African linguistic phenomenology as illustrated through the Setswana language
- Authors: Modisakeng, Lemogang
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Uncatalogued
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/425089 , vital:72208
- Description: Embargoed. Expected release date 2025. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2023-10-13
- Authors: Modisakeng, Lemogang
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Uncatalogued
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/425089 , vital:72208
- Description: Embargoed. Expected release date 2025. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2023-10-13
Anonymous testimony and epistemic responsibility
- Authors: Ajiboro, Aderonke Adeyinka
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Anonymity , Assertion , Credibility , Truthfulness and falsehood , Responsibility , Testimony (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/432286 , vital:72858 , DOI 10.21504/10962/432286
- Description: In this thesis, I examine anonymous testimony in both offline (face-to-face) and online (internet and social media) interactions and the epistemic concerns it raises in relation to belief, knowledge, justification, and normative assessments of assertions. I discuss anonymous testimony as involving a relation between the hearer and the content of the testimony in comparison to ordinary cases where the speaker of an assertion is known. In anonymous testimony, the hearer has the burden of epistemic responsibility to arrive at a testimonial belief or arguably acceptance. The hearer is also accountable for the anonymous testimony in the event of re-assertion. I also assess the norms of assertion for anonymous testimony and argue that knowledge, truth, and belief norms that apply in cases where the speaker is known should not be applied to cases of anonymous speakers. Epistemologists have paid little attention to anonymous testimony and its implications on the norms of interaction. This is a study in the epistemology of testimony and it aims at providing further understanding of the epistemic responsibility of hearers of anonymous testimony. In Chapter One, I argue that anonymous testimony can be appropriately described as testimony; where the properties of an assertion to induce belief in the hearer are sufficient to describe the assertion as testimony. I examine the kinds of anonymity and the burden of epistemic responsibility for the hearer. I introduce basically anonymous testimony in offline and online contexts of interaction. A basically anonymous testimony occurs where, at the instance of receiving testimony and making an epistemic decision on it, the speaker is unidentifiable to the hearer. In Chapter Two, I discuss the kinds of epistemic attitudes hearers may have when they receive anonymous testimony. I discuss reductionism, antireductionism, and entitlement theory as accounts of the justification for believing testimony. I argue that acceptance is the appropriate attitude and the entitlement theory provides a basis for accepting anonymous testimony. I also argue that practical reasons are a sufficient to accept anonymous testimony. Also, I discuss the possibility that a hearer of anonymous testimony can make a wrongful presumption by assigning an identity to a person as the speaker of an anonymous testimony. This can cause harm to the ‘person’ of the presumed speaker such as an unwarranted credibility assessment of the person by other people in the community. I also argue that making a credibility assessment of a presumed speaker constitutes harm to a proper epistemic assessment of the content. In Chapter Three, I discuss the possibility of trust relations between an anonymous speaker and a hearer. I argue that the hearer is solely responsible for making an epistemic decision from anonymous testimony. I argue that anonymous testimony can be relevant to a hearer given the value of its content. In Chapter Four, I discuss the applicability of knowledge, truth, belief, reasonable to believe and supportive reasons norms for the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. Hence, I argue that the supportive reasons norm, which acknowledges acceptance of an assertion, the relevance of contexts, and admits both epistemic and practical reasons to make an assertion, should guide the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. I also argue that a hearer should be epistemically conscientiousness for responsible re-assertion of received anonymous testimony. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2023-10-13
- Authors: Ajiboro, Aderonke Adeyinka
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Anonymity , Assertion , Credibility , Truthfulness and falsehood , Responsibility , Testimony (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/432286 , vital:72858 , DOI 10.21504/10962/432286
- Description: In this thesis, I examine anonymous testimony in both offline (face-to-face) and online (internet and social media) interactions and the epistemic concerns it raises in relation to belief, knowledge, justification, and normative assessments of assertions. I discuss anonymous testimony as involving a relation between the hearer and the content of the testimony in comparison to ordinary cases where the speaker of an assertion is known. In anonymous testimony, the hearer has the burden of epistemic responsibility to arrive at a testimonial belief or arguably acceptance. The hearer is also accountable for the anonymous testimony in the event of re-assertion. I also assess the norms of assertion for anonymous testimony and argue that knowledge, truth, and belief norms that apply in cases where the speaker is known should not be applied to cases of anonymous speakers. Epistemologists have paid little attention to anonymous testimony and its implications on the norms of interaction. This is a study in the epistemology of testimony and it aims at providing further understanding of the epistemic responsibility of hearers of anonymous testimony. In Chapter One, I argue that anonymous testimony can be appropriately described as testimony; where the properties of an assertion to induce belief in the hearer are sufficient to describe the assertion as testimony. I examine the kinds of anonymity and the burden of epistemic responsibility for the hearer. I introduce basically anonymous testimony in offline and online contexts of interaction. A basically anonymous testimony occurs where, at the instance of receiving testimony and making an epistemic decision on it, the speaker is unidentifiable to the hearer. In Chapter Two, I discuss the kinds of epistemic attitudes hearers may have when they receive anonymous testimony. I discuss reductionism, antireductionism, and entitlement theory as accounts of the justification for believing testimony. I argue that acceptance is the appropriate attitude and the entitlement theory provides a basis for accepting anonymous testimony. I also argue that practical reasons are a sufficient to accept anonymous testimony. Also, I discuss the possibility that a hearer of anonymous testimony can make a wrongful presumption by assigning an identity to a person as the speaker of an anonymous testimony. This can cause harm to the ‘person’ of the presumed speaker such as an unwarranted credibility assessment of the person by other people in the community. I also argue that making a credibility assessment of a presumed speaker constitutes harm to a proper epistemic assessment of the content. In Chapter Three, I discuss the possibility of trust relations between an anonymous speaker and a hearer. I argue that the hearer is solely responsible for making an epistemic decision from anonymous testimony. I argue that anonymous testimony can be relevant to a hearer given the value of its content. In Chapter Four, I discuss the applicability of knowledge, truth, belief, reasonable to believe and supportive reasons norms for the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. Hence, I argue that the supportive reasons norm, which acknowledges acceptance of an assertion, the relevance of contexts, and admits both epistemic and practical reasons to make an assertion, should guide the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. I also argue that a hearer should be epistemically conscientiousness for responsible re-assertion of received anonymous testimony. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2023-10-13
Kant and the experience of skepticism: rranscendental arguments, skepticism, and a version of the problem of the justification of foundational assumptions
- Authors: Grecia, Hadley
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 , Transcendental argument , Deductive reasoning , Skepticism , Foundationalism (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/425078 , vital:72207
- Description: Immanuel Kant is a key thinker in the History of Western Philosophy whose ideas continue to fascinate contemporary English-speaking academic philosophers. One such idea is Kant's conception of transcendental arguments. Although these arguments do not originate in Kant's philosophy, Kant's conception of them occupies a special place in the English-speaking literature on the topic. A growing trend in this literature is to claim that Kant's transcendental arguments are unique because they aim to achieve an anti-skeptical end through deductive means. I call the basic assumption behind readings of transcendental arguments like these the deductive/anti-skeptical assumption. This assumption claims that deduction is the best means to achieve an anti-skeptical end. In this thesis, I argue that accepting this assumption is one way to misinterpret transcendental arguments because—even though it seems compelling at first blush—it must be false. The resultant twist is that transcendental arguments cannot be deductive, which, in turn, means that understanding that Kant's transcendental arguments are not deductive in nature is itself no small detail for understanding the version of Kant's 'not-deductive' solution to skepticism developed here. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2023-10-13
- Authors: Grecia, Hadley
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 , Transcendental argument , Deductive reasoning , Skepticism , Foundationalism (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/425078 , vital:72207
- Description: Immanuel Kant is a key thinker in the History of Western Philosophy whose ideas continue to fascinate contemporary English-speaking academic philosophers. One such idea is Kant's conception of transcendental arguments. Although these arguments do not originate in Kant's philosophy, Kant's conception of them occupies a special place in the English-speaking literature on the topic. A growing trend in this literature is to claim that Kant's transcendental arguments are unique because they aim to achieve an anti-skeptical end through deductive means. I call the basic assumption behind readings of transcendental arguments like these the deductive/anti-skeptical assumption. This assumption claims that deduction is the best means to achieve an anti-skeptical end. In this thesis, I argue that accepting this assumption is one way to misinterpret transcendental arguments because—even though it seems compelling at first blush—it must be false. The resultant twist is that transcendental arguments cannot be deductive, which, in turn, means that understanding that Kant's transcendental arguments are not deductive in nature is itself no small detail for understanding the version of Kant's 'not-deductive' solution to skepticism developed here. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2023-10-13
Global climate justice: the case of climate migrants
- Van Heerden, Samantha Jane Ashburner
- Authors: Van Heerden, Samantha Jane Ashburner
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Climate justice , Environmental refugees , Climatic changes Social aspects , Applied ethics , Political science Philosophy , Refugees , Global justice , Relocation (Housing) Environmental aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406749 , vital:70304
- Description: Climate change is predicted to displace thousands of people across the globe. Due to their geographical location and limited resources available for adaptation, this will particularly impact those in developing states, who might have to flee from the growing frequency and severity of rising sea levels, drought and desertification, and acute natural disasters such as floods, wildfires, and hurricanes. This is likely to have pervasive effects on the moral interests of those affected, threatening loss of life, the deterioration of livelihoods, and for small island states even complete or substantial loss of state territory. In this thesis I will argue that we should conceive of this situation as a problem of global justice. Though some argue that questions of justice only arise within the state, I will argue that global economic and political institutions have contributed to the plight of climate migrants, and that following from Darrel Moellendorf’s theory of associational justice, this enduring impact results in an association and duties of justice that transcend state borders. To respect the dignity of climate migrants, such an unjust association needs to be rectified by establishing ethical principles that could be reasonably endorsed by everyone affected. Drawing from Gillian Brock, I will argue that the best way to rectify the situation is through establishing a principle of distributive justice which focuses on ‘agency needs’: needs whose fulfilment is necessary for human agency. Using this framework, I then provide some recommendations of what is owed to climate migrants to achieve justice for them. I also consider how these duties of justice should be distributed, first critiquing a dominant approach that attributes duties primarily to polluters. In the end, I recommend that duties should be dispersed between all those who support the global institutions responsible, those who have been high polluters since 1990, and the most affluent in the world. As the effects of climate change become increasingly pronounced within the next fifty years, establishing what is owed to those displaced is of utmost importance, and I hope this thesis shows how normative philosophy can help us think through these urgent questions. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
