SUBTLE RACISM AMONGST UNDERGRADUATE LEARNERS AFTER A DECADE OF DEMOCRACY

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Magister Artium in Counselling Psychology

In the
Faculty of Health Sciences at the
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University

August 2007

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I do hereby declare and attest to the fact that this is an original study based solely upon my own work at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University and that I have not submitted it for any other college or university course or degree here or elsewhere.

Full Legal Name: ________________________________

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The concept of “race” has been the organising feature of South African society for more than three centuries. More recent social changes in the United States of America, Europe, Australia, and South Africa have lead to more subtle expressions of racism. The present study aimed to explore and describe subtle racism amongst undergraduate psychology learners at a tertiary institution in Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality in 2004. The Subtle Racism Scale was used to measure anti-Black sentiment among a sample of 286 undergraduate psychology learners, obtained through non–probability, convenience sampling. Multiple regression analysis revealed the independent variables of race, age, and the race-age interaction were significantly associated with subtle racism of the participants. Research results demonstrated that participants’ level of estimated subtle racism varied according to the age and race of the participants, supporting the notion that racism in South Africa did not influence different age and race groups in a uniform manner.

Key words: racism, subtle racism, South Africa, undergraduate psychology learners, multiple regression analysis.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Significant changes in the racial climate of countries in North America, Britain, Europe, and Australia have been evident in South Africa since the demise of apartheid. Globally, this change was a knee-jerk response to Hitler and Nazi Germany’s racist ideology as it became difficult for democratic countries such as the United States of America to claim democracy while actively practicing racial discrimination (Leach, 2005). Since World War II, dramatic and drastic changes in policies and legislation in these previously segregated countries led to the entrenchment of racial equality through policies and programs to bring about social transformation (McConahay, 1986; Durheim, 2003; Leach, 2005).

In line with changing norms and legislative interventions, shifts in race attitudes have been observed. In the United States of America, for example, researchers found increasing evidence of the rejection of racial segregation and racial stereotypes based on notions of racial inferiority of Black people and support for equal treatment of Black people (Durheim, 2003). Concurrently, however, American researchers found that interracial conflict was still present, while anti-Black attitudes only showed a modest decline (McConahay, 1986). This led to speculations that changing social norms have created stronger demands for Whites to disguise their negative racial attitudes (Durheim, 2003), resulting in a change in the nature of racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). In the United States of America, it was found that contemporary expressions of racism and discrimination were more subtle, less conscious, and expressed more symbolically than traditional forms of racism. These contemporary forms of racism were not acknowledged by Whites as racism, as they differed from the overt expressions of traditional racism. However, for targets of
racism, the contemporary forms of racism have been as significant and destructive as the
traditional, overt form of racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000).

Recent Changes in South African Society

As in the United States of America, intergroup issues have also featured prominently in the
history of South Africa (De la Rey, 1991). Soon after the first White people established a base at
the southern tip of Africa in 1652, they conducted their first act of racial segregation by planting a
hedge of bitter almonds to separate Whites from Blacks (Sparks, 2003). However, as the global
trend towards abandoning racial discrimination and segregation increased in momentum (Louw &
Foster, 1991), South Africa established the apartheid structure, built on the concept of group
differences (De la Rey, 1991), prejudice, and the power struggle for the control of South Africa
(Sparks, 2003). The basis of apartheid has been the division and classification of all South
Africans according to race, legalised by laws such as the Population Registration Act, the Group
Areas Act, and the Immorality Act (Eades, 1999; Sparks, 2003), thereby creating a racist society
in that country (Foster, 1991b).

However, between 1990 and 1994, remarkable changes took place in South Africa (Smith &
Stones, 2001). In February 1990, apartheid South Africa was transformed by two events. The
first was a forty-five minute speech during the opening of Parliament by the President F.W. de
Klerk that announced the lifting of bans on organisations such as the African National Congress,
the South African Communist Party, and Pan-Africanist Congress. The second event, on 11
February 1990 was the release of Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years of political
confinement (Eades, 1999; Sparks, 2003).
The first democratic election in South Africa was held in April 1994, and this constituted the first step towards the South Africa that Nelson Mandela and his supporters had aimed at creating (Pratt, 1995). After racial prejudice had saturated South African society for nearly three and a half centuries (Sparks, 2003), the aim was then for a continuing pattern of change away from a racist system (Eades, 1999). At the swearing in of the new National Assembly in 1994, President Mandela announced:

We enter into a covenant that we shall build the society in which all South Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable right to human dignity—a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world (Lewis, 2005, p.166).

It is interesting to note that due to crucial differences between the features of racism in South Africa and in other countries in which social changes have occurred, the content of racism in South Africa may be different from that in other contexts. For example, racial beliefs that are understood to be part of the contemporary racism model in the United States, such as “Blacks are being pushy and overly demanding” is considered to reflect a traditional racial opinion common in apartheid South Africa, especially after the Soweto-riots of 1976 (Durheim, 2003).

Other contextual differences can be identified. In the first place, in South Africa, a numerical White minority oppressed a Black majority. While maintaining control of economic institutions, South African Whites, as a group, have lost political and social power in the democratic South Africa. Their position is therefore significantly more uncertain than their American counterparts. Second, racism under apartheid was particularly harsh, blatant, and oppressive. In addition, the effects of racism in terms of racial disparities in access to resources, such as health and education, living conditions and economic welfare were more extreme in South Africa than in the United States (Durheim, 2003).
It is now more than a decade since apartheid has been dismantled and the years since 1994 have been characterised by the challenge of working towards an egalitarian society (Smith & Stones, 2001). South Africa adopted a new constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996) that explicitly forbids any form of direct or indirect discrimination, thereby incurring considerable change in South Africa’s social context and organisation (Korf & Malan, 2002; Pillay & Collings, 2004). In accordance with the new Constitution, the new democratic government committed itself to addressing imbalances of the apartheid system, in particular racial and gender imbalances (Makaula, 2005). In addition, in an attempt to find the truth and reconcile perpetrators and their victims or the families of victims, public hearings around gross human rights abuses during the apartheid regime were staged in South Africa (Meyer & Finchilescu, 2006).

**Contemporary Racism in the “new” South Africa**

A number of authors have argued that social and political changes in South Africa were likely to lead to improved interracial relations (De la Rey, 1991; Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998; Smith & Stones, 1999; Smith, Stones & Naidoo, 2003). Other commentators, however, have questioned whether significant political changes have led to similar changes in racial attitudes between pre-democratic and post-apartheid South Africa (Foster, 2006). Such commentators have argued that deeply entrenched psychological and social divisions of the past, maintained by fears of crime and violence, and a deep-seated mistrust of other racial groups, have restricted the transformation of racial attitudes (Smith & Boero, 2001). According to this line of reasoning, entrenched racial attitudes could be a reason widespread intergroup conflict, prejudice, ethnocentric pride, and
racism have been observed in post-apartheid South Africa (Duckitt, 1994; Hook, 2004; Smith & Boero, 2001).

It may be true then that “apartheid still casts a shadow over the South African social and physical landscape” (Meyer & Finchilescu, 2006, p.82), even though South Africans have been exposed to multiple social changes, increasingly liberal racial attitudes, and repeated calls for a “rainbow nation” (Smith, et al., 2003). The continuation of racial tension in post-apartheid South Africa has led other researchers to postulate that widespread racism in South Africa has persisted in the form of contemporary, more subtle racism (Duckitt, 1994; Foster, 2006; Meyer & Finchilescu, 2006; Pillay & Collings, 2004).

Whereas research into racial attitudes was prominent in previous decades, research on South African racial attitudes has been sparse and somewhat ambiguous since the 1980s. Whereas some studies indicated slight improvements in racial attitudes (Smith & Stones, 1999; Smith, et al., 2003), other studies revealed that racial attitudes have not changed since 1994 (Finchilescu & Dawes, 2001), while traditional racism and discrimination were still found to be prevalent at South African universities (Finnemore, 1998; Pillay & Collings, 2004). Most empirical evidence regarding contemporary forms of racism has been gathered in North America, Europe and Australia. However, large empirical gaps in the understanding of contemporary racism in the post-apartheid South African context exist. For example, little information has been gathered on the racial attitudes of different age groups in post-apartheid South Africa.

The lack of South African empirical research into racism is not a recent phenomenon. MacLeod (2004) and Ratele (2006) have both asserted that South African psychological research has largely avoided critical issues facing South Africans. Even though psychology as a profession and science is aimed at promoting human welfare, apartheid as a racially oppressive system and declared a crime against humanity by the United Nations, did not enjoy critical attention from
scholars (Ratele, 2006). The low percentage of articles in psychological journals that have focused on the issue of race, racism, and interracial relations is an illustration of this inherent weakness of South African psychological research (MacLeod, 2004; Ratele, 2006). This trend persists in post-apartheid South Africa, perhaps fuelled by the common, but disturbing public discourse that in the “new” South Africa, racism no longer is a serious problem (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003). The present chapter contextualises the need to explore the expressions of contemporary, subtle racism within the post-apartheid South African context, hence highlighting the need for the present study.

**Purpose of the Study**

The primary purpose of the study is to investigate the levels of contemporary, subtle racism in a South African university among a sample of undergraduate psychology learners. To achieve the primary purpose, the association between subtle racism and the demographic variables of gender, language, age, and race were explored and described.

Crucial historical, economic, and social differences exist between South African and other contexts in which contemporary forms of racism have been studied. In addition, Pettigrew (1979) asserted that a construct should be studied and conceptualised within the context in which it occurs. Thus, instead of merely adopting or amending constructs and measures conceptualised in other contexts, the present study aims to explore and describe contemporary racism as it occurs in a South African context. Increased understanding of contemporary forms of racism in a South African situation will have an additional benefit. Contemporary forms of racism have been empirically shown to have continuing effects on the targets of such prejudice. Furthermore, Brown (2006) argued that attitude and prejudice research should keep an essential aim in mind,
namely consideration of how prejudice could be reduced. Conclusions and recommendations from this study will therefore add to empirical evidence about contemporary racism in South Africa which could then possibly be applied in developing prejudice reduction programs focused on reducing contemporary forms of racism.

**Terminology Used in the Present Study**

In the present study, the term ‘race groups’ has been used to denote the categories reified by the apartheid government. These categories – Black, Asian (or Indian), White, and Coloured, although not regarded as meaningful or supporting a belief in essential or biological differences between these groups by the current researcher, do nevertheless reflect differences in life circumstances of South Africans. These categories are also maintained by the current government as a means of monitoring transformation towards equity.

In the present study, the term Black is used to refer to the aboriginal people of South Africa; the term Coloured refers to people of mixed race or those who were descended from slaves brought to South Africa mainly from Malaysia; Asian refers to descendents of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent, and White refers to people of European descent.

**Structure of the Study**

Racism is a complex; “hydra-headed” construct (Jones, 1997, p. 373). Before this multifaceted construct can be conceptualised accurately, it is necessary to elucidate on the constructs that underlie racism. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical background to racism by explicating attitude as a construct that underlies racism. Attitude is explored in terms of its
definition and structure. Thereafter, prejudice, stereotypes, discrimination are conceptualised in terms of the definitions and theoretical assumptions regarding the origins of these concepts. Prejudice reduction and measurement are also described. After the theoretical underpinnings of racism have been explored, racism as a construct is explored and conceptualised in Chapter 3. This chapter first examines the changing concept of race before investigating racism as an ideology, as articulated by apartheid in South Africa. As it is postulated that the expressions of racism have changed in response to societal changes, both the traditional and contemporary forms of racism are investigated and discussed. National and international empirical research findings regarding the relationship between racism and the demographic variables focused on in the present study (i.e., gender, language, age, and race) are also provided. In Chapter 4, the research problem is formulated and delineated according to two specific aims. Furthermore, the methodology utilised in investigating these aims is outlined. Chapter 5 contains the presentation of the results of the statistical analyses and a discussion of the findings within the context of theories of contemporary racism, whilst positioning the findings within the context of previously reported international and national research. The final chapter, Chapter 6, presents conclusions reached by the present study. Limitations of the present study as well as recommendations for future research on contemporary racism are also presented in this chapter.
CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCING THE CONCEPTS OF ATTITUDE, PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPE, AND DISCRIMINATION

Racism, the phenomenon investigated in the present study, is a multifaceted construct. It is underpinned by other constructs such as attitude, racial prejudice, and racial discrimination. In fact, an attitudinal definition is given to elements of racism, such as racial prejudice (i.e., a negative attitude towards a race group) and racial discrimination (i.e., negative behaviour towards a negatively evaluated race group). Attitudes thus feature prominently when referring to racism, signifying the necessity to elucidate the attitude concept. Thus, the notion that attitudes were regarded as a central concept in the study of interracial interaction is explored. Thereafter, the definition and components of attitudes are examined in order to increase understanding of the components of prejudice.

Attitude as a Central Concept in Social Psychology

Initially, the attitude concept was regarded as one of the keystone concepts in the field of social psychology (Albarracín, Zanna, Johnson, & Kumkale, 2005, 2005; Allport, 1954a; Bohner, 2001; Foster, 1991a; Meyers, 2005) as it was postulated that behaviour could be predicted if the underlying attitude was known (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; Myers, 2005). Allport (1954a) even defined social psychology as the scientific study of attitudes. However, the attitude concept soon lost its status as the chief concept in social psychology, due to a review of evidence from research studies which demonstrated that self-reported attitudes were poor predictors of behaviour (Wicker, 1969).
Current research indicates that attitudes are not the powerful key to behaviour prediction as previously supposed. While attitudes sometimes control behaviour, the reverse is often true (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; Taylor, Peplau, & Sears, 2006). Yet, attitudes are still seen to play a key role in the social functioning of all people (Bohner, 2001; Rogers, 2003) and are still the focus of much empirical research (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005). The nature of attitudes was at the centre of empirical investigations and theoretical postulations of social psychologists (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

**The Nature of Attitudes**

Through its use in the field of art and theatre in the 1800s, the meaning of attitude evolved. First, attitude was used to describe a physical posture or body position of an actor, a statue, or a figure in a painting. Gradually, attitude not only referred to a body posture, but also to the way a person’s physical posture conveyed internal intentions and emotions (Allport, 1954a; Franzoi, 2003; Lord, 1997). Thereafter, the use of attitude expanded to refer to the beliefs and feelings related to someone or something, and the behaviour or behavioural intentions that result from these beliefs and feelings (Brown, 2006; Myers, 2005). The definition of an attitude has also been adjusted repeatedly as empirical knowledge about attitudes grew.

**Defining Attitude**

Throughout its history in social psychology, attitudes have been defined in numerous ways (Fabrigar, MacDonald & Wegener, 2005). Initially, attitudes were broadly defined (Krosnick, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2005). For example, Allport (1935, as cited in Krosnick, et al., 2005)
defined an attitude as “a mental and neural state of readiness, organised through experience, exerting a distinctive or dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it is related” (p. 22).

The definition of attitudes has since expanded to include evaluative predispositions that lead to approach and avoidance behaviours (Foster, 1991a; Krosnick et al., 2005). Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) definition of attitudes, which is regarded as the most widely accepted contemporary definition of the concept (Alabarracín et al., 2005; Lord, 1997), included the evaluative predisposition of the concept by defining attitudes as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour” (p. 1). Accordingly, an attitude is focussed on a specific element or object, rather than all objects and situations to which it is related. In addition, an attitude is a predisposition to like or dislike that element or object, apparently with approach or avoidance consequences (Krosnick et al., 2005). Central to these definitions of attitudes are the fact that attitudes are intrapersonal tendencies that are evaluative in nature about an attitude object.

*An Attitude is a Consequence of the Tendency to Evaluate*

Social psychologists regard evaluation as a fundamental human activity (Albarracín, et al., 2005; Franzoi, 2003) as the evaluation of persons, events, and objects helps people to understand and react to their environment (Briñol & Petty, 2005; Dovidio, Kawakami & Beach, 2003). This tendency to evaluate is thus a critical feature of an attitude (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; 1993), implying that an attitude will always be evaluative (Aronson, et al., 2002). In addition, an individual is regarded as having an attitude only after he or she has responded overtly or covertly
in an evaluative manner to an entity (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). For example, when encountering a condescending White person, a Black person may negatively evaluate the White person and covertly respond by deciding to avoid Whites in future. The Black person will thus have a negative racial attitude towards individuals belonging to the White race group.

Empirical studies have demonstrated that humans can develop an attitude with relative ease (Franzoi, 2003; Taylor et al., 2005) about nearly anything (Briñol & Petty, 2005). However, it has also been suggested that some individuals have a higher need to evaluate than others (Jarvis & Petty, 1996). These individuals were also shown to be more likely to hold attitudes towards previously encountered issues, implying that individuals’ tendency to evaluate originate from their experiences (Bohner, 2001).

**Attitude Objects**

Bohner (2001) declared that every attitude has an entity, such as a person, an object, or a social issue which is the “something” that the attitude is about. These evaluated entities are known as attitude objects in the vernacular of social psychology. Virtually anything can be evaluated and can function as an attitude object (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Attitude objects can be: (a) concrete (a certain type of food), (b) abstract (such as equality), (c) inanimate objects (such as personal computers), (d) persons (such as a political figure), or (e) groups (such as race groups) (Bohner, 2001). Accordingly some attitudes are grouped according to the attitude object involved: (a) negative attitudes towards certain social groups are called prejudice, while (b) self-esteem is the label for attitudes towards oneself (Bohner, 2001). The evaluation of an attitude object may also be the result of conscious or unconscious evaluative processes (Dovidio, et al., 2003) and an
attitude can thus be explicit or implicit. A person may also possess contradictory explicit and implicit attitudes towards the same attitude object or hold an ambivalent attitude.

Explicit, Implicit, Dual, and Ambivalent Attitudes

As previously discussed, evaluation is central to the definition of attitude (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). However, some evaluations are automatically activated in the presence of an attitude object, often without conscious recognition from the holder of the attitude (Dovidio, et al., 2003; Eagly & Chaiken, 2005). These types of attitudes are called implicit attitudes. Feeling uncomfortable around a person of a different race group because he or she unconsciously triggers negative evaluations of the race group is an example of an implicit attitude. By comparison, explicit attitudes are consciously held (Franzoi, 2003) and are activated in a more deliberate manner that requires cognitive effort (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005).

The existence of implicit attitudes has emerged from research about racial attitudes in which an apparent discrepancy between low professed prejudice and high levels of discrimination was found (Dovidio, et al., 2002; Pillay & Collings, 2004). Implicit attitudes have a significant influence on behaviour. It is generally assumed that automatically activated implicit attitudes guide behaviour by default until they are overridden by controlled processes. Since prejudicial racial attitudes are frowned upon in modern society, implicit attitudes tend to influence behaviours that are not consciously monitored or that are difficult to control (e.g., facial expressions, eye contact, blushing, and other nonverbal behaviours) as well as behaviours that people do not consider to be indicative of prejudice. In contrast, explicit attitudes predict behaviours that are under volitional control and whose implications for prejudice are apparent (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005).
The idea that people can hold more than one attitude simultaneously has also emerged in several guises in attitude research. One such manifestation of the multiple attitude idea is Wilson, Linsey, and Schooler’s (2000, as cited in Eagley & Chaiken, 2005; Franzoi, 2003) concept of dual attitudes, whereby people have contradictory explicit and implicit attitudes towards the same attitude object. Dual attitudes can form, for example, when new information changes an attitude, creating a new explicit attitude. Yet the old attitude may continue to be present, but often in an implicit and unconscious form (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; Fabrigar, et al., 2005). Both the new and the old attitude are still linked to the attitude object in memory. Therefore, either or both attitudes can be activated (Fabrigar, et al., 2005). Research suggests that dual attitudes will most likely develop for socially sensitive issues such as attitudes towards pornography and racial or ethnic groups (Wilson, et al, as cited in Franzoi, 2003).

Another demonstration of the idea of multiple attitudes is the concept of attitudinal ambivalence. Instead of conceptualising attitudes to fall on a continuum ranging from extremely negative to extremely positive, a person may also be described as holding two attitudes towards one attitude object; one positive and one negative (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005; Brown, 2006). Ambivalent attitudes therefore consist of coexisting positive and negative tendencies (Eagly & Chaiken, 2005). Lord (1997) attributes ambivalent attitudes to the lack of correspondence between a person’s thoughts, feelings, and actions towards an attitude object. Lord (1997) thereby identifies that an attitude consists of different components.

**Components of an Attitude**

The tri-component theory, which is the idea that an attitude has three components, has enjoyed a long history (Fabrigar, et al., 2005). According to this theory, diagrammatically
illustrated in Figure 1, an attitude is assumed to be an evaluation based on affective (feelings),
behavioural (actions), and cognitive (beliefs) processes (Bohner, 2001; Franzoi, 2003; Taylor, et
al., 2006).

Figure 1. The tri-component theory of attitude. An attitude is the result of cognitive, affective,
and behavioural processes and manifests in cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses.

Source: Bohner, 2001, p. 242

Attitudes and the manifestations of attitudes are therefore considered to comprise of three
distinct components, namely beliefs, feelings, and behaviours or behavioural intentions (Bohner,
from each component can vary. For example, some attitudes might express relevant feelings
more than any specific beliefs and behaviour, such as attitudes towards abstract art. Other
attitudes might express all three types of information simultaneously such as attitudes about war
(Johnson, Maio & McLallen, 2005). The three components are now addressed individually.

The cognitive component consists of the facts, knowledge, and beliefs of the person
towards the attitude object. The affective component consists of the person’s positive and
negative feelings towards and the emotional reactions towards the attitude object. The behavioural
component consists of the person’s observable past behaviour and behavioural intentions to
approach or avoid an attitude object (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2002; Bohner; 2001; Fabrigar, et
al, 2005; Rogers, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006).
Brown (2006) postulated that the three components operate in unison as the result of an innate human drive that strives to maintain consistency among the cognitive, affective, and behavioural components of an attitude. Inconsistencies between the cognitive, affective, and behavioural components of an attitude create psychological tension which people are driven to avoid and reduce (Brown, 2006). For example, a person who believes he or she is unprejudiced against Black people, and interacts regularly with Black people, but feels uncomfortable when around Black people is experiencing inconsistencies between the cognitive, affective, and behavioural components of an attitude.

More recently, the tri-component attitude theory has been modified (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; 2005; Fabrigar, et al., 2005; Franzoi, 2003). The contemporary view holds that an attitude does not consist of all three components, but instead is a general evaluative summary of the information derived from cognitions, affects, and behaviour (Fabrigar, et al., 2005; Franzoi, 2003). However, a factor analytical study conducted by Breckler (1984) found that the tri-component theory of attitude predicted overall attitudes more effectively than any single factor alone.

It has now also been established that any attitude is the result of cognitive, affective, and behavioural processes that manifest in cognitions, affects, and behaviours or behavioural intentions. It was also established that an attitude is the results of an evaluation of an attitude object. When an attitude consists mainly of negative evaluations of the attitude object, this attitude is referred to as prejudice. Prejudice can thus be conceptualised as an attitude that consists of affective, cognitive, and behavioural components, called (a) stereotypes, (b) prejudice, and (c) discrimination respectively (Aronson, et al., 2002; Brown, 2006; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Lord, 1997; Taylor, et al., 2006). When the negative attitudes in question refer to racial attitudes, it is referred to as racial prejudice or racism. It is apparent,
therefore, that prejudice also underlies the construct of racism. The complexity of the construct of racism can thus not be appreciated without first conceptualising prejudice. To avoid confusion, it is important to note that prejudice can be used as an umbrella term to refer to negative attitudes towards individuals due to their membership to a particular group, but may also be used to specifically refer to the affective component of the intergroup attitude (Aronson, et al., 2002).

**Prejudice**

Social psychologists have found few topics to be as controversial and vital to understand as prejudice (Sampson, 1999) because of its significant influence on intergroup relations (Jones, 1997). Intergroup prejudice is based on the dynamics created by the innate human tendency to divide the world into us and them, or in-groups and out-groups (Baron & Byrne, 2003).

**The Dynamics of In-Groups and Out-Groups**

In general, individuals tend to have more positive attitudes towards members of their own group, while they tend to have more negative attitudes towards other groups (Nelson, 2006). This dynamic forms the basis of prejudice: the feelings toward, thoughts and beliefs about, and behaviour toward fellow members of in-groups and members of out-groups (Nelson, 2006) are the source of stereotypes (beliefs), prejudice (feelings), and discrimination (behaviours or behavioural intentions) (Allport, 1954b; Jones, 1997; Myers, 2005; Nelson, 2006).

Dividing people into in-groups or out-groups has a number of consequences for members of both categories (Nelson, 2006). Members of out-groups are regarded in terms of a phenomenon termed out-group homogeneity (Aronson, et al, 2002; Baron & Byrne, 2003; Nelson,
whereby individuals of out-groups are perceived to be “all alike” (Nelson, 2006, p. 29), sharing similar characteristics, motives and other features (Aronson, et al., 2002; Baron & Byrne, 2003; Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006). However, according to the phenomenon of in-group bias (Aronson, et al., 2002; Baron & Byrne, 2003; Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006), members of in-groups are judged to be “as different as snowflakes” (Nelson, 2006, p. 29).

The in-group, out-group distinction also has an effect on the way in which behaviour by members of these two categories is explained according to a dynamic called the ultimate attribution error. People have a tendency to attribute desirable behaviours by members of in-groups to stable, internal causes (e.g., their admirable traits), while dismissing desirable behaviours by out-group members as the result of transitory factors or external causes (i.e., luck, special circumstances, or unfair advantages) (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Hewstone, 1990; Myers, 2005). Negative out-group behaviour is attributed to flawed, natural characteristics and dispositions, as illustrated by Hewstone (1990): “They fail because they’re stupid; we fail because we didn’t try” (p. 366).

A salient feature of the ultimate attribution error is that important situational forces that impact upon the members of the out-group are often discounted. For example, the misfortune of slaves in the United States was often attributed to the slave’s flawed nature and deficiencies, while the effect of exploitation was disregarded (Myers, 2005). Similarly, the poverty of Black people in South Africa has been attributed to biological inferiority, while oppression and social circumstances that denied Black people opportunities were disregarded (Duckitt, 1992b). In-group bias, however, does not automatically lead to out-group hate (Allport, 1954b; Voci, 2006), but may imply a variety of out-group evaluations ranging from mildly positive to blatantly hateful (Voci, 2006).
The Definition of Prejudice

To social psychologists, prejudice is fundamentally about interpersonal relationships (Jones, 1997). A large number of definitions of prejudice have been offered (Duckitt, 1994; Jones, 1997). One of the foundational works for the study of prejudice was Allport’s (1954b) *The Nature of Prejudice*, which still remains one of the most widely cited works on prejudice (Dovidio, Glick & Rudman, 2005). Allport (1954b) defined prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalisation. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed towards a group as a whole, or towards an individual because he is a member of that group” (p. 9) and “thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant” (p. 7). His definition, however, did not account for the complexities of prejudice that social psychologists have since considered (Eagly & Diekman, 2005). For example, Harding, Proshansky, Kutner & Chein (1969) highlighted the fact that prejudice can be considered as immoral by defining prejudice as “a failure of justice or a failure of human-heartedness in an individual’s attitude toward members of another ethnic group” (p.6). Banton (1967) accentuated the emotional nature of prejudice: “The essential features of prejudice would appear to be its emotional character…” (p.8).

