Violations of good security practices in graphical passwords schemes: Enterprise constraints on scheme-design
- Vorster, Johannes, Irwin, Barry V W, van Heerden, Renier P
- Authors: Vorster, Johannes , Irwin, Barry V W , van Heerden, Renier P
- Date: 2018
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/430324 , vital:72683 , https://researchspace.csir.co.za/dspace/bitstream/handle/10204/10919/Vorster_22337_2018.pdf?sequence=1isAllowed=y
- Description: During the past decade, the sophistication and maturity of Enterprise-level Information Security (EIS) Standards and Systems has increased significantly. This maturity, particularly in the handling of enterprise-wide capability models, has led to a set of standards – e.g. ISO/IEC 27001, NIST 800-53, ISO/IEC 27789 and CSA CCM – that propose controls applicable to the implementation of an Information Security Manage-ment System (ISMS). By nature, the academic community is fruitful in its endeavour to propose new password schemes; and Graphical Passwords (GPs) have had many proposals for schemes. In this paper, we explore the impact of good security standards and lessons-learnt over the past decade of EID as a model of constraint on GPs schemes. The paper focuses on a number of GP schemes and points out the var-ious security constraints and limitations, if such schemes are to be im-plemented at the enterprise level.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2018
- Authors: Vorster, Johannes , Irwin, Barry V W , van Heerden, Renier P
- Date: 2018
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/430324 , vital:72683 , https://researchspace.csir.co.za/dspace/bitstream/handle/10204/10919/Vorster_22337_2018.pdf?sequence=1isAllowed=y
- Description: During the past decade, the sophistication and maturity of Enterprise-level Information Security (EIS) Standards and Systems has increased significantly. This maturity, particularly in the handling of enterprise-wide capability models, has led to a set of standards – e.g. ISO/IEC 27001, NIST 800-53, ISO/IEC 27789 and CSA CCM – that propose controls applicable to the implementation of an Information Security Manage-ment System (ISMS). By nature, the academic community is fruitful in its endeavour to propose new password schemes; and Graphical Passwords (GPs) have had many proposals for schemes. In this paper, we explore the impact of good security standards and lessons-learnt over the past decade of EID as a model of constraint on GPs schemes. The paper focuses on a number of GP schemes and points out the var-ious security constraints and limitations, if such schemes are to be im-plemented at the enterprise level.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2018
DDoS Attack Mitigation Through Control of Inherent Charge Decay of Memory Implementations
- Herbert, Alan, Irwin, Barry V W, van Heerden, Renier P
- Authors: Herbert, Alan , Irwin, Barry V W , van Heerden, Renier P
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/430339 , vital:72684 , https://www.academic-bookshop.com/ourshop/prod_3774091-ICCWS-2015-10th-International-Conference-on-Cyber-Warfare-and-Security-Kruger-National-Park-South-Africa-PRINT-ver-ISBN-978191030996.html
- Description: DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks over recent years have shown to be devastating on the target systems and services made publicly available over the Internet. Furthermore, the backscatter1 caused by DDoS attacks also affects the available bandwidth and responsiveness of many other hosts within the Internet. The unfortunate reality of these attacks is that the targeted party cannot fight back due to the presence of botnets and malware-driven hosts. These hosts that carry out the attack on a target are usually controlled remotely and the owner of the device is unaware of it; for this reason one cannot attack back directly as this will serve little more than to disable an innocent party. A proposed solution to these DDoS attacks is to identify a potential attacking address and ignore communication from that address for a set period of time through time stamping.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2015
- Authors: Herbert, Alan , Irwin, Barry V W , van Heerden, Renier P
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/430339 , vital:72684 , https://www.academic-bookshop.com/ourshop/prod_3774091-ICCWS-2015-10th-International-Conference-on-Cyber-Warfare-and-Security-Kruger-National-Park-South-Africa-PRINT-ver-ISBN-978191030996.html
- Description: DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks over recent years have shown to be devastating on the target systems and services made publicly available over the Internet. Furthermore, the backscatter1 caused by DDoS attacks also affects the available bandwidth and responsiveness of many other hosts within the Internet. The unfortunate reality of these attacks is that the targeted party cannot fight back due to the presence of botnets and malware-driven hosts. These hosts that carry out the attack on a target are usually controlled remotely and the owner of the device is unaware of it; for this reason one cannot attack back directly as this will serve little more than to disable an innocent party. A proposed solution to these DDoS attacks is to identify a potential attacking address and ignore communication from that address for a set period of time through time stamping.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2015
- «
- ‹
- 1
- ›
- »