Concerning Marya Schechtman’s narrative account
- Authors: Simuja, Clement
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Schechtman, Marya, 1960- Criticism and interpretation , Narrative inquiry (Research method) , Identity (Psychology) , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Self , Individuality
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190748 , vital:45024
- Description: The persistence of personal identity stands at the heart of many human practices, such as paying individuals for their work or holding people responsible for their actions. As such, it seems important that theories of personal identity are able to account for the practical implications of continuity of personal identity. Mindful of the practical importance of personal identity, Marya Schechtman (1994) argues that her narrative view only accounts for the four features that persons must possess. Any account of personal identity is supposed to make persons capable of possessing these features. She then posits her narrative self-constitution view as an account of personal identity she feels is capable of explaining the link between personal identity and certain features of persons. In this thesis project, I present how the narrative views, as described by Schechtman and others, are interpretive enterprises and that this leads them to a potentially devastating conclusion. The narratives must be constructed from something, and I argue that it is memory. But empirical facts about memory do not allow for it to persist in a quantitative way, but rather in a qualitative way, much like persons. Upon making this argument, I further argue that if mainstream psychological views is correct, this reduces the persistence of memory to resemblance relations. And memory is the building blocks of narrative. If this is the case, then narrative is also reduced to resemblance relations. Narrative, therefore, does not persist through time in a non-qualitative way, and one is better off accepting a psychological theory by virtue of parsimony. Ultimately, I argue that Schechtman and narrative theorists may save narrative views by adopting what I call as a ‘causal narrative view’. A causal narrative view will encapsulate all of the relevant features of the typical narrative view, including the emphasis on construction, but will also add the addendum that narrative states must be placed in a causal relation to each other. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Simuja, Clement
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Schechtman, Marya, 1960- Criticism and interpretation , Narrative inquiry (Research method) , Identity (Psychology) , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Self , Individuality
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190748 , vital:45024
- Description: The persistence of personal identity stands at the heart of many human practices, such as paying individuals for their work or holding people responsible for their actions. As such, it seems important that theories of personal identity are able to account for the practical implications of continuity of personal identity. Mindful of the practical importance of personal identity, Marya Schechtman (1994) argues that her narrative view only accounts for the four features that persons must possess. Any account of personal identity is supposed to make persons capable of possessing these features. She then posits her narrative self-constitution view as an account of personal identity she feels is capable of explaining the link between personal identity and certain features of persons. In this thesis project, I present how the narrative views, as described by Schechtman and others, are interpretive enterprises and that this leads them to a potentially devastating conclusion. The narratives must be constructed from something, and I argue that it is memory. But empirical facts about memory do not allow for it to persist in a quantitative way, but rather in a qualitative way, much like persons. Upon making this argument, I further argue that if mainstream psychological views is correct, this reduces the persistence of memory to resemblance relations. And memory is the building blocks of narrative. If this is the case, then narrative is also reduced to resemblance relations. Narrative, therefore, does not persist through time in a non-qualitative way, and one is better off accepting a psychological theory by virtue of parsimony. Ultimately, I argue that Schechtman and narrative theorists may save narrative views by adopting what I call as a ‘causal narrative view’. A causal narrative view will encapsulate all of the relevant features of the typical narrative view, including the emphasis on construction, but will also add the addendum that narrative states must be placed in a causal relation to each other. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Self-inquiry: Comparing Plato and Patanjali
- Authors: Coughlan, Daniel Michael
- Date: 2021-10
- Subjects: Plato , Patañjali , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Comparison (Philosophy) , Justification (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190066 , vital:44960
- Description: At its most effective my research hopes to re-affirm the central value and importance of self-inquiry. That is, I hope to echo the familiar call of the wise to know thyself. Of the many mouths and temple walls that have lent authority to this precept there is perhaps no mouth more important than one’s own. To know thyself is the task and responsibility of the individual. In order to arrive at the point where I can re-affirm its value I explore the nature of self-inquiry with the help of Plato, Patanjali and a comparison between them. I propose two general senses in which we might understand self-inquiry and seek to bring out the core problems faced by each. We find an account of these two senses and the relationship between them in both Plato and Patanjali, so too, though less obviously, in the comparison between them. The comparison provides the opportunity for reflecting on the ground that it moves from and depends on, the common ground we assume between the two compared philosophers/ies. I contend that this ground is ultimately the comparer, one’s self. The consequence is that the comparative project and the project of self-inquiry both meet and are mutually beneficial. The three together; Plato, Patanjali, and the comparison between them help us account for nature of self-inquiry in helping us to better understand the relationship between the two senses in which we can come to understand and think about it. In the first sense, self-inquiry is cast as the examination of one’s life. In the second sense, we are invited to consider the possibility of an unmediated knowing of the examiner, an unmediated self-knowing. With a better understanding of what self-inquiry is I stand to conclude by re-affirming its value. , Thesis (MPhil) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10
- Authors: Coughlan, Daniel Michael
- Date: 2021-10
- Subjects: Plato , Patañjali , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Comparison (Philosophy) , Justification (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190066 , vital:44960
- Description: At its most effective my research hopes to re-affirm the central value and importance of self-inquiry. That is, I hope to echo the familiar call of the wise to know thyself. Of the many mouths and temple walls that have lent authority to this precept there is perhaps no mouth more important than one’s own. To know thyself is the task and responsibility of the individual. In order to arrive at the point where I can re-affirm its value I explore the nature of self-inquiry with the help of Plato, Patanjali and a comparison between them. I propose two general senses in which we might understand self-inquiry and seek to bring out the core problems faced by each. We find an account of these two senses and the relationship between them in both Plato and Patanjali, so too, though less obviously, in the comparison between them. The comparison provides the opportunity for reflecting on the ground that it moves from and depends on, the common ground we assume between the two compared philosophers/ies. I contend that this ground is ultimately the comparer, one’s self. The consequence is that the comparative project and the project of self-inquiry both meet and are mutually beneficial. The three together; Plato, Patanjali, and the comparison between them help us account for nature of self-inquiry in helping us to better understand the relationship between the two senses in which we can come to understand and think about it. In the first sense, self-inquiry is cast as the examination of one’s life. In the second sense, we are invited to consider the possibility of an unmediated knowing of the examiner, an unmediated self-knowing. With a better understanding of what self-inquiry is I stand to conclude by re-affirming its value. , Thesis (MPhil) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10
The nature of a self
- Authors: Le Chat, Gavin John
- Date: 1978 , 2013-10-17
- Subjects: Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Dualism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2737 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1006916 , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Dualism
- Description: The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate just what kind of entity a self or person is (p. 1). , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Date Issued: 1978
- Authors: Le Chat, Gavin John
- Date: 1978 , 2013-10-17
- Subjects: Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Dualism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2737 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1006916 , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Dualism
- Description: The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate just what kind of entity a self or person is (p. 1). , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Date Issued: 1978
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