After reviewing all available definitions of prejudice, Ashmore (1970) identified four basic points of agreement common to most definitions of prejudice. These were: (a) prejudice is an intergroup phenomenon, (b) prejudice is a negative orientation, (c) prejudice is immoral, and (d) prejudice is an attitude. Thereafter, Ashmore (1970) concluded that prejudice can be defined as “a negative attitude towards a socially defined group and toward any person perceived to be a member of that group” (p. 253). Based on Ashmore’s (1970) review, Duckitt (1994) noted that prejudice could be viewed as “a negative intergroup attitude which is bad, unjustified, or irrational in some way or other” (p.9).
One important element of these views of prejudice, namely that prejudice is marked by negative attitudes (Jones, 1997), has been challenged by research in the late twentieth century (Eagly & Diekman, 2005). Empirical work uncovered positive attitudes towards many racial, ethnic, and gender groups, leading to speculation that out-groups do not necessarily activate negative attitudes, but merely fail to elicit positive evaluation (Eagly & Diekman, 2005). In light of these developments in the understanding of the concept, Jones (1997) proposed the following definition of prejudice: “Prejudice is a positive or negative attitude, judgement, or feeling about a person that is generalised from attitudes or beliefs held about the group to which the person belongs” (p. 10).

It is important to note that although prejudice can involve positive and negative evaluations and affects, social psychologists and people in general reserve the word prejudice for use primarily when referring to negative attitudes about others. In this regard, some researchers (Aaronson, et al., 2002; Baron & Byrne, 2003; Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Lord, 1997; Myers, 2005) further refined the definition of prejudice to only refer to negative attitudes or evaluations of individuals or specific social groups.

Some researchers highlighted a fundamental aspect of prejudice that is also implicated by its morphological structure (Jones, 1997; Myers, 2005; Sampson, 1999; Taylor, et al., 2006). As the word prejudice is comprised of the affix pre-, meaning before, and the word judgement, it can be implied that the definition of prejudice should also include the forming of a judgement before all facts are known (Sampson, 1999; Taylor, et al., 2006). The definition of prejudice can therefore be expanded to also allow for the negative prejudgement of a group and its individual members (Myers, 2005).

The definition of prejudice has thus expanded since its original definition in the first half of the twentieth century. Another aspect of prejudice that has enjoyed a large amount of attention
from scholars has been the explanation of the origins of prejudice (Duckitt, 1994). As prejudice is such a complex construct, the origins of prejudice has been conceptualised to be determined by many factors (Ashmore, 1970; Harding, et al., 1969). A number of theories to explain the genesis of prejudice have been proposed.

**Origins of Prejudice**

It has been the tendency of prejudice theorists to concentrate on only psychological or social subset of causal processes to explain the origins of prejudice (Duckitt, 1994). In addition, social and psychological theories of prejudice have been regarded as competing theories (Duckitt, 1993b; 1991a). Thus, no integrated theory to comprehensively explain prejudice has been offered (Duckitt, 1994). However, Duckitt (1994; 1992b; 1991a) asserted that social and psychological theories of prejudice can be regarded as equally important in the explanation of prejudice. Whereas social factors are more important in determining the general level of prejudice, psychological factors could account for the variation in prejudice around the general level (Duckitt, 1994, 1993b).

Brown (2006) suggested four major approaches to conceptualise the origins of prejudice that reflects both social and psychological theories of prejudice: (1) Realistic Group Conflict Theory, which argues that prejudice results when groups compete for finite resources; (2) motivational approaches, which maintains that prejudice stems from people’s need to feel better about themselves; (3) individual theories, which attempt to understand why some people are more prejudiced than others; and (4) learning theory approaches, which asserts that people learn to be prejudiced during social interaction.
**Realistic Conflict Theory**

Realistic Conflict Theory (RCT) may be considered as a broad social psychological perspective which assumes that the conditions of intergroup contact and interaction develop into normative patterns of prejudice (Duckitt, 1994). RCT, as proposed by Campbell (1965), suggests that prejudice is an inevitable consequence of competition between groups for scarce resources such as land, water, good schools, or safe neighbourhoods. The group conflict is seen as realistic because it is based on real competition (Aaronson, et al., 2002; Myers, 2005), seems to involve “the hope of a gain rather than the fear of a loss” as the underlying motive (Duckitt, 1994, p.96), and is the result of a social comparison process (Brown, 2006).

The perception of relative deprivation may give rise to feelings of prejudice and hostility towards out-groups in terms of important goals, such as good educational opportunities, employment, and housing (Nelson, 2006). For example, a White person may develop prejudice towards Black people if Blacks are hired ahead of Whites due to affirmative-action policy. In this regard, some researchers (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman & Tyler, 1990) have suggested that merely seeing someone else as an out-group member is enough to arouse prejudice in the perceiver.

RCT also asserts that when groups are in conflict, ethnocentrism develops. This refers to a pattern of behaviour characterised by increased hostility toward the opposing out-group, accompanied by intensified loyalty towards the in-group (Franzoi, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006). RCT makes two important predictions. First, the theory predicts that people who are realistically threatened are more prejudiced than people who are not realistically threatened. Secondly, it predicts that prejudice will be eliminated if enough resources exist (Brown, 2006).

Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961, as cited in Brown, 2006) demonstrated how realistic group conflict could be a cause of prejudice through their landmark experiment with
a group of twenty-two 11-year old boys who were going to a summer camp at Robber’s Cave National Park in Oklahoma, United States. First the boys were divided into two groups and to create in-groups and allowed to form in-group relationships and in-group identity. Thereafter, to test the hypothesis that realistic group conflict creates prejudice, the groups had to participate in a series of competitive activities in which the winning team received prizes. Thus, the boys were competing for a scarce resource. As the RCT predicted, out-group prejudice between the groups developed that even resulted in name-calling and petty acts of violence. Later attempts to reduce prejudice by having the groups interact in social situations that did not involve competition only served to increase distrust and enmity between the groups (Brown, 2006; Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006).

From the preceding discussion, it is apparent that intergroup conflict of interest, perceived or actual, can induce prejudiced intergroup attitudes (Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994) as has been the case in South Africa (Duckitt, 1994).

Motivational Approach

This approach locates the roots of prejudice in certain inborn elements of psychological functioning, such as the motivation of human beings to attain their psychological goals (Duckitt, 1994; Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006). Although there are several motivation models, all postulate that humans have a tendency to dislike others in order to feel better about themselves (Brown, 2006; Nelson, 2006). The most prominent theories under this approach are the Social Identity Theory by Tajfel and Turner (1986) and the Scapegoat Theory (Allport, 1954b; Berkowitz & Green, 1962).
Social-Identity Theory. Nelson (2006) asserted that no other theory of prejudice has had as strong an impact on the field of prejudice research than the Social-Identity Theory (SIT) by Tajfel and Turner (1986). This theory postulates that the self concept of human beings contains both a personal identity (a sense of personal attributes and attitudes) and a social identity (Myers, 2005), which includes other people and membership of various social groups (Brown, 2006). SIT proposes that people naturally categorise their social world into in-groups (us) and out-groups (them) and derive a sense of collective self-esteem from their social identity as members of an ingroup. In order to enhance their collective self-esteem, people are motivated to perceive their own in-groups as superior to other groups. Maintenance of the perceived high status of an ingroup is achieved by derogating out-groups and other individuals that reflect negatively on the ingroup, as well as deviant or stereotype-confirming in-group members (Nelson, 2006) giving rise to prejudice (Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006). However, Brown (2006) cautioned the reader to bear in mind that in-group favouritism does not always lead to out-group derogation and prejudice.

Often, people who lack positive personal identity, will seek collective self-esteem by identifying with a group (Myers, 2005), which they have reasoned, is in some way better than other groups to which they do not belong (Brown, 2006). A person belonging to a specific ethnic group will therefore develop in-group favouritism and will believe that their ethnic group is better than other ethnic groups (Franzoi, 2003).

The SIT postulation that people are highly motivated to show in-group favouritism and negatively evaluate out-groups (Nelson, 2006) has been confirmed by research. For example, Lemyre and Smith (1985) found that participants in an in-group, out-group allocation condition who were given a chance to display in-group favouritism, felt better about themselves than participants who were not given the opportunity. In addition, research has found that people who
strongly identify with an in-group derive pleasure when an out-group suffers misfortune or hardship (Leach, Spears, Branscombe & Doosje, 2003), confirming the claim that in-group favouritism increases self-esteem (Fein & Spencer, 1997).

**Scapegoat Theory.** The scapegoat theory conceptualised prejudice according to both the motivation approach and conflict-competition theories (Brown, 2006; Aronson, et al., 2002). This theory proposes that merely derogating the proverbial black sheep can serve a motivational function by maintaining feelings of self-worth while repairing blemished in-group identity (Brown, 2006). According to the conflict-competition approach, (Allport, 1954b; Berkowitz & Green, 1962) people may feel anger, irritation, or frustration (Nelson, 2006) in times of deprivation (Aronson, et al., 2002) or when prevented from reaching a particular goal (Nelson, 2006). A tendency to displace their aggression onto groups that are disliked, visible, and relatively powerless then emerges (Aronson, et al., 2002; Ashmore, 1970; Berkowitz & Green, 1962). This is true even when the out-group had nothing to do with the source of frustration and anger (Nelson, 2006) or a logical competitor does not exist (Aronson, et al., 2002). For example, in Germany following the Second World War, inflation was high and people were extremely poor, demoralised, and frustrated. As a result, when the Nazis gained power in the 1930s, they were able to focus the frustration of the German population on the Jews; an easily identifiable and powerless out-group (Berkowitz & Green, 1962).

Duckitt (1994) has suggested that the correlation between frustration and prejudice does exist under certain circumstances and may contribute to explaining individual differences in prejudice. However, Nelson (2006) reports that frustrated people may be equally prejudiced toward disliked and liked out-groups.
Prejudice in individuals is not merely a function of social influences and structures, as individuals who are exposed to similar social experiences and structures conducive to prejudice, may differ in the degree to which they come to hold prejudiced beliefs. It seems therefore that psychological factors may modulate the degree to which individuals absorb prejudice from their social environment (Duckitt, 1994; 1992a).

**Individual Differences Approach**

This approach gained momentum in the aftermath of the strong anti-Semitism that characterized Germany during Hitler’s regime (Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 2003; Myers, 2005) when it was found that the holocaust could not easily be explained in terms of realistic conflict of economic and social interests (Duckitt, 1994). One empirical finding also supports the view of prejudice as an individual phenomenon: Prejudice tends to be generalised over a variety of targets (Duckitt, 2001). A number of psychological factors that are thought to influence individuals’ predisposition or readiness for prejudice (Duckitt, 1992b, 1991a) will be discussed under this approach, such as political conservatism, religious fundamentalism, and authoritarianism (Duckitt, 1991a; Nelson, 2006). The most well-known and influential theory within this approach, based on psychoanalytic theory (Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 2003) is Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford,’s (1950) authoritarian personality-theory.

**The authoritarian personality.** This theory, proposed soon after World War II, focussed particularly on anti-Semitism (Taylor, et al., 2006). The theory proposed that a number of traits, needs, and dispositions together form a general pattern expressed as a personality syndrome that
made people especially likely to adopt prejudice (Duckitt, 1991a; Foster, 2001; Nelson, 2006; Taylor et al., 2006). The basic characteristics of the authoritarian personality which distinguishes it from the non-authoritarian personality are as follows:

- Rigid in outlook, intolerant of ambiguity or argument.
- Strong emphasis on conventional and traditional values.
- Admiration of power and toughness.
- Belief in importance of obedience to, and respect for authority.
- Only secure in a hierarchical structure.
- Combines aggression with submission.
- Exaggerated concern with sex.
- Punitive orientation to those who differ.
- Power orientated in family relationships.
- Uses stereotypes of race, gender, age, class, etc.
- Cynical about human nature.
- Does not like to look inwards and examine own feelings and motives (Adorno, et al., 1950).

Adorno, et al. (1950) believed that the authoritarian personality hates deviant impulses (e.g., fear, aggression, and sex) and was more likely to project these unacceptable impulses onto other people (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Harding et al., 1969). Those with authoritarian personality, more than other individuals, tend to hold prejudices against many groups (Duckitt, 2001; Nelson, 2006) and are more likely to display exaggerated submission to authority, extreme and rigid levels of conformity to conventional standards of behaviour, self-righteous hostility, hero-worship, ethnocentric in-group glorification, politico-economic conservatism, pro-fascist attitudes, a
tendency to think in categorical (black-and-white) terms, and punitiveness towards deviants and members of minority groups than other individuals (Adorno, et al., 1950; Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 2001; Nelson, 2006).

The theory was detailed, comprehensive, and based on extensive empirical research that produced the F (fascist)-scale as a measure of the authoritarian personality (Duckitt, 1991a). However, after enjoying much prominence and generating a large amount of research, the interest in this theory has waned (Duckitt, 2001; Nelson, 2006). Adorno, et al’s (1950) original investigation was criticised for serious methodological flaws. In addition, subsequent research could not support postulations that high authoritarianism arises from psychodynamic assumptions such as a domineering father and a punitive mother (Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1991a, 1993b).

In recent years, a new perspective on the authoritarian personality has reappeared as right wing authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, 2001; 1994; 1993b; 1991a; Taylor, et al., 2006). Both perspectives on authoritarianism described similar effects, such as submission to established authority figures, strong adherence to standard social conventions, and hostility towards out-groups (Franzoi, 2003). However, Altemeyer’s (1981) research suggested that three of the nine facets of authoritarianism described by Adorno et al. (1950) - conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and authoritarian submission - converged to form one social attitude dimension, namely RWA. The RWA scale was developed (Altemeyer, 1981) to measure this dimension.

The RWA scale has been extensively used in South Africa (Duckitt, 1994), revealing consistent group differences regarding the concept of authoritarianism. For example, White Afrikaners consistently scored higher than English White people and the less educated scored higher than the better educated. Empirical support for the link between authoritarianism and out-group prejudice, ethnocentricity, and anti-democratic tendencies were found. For example,
improved measures of RWA have shown strong and reliable correlations ($r=0.60+$) with anti-Black racism and social distance scales (Duckitt, 1994, 1993b; Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Foster, 2001).

RWA also described a pattern of generalised prejudice. Altemeyer (1981) jokingly referred to people with RWA as “equal-opportunity bigots” (p. 136) when research revealed that RWA was associated with prejudice towards “virtually everyone” (Nelson, 2006, p. 94).

Researchers (Brown, 2006; Cunningham, Nezlek & Banji, 2004; Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al, 2006) reported that people with RWA exhibited implicit and explicit prejudicial attitudes and hostility towards racial, ethnic and disadvantaged groups that have little in common with one another, such as gays and lesbians, drug users, Jews, feminists, people with AIDS, the homeless, and overweight people. Contradictory to the original perspective on authoritarianism, RWA attributes the roots of authoritarianism to social learning, rather than ingrained personality factors (Altemeyer, 1981; Foster, 2001; Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006).

According to Duckitt (1994), “religious and political belief systems may influence individuals’ proneness to prejudice” (p. 174). For example, RWA is most widespread among political conservatives and highly religious communities that limit experiences with people that challenge established authority, unconventional people, and other ethnic groups (Taylor, et al., 2006). The effects of political conservatism and religion on prejudice are examined next.

**Political conservatism and prejudice.** Political conservatism is a correlate of prejudice (Brown, 2006). Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway (2003) found that conservative individuals tend to be resistant to change and strongly endorse Protestant values, in particular the values of individualism and self-reliance. This leads many conservative individuals to believe that the
socially disadvantaged are responsible for their own difficulties because they don’t work hard enough to overcome obstacles and improve their conditions (Farwell & Weiner, 2000). In some instances, these beliefs can increase prejudice towards members of disadvantaged groups, such as ethnic and racial groups (Brown, 2006).

Political conservatism can also be correlated with a social domination orientation (SDO) (Brown, 2006; Jones, 1997; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996). SDO, an intergroup attitude, is a general tendency to believe that groups are inherently unequal, and to minimise conflict, more competent groups should dominate over less capable groups. Ideologies, containing negative stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes about those they oppress, are developed by dominant groups to legalise the continued oppression of subordinate groups (Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 2001; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Pratto, et al., 1994).

This theory also proposes that support of social policies that have implications for group-based hierarchies (e.g., immigration and affirmative action policies) will vary as a function of an individual’s SDO. As affirmative action and immigration policies would advance low-hierarchy groups into higher positions or absorb resources that may have been used to support the more advanced in the social hierarchy, individuals with a high degree of SDO will be more likely to oppose these policies (Jones, 1997).

Pratto, et al. (1994) developed an SDO scale to investigate people’s beliefs regarding the inevitability and desirability of group differences. As was predicted by the SDO model, SDO scores were positively correlated with hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and beliefs such as political-economic conservatism, anti-Black racism, sexist attitudes towards women, and preference for the conservative United States Republican party. On the other hand, SDO scores were negatively correlated with support of women’s rights, social programs, and gay and lesbian rights.
The issues of political conservatism, individualism, and an orientation towards social dominance discussed above, have had far reaching implications for issues facing industrialised nations in North America and Europe. Once homogenous with respect to ethnicity, race and religion, many of these countries have been transformed by immigration patterns and war into multicultural societies. Conservatives, who generally believe that minority groups should assimilate to the dominant culture, have opposed programs that support multiculturalism and diversity, such as bilingual education policies. This has lead to increased racial and ethnic inequality, prejudice, and ethnic conflict (Brown, 2006; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997).

**Religion and prejudice.** It seems logical to assume that people who belong to organised religions would be more tolerant of out-groups than those who have no religious affiliations (Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006). However, research suggests this is not always the case, as empirical research shows a positive correlation exists between being more religious and having less tolerance and more stereotyped cognitions (Adorno, et al., 1950; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 2003; Gough, 1951; Hunsberger, Owusu & Duck, 1999; Laythe, Finkel & Kirkpatrick, 2001).

Allport (1954b) reflected contradictory postulations regarding the relationship between religion and prejudice: “Some people say the only cure for prejudice is more religion; some say the only cure is to abolish religion” (p.444). Research presents a similar contradictory picture (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994; Franzoi, 2003). Attempts to explain contradictory findings, lead to defining what is meant by “religion”. Allport and Ross (1967) found that if being religious is defined by church attendance and superficial adherence to religious teachings, religious people are more prejudiced than nonreligious people, irrespective of the target of prejudice (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975).
Religious fundamentalism, the belief that there is only one, unchanging truth about humanity and God that must be followed strictly to have a relationship with God predicts greater prejudice, intolerance, and hatred (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1996; Nelson, 2006; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004), especially towards homosexuals (Hunsberger, 1996; Hunsberger, et al., 1999; Laythe, et al., 2001). Fundamentalism is also a significant predictor of prejudice in controversial religious groups (O’Donnell, 1993). The social learning theory, the simplest of general theories about the origins of group antagonism, views prejudice simply as being learned the same way people learn other attitudes and values (Taylor, et al., 2006).

Social Learning

The social learning approach asserts that learning in social situations, both inside and outside the home influences the development of the cognitive, affective, and behavioural components of prejudice (Brown, 2006; Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006). Therefore, children are not believed to be born with prejudice, but learn it from their family, peers, the media, schools, and society (Ashmore, 1970; Taylor, et al., 2006). In early life socialization occurs mostly through significant others, such as parents (Brown, 2006; Chaiken & Eagly, 1993; Duckitt, 1994; Nelson, 2006). Research by Kofkin, Katz, and Downey (1995, as cited in Aboud & Amato, 2005), however, has suggested that children are influenced by their parents’ attitudes only when parents explicitly express their views regarding race and ethnicity. This typically occurs in regions with a high occurrence of ethnic conflicts (Aboud & Amato, 2003).

Later, other agents of socialisation such as peers and the media play significant roles in determining prejudicial attitudes in adolescents and adults (Aboud, 1988; Ashmore, 1970; Brown, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006). Conformity, a process separate to socialisation, becomes more
important as children have more contact with peers, and is particularly important during adolescence (Ashmore & DelBoca, 1976). The pressure to conform to social norms can induce compliance with prejudiced norms (Duckitt, 1994). This is illustrated by studies done among Whites in South Africa and the American South by Pettigrew (1958) that revealed that people who conformed most to other social norms, were also the most prejudiced. Le Roux (1986) confirmed this in a semi-autobiographical account of growing up as an Afrikaner in South Africa:

Racial stereotypes which we acquired at home were mostly reinforced at school. Our history books…, our literature…, and the attitude of teachers, preachers, parents and friends left us in no doubt that Africans were very different from Whites and had to be treated as a separate, inferior group (p. 198).

This account (Le Roux, 1986) highlights the fact that stereotypes, as beliefs about an out-group, are a significant component of intergroup attitudes. It is thus important to examine the cognitive component of prejudice for a more comprehensive conceptualisation of prejudice.

**Stereotypes**

In the printing industry, “stereotype” refers to a metal plate that is used to make duplicate pages of the same type. As early as 1922, social commentator and journalist Walter Lippmann, used the term stereotype as a metaphor to describe biased perception of people (Aronson, et al., 2002; Kanahara, 2006). Since this innovative use of stereotypes, the concept has been extensively examined by social and cognitive psychologists (Jones, 1997) and researchers became more aware of the ways people deal with differences by forming ready-made judgments of others (Sampson,
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1999). As researchers have learnt more about stereotypes, the definition of the concept has also been refined (Nelson, 2006).

**The Definition of Stereotypes**

One of the earliest definitions of stereotypes was by Katz and Braly (1935), who defined a stereotype as a bad generalisation because it is factually incorrect. Allport (1954b) defined a stereotype as “an exaggerated belief associated with a category” (p. 191). Noticeably, Allport (1954b) regarded stereotypes to be mere generalisations about a group without implying that stereotypes include positive or negative evaluations. Currently, however, negative stereotypes of groups are better known, although positive attributions of groups can also be generalised (Nelson, 2006). For example, Brown (2006) stated among the most common positive stereotypes are the beliefs that “Black people are musical” and “the Chinese are mathematical” (p. 369).

In the early 1970’s, cognitive and social psychologists came to regard stereotyping as the result of the inherent, automatic process of categorisation (Nelson, 2006; Sampson, 1999) that is believed to occur “in the thoughts of individuals or in the ‘consensus’ of an entire society” (Lord, 1997, p. 229). People thus have a tendency to categorise according to what they perceive as normative in their culture (Aronson, et al., 2002; Kanahara, 2006). Stereotyping may also occur without any value attachment. For example, when one believes that all Blacks have musical abilities, one may believe so “with a positive value, with a negative value, with a mixed value, or without a value” (Kanahara, 2006, p. 312).

However, stereotypes involve generalising identical characteristics to all group members (Aronson, et al., 2002; Baron & Byrne, 2003; Brown, 2006; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Taylor, et al., 2006) or generalising general beliefs to an individual (Jones, 1997). For example,
acquiring a stereotype “all Blacks are musical”, one may then apply the stereotype: “John must have musical abilities as he is Black” (Kanahara, 2006). Some researchers (Jones, 1997; Kanahara, 2006) have asserted that mere stereotyping can not be considered problematic. However, when the application of a stereotype influences behaviour towards a member of the stereotyped group, stereotyping does become problematic.

Considering trends in and conclusions from stereotype research, Jones (1997) offered a comprehensive definition of a stereotype:

A stereotype is a positive or negative set of beliefs held by an individual about the characteristics of a group of people. It varies in its accuracy, the extent to which it captures the degree to which the stereotyped group members possess these traits, and the extent to which the set of beliefs is shared by others (p. 170).

When defining stereotypes, Jones (1997) referred only to individually-held stereotypes. However, it is useful to consider the distinction between cultural (group-level) and individual stereotypes (Allport, 1954b; Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006). A cultural stereotype implies that particular beliefs are shared by a social group and reflect community-wide patterns (Jones, 1997) whereas an individual stereotype describes the beliefs held by one individual about the characteristics of a group. One’s cultural stereotype about a group may not correspond to one’s individual stereotype about the group (Nelson, 2006). For example, whereas Black people in South Africa may believe that all Afrikaners are racist (cultural stereotype), individually they might not believe this true of all Afrikaners.

A stereotype can therefore be held by an individual (Jones, 1997; Kanahara, 2006; Nelson, 2006) or can be shared by a large number of individuals (Jones, 1997; Schaller, Conway &
A stereotype can be temporary or permanent (Weary, Jacobson, Edwards & Tobin, 2001) and may be about out-groups or in-groups (Hippel, Hawkins & Schooler, 2001). Stereotypes may lead to prejudice and discrimination. To find ways to reduce or even eliminate stereotypes, researchers have focussed a large amount of attention on answering questions about the origin and maintenance of stereotyping (Nelson, 2006). Currently, it is understood that stereotype development is influenced by many factors such as social learning and cognitive processes, such as categorisation (Brown, 2006; Nelson, 2006).

**Formation of Stereotypes**

*Categorisation*

According to the cognitive approach, stereotypes arise from the automatic cognitive tendency of humans to classify others into broad social categories, based on the perception of easily identifiable physical characteristics, such as race, gender, age, attractiveness, and height. This cognitive process is called categorisation (Brown, 2006; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Myers, 2005; Nelson, 2006). Within these social categories, often referred to as basic categories, there also exist beliefs about the personalities, abilities, and motives of the social group (Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006). Other cues that can be used to classify people into categories include occupation, socio-economic position, accent, and clothing (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). Some of these beliefs regarding categories are correct, while others are not (Brown, 2006).

Social categorisation significantly influences the processing of social information and forms the basis for the activation of a stereotype. The perception of a person leads to the categorisation of that person into a social category. Thereafter, a stereotype of the social category
is automatically activated and the person is perceived to possess all the traits and characteristics
associated with the social category (Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006). For example, when
encountering a White, Afrikaans-speaking person, one could automatically assume that this
person belongs to the social category of Afrikaner, along with all the stereotyped characteristics of
Afrikaners.

This categorisation occurs so rapidly that with repeated use the categorisation of an
individual can become virtually automatic, effortless, and outside of conscious thought (Franzoi,
2003; Nelson, 2006). For example, when encountering the White Afrikaans-speaking person, one
may automatically assume that he or she is racist, authoritarian, materialistic, and hardworking.
People find it especially easy and efficient to rely on stereotypes when they are pressed for time,
preoccupied, tired, emotionally aroused, and too young to appreciate diversity (Gilbert & Hixon,
1991; Myers, 2005). Basic categories are used so often when automatically categorising people,
they often are the central points around which stereotypes develop (Nelson, 2006). For example,
research has suggested that mere exposure to the face of a Black or White person is enough to
instantaneously evoke associated thoughts, feelings, and beliefs regarding that racial group (Fazio,
Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). By itself, such categorisation is not prejudice, but it does
provide the foundation of prejudice (Myers, 2005).

**Social Learning**

In psychology, it has long been an accepted fact that children learn many of their values,
attitudes, and social cognitions (Duckitt, 1994; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Nelson, 2006) through
direct or observational learning of the rewards and norms that parents (and significant others)
believe in and behave according to (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Nelson, 2006). In addition,
stereotypes are also learnt through overt and covert messages about intergroup relations received from films, television, magazines, video games, and all other types of media. By routinely observing stereotypes portrayed in the media, a child may come to believe that these attitudes represent the mainstream view of society. Due to biased portrayal of crime in the United States, for example, a common belief among many Americans is that African Americans, more than other racial groups, are more likely to engage in criminal behaviour (Nelson, 2006).

According to Aboud and Amato (2003), racial attitudes are gradually learnt in the first years of life. Around age 4, most children exhibit an awareness of racial cues and prefer their own ethnic or racial group above others. This racial bias sharply increases until it peaks at age 7, after which racial bias significantly decreases. The relationship between age and racial bias thus takes the shape of an inverted-U (Aboud & Amato, 2003). In addition to decreasing in negativity with age, the racial attitudes of children also become more coherent, complex, and intense as they grow older (Aboud, 1988; Aboud & Amato, 2003; Nelson, 2006). Similarly, Melamed (1968; 1970) established that South African children had formed the basic features of racial differentiation and stereotypes by the age of six years.

