Desert
- Authors: Harper, Sean Julian
- Date: 2000
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2710 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002840 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Description: This thesis examines the idea of desert as expounded in the work of John Rawls, and some of the implications of this conception of desert for moral and political philosophy. In this work, I analyse a series of arguments against retaining this particular conception of desert.I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently diminishes the force of Rawls’ argument for desert, while many of them do state, and I argue that they are correct in doing so, that this conception of desert is dangerous for political or moral philosophy to maintain. I argue that the moral, political and legal implications of accepting this account of desert severely undermine various institutions of differential treatment, and indeed, moral assessment. I regard it as obvious that societies must, on occasion, treat members of those societies differently, for moral, as well as practical reasons. The Rawlsian account of desert, and the account of responsibility on which it rests, however, will endanger the legitimacy of such procedures. I argue further that the Rawlsian account of desert requires that differences in wealth, and inheritance of wealth, influence and privilege be diminished, if not abolished, if we are to talk of any form of desert meaningfully. I argue that this is a strength of Rawls’ account, and further that any account of desert that is true to the philosophical tradition of the concept will require similar steps to be taken. The primary aim of this thesis is to show that Rawls’ arguments against desert are serious ones, both in terms of strength and scope, and that they must be addressed. I intend to show that these arguments are founded on strong moral intuitions, and that it is plausible that these intuitions may need revision. Finally,I intend to show that desert is an important moral and political concept, and that the disciplines of moral and political philosophy will be impoverished by the absence this concept. This absence, I will argue, is a natural consequence of the acceptance of the Rawlsian arguments.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2000
- Authors: Harper, Sean Julian
- Date: 2000
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2710 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002840 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Description: This thesis examines the idea of desert as expounded in the work of John Rawls, and some of the implications of this conception of desert for moral and political philosophy. In this work, I analyse a series of arguments against retaining this particular conception of desert.I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently diminishes the force of Rawls’ argument for desert, while many of them do state, and I argue that they are correct in doing so, that this conception of desert is dangerous for political or moral philosophy to maintain. I argue that the moral, political and legal implications of accepting this account of desert severely undermine various institutions of differential treatment, and indeed, moral assessment. I regard it as obvious that societies must, on occasion, treat members of those societies differently, for moral, as well as practical reasons. The Rawlsian account of desert, and the account of responsibility on which it rests, however, will endanger the legitimacy of such procedures. I argue further that the Rawlsian account of desert requires that differences in wealth, and inheritance of wealth, influence and privilege be diminished, if not abolished, if we are to talk of any form of desert meaningfully. I argue that this is a strength of Rawls’ account, and further that any account of desert that is true to the philosophical tradition of the concept will require similar steps to be taken. The primary aim of this thesis is to show that Rawls’ arguments against desert are serious ones, both in terms of strength and scope, and that they must be addressed. I intend to show that these arguments are founded on strong moral intuitions, and that it is plausible that these intuitions may need revision. Finally,I intend to show that desert is an important moral and political concept, and that the disciplines of moral and political philosophy will be impoverished by the absence this concept. This absence, I will argue, is a natural consequence of the acceptance of the Rawlsian arguments.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2000
Making sense of ʺessenceʺ : a critical examination of the adequacy of the modern philosophical conception of ʺessenceʺ
- Authors: Ross, Allison
- Date: 2000
- Subjects: Essentialism (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2720 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002850 , Essentialism (Philosophy)
