Global climate justice: the case of climate migrants
- Van Heerden, Samantha Jane Ashburner
- Authors: Van Heerden, Samantha Jane Ashburner
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Climate justice , Environmental refugees , Climatic changes Social aspects , Applied ethics , Political science Philosophy , Refugees , Global justice , Relocation (Housing) Environmental aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406749 , vital:70304
- Description: Climate change is predicted to displace thousands of people across the globe. Due to their geographical location and limited resources available for adaptation, this will particularly impact those in developing states, who might have to flee from the growing frequency and severity of rising sea levels, drought and desertification, and acute natural disasters such as floods, wildfires, and hurricanes. This is likely to have pervasive effects on the moral interests of those affected, threatening loss of life, the deterioration of livelihoods, and for small island states even complete or substantial loss of state territory. In this thesis I will argue that we should conceive of this situation as a problem of global justice. Though some argue that questions of justice only arise within the state, I will argue that global economic and political institutions have contributed to the plight of climate migrants, and that following from Darrel Moellendorf’s theory of associational justice, this enduring impact results in an association and duties of justice that transcend state borders. To respect the dignity of climate migrants, such an unjust association needs to be rectified by establishing ethical principles that could be reasonably endorsed by everyone affected. Drawing from Gillian Brock, I will argue that the best way to rectify the situation is through establishing a principle of distributive justice which focuses on ‘agency needs’: needs whose fulfilment is necessary for human agency. Using this framework, I then provide some recommendations of what is owed to climate migrants to achieve justice for them. I also consider how these duties of justice should be distributed, first critiquing a dominant approach that attributes duties primarily to polluters. In the end, I recommend that duties should be dispersed between all those who support the global institutions responsible, those who have been high polluters since 1990, and the most affluent in the world. As the effects of climate change become increasingly pronounced within the next fifty years, establishing what is owed to those displaced is of utmost importance, and I hope this thesis shows how normative philosophy can help us think through these urgent questions. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
- Authors: Van Heerden, Samantha Jane Ashburner
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Climate justice , Environmental refugees , Climatic changes Social aspects , Applied ethics , Political science Philosophy , Refugees , Global justice , Relocation (Housing) Environmental aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406749 , vital:70304
- Description: Climate change is predicted to displace thousands of people across the globe. Due to their geographical location and limited resources available for adaptation, this will particularly impact those in developing states, who might have to flee from the growing frequency and severity of rising sea levels, drought and desertification, and acute natural disasters such as floods, wildfires, and hurricanes. This is likely to have pervasive effects on the moral interests of those affected, threatening loss of life, the deterioration of livelihoods, and for small island states even complete or substantial loss of state territory. In this thesis I will argue that we should conceive of this situation as a problem of global justice. Though some argue that questions of justice only arise within the state, I will argue that global economic and political institutions have contributed to the plight of climate migrants, and that following from Darrel Moellendorf’s theory of associational justice, this enduring impact results in an association and duties of justice that transcend state borders. To respect the dignity of climate migrants, such an unjust association needs to be rectified by establishing ethical principles that could be reasonably endorsed by everyone affected. Drawing from Gillian Brock, I will argue that the best way to rectify the situation is through establishing a principle of distributive justice which focuses on ‘agency needs’: needs whose fulfilment is necessary for human agency. Using this framework, I then provide some recommendations of what is owed to climate migrants to achieve justice for them. I also consider how these duties of justice should be distributed, first critiquing a dominant approach that attributes duties primarily to polluters. In the end, I recommend that duties should be dispersed between all those who support the global institutions responsible, those who have been high polluters since 1990, and the most affluent in the world. As the effects of climate change become increasingly pronounced within the next fifty years, establishing what is owed to those displaced is of utmost importance, and I hope this thesis shows how normative philosophy can help us think through these urgent questions. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
Reforging Ockham’s Razor: an enquiry into the ontology of parsimony arguments
- Authors: Dichmont, Thomas
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Logic , Metaphysics , Ontology , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemology , Philosophy and science , Occam's razor