Stereotypes have a strong influence on a child’s perception of their in-group and out-groups (Nelson, 2006). For example, Corenblum, Annis, and Young (1996) found that majority-group children held more positive attitudes toward their own group and believed that successful performances of their in-group members were the result of positive, internal, and optimistic attributions, while minority-group success was attributed to luck. Surprisingly, minority-group children also held more positive views of the majority group and attributed in-group success to luck. Also in South Africa, research has shown that White children display very strong in-group preference (Melamed, 1968; 1970).
It can be concluded that stereotypes are an extension of the innate human tendency to simplify the amount of information that must be dealt with at any given moment. The acquisition of stereotypes is also informed by the direct or indirect transmission of values, beliefs and stereotypes by both parents and the media. With this perspective, it is necessary to explore the cognitive tendencies and processes by which humans maintain stereotypes.

**Maintenance of Stereotypes**

As stereotypes enable the holder to make a rapid judgement about another person with little cognitive effort, humans are motivated to maintain stereotypes even though most people agree that stereotypes are undesirable, often promote inaccurate evaluations of other, and can lead to strained relationships between groups of people. Four factors facilitate stereotype maintenance in daily social judgements, namely: (a) selective attention to stereotype-relevant information, (b) subcategorisation of individuals, (c) illusory correlations, and (d) the motivation of the individual to maintain stereotypes (Nelson, 2006).

**Selective Attention to Stereotype-Relevant Information**

According to Jones (1997) “a stereotype will affect what we attend to and therefore, what we later remember” (p.190). People are exposed to a variety of information that pertains to their stereotypes. Some information is consistent with existing stereotypes; other information is not consistent with existing stereotypes. Stereotype inconsistent information arouses dissonance and is perceived as threatening to one’s self concept (Nelson, 2006). For example, a White person who holds the stereotype “Black people are lazy” will experience dissonance when encountering a
self-motivated, hardworking Black person. His or her self-concept is thus threatened as stereotype inconsistent information implies his or her way of interpreting information is flawed. Instead of acknowledging that he or she might be irrational, the person will instead change the way he or she thinks about the validity of the stereotype-inconsistent information by applying heuristics (mental shortcuts) that only allow for the consideration of stereotype-consistent information (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 2003).

Stereotypes enable people to expect certain attitudes and behaviours from others and people may be more likely to remember information that is not consistent with their expectations (Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006). For example, if the White person did not expect to encounter a hardworking Black person, he or she may be more likely to remember such surprising expectation-inconsistent information. However, when it comes to very strong expectancies, which describes most stereotypes, people are more prone to remember stereotype-consistent information. This serves to maintain existing stereotypes (Nelson, 2006). For example, the White person that encountered a hardworking Black person may not pay enough attention to the stereotype-inconsistent information in order to remember it. Yet, when encountering a lazy Black person, the White person will be more likely to remember this encounter, as it is consistent with his or her expectation of Black people.

It is an interesting fact that people are more likely to remember stereotype-inconsistent information regarding their in-group, suggesting that humans are willing to think of their in-groups as consisting of individuals with unique characteristics. On the other hand, people tend to remember stereotype-consistent information of their out-groups. This suggests that people want to think of their out-groups of consisting of people who share common characteristics and who are more similar than different (Nelson, 2006).
Sub-Categorisation

Stereotypes can also be maintained by the creation of specific subcategories for individuals of the stereotyped group that do not match the global stereotype (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Franzoi, 2003). At first, stereotype information about the group tends to be stored as information that applies to all group members. As stereotype-discrepant information is perceived, separate subcategories for the deviant individual that does not match the global stereotype are formed (Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006; Weber & Crocker, 1983). The stereotype-inconsistent person is therefore seen as unrepresentative of the whole group, suggesting that group-stereotypes do not apply to the particular member (Nelson, 2006). For example, celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey can be idolised by Whites who harbour negative racial attitudes towards Blacks because she is not perceived as representative of the average Black person (Franzoi, 2003).

Sub-categorisation enables people to retain rigid and unflattering stereotypes in the face of stereotype-disconfirming evidence (Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006). It also enables one to think of oneself as unprejudiced toward a particular group. Because stereotypes are largely negative, it is likely that stereotype-disconfirming group members will represent positive qualities not usually associated with the out-group. As a result, people are more likely to have positive evaluations for those individuals for whom they have created subcategories (Nelson, 2006). For example, a White person may create a subcategory for the self-motivated, hardworking Black person he or she observed, or for other stereotype-disconfirming group members such as Oprah Winfrey, Tokyo Sexwale, a Black co-worker, and a Black friend. In this way, the White person can reason that he or she is not prejudiced because, according to him or her, some of his or her best friends or people he or she admires are Black.
A stereotype will be modified only when a stereotype-inconsistent individual is seen as representative of a group (Nelson, 2006). For example, after observing a self-motivated and hardworking Black person, a White person may be motivated to change his or her stereotype about Black persons being lazy. However, if the hardworking Black person is not seen as representative of the group, a White person is more likely to create a subcategory while keeping the stereotype intact.

Research indicates that if people can explain a stereotype-inconsistent characteristic as being attributable to some aspect of the situation, or to vague stereotype-relevant information, or to any other ready variable that would explain the origin of the group-deviant characteristic, it would be used to subcategorise the person (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 1999; Kunda & Oleson, 1985; Rothbart and Lewis, 1988). For example, rather than change the existing stereotype of “Black people are lazy”, a White person will subcategorise the self-motivated, hardworking Black person by explaining the stereotype-inconsistent behaviour as a result of a private school education where the value of hard work was instilled.

**Illusory Correlations**

To increase the predictability of the social environment, humans also have a tendency to notice correlations between events, objects, and people. Some of these correlations are correct (Nelson, 2006). However, it is also a fact that people often perceive a relationship between variables that are weakly correlated or not correlated at all. This perceived correlation is called an illusory correlation and can lead to both the formation and maintenance of stereotypes (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006). For example, as the American media tend to over report crime perpetrated by African Americans, people can infer that African
Americans, more than any other ethnic groups, are more likely to be criminal (Taylor, et al., 2006).

The effect of illusory correlations is heightened by the human tendency to pay more attention to stereotype-consistent information, while disregarding information that is inconsistent with a stereotype (Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006). Through this process of selective attention to stereotype-consistent information, the stereotype can prove to be resistant to change (Franzoi, 2003). For example, if a White person believes that Black people are lazy, he or she is more likely to notice and remember examples of lazy behaviour in Black people and forget examples of hardworking Black people or lazy White people. In this way, his or her stereotype leads him or her to perceive a strong (illusory) correlation between laziness and Black people.

Motivation

In addition to cognitive biases, heuristics, and other capacity limitations of the human cognitive system, stereotypes may also be formed and maintained simply on the basis of motivation to do so. Some people may have a specific interest in perceiving out-groups as inferior, and their effort and energy directed at meeting that need is what can be called motivation. On the other hand, some people are more motivated than others to form accurate impressions of others instead of relying on stereotypes in their social perceptions. Stangor and Ford (1992, as cited in Nelson, 2006) have suggested that people can be identified as either perceiving others in an accuracy-oriented or expectancy-confirming manner. Accuracy-oriented individuals tend to be motivated to be more accurate in their social perceptions than expectancy-confirming individuals who are more likely to perceive individuals based on stereotypes of the target group. The latter
group focuses more on expectancy-confirming behaviour of the out-group members, and forgets instances of expectancy-disconfirming behaviour (Nelson, 2006).

People are sometimes accuracy orientated, and sometimes expectancy orientated. However, most people are not motivated to avoid using stereotypes in social perceptions because there is usually no good reason to carefully consider others and expend that much cognitive energy in social evaluations. Lack of motivation to avoid stereotyping others does therefore serve to maintain existing stereotypes (Nelson, 2006).

Previously it was explained that some attitudes may be automatically activated, often without the awareness of the holder of the attitude (Dovidio, et al., 2003; Eagly & Chaiken, 2005). In a similar manner, stereotypes can also be activated outside the conscious awareness of the stereotype holder, as people can hold implicit stereotypes.

**Implicit Stereotypes**

It is a common misconception that people wilfully and consciously use stereotypes (Sampson, 1999). Therefore, the prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behaviour that follows stereotypes are considered to be intentional and the “symptoms of a bad person” (Sampson, 1999, p.138). However, as previously discussed, cognitive psychologists argue that stereotyping is part of normal human categorisation (Nelson, 2006; Sampson, 1999; Taylor, et al., 2006). The idea of implicit stereotyping adds to the “picture of normalcy” (Sampson, 1999, p. 138) regarding stereotyping.

Implicit stereotypes refer to stereotypes that, although difficult to identify through introspection, still influence people’s beliefs regarding characteristics held by members of a particular social category. Therefore, racial, ethic, or gender stereotypes of which people are
mostly unaware, can be activated merely by perceiving members of the groups to which these stereotypes apply. Once activated, these stereotypes influence the cognitions, decisions, and overt behaviour regarding members of the stereotyped group (Baron & Byrne, 2003). An interesting question arises as to whether people, who personally reject negative stereotypes, can successfully avoid using stereotypes when encountering an out-group member. Devine’s (1989) activation-application model addresses this issue.

**Devine’s Model of Stereotype Activation and Application**

Devine (1989) has developed a model about stereotype activation that distinguished between automatic processing of information and controlled processing of information. This model is illustrated in Figure 2. Controlled processing refers to the more familiar, conscious, and voluntary cognitive processing of information that people engage in on a daily basis (Brown, 2006; Devine, 1989; Taylor, et al., 2006). Automatic processing refers to cognitive processing and stereotype activation over which people have no control (Aronson, et al., 2002; Devine, 1989). For example, even a person who scores low on a prejudice scale, is most likely familiar with certain stereotypes that exist in society that “pops into one’s mind” (Aronson, et al., 2002, p.474), such as “Jews are materialistic”, “homosexual men are effeminate”, “Afrikaners are racist”, and “Black people are violent”.

Devine’s (1989) theory suggests that cognitive processing involves two steps: The automatic processing brings up stereotypes, but the controlled (or conscious) processing can refute or ignore it. For example, a person can refute the automatic stereotype by saying to him or herself that the stereotype is not right or fair since Black people are no more hostile than White people. The person can therefore choose to ignore the stereotype about the person’s racial group
(Aronson, et al., 2002). Thus, if information-processing demands are light (e.g., the individual has enough time to make a decision or is not attending to more than one stimulus at a time), low-prejudiced people will successfully inhibit the use of automatically activated stereotypes. If, however, information-processing demands are heavy, even low-prejudice people will be unable to prevent the second step, the application of stereotypes.

Figure 2. Devine’s model of stereotype activation and application.


Research stimulated by Devine’s model of stereotype activation and application has not supported all of the predictions of the model (Brown, 2006). For example, although low-prejudiced people are aware of negative cultural stereotypes, they tend to be less aware of these stereotypes than highly prejudiced people are (Gordijn, Koomen & Stapel, 2001). Furthermore, negative stereotypes are not automatically activated in low-prejudiced people whenever an out-group member comes to mind (Lepore & Brown, 1997), and they are not automatically applied when information-processing demands are heavy (Fazio & Dunton, 1997). Finally, Kawakami,
Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen and Russin (2000) found that even high-prejudice people can be trained to ignore or suppress stereotypes when thinking about out-group members. In summary, contrary to Devine’s (1989) postulation, some researchers have postulated that stereotype activation is not always automatic, and stereotype application not inevitable (Brown, 2006).

Although stereotypes are considered to be cognitive and prejudice considered to be affective, the two concepts tend to operate together (Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006). For example, prejudiced individuals’ evaluation of unemployed Black people are likely to involve both a group label (e.g., Black people), its accompanying stereotypical traits (e.g., lazy), and the associate negative affect (e.g., disgust, irritation) regarding Black people.

In the previous sections, it has been established that prejudice is a negative attitude directed toward people because they are members of a specific group. Prejudiced attitudes often reveal themselves in biased behaviour (Franzoi, 2003). Thus, as the behavioural component of prejudice, discrimination is closely tied to stereotypes and prejudice.

**Discrimination**

Although prejudice does not always lead to discrimination (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Franzoi, 2003) and discrimination may occur without prejudice (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Franzoi, 2003), it is a fact that negative feelings (prejudice) and beliefs (stereotypes) often go hand in hand with negative action or treatment (discrimination) (Lord, 1997). Discrimination is generally described as that which is “actionable” (Jones, 1997, p.10).
The Definition of Discrimination

Discrimination refers to “selectively unjustified negative behaviour towards members of the target group” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986, p. 3) with the aim of maintaining the in-group’s preferred position at the expense of members of the comparison group (Jones, 1997). Discrimination therefore refers to unjustified negative or harmful actions towards a person, merely because of that person’s membership to a specific group (Aaronson, et.al, 2002; Baron & Byrne, 2003; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Myers, 2005). For example, during apartheid, Black people were not allowed to use beaches designated for White people, merely because they were Black (Sparks, 2003).

Allport’s (1954b) definition of discrimination draws attention to the fact that discrimination does not only involve the person that discriminates, but also includes a recipient of discriminatory behaviour, who disagrees with this treatment. He defined discrimination as behaviour that “comes about only when we deny to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish” (p. 51).

As seen in the definitions above, discrimination is often conceptualised only in terms of negative behaviour towards target groups. However, it can also refer to positive behaviour towards a person based on positive attributes held towards the group to which that person belongs (Jones, 1997). For example, a student with comparatively low Grade 12 results may be admitted to a tertiary institution, while another with higher marks may be rejected because the former is a son of an important alumnus.

Discrimination also refers to a range of negative actions towards the target group. Allport (1954b) described an intuitively based continuum of discrimination: antilocution, avoidance, discrimination, physical attack, and extermination. More recently, Essed (1991) included all
verbal, nonverbal, and paraverbal acts which result in negative or unfavourable consequences for the dominated racial or ethnic group into the definition of discrimination.

When discrimination disadvantages members of groups based on racially-based criteria, it is referred to as racial discrimination (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Jones, 1997). Racial discrimination can therefore be described as the behavioural enactment of racial prejudice (Essed, 1991). Traditionally, racial discrimination has been expressed either directly and blatantly or more indirectly.

**Direct and Indirect Racial Discrimination**

Direct racial discrimination refers to the intentional and fully reflected decision for the unequal treatment of people based on racial or related criteria (Essed, 1991; Mummendey & Otten, 2003) and is the form of discrimination that has been traditionally regarded as discrimination. During direct racial discrimination out-groups are perceived as being distinct and deserving less positive or even negative treatment. Consequently, out-groups will be consistently treated negatively, or others that do so will be supported (Mummendey & Otten, 2003). Many examples of this form of discrimination were evident in apartheid South Africa (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003). For example, educational, health and housing facilities available to White people were considerably superior to those of Coloured, Asian, and Black people (Duckitt, 1994; Sparks, 2003).

It is understandable that blatant discrimination will have many negative ramifications for its targets. However, discrimination disguised as something else may also be particularly difficult to deal with (Taylor, et al., 2006). Indirect racial discrimination is an example of disguised discrimination. Indirect racial discrimination refers to the tendency to “adhere to the ‘equal
treatment’ of different racialised groups under systematically unequal conditions” (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003, p. 50). Patterns of racial inequality may be perpetuated or even created when, due to indirect discrimination, people are unwilling to redress past patterns of inequality (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003). For example, overrepresentation of White persons in positions of authority in South African institutions may point to an unwillingness to change selection, employment, and promotion practices to include members of previously disadvantaged groups.

In recent years, due to social and historical changes in society, another manifestation of discrimination that overlaps significantly with indirect discrimination has emerged.

**Subtle Discrimination**

Subtle discrimination refers to a behavioural manifestation of prejudice that is vague, often not visible, and difficult to prove. This type of discrimination may be intentional or unintentional, and together with indirect discrimination, is becoming the foremost mode in which racism currently manifests itself (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003).

Subtle discrimination is usually expressed in disguised ways, such as paternalism and condescension, supportive discouragement, and stereotyped humour. Paternalism and condescension refer to behaviour that is polite and nice on the surface, but which treats members of the target group as though they are children, lacking in some things or otherwise inferior. For example, a White person that speaks loudly and slowly when addressing Black people, even if they have a good grasp of language in which they are addressed, practices this form of discrimination (De la Rey & Duncan, 2002).

Second, supportive discouragement occurs when mixed messages about the abilities, intelligence, or accomplishments are conveyed to a person of the target group. For example, a
White person may constantly complement the work of Black colleagues but not that of White colleagues. This may be because the competence of White colleagues is always taken for granted, while Black colleagues are expected to fail. The third form of subtle discrimination, stereotyped humour, refers to the telling of jokes that are based on stereotypes. It may also include the imitation of accents to create humour (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003).

Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination thus leads to many difficulties between people, as it is an inappropriate and unjustified differentiation between people, based merely on their group membership (Mummendey & Otten, 2005). While overt acts of prejudice might have declined in recent years, several researchers (Brown, 2006; Gibbons, Gerrard, Cleveland, Wills & Brody, 2004; Jones, 1997) suggest that targeted groups, such as racial and ethnic groups, still have to confront the devastating consequences of prejudice in their lives.

**Consequences of Prejudice on Its Targets**

Prejudice not only affects the prejudiced person’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviour, but also triggers adaptive responses in the target of prejudice (Jones, 1997; Meyers, 2005). In this regard, Allport (1954b) stated: “one’s reputation cannot be hammered, hammered, hammered into one’s head without doing something to one’s character” (p. 139).

Allport (1954b) reduced the reactions of the targets of prejudice to two basic types, namely: (a) those that involve blaming oneself (e.g., withdrawal, self-hate, and aggression against one’s own group), and (b) those that involve blaming external causes (e.g., fighting back, suspiciousness, and increased group pride). Fanon (1990) suggested that racism can be considered a form of systemic vertical violence. In racist contexts, thus, the dominated group is kept in subjugation by force and social stratification. More significantly, though, is the fact that
suppression is also be maintained when the dominated group internalises the dominant group’s racist beliefs. Such internalisation results in intense intra-psychic stress and rage in the dominated group and is often turned inwards where it manifests in all forms of addictions. The dominated group may also direct their rage at safe targets, such as other victims of racism. Hence the high levels of abuse evident in many dominated and marginalised communities (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003).

In recent years it has also became clear that the study of the consequences of prejudice would not be complete without considering the influence of the target’s expectations on the perceiver in the social context. For example, feedback from the target often confirms the expectations of the perceiver, while the behaviour of the perceiver often confirms the expectations of the target (Nelson, 2006). The effects of prejudice on its targets reveals itself most prominently in five different observable phenomena, namely: (a) identity maintenance, (b) stereotype threat, (c) the self-fulfilling prophesy of prejudice, (d) disidentification and disengagement, (e) system justification, and (f) the paradoxical effects of affirmative action.

**Identity Maintenance**

Historically, racial, ethnic, or gender groups who are targets of prejudice because of their unique racial, ethnic, or gender characteristic have assimilated their identity into the dominant culture at the cost of losing their identity and racial or national heritage (Brown, 2006). For example, Black persons have altered their mannerisms and changed their names and styles of dress in order to become more westernised (Brown, 2006).

Yet, these groups have been able to maintain cultural identities through various strategies. One such strategy aims to protect self-esteem by attributing negative outcomes to prejudice.
For example, if a person from a group regularly targeted by prejudice fails to be promoted at work, he or she may believe the outcome was due to prejudice. Unfortunately, attributing failure to discrimination may be a psychological double-bind. As people disapprove of individuals who evade personal responsibility for negative outcomes, this strategy may reflect poorly on the individual (Kaiser & Miller, 2001). For that reason, research has shown, members of targeted groups are in many cases unlikely to report discrimination (Pillay & Collings, 2004; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1995; 1997) due to their awareness of the social cost of reporting discrimination to high-status others (Stangor, Swim, Van Allen & Sechrist, 2002).

Investigations into self-esteem of Americans have suggested that group pride can insulate people from prejudice and protect them from the adverse effects of discrimination. For example, most minorities in the United States have evaluated their collective identity in positive terms (Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994), while many report a personal level of self-esteem that is equivalent to that of White Americans (Twenge & Campbell, 2002).

**The Stereotype Threat**

On average, minority groups in the United States of America, such as African Americans and Hispanic Americans consistently average about 15 units less on standardised intelligence and achievement tests than White Americans. Even though many explanations for this effect, such as socioeconomic disadvantages and cultural biases imbedded into standardised intelligence tests have been offered, factors in the immediate testing situation are also considered to have an effect (Brown, 2006; Nelson, 2006).

Research reported by Steele and Aronson (1995) suggested that the debilitating effects of stereotype threat may account for the disparity in achievement between African Americans and
White Americans. The researchers discovered that African American students showed poorer performance on standardised tests when they felt the threat of their intellectual ability being evaluated. However, when they were led to believe that the test does not count, they performed as well as White students.

The apprehension of the African American students related to their fear of confirming the existing negative cultural stereotype of intellectual inferiority (Aronson et al., 2002), caused enough anxiety to disrupt their test performance, thereby fulfilling the stereotype (Nelson, 2006; Sampson, 1999). The effort it takes to dismiss the accusations of stereotype threat increases mental demands and decreases working memory (Schmader & Johns, 2003). Worrying about mistakes under stereotype threat can also impair performance and motivation (Seibt & Foster, 2004).

In addition to psychological consequences, stereotype threat may also have damaging physiological consequences. Blasovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, and Kowai-Bell (2001) varied stereotype threat while giving Black and White students a written test. The Black students showed considerable higher blood pressure under the high stereotype threat condition than the White participants, but they did not differ in the low stereotype threat condition.

The Self-Fulfilling Prophesy

One mechanism whereby targets of prejudice may come to accept and believe negative stereotypes about their group, is through the self-fulfilling prophesy (Nelson, 2006; Jones, 1997; Sampson, 1999). This refers to the phenomenon by which a perceiver’s expectations about a target eventually lead that target to behave in ways that confirms those expectations (Nelson, 2006). The self-fulfilling prophesy can be illustrated with the following example: If a White
person believes that his Black domestic worker is not intelligent, the White person will probably not ask the domestic worker interesting questions, or listen intently while she is talking. This behaviour will be due to a simple expectation regarding the domestic worker: Why waste energy paying attention to the domestic worker if she is unlikely to say something clever or interesting? This is bound to have an influence on the behaviour of the domestic worker. Since the White person is not paying much attention to her when she’s talking, she will feel uneasy and will probably not communicate the knowledge and wisdom that she possesses. This will serve to confirm and justify the original stereotype of the White person, completing the self-fulfilling prophesy.

Self-fulfilling prophesies can also operate on a societal level (Franzoi, 2003). For example, general beliefs of White South-Africans regarding the intellectual inferiority of non-White people led to inferior education for non-White South Africans through the promulgation of the Bantu Education Act of 1953. As a result of inferior education, among other factors, up to the 1990s non-White people could mostly only find unschooled and menial positions (Sparks, 2003), seemingly confirming the original belief of intellectual inferiority that created inferior education in the first place.

Disidentification and Disengagement

A consequence of repeatedly experiencing the stereotype threat is that the target may disidentify with whatever task is associated with the threatening evaluation (Brown, 2006; Franzoi, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006). In disidentification, individuals disengage their identity from the achievement domain in question, thereby shielding their self-esteem and sense of self-competence (Nelson, 2006). For example, African Americans disidentify with academic
achievement, while women disidentify with achievement in science and mathematics (Major, Spencer, Schmader & Wolfe, 1998).

Disidentification can be both adaptive and maladaptive (Nelson, 2006). On the one hand, since disidentification protects self-esteem, it can be regarded as an effective coping response in the face of prejudice and discrimination (Crocker, et al., 1998). However, disidentification is also one of the factors that most undermines achievement and success in domains which society deems important. It is not surprising, therefore, that the effects of prejudice are also most noticeable among social groups that have been historically disadvantaged (Franzoi, 2003).

**System Justification**

Ironically, members of disadvantaged groups may sometimes cooperate by endorsing negative stereotypes of their in-group (Jost & Banaji, 1994) to justify, rationalise, or explain the status quo. For example, Triandis (1989) reported that Hispanic and African Americans have approximately the same stereotypes of one another that White Americans have of them. Thus, wealthy Whites and poor Black Americans might both support the stereotype that poor people are less industrious and intelligent (Lord, 1997), thereby serving to maintain the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Justifying the existing system enables members of disadvantaged groups to reassure themselves that they live in a just world where people get what they deserve (Hafer & Olson, 1993). According to Jost and Banji (1994), system justification does not occur consciously and deliberately. Instead, members of groups, disadvantaged by negative stereotypes, might “absorb” implicit messages from the media. They thus come to believe that “the world has to work this way” (Lord, 1997, p. 328) without ever examining their reasons for system justification.
The Paradoxical Effects of Affirmative Action

Members of stereotyped groups are sometimes the beneficiaries of policies and programs that aim to help them economically, occupationally, or educationally (Brown, 2006; Nelson, 2006). For example, in South Africa, affirmative action policy is designed to overcome the effects of past discrimination and current stereotypes. These policies also function to help underrepresented members of previously disadvantaged groups to find good employment (Nelson, 2006).

However, the individuals who benefit from these programs might also be adversely affected (Brown, 2006). Affirmative action programs may be seen as mere reverse discrimination, incurring psychological costs for those who benefit from the program (Nelson, 2006). For example, Schneider, Major, Luhtanen, and Crocker (1996) hypothesised that offers of help from the perceived prejudiced group might reinforce stereotypes of lesser abilities on groups that benefit from affirmative action, leading to negative effects on the self-esteem and beliefs of work competence of the stereotyped groups.

Affirmative action can be beneficial to previously disadvantaged groups. When beneficiaries of affirmative action were informed that their ability as well as group status were factors in the hiring decision, they did not suffer negative psychological effects, such as self-doubt (Brown, Charnsangavej, Keough, Newnam, & Rentfrow, 2000). Affirmative action programs therefore need to be perceived as fair to both the beneficiaries and critics of the programs to incur positive effects (Taylor & Dube, 1986).

Prejudice therefore has many negative consequences for its targets. It is therefore necessary to explore the ways in which prejudice can be reduced.
Reducing Prejudice

Given the deep roots and long history of the presence of prejudice, prejudice reduction is a difficult, but necessary challenge (Sampson, 1999). Similarly, Brown (2006) asserted that no issue in the study of prejudice is more essential than considering how prejudice can be reduced. While Duckitt (1994) considered it unlikely that the universal psychological processes that underlie prejudice can be changed, other researchers (Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Sampson, 1999) believed it possible to decrease the degree in which prejudice is expressed. Jones (1997) suggested the grouping of prejudice reduction strategies under two approaches, namely (1) individual-based approaches, and (2) group-based approaches.

**Individual-Based Processes**

As prejudice and discrimination are often based on stereotypical thinking it can be suggested that positive changes may occur if people make a conscious effort not to apply stereotypical thinking in their daily lives (Franzoi, 2003). Allport (1954b) postulated that most people experience thinking about others in stereotypes as a negative experience because it brings about feelings of discomfort, guilt, and shame. Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink and Elliot (1991) found that this was especially true for those individuals who pride themselves on their egalitarian attitudes. It seems obvious, therefore, that people may try various strategies to avoid applying stereotypes, such as decategorisation and stereotype suppression.
Decategorisation

Given that social categorisation may lead to prejudice, the opposite tendency, namely decategorisation may reduce stereotyping and prejudice (Jones, 1997; Sampson, 1999). However, some social scientists believe that since social categorisation is an inevitable product of universal cognitive mechanisms (Cristonaffanini, 2004), it can not be changed (Franzoi, 2003), questioned or counteracted (Cristonaffanini, 2004). For example, Fox (1992) postulated that although the content of a stereotype may change, the process of stereotyping is inherent and automatic and therefore inevitable. He contends “the whole point of this argument has been to show that we have no choice but to think in stereotypes” (Fox, 1992, p.149).

Fox (1992) furthermore asserted that humans are only motivated to change the contents of their stereotypes when such stereotypes lack social approval or conflicts with the values of the holder of the stereotype. However, Franzoi (2003) cautioned against describing stereotypical thinking as inherent, natural and inevitable, as this might appear to condone the prejudice and discrimination that could result from negative stereotypes (Franzoi, 2003).