- Description: The idea that some sub-set of the properties of an object captures what it is to be that thing i.e. that it has an essence which is there to be discovered and about which we can be mistaken - is a commonsense assumption that we use all the time. However, philosophers of this century have regarded the realism about essence with skepticism, arguing that we impose essences on things by the way we define our concepts as opposed to discovering them. Essences are supposedly characteristics of our concepts rather than of objects in the world. This was the orthodox view until a group of philosophers of language developed the theory of direct reference. They claimed that proper names and certain other words refer non-connotatively which entails that the real properties of objects are crucial to the establishment of the reference of such terms. It can be shown that the properties involved in reference determination must be all and only the necessary properties of those objects. This discovery has been taken to mark the rehabilitation of the notion of essence, with an object’s essence being taken to be that set of properties which it must have in all possible worlds in which it exists. I will argue that the theory of direct reference is correct up to the point at which it assimilates the necessary properties of objects to their essences. I will show that the set of an object’s necessary properties cannot fulfill the role reserved for the concept of essence in metaphysical hypotheses concerning the nature of objects. I will go on to show that a sub-set of a thing’s necessary properties can fulfill this role and I will suggest that we identify the members of this sub-set by testing their ability to furnish the kinds of explanations we expect from essences. I will demonstrate how this can be done using the Aristotelian idea that the notion of essence is required in order to explain how it is that objects can persist through change.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2000
- Authors: Ross, Allison
- Date: 2000
- Subjects: Essentialism (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2720 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002850 , Essentialism (Philosophy)
- Description: The idea that some sub-set of the properties of an object captures what it is to be that thing i.e. that it has an essence which is there to be discovered and about which we can be mistaken - is a commonsense assumption that we use all the time. However, philosophers of this century have regarded the realism about essence with skepticism, arguing that we impose essences on things by the way we define our concepts as opposed to discovering them. Essences are supposedly characteristics of our concepts rather than of objects in the world. This was the orthodox view until a group of philosophers of language developed the theory of direct reference. They claimed that proper names and certain other words refer non-connotatively which entails that the real properties of objects are crucial to the establishment of the reference of such terms. It can be shown that the properties involved in reference determination must be all and only the necessary properties of those objects. This discovery has been taken to mark the rehabilitation of the notion of essence, with an object’s essence being taken to be that set of properties which it must have in all possible worlds in which it exists. I will argue that the theory of direct reference is correct up to the point at which it assimilates the necessary properties of objects to their essences. I will show that the set of an object’s necessary properties cannot fulfill the role reserved for the concept of essence in metaphysical hypotheses concerning the nature of objects. I will go on to show that a sub-set of a thing’s necessary properties can fulfill this role and I will suggest that we identify the members of this sub-set by testing their ability to furnish the kinds of explanations we expect from essences. I will demonstrate how this can be done using the Aristotelian idea that the notion of essence is required in order to explain how it is that objects can persist through change.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2000
Personal autonomy : philosophy and literature
- Authors: Vice, Samantha Wynne
- Date: 1999
- Subjects: Autonomy (Philosophy) , Ishiguro, Kazuo, 1954- -- Remains Of The Day , James, Henry, 1843-1916. Portrait of a lady
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2723 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002853 , Autonomy (Philosophy) , Ishiguro, Kazuo, 1954- -- Remains Of The Day , James, Henry, 1843-1916. Portrait of a lady
- Description: Gerald Dworkin's influential account of Personal Autonomy offers the following two conditions for autonomy: (i) Authenticity - the condition that one identify with one's beliefs, desires and values after a process of critical reflection, and (ii) Procedural Independence - the identification in (i) must not be "influenced in ways which make the process of identification in some way alien to the individual" (Dworkin 1989:61). I argue in this thesis that there are cases which fulfil both of Dworkin's conditions, yet are clearly not cases of autonomy. Specifically, I argue that we can best assess the adequacy of Dworkin's account of autonomy through literature, because it provides a unique medium for testing his account on the very terms he sets up for himself - ie. that autonomy apply to, and make sense of, persons leading lives of a certain quality. The examination of two novels - Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains of the Day and Henry James's The Portrait of a Lady - shows that Dworkin's explanation of identification and critical reflection is inadequate for capturing their role in autonomy and that he does not pay enough attention to the role of external factors in preventing or supporting autonomy. As an alternative, I offer the following two conditions for autonomy: (i) critical reflection of a certain kind - radical reflection, and (ii) the ability to translate the results of (i) into action - competence. The novels demonstrate that both conditions are dependent upon considerations of the content of one's beliefs, desires, values etc. Certain of these will prevent or hinder the achievement of autonomy because of their content, so autonomy must be understood in relation to substantial considerations, rather than in purely formal terms, as Dworkin argues.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1999