- Authors: Van Heerden, Samantha Jane Ashburner
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Climate justice , Environmental refugees , Climatic changes Social aspects , Applied ethics , Political science Philosophy , Refugees , Global justice , Relocation (Housing) Environmental aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406749 , vital:70304
- Description: Climate change is predicted to displace thousands of people across the globe. Due to their geographical location and limited resources available for adaptation, this will particularly impact those in developing states, who might have to flee from the growing frequency and severity of rising sea levels, drought and desertification, and acute natural disasters such as floods, wildfires, and hurricanes. This is likely to have pervasive effects on the moral interests of those affected, threatening loss of life, the deterioration of livelihoods, and for small island states even complete or substantial loss of state territory. In this thesis I will argue that we should conceive of this situation as a problem of global justice. Though some argue that questions of justice only arise within the state, I will argue that global economic and political institutions have contributed to the plight of climate migrants, and that following from Darrel Moellendorf’s theory of associational justice, this enduring impact results in an association and duties of justice that transcend state borders. To respect the dignity of climate migrants, such an unjust association needs to be rectified by establishing ethical principles that could be reasonably endorsed by everyone affected. Drawing from Gillian Brock, I will argue that the best way to rectify the situation is through establishing a principle of distributive justice which focuses on ‘agency needs’: needs whose fulfilment is necessary for human agency. Using this framework, I then provide some recommendations of what is owed to climate migrants to achieve justice for them. I also consider how these duties of justice should be distributed, first critiquing a dominant approach that attributes duties primarily to polluters. In the end, I recommend that duties should be dispersed between all those who support the global institutions responsible, those who have been high polluters since 1990, and the most affluent in the world. As the effects of climate change become increasingly pronounced within the next fifty years, establishing what is owed to those displaced is of utmost importance, and I hope this thesis shows how normative philosophy can help us think through these urgent questions. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
Reforging Ockham’s Razor: an enquiry into the ontology of parsimony arguments
- Authors: Dichmont, Thomas
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Logic , Metaphysics , Ontology , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemology , Philosophy and science , Occam's razor
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406736 , vital:70303
- Description: Nearly every philosopher in English-speaking world has heard of Ockham’s Razor, which is given in one of two ways, don’t multiply entities beyond necessity and all things being equal choose the simpler explanation. Yet it is unclear from the scholarship whether the use of Ockham’s Razor is justified in science and philosophy. However, if it can be shown to ‘get’ us truth, it would gain an unequivocal justification, as disputes that are continued after the parties to the substantive truth of one or the other are defined as frivolous. Alternative, one may contend that explanation could have other criteria of success. The implication of a direct connection between the razor and truth comes with ontological commitments, namely a commitment to realism (about universals) and philosophical theism. This is contrary to the razor’s use as a tool of nominalism and naturalism. I argue in this thesis there that the only possible non-circular justification for Ockham’s Razor is truth and that therefore certain philosophical positions are excluded from using the razor to animate their positions. There is an additional, second criteria for the success of our inquiry, namely the justification must in some way be consistent with the razor, which means the chosen explanation for the razor, must be simpler than any of its rivals and not have superfluous entities, otherwise our justification would be contrary to the advice of the razor. We are presented with a Scylla and Charybdis type problem, we avoid a circularity on the one hand and on the other we must not contradict the razor itself, these are contrary intellectual impulses. So firstly I will look at disciplines outside philosophy for some initial inspiration. If we could answer this question in a ‘non’ philosophical way, the problem would have solved itself in a way that require little change of practice. If lawyers or scientist can account for the razor properly, there is not really a problem of justification, at least not a philosophical one. Second, I consider the realist and theist positions, namely an argument of Aristotle’s in the Posterior Analytics and part of Aquinas’ On the Divine Simplicity. Further, I consider the work of Ockham as a nominalist. Lastly, I consider modern and contemporary philosophy, in the form of Hume, Quine and Sober (a modern writer on the razor). The aim here is to ‘stress test’ the philosophical resources of the various systems and analyse the results to see if they can produce a non-circular result. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
- Authors: Dichmont, Thomas
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Logic , Metaphysics , Ontology , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemology , Philosophy and science , Occam's razor
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406736 , vital:70303
- Description: Nearly every philosopher in English-speaking world has heard of Ockham’s Razor, which is given in one of two ways, don’t multiply entities beyond necessity and all things being equal choose the simpler explanation. Yet it is unclear from the scholarship whether the use of Ockham’s Razor is justified in science and philosophy. However, if it can be shown to ‘get’ us truth, it would gain an unequivocal justification, as disputes that are continued after the parties to the substantive truth of one or the other are defined as frivolous. Alternative, one may contend that explanation could have other criteria of success. The implication of a direct connection between the razor and truth comes with ontological commitments, namely a commitment to realism (about universals) and philosophical theism. This is contrary to the razor’s use as a tool of nominalism and naturalism. I argue in this thesis there that the only possible non-circular justification for Ockham’s Razor is truth and that therefore certain philosophical positions are excluded from using the razor to animate their positions. There is an additional, second criteria for the success of our inquiry, namely the justification must in some way be consistent with the razor, which means the chosen explanation for the razor, must be simpler than any of its rivals and not have superfluous entities, otherwise our justification would be contrary to the advice of the razor. We are presented with a Scylla and Charybdis type problem, we avoid a circularity on the one hand and on the other we must not contradict the razor itself, these are contrary intellectual impulses. So firstly I will look at disciplines outside philosophy for some initial inspiration. If we could answer this question in a ‘non’ philosophical way, the problem would have solved itself in a way that require little change of practice. If lawyers or scientist can account for the razor properly, there is not really a problem of justification, at least not a philosophical one. Second, I consider the realist and theist positions, namely an argument of Aristotle’s in the Posterior Analytics and part of Aquinas’ On the Divine Simplicity. Further, I consider the work of Ockham as a nominalist. Lastly, I consider modern and contemporary philosophy, in the form of Hume, Quine and Sober (a modern writer on the razor). The aim here is to ‘stress test’ the philosophical resources of the various systems and analyse the results to see if they can produce a non-circular result. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
Institutional self-deception
- Jacot-Guillarmod, Genevieve Nicole
- Authors: Jacot-Guillarmod, Genevieve Nicole
- Date: 2022-04-07
- Subjects: Self-deception , Business ethics , Social responsibility of business , Responsibility , Collective behavior Moral and ethical aspects , Attribution (Social psychology)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/294548 , vital:57231 , DOI https://doi.org/10.21504/10962/294548
- Description: There are many examples of institutions which have made false claims, or performed certain acts, that have had, to varying degrees, a negative impact on their societies. For example, many corporations go to great lengths to present themselves as being environmentally friendly when in fact they are not. Many corporations have also been forced to recall dangerous products which they at one time or another insisted were safe. Research teams have misled participants with regard to what they can expect from their participation in studies, with grave consequences. Governments throughout the world are mired in corruption, and yet deny that this is so. One possible explanation is that in such situations these institutions are simply lying. However, another possible explanation is that these institutions are self-deceived, or lying to themselves. Recently it has been suggested that self-deception is something that affects certain groups as well as individuals. Given that institutions can wield a great deal of political, social and economic power, if institutions are capable of self-deception there is room for things to go awry on a very large scale with potentially dire consequences. Yet the explanations currently on offer for group-level self-deception appear to amount to instances of individual self-deception (either to certain key individual members of those groups being self-deceived, or to all or most members of a group sharing the same self-deceptive belief), and as such I do not regard the explanations currently on offer as satisfactory. I propose that there are certain situations in which we ought to see institutions themselves as self-deceived or lying to themselves. While the terms ‘self-deception’ and ‘lying to oneself’ are often used interchangeably, I differentiate between the two and argue that both institutional self-deception and an institution lying to itself are institution-level phenomena, and do not rely on any individual within the institution being self-deceived or lying to themselves. That this is so is of relevance to our attributions of accountability, and makes changes to institutional structure and procedures the focus of concern when it comes to preventing an institution succumbing to self-deception or lying to itself. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-04-07
- Authors: Jacot-Guillarmod, Genevieve Nicole
- Date: 2022-04-07
- Subjects: Self-deception , Business ethics , Social responsibility of business , Responsibility , Collective behavior Moral and ethical aspects , Attribution (Social psychology)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/294548 , vital:57231 , DOI https://doi.org/10.21504/10962/294548