Other researchers (Allport, 1954b; Billig, 1985; Devine, 1989; Franzoi, 2003; Sampson, 1999) rejected the postulation that humans need this type of thinking to function. Allport (1954b) believed that people can categorise without it inevitably leading to negative stereotyping, based on the fact that categories and stereotypes are not identical concepts. Categories create order, are flexible and can change. On the other hand, stereotypes are rigid, inflexible, and tend to link only one meaning to the out-group. Similarly, Billig (1985) argued that people think not only by applying categories, but are also are able to making distinctions within categories by observing generalities and individual attributes. Consistent with Billig’s analysis, Devine (1989) postulated that people can circumvent judgements based on stereotypical thinking by making a conscious
effort to use more rational, inductive cognitive strategies. People should therefore be able to inhibit prejudice though conscious and deliberate self-regulation (Franzoi, 2003).

Decategorisation as a conscious strategy to inhibit prejudice aims to lessen focus on the social identity of out-group members, concentrating more on the individual identity of out-group members (Sampson, 1999). Several strategies facilitate decategorisation. One such strategy involves differentiating members of out-groups according to their individual entities distinctive to them as individuals of the out-group category. For example, the role of parent can be emphasised. Another strategy entails personalising members of out-groups by responding to them in terms of their individuating information that is relevant. For example, instead of categorising a person as a Black person, personal information such as “my neighbour” may be applied (Jones, 1997). Due to the reality of social conditions that may limit contact between groups, Jones (1997) concedes that decategorisation may be difficult to achieve. Another limitation of this approach is that it may undermine important social identities (Sampson, 1999).

*Stereotype Suppression*

Besides choosing to apply current personal beliefs instead of stereotypes, the strategy of stereotype suppression may also be utilised to avoid stereotypic thinking. This strategy entails making a conscious effort of not thinking of someone in terms of a stereotype by quickly “pushing [the stereotype] out of mind” (Nelson, 2006, p.81) as soon as the stereotype is activated. Research investigating stereotype suppression, however, suggested that it is very difficult to avoid stereotyping. Furthermore, the effect of stereotype avoidance only lasts a short time and the stereotypic thoughts come back even stronger and more frequently (Gordijn, Hindriks & Koomen, 2004; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & Jetten, 1994).
Nevertheless, some people are able to avoid the rebound effects of stereotype suppression (Rudman, Ashmore & Gary, 2001). Monteith, Spicer and Tooman (1998) found that low prejudice people did not demonstrate stereotype rebound. The researchers concluded that people who are motivated not to use stereotypes and possess well-practiced, alternative ways of thinking about other people, will be able to avoid stereotypic thinking without suffering stereotype rebound effects. Dunn and Spellman (2003) suggested that access to stereotypical information might be inhibited for people who do not believe in stereotypes. Such people were therefore less likely to stereotype an encountered individual. It seems therefore that non-stereotypical responses can be practiced, as suggested by Macrae, et al. (1994): “If stereotype activation can become routinized, automated, and triggered by external stimulus cues, then there is no compelling reason why stereotype inhibition should not take a similar course” (p.815). Cristonaffanini (2004) claimed that examples from history do in fact illustrate how political specific stereotypes can change as a product of historical context. As example, Christonaffanini (2004) pointed out how the post-Second World War Jewish stereotypes have changed to perceptions of “today’s European Jews” (p.9).

**Intergroup Processes**

Social psychologists believe that prejudice is not inevitable and can be reduced by several techniques that involve intergroup processes (Jones, 1997). Two of the most prominent techniques in this approach will be discussed, namely: (a) intergroup contact, and (2) recategorisation.
Intergroup Contact

The idea of intergroup contact to reduce prejudice was proposed by Allport (1954b). He held that reduced prejudice will result when four positive situations in the contact situation are present, namely: (a) equal status between the groups, (b) common goals, (c) intergroup cooperation, and (d) the support of authorities, law, or custom (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997; Kenworthy, Turner, Hewstone & Voci, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005).

Studies conducted since this original formulation generally support the importance of these four conditions for intergroup contact to reduce prejudice (Baron & Byrne, 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005).

When the four conditions of intergroup contact are met, several factors predict the success of intergroup contact as a prejudice reduction strategy (Pettigrew, 1997). First, increased contact between persons from different groups can lead to a growing recognition of the similarities between them, which can enhance mutual attraction (Baron & Byrne, 2003). Second, although stereotypes can be resistant to change, they can be altered when sufficient stereotype-inconsistent information is encountered, or when individuals meet a sufficient number of exceptions to their stereotypes (Kunda & Oleson, 1995). Third, increased contact may counter the illusion of out-group homogeneity (Baron & Byrne, 2003). For example, some South African studies (Luiz & Kringe, 1981; Spangenberg & Nel, 1983) indicated that increased quality of contact facilitated intergroup relations. Similarly, Holtman, Louw, Tredoux, and Carney (2005) found that quality of intergroup contact with members of other race groups and increased contact in various contexts was the best predictor for improved racial attitudes of learners of previously segregated schools in South Africa. Some research findings implied that only the dominant race group in a specific society benefits from contact. For example, Finchilescu (1988) found that racially integrated
training in a school setting reduced prejudice among the White learners, but not among Black or Indians learners.

Intergroup contact may also increase stereotyping and prejudice. Holtman, et al., (2005) reported that a high degree of identification with one’s own race was in some instances significantly associated to less positive attitudes towards other groups. This may by due to superficial contact between members of different groups which fails to provide new information about each group, thereby merely reinforcing existing stereotypes (Allport, 1954b; Kenworthy, et al., 2005).

Contact between members of out-groups, especially when these groups are the target of strong prejudice, may also generate negative emotions such as anxiety, discomfort, and fear of appearing prejudiced. Such reactions may also impact on the benefits of intergroup contact (Baron & Byrne, 2003). Following this argument, Smith and Boero (2001) expressed their concern about the lack of equal status and high quality interracial contact in South Africa. According to these researchers, these conditions are essential ingredients for the decrease of prejudice through contact, but are largely absent in South Africa. For example, a common context for interracial contact in South Africa is the superficial and scripted contact between a socially dominant White homeowner and domestic worker. Another strategy that encourages perceivers to focus on additional dimensions of group membership is recategorisation.

**Recategorisation**

Decategorisation aims at separating individual identities from group identities to enable people to relate more as individuals. Recategorisation challenges the distinction between in-groups and out-groups by encouraging the development of a superordinate goal that will
transform people from us versus them to a common superordinate group identity of we (Crisp, Walsh & Hewstone, 2006; Dovidio, Gaertner, Niemann & Snider, 2001; Jones, 1997; Sampson, 1999; Taylor, et al., 2006).

Recategorisation can be facilitated by reducing sub-group salience (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio, 1989), while enlisting members of all sub-groups in a common task. For example, the salience of racial sub-groups during a common task will be decreased if both Black and White learners are given a similar headdress for the duration of the task. This will increase the perception that both in-groups and out-groups are part of a larger, more inclusive group (Crisp, et al., 2006; Dovidio, Gaerter & Validzic, 1998). As members conceive themselves as being part of a superordinate group, it has been found that attitudes towards former out-group members improve, thereby reducing intergroup prejudice (Dovidio, et al., 2001; Gaertner, Dovidio, Rust, Nier, Banker, Ward, et al., 1999; Gaertner, et al., 1990). However, recategorisation’s superordinate goal may be successful in reducing prejudice only in the short term (Sampson, 1999).

Reducing prejudice requires interventions at both individual level and group level, depending on the circumstances and the requirements of the intervention (Sampson, 1999). Jones (1997) also regarded trust, individual desires to control prejudice reactions, and seeking common ground as essential ingredients to foster a positive basis for intergroup relations. The level at which prejudice reduction interventions are aimed also directs the success of such interventions. In this regard, Duckitt (1994) asserted that the higher the level of intervention, the greater the potential impact of the intervention will be. For example, prejudice reduction interventions at a school will have a larger impact than simply targeting an individual learner. To further understand the effects of prejudice, and to develop strategies to reduce such negative effects, it is of great relevance that stereotypes and prejudice are accurately measured (Jones, 1997).
Measurement of Prejudice

Prejudice rests primarily on attitudes and prejudice measurement thus rest on the techniques and methods developed to measure attitudes. Attitude measurement is ever-present in various academic disciplines, such as social psychology, sociology, political science, and economic sciences. News media regularly conduct and report surveys assessing public attitudes towards a range of objects (Krosnick, et al., 2005). A well-known example is the routine measurement of South Africans’ approval of political leaders.

An attitude, like all psychological constructs, is a latent construct and can not be observed directly (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Krosnick, et al., 2005). In addition, attitudes are not “simple productions that emerge intact, ripe for measurement” (Krosnick, et al., 2005, p.63). Attitude measurement therefore depends on those attitudes being revealed in verbal or nonverbal overt responses aimed at determining the stable construct underlying responses given during measurement (Krosnick, et al., 2005). Attitude measurement procedures are generally divided into (a) direct measurements where the verbal self-report of attitudes are taken as indicative of latent attitudes and (b) indirect procedures where attitudes are inferred without asking people directly to report them (Krosnick, et al., 2005).

Direct Self-Report Measures

To determine people’s attitudes, a wide variety of measurement techniques that has varied across history has been used. Initially, the pioneers of attitude measurement presumed that an attitude could be accurately assessed only by using a large set of questions that were selected through an elaborate procedure (Krosnick, et al., 2005). Questions regarding the participants’
beliefs, feelings, or behaviour were put directly to them and their responses were then self-reported (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Manstead & Semin, 2001).

One of the earliest attempts to create an attitude measuring tool was the time consuming and cumbersome Thurstone method of attitude measurement (Brown, 2006; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Foster, 1991a; Krosnick, et al., 2005), later followed by the less labour intensive Likert scale (Brown, 2006; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Krosnick, et al., 2005). The “Anti-Black Scale” (Heaven & Moerdyk, 1977) is a South African example of a Likert scale in which respondents are asked to rate their evaluation of their attitude according to a five-point response scale: strongly agree, agree, don’t know, disagree, and strongly disagree (Foster, 1991a).

The simplest type of self-report attitude scale is known as the semantic differential scale (Krosnick, et al., 2005; Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957, as cited in Brown, 2006). This scale focuses on people’s feelings, rather than their beliefs towards an attitude object (Brown, 2006). The generic nature of the semantic differential scale makes it easy to compare different attitudes towards any attitude object (Brown, 2006). Direct self-report measuring techniques, which has been widely used to measure explicit, consciously held prejudicial attitudes (Nelson, 2006), has number of strengths and limitations.

**Strengths and Limitations**

Direct self-report methods have the disadvantage of being time consuming and demanding for respondents since completion of such measures involve the administration of a large set of questions to measure a single attitude. In addition, the Thurstone and Likert procedures require a large amount of preparatory groundwork. However, these methods have the key advantages of higher reliability and correlational validity of their items (Krosnick, et al., 2005).
Another factor that limits the validity of direct self-report measures is the social desirability response bias (Brown, 2006; Krosnick, et al., 2005; Lord, 1997). This refers to the tendency of participants in attitude studies to give socially desirable answers, rather than their true attitudes (Orne, 1962) especially when highly personal or contentious issues are under consideration. As a result, it is especially difficult to measure people’s true attitudes regarding matters of sexuality and prejudice (Brown, 2006).

Numerous attempts have been made to surmount the social desirability tendency of people during self-reported attitude measurement. One such strategy is the bogus pipeline technique, which involves telling participants that the researcher can determine their true attitudes towards an attitude object by means of heart rate and blood pressure measurement (Brown, 2006; Krosnick, et al., 2005; Lord, 1997). Even though the physiological measurement was fake (bogus), it was found that by merely telling participants that the truth can be detected was sufficient to increase (not ensure) the honesty of responses (Brown, 2006). Under these conditions White participants were more willing to ascribe undesirable personality characteristics to Blacks and more desirable characteristic to Whites (Sigall & Page, 1971) and were more honest in reporting their dislike of Blacks (Allen, 1975). However, the bogus pipeline technique is difficult to implement, ethically questionable, and might even alter weakly held attitudes (Lord, 1997), which limits its usefulness for the purpose of attitude measurement.

To overcome limitations with intentional and unintentional distortion of reported attitudes during self-reported measurement of attitudes, research has increasingly focused on using measurement techniques that limit the occurrences of self-presentational distortions during a person’s deliberation of his or her evaluation. These techniques do not rely on self-reports of attitudes from participants, but on indirect or implicit ways of measuring attitudes.
Indirect Measurement Techniques

The expressed goal of indirect measures is to eliminate strategic misrepresentation by limiting participants’ control over the evaluation process. By reducing the impact of self-representational concerns during the assessment, it is assumed that the accuracy of attitude measurement will increase. Indirect measurement techniques have increased in popularity as technology has become more sophisticated (Krosnick, et al., 2005; Manstead & Semin, 2001). Three kinds of implicit or indirect measures of attitude measurement have been used extensively in attitude research, namely: (a) unobtrusive behavioural observation, (b) response latency measures, and (c) physiological measures.

Unobtrusive Behavioural Observation

Initially, measures designed to limit self-presentational distortions relied mainly on unobtrusive assessments of overt behaviours. These assessments of attitudes hid the true purpose of the attitude scale (Brown, 2006) and sometimes even concealed the measurement itself (Krosnick, et al., 2005). One strategy for unobtrusive observation is to disguise the attitude that is actually being studied. For example, Gaertner & Dovidio (1977) considered helping behaviour in interpersonal contexts as a measure of racial attitudes by assessing how a person responds when given the opportunity to aid another individual who is either an in-group or out-group member. Although the participants of the study were aware of the fact that their behaviour was being recorded, they may have been unaware that their interracial attitudes were the focus of the measurement effort. In addition, enacting the behaviour may be engrossing, resulting in less
opportunity for participants to modify their behaviour than in self-reported measures (Manstead & Semin, 2001).

Another strategy in the set of traditional unobtrusive observation techniques concerns measures of nonverbal communication. These techniques intend to capture implicit evaluations even in circumstances in which people are motivated to monitor the appropriateness of their behaviour (Krosnick, et al., 2005). The general idea behind such measures is that nonverbal channels of communication are harder to control than aspects of verbal communication (Dovidio, et al., 2002). For example, in an interracial interaction, people might be successful at keeping negative racial attitudes from influencing their verbal statements. On the other hand, it might be harder to keep their negative racial attitudes from influencing their nonverbal behaviours such as body posture, eye contact, and fidgeting (Krosnick, et al., 2005).

Since behaviour is generally influenced by a host of factors that includes attitudes, unobtrusive observation techniques can not guarantee that the attitude in question will be a particularly prominent influence on the assessed response. As a result, unobtrusive observation measures have become less popular among attitude researchers. Other indirect assessment techniques have been developed to overcome these limitations. These measurement techniques assess evaluation activation that takes place independent of evaluative responses evaluative processing (Krosnick, et al., 2005).

**Response Latency Measures**

Response latency measures attempt to determine attitude activation from the impact that an attitude object has on the speed with which a person can make certain judgments. One such measure, called the Implicit Association Test (IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998),
requires participants to classify two sets of target items along two dimensions of judgment. For example, items such as flowers (i.e., tulips and roses) and insects (i.e., spiders and ants) may be paired with two dimensions of responses, such as pleasant and unpleasant (i.e., flower/pleasant and insect/un unpleasant versus flower/unpleasant and insect/pleasant). The critical measure then assesses which of these items produces more fluent, faster responses. For example, relatively faster responses when flower is paired with pleasant and insect are paired with unpleasant would indicate that flowers automatically activate a more positive evaluation than insects (Krosnick, et al., 2005). The IAT thus measures the extent to which people readily associate various objects with positive or negatively valued stimuli (Brown, 2006). The IAT has also been used to study attitudes towards race and gender groups (e.g., McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Neuman & Seibt, 2001; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Wade & Lewis, 2004).

While this measure has become the most widely used indirect attitude measure because it is possible to produce relatively large effect sizes with relatively limited technical effort (Krosnick, et al., 2005), it has also been criticized because to some extent it may tap widely shared evaluative associations that may not be personally endorsed (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2004). Indirect attitude measures can also measure physiological correlates of evaluative responses (Krosnick, et al., 2005).

**Physiological Measures**

Although attitudes do not have a physical basis, they do have some measurable physiological responses (Brown, 2006) that people are generally not able to control. This enabled researchers to consider assessment of autonomic responses such as galvanic skin conductance and pupillary responses to overcome intentional misrepresentation in direct attitude self-reports.
Rankin & Campbell (1955) were among the first to use galvanic skin response (GSR), a measure of the ability of skin to conduct electricity, in attitude research. In their study, White participants showed an elevated GSR during interactions with a Black researcher compared to their responses with a White researcher. However, both GSR and pupillary response measurements have been proved to be inconsistent in the evaluation of attitudes (Himmelfarb, 1993).

More effective measurement approaches measure subtle muscle activity in specific areas of the face such as frowning and smiling, modulation of eye blink reflexes during exposure to an attitude object, and activity in the brain through newly emerging brain imaging techniques (Krosnick, et al., 2005).

As social psychologists have become increasingly sophisticated in their measurement of attitudes, the ability to detect prejudice or the potential for it has also increased (Jones, 1997). However, a variety of conceptual and methodological challenges has complicated the measurement of prejudiced behaviours, attitudes, and affects (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Duckitt, 1992a). One such challenge is the measurement of implicit prejudicial attitudes.

Measurement of Implicit Prejudice

Implicit prejudice refers to unconsciously held prejudicial attitudes (Franzoi, 2003) that predict spontaneous, unconscious, or less easily controlled behaviour, such as nonverbal behaviour (Brown, 2006). Fazio, et al. (1995) has studied racial attitudes through one such technique, namely the semantic priming technique in which participants make judgements about a target word after being exposed to a prime word. Results of this study suggested that both White and African Americans had negative attitudes towards out-group members, as seeing the face of a
person of the other race facilitated the classification of negative traits but hindered the classification of positive traits.

It is a surprising fact that there exists only a weak correlation between explicit and implicit attitudes (Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998). This suggests that measures intending to assess these attitudes may in fact capture somewhat different aspects of prejudicial attitudes (Brown, 2006). However, depending on the context, both measures may be accurate in predicting behaviour. Measures aimed at measuring explicit prejudicial attitudes will be more effective in predicting deliberate and conscious behaviour, while measures of implicit prejudicial attitudes will predict more spontaneous, unconscious behaviour (Brown, 2006).

Measurement of Stereotypes

Stereotypes have been assessed by assessment methods such as the adjective checklist (i.e., Katz and Braly, 1933) and the diagnostic ratio measure of stereotyping (i.e., McCauley & Stitt, 1978). These types of measures did indicate stereotypes predominant at the time of the research. For example, Katz & Braly’s (1933) study revealed that Germans were dominantly viewed as scientifically minded, Italians as artistic and passionate, and African Americans as superstitious, lazy, and ignorant.

Another main approach in stereotype research is the determination of the conditions that facilitate or hamper the inclination to use stereotypes while making social judgements. Utilising such measures, researchers have found that when people are happy (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsster, 1994), angry (Bodenhausen, Sheppard & Kramer, 1994), and cognitively preoccupied (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987), they are more likely to use a stereotype in their judgments about a target.
A variety of techniques have been developed to measure implicit stereotypes by measuring automatic associations in long-term memory. For example, the evaluative priming technique is based on the idea that the evaluation of a stereotype-consistent word is faster after the presentation of a prime of the group (Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006). The prime, such as the face of a Black person or a White person, is supposed to activate unconscious associations to stereotypes. After being primed, the participant to the study is then asked to indicate as rapidly as possible whether stereotypical words (i.e., lazy, intelligent) are negative or positive words. A White person who has a high number of implicit racial stereotypes should therefore respond quickly to the word lazy after being primed with a black person’s face, or to the word intelligent after being primed with the White person’s face (Fazio, Sanbonmatus, Powell & Kardes, 1986).

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the concepts of attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. In particular, the evaluative nature of an attitude was highlighted. As an evaluation of an individual on the basis of his or her group membership, prejudice can be considered to be an intergroup attitude. Prejudice, consisting of negative feelings (prejudice) and beliefs (stereotypes) about out-group member characteristics may bring about negative behaviour (discrimination) towards out-groups that ranges from mild uneasiness towards members of out-groups to more extreme behaviour such as intergroup hostility and violence (Aaronson, et al., 2002; Brown, 2006; Franzoi, 2003; Nelson, 2006). For example, virtually all of history’s wars, battles and other acts of group violence, such as the Holocaust and genocide in Rwanda have been driven by some form of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). Prejudice thus has had a powerful impact on intergroup relationships.
One of the emerging issues regarding stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination introduced in this chapter, is the fact that these constructs may also exert influence on intergroup relations in more implicit, indirect, and subtle ways. This is postulated to be result of changing social attitudes that make the explicit expression of stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination less acceptable (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Brown, 2006; Duckitt, 1994; McConahay, 1986; Nelson, 2006). A consequence of this change in the expression of prejudice, demonstrated in this chapter, is that the more contemporary forms of prejudice calls for the continuous revision of measurement methods to accurately measure contemporary forms of prejudice. The current study thus seeks to add to the understanding of contemporary, subtle racism in the South African context, while simultaneously attempting to expand the body of national research.

It became evident that prejudice has enjoyed a large amount of attention by researchers since early in the twentieth century. However, as evident by the research presented, the largest amount of research on stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination has been conducted outside of South Africa. This questions the relevance of the information presented in this chapter to the South African context and further emphasizes the need for South African research on critical issues regarding race and racism, as addressed by the current study. Having now introduced research on the concepts of attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination, the following chapter will focus on the construct of racism.
CHAPTER 3

RACISM

Racism is not a recent phenomenon. Jones (1997) regarded racism in the United States of America as “old as the country itself” (p. 365). Similarly, in South Africa, racism has had a long history in creating and strengthening group differences. Allport (1954b) observed: “In South Africa, the English, it is said, are against the Afrikaner; both are against the Jews; all three are opposed to the Indians; while all four conspire against the native Black” (p. 3).

In the following section, racism is further explored and conceptualised with regard to the notion that racism as a construct and an ideology has its origins in the race dogma which prescribed theoretical assumptions such as immutable race groups and race hierarchies. The roles of Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid in the shaping of racism in South Africa are also examined.

Miles (1989) has asserted that racism takes various substantially different forms, “each historically specific and articulated in a different way in the societies in which they appear” (p. 82). Thus, like the race concept, racism does change with time to adapt to historically specific political- and social contexts. Racism is therefore further conceptualised along the notion that it is an adaptable and changing construct. First traditional expressions of racism are addressed. Thereafter, theoretical postulations regarding contemporary expressions of racism in countries such as the United States of America, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and various Western European countries are examined to further inform on contemporary racism and its measurement.

Finally, international and national research regarding the association between racism and the independent, demographic variables that are the focus of the present study (i.e., gender, language, age, and race) are considered.
Race

Even though “race” is a construct that has emerged in recent centuries (Smedley & Smedley, 2005), it has had a momentous global impact in shaping social and political interactions within societies (Solomos & Back, 1997). In fact, the impact of race is so comprehensive that all human beings have been divided into racial categories that not only label their superficial physical differences, but also define how they should act and define themselves (Jones, 1997).

Despite the impact of race, there still is little consensus on what it actually means (Jones, 1997). In addition, the meaning of race has evolved over time from a word that referred to the breeding of a specific lineage of domestic animals (Fredrickson, 2002) to a construct that denotes observed or ascribed characteristics with socially significant meanings (Smedley & Smedley, 2005). Race was first used in connection with humans in the seventeenth century, when it was coupled with words such as tribe, religion, nation, lineage, physical differences, and geographical origins (Jones, 1997; Smedley & Smedley, 2005). However, the construct did not specifically refer to skin colour (Jones, 1997), as indicated by the use of race when referring to differences between Celtics, Saxons, Gauls, Normans, Irish, and Welsh (Fredrickson, 2002). In fact, history showed that Africans in Europe were assimilated into society without any significant social meaning attached to their dark skin colour and other physical differences (Smedley & Smedley, 2005).

In the eighteenth century the process of defining, describing, and categorising racial differences by scientists gave rise to the biological definition of race, mainly for descriptive purposes. Since then, besides referring to the classification of differences between human beings, race also acquired various social meanings and value judgements that have provided the rationale for moral judgements and social, political, and economic policies (Jones, 1997).
Thus, the construct of race carries with itself a history and meaning which makes the definition of race complex. Race cannot be separated from racism (Jones, 1997), the focus of the present study. Therefore, to fully comprehend the ominous concept of racism, it will be meaningful to explore how the conceptualisation, definition, and meaning of race has evolved from a simple descriptive classification to a broad social construct.

*Changing Definition and Meaning of Race*

The biological classification of race was first developed from the work of eighteenth century naturalists who distinguished populations in different geographic areas on the basis of physical features, temperament, character, and other behavioural propensities that underlie genetic variation (Asia-Europe Foundation, 2005; Jones, 1997; Smedley & Smedley, 2005). The result was the development of several racial taxonomies, based on the systematic measurement and comparison of observable physical features (Jones, 1997) such as skin colour, eye shape and colour, hair type and colour, and head shape and size (Aronson, et al., 2002; Asia-Europe Foundation, 2005). For example, the Swedish biologist Linnaeus developed a taxonomy that described White Europeans as tall, flaxen haired, and blue eyed. The Black race was described as having dull, kinky black hair, silken skin, flat nose, and thick lips (Foster, 1991c).

As such physical characteristics were genetic and immutable, scientists of the time reasoned that race denotes distinct and separate subdivisions of the human species based on genetic or biological arguments (Jones, 1997). According to this argument, race was defined as “an inbreeding, geographically isolated population that differs in distinguishable physical traits from other members of the species” (Zuckerman, 1990, p. 1297).
Race acquired social meaning when physical characteristics were also assumed to be fundamentally related to moral, intellectual, temperament, and other non-physical attributes and characteristics (Asia-Europe Foundation, 2005; Jones, 1997; Van den Berghe, 1967). For example, Linnaeus described White Europeans as optimistic, nimble, and innovative. Less desirable characteristics, however, were linked to the Black race (i.e., cunning, lazy, sluggish, and careless) (Foster, 1991c). Racial distinctions thus led to value judgements (Jones, 1997) that have been applied in the hierarchical value judgement of races into superior and inferior categories. These value judgements are based on the value systems and cultural worldviews of societies at specific times (Jones, 1997).

History has shown that these hierarchical categories of races have been used to justify race-based acts of domination such as slavery in the United States (Jones, 2007) and apartheid in South Africa (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003). It has been suggested that it is the racial hierarchy that has done the most damage in social relations, especially when the hierarchy is supported by those in a position of authority and influence. Racial classification affects access to resources, such as education and health care, the distribution of income and wealth, residential living patterns, and interpersonal relationships. Moreover, the consequences of racial classification over time can create boundaries among racially defined groups that affect people on a daily basis (Jones, 1997).

Even though the biological significance of race has largely been discredited by scientists, race is still used to organise people into socially significant categories with attached social meanings (Jones, 1997; Van den Berghe, 1967; Smedley & Smedley, 2005). Thus skin colour, hair texture, nose width, and lip thickness are still perceived to be markers of racial identity (Smedley & Smedley, 2005).

As a social construct, race is not a fixed concept, but may change over time as it is continuously redefined by social conventions, role definitions, and characteristics of societies at
specific times (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Jones, 1997). For example, apartheid South Africa entrenched extensive racial taxonomies as “the cornerstone of the whole apartheid structure” (Sparks, 2003, p.83) through legislation such as the Population Registration Act of 1950, articulated in Table 1. In present-day South Africa, however, individuals who were classified as Coloured in the apartheid years, refer to themselves as Black, ‘so-called Coloured’, “Coloured” and Coloured (Sparks, 2003).

Table 1.