- Authors: Vice, Samantha Wynne
- Date: 1999
- Subjects: Autonomy (Philosophy) , Ishiguro, Kazuo, 1954- -- Remains Of The Day , James, Henry, 1843-1916. Portrait of a lady
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2723 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002853 , Autonomy (Philosophy) , Ishiguro, Kazuo, 1954- -- Remains Of The Day , James, Henry, 1843-1916. Portrait of a lady
- Description: Gerald Dworkin's influential account of Personal Autonomy offers the following two conditions for autonomy: (i) Authenticity - the condition that one identify with one's beliefs, desires and values after a process of critical reflection, and (ii) Procedural Independence - the identification in (i) must not be "influenced in ways which make the process of identification in some way alien to the individual" (Dworkin 1989:61). I argue in this thesis that there are cases which fulfil both of Dworkin's conditions, yet are clearly not cases of autonomy. Specifically, I argue that we can best assess the adequacy of Dworkin's account of autonomy through literature, because it provides a unique medium for testing his account on the very terms he sets up for himself - ie. that autonomy apply to, and make sense of, persons leading lives of a certain quality. The examination of two novels - Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains of the Day and Henry James's The Portrait of a Lady - shows that Dworkin's explanation of identification and critical reflection is inadequate for capturing their role in autonomy and that he does not pay enough attention to the role of external factors in preventing or supporting autonomy. As an alternative, I offer the following two conditions for autonomy: (i) critical reflection of a certain kind - radical reflection, and (ii) the ability to translate the results of (i) into action - competence. The novels demonstrate that both conditions are dependent upon considerations of the content of one's beliefs, desires, values etc. Certain of these will prevent or hinder the achievement of autonomy because of their content, so autonomy must be understood in relation to substantial considerations, rather than in purely formal terms, as Dworkin argues.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1999
Dennett's compatibilism considered
- Authors: Puttergill, Julian Gatenby
- Date: 1997
- Subjects: Dennett, Daniel Clement , Intentionality (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2718 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002848 , Dennett, Daniel Clement , Intentionality (Philosophy)
- Description: My basic concern in this thesis is to examine the details behind Dennett's attempt to reconcile the notions of mechanism and responsibility. In the main this involves an examination of how he tries to secure a compatibilism between mechanistic and intentional explanations by developing a systematised conception of intentional explanation. I begin by briefly discussing the various notions needed for understanding what is at stake in the area and where the orthodoxy on the matter lies. As such the first three sections of the work are not focussed on Dennett's work itself and playa stage-setting role for the deeper work to follow. These notions include the likes of the rationale behind attributing moral responsibility, agency and action, mechanism and mechanistic explanation, and intentional explanation. I suggest that the basic intuition regarding mechanism and responsibility is such that the two are seen to be incompatible with each other. The main reason for this lies in an intuition that mechanism undermines intentional explanation and so renders the notion of action largely empty. Action, I show, is at the heart of our attribution of responsibility and is dependent on intentional explanation. Having presented these issues, I turn to the details of Dennett's 'intentional systems theory'. I argue that Dennett attempts to avoid the intuition that mechanism is incompatible with responsibility by developing a specialised account of intentional explanation. Dennett calls it the intentional stance. r highlight the two important features of this intentional stance, namely rationality and intentionality. r show that Dennett's position on rationality and intentionality is such that it does allow him to secure an explanatory compatibilism between mechanism and his sort of intentional explanation. I argue, however, that his sort of intentional explanation does not fulfil our requirements for ascribing agency or moral responsibility. This is accomplished in part by developing alternative conceptions of the two notions. Out of this I develop a different sort of intentional stance, which I call the folk stance. I show finaIly that Dennett's compatibilist move is incapable of being applied to the folkstance from which we do in fact make attributions of responsibility, and so conclude thatDennett fails to make the case for reconciling mechanism and responsibility.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1997
- Authors: Puttergill, Julian Gatenby
- Date: 1997
- Subjects: Dennett, Daniel Clement , Intentionality (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2718 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002848 , Dennett, Daniel Clement , Intentionality (Philosophy)