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406736 , vital:70303
- Description: Nearly every philosopher in English-speaking world has heard of Ockham’s Razor, which is given in one of two ways, don’t multiply entities beyond necessity and all things being equal choose the simpler explanation. Yet it is unclear from the scholarship whether the use of Ockham’s Razor is justified in science and philosophy. However, if it can be shown to ‘get’ us truth, it would gain an unequivocal justification, as disputes that are continued after the parties to the substantive truth of one or the other are defined as frivolous. Alternative, one may contend that explanation could have other criteria of success. The implication of a direct connection between the razor and truth comes with ontological commitments, namely a commitment to realism (about universals) and philosophical theism. This is contrary to the razor’s use as a tool of nominalism and naturalism. I argue in this thesis there that the only possible non-circular justification for Ockham’s Razor is truth and that therefore certain philosophical positions are excluded from using the razor to animate their positions. There is an additional, second criteria for the success of our inquiry, namely the justification must in some way be consistent with the razor, which means the chosen explanation for the razor, must be simpler than any of its rivals and not have superfluous entities, otherwise our justification would be contrary to the advice of the razor. We are presented with a Scylla and Charybdis type problem, we avoid a circularity on the one hand and on the other we must not contradict the razor itself, these are contrary intellectual impulses. So firstly I will look at disciplines outside philosophy for some initial inspiration. If we could answer this question in a ‘non’ philosophical way, the problem would have solved itself in a way that require little change of practice. If lawyers or scientist can account for the razor properly, there is not really a problem of justification, at least not a philosophical one. Second, I consider the realist and theist positions, namely an argument of Aristotle’s in the Posterior Analytics and part of Aquinas’ On the Divine Simplicity. Further, I consider the work of Ockham as a nominalist. Lastly, I consider modern and contemporary philosophy, in the form of Hume, Quine and Sober (a modern writer on the razor). The aim here is to ‘stress test’ the philosophical resources of the various systems and analyse the results to see if they can produce a non-circular result. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
- Authors: Dichmont, Thomas
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Logic , Metaphysics , Ontology , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemology , Philosophy and science , Occam's razor
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406736 , vital:70303
- Description: Nearly every philosopher in English-speaking world has heard of Ockham’s Razor, which is given in one of two ways, don’t multiply entities beyond necessity and all things being equal choose the simpler explanation. Yet it is unclear from the scholarship whether the use of Ockham’s Razor is justified in science and philosophy. However, if it can be shown to ‘get’ us truth, it would gain an unequivocal justification, as disputes that are continued after the parties to the substantive truth of one or the other are defined as frivolous. Alternative, one may contend that explanation could have other criteria of success. The implication of a direct connection between the razor and truth comes with ontological commitments, namely a commitment to realism (about universals) and philosophical theism. This is contrary to the razor’s use as a tool of nominalism and naturalism. I argue in this thesis there that the only possible non-circular justification for Ockham’s Razor is truth and that therefore certain philosophical positions are excluded from using the razor to animate their positions. There is an additional, second criteria for the success of our inquiry, namely the justification must in some way be consistent with the razor, which means the chosen explanation for the razor, must be simpler than any of its rivals and not have superfluous entities, otherwise our justification would be contrary to the advice of the razor. We are presented with a Scylla and Charybdis type problem, we avoid a circularity on the one hand and on the other we must not contradict the razor itself, these are contrary intellectual impulses. So firstly I will look at disciplines outside philosophy for some initial inspiration. If we could answer this question in a ‘non’ philosophical way, the problem would have solved itself in a way that require little change of practice. If lawyers or scientist can account for the razor properly, there is not really a problem of justification, at least not a philosophical one. Second, I consider the realist and theist positions, namely an argument of Aristotle’s in the Posterior Analytics and part of Aquinas’ On the Divine Simplicity. Further, I consider the work of Ockham as a nominalist. Lastly, I consider modern and contemporary philosophy, in the form of Hume, Quine and Sober (a modern writer on the razor). The aim here is to ‘stress test’ the philosophical resources of the various systems and analyse the results to see if they can produce a non-circular result. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
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