*Racial Categorisation in South Africa*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>A person who is in appearance obviously a White person and who is generally accepted as a White person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native (later Bantu)</td>
<td>A person who is, or is generally accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>A person who is not a White person or a Native. Subgroups of the category:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) the Cape Coloured group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) the Malay group</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) the Griqua group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) the Chinese group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e) the Indian group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(f) the Other Asiatic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(g) the Other Coloured Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Adapted from Sparks, 2003
Thus, race relations are distinguished not by the biological significance of phenotypical features but by the social use of those features as signs identifying group membership and the “roles people are expected to play” (Banton, 1983, p. 77). Race therefore “does not exist. And yet it does. Not in the way that people think; but it remains the most tangible, real and brutal of realities” (Guillaumin, 1995, p. 107).

Confusion about the use of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’ exists. The two terms are often used interchangeably (Harley, Jolivette, McCormick & Tice, 2002). For example, in Bosnia, “ethnic cleansing” was used to describe the systematic attempt to eliminate Bosnian Muslims by Bosnian Serbs - two racially similar groups. Yet, the extermination of 6 million Jews in Nazi Germany is considered an act of racial genocide (Jones, 1997).

**Race and Ethnicity**

For many, ethnicity is simply a contemporary term for what was historically called race, types, or nationality (Harley, et al., 2002; Jones, 1997). Yet, Van den Berghe (1967) defined ethnicity as a social group that is defined on the basis of cultural criteria. This implies that ethnicity is mutable and a matter of choice. This is distinct from the concept of race, which is considered to be immutable at some level and offers no choice. The construct of ethnicity is thus less likely to include the type of biases that is associated with the race concept (Harley, et al., 2002; Jones, 1997). Another concept that is closely associated with race is culture.
Jones (1997) asserted that “everything we are and do, all that we have been and will be filters through the lenses of culture” (p. 361). Thus, race also needs to be understood in the context of culture. In fact, in its earliest usage in the sixteenth century, race was understood largely in cultural terms when it was coupled with words such as nation, tribe, and lineage (Jones, 1997; Smedley & Smedley, 2005). Culture refers to patterns of thoughts, feelings, and reactions derived from history and transmitted through symbols (Jones, 1997). For example, the old South African flag represents different things to different people, depending on their cultural beliefs and values. Some White people may regard it as a symbol of a proud Afrikaner heritage that does not necessarily include beliefs regarding White supremacy, while Black South-Africans may regard it as a symbol of racial oppression by the apartheid government.

The concept of race has been central in the development of Western culture and is one of the symbols of culture. This makes it difficult to separate the meaning of race from the meaning of culture. For example, objectifying Black people in the absence of what White South Africans think about Black people is not possible. Therefore, at its core, racial conflict may actually be indicative of dilemmas of the South African culture. Given the influential role of culture in the daily lives of people, and the powerful place that the concept of race holds, it can be concluded that race is one of the most centrally positioned elements of South African culture (Jones, 1997). Constructed from the scientific and socially constructed notions of race, is the construct of racism.
Racism

In order to explore and conceptualise the construct of racism, it is useful to examine how the construct has been defined by various researchers. However, to arrive at a single, clear definition of racism is confounded by three issues. First, the term racism has many common meanings today and is often used very loosely to refer to racial prejudice, racial discrimination, to both of these (Duckitt, 1992a), or to institutionalised racism (Miles, 1989). Second, the fact that racism is a multidimensional concept that occurs on individual and societal level complicates defining this complex construct (Jones, 1997; Miles, 1989). Third, racism is a relatively new term in the English language that was only coined in the 1930s. As scholars’ understanding of the construct has grown, so has the definition of racism become more complex (Jones, 1997). In addition, definitions of racism have also expanded to incorporate the changing discourses about race (Miles, 1989). It is therefore also necessary to take note that more recent definitions of racism are more comprehensive to account for the growing understanding of the complex and multidimensionality of the racism construct.

Definition of Racism

The earliest definitions of racism were narrowly defined to refer exclusively to the theory of the hierarchy of human races (Miles, 1989). For example, in Race and Racism, Benedict (1943, as cited in Solomos & Back, 1996) referred to racism in terms of sets of ideas that defined ethnic and racial groups on the basis of claims about biological nature and inherent superiority or ability. As a consequence, Benedict (1943, as cited in Solomos & Back, 1996) believed one race group is “condemned by nature to congenital inferiority and another group is destined to
congenital superiority” (Miles, 1989, p. 45). Beliefs in a particular race’s cultural and biological inferiority (Miles, 1989) were legitimised in the 1930s and 1940s in the two most notorious systems of racism witnessed in twentieth century history, namely, apartheid and Nazism. In these systems, Blacks and Jews were constructed as racially inferior to White South Africans and Aryan Germans respectively, and subjected to systematic subjugation and abuse (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003). The essence of Benedict’s definition of racism was repeated by writers in the 1970s such as Banton (1970).

As scholars rejected the biological concept of race, definitions of racism changed in focus to become more descriptive (Miles, 1989). For example, some writers (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Jones, 1997) rejected the theory that the human race consists of discrete groups, but recognised that such beliefs, explicit or implicit, are used to legitimize inequality between racial groups (Jones, 1997; Miles, 1989). Therefore, the domination of one racialised group over other groups can be regarded as both the central feature of racism (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Jones, 1997) and the function and intention of those who hold racist beliefs (Miles, 1989).

Later definitions of racism portray racism as operating at both individual and societal spheres of social influence. *Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary* defined racism as being characterised by “discrimination, segregation, persecution, and domination based on a … doctrine or feeling of racial … superiority” (1965, p. 1485). The exemplification of segregation, persecution, and domination implied that racism is organised at a societal level, while the involvement of feelings of superiority indicates that racism also occurs at the individual level (Jones, 1997). Similarly, De la Rey & Duncan (2003) highlighted the societal nature of racism by defining the construct as “an institutionalised system whereby certain racialised groups are systematically dominated or marginalized by another racialised group or other groups” (p. 46).
Essed (1991) also acknowledged that racism operated at both an individual and societal level and drew further attention to how racist ideas, opinions, and behaviours that operate on an individual level in “everyday situations” produce “everyday racism” that becomes part of a racist system that operates on societal level. Essed (1991) therefore regarded racism as what happens on an everyday basis between people of different races. For example, vague notions of Eurocentrism may compel a Black person to do away with some of his or her cultural identity. However, since it becomes part of everyday life, the Black person may often not even be aware of the influence of everyday racism.

The sociologist, Miles (1989) differed from other approaches to the concept of racism by proposing that the term racism should refer exclusively to a specific ideology. Miles (1989) also differentiated between racism as an ideology and the closely related concept of institutional racism. Both phenomena operate on a broad societal level, but racist ideology may be expressed through institutional racism (Jones, 1997).

**Institutional Racism**

Institutional racism was first described in the 1970s (Jones, 1997). Institutional racism refers to any organisational policy, practice, and structure in public and private institutions, schools, universities, churches, courts, and law enforcement agencies which systematically give White people a variety of social, political, and economic advantages, while marginalising and disadvantaging other racial groups (Erase racism, 2006; Jones, 1997; Sue, 2005). Examples of institution racism include housing patterns, segregated schools, discriminatory employment and promotion policies, racial profiling, inequality in health care, segregated churches, and educational curricula that ignore or distort the history of disadvantaged groups (Sue, 2005).
Jones (1997) distinguished between two forms of institutional racism, namely: (a) individual-mediated, and (b) standard of practice institutional racism. Individual-mediated institutional racism refers to individual leaders who hold racist beliefs or function under the influence of racial stereotypes, which may influence decision making in their institution in such a manner that racial inequality is promoted. This form of institutional racism may be considered a mere extension of interpersonal prejudice and racism to the institutional setting (Jones, 1997). Examples of this form of institutional racism in South African history are extensive and were reflected in all spheres of South African society. For example, segregation and gross inequalities have been evidence of racism in South African mental health for decades (Foster, 1991c). As recently as 1987 a government report on disability in South Africa admitted that almost no facilities existed for Black mentally handicapped children (Hattingh, Harvey, Saayman & Van Jaarsveldt, 1987).

The second form of institutional racism is not considered to be race conscious, but rather to have race effects. It refers to standards of practice that systematically benefit White people, while disadvantaging people of other races, thereby maintaining racial discrimination, segregation, and inequality even in the absence of conscious racial animosity (Erase racism, 2006; Jones, 1997).

This type of institutional racism is evident when comparing broad societal patterns. For example, in the United States of America, racial and ethnic minorities have lower income, poorer quality and more overcrowded accommodations, less desirable occupations, and longer periods of unemployment when compared to their ethnic majority counterparts (Karlsen & Nazroo, 2002). This phenomenon is demonstrated in South Africa when considering the distribution of and access to mental health care that has reflected the effect of entrenched institutional racism from apartheid. For example, the application of the reformist Mentally Retarded Children’s Training Act of 1974 was restricted to apply only to White South Africans. The Bantu Special Education
Act of 1964 only enabled the provision of facilities to Blacks with physical disabilities, while expressly excluding the provision of facilities for those with a mental handicap (Foster, 1991b).

Even though South Africa has been a democratic country since 1994, remnants of institutional racism that neglected the needs of poor and mentally handicapped non-Whites (Foster, 1991b) are still evident in the provision of mental health care facilities. For example Ahmed and Pillay (2004) have noted that communities living in peri-urban, semi-rural, and rural areas still have little or no mental health facilities within reasonable distance, even though a large proportion (46.3%) of the national population lives in non-urban areas (Statistics South Africa, 2002).

Likewise, South African psychology too has played a role in the perpetuation of apartheid (Foster, 1991b; Hook, 2004) through institutional practices. The absence of research about the psychological consequences of apartheid oppression and the psychological life of Black South Africans have been cited as examples of South African psychology’s poor social and scientific record (Suffla & Seedat, 2004). In addition, Black people are still significantly under-represented in academic and professional psychology in South Africa (Duncan, Seedat, Van Niekerk, de la Rey, Gobodo-Madikezela, Simbayi, et al., 1997).

The effects of institutional racism, intentional or unintentional, magnify the racial biases of individuals in any given society and promote racial inequalities at societal level which serve to systematically undermine the physical and emotional well-being of countless people (Jones, 1997). It is for these reasons that institutional racism is considered to be closely related to the racial ideology of the society in which it operates (Jones, 1997; Miles, 1989).
Racism as Ideology

Ideology refers to a fairly organised set of ideas, attitudes, beliefs, or values, such as liberalism or fascism (Foster, 1991c) which Adorno, et al. (1950) referred to as “a way of thinking about man and society” (p. 2). An ideology also involves language and actions (Foster, 1993) and can therefore also be regarded as part of a social process in which humans are active agents (Althusser, 1969) reproducing the ideas, attitudes, beliefs, emotions, and values of an ideology in everyday language and actions. This constant reproduction has the function of changing an ideology over time (Foster, 1993).

Racism is regarded by some researchers (Foster, 2006; 1991c; Miles, 1989; Smedley & Smedley, 2005) as an ideology that has provided justification for legislation and social policies to justify exclusion and domination (institutional racism) in the United States and South Africa (Foster, 1993; Miles, 1989). More specifically, in these countries, racism has enabled people of one skin colour to dominate those of a different skin colour through practices such as discrimination, slavery, segregation, and job reservation (Foster, 2006).

Foster (1991c) asserted that such racist ideology has been operative in South Africa since the arrival of the first White settlers. It has manifested itself in many different and changing forms, such as slavery, colonial conquest, extermination, segregation, political segregation from 1910, petty apartheid, and grand apartheid from 1948 (Foster, 1991c; Giliomme & Schlemmer, 1989). Through social and political changes in the last three decades, racism as an ideology has become undesirable. However, it is believed that racist ideologies still exert influence in societies by masquerading in other discourses, such as cultural pluralism, ethnicity, and first and third worlds (Boonzaier & Sharp, 1988). One ideology that has received a large amount of attention in
South Africa, as one of the contributors to legalised racism of the apartheid system, is Afrikaner nationalism.

*Afrikaner Nationalism*

Afrikaner nationalism as an ideology developed over two centuries in response to perceived threats from the British Empire and the indigenous Black people of South Africa (Foster, 1991c). In the first four decades of the twentieth century, the themes of mobilization, including the notions of independence, racism, and White superiority were particularly prominent within Afrikaner nationalism (Thompson, 1985). Afrikaner nationalism was actively created through organisations such as the Broederbond, the Dutch Reformed Church, the South African Broadcasting Corporation, newspapers, and the system of Christian National Education. Simultaneously, the ideological message of Afrikaner nationalism was spread through symbols such as the flag, the national anthem, public holidays, monuments, and festivals (Foster, 1991c).

During the establishment of Afrikaner nationalism, a strong association between racism and Afrikaans-speaking Whites developed. In the 1870s, an Afrikaner cultural renaissance began based on Afrikaans as “the people’s language” (Johnson, 2004, p. 88). Afrikaans was given a distinct White culture in the early part of the twentieth century by refining the language through poetry, language, and journalism. Thereby, even though Afrikaans was spoken by Coloured and Black servants, Afrikaans was stripped of its non-White associations (Atwell, 1986) and became one of the cultural weapons and symbols of the Afrikaner, Afrikaner nationalism, apartheid, and racism in South Africa (Atwell, 1986; Johnson, 2004; Sparks, 2003).

Afrikaner nationalism was thus used as a tool to mobilise and create a separate group of Afrikaners and to provide grounds for the exclusion of non-Whites (Foster, 1991c; Thompson,
Apartheid

“Apartheid” refers to the formal ideology, policies, and programs that maintained racial segregation and White domination in South Africa from 1948 until 1994 (Jones, 1997). As an ideology, apartheid aimed to justify White, racist domination of non-Whites. The ideology was rooted in various myths and ideas, such as the Calvinist paradigm (De Toit, 1983; Thompson, 1985), race, culture, class, nation, volk, Christianity, and law and order (Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1989).

Apartheid also included the idea that racial friction is best avoided by the segregation of races in all levels of society. This notion was enforced through limiting racial contact through legislation (Foster & Finchilescu, 1986), such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, The Immorality Act of 1950, the Population Registration Act of 1950, and the Group Areas Act of 1950. When Black protest and disobedience emerged in response to forced segregation, the Public Safety and Criminal Law Amendment Acts of 1953 proved that apartheid was not meant to be a benign form of racism (Foster, 1991c).

Apartheid, like all ideologies, has changed in form and content (Du Preez, 1980). When grand apartheid of the 1950s triggered violent protest by non-Whites in the 1970s, neo-apartheid was initiated in 1983 to include Coloureds and Indians in the tri-cameral parliament (Sparks, 2003). Even in post-apartheid South Africa where apartheid has ceased to be a formalised ideology, the core themes of apartheid are still discernable under new ideas and discourses such as ethnicity, the protection of minority group rights, and contemporary forms of racism (Foster,
It is interesting to note that as the race concept has changed, racism has also adapted (Jones, 1997). Contemporary forms of racism differ from the traditional expressions of racism, characteristic of apartheid and Jim Crow laws, and redneck forms of racism in the United States of America. In order to further understand the multifaceted construct of racism, it is first necessary to describe the traditional form of racism.

Traditional Expressions of Racism

Traditionally, the expression of racist beliefs and feelings towards despised groups in countries such as the United States of America, Australia, and South Africa were performed in overt, obvious, recognisable ways (Duckitt, 1994; Pedersen & Walker, 1997), described as “hot, close and direct” by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995, p. 57). This form of racism has been referred to in various terms, such as blatant racism (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), traditional racism (Brown, 2006), and old-fashioned racism (McConahay, 1986) as “these beliefs are…out of style in trendy circles as are wide ties and spats” (McConahay, 1986, p. 93).

Traditional racism has three components, namely: (a) a belief in inborn intellectual and moral White superiority, (b) racial segregation in all areas of life including schools, public amenities, and marriage, and (c) discrimination against all Black people in areas such as employment and education (Jones, 1997; McConahay, 1986; Sears, 2005; Taylor, et al., 2006). The traditional form of racism also tended to arouse strong emotions such as anger and contempt and often led to behaviour against the scorned group, such as physical violence (Franzoi, 2003; Jones, 1997). Racism under apartheid took the traditional form, as apartheid included the notion of White superiority and legally enforced the segregation of races. Apartheid resulted in disparities in wealth, living conditions, and access to resources such as education and employment
As there has been a trend over the last three decades for racism to be “politically incorrect” (Mellor, Bynon, Maller, Cleary, Hamilton & Watson, 2001, p. 473), traditional expressions of racism in the United States have declined sharply in response to such societal changes (Brown, 2006; Devine, et al., 2003; Franzoi, 2003; McConahay, 1986). However, there is evidence of continuing resistance to full racial equality in the United States. For example, in 1996, 13% of White people reported that they favoured laws against interracial marriages (Taylor, et al., 2006). It was also noted in the United States of America that anti-Black feelings showed only a fairly small decline (McConahay, 1986) while anti-Black attitudes were still being expressed, albeit in a different form (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981) by those who claim to have renounced prejudice (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 1997). This suggests that people in the United States of America have learnt to suppress prejudiced responses to avoid being labelled racist, but when the situation becomes safe, their prejudice is exposed (Aaronson, et al., 2002, p. 492). That a similar trend is possible in other countries has been suggested by research in Australia, which revealed that Australian Aborigines continue to perceive much blatant racism, despite egalitarian legislation that protects their equal rights (Mellor, 2003). Similarly, South African learners reported the presence of acts of overt discrimination (Finnemore, 1998; Pillay & Collings, 2004) in post-apartheid South Africa.

As racism is a dynamic concept that evolves and adapts to new circumstances (Jones, 1997; Pillay & Collings, 2004; Solomos & Back, 1996), it has been suggested that a contemporary form of racism, either co-existing with, or replacing traditional racism, has emerged in North America, Western-Europe, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia (Augoustinos, Ahrens & Innes, 1994; Devine et al., 2003; Duckitt, 1992a; Jackman, 2005; Kinder & Sears,
Contemporary Expressions of Racism

Contemporary racism is considered to be as more subtle, socially sensitive expression of racism (Brown, 2006; Devine, Plant & Blair, 2003; Jackman, 2005; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) and is qualitatively different from negative racial attitudes of fifty years ago (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). The contemporary forms of racism serve to maintain the racial status-quo but are justified on a non-racial basis (Augoustinos, Ahrens & Innes, 1994; Devine et al., 2003; Duckitt, 1992a; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Lea, Bokhorst & Colenso, 1995; Lui & Mills, 2006; McConahay, 1986; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Pedersen & Walker, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Sears, 1988; Solomos & Back, 1996).

A number of theories have emerged to explain the complex, sometimes contradictory nature of contemporary racism. These theories are all rooted in the assumption that people’s racial attitudes have shifted from being overtly negative to being more mixed or ambivalent in nature (Brown, 2006; Devine, et al., 2003, Durheim, 2003; McConahay, 1996). Some theorists (Baron & Byrne, 2003) also indicated that the modern expressions of racism tend to attribute prejudiced racial attitudes to sources other than prejudice. For instance, an individual may state that he or she is against interracial marriages because the children of such marriages may experience many difficulties. However, this view may stem from the prejudiced belief that members of racial or ethnic groups, other than that of the perceiver, are inferior in various ways.
In France, Britain, Germany, Australia, and the Netherlands racism in its modern form is expressed in the form of exaggerated ethnic differences. This tends to be accompanied by feelings of diminished admiration and affection for immigrant minorities and a rejection of them for supposedly non-racial reasons (Augoustinos, et al., 1994; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Myers, 2005; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). In these countries, as in the United States, modern racism “surfaces when they [prejudiced attitudes] can hide behind the screen of some other motive” (Myers, 2005, p. 336). Thus, it is reasoned, prejudice has “gone underground” (Devine, et al., 2000, p. 201) or has been transformed into subtle and increasingly covert expressions of racism (Devine, et al., 2003).

Researchers differ in their labels for contemporary forms of racism. In the United States, the more subtle form of racism has been referred to as modern racism (McConahay, 1986), symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981), and aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). In Western Europe and South Africa, the term subtle prejudice and subtle racism is used to capture the more covert forms of prejudice (Duckitt, 1991b; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).

Symbolic Racism

Symbolic racism as an explanatory construct was first proposed by Sears and Kinder (1971, as cited in Durheim, 2003) to explain White opposition to a liberal Black city counsellor in the 1969 mayoral campaign in Los Angeles (Durheim, 2003; Sears, 2005). The researchers (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988) proposed that symbolic racism is more subtle, indirect, and unconscious than traditional racism. Kinder and Sears (1981) also postulated that symbolic racism is rooted in mostly implicit “early learned racial fears and stereotypes” (p. 416) and deep-seated feelings about social morality (Durheim, 2003). This perspective suggests that after early
socialisation, the basic affective component of racial prejudice remains very resistant to change (Duckitt, 1994).

Institutional and structural changes in the United States of America in the wake of the civil rights movements in the 1950s and 1960s gave way to more egalitarian norms that prohibited explicit expression of racism. Therefore, Kinder and Sears (1981) proposed that negative racial attitudes are more likely to be expressed symbolically in general beliefs that Black people violate traditional American values, such as self-reliance, individualism, hard work, and obedience (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Nelson, 2006) or egalitarianism, honesty, and humility in New Zealand (Liu & Mills, 2006). These beliefs are manifested in the form of animosity towards policies that symbolise the advancement of Black people’s interests at the expense of White people, such as affirmative action policies (Dovidio, et al., 2003; Lord, 1997). Symbolic racism is thus “a blend of anti-Black affect and traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic” (Kinder & Sears, 1981, p. 416).

Those with racial attitudes consistent with symbolic racism deny holding racist attitudes (Dovidio, et al., 2003; Nelson, 2006), but explain their negative affect and attitudes towards racialised groups as a disapproval for groups that do not value traditional American values (Nelson, 2006). Therefore, persons with symbolic racial attitudes would oppose racial segregation and discrimination, but would simultaneously resent Black people’s complaints about discrimination and mistreatment (Taylor, et al., 2006).

 Critics of the theory of symbolic racism have argued that symbolic racism is an ill-defined concept (Bobo, 1988; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) merely representing “old wine in a new bottle” (Sidanius, Devereux & Pratto, 1992, p. 390), that is, a more socially accepted expression of traditional racism (Sidanius, Devereux & Pratto, 1992). Researchers in the United States of
America (Sidanius, et al., 1992) and South Africa (Lea, et al., 1995) have also reported that it can not be empirically proved that symbolic racism is sufficiently distinct from traditional racism.

However, over time and with expanding evidence, the theory of symbolic racism has evolved. In recent years, it has been conceptualised and measured in terms of four themes, namely: (a) the denial of discrimination, (b) criticism of the work ethic of Black people, (c) resentment of demands made by Black people, and (d) resentment of unfair advantages given to Black people by broader society (Sears, 2005). Moreover, Sears and Henry (2003) have shown that symbolic racism is distinct from the similar constructs of modern and aversive racism.

**Modern Racism**

McConahay (1986) initially supported the term symbolic racism, but later expanded on the theory of symbolic racism by redefining the construct of modern racism to “emphasize the contemporary, post-civil-rights-movement nature of the tenets constituting the new ideology or belief system” (p. 96). According to McConahay (1986), the theory of modern racism asserts that some White people are ambivalent towards Black people as they are conflicted between their anti-Black feelings and their beliefs that racism and discrimination is wrong. However, those persons with attitudes consistent with modern racism only acknowledge behaviour and beliefs consistent with traditional racism as racist (McConahay, 1986). Their own beliefs and attitudes such as “discrimination is a thing of the past because Blacks now have the freedom to compete in the marketplace and to enjoy those things they can afford” and “Blacks are pushing too hard, too fast, and into places where they are not wanted” are thus not considered to be racist (Jones, 1997; McConahay, 1986, p.92).
Similar to persons with symbolic racial attitudes, individuals with modern racial attitudes feel resentment over systems aimed at rectifying previous patterns of inequality (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006) as they believe it violates the work ethic that prescribes that advancement in life should be based on hard work rather than unfair shortcuts (Nelson, 2006). Persons with attitudes consistent with modern racism therefore disguise their subtle negative feelings towards Black people by expressing negative attitudes towards anyone who violates what they believe are traditional American values (McConahay, 1986; Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006).

The theory has good empirical support, and the Modern Racism Scale, a self-report scale devised by McConahay (1986) has been shown to have fair reliability and validity. It has also been one of the most widely used measures of contemporary prejudice towards African Americans (Jones, 1997; Nelson, 2006).

There is substantial similarity between the symbolic and modern racism theories. For example, both theories argue that negative feelings towards Black people are learnt relatively early in life and continue to influence evaluations and perceptions into adulthood (Jones, 1997). As a result, the concepts of modern and symbolic racism have at times been used interchangeable and synonymously (Duckitt, 1994; Lord, 1997; Myers, 2005; Taylor, et al., 2006). However, modern racism is regarded as a distinct theory from symbolic racism (Jones, 1997; McConahay, 1986) as seen from its history. Modern racism, more than symbolic racism, now emphasizes the cognitive aspect of racial attitudes and suggests that distinguishing between traditional and modern racial beliefs is a more conscious cognitive process (Jones, 1997). Symbolic and modern racism are considered to reflect the racial attitudes of conservative Whites in the United States of America. The theory of aversive racism is considered to describe the racial attitudes of most well educated, liberal White citizens of the United States of America (Dovidio, 1993; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005; Taylor, et al., 2006).
Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) have conceptualised persons with aversive racial attitudes as White people who possess both unconscious negative racist feelings and beliefs towards Black people, and conscious, sincere commitments to egalitarian values and beliefs (Dovidio, 2001; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio, et al., 2003). As racist attitudes are unconscious, persons with attitudes consistent with aversive racism truly believe they are not prejudiced and will make a great effort not to say or do anything that appears to be prejudiced. However, when in the company of Black people, persons with attitudes consistent with aversive racism experience subtle, yet aversive feelings of “discomfort, uneasiness, disgust and sometimes fear” (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986, pp. 62). This type of racist therefore protects his or her egalitarian self-image by denying racist attitudes (Devine, et al., 2003). Interracial encounters tend to make persons with aversive racial attitudes aware and ashamed of their attitudinal conflict, which motivates such persons to steer clear of interracial interactions to avoid evoking negative emotions and confronting their hidden prejudice (Devine, 2005; Franzoi, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006).

The aversive in aversive racism reflects two types of aversion. The first refers to the aversive feelings experienced during interracial interaction that leads to avoidance behaviour. Also, as persons with aversive racial attitudes believe that they are non-prejudiced, they would find any thought or indication that they might be racists aversive (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005).

Persons with attitudes consistent with aversive racism are most likely to express their negative racial feelings towards Black people under situational ambiguity (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Dovidio, et al., 2003) and when the attitude or behaviour that disadvantages Blacks can be attributed to causes other than prejudices or can be justified along non-racial grounds (Dovidio, 2001; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio, et al., 2003). For example, Dovidio and Gaertner
(2000) found that subtle and underlying hostilities towards Black applicants only emerged when the qualifications of the Black applicants were ambiguous, not better or worse, when compared with White applicants. White participants then preferred to hire a White candidate.

Dovidio (1993) has acknowledged that expressions of traditional racism still persist, while it is true that some White people are not racist. In addition, Dovidio (1993) noted that there are individual differences in expression of aversive racism.

**Subtle Racism**

Contemporary racism in Western Europe and South Africa has been referred to as subtle racism (Aronson, et al., 2002) and subtle prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Research in both South Africa (Duckitt, 1991b, 1993a; Lea, et al., 1995) and Western Europe (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) has demonstrated the co-existence of traditional and contemporary forms of racism. However, anti-immigration sentiment was more significantly associated with subtle racism than traditional racism in Western Europe.

