Understanding the harm of rape
- Authors: Kelland, Lindsay-Ann
- Date: 2013-04-19
- Subjects: Rape -- Social aspects--Research -- South Africa Rape -- Psychological aspects -- Research -- South Africa Rape trauma syndrome -- Research -- South Africa Rape victims -- South Africa Patriarchy -- South Africa Sexual dominance and submission -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:2700 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001582
- Description: The aims of this thesis are twofold: to provide an account of the lived experience of the harm of male-on-female rape in patriarchal societies and, on the basis of this account, to generate suggestions that could be of use in the recovery process for survivors of this type of rape. In order to reach these aims my thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part, I propose a phenomenologically based account of women’s situation as a group under patriarchy, according to which women as a group are subjugated to the hegemonic rule of patriarchal ideology. I argue, further, that the meaning, place and pervasiveness of sexual objectification in the lives of women under patriarchy typically results in women’s alienation from their bodies and creates an atmosphere of threat under which women qua women are especially vulnerable to rape. In the second part, I explore the lived experience of the harm of rape; focusing, first, on the reflexive process whereby a survivor attempts to understand how she has been harmed and, second, on providing explanations based on shared features in the lives of women for two phenomena reported to be experienced by rape victims in the aftermath of the trauma, which I call ‘shattering’ and ‘fragmentation'. My discussion of the lived experience of the harm of rape is meant to supplement existing accounts in the contemporary literature that, I argue, are limited to a thirdperson, objective point of view and so fail to provide a link between the harms they describe and the victim’s actual experience of these harms. Finally, I defend two suggestions for the building up of the survivor’s agency and personhood in the aftermath of rape—the deliberate therapeutic use of feminist consciousness-raising and the use of narrative understanding. , Adobe Acrobat 9.53 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Authors: Kelland, Lindsay-Ann
- Date: 2013-04-19
- Subjects: Rape -- Social aspects--Research -- South Africa Rape -- Psychological aspects -- Research -- South Africa Rape trauma syndrome -- Research -- South Africa Rape victims -- South Africa Patriarchy -- South Africa Sexual dominance and submission -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:2700 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001582
- Description: The aims of this thesis are twofold: to provide an account of the lived experience of the harm of male-on-female rape in patriarchal societies and, on the basis of this account, to generate suggestions that could be of use in the recovery process for survivors of this type of rape. In order to reach these aims my thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part, I propose a phenomenologically based account of women’s situation as a group under patriarchy, according to which women as a group are subjugated to the hegemonic rule of patriarchal ideology. I argue, further, that the meaning, place and pervasiveness of sexual objectification in the lives of women under patriarchy typically results in women’s alienation from their bodies and creates an atmosphere of threat under which women qua women are especially vulnerable to rape. In the second part, I explore the lived experience of the harm of rape; focusing, first, on the reflexive process whereby a survivor attempts to understand how she has been harmed and, second, on providing explanations based on shared features in the lives of women for two phenomena reported to be experienced by rape victims in the aftermath of the trauma, which I call ‘shattering’ and ‘fragmentation'. My discussion of the lived experience of the harm of rape is meant to supplement existing accounts in the contemporary literature that, I argue, are limited to a thirdperson, objective point of view and so fail to provide a link between the harms they describe and the victim’s actual experience of these harms. Finally, I defend two suggestions for the building up of the survivor’s agency and personhood in the aftermath of rape—the deliberate therapeutic use of feminist consciousness-raising and the use of narrative understanding. , Adobe Acrobat 9.53 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
Determinism and reactive attitudes: reflections on our alleged unrenounceable commitments
- Authors: Kelland, Lindsay-Ann
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Free will and determinism Responsibility
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2713 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002843
- Description: There seems to exist a tension between our metaphysical and phenomenological commitments in the free will debate. On the one hand, I argue that at the metaphysical level we cannot coherently defend the belief that we are morally responsible in the sense that we deserve to be rewarded and punished for our actions, where desert-entailing moral responsibility is the primary understanding of moral responsibility presupposed in the free will debate. I argue that we are responsible for our actions but only in the weaker sense, termed ‘attributability’ by Gary Watson. On the other hand, we are allegedly unrenounceably committed at the phenomenological level to conceiving of, and treating, ourselves and one another as morally responsible beings in the desert-entailing sense. P. F. Strawson famously defends this claim in his seminal work, ‘Freedom and Resentment’. In my thesis I will set out this tension by exploring both commitments in turn. I then aim to show that the tension can be dissolved by arguing, contra P. F. Strawson, that our phenomenological commitment is not in fact unrenounceable. The dissolution of this tension entails, I argue, that we must examine our conception of self and other. We must explore the implications of adopting a position which denies that we are morally responsible beings for our life-hopes, personal feelings, inter-personal relationships and projects. Most importantly, I argue that we must renounce our current retributive condemnatory practices which are based on the unjustified belief that we are morally responsible beings.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
- Authors: Kelland, Lindsay-Ann
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Free will and determinism Responsibility
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2713 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002843
- Description: There seems to exist a tension between our metaphysical and phenomenological commitments in the free will debate. On the one hand, I argue that at the metaphysical level we cannot coherently defend the belief that we are morally responsible in the sense that we deserve to be rewarded and punished for our actions, where desert-entailing moral responsibility is the primary understanding of moral responsibility presupposed in the free will debate. I argue that we are responsible for our actions but only in the weaker sense, termed ‘attributability’ by Gary Watson. On the other hand, we are allegedly unrenounceably committed at the phenomenological level to conceiving of, and treating, ourselves and one another as morally responsible beings in the desert-entailing sense. P. F. Strawson famously defends this claim in his seminal work, ‘Freedom and Resentment’. In my thesis I will set out this tension by exploring both commitments in turn. I then aim to show that the tension can be dissolved by arguing, contra P. F. Strawson, that our phenomenological commitment is not in fact unrenounceable. The dissolution of this tension entails, I argue, that we must examine our conception of self and other. We must explore the implications of adopting a position which denies that we are morally responsible beings for our life-hopes, personal feelings, inter-personal relationships and projects. Most importantly, I argue that we must renounce our current retributive condemnatory practices which are based on the unjustified belief that we are morally responsible beings.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
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