- Description: There are many examples of institutions which have made false claims, or performed certain acts, that have had, to varying degrees, a negative impact on their societies. For example, many corporations go to great lengths to present themselves as being environmentally friendly when in fact they are not. Many corporations have also been forced to recall dangerous products which they at one time or another insisted were safe. Research teams have misled participants with regard to what they can expect from their participation in studies, with grave consequences. Governments throughout the world are mired in corruption, and yet deny that this is so. One possible explanation is that in such situations these institutions are simply lying. However, another possible explanation is that these institutions are self-deceived, or lying to themselves. Recently it has been suggested that self-deception is something that affects certain groups as well as individuals. Given that institutions can wield a great deal of political, social and economic power, if institutions are capable of self-deception there is room for things to go awry on a very large scale with potentially dire consequences. Yet the explanations currently on offer for group-level self-deception appear to amount to instances of individual self-deception (either to certain key individual members of those groups being self-deceived, or to all or most members of a group sharing the same self-deceptive belief), and as such I do not regard the explanations currently on offer as satisfactory. I propose that there are certain situations in which we ought to see institutions themselves as self-deceived or lying to themselves. While the terms ‘self-deception’ and ‘lying to oneself’ are often used interchangeably, I differentiate between the two and argue that both institutional self-deception and an institution lying to itself are institution-level phenomena, and do not rely on any individual within the institution being self-deceived or lying to themselves. That this is so is of relevance to our attributions of accountability, and makes changes to institutional structure and procedures the focus of concern when it comes to preventing an institution succumbing to self-deception or lying to itself. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-04-07
The fiction of scarcity: conceptualising scarcity in terms of global justice
- Authors: Brotherton, Michelle
- Date: 2022-04-07
- Subjects: Scarcity Philosophy , Distributive justice , Political science Philosophy , Philosophy , Justification (Ethics) , Fallacies (Logic)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/294526 , vital:57229 , DOI https://dx.doi.org/10.21504/10962/294526
- Description: This thesis intends to contribute to the discourse on global justice as it pertains to resources, the distribution of resources, and the allocation of resources. The focus is on the concept of scarcity. I examine scarcity for how it is understood, interpreted, and applied in the literature on global justice. This thesis argues that scarcity lacks conceptual clarity in the discourse on global justice and argues that if scarcity is misconstrued, the consequences can be severe. Conceptual clarity is thus necessary to ensure that scarcity is properly referred to in the discourse on global justice so that scarcity is not erroneously used when justifications are sought for material deprivation and consequent human suffering. In the process, I will also examine how scarcity is used as a justification in instances of material deprivation and why this is problematic. Given the lack of conceptual clarity regarding scarcity, I argue that reliance on scarcity as justification may be erroneous. The conflation of absolute scarcity and relative scarcity may amount to a category mistake. This thesis purports to clarify scarcity conceptually in the context of global justice. In doing so, I recommend that a resource-centric approach to resource scarcity is adopted to accurately account for the scarcity status of resources. A resource-centric approach to resource scarcity based on a more nuanced understanding of scarcity avoids the potential category mistake. Such an approach ensures that material deprivation and consequent human suffering are not wrongfully attributed to scarcity. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-04-07
- Authors: Brotherton, Michelle
- Date: 2022-04-07
- Subjects: Scarcity Philosophy , Distributive justice , Political science Philosophy , Philosophy , Justification (Ethics) , Fallacies (Logic)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/294526 , vital:57229 , DOI https://dx.doi.org/10.21504/10962/294526
- Description: This thesis intends to contribute to the discourse on global justice as it pertains to resources, the distribution of resources, and the allocation of resources. The focus is on the concept of scarcity. I examine scarcity for how it is understood, interpreted, and applied in the literature on global justice. This thesis argues that scarcity lacks conceptual clarity in the discourse on global justice and argues that if scarcity is misconstrued, the consequences can be severe. Conceptual clarity is thus necessary to ensure that scarcity is properly referred to in the discourse on global justice so that scarcity is not erroneously used when justifications are sought for material deprivation and consequent human suffering. In the process, I will also examine how scarcity is used as a justification in instances of material deprivation and why this is problematic. Given the lack of conceptual clarity regarding scarcity, I argue that reliance on scarcity as justification may be erroneous. The conflation of absolute scarcity and relative scarcity may amount to a category mistake. This thesis purports to clarify scarcity conceptually in the context of global justice. In doing so, I recommend that a resource-centric approach to resource scarcity is adopted to accurately account for the scarcity status of resources. A resource-centric approach to resource scarcity based on a more nuanced understanding of scarcity avoids the potential category mistake. Such an approach ensures that material deprivation and consequent human suffering are not wrongfully attributed to scarcity. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-04-07
Concerning Marya Schechtman’s narrative account
- Authors: Simuja, Clement
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Schechtman, Marya, 1960- Criticism and interpretation , Narrative inquiry (Research method) , Identity (Psychology) , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Self , Individuality
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190748 , vital:45024
- Description: The persistence of personal identity stands at the heart of many human practices, such as paying individuals for their work or holding people responsible for their actions. As such, it seems important that theories of personal identity are able to account for the practical implications of continuity of personal identity. Mindful of the practical importance of personal identity, Marya Schechtman (1994) argues that her narrative view only accounts for the four features that persons must possess. Any account of personal identity is supposed to make persons capable of possessing these features. She then posits her narrative self-constitution view as an account of personal identity she feels is capable of explaining the link between personal identity and certain features of persons. In this thesis project, I present how the narrative views, as described by Schechtman and others, are interpretive enterprises and that this leads them to a potentially devastating conclusion. The narratives must be constructed from something, and I argue that it is memory. But empirical facts about memory do not allow for it to persist in a quantitative way, but rather in a qualitative way, much like persons. Upon making this argument, I further argue that if mainstream psychological views is correct, this reduces the persistence of memory to resemblance relations. And memory is the building blocks of narrative. If this is the case, then narrative is also reduced to resemblance relations. Narrative, therefore, does not persist through time in a non-qualitative way, and one is better off accepting a psychological theory by virtue of parsimony. Ultimately, I argue that Schechtman and narrative theorists may save narrative views by adopting what I call as a ‘causal narrative view’. A causal narrative view will encapsulate all of the relevant features of the typical narrative view, including the emphasis on construction, but will also add the addendum that narrative states must be placed in a causal relation to each other. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Simuja, Clement
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Schechtman, Marya, 1960- Criticism and interpretation , Narrative inquiry (Research method) , Identity (Psychology) , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Self , Individuality
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190748 , vital:45024
- Description: The persistence of personal identity stands at the heart of many human practices, such as paying individuals for their work or holding people responsible for their actions. As such, it seems important that theories of personal identity are able to account for the practical implications of continuity of personal identity. Mindful of the practical importance of personal identity, Marya Schechtman (1994) argues that her narrative view only accounts for the four features that persons must possess. Any account of personal identity is supposed to make persons capable of possessing these features. She then posits her narrative self-constitution view as an account of personal identity she feels is capable of explaining the link between personal identity and certain features of persons. In this thesis project, I present how the narrative views, as described by Schechtman and others, are interpretive enterprises and that this leads them to a potentially devastating conclusion. The narratives must be constructed from something, and I argue that it is memory. But empirical facts about memory do not allow for it to persist in a quantitative way, but rather in a qualitative way, much like persons. Upon making this argument, I further argue that if mainstream psychological views is correct, this reduces the persistence of memory to resemblance relations. And memory is the building blocks of narrative. If this is the case, then narrative is also reduced to resemblance relations. Narrative, therefore, does not persist through time in a non-qualitative way, and one is better off accepting a psychological theory by virtue of parsimony. Ultimately, I argue that Schechtman and narrative theorists may save narrative views by adopting what I call as a ‘causal narrative view’. A causal narrative view will encapsulate all of the relevant features of the typical narrative view, including the emphasis on construction, but will also add the addendum that narrative states must be placed in a causal relation to each other. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Ethics of climate change: a normative account
- Authors: Afolabi, Abiodun Paul
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Climatic changes Senegal Saint-Louis , Climatic changes Moral and ethical aspects , Cultural property Senegal Saint-Louis , Ethics Senegal Saint-Louis , Applied ethics , Environmental justice Senegal Saint-Louis , Philosophy, African , Normativity (Ethics)
- Language: English
- Type: Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192864 , vital:45272 , 10.21504/10962/192864
- Description: Consider, for instance, you and your family have lived around a place where you enjoyed the flora and fauna of the land as well as the natural environment. Fishing and farming were pleasant activities for your family, and anyone in the community not only to survive but thrive. Your neighbours and the people in the community pride themselves so much in their farming abilities and fishing techniques. Suddenly things start taking a different turn because of rising sea level and changing weather pattern. First, your land began to give way because of sweeping erosion, and later the riverbank serving the community starts drying up. Your neighbour could not hold their own in this grim condition as they started relocating. You even witnessed some of your family and friends leaving the community and you later heard that they have become climate refugees. To put it all together, you were told that what you are experiencing is one of climate change effects. You were told that the loss of the place that you once cherished is not an act of God but the result of the reckless flaring of greenhouse gasses harmful to the environment by some powerful but polluting nations. What will you do? This might sound like a fairy tale. In reality, this is the story of the people of Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts in Senegal, captured by the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative.1 Their situation has been described as ‘living on the edge’ because for centuries, Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts, home to around 230,000 inhabitants, also known as the ‘Venice of Africa’ has been protected from the pounding Atlantic waves by the ‘Langue de Barbarie,’ a narrow, 30 km peninsula at the mouth of the Senegal river. However, the low-lying sandy spit of land along this World Heritage site is itself rapidly disappearing in the present. This is the consequence of a changing climate and other man-made problems such as illegal sand-mining and over-development. Today, the southern part of the Langue de Barbarie is an island, and the village of Doune Baba Dieye is under more than a metre of water. The villagers have become climate refugees, forced to live in temporary camps on the mainland. Not only have they lost their homes, but they have also lost significant cultural heritage like the farming and fishing culture tied to this place. The ethical considerations that emerge from climate change impacts on the world’s cultural heritage are varied. However, it seems not as self-evident in the way that research on climate change ethics has been framed around economic interest and direct threats to human life and other species. Even when they mention climate impacts on heritage sites around the world, those of Africans have been