- Description: My basic concern in this thesis is to examine the details behind Dennett's attempt to reconcile the notions of mechanism and responsibility. In the main this involves an examination of how he tries to secure a compatibilism between mechanistic and intentional explanations by developing a systematised conception of intentional explanation. I begin by briefly discussing the various notions needed for understanding what is at stake in the area and where the orthodoxy on the matter lies. As such the first three sections of the work are not focussed on Dennett's work itself and playa stage-setting role for the deeper work to follow. These notions include the likes of the rationale behind attributing moral responsibility, agency and action, mechanism and mechanistic explanation, and intentional explanation. I suggest that the basic intuition regarding mechanism and responsibility is such that the two are seen to be incompatible with each other. The main reason for this lies in an intuition that mechanism undermines intentional explanation and so renders the notion of action largely empty. Action, I show, is at the heart of our attribution of responsibility and is dependent on intentional explanation. Having presented these issues, I turn to the details of Dennett's 'intentional systems theory'. I argue that Dennett attempts to avoid the intuition that mechanism is incompatible with responsibility by developing a specialised account of intentional explanation. Dennett calls it the intentional stance. r highlight the two important features of this intentional stance, namely rationality and intentionality. r show that Dennett's position on rationality and intentionality is such that it does allow him to secure an explanatory compatibilism between mechanism and his sort of intentional explanation. I argue, however, that his sort of intentional explanation does not fulfil our requirements for ascribing agency or moral responsibility. This is accomplished in part by developing alternative conceptions of the two notions. Out of this I develop a different sort of intentional stance, which I call the folk stance. I show finaIly that Dennett's compatibilist move is incapable of being applied to the folkstance from which we do in fact make attributions of responsibility, and so conclude thatDennett fails to make the case for reconciling mechanism and responsibility.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1997
Equality, resources and primary goods: Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls on the currency of egalitarianism
- Authors: May, Simon James Peter
- Date: 1996
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Dworkin, R M , Law -- Philosophy , Law -- Political apsects , Equality , Justice , Jurisprudence
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2714 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002844 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Dworkin, R M , Law -- Philosophy , Law -- Political apsects , Equality , Justice , Jurisprudence
- Description: In this thesis I compare the work of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls within the context of the 'equality of what?' debate. I argue that the Rawlsian paradigm offers a much more flexible defence of a resourcist approach to egalitarianism than Dworkin's theoI)' of' equality of resources'. I argue that Dworkin's fundamental distinction between persons and circumstances is flawed because it involves commitment to a view of the person which belongs in the realm of' comprehensive moral doctrines', rather than in the realm of a political theory of justice. I also argue that an alternative distinction between choice and luck, expressed in the 'luck-neutralising aim' of egalitarianism, is inappropriate since it too involves transgressing political constraints on theories of justice. Rawls's utilisation of primary goods in his theory of justice is supported by considerations derived from the work of Thomas Scanlon. The schematic picture of relative urgency which Scanlon advances provides the rationale for the use of primary goods, and also allows us to discriminate . between compensation for handicaps and compensation for expensive tastes. Scanlon's schematic picture also frees the utilisation of primary goods from criticisms raised by Amartya Sen. Lastly, I discuss arguments advanced by Susan Hurley which enable an interpretation of Rawls's original position device which is independent of the luck-neutralising aim. Her arguments are extended as a criticism of Dworkin's hypothetical insurance market.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1996
- Authors: May, Simon James Peter
- Date: 1996
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Dworkin, R M , Law -- Philosophy , Law -- Political apsects , Equality , Justice , Jurisprudence
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2714 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002844 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Dworkin, R M , Law -- Philosophy , Law -- Political apsects , Equality , Justice , Jurisprudence
- Description: In this thesis I compare the work of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls within the context of the 'equality of what?' debate. I argue that the Rawlsian paradigm offers a much more flexible defence of a resourcist approach to egalitarianism than Dworkin's theoI)' of' equality of resources'. I argue that Dworkin's fundamental distinction between persons and circumstances is flawed because it involves commitment to a view of the person which belongs in the realm of' comprehensive moral doctrines', rather than in the realm of a political theory of justice. I also argue that an alternative distinction between choice and luck, expressed in the 'luck-neutralising aim' of egalitarianism, is inappropriate since it too involves transgressing political constraints on theories of justice. Rawls's utilisation of primary goods in his theory of justice is supported by considerations derived from the work of Thomas Scanlon. The schematic picture of relative urgency which Scanlon advances provides the rationale for the use of primary goods, and also allows us to discriminate . between compensation for handicaps and compensation for expensive tastes. Scanlon's schematic picture also frees the utilisation of primary goods from criticisms raised by Amartya Sen. Lastly, I discuss arguments advanced by Susan Hurley which enable an interpretation of Rawls's original position device which is independent of the luck-neutralising aim. Her arguments are extended as a criticism of Dworkin's hypothetical insurance market.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1996
