of reporting findings from M&E in your organization?
Monthly □ Quarterly □ Bi-annually □
Annually □

III. Credibility of monitoring and evaluation

11. Which of the following aspects of the reform programme are measured during M&E in your organization?
Outcome measurement □ Needs assessment □
Compliance with standards □ Process evaluation □
Program review □ Cost-benefit analysis □

12. Would you say that various stakeholders are actively involved during monitoring, evaluation and reporting of targeted ‘Results for Kenyans’?
Yes □ No □

13. On the overall, does the M&E system enhance public confidence in the reform programme?
Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Indifferent □ Disagree □
Strongly Disagree □
IV. Linkage with other institutional M&E systems and NIMES

14. Do you agree that there is a clear link between your organization’s M&E system to the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES)?
   Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Indifferent □ Disagree □
   Strongly Disagree □

15. Do you agree that your organization’s M&E system critically informs NIMES and that NIMES has a direct effect on the operation of your organization’s M&E system?
   Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Indifferent □ Disagree □
   Strongly Disagree □

16. The link between the organizational M&E promotes and strengthens connectedness and collaboration in government.
   Strongly Agree □ Agree □ Indifferent □ Disagree □
   Strongly Disagree □

V. strategy dysfunction and distortion in monitoring, evaluation and reporting

17. Would you say that the officers in your organization possess a sense of ownership and responsibility for the existing M&E system(s)?
   Yes □ No □

18. The systems in place for addressing anomalies detected during monitoring, evaluation and reporting in your organization are effective and
19. There is a glaring possibility for strategy dysfunction and distortion behaviour in your organization due to inadequacies in the M&E and reporting system.

Strongly Agree [ ] Agree [ ] Indifferent [ ] Disagree [ ]

Strongly Disagree [ ]

20. How do you suggest the M&E system can be improved to make it more effective and sustainable?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________