side-lined. For instance, the impact of climate change on small island nations like Tuvalu, Kiribati2 have gained much traction in climate change discourse, but we do not get to see stories of Africans whose cherished cultural heritage are affected by climate despoliation. How do we respond to this intractable challenge? This is a question of justice and, to be more precise, climate justice. Many principles and proposals for climate justice have been put forward, but the insufficient attention to the vulnerabilities or loss of cultural heritage values of Africans, which is a critical aspect of their social realities, make these theories less persuasive on a global level. This thesis, then, fills this gap in the literature by suggesting that the failure to take cognizance of the injustice in neglecting cultural heritage values when dealing with the burden of climate change is the effect of three problems. One, the value of culture is less understood in this environmental age. Hence, cultural values are excluded or made to be secondary in consideration of principles of climate justice. Second, the idea of Personhood has been neglected in climate ethics and climate justice discourse. Yet, this idea of Personhood can be an enabler of climate justice in that a realization of the significance of cultural heritage to the wellness of the human persons in Africa, makes it loss morally reprehensible. Third, those whose cultural heritage is significantly affected do not get represented in the debate about sharing the burden of climate change. This dissertation thereby builds upon the general findings of the past about anthropogenic climate change, its causes and consequences. Adopting a discursive normative framework, I also address the significance of cultural heritage in this contemporary environmental age and discuss the global justice implications of cultural heritage loss to climate change. This dissertation further provides a critique of mainstream climate justice theories, especially their marginalization of the cultural dimension of climate change. In this regard, the metaphor - ‘cultural storm’ was deployed to argue that climate justice discourses have neither factored the deep socio-cultural impact of climate change nor do they draw on the cultural understanding of justice in putting forward their theories. Given the nature of the indirect, cumulative, and interconnected invisible losses to cultural heritage from climate change, it seems unlikely that they can be addressed by simple tweaks of the climate justice status quo. This dissertation proposes that the idea of personhood in African philosophy, can be conceived to ensure climate justice live up to its expectations in a world of diverse persons dealing with a complex phenomenon like climate change. It argues that a cultural dimension of climate ethics has implications for how mitigation, adaptation and compensation plans should be furthered for global climate justice. At the foundation of my argument, I suggest that what is needed in climate justice discourse is a commitment to explore new and innovative alternatives that will produce an inclusive global climate treaty that is sensitive to the cultural heritage assets that is destroyed by climate change in Africa. This will require a multi-dimensional framework that allows fundamentally different kinds of values and benefits to be given equal visibility and standing in global climate negotiations. The dissertation proceeds in six chapters. In the first chapter, I discuss how climate change denies, damage and destroys cultural heritage values in Africa and argue that it is unjust to ignore this dimension of climate change impact, particularly on the African continent. In the second chapter, I critically discuss the normative value of cultural heritage in an environmentally sustainable and morally appropriate way for this global age. I argue that what is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage is a significant cultural asset that ought to be seriously considered in climate ethics. The third chapter addresses the global justice implications of the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage by climate change that must be paid attention to. In chapter four, I evaluate the plausibility of some of the mainstream climate justice proposals. I offered a different possible critique of current approaches to climate justice to show how they have furthered cultural injustice. The critique of current climate justice theories that I offer, stems from an uninspiring approach that belies logic permitting the sacrificing of that which is connected to others wellbeing as well as the implicit assumptions and the limitation of the idea of justice that undergird these climate justice theories. I offer, in chapter five, a plausible climate ethics theory that recognizes culturally embedded ideas of justice and empower all stakeholders to build by themselves, lives that are, in the light of these ideas, deemed to be adversely impacted by climate change. This theory advances a socio-cultural perspective to climate change which could provide a nuanced basis for understanding and addressing global climate duties that will be sensitive to the loss of cultural heritage. Specifically, I apply the African conception of personhood, to provide a normative basis for a different but intuitive understanding of the cultural dimension of climate ethics. In the final chapter, I discuss how this theory can be applied to rethink current global responses in the form of mitigation, adaptation and compensation in such a way that it takes seriously the impacts of climate change on Africa’s cultural heritage and values. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Afolabi, Abiodun Paul
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Climatic changes Senegal Saint-Louis , Climatic changes Moral and ethical aspects , Cultural property Senegal Saint-Louis , Ethics Senegal Saint-Louis , Applied ethics , Environmental justice Senegal Saint-Louis , Philosophy, African , Normativity (Ethics)
- Language: English
- Type: Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192864 , vital:45272 , 10.21504/10962/192864
- Description: Consider, for instance, you and your family have lived around a place where you enjoyed the flora and fauna of the land as well as the natural environment. Fishing and farming were pleasant activities for your family, and anyone in the community not only to survive but thrive. Your neighbours and the people in the community pride themselves so much in their farming abilities and fishing techniques. Suddenly things start taking a different turn because of rising sea level and changing weather pattern. First, your land began to give way because of sweeping erosion, and later the riverbank serving the community starts drying up. Your neighbour could not hold their own in this grim condition as they started relocating. You even witnessed some of your family and friends leaving the community and you later heard that they have become climate refugees. To put it all together, you were told that what you are experiencing is one of climate change effects. You were told that the loss of the place that you once cherished is not an act of God but the result of the reckless flaring of greenhouse gasses harmful to the environment by some powerful but polluting nations. What will you do? This might sound like a fairy tale. In reality, this is the story of the people of Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts in Senegal, captured by the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative.1 Their situation has been described as ‘living on the edge’ because for centuries, Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts, home to around 230,000 inhabitants, also known as the ‘Venice of Africa’ has been protected from the pounding Atlantic waves by the ‘Langue de Barbarie,’ a narrow, 30 km peninsula at the mouth of the Senegal river. However, the low-lying sandy spit of land along this World Heritage site is itself rapidly disappearing in the present. This is the consequence of a changing climate and other man-made problems such as illegal sand-mining and over-development. Today, the southern part of the Langue de Barbarie is an island, and the village of Doune Baba Dieye is under more than a metre of water. The villagers have become climate refugees, forced to live in temporary camps on the mainland. Not only have they lost their homes, but they have also lost significant cultural heritage like the farming and fishing culture tied to this place. The ethical considerations that emerge from climate change impacts on the world’s cultural heritage are varied. However, it seems not as self-evident in the way that research on climate change ethics has been framed around economic interest and direct threats to human life and other species. Even when they mention climate impacts on heritage sites around the world, those of Africans have been side-lined. For instance, the impact of climate change on small island nations like Tuvalu, Kiribati2 have gained much traction in climate change discourse, but we do not get to see stories of Africans whose cherished cultural heritage are affected by climate despoliation. How do we respond to this intractable challenge? This is a question of justice and, to be more precise, climate justice. Many principles and proposals for climate justice have been put forward, but the insufficient attention to the vulnerabilities or loss of cultural heritage values of Africans, which is a critical aspect of their social realities, make these theories less persuasive on a global level. This thesis, then, fills this gap in the literature by suggesting that the failure to take cognizance of the injustice in neglecting cultural heritage values when dealing with the burden of climate change is the effect of three problems. One, the value of culture is less understood in this environmental age. Hence, cultural values are excluded or made to be secondary in consideration of principles of climate justice. Second, the idea of Personhood has been neglected in climate ethics and climate justice discourse. Yet, this idea of Personhood can be an enabler of climate justice in that a realization of the significance of cultural heritage to the wellness of the human persons in Africa, makes it loss morally reprehensible. Third, those whose cultural heritage is significantly affected do not get represented in the debate about sharing the burden of climate change. This dissertation thereby builds upon the general findings of the past about anthropogenic climate change, its causes and consequences. Adopting a discursive normative framework, I also address the significance of cultural heritage in this contemporary environmental age and discuss the global justice implications of cultural heritage loss to climate change. This dissertation further provides a critique of mainstream climate justice theories, especially their marginalization of the cultural dimension of climate change. In this regard, the metaphor - ‘cultural storm’ was deployed to argue that climate justice discourses have neither factored the deep socio-cultural impact of climate change nor do they draw on the cultural understanding of justice in putting forward their theories. Given the nature of the indirect, cumulative, and interconnected invisible losses to cultural heritage from climate change, it seems unlikely that they can be addressed by simple tweaks of the climate justice status quo. This dissertation proposes that the idea of personhood in African philosophy, can be conceived to ensure climate justice live up to its expectations in a world of diverse persons dealing with a complex phenomenon like climate change. It argues that a cultural dimension of climate ethics has implications for how mitigation, adaptation and compensation plans should be furthered for global climate justice. At the foundation of my argument, I suggest that what is needed in climate justice discourse is a commitment to explore new and innovative alternatives that will produce an inclusive global climate treaty that is sensitive to the cultural heritage assets that is destroyed by climate change in Africa. This will require a multi-dimensional framework that allows fundamentally different kinds of values and benefits to be given equal visibility and standing in global climate negotiations. The dissertation proceeds in six chapters. In the first chapter, I discuss how climate change denies, damage and destroys cultural heritage values in Africa and argue that it is unjust to ignore this dimension of climate change impact, particularly on the African continent. In the second chapter, I critically discuss the normative value of cultural heritage in an environmentally sustainable and morally appropriate way for this global age. I argue that what is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage is a significant cultural asset that ought to be seriously considered in climate ethics. The third chapter addresses the global justice implications of the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage by climate change that must be paid attention to. In chapter four, I evaluate the plausibility of some of the mainstream climate justice proposals. I offered a different possible critique of current approaches to climate justice to show how they have furthered cultural injustice. The critique of current climate justice theories that I offer, stems from an uninspiring approach that belies logic permitting the sacrificing of that which is connected to others wellbeing as well as the implicit assumptions and the limitation of the idea of justice that undergird these climate justice theories. I offer, in chapter five, a plausible climate ethics theory that recognizes culturally embedded ideas of justice and empower all stakeholders to build by themselves, lives that are, in the light of these ideas, deemed to be adversely impacted by climate change. This theory advances a socio-cultural perspective to climate change which could provide a nuanced basis for understanding and addressing global climate duties that will be sensitive to the loss of cultural heritage. Specifically, I apply the African conception of personhood, to provide a normative basis for a different but intuitive understanding of the cultural dimension of climate ethics. In the final chapter, I discuss how this theory can be applied to rethink current global responses in the form of mitigation, adaptation and compensation in such a way that it takes seriously the impacts of climate change on Africa’s cultural heritage and values. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Pessimism and the secular problem of evil