Research suggested that subtle racism is expressed in socially accepted ways such as the defence of traditional ingroup values, exaggeration of cultural differences, and denial of positive emotional responses towards the outgroup (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) in everyday contexts such as shopping, using public transport, and eating in restaurants (Mellor, et al., 2001). Persons with racial attitudes consistent with subtle racism therefore comply with egalitarian norms and “express their negative intergroup views only in ostensibly non-prejudiced ways that ‘slip under the norm’” (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995, p. 73). In this form, racism still has a significant negative impact on those who experiences it on a daily basis (Mellor, et al., 2001).
The conceptualisation of the different theories of contemporary racism share three common elements, namely: (a) traditional forms of racism are generally replaced by an acceptance of formal racial equality, (b) continuing negative feelings toward Black people (whether animosity, uneasiness, or distancing), combined in some way with (c) non-racial values, such as traditional morality, individualism, and the Protestant ethic (Sears, 2005).

Despite similarities, there are differences between the forms of contemporary racism. First, the contexts in which these types of racism occur vary. For example, symbolic and modern racism are found primarily in politically conservative Whites, while aversive racism is associated with liberal Whites (Nelson, 2006). Second, the different theories of contemporary racism propose different methods of coping with ambivalent racial attitudes. Individuals with modern and symbolic racial attitudes cope with their ambivalence by rationalising their negative feelings in terms of abstract political and social issues (Devine, et al., 2003). On the other hand, individuals with aversive racial attitudes deny their negative racial attitudes and avoid interracial contact to avoid uncomfortable feelings brought about by ambivalence. In addition, these individuals only manifest their negative racial attitudes when a justification is readily available (Devine, et al., 2003). Third, the forms of contemporary racism vary in subtlety in which racist attitudes are expressed. Modern and symbolic racism are considered to be the least subtle, while aversive racism is the most subtle (Kleinpenning & Haagendoor, 1993). Meertens and Pettigrew’s (1997) conceptualisation of subtle prejudice is believed to lie between the other forms of racism in terms of subtlety. One common feature of all the contemporary theories of racism is the presence of racial ambivalence (Nelson, 2006).
Theory of Racial Ambivalence

Some researchers (Katz & Hass, 1988; Katz, Wackenhut & Hass, 1986) have posited that value conflict in Whites leads to ambivalent attitudes towards Blacks. According to this theory, many White Americans simultaneously hold two sets of conflicting values, egalitarianism and individualism, which affect their responses to Black people.

Egalitarianism is grounded in democratic and humanitarian principles that give rise to genuine pro-Black sentiments such as sympathy for Blacks and favourable stereotypes about Black people. Individualism, grounded in the Protestant work ethic, supports principles such as personal freedom, individualism, self-reliance, devotion to work, and achievement. Individualism may give rise to anti-Black sentiments such as beliefs that unemployment, drug addiction, and criminal behaviour are rooted in personal weaknesses of Black people rather than in situational factors. Holding these dual attitudes creates ambivalence, which may explain the persistence of prejudiced responses among people who appear to be low in prejudice (Devine, et al., 2003; Katz & Hass, 1988; Katz, et al., 1986).

Ambivalent people are pulled in opposite directions at the same time (McConahay, 1986) and may experience psychological distress and sharp alterations in behaviour towards Black people (Devine, et al., 2003; Katz, et al., 1986; McConahay, 1986) as responses to Black people depend on which component of the ambivalent attitude is activated in a specific situation (Devine, et al., 2003). A highly ambivalent person may be more positive than expected in some situations, and be more negative than expected in others, depending on the context and content of behaviour (Devine, 2005; McConahay, 1986). For example, White people with ambivalent attitudes towards Black people may act overfriendly and attentive when being introduced to a Black person whom they perceive to be competent and ambitious to discredit the negative component of their
attitudes. Likewise, they may react with great annoyance and anger when interaction with Black people who they judge to be incompetent and lazy to discredit the positive component of their ambivalent attitudes.

Expressions of racial attitudes have therefore shifted from being obvious and overt to being subtle, distant, and hidden. Sears (1988) asserted that it is essential to empirically distinguish between the traditional and contemporary forms of racism, as they have been shown to have different sets of predictors and correlates. In addition, research has shown these contemporary forms of racism to be complex and multidimensional (Duckitt, 1994; Kinder & Sears, 1981; MacConahay, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). This suggests that measurement of racial attitudes also had to be adapted in order to accurately measure racial attitudes in its contemporary forms.

**Measurement of Contemporary Racism**

Studies of traditional racism measured prejudiced attitudes towards out-groups (usually Black people) in an open and obvious manner, usually by means of direct self-report measures with extremely transparent expressions of racist derogation (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a; 1994). For instance, Heaven and Moerdyk’s (1977) adaptation of Ray’s Anti-Black Attitude Scale, used in South Africa includes statements such as “Blacks are a rather ugly race” and “Blacks are not very hygiene-conscious”. Earlier measures contained even more transparent racist statements, for example: “There is something inherently primitive and uncivilized in the native, as shown in his music and extreme aggressiveness”, (Pettigrew, 1958) and “Africans are too lazy and ignorant to support themselves” (Colman, 1971, as cited in Duckitt, 1991b). The obviousness of items in
these scales seemed to have ensured the content validity of these measures at the time (Duckitt, 1991b; 1994).

When socio-political changes in the United States of America made the expression of traditional racism unacceptable, however, most White Americans reacted to transparent items in accordance with new social norms. As overtly racist statements did not correlate with socially desirable answers, it increased the potential for faking and threatened the reliability and validity of these measures (Duckitt, 1991b; McConahay, 1986).

As “looking for racism under the same old rocks and in the same old utterances” (Jones, 1997, p. 125) have produced misleading data, researchers (e.g., McConahay, 1986) developed less reactive items to measure racial attitudes more accurately. In line with the theories of symbolic and modern racism, the new items included a more abstract, moral tone such as “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve” and “Discrimination against Blacks is no longer a problem in the United States (McConahay, 1986). Samples of White suburbanites and students were more willing to endorse these subtler, more indirect contemporary racism items than traditional racism items (McConahay, 1986). One measure of contemporary racism in the United States of America, the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) has subsequently become one of the most used measures of White racial attitudes towards African Americans (Nelson, 2006).

Contemporary racism in Western Europe has also been examined with the use of newly developed measures of contemporary racism such as the Blatant and Subtle Prejudice Scale, used to assess prejudice against Turks in Germany (Neumann & Seibt, 2001; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Some of the items reflected sentiments of modern racism (i.e., “Turks living here should not push themselves where they are not wanted”), while some items of this scale tapped traditional racist beliefs relating to intimacy factors (i.e., “I would be willing to have a sexual
relationship with a Turkish person”) and threat and rejection beliefs (i.e., “Turks have jobs that Germans should have”).

Socio-political changes in South Africa also necessitated the development of racial attitude measures along the lines of contemporary racism. In the 1980s (Duckitt, 1991b) found that the collapsing legitimacy of apartheid in South Africa made it markedly less acceptable among certain White social groups to express racial attitudes consistent with traditional racism. According to Duckitt (1991b) such “crudely obvious and transparent measures” (p. 234) of traditional racism could no longer be relied on to adequately measure racial attitudes. This seemed particularly relevant in the case of students at English universities in the larger urban centres, English speaking South Africans, and the Afrikaner elite (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a).

The Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a) was subsequently developed to measure anti-Black sentiment, aspiration for equal status among all races, and the acceptance of interracial relationships with South African samples along the lines of the measures of modern racism used in the United States (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a; Foster, 1991a; Holtman, Louw, Tredoux & Carney, 2005; Smith & Stones, 2001). The Subtle Racism Scale contained items that indicated anti-Black sentiment formulated to avoid being regarded as offensive or socially undesirable by liberal or sophisticated respondents (Foster, 1991a). The measure includes items such as: “Given the same education and opportunities, Blacks should be able to perform as well as Whites in any field” and “Although Black living conditions should be improved, it is crucial for the stable development of the country that Whites retain political control”.

It is important to keep in mind that social desirability bias has an attenuating effect on the self-report of both traditional and contemporary racist attitudes and behaviours (Gonzalez, 2001; McConahay, 1986). Most White people understand the societal expectations to be racially
tolerant. Yet, internalised beliefs about White superiority, expressed in subtle ways, have been revealed in research (Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 2001).

In South Africa, relatively little research has been conducted on the prevalence of contemporary expressions of racial attitudes and if it differs from the more traditional, overt forms of racism. Exceptions are Duckitt (1991b; 1993a) who claimed that his Subtle Racism Scale seemed to be “potentially able to tap more sophisticated and subtle forms of prejudice” (p. 238) and Durheim (2003) whose research into White opposition to transformation revealed that participants to his study scored higher on the measure of contemporary racism than the measure for traditional racism. Durheim (2003) speculated that this research suggested that people will more easily endorse contemporary forms of racism compared to supporting expressions of old-fashioned racism. Although expressions of racism may have become more private, Durheim (2003) concluded that beliefs that formed the basis of traditional racism still exist and influence socio-political decisions in South Africa. For example, traditional racism was found to predict White opinion on the Reconstruction and Development Policy and opposition to affirmative action policies (Durheim, 2003). In an examination of racial attitudes, Pillay and Collings (2004) also found that a large proportion of participants in their study supported statements that reflected both traditional and contemporary expressions of racism. The researchers (Pillay & Collings, 2004) deduced that traditional forms of racism have not been replaced by contemporary racism. Rather, results of this study seemed to suggest that that contemporary racism is the predominant form of racism in contemporary South Africa, while significant remnants of traditional racism are also still present.

Research into people’s experiences of racial discrimination strongly suggests that traditional racism is still prevalent in South Africa, as claimed by researchers such as Lea, et al. (1995). For example, in a 1998-survey at the University of Port Elizabeth (now Nelson Mandela
Metropolitan University), 27% of participants indicated that they had experienced racial discrimination from other students, administrative staff, and academic staff at the institution (Finnemore, 1998). Similarly, Pillay & Collings (2004) indicated that 56% of participants in their study reported having experienced a recent incident of racial discrimination in the form of racial jokes, racial comments, or discriminatory behaviours by other students and university staff (i.e., lecturer or administration).

Having conceptualised both the various constructs and theories of importance in this study, and discussed evolving measurement techniques, the next section seeks to examine both international and national research on racial attitudes.

**Research on Variables Associated with Racial Attitudes**

The study of racial attitudes has long been considered one of the most controversial areas in the social sciences and has therefore generated a considerable amount of research, especially after World War II (Duckitt, 1994). As a result, the international racism research base is very broad and complex, with researchers having studied the impact of a variety of variables on racism in a range of contexts and populations. Thus, only research that is of topical interest to the present study will be considered, namely national and international research regarding the relationship between racism and the explanatory variables of interest in this study, i.e., gender, language, age, and race will be reviewed. Since societal factors shape expressions of racism into context-specific articulations (Miles, 1989; Pettigrew, 1979), specific attention will be given to South African research, the context of the present study.
Gender and Racism

Gender differences in attitude research have been investigated in topics such as attitude change and persuasion (i.e., Cooper, 1979; Eagly & Carli, 1981). The role of gender differences on racial attitudes, however, has not received much attention from attitude researchers. Empirical evidence from international and national studies among tertiary and secondary level learners that have included gender as an explanatory variable in racial attitude research, have revealed conflicting results. One study (Van den Berghe, 1962) has found that there was no evidence that gender accounted for differences in racial attitudes. Other studies, however, have shown that gender accounts for differences in racial attitude. In the United States of America, Hoxter and Lester (1994) reported that White male tertiary level learners consistently revealed more prejudiced attitudes towards minority learners than White female tertiary level learners. While investigating the interface between racism and sexism, Sidanius (1993) found that male tertiary level learners showed significantly higher sexist and racist attitudes than their female tertiary level counterparts.

In South Africa, Dawes and Finchilescue (1994) reported that White and Indian male secondary learners were more racist than females on Duckitt’s (1991b; 1993a) Subtle Racism Scale, while Pillay and Collings (2004) reported that male undergraduate learners exhibited more traditional and contemporary racist attitudes than their female counterparts.

Language and Racism

In South African research on racial attitudes, home language has been “the single most dominant factor associated with differences in white racial prejudice” (Foster & Nel, 1991, p.
However, in a multilingual society, such as South Africa, language categories are not clear-cut social categories. While home language does create clear-cut linguistic categories, such as Afrikaans-speaking, English-speaking, or Xhosa-speaking categories, it also serves an integrative function by integrating linguistic categories with wider social and ideological categories. Thus Afrikaans-speaking individuals (linguistic category) may simultaneously belong to an ethnic category (i.e., Afrikaner) and a racial category (i.e., Coloured or White). The boundaries between social, ethnic, and linguistic categories in South Africa are thus blurred, changeable, and confusing (Louw-Potgieter, 1991).

In order to limit the confounding effect of language, researchers who have investigated the association between home language and racial attitudes further demarcated race categories into linguistic categories. Thus, White participants in a study were further separated into Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking Whites. In this manner, consistent trends regarding the association between home language and racial attitudes have been found since the 1930s (Foster, 2006). Both English- and Afrikaans-speaking Whites have held negatives attitudes towards Black people, with Afrikaans speakers consistently showing a greater degree of prejudice (e.g., Appelgryn & Bornman, 1996; Dawes & Finchilescue, 1994; Hampel & Krupp, 1977; Mynhardt, 1980; Plug & Nieuwoud, 1983; Smith & Stones, 1999; Stones, Heaven, & Bester, 1997; Thiele, 1988, as cited in Foster & Nel, 1991). One recent study that utilised the Subtle Racism Scale, however, revealed results that indicate a reverse in this trend. Holtman, et al. (2005) found that White, English-speaking secondary level learners evidenced more racist attitudes than White Afrikaans-speaking learners.

Despite being stable over a long period of time, racial attitudes may also change rapidly in response to events, such as peace, war, and alliance (Duckitt, 1994; Sinha & Upadhyaya, 1960). Nieuwoud and Plug (1983) revealed evidence that Afrikaans-speaking White attitudes towards
Blacks became significantly more negative after the eruption of open Black rebellion during the Soweto riots in 1976. The researchers (Plug & Nieuwoudt, 1983) speculated that the effects of the Soweto riots in 1976 may have been amplified by television which was introduced in 1976. However, Thiele (1988, as cited in Foster & Nel, 1991) found no real evidence of changes in White attitudes towards Blacks after the 1976 political unrest.

In the 1980s, English-speaking Whites showed some evidence of attitude change towards a more liberal stance (Hofmeyer, 1990). Duckitt (1992a; 1994) postulated that much of this tolerance could be relatively superficial, as empirical studies have shown the co-existence of liberal attitudes in English South Africans with paternalistic reverse discrimination (Tyson, Schlacter & Cooper, 1988). Results of research conducted in 1993 (6 months before the first democratic election in South Africa) and 1994 (6 months after the election) also indicated that White English-speaking tertiary level participants’ socio-political attitudes (i.e., patriotism, racial prejudice, and authoritarianism) changed after the elections and had become reflective of “a truly, non-sexist, and democratic society” (Stones, et al., 1997, p. 112). However, Stones, et al. (1997) suggested that the unique social identity of the English-speaking community could account for such changes. For example, writers such as Du Preez (1980) have speculated that the English-speaking community in South Africa tends to adopt a “chameleon-like approach” (Stones, et al., 1997, p. 112) to political issues.

Research has further noted differences between Afrikaans and English-speaking White South Africans in their approach to change (Stones, et al., 1997). It has been noted that White English speakers tend to be more catastrophic and paranoid in their attitude towards change, while White Afrikaans speakers traditionally have held a more conservative stance. However, this has shifted towards a more catastrophic and paranoid attitude in more recent years (Foster & Nel, 1991).
Age and Racism

Research on the relationship between the age of a person and his or her racial attitudes in the United States of America has shown mixed results. Some studies (Glover 1995; Seltzer, Frazier & Ricks, 1995) found that older populations hold more negative attitudes towards minority groups. Other investigations (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993) found that age has no bearing on racial attitudes, while Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit & Leeson (2006) found that older Australian participants had the most positive attitudes towards Middle Eastern people before and during the Iraqi war.

South African research on racial attitudes has been conducted with children (i.e., Elliot & Tyson, 1983), adolescents (i.e., Dawes & Finchelescue, 1994), and adults (i.e., Durheim, 2003). Such studies found that South African secondary level learners had less tolerant racial attitudes than their counterparts in the United States of America (Smith & Stones, 1999). Other studies with secondary and tertiary learner populations showed mixed results. Some studies (Collings & Naidoo, 2004; Finchelescu & Dawes, 2001) revealed contemporary racism scores higher than the theoretical midpoint of the scale used, while other researchers (Collings & Naidoo, 2004; Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a; Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Holtman, et al., 2005; Lea, et al., 1995; Stones, et al., 2003) found research participants had contemporary racist scores moderately lower than the theoretical midpoint of the scale used.

However, the association between age and racial attitudes towards Blacks has not enjoyed much attention by researchers. An exception is research conducted by Durheim (2003) who investigated variables associated with opposition to racial transformation policy among White South-Africans. Durheim (2003) found that relatively higher age significantly predicted favourable attitudes towards reconstruction and development policies and affirmative action
Race is one of the most salient and significant categories in which people are placed. The association between race and racism has thus occupied a central role in global intergroup relations research. More specifically, racist attitudes of Whites against Blacks have been the primary focus of research of racial attitudes in the United States and South Africa (Foster, 1991b; Jones, 1997; Louw & Foster, 1991b; Ratele, 2006; Wilson, 2006). In fact, Jones (1997) asserted that the focus on Black-White relations “offers the most compelling glimpse into the operation of prejudice and racism in the United States” (p. 18). Such a glimpse into racial attitudes in the United States of America is offered by surveys conducted in the United States of America in the early to mid-1990s. These surveys revealed that White American racial attitudes towards Black Americans were more pronounced, coherent, and crystallised than attitudes towards other groups. For example, symbolic racist attitudes of White American towards Black Americans were more negative than attitudes towards Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, and other Whites (Jones, 1997).

Similarly, South African psychological research into intergroup relations has been influenced by the perspective that relations between groups are shaped by the attitudes one race group holds towards other race groups (Louw & Foster, 1991b; Ratele, 2006). The racial attitudes of Whites towards Blacks have therefore enjoyed prominence in South African research (Foster &
A number of investigations into racial attitudes by means of social distance scales (Heaven & Groenewald, 1977; Lever, 1969; 1972; Van den Berghe, 1962) and semantic differential scales (Nieuwoudt, Plug & Mynhardt, 1977; Plug & Nieuwoudt, 1983) revealed a consistent pattern of White racial attitudes: English- and Afrikaans-speaking Whites held negative attitudes towards all non-White groups.

While systematic social psychological research on racial attitudes has declined considerably since South Africa’s transition to democracy, several studies have investigated whether White racist attitudes towards other race groups have changed along with positive political changes (Foster, 2006). These studies with secondary and tertiary level learners, however, have replicated pre-democracy attitudinal trends and confirmed that White racist attitudes towards other race groups are deeply entrenched. Pillay & Collings (2004) found White learners scored higher than other race groups on a measure of traditional racism towards Blacks, while Indian and White students scored highest on a measure of contemporary racism towards Blacks. Similarly, Finchilescu and Dawes (2001) reported that pre-democracy patterns continued among secondary level learners as White learners scored higher on anti-Black measures than Coloured or Indian learners. In addition, this study revealed that White anti-Black sentiment was higher in 1996 than in 1992. This is contradictory to findings of Smith, et al. (2003) who found that anti-Black sentiment in White and Coloured tertiary and secondary learner samples had decreased between 1995 and 1999. Smith and Stones (1999) also found ambivalent racist attitudes among White secondary level participants. The White learners showed strong support for improved conditions for Black people and strong pro-White attitudes, but also an unwillingness to accept Black people as equals to Whites and a preference that racial groups in South Africa remain separate and distinct. Yet, only 15% of the White participants in the study reflected strong racist attitudes.
A neglected area of research, both internationally (Wilson, 2006) and in South Africa (Foster & Nel, 1991) has been the racial attitudes of Black people towards other racial groups (Foster & Nel, 1991). Although scant, research reveals a consistent pattern of Black attitudes: relatively positive views towards English-speaking Whites, but negative attitudes and even hostility towards Afrikaans-speaking Whites (Foster, 2006; Foster & Nel, 1991). One such study conducted by Voster and Proctor (1976) measured the levels of bias of Black tertiary level learners towards English and Afrikaans-speaking Whites by letting Black participants listen to the recordings of White voices. Their findings showed a bias in favour of English White people, distinguished from Afrikaans-speaking Whites by their accents. The English stereotype, as judged by Black participants, indicated that English speaking White people were better-looking, more likeable, more sociable, and kinder than the Afrikaans-speaking White participants.

In more recent years, the Anti-White Sentiment Scale (AWS) (Duckitt & Farre, 1994) was developed to measure anti-White sentiment and attitudes held regarding the participation of White South Africans in the social, political, and economic areas of South Africa (Holtman, et al., 2005; Smith & Stones, 2001). This scale contains items such as “Whites should not be allowed to keep their wealth. It should be taken from them and re-distributed among all people of South Africa”, and “Whites should have to suffer for the wrongs of apartheid” (Holtman, et al., 2005). Investigations with the AWS have confirmed pre-democracy Black racial attitude trends. For example, Duckitt & Mphuthing (1998) found that Black students have significantly more negative attitudes toward Afrikaans-speaking Whites than towards English-speaking Whites. Finchilescu and Dawes (1994; 2001) also found that Black secondary level learners showed the most negative anti-White attitudes, followed by Coloured and Indian participants. However, when compared to other groups, Blacks’ racial attitudes have been found to be more tolerant than other racial groups
in South Africa (Finchilescu & Dawes, 2001; Pillay & Collings, 2004; Smith & Stones, 1999; Smith, et al., 2003; Verganani, 1985, as cited in Foster, 1991c).

Even though Smith and Stones (2001) have asserted that the factor structure of the Subtle Racism Scale does not lend itself for use as an aggregate total of the individual items with Black and Coloured participants, the Subtle Racism Scale has been administered to Black participants. For example, Smith, et al. (2003) administered the Subtle Racism Scale to two samples that included Blacks in 1995 and 1999. The results indicated moderately low ratings of anti-Black contemporary racist beliefs that fell below the theoretical midpoint. Pillay and Collings (2004) assessed the racial attitudes of tertiary level learners, including those of Black learners, by administering a measure of both traditional and contemporary racial attitudes towards Blacks. While Blacks scored lower than all groups on both measures, it is interesting to note that the group scored higher on the items that reflected anti-Black sentiments along the lines of contemporary racism than on the items that reflected traditional racism.

As a distinctive group in South Africa, the Coloured group consists of people of mixed racial origin. During apartheid the Coloured group was granted more privileges than Blacks, but fewer privileges than Whites. Due to this social hierarchy and because this group represents a small minority of the South African population, the Coloured group have been marginalised in apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Smith, Stratton, Stones, & Naidoo, 2003). Similar to the previously reported trend of Black attitudes, investigations into the racial attitudes of Coloured towards Whites have revealed a consistent pattern: Afrikaans-speaking Whites were consistently rated as the least favoured group, followed by English-speaking Whites (Morse & Peele, 1975; Thiele, 1988, as cited in Foster & Nel, 1991). However, Thiele’s (1988, as cited in Foster & Nel, 1991) assessment of the racial attitudes of Coloured adults also revealed that Coloured participants had more negative attitudes towards Blacks than
towards Afrikaans-speaking Whites. However, when contemporary racist attitudes were measured, Coloured participants were more tolerant towards Blacks than Whites were (Pillay & Collings, 2004; Smith, et al., 1999; Stones, et al., 2003).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the changing notions of race and racism across time and contexts. It can be concluded that racism as an adaptable construct has evolved into more contemporary forms of racism, expressed in a more subtle, covert, and indirect ways when compared with traditional forms of racism.

As the result of a considerable decline in systematic social psychological research on racial attitudes since the late 1980s, it has also been found that empirical evidence that describes post-apartheid trends in South African race attitudes is scarce and somewhat equivocal. Furthermore, the relationship between subtle racism and demographic variables such as age has not previously been investigated. The present study thus seeks to address some of the empirical gaps present within existing research literature, while simultaneously attempting to increase the body of national research available on subtle racism. The following chapter will focus on the methodology adopted for the present study.
CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Chapters 2 and 3 have contextualized the theory and research relevant to attitudes, prejudice, stereotypes, discrimination, and contemporary racism. In these chapters, empirical evidence was provided regarding the complexity of the construct of racism and the changing nature of racism. The limited number of studies that have investigated racial attitudes in post-apartheid South Africa were also highlighted in Chapter 3. The present study is therefore specifically aimed to address an empirical gap in South African race relations research as it aims to explore and describe the association between the dependent variable of subtle racism of undergraduate psychology learners and the independent variables of gender, language, race, and age of the participants. This introduction provides the rationale for the two aims of the present study, which are formulated below.

Primary Aim of the Research

The primary purpose of this study was to explore and describe subtle racism among undergraduate psychology learners at a tertiary institution in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality in 2004. In particular this study aimed to: (a) explore and describe subtle racism of undergraduate psychology learners and (b) explore and describe patterns of subtle racism amongst undergraduate psychology learners according to selected demographic variables.
Research Design

According to Fouché and De Vos (2002), a research design can be considered to be a “plan or blueprint according to which data is collected” (p. 137) in accordance to the aims of the research study. As the present study utilised a measure that collected numerical data, the study fell within the quantitative research domain. A quantitative study enables the researcher to accurately present data generated by the study in a coherent and functional way (Struwig & Stead, 2001), while enabling the researcher to remain detached from the study object. This increases the objectivity of the quantitative research design. A disadvantage of the quantitative method is that detailed insight into the research problem might be compromised (De Vos, 1998).

The current study was non-experimental, exploratory-descriptive in nature as data was gathered without the direct control or manipulation of independent variables (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000; Leedy, 1993). Exploratory research has the purpose of discovering relationships between variables (Kerliner & Lee, 2000). The present study was exploratory in nature as it aimed to gather data on the association between the independent variables of race, age, gender, and language and the dependent variable of subtle racism of undergraduate psychology learners to determine if patterns emerged (Mouton, 1996). Another feature of the exploratory research design of this study was that it aimed to formulate and focus questions for future research (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000; Neuman, 2006).

The study was descriptive in that the primary purpose of the study was to employ statistical data to provide an accurate description of subtle racism amongst undergraduate psychology learners in 2004. Data regarding anti-Black subtle racist attitudes was collected for the present study with the Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a). The advantage of a non-experimental, explorative-descriptive approach is that it attempts to provide a complete and
accurate description of a phenomenon (Struwig & Stead, 2001) while providing a description of a relatively large set of data (Van Lill & Grieve, 1994). The disadvantages of this approach are that it is time-consuming (Struwig & Stead, 2001) and it has no method for controlling extraneous variables. Thus, no cause-and-effect conclusions can be drawn (Burns & Grove, 1993; Eaton, 2001; Kerlinger & Lee, 2000).

For the purpose of the present study, the demographic variables of race and language were categorised into sub-groups. Grouping of race was necessary due to the sizes of the Coloured (n=45) and Asian (n=10) race groups in the sample that were too small for meaningful statistical comparison with the White (n=106) and Black (n=102) race groups. Coloured and Asian participants were therefore combined into one race sub-group, namely Coloured/Asian group for the purpose of statistical analysis.

Similarly, the demographic variable of language was also categorised into sub-groups. Within the sample, participants reported six different languages, namely English, Afrikaans, Xhosa, Sesotho, Tswana, Zulu, and Sepedi. The following language sub-groups were utilised for the description and statistical analysis of data in the present study: (a) English-speaking, (b) Afrikaans-speaking, and (c) African languages, incorporating Xhosa, Sesotho, Tswana, Zulu and Sepedi languages. Age, as a continuous variable was not categorised for the purpose of the statistical analysis as the categorisation of a continuous variable has the disadvantage of failing to use all the information of the continuous variable (Harris, 1988).