Form and substance in R.M. Hare's utilitarianism
- Authors: Coetzee, Pieter Hendrik
- Date: 1992
- Subjects: Hare, R. M. (Richard Mervyn) -- Ethics , Utilitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2706 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002836 , Hare, R. M. (Richard Mervyn) -- Ethics , Utilitarianism
- Description: Throughout his career as moral philosopher Hare has insisted that there is a rational way of arriving at substantive moral judgements. Hare develops this view - first presented in ' The language of morals' (1952) and ' Universalizability' (1955) - into the claim that rational agents are required to adopt utilitarian solutions to moral disputes. In ' Freedom and reason ' (1963) this claim is defended with reference to the view that the formal features of moral language (universalizability and prescriptivity)commit moral agents to a certain method of reasoning, and that this method of reasoning, when conjoined with facts about people's desires and preferences, leads us to accept substantive moral judgements consistent with those required by a form of utilitarianism. This view features throughout Hare's subsequent work, but the argument for it undergoes change. This means change in the defence of the claim that the meta-theory Universal Prescriptivism is consistent with a form of normative utilitarian theory, as this claim is argued for in 'Ethical theory and utilitarianism' (1976) and 'Moral Thinking' (1981). I shall endeavour to trace the chronological development of Hare's thinking, and will concentrate on developments in the argument for a theory of act-utilitarianism. I shall argue that the argument for utilitarianism gives rise to two major problems which arise from a specific feature of the argument, namely, the attempt to run the resolution of bi-lateral and multi-lateral cases of conflict along lines analogous to the resolution of conflict in the single-person case. Hare's argument requires that a decision-maker must identify the person with whom he reverses roles as himself, and that he must be prepared to concede that the things his recipient has good reasons for wanting are also reasons for him to want the same things. I argue that it is not possible to make coherent sense of the identity of the person in the reversed-role situation and that the motivational states a decision -maker is expected to deem 'his own' are not properly states of himself. If I am right, the 'identity'-question sits at the root of a motivational gap in Hare's theory.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1992
- Authors: Coetzee, Pieter Hendrik
- Date: 1992
- Subjects: Hare, R. M. (Richard Mervyn) -- Ethics , Utilitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2706 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002836 , Hare, R. M. (Richard Mervyn) -- Ethics , Utilitarianism
- Description: Throughout his career as moral philosopher Hare has insisted that there is a rational way of arriving at substantive moral judgements. Hare develops this view - first presented in ' The language of morals' (1952) and ' Universalizability' (1955) - into the claim that rational agents are required to adopt utilitarian solutions to moral disputes. In ' Freedom and reason ' (1963) this claim is defended with reference to the view that the formal features of moral language (universalizability and prescriptivity)commit moral agents to a certain method of reasoning, and that this method of reasoning, when conjoined with facts about people's desires and preferences, leads us to accept substantive moral judgements consistent with those required by a form of utilitarianism. This view features throughout Hare's subsequent work, but the argument for it undergoes change. This means change in the defence of the claim that the meta-theory Universal Prescriptivism is consistent with a form of normative utilitarian theory, as this claim is argued for in 'Ethical theory and utilitarianism' (1976) and 'Moral Thinking' (1981). I shall endeavour to trace the chronological development of Hare's thinking, and will concentrate on developments in the argument for a theory of act-utilitarianism. I shall argue that the argument for utilitarianism gives rise to two major problems which arise from a specific feature of the argument, namely, the attempt to run the resolution of bi-lateral and multi-lateral cases of conflict along lines analogous to the resolution of conflict in the single-person case. Hare's argument requires that a decision-maker must identify the person with whom he reverses roles as himself, and that he must be prepared to concede that the things his recipient has good reasons for wanting are also reasons for him to want the same things. I argue that it is not possible to make coherent sense of the identity of the person in the reversed-role situation and that the motivational states a decision -maker is expected to deem 'his own' are not properly states of himself. If I am right, the 'identity'-question sits at the root of a motivational gap in Hare's theory.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1992
Arguments for other minds
- Authors: Dowling, Dolina Sylvia
- Date: 1989
- Subjects: Mind and body -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2702 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001977