- Authors: Ruiters, Siphamandla
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Good and evil , Pessimism , Optimism , Secularism , Quality of life
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190111 , vital:44964
- Description: How should we respond to the prevalence of ubiquitous evil? In this thesis, I present two responses to the secular problem of evil. The secular problem of evil exists because we want to live good lives, but we are all existentially vulnerable to evil. Consequently, we can think of various ways in which evil's existence poses a problem for us. When faced with such evil, I distinguish two responses that we may adopt, namely, optimistic or pessimistic responses to the secular problem of evil. These responses may be understood as stances that we may adopt about the relative evil and goodness in the world. Once I have made a thorough evaluation of the discussion around the secular problem of evil and the responses, I will suggest that pessimism is an appealing and appropriate response that we should adopt. To achieve the aims of this thesis, I will first clarify the kind of evil at stake in this thesis and then explain how philosophers have historically responded to this problem. Secondly, I will focus on the contemporary discussion on the secular problem of evil and show the responses are optimistic responses. Finally, I will provide a case against optimism and then show why pessimism is the most appealing and appropriate response. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Ruiters, Siphamandla
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Good and evil , Pessimism , Optimism , Secularism , Quality of life
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190111 , vital:44964
- Description: How should we respond to the prevalence of ubiquitous evil? In this thesis, I present two responses to the secular problem of evil. The secular problem of evil exists because we want to live good lives, but we are all existentially vulnerable to evil. Consequently, we can think of various ways in which evil's existence poses a problem for us. When faced with such evil, I distinguish two responses that we may adopt, namely, optimistic or pessimistic responses to the secular problem of evil. These responses may be understood as stances that we may adopt about the relative evil and goodness in the world. Once I have made a thorough evaluation of the discussion around the secular problem of evil and the responses, I will suggest that pessimism is an appealing and appropriate response that we should adopt. To achieve the aims of this thesis, I will first clarify the kind of evil at stake in this thesis and then explain how philosophers have historically responded to this problem. Secondly, I will focus on the contemporary discussion on the secular problem of evil and show the responses are optimistic responses. Finally, I will provide a case against optimism and then show why pessimism is the most appealing and appropriate response. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Practicing conciliation: Towards a practical application of the Equal Weight View
- Authors: Hartley, Danyel Jordan
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Opinion (Philosophy) , Verbal self-defense , Epistemics , Interpersonal relations , Equal Weight View
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/188341 , vital:44745
- Description: The Equal Weight View is a frequently discussed position in the philosophy of disagreement. It holds that when someone disagrees with an epistemic peer, they should adjust their belief to be closer to their peer’s belief. While the reasons for adopting this response to disagreement have been debated, there has been less discussion about its utility as a tool for handling real-world disagreements. In this thesis I pursue a version of the Equal Weight View which is useful in practice. I argue that traditional applications of the Equal Weight View do not reflect its underlying principles when they are used to resolve real-world disagreements. I develop an idealized application of the Equal Weight View that addresses the problems traditional applications face in real-world scenarios. Unfortunately, addressing these problems results in an application that is unrealistically cognitively demanding. The application trades being insensitive to the environment it would be used in for being insensitive to the limits of its user. I suggest that we might be able to save the idealized application and work around those limits by either externalizing or simplifying the most demanding aspects of the application. Externalization is best achieved by making use of some kind of computer assistance. Simplification involves replacing taxing data tracking and computation with heuristic methods. While neither approach is ideal, I argue that both get us closer to resolving disagreements in accordance with the underlying principles of the Equal Weight View than traditional applications do. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Hartley, Danyel Jordan
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Opinion (Philosophy) , Verbal self-defense , Epistemics , Interpersonal relations , Equal Weight View
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/188341 , vital:44745
- Description: The Equal Weight View is a frequently discussed position in the philosophy of disagreement. It holds that when someone disagrees with an epistemic peer, they should adjust their belief to be closer to their peer’s belief. While the reasons for adopting this response to disagreement have been debated, there has been less discussion about its utility as a tool for handling real-world disagreements. In this thesis I pursue a version of the Equal Weight View which is useful in practice. I argue that traditional applications of the Equal Weight View do not reflect its underlying principles when they are used to resolve real-world disagreements. I develop an idealized application of the Equal Weight View that addresses the problems traditional applications face in real-world scenarios. Unfortunately, addressing these problems results in an application that is unrealistically cognitively demanding. The application trades being insensitive to the environment it would be used in for being insensitive to the limits of its user. I suggest that we might be able to save the idealized application and work around those limits by either externalizing or simplifying the most demanding aspects of the application. Externalization is best achieved by making use of some kind of computer assistance. Simplification involves replacing taxing data tracking and computation with heuristic methods. While neither approach is ideal, I argue that both get us closer to resolving disagreements in accordance with the underlying principles of the Equal Weight View than traditional applications do. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Robot Rights, an approach appealing to Animal Rights Theory
- Authors: Millin, Murray David
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Artificial intelligence , Singer, Peter, 1946- , Dennett, D C (Daniel Clement) , Animal rights , Ethics , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992 Criticism and interpretation , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992. Bicentennial man , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992. Sally , Preference utilitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/191854 , vital:45172
- Description: This thesis proposes that Peter Singer’s theory of preference utilitarianism, which is designed to be universally applicable to humans and animals, can be applied to robots of a particular kind — such as those seen in Isaac Asimov’s work. I shall do this by using Singer’s conception of interests as a framework, and appealing to Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance to deal with methodological issues about other minds. I shall then apply those theories to Isaac Asimov’s Sally and The Bicentennial Man. These two narratives show the importance of the intentional stance as an ethical tool and provide an example of how we might talk about the interests of a robot. Sally’s behaviour and ethical status is examined according to how she is perceived, and so I shall investigate how various persons engage with her and why they do so in those manners. This narrative demonstrates the value of the intentional and design stance as methods to approach other minds problems with regards to ethical status. The Bicentennial Man’s Andrew allows us to look for interests in a more concrete way. I look to see how he situates himself in his world, as well as investigate how and why he makes the demand to be morally considerable. This will be done by examining his creativity, personal development and drive for mortality throughout the narrative. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Millin, Murray David
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Artificial intelligence , Singer, Peter, 1946- , Dennett, D C (Daniel Clement) , Animal rights , Ethics , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992 Criticism and interpretation , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992. Bicentennial man , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992. Sally , Preference utilitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/191854 , vital:45172
- Description: This thesis proposes that Peter Singer’s theory of preference utilitarianism, which is designed to be universally applicable to humans and animals, can be applied to robots of a particular kind — such as those seen in Isaac Asimov’s work. I shall do this by using Singer’s conception of interests as a framework, and appealing to Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance to deal with methodological issues about other minds. I shall then apply those theories to Isaac Asimov’s Sally and The Bicentennial Man. These two narratives show the importance of the intentional stance as an ethical tool and provide an example of how we might talk about the interests of a robot. Sally’s behaviour and ethical status is examined according to how she is perceived, and so I shall investigate how various persons engage with her and why they do so in those manners. This narrative demonstrates the value of the intentional and design stance as methods to approach other minds problems with regards to ethical status. The Bicentennial Man’s Andrew allows us to look for interests in a more concrete way. I look to see how he situates himself in his world, as well as investigate how and why he makes the demand to be morally considerable. This will be done by examining his creativity, personal development and drive for mortality throughout the narrative. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
To fail at becoming South African: Moral blindness, liminality, and Rainbowism
- Authors: Moletsane, Dimpho
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Liminality , South Africa Social conditions 1994- , South Africa Economic conditions 1991- , Contractarianism (Ethics) , Political science South Africa , Humanity South Africa , Social integration South Africa , Social justice , Rainbow Nation-Building Project (RNP) , Rainbowism
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/188352 , vital:44746