Other than race, age, gender, and language, another variable that had the potential to be associated with subtle racism is socio-economic status, defined as “the status of an individual’s position in a stratified society based on a variety of social and economic indices (Reber & Reber, 2001, p. 692). Foster and Nel (1991) claimed that socio-economic status is a potentially important variable in the study of racism. However, since learner samples have dominated
prejudice research, socio-economic status has not been investigated, or has been of little pertinence. In addition, the researchers (Foster & Nel, 1991) claimed that socio-economic status as a variable is at risk of being confounded by other variables, such as level of education. Furthermore, as information on comparative socio-economic status groups in the South African context are difficult to obtain (Müller, 2005), it was decided to omit this variable from the research design. Consequently, results reported in Chapter 5 could have been influenced by socio-economic status, but the nature of such influence was not established.

The time dimension of the present study is cross-sectional. This entails collecting data at one point in time and taking a snap-shot approach of the social world. This differs from the longitudinal approach, which involves multiple data collections from the same sample over a period of time. The cross-sectional approach is also simpler and more cost-and time effective than the longitudinal approach. However, the cross-sectional approach has the disadvantage of not being able to trace social change over a period of time (Nieuman, 2006). Hence, the present study was unable to capture how subtle racism of undergraduate learners changed over a certain period of time.

The present study made use of existing data that were collected by another researcher. As the data were collected by others, it has the disadvantage that there was no control over the quality and quantity of data and the manner in which data was collected (Leary, 1991).

It is therefore acknowledged that the research design used in the present study offered certain advantages and limitations. In addition, the researcher was aware of the fact that socio-economic status could not be controlled. Findings of the present study should therefore be interpreted while taking these constraints into consideration.
Sampling

This study formed part of a larger ongoing research study at a tertiary institution in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality. The larger study entailed gathering data on subtle racism with the Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a) from undergraduate psychology learners registered for a second-year social psychology module at the tertiary institution in 1994 and 2004. The current study focused on the 2004 sample.

The population, the total set of entities from which the participants of the present study were acquired (Strydom & Venter, 2002), were undergraduate psychology learners who were registered for a second-year social psychology module at a tertiary institution in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality in 2004. This population was selected due to the large number of undergraduate learners that registered for this module. A large sample is desirable as statistics calculated from larger samples are more accurate than those calculated from small samples (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Data collection was done during the introductory lecture of the social psychology module before any lectures on prejudice and racism took place, thereby restricting the potentially confounding effect of knowledge of contemporary racism on the anti-Black subtle racist attitudes of the participants of the present study.

Participants for the present study were obtained through non-probability, convenience sampling in which the researcher simply included easily available participants into the study (Bailey, 1994; Leary, 1991; Struwig & Stead, 2001). Thus, only undergraduate psychology learners, registered for a second-year social psychology module who attended a social psychology lecture on the day of data collection were included in the present study. Learners who did not attend the social psychology lecture on the day of measurement were thus not included in the
sample, even though they had registered for the social psychology module. The sample for this study consisted of 286 undergraduate psychology learners.

Convenience sampling is a frequently used form of sampling (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000; Leary, 1991). It has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of this sampling method are that it is cost-effective and less time-consuming than other methods. A disadvantage of convenient sampling, however, is that generalisability is reduced (Bailey, 1994; Trochim, 2002; Struwig & Stead, 2001) as the degree to which the participants are representative of the population is not known. When learner samples are used, such as in the present study, generalisability is further reduced as learners tend to be more intelligent and have more liberal attitudes than the general population (Leary, 1991). However, since the present study was exploratory-descriptive in nature and concerned with describing the current sample, generalisation was not important (Neuman, 2006).

Demographic data such as age, gender, home language and race group were collected from the participants of the present study. This data was utilised in the description of the sample, as well as in data analysis.

Data Collection Method

The Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a) was developed as a measure of anti-Black attitudes with the purpose of reflecting more subtle and covert expressions of racial prejudice as well as more traditional, old-fashioned and cruder forms of racism (Duckitt, 1991b). This measure was developed in accordance with symbolic or modern racism as it is known in the United States of America (Duckitt, 1993b).
The Subtle Racism Scale consists of 10 items (Duckitt, 1991b); five negatively formulated items (e.g., “It is almost certainly best for all concerned that interracial marriages not be allowed”) and five positively formulated items (e.g., “Given favourable conditions it is quite possible that Black majority rule could result in a stable, prosperous, and democratic South Africa”) (Duckitt, 1992a). The items were formulated to indicate anti-Black affect in a less direct and obvious manner than was typical in measures that were previously used to assess traditional forms of racism (Duckitt, 1993b) to prevent items being viewed as offensive or socially undesirable by liberal or sophisticated participants (Duckitt, 1991b; Duckitt & Farre, 1994). The Subtle Racism Scale, as validated by Duckitt (1991b; 1993a) was a 7-point Likert scale with a range of 10 to 70, with lower subtle racism indicated by lower scores. However, Heine, Lehman, Peng, and Greenholtz (2002) asserted that cross-cultural comparisons of attitudes with the use of Likert scales needs to be approached with caution as the validity of results may be compromised due to different reference groups of individualistic and collectivist cultures. This might limit the value of the 7-point Likert scale Subtle Racism Scale in the multi-cultural context of South Africa.

In the present study, the range of the Subtle Racism Scale was 10 to 30, with lower subtle racism indicated by lower scores. All items were scored 3 for “yes”, 2 for “unsure”, and 1 for “no”. Negatively-worded items were reverse scored.

The Subtle Racism Scale was validated amongst psychology learners in two tertiary institutions in 1984. It was administered to 217 undergraduate psychology learners at the University of Natal at Pietermaritzburg (Duckitt, 1991b) and 303 undergraduate psychology students at the University of the Witwatersrand (Duckitt, 1993a). Construct validity has been established through an examination of the relationship between the Subtle Racism Scale and measures of other constructs to which subtle racism should be theoretically related. For that purpose, other measures, such as Heaven and Moerdyk’s (1977) South African adaptation of
Ray’s (1976) anti-Black attitude scale, a social distance scale, Altemeyer’s (1981) Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale and an interracial behavioural intention scale were simultaneously administered to cross-validate the Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b).

Results indicated that the Subtle Racism Scale outperformed the traditional anti-Black attitude scale in all five validity criteria utilised (Duckitt, 1991b). The Subtle Racism Scale showed high concurrent validity (coefficient of 0.79) when correlated with the more transparent measure of anti-Black attitude, namely Ray’s (1976) anti-Black attitude scale. This suggested that these two scales were measuring almost exactly the same dimension (Duckitt, 1991b), while it correlated more highly with indices of anti-Black racism and discriminatory behaviour than traditional measures of anti-Black prejudice (Duckitt & Farre, 1994).

Reliability of the Subtle Racism Scale has been computed in various South African studies (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a; Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Dawes & Finchilescu, 1994; Holtman, et al., 2005; Lea, et al., 1995; Smith, et al., 2003). These studies reported internal reliability coefficients ranging from 0.53 to 0.91. In the present study, the Cronbach alpha was determined to be 0.71. Internal reliability of the Subtle Racism Scale in the present study thus fell within the moderate to low reliability level (Murphy and Davidshofer, 2001).

Factor analysis is a construct validity tool used to examine the latent variables that underlie measurements of any kind (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Duckitt (1991b) conducted a factor analysis to assess the dimensionality of the Subtle Racism Scale in 1984 with a final sample of 211 White undergraduate psychology learners at the “relatively conservative” (p. 235) University of Pietermaritzburg. Black participants were excluded from the analysis. Factor loadings were found to be greater than 0.50 for all ten items of the final scale. This suggested that the Subtle Racism Scale was “adequately” unidimensional and measured only one underlying construct (Duckitt, 1991b, p. 237).
However, rapid social change in transforming societies such as South Africa may rapidly outdate measures of social attitudes such as the Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a). A factor analysis was thus repeated to assess the dimensionality of the Subtle Racism Scale. The result of the factor analysis indicated that the Subtle Racism Scale can not be regarded as unidimensional according to the present study, as factor analysis identified that two factors could be extracted from the Subtle Racism Scale. Factor loadings for items 9 and 10 was smaller than 0.50. Factor analysis also revealed that Item 9 fell within both extracted factors. This suggests that the Subtle Racism Scale should be reassessed and adapted in future studies to ensure unidimensionality.

**Procedure**

Data-collection in descriptive research can be done with most data-gathering techniques (Neuman, 2006). The Subtle Racism Scale (Duckitt, 1991b) was administered during a normal lecture period to a group of undergraduate psychology learners who were registered for a second-year level social psychology module. The purpose of the study, the voluntary nature of participation, as well as the anonymity of the data were explained and emphasised to prospective participants before administration of the measure.

Firstly, participants were asked to provide demographic information, such as their age, language, race group and gender in the spaces provided on the measure. Thereafter, participants were requested to complete the measure by indicating whether they agreed or disagreed with each of the items. The participants were also given the option to indicate whether they were unsure, agreed, or disagreed with each of the items, by marking the appropriate space. Participants were given as much time as was required to complete the measure.
Statistical Analysis

The primary purpose of this study was to explore and describe subtle racism among undergraduate psychology learners. Two specific aims focused on the exploration and description of subtle racism among the present sample by concentrating on the relationship between participant demographic variables (i.e., gender, language, age, and race) and subtle racism. As “statistics is a tool…[that] can be used to explain and clarify” (Hofstee, 2006. p. 215), the data gathered in the current study were analysed in terms of the aims and objectives of the study to explore and describe subtle racism. The Microsoft Excel and Statistica (Statsoft, 1995) software packages were used to conduct the statistical analysis.

Considering the exploratory-descriptive nature of the aims, descriptive statistics were calculated and used to describe the sample according to demographic variables. Thereafter, descriptive statistics also allowed for the identification of general trends of subtle racism according to the selected demographic variables. Furthermore, a multiple regression analysis was used to explore the association between participant demographic variables (i.e., gender, language, age, and race) and subtle racism. This was considered the most appropriate statistical technique, as it allows for the exploration and description of the relationship between a dependent variable (i.e., subtle racism) and two or more independent variables (i.e., gender, language, age, and race) (Russo, 2003; Shavelson, 1988). This type of statistical analysis may also be used in an exploratory fashion in an attempt to identify those demographic variables (i.e., gender, language, age, and race) significantly associated with subtle racism (Russo, 2003). This is well-suited to the descriptive-exploratory aims of the present study.

Significant independent variables were selected by means of multiple regression analysis. The dependent variable was subtle racism as derived from Duckitt’s (1991b; 1993a) Subtle
Racism Scale. The independent variables in the initial models were the demographic variables of gender, language, age, and race. A stepwise regression procedure was followed in which independent variables were repeatedly added and taken out of the model until the addition of variables produces no significant improvement in the squared multiple correlation coefficient ($R^2$) and until the $p$-values of all the variables retained in the model were lower than 0.05, the maximum level at which one can still claim significance of the respective independent variable (Harris, 1988; Ramsey & Shafer, 2002). All independent variables with a $p$-value lower than 0.05 in the output of the stepwise regression were thus retained as independent variables in the multiple linear regression model. As this study is non-experimental, significant independent variables should not be referred to as predictor variables, as this suggests that these findings can be generalized to the complete population of undergraduate psychology learners, which is not the case (C. Bosma, personal communication, February 2, 2007). Using stepwise regression increases the parsimoniousness of the statistical analysis, as only the variables that most explain variability in the dependent variable are included (Hinton, 2004).

Dummy variables were used in the regression analysis for the categorical independent variables of race and language. Dummy variables are used to represent sub-groups of the same sample and are useful as they allow for the use of a single regression equation to represent multiple groups (Trochim, 2006). In the present study, a 0,1 dummy variable was used for both the race and language independent variables. For the race variable, the White group were used as the reference group, while English-speaking participants were used as the reference group in the language variable. For example, the subtle racism scores of the Black and Coloured/Asian sub-groups were compared against the White sub-group to determine which race sub-groups are significant independent variables of subtle racism. Similarly, the Afrikaans-speaking and African languages-speaking sub-groups were compared with the English-speaking sub-group during the
multiple regression analysis to determine significant associations with subtle racism. The advantage of using a 0,1 dummy-coded variable is that it enables the researcher to treat a nominal-level variable like an interval-level variable in an statistical analysis (Trochim, 2006).

As mentioned in Chapter 3, linguistic and race categories in South Africa are confounding. Researchers have generally attempted to overcome this confounding effect, by further dividing race groups into home-language groups. The present study too found an overlap between the demographic variables of race and language, as indicated by the multiple regression analysis. The model indicated a high partial correlation between the independent variables of language and race. According to the model, language had the highest $p$-level, and was removed from the model as it was considered to be spurious (C. Bosma, personal communication, 8 December 2006).

As previous research trends indicated that home language was an important independent variable to consider when investigating racial attitudes, descriptive statistics for White Afrikaans-speaking and White English-speaking sub-groups were calculated. Descriptive statistics for other Afrikaans-speaking race sub-groups were not calculated as sample sizes for the Afrikaans-speaking Coloured/Asian ($n=16$) and Black ($n=1$) race sub-groups were considered too small for meaningful deductions to be derived (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000).

Linear multiple regression analysis typically calculates a linear model that best represents the overall pattern of association between the dependent variable and the independent variables (Caldwell, 2007). However, since it is unlikely that a model describing subtle racism is linear with respect to the age of respondent, a curvilinear model in which age was modelled in a polynomial form, was fitted (C. Bosma, personal communication, April 16, 2007). This curvilinear multiple regression model is more complex than a linear multiple regression model (Shavelson, 1988), but as the introduction of the curvature with respect to age in the model describing subtle racism proved to be highly significant ($p<0.0028$), it indicated a more accurate
reflection of sample characteristics than a linear model (C. Bosma, personal communication, February 2, 2007).

Shavelson (1988) reported that a general rule of thumb regarding sample size needed to provide adequate estimates of the regression coefficients is that there should be at least 10 times as many subjects as independent variables. As this study has 4 independent variables (i.e., gender, language, age, and race), the sample size of the current study (n=263) was considered sufficient for an adequate estimate of the regression coefficients of the present study. A disadvantage of this type of statistical analysis is that no causal interpretation of the effect of the independent on the dependent variable should be made, as the independent variable was not manipulated by the researcher (Russo, 2003).

**Ethical Considerations**

Strydom (2002) defined ethics as “a set of widely accepted moral principles that offer rules for, and behavioural expectations of, the most correct conduct towards experimental subjects” (p. 75). This study utilised post-hoc analysis of existing data collected by another researcher. During the collection of data in 2004, the purpose and voluntary nature of participation in the study were clearly explained to prospective participants to ensure that no deception of and possible harm to prospective participants took place. The anonymity of the participants and the data collected were also ensured as participants were not required to provide their names on the questionnaire. Informed consent to use the data for research purposes was also obtained from prospective participants of the study.
CHAPTER 5

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In this chapter, the findings of the study are presented and discussed in relation to the two specific aims of the study. The first specific aim was to explore and describe subtle racism of undergraduate psychology learners. The second specific aim was to explore and describe patterns of subtle racism among undergraduate learners with regards to sub-group demographic variables. Below, the sample is described according to demographic variables of gender, language, age, and race. Thereafter, the results of the statistical analysis of the association between the demographic variables (as independent variables) and subtle racism (as dependent variable) is presented, along with a discussion of the findings within the context of theories of contemporary racism and previous research on prejudice and contemporary forms of racism as presented in Chapters 2 and 3.

Description of sample

As mentioned earlier in this study, 286 undergraduate psychology learners attending a second-year social psychology lecture participated in the present study. Twenty-three of the measures were incomplete and were therefore not considered for statistical analysis. This gave a final sample of 263. As a sample size of 30 is considered to be sufficient for basic statistical procedures (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000), the final sample size of present study was sufficiently large to allow for parametric techniques to be performed and for meaningful deductions to be derived.

The gender distribution of this sample was disproportionate as 31 % of the participants were male, while 69 % of the sample was female. Within the racial sub-groups of the sample of
In the present study, the females consistently outnumber the males. The gender distribution of the sample per racial sub-group, expressed as a percentage of the total sample, is presented in Figure 3.

![Gender Distribution per Race Sub-group](image)

Figure 3. Gender distribution per race sub-group expressed as a percentage of the total sample.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, language groups indicated by participants were divided into 3 language sub-groups, namely English, Afrikaans, and African. Of the sample, 48% of participants were English-speaking, 18% were Afrikaans-speaking, and 35% of participants spoke an African language. English-speakers were the majority language sub-group within both the White and Coloured/Asian race sub-groups. The language distribution per racial sub-group, expressed as a percentage of the total sample is presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Language distribution per race sub-group expressed as a percentage of the total sample.

The mean age of tertiary learner samples usually range between 18 and 22 years (Leary, 1991). The mean age of the present study was 22.8 years ($SD=6.04$), slightly older than the reported learner sample mean age range. Participants ranged between 18 and 57 years. Measures of central tendency indicate that the Black race sub-group had the highest mean age ($M=25.10$, $SD=7.04$), while the White race sub-group had the largest range of ages (18-57 years). The mean, standard deviation and age ranges per race sub-group are presented Table 2.
Table 2.

*Mean, Standard Deviation, and Age Range per Race Sub-Group*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race sub-group</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Coloured/Asian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean age (years)</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>25.10</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD (years)</td>
<td>(5.48)</td>
<td>(7.04)</td>
<td>(2.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum Age (years)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Age (years)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The White (40%) and Black race sub-groups (39%) were similar in size, while the Coloured/Asian subgroup (21%) was the smallest race sub-group. The race sub-group distribution of the present study mirrors the racial distribution of the 2004 student body (R. Knoetze, personal communication, November 28, 2006). A comparison between the racial sub-group distribution of the present study and the 2004 student body, expressed in percentages, are presented graphically in Figure 5.

![Figure 5. Comparison between race sub-group distribution of the present study sample and the 2004 student body.](image-url)
Subtle Racism

As indicated in Chapter 4, the theoretical range of the measure used in the present study is 10 to 30, with a theoretical midpoint of 20. In order to define descriptive categories for scores obtained on the Subtle Racism Scale, the theoretical range was divided into equal categories of 7 units each. Therefore, a participant that obtained a score of 20 (the theoretical midpoint of the scale) will fall within the category that suggests moderate subtle racism according to this scale. The descriptive categories for the scores obtained on the subtle racism score are presented in Table 3.

Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptive Category</th>
<th>Category range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low subtle racism</td>
<td>10-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate subtle racism</td>
<td>17-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High subtle racism</td>
<td>24-30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average subtle racism score obtained by the present sample is 15.58 (SD=3.77). This is below the theoretical midpoint of the scale and can be described as low subtle racism according to the descriptive categories established (see Table 3). According to these descriptive categories, the largest percentage of participants (65 %) obtained scores that indicate low subtle racism. A considerable smaller percentage of participants (32 %) had less tolerant racial attitudes towards Blacks as their scores indicated moderate subtle racism. A small percentage of participants (4 %)
were the least racially tolerant towards Blacks and obtained scores which indicate high subtle racism according to this measure.

Patterns of Subtle Racism According to Demographic Sub-groups

Multiple regression analysis was conducted with four independent variables (i.e., gender, language, age, and race). Two of the variables (i.e., age and race) were retained. In Chapter 4, it was explained that dummy variables for the independent variables of race and language were utilised during the regression analysis. The model that illustrates the use of dummy variables for the racial sub-groups (i.e., White, Black, and Coloured/Asian) of the present study is shown in Table 4. Thus, by allocating codes to the dummy variables in this manner, the White sub-group was selected as the reference group.

Table 4.

Model of Dummy Variables for Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race sub-group</th>
<th>R₁</th>
<th>R₂</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured/Asian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The curvilinear regression model which gave the best fit to the data was:

\[
\text{Estimated Subtle Racism} = b_0 + b_1 \text{Age} + b_2 \text{Age}^2 + b_3 R_1 + b_4 R_2
\]

The term \(b_0\) represents the intercept, \(b\) the estimated coefficients for each independent variable retained by the model (i.e., age and race), \(\text{Age}\) refers to the independent variable of age,
while \text{Age}^2 \text{ describes the curvature with respect to age. According to the model for dummy variables for race expressed in Table 6, } R_1 \text{ thus refers to the Black sub-group, while } R_2 \text{ refers to the Coloured/Asian sub-group.}

A summary of the multiple regression analysis is presented in Table 5. The table expresses the estimated coefficients for this model \((b)\), as well as the \(p\)-value for each estimated coefficient. In addition, the \(t\)-values and \textit{SE}-values, intermediate statistics to calculate the \(p\)-value, are presented in Table 5. However, instead of discussing Table 5 here, separate subsections will be dedicated to each of the independent variables and its association with subtle racism as determined by statistical analysis.

The multiple regression model was able to account for 21 \% of variance in subtle racism \((R^2 = .207 \times 100)\). This is relatively low, and implies that 79 \% of variance in subtle racism is due to independent variables that were not included in the model, such as socio-economic status, educational level, religious commitment, political party orientation, or ethnic identity.
Table 5.

Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Results for Gender, Language Sub-Groups, Age, Age², Race Sub-Groups, and the Interaction Between Race Sub-Groups and Age, and Race Sub-Groups and Age².

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.3274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afrikaans-speaking sub-group d</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.3166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-speaking sub-group d</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>0.3711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-3.61</td>
<td>0.0004***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>0.0028**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black sub-group a</td>
<td>-23.75</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>-3.40</td>
<td>0.0008***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured/Asian sub-group a</td>
<td>-2.20</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-4.00</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction between race and age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black*Age interaction b</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>0.0060**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured/Asian*Age interaction b</td>
<td>-1.63</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
<td>0.1869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black*Age² interaction c</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-2.40</td>
<td>0.0170*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured/Asian*Age² interaction c</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.2084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: R=.455; R² = .207; F(6, 257)=13.38, p<.000.
The descriptive statistics revealed that only a small difference of 0.3 units in average subtle racism scores obtained by males ($M=15.89,\ SD=4.17$) and females ($M=15.59,\ SD=3.58$). Likewise, the distribution of subtle racism scores according to descriptive categories (see Table 3) between the genders is fairly similar with 5% more females than males in the low subtle racism category and 3% more males than females in the high subtle racism category. The distribution of participants according to gender for each descriptive category, expressed as a percentage of the total sample is presented in graphic form in Figure 6. This trend reflects international and South African results for secondary and tertiary levels (i.e., Dawes & Finchilescue, 1994; Hoxter & Lester, 1994; Pillay & Collings, 2004; Sidanius, 1993) in which males consistently had higher levels of racism than females and is contradictory to Van den Berghe’s (1962) findings.
However, in investigating the association between gender and subtle racism, multiple regression analysis revealed a non-significant relationship ($p > 0.05$). In the present study, therefore, it could not be demonstrated that gender accounts for differences in subtle racism. The absence of significant gender differences in the expression of racism is contrary to recent South African (Dawes & Finchilescue, 1994; Pillay and Collings, 2004) and international research (Hoxter & Lester, 1994; Sidanius, 1993). It should be noted, however, that the unequal gender distribution of the present study could have contributed to the non-significant result in the present study. With an equal gender distribution, the male contribution to the statistical analysis would have had more statistical power which may have resulted in a statistical result more representative of the association between gender and racism than in the present sample.
The Association between Language and Subtle Racism

It could not be demonstrated with multiple regression analysis that language is significantly associated with subtle racism in the present sample (p > 0.05) (see Table 5). However, when the average subtle racism scores of the different language sub-groups were compared, it was possible to distinguish trends regarding the relationship between language and subtle racism. In the present study, the Afrikaans-speaking sub-group ($M=17.23, SD=4.34$) had the highest average subtle racism of the sample. The African language sub-group ($M=13.77, SD=2.42$) had the lowest average subtle racism score, while the English-speaking sub-group ($M=16.49, SD=3.81$) had a mean score higher than the African languages sub-group, but lower than the Afrikaans-speaking sub-group.

A distribution of subtle racism scores according to language sub-groups (see Table 3), expressed as a percentage of the total sample is graphically illustrated in Figure 7. According to this distribution, Afrikaans-speaking participants of the study had the lowest percentage of participants (9%) in the low subtle racism category when compared to the other language sub-groups of the present study. From this one can conclude that Afrikaans-speaking participants of the present study have the least racially tolerant attitudes towards Blacks compared to the participants from other language sub-groups.
As explained in Chapter 4, descriptive statistics were calculated for the Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking White sub-groups. From the results, it emerged that Afrikaans-speaking White participants ($M=18.53, SD=4.61$) had scores that indicated moderate subtle racism, while the average subtle racism scores of English-speaking White participants ($M=16.49, SD=3.81$) indicated low subtle racism (see Table 3). From these results one is thus able to conclude that within the language sub-groups; the White Afrikaans-speaking sub-group emerged to be the sub-group with the least racial tolerance towards Blacks.

These results reflect the strong association between racism and Afrikaans-speaking Whites that has spanned more than a hundred years as discussed in Chapter 3 and confirms earlier research in which Afrikaans-speaking Whites were consistently shown to have more racist attitudes towards Blacks than English-speaking Whites (e.g., Appelgryn & Bornman, 1996; Dawes & Finchilescue, 1994; Hampel & Krupp, 1977; Plug & Nieuwoud, 1983; Smith & Stones, 1999; Smith, et al., 2003; Stones, et al., 1997; Mynhardt, 1980; Thiele, 1988, as cited in Foster &
Nel, 1988). This suggests that after ten years of democracy, Afrikaans-speaking Whites still hold more negative racial attitudes towards Blacks than English-speaking Whites, demonstrating the deeply entrenched anti-Black sentiment among Afrikaans-speaking White South Africans.

**The Association between Age and Subtle Racism**

It was previously mentioned that age is a continuous variable. Therefore, age was not categorised for the purpose of statistical analysis. However, for the purpose of describing subtle racism of the present sample, the age range (18 years to 57 years) was divided into 4 equal sub-groups each spanning 10 years. The average subtle racism score for the sample according each of the age sub-groups are graphically expressed in Figure 8.

![Figure 8. Average subtle racism score per age sub-group.](image)
From the graph, it can be concluded that the association between age and subtle racism is not a simple, linear relationship in which subtle racism simply increases or decreases with age. Rather, subtle racism decreases along with age to a certain age (i.e., in the 38 – 47 years sub-group), when it again increases. Participants in the 38 – 47 years sub-group therefore exhibited the most racial tolerance towards Blacks, while participants in the 18 – 27 years sub-group were the least tolerant towards Blacks. It is noticeable, however, that even though the average subtle racism score for the sample varies up to approximately 3 units between the different age sub-groups, the average subtle racism score remains within the low subtle racism category (see Table 3). This is indicative of low anti-Black sentiment within all four age groupings is and is comparable to other studies with undergraduate learner samples in which mean ratings were lower than the theoretical midpoint (i.e., Duckitt, 1991b; 1993a; Duckitt & Farre, 1994; Smith, et al., 2003; Stones, et al., 2003).

Multiple regression analysis with age as an independent variable indicated a significant relationship between age and subtle racism ($p < 0.001$). According to the model, the age curvature, modelled by $\text{Age}^2$ also revealed a significant association with subtle racism ($p < 0.001$). According to Ramsy & Schafer (2002), significance at this stringent level of significance ($p<0.001$) could be considered as convincing evidence of significance and strongly suggests that the relationship between age and subtle racism of the present sample is an accurate reflection of tendencies of this sample and not due to chance. This is contradictory to research that has found no association between racial attitudes and age (e.g., Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996) and the finding that older Australians had more positive attitudes towards ethnic out-groups than younger people (Heaven, et al., 2006)

According to Miles (1989) social and historical contexts have an effect on the form of racism articulated in a specific society at a specific time. In addition, many psychologists agree
the interpersonal and intergroup processes are rooted within socio-historical contexts. Shifts or perceptions of shifts within these contexts are thus likely to bring about changes in intergroup and interpersonal processes (Stevens & Lockhat, 2003). The level of subtle racism revealed by each age sub-group may thus provide a snapshot of the interaction between racial attitudes and the socio-political and historical context of South Africa.