- Description: If I am aware of my own mental states by introspection (a) How can I know that other people have minds? and (b) How can I know what their mental states are? These are two of the questions with which I will be concerned in this dissertation. I discuss five different attempts to deal with them. (i) The claim that we can know that other people have minds by an argument from analogy. I show a number of serious flaws in Russell's and other versions of this argument. (ii) Malcolm's thesis that the criteria by which we apply mental terms to others are just different from the criteria one applies in one's own case. I argue that Halcolm's accounts of both first- and third-person criteria are not adequate. (iii) I consider Strawson claim that 'persons' is a primitive concept and that behavioural criteria are "logically adequate" for determining the correctness of statements about the mental states of others. I argue that both of his key concepts are underanalysed. (iv) A quite different attempt to answer our questions (a) and (b) is given by the empirical realist who argues that knowledge claims about other minds are best understood as hypotheses in a wider psycho-physical theory. I show that the major fault in Putnam's version of empirical realism is that he overlooks the subjective character of (iii) our mental states. (v) Finally I consider the claim, due to Nagel, that a conception of mental states is possible which incorporates both subjective and objective aspects of the phenonemon. I speculate that with a great deal of development this approach might hold the answer to our questions.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1989
- Authors: Dowling, Dolina Sylvia
- Date: 1989
- Subjects: Mind and body -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2702 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001977
- Description: If I am aware of my own mental states by introspection (a) How can I know that other people have minds? and (b) How can I know what their mental states are? These are two of the questions with which I will be concerned in this dissertation. I discuss five different attempts to deal with them. (i) The claim that we can know that other people have minds by an argument from analogy. I show a number of serious flaws in Russell's and other versions of this argument. (ii) Malcolm's thesis that the criteria by which we apply mental terms to others are just different from the criteria one applies in one's own case. I argue that Halcolm's accounts of both first- and third-person criteria are not adequate. (iii) I consider Strawson claim that 'persons' is a primitive concept and that behavioural criteria are "logically adequate" for determining the correctness of statements about the mental states of others. I argue that both of his key concepts are underanalysed. (iv) A quite different attempt to answer our questions (a) and (b) is given by the empirical realist who argues that knowledge claims about other minds are best understood as hypotheses in a wider psycho-physical theory. I show that the major fault in Putnam's version of empirical realism is that he overlooks the subjective character of (iii) our mental states. (v) Finally I consider the claim, due to Nagel, that a conception of mental states is possible which incorporates both subjective and objective aspects of the phenonemon. I speculate that with a great deal of development this approach might hold the answer to our questions.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1989
An examination of Aristotelian modality
- Authors: Munshi, Salma
- Date: 1986
- Subjects: Aristotle , Modality (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2703 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001978
- Description: From introduction: A popular misconception regarding Aristotle's views on modality is that Aristotle adhered to the doctrine of no unrealized possibilities. According to this doctrine, all possibilities are realized in time; in other words, if it is possible that something could happen, then at some time it is the case that that happens. For example, if it is possible for Socrates to escape from prison, then there will be a time at which Socrates will actually escape from prison. On this view, the possible and the actual co-incide; whereas there is abundant evidence that Aristotle was careful to maintain a distinction between the possible and the actual.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1986
- Authors: Munshi, Salma
- Date: 1986
- Subjects: Aristotle , Modality (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2703 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001978
- Description: From introduction: A popular misconception regarding Aristotle's views on modality is that Aristotle adhered to the doctrine of no unrealized possibilities. According to this doctrine, all possibilities are realized in time; in other words, if it is possible that something could happen, then at some time it is the case that that happens. For example, if it is possible for Socrates to escape from prison, then there will be a time at which Socrates will actually escape from prison. On this view, the possible and the actual co-incide; whereas there is abundant evidence that Aristotle was careful to maintain a distinction between the possible and the actual.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1986
Zusammenhangen and logical atomism in Wittgenstein's tractatus
- Authors: Dyer, Clive
- Date: 1982 , 2013-03-19
