- Title
- Land rental policy and land market in Mashonaland East Province, Zimbabwe: implications on farmer decisions, efficiency and equity under A1 and A2 models
- Creator
- Tatsvarei , Simbarashe
- Subject
- Farms, Small Agricultural extension work
- Date Issued
- 2019
- Date
- 2019
- Type
- Thesis
- Type
- Doctoral
- Type
- PhD
- Identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/10353/15666
- Identifier
- vital:40501
- Description
- Government promulgated the land rental policy starting in the year 2007. The policy required that A1 (market residual) and A2 (indigenous commercial) farmers pay rentals to the state. Since then, there has also been an emerging trend in which farmers have been renting in and out land, resulting in an informal market for land rentals. The study therefore assessed farmers’ perceptions of land rental policy and evaluated the possible association of this policy to farmers’ decision making on land rental markets as well as its implications on farmers’ efficiency and equity. The study was carried out in Mashonaland East Province of Zimbabwe, covering two districts, Goromonzi and Marondera. The focus was specifically on A1 and A2 farmers, as the rental policy was directed at these resettlement models only and much of the informal land rental markets were prevalent among these categories of farmers. Data collection utilised the survey approach. This was supported by key informant interviews and focus group discussions, with a final sample of 339 households selected using multi-stage sampling method. Survey data were transcribed on CsPro 6, and analysed using Stata, SPSS and Frontier 4.1. Results showed that about a third of household respondents was from Marondera and twothirds was from Goromonzi, while 79% and 21% was A1 and A2 farmers respectively. About 80% was male headed households and the remainder was female headed households. About half of the households were not participating in land rental markets while the other half was split almost equally between those renting-in and renting-out land. In general, A2 farmers were better in agricultural productivity than A1 farmers. It was concluded that farmers had a fairly good knowledge of the agricultural land rental policy enunciated in the Finance Bills. A1 farmers were more knowledgeable than A2 farmers, but no vii significant differences were observed between male and female headed households and farmers involved and not involved in land rental markets. Farmers’ attitudes in relation to policy were categorised as fair, with significant differences based on gender and land market participation. Practice scores showed a poor adherence to policy for all categories of farmers. Overall perceptions of farmers on rental policy was inferred as fair with significant differences existing between land rental market participants and non-participants (autarky). The results of a bivariate Tobit model results showed that the decision to rent-in land was significantly influenced by gender, household income, permanent labour, cultivated area, tenure certainty, irrigable land size and crop diversification. On the other hand, age, permanent labour, irrigable land size and crop diversification significantly influenced farmers’ decisions to rent-out land. The conclusion was that household characteristics, land endowments and transaction costs significantly influenced the decision to rent-in land while the former two were strong in influencing renting-out decisions. Results from the linearized Cobb Douglas model showed that economic efficiency for most farmers was above 50%. Farmers renting-out land under A1 were found to be the most economically efficient, followed by those who were renting-in and least efficient were farmers not participating in land rental markets, though the differences were marginal. For the A2 model, renting-in farmers were the most efficient, followed by those in autarky position, while renting-out farmers were the least. Overall, the most efficient farmers were those renting-in, followed by those renting-out while farmers in autarky were the least efficient. Overall efficiency was higher for A2 farmers than for A1 farmers. For farmers not participating in rental markets, the sources of inefficiency were crop type, crop area and labour. For farmers renting-in, it was proportion of irrigable land, size of irrigable land, crop type, crop area and viii labour, while inefficiency drivers for renting-out farmers were crop type and associated area. Equity analysis showed that participation in land rental markets reduced inequality for farmers in the two districts and male and female headed households. Inequality was increased among A1 farmers and remained unchanged among A2 farmers. Overall, the emerging position was that participation in land rental markets resulted in higher efficiency and reduced inequality in land holding among the sampled farmers. It is recommended that government should be consistent on land rental policy and bring into place effective administration of land rental policy. Government may also consider formal acceptance of land rental markets in light of the marginal efficiency and equity benefits shown in the study. However, formalizing land rental markets alone may not be a panacea to improved efficiency and needs to be supported by other productivity measures given the average efficiency values for farmers. Crop and livestock production based on compatibility with the natural regions and defined minimum size of land should be encouraged to improve efficiency
- Format
- 220 leaves
- Format
- Publisher
- University of Fort Hare
- Publisher
- Faculty of Science and Agriculture
- Language
- English
- Rights
- University of Fort Hare
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UFH Department of Agricultural Economics and Extension
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