- Description: In an effort to move away from Apartheid and its evils -South Africa and South Africans have committed to a shared moral project -the Rainbow Nation-Building Project (RNP); a project that confers certain moral duties and responsibilities upon its citizens, including a joint commitment to robust inclusivity, equality, and unity. Importantly, however, our environments –be they physical, social, or psychological –are such that they (actively or passively) obscure our awareness of some morally relevant facts about our society, and thereby hinder us as moral agents and therefore threaten our abilities to fulfil our moral project and commitment.What does it mean for us -a society ostensibly committed to the RNP -to be plagued by racism, sexism, queerphobia and xenophobia? What is it that contributes to our complicity regarding social practices and ideas that we would otherwise find morally objectionable? What does it say about our commitment to our publicly-exalted ideals and values (of inclusivity, diversity, reconciliation, justice, and unity) when we are unwittingly complicit in the marginalisation and social exclusion of members of our society? And how can institutions such as universities work to overcome this?In this work, I argue that the obscuring of, and failure to perceive, morally relevant facts that call on us for ethical attention and/or action -a phenomenon I refer to as ‘moral blindness’ -is responsible for at least some of our behaviours and practices that run contrary to our moral ambitions; and therefore has profound implications for us as moral agents and our ability to succeed in our moral goals. Moral blindness, then, is both an epistemic and ethical concern that enables socially unjust systems to perpetuate themselves; and is thus a threat toallmoral projects.I argue that, for South Africa, much of what can be identified as moral blindness is the direct result of the shifting and conflicting socio-cultural conditions the nation finds itself liminally caught amidst in its transition from its Apartheid past and towards its promised inclusive Rainbow Nation future. Commitment to the RNP, I argue, involves a self-transformation and habituation of certain supportive virtues on the part of South Africans to become the kinds of people who are compatible with the Rainbowist society -whom I call Rainbow Citizens. But this self-transformation itself is also a moral project, and therefore subject to the threat that moral blindness presents, and so too can be failed. If all this is true, then it seems that if we do not take moral blindness seriously, we could ultimately fail to become South African. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Moletsane, Dimpho
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Liminality , South Africa Social conditions 1994- , South Africa Economic conditions 1991- , Contractarianism (Ethics) , Political science South Africa , Humanity South Africa , Social integration South Africa , Social justice , Rainbow Nation-Building Project (RNP) , Rainbowism
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/188352 , vital:44746
- Description: In an effort to move away from Apartheid and its evils -South Africa and South Africans have committed to a shared moral project -the Rainbow Nation-Building Project (RNP); a project that confers certain moral duties and responsibilities upon its citizens, including a joint commitment to robust inclusivity, equality, and unity. Importantly, however, our environments –be they physical, social, or psychological –are such that they (actively or passively) obscure our awareness of some morally relevant facts about our society, and thereby hinder us as moral agents and therefore threaten our abilities to fulfil our moral project and commitment.What does it mean for us -a society ostensibly committed to the RNP -to be plagued by racism, sexism, queerphobia and xenophobia? What is it that contributes to our complicity regarding social practices and ideas that we would otherwise find morally objectionable? What does it say about our commitment to our publicly-exalted ideals and values (of inclusivity, diversity, reconciliation, justice, and unity) when we are unwittingly complicit in the marginalisation and social exclusion of members of our society? And how can institutions such as universities work to overcome this?In this work, I argue that the obscuring of, and failure to perceive, morally relevant facts that call on us for ethical attention and/or action -a phenomenon I refer to as ‘moral blindness’ -is responsible for at least some of our behaviours and practices that run contrary to our moral ambitions; and therefore has profound implications for us as moral agents and our ability to succeed in our moral goals. Moral blindness, then, is both an epistemic and ethical concern that enables socially unjust systems to perpetuate themselves; and is thus a threat toallmoral projects.I argue that, for South Africa, much of what can be identified as moral blindness is the direct result of the shifting and conflicting socio-cultural conditions the nation finds itself liminally caught amidst in its transition from its Apartheid past and towards its promised inclusive Rainbow Nation future. Commitment to the RNP, I argue, involves a self-transformation and habituation of certain supportive virtues on the part of South Africans to become the kinds of people who are compatible with the Rainbowist society -whom I call Rainbow Citizens. But this self-transformation itself is also a moral project, and therefore subject to the threat that moral blindness presents, and so too can be failed. If all this is true, then it seems that if we do not take moral blindness seriously, we could ultimately fail to become South African. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
What is political corruption?: A philosophical analysis
- Authors: Onah, Gideon Owogeka
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Political corruption , Political ethics , Political science Philosophy , Philp, Mark , Thompson, Dennis F (Dennis Frank), 1940- , Miller, Seumas
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192298 , vital:45213
- Description: The concept of political corruption is crucial in political discourses. Since the 1990s, there has been a massive resurgence of focus on political corruption. Definitional accounts of the concept have been proposed. This work is a critique of the accounts that have since been provided. I argue that these definitions are inadequate, offering an alternative. The predominant definition of the concept is that it refers to public officials’ violations of public office rules due to their respective interests in private gain. I consider this wrong for three reasons. First, politics includes more than the activities of public officials. Second, that is not the only behaviour that is contrary to the moral imperatives of politics. Third, the lack of political integrity is not just about acting wrongly. It also includes the possession of political vices. Observing the inadequacy of the dominant perspective, Seumas Miller offers a more comprehensive definition. He defines political corruption as any act that despoils the moral character of political actors and undermines the processes and purposes of legitimate political institutions. However, his definition is also insufficient. First, he includes some immoral non-political acts as examples of political corruption, although he agrees that political corruption entails immorality in politics. Second, he unjustifiably excludes some immoral political actions as denoting political corruption. In contrast, I define political corruption as possessing political vices or acting contrary to moral, political imperatives. This definition is a comprehensive reflection of what it means to lack political integrity. My thesis begins with a critical account of politics and its moral imperatives. That is the criteria for determining what political corruption is. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Onah, Gideon Owogeka
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Political corruption , Political ethics , Political science Philosophy , Philp, Mark , Thompson, Dennis F (Dennis Frank), 1940- , Miller, Seumas
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192298 , vital:45213
- Description: The concept of political corruption is crucial in political discourses. Since the 1990s, there has been a massive resurgence of focus on political corruption. Definitional accounts of the concept have been proposed. This work is a critique of the accounts that have since been provided. I argue that these definitions are inadequate, offering an alternative. The predominant definition of the concept is that it refers to public officials’ violations of public office rules due to their respective interests in private gain. I consider this wrong for three reasons. First, politics includes more than the activities of public officials. Second, that is not the only behaviour that is contrary to the moral imperatives of politics. Third, the lack of political integrity is not just about acting wrongly. It also includes the possession of political vices. Observing the inadequacy of the dominant perspective, Seumas Miller offers a more comprehensive definition. He defines political corruption as any act that despoils the moral character of political actors and undermines the processes and purposes of legitimate political institutions. However, his definition is also insufficient. First, he includes some immoral non-political acts as examples of political corruption, although he agrees that political corruption entails immorality in politics. Second, he unjustifiably excludes some immoral political actions as denoting political corruption. In contrast, I define political corruption as possessing political vices or acting contrary to moral, political imperatives. This definition is a comprehensive reflection of what it means to lack political integrity. My thesis begins with a critical account of politics and its moral imperatives. That is the criteria for determining what political corruption is. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Self-inquiry: Comparing Plato and Patanjali
- Authors: Coughlan, Daniel Michael
- Date: 2021-10
- Subjects: Plato , Patañjali , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Comparison (Philosophy) , Justification (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190066 , vital:44960
- Description: At its most effective my research hopes to re-affirm the central value and importance of self-inquiry. That is, I hope to echo the familiar call of the wise to know thyself. Of the many mouths and temple walls that have lent authority to this precept there is perhaps no mouth more important than one’s own. To know thyself is the task and responsibility of the individual. In order to arrive at the point where I can re-affirm its value I explore the nature of self-inquiry with the help of Plato, Patanjali and a comparison between them. I propose two general senses in which we might understand self-inquiry and seek to bring out the core problems faced by each. We find an account of these two senses and the relationship between them in both Plato and Patanjali, so too, though less obviously, in the comparison between them. The comparison provides the opportunity for reflecting on the ground that it moves from and depends on, the common ground we assume between the two compared philosophers/ies. I contend that this ground is ultimately the comparer, one’s self. The consequence is that the comparative project and the project of self-inquiry both meet and are mutually beneficial. The three together; Plato, Patanjali, and the comparison between them help us account for nature of self-inquiry in helping us to better understand the relationship between the two senses in which we can come to understand and think about it. In the first sense, self-inquiry is cast as the examination of one’s life. In the second sense, we are invited to consider the possibility of an unmediated knowing of the examiner, an unmediated self-knowing. With a better understanding of what self-inquiry is I stand to conclude by re-affirming its value. , Thesis (MPhil) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10
- Authors: Coughlan, Daniel Michael
- Date: 2021-10
- Subjects: Plato , Patañjali , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Comparison (Philosophy) , Justification (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190066 , vital:44960
- Description: At its most effective my research hopes to re-affirm the central value and importance of self-inquiry. That is, I hope to echo the familiar call of the wise to know thyself. Of the many mouths and temple walls that have lent authority to this precept there is perhaps no mouth more important than one’s own. To know thyself is the task and responsibility of the individual. In order to arrive at the point where I can re-affirm its value I explore the nature of self-inquiry with the help of Plato, Patanjali and a comparison between them. I propose two general senses in which we might understand self-inquiry and seek to bring out the core problems faced by each. We find an account of these two senses and the relationship between them in both Plato and Patanjali, so too, though less obviously, in the comparison between them. The comparison provides the opportunity for reflecting on the ground that it moves from and depends on, the common ground we assume between the two compared philosophers/ies. I contend that this ground is ultimately the comparer, one’s self. The consequence is that the comparative project and the project of self-inquiry both meet and are mutually beneficial. The three together; Plato, Patanjali, and the comparison between them help us account for nature of self-inquiry in helping us to better understand the relationship between the two senses in which we can come to understand and think about it. In the first sense, self-inquiry is cast as the examination of one’s life. In the second sense, we are invited to consider the possibility of an unmediated knowing of the examiner, an unmediated self-knowing. With a better understanding of what self-inquiry is I stand to conclude by re-affirming its value. , Thesis (MPhil) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10
Does the construction of ‘rapeable’ bodies constitute an instance of hermeneutical injustice?