- Subjects: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2734 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005929 , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Description: Introduction: The argument presented in this thesis is that Wittgenstein's answer to the question - as to how one. proposition can be generated out of another - can show a way in which the reconciliation between logical atomism and Zusammenhangen becomes obvious. In the Preliminaries an exposition of logical atomism and the Zusammenhangen thesis is given. The way in which the problem appears is then briefly exposed. The way towards a solution begins with the elucidation of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and the truthfunctional analysis of a proposition. The problem is clarified in the question which now arises: i.e., given the truth-functional analysis of a proposition,. how can one proposition be generated out of another? The problem is then shown to vanish in the logical construction of a proposition and of propositions. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.53 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1982
- Authors: Dyer, Clive
- Date: 1982 , 2013-03-19
- Subjects: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2734 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005929 , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Description: Introduction: The argument presented in this thesis is that Wittgenstein's answer to the question - as to how one. proposition can be generated out of another - can show a way in which the reconciliation between logical atomism and Zusammenhangen becomes obvious. In the Preliminaries an exposition of logical atomism and the Zusammenhangen thesis is given. The way in which the problem appears is then briefly exposed. The way towards a solution begins with the elucidation of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and the truthfunctional analysis of a proposition. The problem is clarified in the question which now arises: i.e., given the truth-functional analysis of a proposition,. how can one proposition be generated out of another? The problem is then shown to vanish in the logical construction of a proposition and of propositions. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.53 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1982
Scientific theories : a philosophical analysis
- Authors: Schwerin, Alan Kenneth
- Date: 1979
- Subjects: Science -- Philosophy , Logical positivism , Realism
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2701 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001976
- Description: In this essay I have considered some of the philosophical problems involved in attempting to settle the question, What are scientific theories about? And in order to expose these problems, I have dealt with two influential responses to this question of the referents of scientific theories - namely, logical empiricism and realism.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1979
- Authors: Schwerin, Alan Kenneth
- Date: 1979
- Subjects: Science -- Philosophy , Logical positivism , Realism
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2701 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001976
- Description: In this essay I have considered some of the philosophical problems involved in attempting to settle the question, What are scientific theories about? And in order to expose these problems, I have dealt with two influential responses to this question of the referents of scientific theories - namely, logical empiricism and realism.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1979
The nature of a self
- Authors: Le Chat, Gavin John
- Date: 1978 , 2013-10-17
- Subjects: Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Dualism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2737 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1006916 , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Dualism
- Description: The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate just what kind of entity a self or person is (p. 1). , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1978
- Authors: Le Chat, Gavin John
- Date: 1978 , 2013-10-17
- Subjects: Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Dualism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2737 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1006916 , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Dualism
- Description: The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate just what kind of entity a self or person is (p. 1). , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1978
Conscientious objection and the concept of worship
- Authors: Moulder, James Edward
- Date: 1977
- Subjects: Conscientious objectors -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Conscientious objectors -- South Africa , Conscientious objection , Conscientious objection -- Religious aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:2749 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013555
- Description: [Preface] " ... the focus of this inquiry is limited to some of the connections between conscientious objection in South Africa and the worship and imitation of Christ. More specifically, at the most general level this essay is an attempt to explore six questions: What kind of conscientious objection does South African law allow? Why are some conscientious objectors only conscientious noncombatants? Why are some Christians conscientious noncombatants? Is it appropriate to worship Christ? Does Romans 13 undermine conscientious noncompliance? And is there a prescription for servile compliance? These are, however, not the only questions which are raised in this essay. Nor are they the only questions which can and need to be asked. But they are the questions which interest me. In addition, they have not received as much attention as they deserve".
