"Tell me how you read and I will tell you who you are": children's literature and moral development
- Authors: Van der Nest, Megan
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Children's literature -- Philosophy Children's literature -- Moral and ethical aspects Children's literature -- History and criticism Literature and morals Ethics in literature Reader-response criticism Moral conditions in literature Literature -- Study and teaching
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2722 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002852
- Description: It is a common intuition that we can learn something of moral importance from literature, and one of the ways in which we teach our children about morality is through stories. In selecting books for children to read a primary concern is often the effect that the moral content of the story will have on the morality of the child reader. In this thesis I argue in order to take advantage of the contribution that literature can make to moral development, we need to teach children to read in a particular way. As a basis for this argument I use an account of moral agency that places emphasis on the development of moral skills - the ability to critically assess moral rules and systems, and the capacity to perceive and respond to the particulars of individual situations and to choose the right course of action in each - rather than on any particular kind of moral content. In order to make the most of the contribution that literature can make to the development of these skills, we need to teach children to immerse themselves in the story, rather than focusing on literary criticism. I argue that, contrary to the standard view of literary criticism as the only form of protection against possible negative effects, an immersed reading will help to prevent the child reader from taking any moral claims made in the story out of context, and so provide some measure of protection against possible negative moral effects of the story. Finally I argue that there are certain kinds of stories - recognisable by features that contribute to a high literary quality - that will enrich the experience of an immersed reading, and will therefore make a greater contribution to moral development than others.
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- Date Issued: 2010
Achieving a realistic utopia: Rawls, realization, and the task of political philosophy
- Authors: Terlazzo, Rosa Elizabeth
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Political science -- Philosophy Justice -- Philosophy Utopias -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2721 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002851
- Description: In this thesis I argue that the tradition of political philosophy which follows in John Rawls's footsteps is obligated to concern itself not only with the realizability, but also with the realization, of justice. Although Rawls himself expresses a commitment only to the former of these, I argue that the roles which he assigns to political philosophy require him to take on the further commitment to realization. This is because these roles are meant to influence not only political philosophers, but the citizens of the wider community as well. The realistically utopian role, which I take to be the central one, requires political philosophy to inspire in that population a hope which I argue that realizability alone cannot provide. Given the deep revisions regarding the political nature of justice as fairness which Rawls made on the basis of realizability concerns, I argue that his theory must in this case be committed to a similar revision. The hope which political philosophy is meant to provide is simply not realizable until the discipline concerns itself centrally with the task of realization.
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- Date Issued: 2010
Control and authenticity: reflections on personal autonomy
- Authors: Paphitis, Sharli Anne
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Frankfurt, Harry G., 1929- -- Criticism and interpretation Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Criticism and interpretation Watson, Gary, 1943- -- Criticism and interpretation Self-control Authenticity (Philosophy) Autonomy (Philosophy) Self (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2717 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002847
- Description: Currently the most influential accounts of personal autonomy, at least in the Englishspeaking world, focus on providing conditions under which agents can be said to exercise self-control. Two distinct accounts of personal autonomy have emerged in this tradition: firstly, hierarchical models grounded in the work of Harry Frankfurt; and secondly, systems division models most famously articulated by Gary Watson. In this thesis I show the inadequacies of both of these models by exploring the problematic views of the self and self-control underlying each model. I will suggest that the problems faced by these models stem from the fact that they endorse a problematic fragmentation of the self. I suggest that a Nietzschean account of personal autonomy is able to avoid these problems. The Nietzschean account can largely, I show, be drawn from Nietzsche’s understanding of both the ‘man of ressentiment’ and his opposite, the sovereign individual. On this picture wholeness of self – rather than fragmentation of the self – is required in order for us to be most fully autonomous. Furthermore, this wholeness of self requires the kind of integrity which is opposed to the problematic fragmentation endorsed by Frankfurt and Watson.
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- Date Issued: 2010
Take my word for it: a new approach to the problem of sincerity in the epistemology of testimony
- Authors: Dewhurst, Therese
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Sincerity Philosophy Terminology Knowledge, Theory of Honesty
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2707 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002837
- Description: The epistemological problem of sincerity in testimony is often approached in the following way: We, as a matter of fact, accept utterances as sincere. We do so in the face of knowledge that people lie and deceive,and yet we still count these beliefs as good beliefs. Therefore there must be some reason or argument that we can cite in order to justify our acceptance of the sincerity of the speaker. In this thesis I will argue, contra this, that there is no reason, per se, that justifies our of a speakers sincerity: this is because recognition of the obligation to accept the sincerity is a necessary condition on the possibility of communication and interpretation. In the first three of the thesis I will argue against three of the main approaches to the problem by focusing on what I believe to be the strongest accounts of each: Elizabeth Fricker's reductionism, Tyler Burge's non-reductionism, and Paul Faulkner's trust account of testimony. In the final chapter I will put forward my positive account. I will argue that it is a constitutive rule of language that a speaker be sincere, and then make the further claim, that it is a constitutive rule of interpretation that the hearer take an utterance as sincere. On my account, successful communication does not just depend on a speaker making sincere utterances,but just as importantly,, on the hearer recognising an obligation to take those utterances as being sincere.
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- Date Issued: 2010