- Authors: Weiffenbach, Michaela
- Date: 2020
- Subjects: Zuma, Jacob -- Trials, litigation, etc. , Rape -- Philosophy , Women's rights -- Africa , Women, Black -- Social conditions -- Africa , Masculinity -- Africa , Men, Black -- Africa -- Psychology , Justice (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/145708 , vital:38460
- Description: This thesis argues that within the conventional imagination of the West, identity functions in a way that particular forms of embodiment are characterised by the experience of endured sexual vulnerability, which I argue is best understood as the construction of ‘rapeable’ bodies (Cahill 2001, 120). By this, I mean that the threat of rape is contingent upon the social and political construction of one’s identity as vulnerable. In virtue of this particular way of constructing the embodiment of certain subjectivities, there is an instance of hermeneutical injustice conferred (Fricker 2007, 114). I inquire into the function and meaning of stereotypic generalisations, prejudice and rape myths embedded within the dominant framework of the West and show how language and representation constructs these identities as ‘rapeable’. Furthermore, I consider how collective hermeneutical discourses construct Blackness, specifically Black masculinities and the construction of the ‘un-rapeable’ Black femxle body. To see how these ideas are congruous the prominent example that occurred in South Africa in 2005, namely, the Jacob Zuma rape trial comes to mind. One relevant feature of the case is that it shows how identities of race are constructed in the aftermath of apartheid and points to a Western collective imagination resistant to change. In addition, it demonstrates the triad of interrelatedness holding between the self-world-other, a relationship constituted mutually by the self and the socially constructed interpretations of identity and embodiment (du Toit 2009, 58). Lastly, the construction of ‘rapeable’ bodies is an example of how discursive narratives construct particular identities as vulnerable through rendering particular embodied subjects as sexually irrelevant and hermeneutically obscured.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2020
- Authors: Weiffenbach, Michaela
- Date: 2020
- Subjects: Zuma, Jacob -- Trials, litigation, etc. , Rape -- Philosophy , Women's rights -- Africa , Women, Black -- Social conditions -- Africa , Masculinity -- Africa , Men, Black -- Africa -- Psychology , Justice (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/145708 , vital:38460
- Description: This thesis argues that within the conventional imagination of the West, identity functions in a way that particular forms of embodiment are characterised by the experience of endured sexual vulnerability, which I argue is best understood as the construction of ‘rapeable’ bodies (Cahill 2001, 120). By this, I mean that the threat of rape is contingent upon the social and political construction of one’s identity as vulnerable. In virtue of this particular way of constructing the embodiment of certain subjectivities, there is an instance of hermeneutical injustice conferred (Fricker 2007, 114). I inquire into the function and meaning of stereotypic generalisations, prejudice and rape myths embedded within the dominant framework of the West and show how language and representation constructs these identities as ‘rapeable’. Furthermore, I consider how collective hermeneutical discourses construct Blackness, specifically Black masculinities and the construction of the ‘un-rapeable’ Black femxle body. To see how these ideas are congruous the prominent example that occurred in South Africa in 2005, namely, the Jacob Zuma rape trial comes to mind. One relevant feature of the case is that it shows how identities of race are constructed in the aftermath of apartheid and points to a Western collective imagination resistant to change. In addition, it demonstrates the triad of interrelatedness holding between the self-world-other, a relationship constituted mutually by the self and the socially constructed interpretations of identity and embodiment (du Toit 2009, 58). Lastly, the construction of ‘rapeable’ bodies is an example of how discursive narratives construct particular identities as vulnerable through rendering particular embodied subjects as sexually irrelevant and hermeneutically obscured.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2020
Understanding of biological teleology from a naturalistic perspective
- Authors: Abrahams, Sanaa
- Date: 2020
- Subjects: Teleology , Biology -- Philosophy , Evolution (Biology) -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/140534 , vital:37896
- Description: To the extent that teleological thinking is metaphysically suspect, many theorists attempt to shift the stigma of functional explanations by reducing function ascriptions, and aim thus to de-legitimise an appeal to teleological causal relations in an analysis of function. The point is to dispel the mystery which envelops the application of function concepts by reformulating biological functional explanations so as to dispense with teleology. My project is to interrogate the success with which teleological explanations have thus been eliminated in the biological sciences, and, over the course of this thesis, I conclude that a kind of teleological causation nevertheless remains the most adequate explanatory ground of natural products. My proposal is that functional explanations are causal explanations for the presence and maintenance of self-reproducing systems. I contend that, insofar as the attribution of function presupposes the valuation of a function-bearing system as a causal necessity for its constituent parts, functional explanation references distinct and irreducible holistic properties. Using Kantian metaphysics to frame the discussion, this thesis aims first to explore critically the subject of functional characterisations of biological phenomena, and second, the metaphysical basis of modern science. Its chief contributions to the philosophical function debate reside in proposing novel arguments in justification of what I consider is an improved formulation of an attempted definition of biological function, in which teleological causal powers are explicitly recognised and accommodated in functional explanation. Moreover, this thesis attempts a naturalistic reconstruction of the metaphysical entailments of the real causality of a whole
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2020
- Authors: Abrahams, Sanaa
- Date: 2020
- Subjects: Teleology , Biology -- Philosophy , Evolution (Biology) -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/140534 , vital:37896
- Description: To the extent that teleological thinking is metaphysically suspect, many theorists attempt to shift the stigma of functional explanations by reducing function ascriptions, and aim thus to de-legitimise an appeal to teleological causal relations in an analysis of function. The point is to dispel the mystery which envelops the application of function concepts by reformulating biological functional explanations so as to dispense with teleology. My project is to interrogate the success with which teleological explanations have thus been eliminated in the biological sciences, and, over the course of this thesis, I conclude that a kind of teleological causation nevertheless remains the most adequate explanatory ground of natural products. My proposal is that functional explanations are causal explanations for the presence and maintenance of self-reproducing systems. I contend that, insofar as the attribution of function presupposes the valuation of a function-bearing system as a causal necessity for its constituent parts, functional explanation references distinct and irreducible holistic properties. Using Kantian metaphysics to frame the discussion, this thesis aims first to explore critically the subject of functional characterisations of biological phenomena, and second, the metaphysical basis of modern science. Its chief contributions to the philosophical function debate reside in proposing novel arguments in justification of what I consider is an improved formulation of an attempted definition of biological function, in which teleological causal powers are explicitly recognised and accommodated in functional explanation. Moreover, this thesis attempts a naturalistic reconstruction of the metaphysical entailments of the real causality of a whole
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2020
Who is a refugee? a philosophical account
- Authors: Oteng, Onalethata
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Refugees -- Philosophy , Refugees -- Government policy , Refugees -- Legal status, laws, etc. , United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons (1951 : Geneva, Switzerland)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/92854 , vital:30755
- Description: This thesis comprises two sections: the first section considers who is a refugee and who is not a refugee; and the second section illustrates the necessity of amending the present international laws and conventions to include other people who should also be recognised as refugees. The critical issue regarding the definition of a refugee, is whether or not there is adequate evidence concerning the current understanding of the notion of who a refugee is. Therefore, in order to reach these goals, this thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter explores the definitions pertaining to what it means to be a refugee. The second chapter takes into account the different types of victims that are excluded from the notion of refugee. The third chapter considers the consequences of having a restricted understanding who qualifies to be a refugee. The fourth chapter provides alternative solutions that would assist in providing a more comprehensive definition. Furthermore, chapter five discusses the necessity to further expand the refugee concept to include other forms of victims that are not already included. Overall, this thesis seeks to support expansion of the term ‘refugee‘ since the reasons for forced migration have changed, and individuals are not only fleeing from individual persecution, for instance, but from other situations that can be considered to fall under forced migration. Consequently, extending the definition of the term ‘refugee‘ should occur, because refusing to consider revising the term amounts to a refusal to show acceptance and empathy to today‘s other migrants who are also experiencing survival challenges in their home countries.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2019
- Authors: Oteng, Onalethata
- Date: 2019
- Subjects: Refugees -- Philosophy , Refugees -- Government policy , Refugees -- Legal status, laws, etc. , United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons (1951 : Geneva, Switzerland)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/92854 , vital:30755