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1977
- Authors: Moulder, James Edward
- Date: 1977
- Subjects: Conscientious objectors -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Conscientious objectors -- South Africa , Conscientious objection , Conscientious objection -- Religious aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:2749 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013555
- Description: [Preface] " ... the focus of this inquiry is limited to some of the connections between conscientious objection in South Africa and the worship and imitation of Christ. More specifically, at the most general level this essay is an attempt to explore six questions: What kind of conscientious objection does South African law allow? Why are some conscientious objectors only conscientious noncombatants? Why are some Christians conscientious noncombatants? Is it appropriate to worship Christ? Does Romans 13 undermine conscientious noncompliance? And is there a prescription for servile compliance? These are, however, not the only questions which are raised in this essay. Nor are they the only questions which can and need to be asked. But they are the questions which interest me. In addition, they have not received as much attention as they deserve".
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1977
Reason and eros
- Authors: Chalmers, W D
- Date: 1967 , 2014-06-09
- Subjects: Philosophy , Love , Reasoning
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2748 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013331
- Description: This study is not intended as a work of research into any existing body of philosopny. It is, rather, an independent inquiry into the origins and the objective of philosophical activity. In this it assumes the somewhat enigmatic role of a philosophy of philosophy.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1967
- Authors: Chalmers, W D
- Date: 1967 , 2014-06-09
- Subjects: Philosophy , Love , Reasoning
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2748 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013331
- Description: This study is not intended as a work of research into any existing body of philosopny. It is, rather, an independent inquiry into the origins and the objective of philosophical activity. In this it assumes the somewhat enigmatic role of a philosophy of philosophy.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1967
Describing behaviour: a philosophical analysis
- Authors: Bunting, I A
- Date: 1966
- Subjects: Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2744 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1009991 , Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Description: Questions revolving around the possibility and justifiability of reductive analyses of the concept 'not', lie at the heart of many of the problems in the philosophical interpretation of not-descriptions. In this thesis, I wish to show, by discussing various problems in the logic of not-descriptions, that, and why, reductive analyses must be unsatisfactory.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1966
- Authors: Bunting, I A
- Date: 1966
- Subjects: Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2744 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1009991 , Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Description: Questions revolving around the possibility and justifiability of reductive analyses of the concept 'not', lie at the heart of many of the problems in the philosophical interpretation of not-descriptions. In this thesis, I wish to show, by discussing various problems in the logic of not-descriptions, that, and why, reductive analyses must be unsatisfactory.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1966
Freedom in the thought of John Locke and John Stuart Mill
- Authors: Omer-Cooper, John David
- Date: 1958
- Subjects: Locke, John, 1632-1704 , Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873 , Liberty , Ethics , Free thought , Autonomy (Psychology)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2746 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1012989
- Description: Recent history has abundantly justified J. S. Mlll's theory that the power of soclety over the indivldual is llkely to increase without limlt If lt was not prevented. One of the most obvlous phenomena of our times has been the rise of the so-called totalltarlan systems of government; states that treat the lndlvldual as a being wlth no other end but the servlce of the state and which are prepared to use the advanced technlques which modern scientific research has made available to them to mould the individual as the perfect tool of the system.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1958
- Authors: Omer-Cooper, John David
- Date: 1958
- Subjects: Locke, John, 1632-1704 , Mill, John Stuart, 1806-1873 , Liberty , Ethics , Free thought , Autonomy (Psychology)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2746 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1012989
- Description: Recent history has abundantly justified J. S. Mlll's theory that the power of soclety over the indivldual is llkely to increase without limlt If lt was not prevented. One of the most obvlous phenomena of our times has been the rise of the so-called totalltarlan systems of government; states that treat the lndlvldual as a being wlth no other end but the servlce of the state and which are prepared to use the advanced technlques which modern scientific research has made available to them to mould the individual as the perfect tool of the system.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1958