Social learning theory emphasises the role that socialising agents such as parents, peers, schools, society, and the media play in the acquisition and modification of racial attitudes (Ashmore, 1970; Brown, 2006; Chaiken & Eagly, 1993; Duckitt, 1994; Nelson, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006). The relatively negative or positive racial attitudes towards Blacks amongst participants may thus be better understood when the historical context at the time when racial attitudes were formed and refined is examined.

The 48-57 year age sub-group were born and raised in the late 1940s and 1950s. After the Second World War, the rest of the world began to move away from racist ideas and began to abandon racial discrimination (Louw & Foster, 1991; McConahay, 1986). South Africa, on the other hand, established the apartheid structure based on the stark hierarchical definition of races and other notions included in the traditional form of racism such as White superiority, racial segregation, and disenfranchisement of all non-Whites (De la Rey, 1991; Durheim, 2003; Foster & Finchelescue, 1986; Jones, 1997; Sparks, 2003). Thus, older participants in the study were generally raised in a social context where negative racist attitudes towards Blacks were explicitly expressed by parents, peers, and in the media (Sparks, 2003) enabling the socialisation of anti-Black racial attitudes. Furthermore, according to contemporary theories of racism, the affective component of racist attitudes stays stable, even if the cognitive and behavioural components of racist attitudes may change (McConahay, 1986). Thus, even though the cognitive and behavioral components of the racial attitudes of the older participants might have changed in post-apartheid
South Africa, it is likely that the negative affective component of their racial attitudes may have remained stable. This may provide a possible explanation for the high level of subtle racism among the older participants in the present study, a trend that has also been found in other studies (i.e., Glover 1995; Seltzer, et al., 1995).

The least negative racial attitudes towards Blacks were found in the sub-group of participants that were born in the era of high apartheid, that is, between 1957 and 1976. This age sub-group were socialised in the ambivalent context of growing racial oppression and censorship on the one hand, and growing anti-apartheid sentiment among some White groups and non-White groups on the other hand. Peaceful protests, which gained momentum in the late 1950s, was met with brutal opposition from the White South African government (Finchilescu & Dawes, 2001). This era was thus characterised by events such as the shootings at Sharpville and Langa (1960), the Soweto riots (1976), the banning of the African National Congress (1960), the Rivonia trials (1963), the approval of detention without trial (1963) and the independence of the first homeland, Transkei (1976) (Attwell, 1986; Beinhart, 1994; Johnson, 2004).

During the 1970s and early 1980s, some White South Africans grew in their beliefs that racism and discrimination is morally wrong (Beinhart, 1994). Within the White English-speaking community, attitude change towards a more liberal stance was evident (Hofmeyer, 1990). Also in the White Afrikaans-speaking communities a “better educated, more urbane and travelled generation of Afrikaners” emerged (Sparks, 2003, p.321) who were aware of the “unworkability of apartheid” and were “embarrassed by its crudity” (Sparks, 2003, p. 321). These changes within White South Africa could account for more tolerant racial attitudes towards Blacks revealed by the present study.

The present study revealed that the youngest participant sub-group evidenced the highest level of subtle racism. As a sub-group that have lived for a large part of their formative years in a
post-apartheid environment in which they have been exposed to more liberal racial and social attitudes (Pillay & Collings, 2004; Stones, et al., 2003) this is a surprising result. However, this result may also reflect this sub-group’s racial attitudes to be consistent with contemporary racist beliefs. Along with the theory of modern racism, participants in this sub-group may have ambivalent attitudes towards Blacks. On the one hand participants believe that racism and discrimination is wrong (Duckitt, 1994; McConahay, 1986). On the other hand, the political unrest and violence of the late 1970s and 1980s (Attwell, 1986; Johnson, 2004), the era in which the racial attitudes of this subgroup were socialised, might have led to beliefs consistent with contemporary racism, such as “the large scale extensions of political rights to blacks will inevitable lead to chaos”. As individuals with subtle racial attitudes only acknowledge behaviour and beliefs consistent with traditional racism as racist (McConahay, 1986), agreeing with contemporary racist statements is not considered to be indicative of anti-Black attitudes. This could account for high subtle racism scores of this particular age sub-group. As a result of the phenomenon of system justification, Black participants could share contemporary racist beliefs about their own race group (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Lord, 1997), which would further explain the relatively high subtle racism scores of the youngest sub-group of participants.

**The Association between Race and Subtle Racism**

Descriptive statistics reveal that White participants of the present study ($M=17.53, SD=4.19$) were the least tolerant towards Blacks, when compared to the Coloured/Asian sub-group ($M=15.47, SD=3.20$) and Black sub-group ($M=13.87, SD=2.49$). Moreover, the White sub-group had the least tolerant racial attitudes towards Blacks with the highest proportion of participants in both the moderate subtle racism (46 %) and high subtle racism (9 %) categories and the smallest
proportion of participants (45%) in the low subtle racism category (see Table 3). The Coloured/Asian sub-group consistently proved to exhibit more tolerance towards Blacks than the White sub-group, but less tolerance than the Black sub-group. Comparisons between percentages of racial sub-groups per descriptive categories are expressed graphically in Figure 9.

Multiple regression analysis with dummy variables (with the White sub-group as the reference sub-group), indicate that there is a statistically significant association between race as an independent variable and subtle racism ($p < 0.001$). This could be considered as convincing evidence of significance (Ramsy & Schefer, 2002) and a strong indication that the relationship between race and subtle racism of the present sample is not due to chance, but is an accurate reflection of tendencies of this sample.

![Figure 9. Distribution of subtle racism scores for each race sub-group according to descriptive categories.](image)

By revealing that the White sub-group had the most negative racial attitudes towards Blacks, the present study thus replicated consistent trends in White racial attitudes towards Blacks.

Furthermore, the Coloured/Asian sub-group revealed more positive racial attitudes towards Blacks than the White sub-group. This confirms the findings of Pillay and Collings (2004), Smith, et al. (1999), Stones, et al.(2003) and Thiele’s (1988, as cited in Foster & Nel, 1991) findings. In line with Stone, et al.’s (2003) investigation of anti-Black attitudes, Black racial attitudes on the Subtle Racism Scale were also the lowest of all the race sub-groups. Pillay and Collings (2004) reported a similar finding on a different measure of racial attitudes. These findings regarding the relationship between race and racial attitudes suggest that racial attitudes are indeed as resistant to change as has been reported in the literature (Foster & Nel, 1991; McConahay, 1986; Pratto, et al., 1994).

The relatively stable pattern of interracial attitudes can be more clearly understood in the context of the history of South African race relations. White representations of Black people were already predominantly negative at the establishment of a staging post in South Africa in 1652. Fuelled by racial hierarchies proposed by scientists, the notion of White superiority and Black inferiority were entrenched in South Africa through many different forms over the last three and a half centuries: slavery, extermination, segregation, influx control, petty apartheid, and grand apartheid (Foster, 1991c; Giliomee & Schlemmer, 1989; Miles, 1989).

Social identity theory proposes that racial prejudice increases when groups seek to maintain or increase positive evaluations of their in-group through negative comparisons and even derogation of out-groups (Nelson, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Taylor, et al., 2006). By representing Africans as inherently different and lower on the scale of human progress or
civilisation (Miles, 1989), White South Africans were able to increase collective and individual self-esteem, which in turn acts as a strong motivating force to maintain prejudicial attitudes.

The perpetuation of White attitudes towards Blacks may also be explained by the theories of modern and aversive racism. Modern racism holds that the affective component of anti-Black attitudes may remain stable, even if the cognitive component of such attitudes has changed (McConahay, 1986). Consistent with the theory of modern racism, more conservative White South Africans may thus cognitively agree with the notion of racial equality, but have strong anti-Black affects that unconsciously affect their evaluations of Blacks (McConahay, 1986; Nelson, 2006) and their beliefs about how previous patterns of racial inequality should be rectified (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Taylor, et al., 2006).

Liberal White South Africans’ racial attitudes towards Blacks may be better conceptualised with the theory of aversive racism. Liberal White South Africans are postulated to simultaneously possess unconscious negative racist feelings and beliefs towards Black people, and conscious, sincere commitments to egalitarian values and beliefs (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio, et al., 2003). Persons with racial attitudes consistent with aversive racism are more likely to express negative racial attitudes towards Blacks when such attitudes can be justified along non-racial lines (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Dovidio, et al., 2003). A measure like the Subtle Racism Scale that is worded to avoid or minimize the risk of being construed as racist (Duckitt, 1991b) thus makes it more likely that persons with racial attitudes consistent with aversive racism express negative racial attitudes towards Black people.

Because society tends to emphasize Black-White group boundaries, members of mixed origins, such as the Coloured group in South Africa are often marginalised. Conceptualising and explaining prejudiced attitudes of Coloureds towards out-groups is thus complex. While the social identity theory maintains that both Whites and Blacks should be rejected in order to main
social identity, Smith, et al., (2003) maintained that “it is difficult to reject a group that is fundamentally similar to your own” (p. 285). It is thus uncertain to what extent the assumptions of the social identity theory explains Coloured racial attitude trends (Smith, et al., 2003). According to the social dominance theory (Sidanius, et al., 1992), a marginalised mixed group may identify more with the group of origin with the lower status and hold prejudicial attitudes towards the group of higher status (Smith, et al., 2003). Coloured South Africans may thus reveal less subtle racism towards Blacks than Whites would, as Coloureds may identify to some extent with Blacks. This notion has been supported by South African research trends in which Coloured participants consistently revealed lower anti-Black sentiment consistent with subtle racism when compared to White anti-Black sentiment (Pillay & Collings, 2004; Smith, et al., 1999; Stones, et al., 2003). This trend was also apparent in the present study. However, responses of Coloured and Asian participants in the present study were combined. Thus, this finding only suggests support for the notion that mixed-group participants hold more tolerant racial attitudes towards the lower status group of origin.

The Association between the Race - Age Interaction and Subtle Racism

As discussed above, the results of a stepwise multiple regression analysis revealed that the independent variables of race, age, and the age curvature ($Age^2$) were significantly associated with subtle racism. To further explore patterns of subtle racism among sub-groups among undergraduate psychology learners, the association between subtle racism and the race – age interaction were explored with multiple regression analysis. The curvilinear regression model, fitted for this purpose, can be expressed separately for the three race sub-groups under study. The three relevant models are stated in Table 6.
Table 6.

Curvilinear Regression Model Expressed Separately for White, Black, and Coloured/Asian Sub-Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race sub-group</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>Estimated SRS= 33.75 – 1.062 Age + 0.0136 Age^2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Estimated SRS= 10 +0.78 Age - 0.0047 Age^2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured/Asian</td>
<td>Estimated SRS= 31.55 – 1.063 Age + 0.0136 Age^2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the previously discussed Figure 8, it was established that subtle racism decreased up to the age sub-group of 38 – 47 years, when it increased again. When the estimated average subtle racism per age sub-group is further divided into the race sub-groups, a different age-subtle racism trend for the White and Black sub-groups is revealed. The White sub-group exhibits a pattern of subtle racism similar to the trend described by Figure 8. The trend for the Black sub-group, however, indicates that subtle racism increased with age up to the age sub-group of 28-37 years, when it decreased again. The Coloured/Asian sub-group has a subtle racism pattern that is similar to that of the White sub-group: subtle racism decreased with age until the age sub-group of 38-47 years, when it increased again.

Multiple regression analysis, using dummy variables with the White sub-group as reference group (see Table 8) revealed that the Black sub-group-age interaction was significantly associated with subtle racism ($p < 0.01$) at a moderately convincing level of significance (Ramsy & Schafer, 2002). According to the model, the relationship between the age curvature (modelled by Age^2) of the Black sub-group and subtle racism was also significantly different from the subtle racism – age curvature interaction of the White sub-group ($p < 0.05$). However, significance at the less stringent level of significance (i.e., $p < 0.05$) offers less convincing evidence of a significant
relationship. Thus, the relationship between subtle racism and the race – age interaction of the Black sub-group is a more accurate reflection of the tendencies of the present sample than the race-Age\(^2\) association with subtle racism of the same sub-group. From this data, it can not be demonstrated that the age-race interaction for the Coloured/Asian sub-group is significantly associated with subtle racism or that age curvature of the Coloured/Asian sub-group differed significantly from that of the White sub-group (\(p>0.05\)). The estimated subtle race score for each race sub-group according to age is graphically expressed in Figure 10.

![Figure 10](image_url)

**Figure 10.** Estimated subtle racism for each race sub-group according to age indicating the age curvature for each race sub-group.

Figure 10 indicates that the estimated subtle racism score per age for the White sub-group is 11% (2.2 units) higher than that of the Coloured/Asian sub-group. This difference is constant for all ages but not statistically significant according to the multiple regression analysis (\(p>0.05\)).
Conversely, according to the model, the significant differences ($p<0.01$) in the estimated subtle racism score between the White and Black sub-groups are dependent on their age. At age 18, the White sub-group displays subtle racism that is 27.4% (5.5 units) higher than that of 18-year old Black participants in the present study. The difference between these two race sub-groups declines to zero for both race sub-groups between 29 and 30 years old. Unexpectedly, between the ages of 30 and 45, the trend between the two race sub-groups reverses and the estimated subtle racism of the Black sub-group is 0.8% to 5% (0.1 to 1 units) higher than the White sub-group. Thereafter, the estimated average subtle racism of the two race sub-groups reverts back to its former pattern where the estimated average subtle racism of the White sub-group increases again with age, while the estimated average subtle racism of the Black sub-group decreases with age. At approximately age 57, the White sub-group scores 32.1% (6.4 units) higher than the Black sub-group of a similar age.

According to the model, the estimated average subtle racism score for the White sub-group was the highest around age 18 ($M=19.02$) and the lowest at approximately age 39 ($M=12.92$). Similarly, the Coloured/Asian sub-group shows its highest estimated average subtle racism score at age 18 ($M=16.81$) and the lowest estimated average subtle racism at age 39 ($M=10.72$). The Black sub-group exhibits the highest estimated average subtle racism between the ages of 29 to 32 ($M=14.21$) and the lowest estimated average subtle racism score at approximately age 57 ($M=10.81$).

Previously it was postulated that socio-political events in the lifetime of the participants may have an impact on the level of anti-Black sentiment exhibited by participants of different age groups. The socio-political landscape as experienced by the participants at the time that their racial attitudes were formed and refined were also elaborated on. However, the reversed subtle racism trend among Black participants and the fact that anti-Black sentiment among the Black
sub-group at a certain age is higher that that of the White sub-group, suggests that anti-Black attitudes of the Black participants in the study developed in a distinctly different fashion than other racial sub-groups in the present study. This supports the notion presented by De la Rey & Duncan (2003) that apartheid did not affect the dominant and the dominated racialised groups in the same manner.

As the dominated group, Black participants had internalised the racist messages and representations of themselves and that of Whites (De la Rey & Duncan, 2003; Fanon, 1990). Stevens and Lockhat (2003) further suggests that such psychological consequences appear particularly in contexts such as South Africa, where state repression, counter-violence, and interpersonal and intrapersonal violence had become endemic to White and non-White society. For example, in the mid-1960s, Atwell (1986) reported that in White and non-White South African societies, very high levels of domestic abuse, general violence, and substance abuse occurred when compared with similar societies such as Australia. This further created a fertile environment for the internalisation of racist messages that may account for the relatively high anti-Black sentiments among Black participants of the present study who were in late adolescence and early adulthood in 1994.

Relatively high anti-Black sentiment expressed by this group may also be the consequence of confusing post-apartheid demands on identity development. The heightened politicisation of adolescents between 1970 and 1990 offered certain Black adolescents, through the identification of a common enemy and common objectives, the opportunity to develop a common social identity. The demise of apartheid, however, called for the rapid redefinition of Black identity. This process may have been frustrated by certain psychological double-binds. One such double-bind is the expectation of economic freedom (i.e., through employment) consistent with a capitalist framework. However, due to the legacy of apartheid-capitalism such expectations are
frequently unattainable. Thus while the role expectations of this group of Black participants may have changed, their social realities and actual roles did not change, thereby hindering Black identity development (Stevens & Lockhat, 2003).

Furthermore, the acceptance of Western economic models and the influence of Western ideologies have encouraged a shift from collectivism to individualism in Black South Africa society. However, straddling individualism and collectivism may lead to increased psychological tension, increased alienation from both worldviews, and increased identity confusion of Black individuals (Stevens & Lockhat, 2003).

Another psychological double-bind that could have a negative influence on self-perception of competence amongst Black individuals (Schneider, et al., 1996) and may have increased anti-Black sentiment is affirmative-action measures implemented in South Africa through the Employment Equity Bill (December, 1997). While this policy aims to redress past discrimination in the labour market by promoting employment equity and equal access to resources (Franchi & Swart, 2003), it could have psychologically detrimental effects on those who benefit from the program (Nelson, 2006). This negative effect on Black identity may be especially true if affirmative action measures are not perceived as fair to both the beneficiaries and critics of the measures (Taylor & Dube, 1986). This phenomenon may explain the relatively negative attitudes towards Blacks by this particular group of Black participants.

A decline in anti-Black sentiments amongst Black participants born in 1977 and later, however, may be indicative of a transformation in the socio-historical context of these participants that had a positive effect on in-group evaluations. One event that may account for such a transformation is the Soweto riot that took place on 16 June 1976. After being fired on by police, a student protest against being taught in Afrikaans, turned into four days of rioting in Soweto and the Western Cape, which in the following months also spread to the Eastern Cape (Atwell, 1986;
Johnson, 2004). The Soweto riot had an effect on Black South African youths, as it demonstrated to them that the unarmed, impoverished, and disenfranchised the Black population “are not impotent” (Atwell, 1986, p. 134) but that they could “contribute to their own destiny” (Atwell, 1986, p. 134).

After the Soweto riot, political activism became a prominent feature of the lives of many Black South Africans (Finchilescu & Dawes, 2001). The overt rejection of racist messages of Black inferiority may thus account for the increased decline in anti-Black sentiment amongst the Black participants in the present study. Increased group pride, social identity, and ingroup favouritism may have also protected the self-esteem of Black participants born after the Soweto riot, thereby increasing pro-Black attitudes of this specific Black sub-group (Atwell, 1986; Brown, 2006; Taylor, et al., 2006).
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The principal objective of this study was to explore and describe subtle racism among undergraduate psychology learners at a tertiary institution in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality in 2004. In particular this study aimed to: (a) explore and describe subtle racism of undergraduate psychology learners, and (b) explore and describe patterns of subtle racism amongst undergraduate psychology learners according to selected demographic variables.

It has been established that the internal reliability of the Subtle Racism Scale in the present study fell within the moderate to low reliability level. Furthermore, factor analysis revealed that in the present study, the Subtle Racism Scale was bi-dimensional and measured two underlying constructs. These findings suggest that the internal reliability and dimensionality of the Subtle Racism Scale be investigated.

To achieve the first and second specific aims of the present study, descriptive and inferential statistics were reported. These demonstrated that there was an absence of any significant gender and language differences in relation to subtle racism. Possible reasons for the absence of significance were highlighted. However, there were differences in average subtle racism among Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking Whites, with Afrikaans-speaking White sub-group emerging to be the sub-group with the least racial tolerance towards Blacks in the present study. This finding supported previously reported patterns in racial attitude research in which White Afrikaans-speaking South Africans were consistently found to have to more negative racial attitudes towards Blacks than English-speaking Whites. Further, consistent with
national research trends reported for secondary and tertiary level learners, the White sub-group revealed anti-Black subtle racism scores that were significantly higher than that of the Black and Coloured/Asian sub-groups.

Previously reported patterns of anti-Black sentiment in South Africa have thus been confirmed in the present study: Afrikaans-speaking Whites have more negative anti-Black attitudes than other language groups, and Whites show stronger anti-Black sentiment than other race groups. This supports the theory and empirical findings of other race attitude researchers (McConahay, 1986) who postulated that racial attitudes may be particularly resistant to change. The persistent pattern of anti-Black sentiment as revealed by the present study further supports postulations that transformation of racial attitudes in South Africa may be restricted by deeply entrenched social and psychological divisions and a deep-seated mistrust between races. Moreover, it could be speculated that racism in South Africa has persevered, albeit in the form of contemporary, more subtle racism.

Significant findings regarding the relationship between subtle racism as dependent variable and the race – age interaction (as independent variable) were reported. According to the data analysis, it was revealed that the race - age trend for the Black sub-group was significantly different from the White sub-group trend. The estimated average subtle racism of the White sub-group decreased with age until approximately age 39, when it sharply increased again. Conversely, the estimated average subtle racism of the Black sub-group gradually increased with age until approximately age 29 to 32, when it decreased again. These research results suggest that levels of subtle racism vary according to the age and race of the participants, thereby supporting the notion that racism in apartheid South Africa has influenced different age and race groups in different ways. This provides additional information on the nature of contemporary, subtle racism
unique to the South African context. Having presented and discussed the conclusions of the present study, it is also necessary to acknowledge the existence of limitations.

**Limitations**

Firstly, difficulties with regard to the availability of relevant literature on the topic of contemporary, subtle racism in South Africa were encountered. This was due to the limited number of studies that have focussed on contemporary racism in post-apartheid South Africa. Further, difficulty was experienced in obtaining South African research on contemporary subtle racism, due to unavailability of unpublished masters or doctoral research, and due to the high cost of obtaining internationally published articles unavailable in South Africa. As a result, theoretical postulations regarding contemporary forms of racism presented in the present study were mainly of international origin and may have limited relevance to the South African context.

Limitations concerning the research design and methodology of the present study were also experienced. The data utilised in the present study were collected by other researchers as part of a larger ongoing research study at a tertiary institution in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality. A number of limitations of the present study result from the fact that the present researcher had no control over the number and type of data measuring techniques utilised and the quantity and quality of data collected. As only the Subtle Racism Scale was utilised for data collection purposes, only anti-Black sentiment could be investigated in the present study. Racism towards other race groups could therefore not be investigated. Furthermore, the researchers who had collected the data had changed the Subtle Racism Scale from a 7-point Likert Scale to a 3-point response format (Yes, No, and Unsure). Thus, comparisons of present research findings with previous studies that have utilised the original form of the Subtle Racism Scale were restricted.
Furthermore, by restricting the number of response options, more sensitive and accurate measurement of subtle racism of the participants was restricted.

The present researcher also had no control over the sampling procedure utilised by the larger study. Convenience sampling that was employed, presents a number of limitations that restricts the generalisation of the present findings to the wider population. The present findings were obtained from a sample of tertiary level learners, who were not representative of the general population of South African adults or tertiary learners. Secondly, due to convenience sampling, the sample was disproportionate in a number of ways. For example, the number of female participants was far greater than the number of male participants, while the White and Black race groups far outnumbered the Coloured and Asian participants. The lack of statistical strength of smaller sub-groups (i.e., male sub-group, Coloured/Asian sub-group) within the present sample may have impacted on statistical significance of research findings as a relatively large sample size is needed to demonstrate statistical significance of lesser relationships between the dependent and independent variables. In addition, the small number of Coloured and Asian participants in the present study necessitated the combination of participants from these two race groups for the purpose of statistical analysis. While the Asian and Coloured race groups were both disadvantaged by the apartheid regime, anti-Black sentiment of these two groups could be dissimilar. Research findings regarding these groups could thus have been distorted.

Thirdly, the final sample was drawn from the population of learners registered for an undergraduate psychology second-year module in social psychology. Although data was collected at the beginning of the social psychology module before the section on prejudice and racism was lectured, it is possible that as psychology students, the participants possessed greater understanding of, or sensitivity towards the topics of prejudice and racism which would have impacted on their responses on the Subtle Racism Scale. Finally, generalisation of the findings
may be further limited as the participants were drawn from a specific geographical area on a specific day during a specific lecture. Thus, data were collected only from those learners who attended the specific social psychology lecture on that specific day. It is uncertain which factors could have contributed to the absence of learners who were registered for the social psychology module but who did not attend the lecture during which the data were collected and whether these factors may have further biased the sample.

A further limitation pertains to the use of race categories in the present study. Delineation of humans into race categories is a legacy of the apartheid regime and the government still uses race categories to track economic and socio-political patterns in South Africa. However, as the present study conducted data analysis based on self-reported race groups of the participants, the ambiguity, uncertainty, and discontent that exist in South Africa regarding the use and application of race categories may have biased results of the statistical analysis. For example, a number of participants of the present study did not indicate to which race group they belonged. As a result, these measures were not included in the final statistical analysis. If it is postulated that individuals who are sensitive to prejudice and racism issues omitted their race group, the omission of these participants in the study could have biased the present research findings.

A number of limitations pertain to the Subtle Racism Scale that was utilised in the present study. Firstly, the self-report nature of the Subtle Racism Scale may be problematic. Social desirability is a common form of response bias that may affect the validity of studies such as the present study in which highly contentious attitudes are under consideration. A decade after the demise of apartheid, it is common knowledge that racism is undesirable. As a result, participants may have been reluctant to report their true racial attitudes. Secondly, although the Subtle Racism Scale was found to be unidimensional in the early 1990s, factor analysis in the present study revealed that the measure in this context consisted of two factors. Thirdly, the Subtle Racism
Scale was developed the early 1990s. As racial attitudes may adjust in line with prevailing social attitudes, it is thus likely that items of this measure might have become less valid over time.

Fourthly, a standard qualitative description for scores obtained on the Subtle Racism Scale has not been established. Comparisons of qualitative descriptions given to Subtle Racism scores in similar studies as the present study are therefore unclear and confusing and make comparison between studies problematic. Finally, the validity of cross-cultural comparisons in South Africa with the 7-point Likert scale Subtle Racism Scale may be compromised due to different reference groups of individualistic and collectivist cultures.

**Recommendations**

As convenience sampling was used with the present study, it has been noted that generalisation of research findings to the population of the study is limited. However, the present study revealed certain research findings of particularly convincing statistical significance. This suggests that some of the research findings could be a reflection of subtle racism of the population of the present study. This warrants further investigation into subtle racism among different contexts in South Africa.

However, in order to increase generalisation of future research findings, it is recommended that a randomised sampling procedure is followed. Through randomisation, disproportionate distribution of demographic variables (i.e., gender, race) can be avoided. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of contemporary subtle racism in the South African context may be facilitated with the inclusion of more independent variables in future investigations.

Second, several practices can minimise socially desirable responding in future investigations into subtle racism. It is recommended that future research should ensure that participants are
explicitly assured of the confidentiality of their responses prior to data collection by explaining how the coding system ultimately guarantees anonymity. In addition, participants should also be asked to provide responses that are reflective of their true attitudes. It is also recommended that future research includes a measure that assesses general social desirability and also examines the relationship of this variable to the other self-report measures utilised.

Third, in light of present research findings regarding dimensionality of the Subtle Racism Scale and in context of changing social values regarding racial attitudes in South Africa, it is recommended that the factor structure and dimensionality of the Subtle Racism scale be reassessed in different contexts in future studies.

Fourth, to enable the accurate description of measured levels of subtle racism and to facilitate comparison between different studies, it is recommended that a standard qualitative description for scores obtained on the Subtle Racism Scale be investigated further.

Fifth, to increase the validity of cross-cultural comparisons of the Subtle Racism Scale it is recommended that strategies that take reference-group effects into consideration be investigated.

Finally, it is recommended that future studies include investigations of racism towards other race groups in addition to anti-Black racism. Due to the lack of empirical evidence of Black racial attitudes towards other race groups, Black attitude research could provide a fruitful avenue for future research.
References


Thompson, L.M. *The political mythology of apartheid*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.