- Description: This thesis comprises two sections: the first section considers who is a refugee and who is not a refugee; and the second section illustrates the necessity of amending the present international laws and conventions to include other people who should also be recognised as refugees. The critical issue regarding the definition of a refugee, is whether or not there is adequate evidence concerning the current understanding of the notion of who a refugee is. Therefore, in order to reach these goals, this thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter explores the definitions pertaining to what it means to be a refugee. The second chapter takes into account the different types of victims that are excluded from the notion of refugee. The third chapter considers the consequences of having a restricted understanding who qualifies to be a refugee. The fourth chapter provides alternative solutions that would assist in providing a more comprehensive definition. Furthermore, chapter five discusses the necessity to further expand the refugee concept to include other forms of victims that are not already included. Overall, this thesis seeks to support expansion of the term ‘refugee‘ since the reasons for forced migration have changed, and individuals are not only fleeing from individual persecution, for instance, but from other situations that can be considered to fall under forced migration. Consequently, extending the definition of the term ‘refugee‘ should occur, because refusing to consider revising the term amounts to a refusal to show acceptance and empathy to today‘s other migrants who are also experiencing survival challenges in their home countries.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2019
A satrean account of the role of social narratives in the identity-formation and self-conception of the queer and intersex subject
- Authors: Phillips, Bianca Jewel
- Date: 2017
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/41554 , vital:25101
- Description: Successful, fully-fledged identity-formation and positive self-conception are contingent on the availability and sufficiency of social narratives. Following a Sartrean account of the human subject, identity will be shown to depend on externally-derived features (termed facticity). Facticity contains both material and social components. This thesis will show the two to be inextricably interlinked, and in so doing endorse Judith Butler's view that the material comes to us already seeped in social meaning. The interactive relationship between the discursive and the material will be illustrated by examining the phenomenon of intersexuality, in which the prevailing narrative of a dichotomized two-sex system has, through surgical, hormonal, and psychological procedures, become written into the flesh of non-binary individuals. The absence of affirming, diverse, and pluralistic narratives surrounding intersexuality, coupled with the imposition of the two-sex script, has (negatively) affected the material experiences, and subsequent identity-formation, of intersex individuals. Given the reliance of identity on socially-constituted facticities, the pursuit of flourishing, dignity, and an authentic and cohesive sense of self requires inclusive and diverse social scripts. Drawing on Mirander Fricker, I will elucidate how lacunae in the hermeneutical resource have resulted in confusion, unhappiness, and a lack of proper self-conception for individuals belonging to subjugated groups. Conversely, the availability of positive, diverse, and inclusive narratives will be shown to allow for more self-aware, self-determined subjects. I will ground my advocacy of inclusive, diverse social narratives in an examination of the beneficial genesis and development of the identity politics present in LGBTQIA++ movements (such as "Out and Proud", recognition of queer identity, and the development of non-binary gender). Assuming that self-understanding, authenticity, and flourishing are ethical goods that are valued, inclusive and affirming narratives for subjugated groups will be shown to be a normative necessity.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2017
- Authors: Phillips, Bianca Jewel
- Date: 2017
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/41554 , vital:25101
- Description: Successful, fully-fledged identity-formation and positive self-conception are contingent on the availability and sufficiency of social narratives. Following a Sartrean account of the human subject, identity will be shown to depend on externally-derived features (termed facticity). Facticity contains both material and social components. This thesis will show the two to be inextricably interlinked, and in so doing endorse Judith Butler's view that the material comes to us already seeped in social meaning. The interactive relationship between the discursive and the material will be illustrated by examining the phenomenon of intersexuality, in which the prevailing narrative of a dichotomized two-sex system has, through surgical, hormonal, and psychological procedures, become written into the flesh of non-binary individuals. The absence of affirming, diverse, and pluralistic narratives surrounding intersexuality, coupled with the imposition of the two-sex script, has (negatively) affected the material experiences, and subsequent identity-formation, of intersex individuals. Given the reliance of identity on socially-constituted facticities, the pursuit of flourishing, dignity, and an authentic and cohesive sense of self requires inclusive and diverse social scripts. Drawing on Mirander Fricker, I will elucidate how lacunae in the hermeneutical resource have resulted in confusion, unhappiness, and a lack of proper self-conception for individuals belonging to subjugated groups. Conversely, the availability of positive, diverse, and inclusive narratives will be shown to allow for more self-aware, self-determined subjects. I will ground my advocacy of inclusive, diverse social narratives in an examination of the beneficial genesis and development of the identity politics present in LGBTQIA++ movements (such as "Out and Proud", recognition of queer identity, and the development of non-binary gender). Assuming that self-understanding, authenticity, and flourishing are ethical goods that are valued, inclusive and affirming narratives for subjugated groups will be shown to be a normative necessity.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2017
Generating shared interpretive resources in the mathematics classroom: using philosophy of mathematics to teach mathematics better
- Authors: De Lange, Laura
- Date: 2017
- Subjects: Mathematics -- Study and teaching , Mathematics -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/4293 , vital:20645
- Description: Every student has a unique mathematical lived experience: a unique amalgamation of ideas about mathematics, exposure to mathematical concepts and feelings about mathematics. A student's unique set of circumstances means that not every explanatory account of mathematics will cohere with her previous experiences. For an explanation to have explanatory potential, it must provide an account which coheres with the other beliefs a student has about mathematics. If an explanation has no such coherence, it will not be recognisable as an explanation of the phenomenon of mathematics for the student. Our explanatory accounts of mathematics and mathematical knowledge are our philosophies of mathematics. Different philosophies of mathematics will better explain different sets of mathematical lived experiences. In this thesis I will argue that students should be exposed to a multiplicity of philosophies of mathematics so that they can endorse the philosophy of mathematics which has the most explanatory potential for their particular set of mathematical lived experiences. I argue that this will improve student understanding of mathematics. The claims inherent in any given philosophy of mathematics, when combined with other stereotypes or prejudices, can work to unjustly exclude members of subordinated groups, such as poor, black or female students, from mathematical participation. If we want to avoid reinforcing and reinscribing prejudicial claims about people in the mathematics classroom, we need to be aware of how a certain philosophy of mathematics can exclude certain students. In this thesis I will be defending the idea that, as mathematics educators, we should diversify the way we see mathematics so that we decrease this exclusion from mathematics. In order to diversify the way in which we see mathematics so as to decrease unjust exclusion, members of subordinated groups should be encouraged to share their mathematical experiences in a space sensitive to the power dynamics present in the mathematics classroom. These accounts can then be combined with existing philosophies of mathematics to create new ways of making sense of mathematics which do not unjustly exclude members of subordinated groups.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2017
- Authors: De Lange, Laura
- Date: 2017
- Subjects: Mathematics -- Study and teaching , Mathematics -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/4293 , vital:20645
- Description: Every student has a unique mathematical lived experience: a unique amalgamation of ideas about mathematics, exposure to mathematical concepts and feelings about mathematics. A student's unique set of circumstances means that not every explanatory account of mathematics will cohere with her previous experiences. For an explanation to have explanatory potential, it must provide an account which coheres with the other beliefs a student has about mathematics. If an explanation has no such coherence, it will not be recognisable as an explanation of the phenomenon of mathematics for the student. Our explanatory accounts of mathematics and mathematical knowledge are our philosophies of mathematics. Different philosophies of mathematics will better explain different sets of mathematical lived experiences. In this thesis I will argue that students should be exposed to a multiplicity of philosophies of mathematics so that they can endorse the philosophy of mathematics which has the most explanatory potential for their particular set of mathematical lived experiences. I argue that this will improve student understanding of mathematics. The claims inherent in any given philosophy of mathematics, when combined with other stereotypes or prejudices, can work to unjustly exclude members of subordinated groups, such as poor, black or female students, from mathematical participation. If we want to avoid reinforcing and reinscribing prejudicial claims about people in the mathematics classroom, we need to be aware of how a certain philosophy of mathematics can exclude certain students. In this thesis I will be defending the idea that, as mathematics educators, we should diversify the way we see mathematics so that we decrease this exclusion from mathematics. In order to diversify the way in which we see mathematics so as to decrease unjust exclusion, members of subordinated groups should be encouraged to share their mathematical experiences in a space sensitive to the power dynamics present in the mathematics classroom. These accounts can then be combined with existing philosophies of mathematics to create new ways of making sense of mathematics which do not unjustly exclude members of subordinated groups.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2017