The politics of philosophy in Africa
- Jones, Ward E, Metz, Thaddeus
- Authors: Jones, Ward E , Metz, Thaddeus
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275733 , vital:55074 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2015.1104797"
- Description: The background to the present discussion is the prevalence of political and personal criticisms in philosophical discussions about Africa. As philosophers in South Africa—both white and black—continue to philosophise seriously about Africa, responses to their work sometimes take the form of political and personal criticisms of, if not attacks on, the philosopher exploring and defending considerations about the African continent. One of us (TM) has been the target of such critiques in light of his work. Our aim in this conversation is not to diminish or deflect such critiques. On the contrary, our aim is to understand them, to make them as strong as possible, and to bring them into the cooler realm of philosophical discussion.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2015
- Authors: Jones, Ward E , Metz, Thaddeus
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275733 , vital:55074 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2015.1104797"
- Description: The background to the present discussion is the prevalence of political and personal criticisms in philosophical discussions about Africa. As philosophers in South Africa—both white and black—continue to philosophise seriously about Africa, responses to their work sometimes take the form of political and personal criticisms of, if not attacks on, the philosopher exploring and defending considerations about the African continent. One of us (TM) has been the target of such critiques in light of his work. Our aim in this conversation is not to diminish or deflect such critiques. On the contrary, our aim is to understand them, to make them as strong as possible, and to bring them into the cooler realm of philosophical discussion.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2015
Venerating death
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275749 , vital:55076 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2015.1014540"
- Description: In this paper, I am concerned with elucidating and expanding our attitudes toward our own death. As it is, our common attitudes toward our death are the following: we fear our premature death, and we dread our inevitable death. These attitudes are rational, but I want to argue that our attitudes toward death should be more complicated than this. A condition upon our value, our preciousness, as creatures is that we are vulnerable, and our vulnerability is, at bottom, a vulnerability to death. A corollary of this is that we could not be loved, either by ourselves or by others, for one cannot love—be concerned for—a being invulnerable to death. As a consequence, death plays a deep and abiding role in our value systems. Our susceptibility to premature and inevitable death is a condition upon our being valuable creatures and, in turn, it is a condition upon our being loved. Given the high value that we place on being valuable creatures who deserve love, we should equally place a high value on the constitutive conditions for being precious and loved. If, as I suggest, one of these conditions is that we will die, we should see our deaths not simply as something to fear or dread, but as something of great importance in our lives. Our deaths should be treated with awe, respect, and even praise.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2015
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275749 , vital:55076 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2015.1014540"
- Description: In this paper, I am concerned with elucidating and expanding our attitudes toward our own death. As it is, our common attitudes toward our death are the following: we fear our premature death, and we dread our inevitable death. These attitudes are rational, but I want to argue that our attitudes toward death should be more complicated than this. A condition upon our value, our preciousness, as creatures is that we are vulnerable, and our vulnerability is, at bottom, a vulnerability to death. A corollary of this is that we could not be loved, either by ourselves or by others, for one cannot love—be concerned for—a being invulnerable to death. As a consequence, death plays a deep and abiding role in our value systems. Our susceptibility to premature and inevitable death is a condition upon our being valuable creatures and, in turn, it is a condition upon our being loved. Given the high value that we place on being valuable creatures who deserve love, we should equally place a high value on the constitutive conditions for being precious and loved. If, as I suggest, one of these conditions is that we will die, we should see our deaths not simply as something to fear or dread, but as something of great importance in our lives. Our deaths should be treated with awe, respect, and even praise.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2015
Seeing Fictions in Film
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275711 , vital:55072 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.818044"
- Description: Although its subtitle refers to an ‘epistemology of movies’, the claim at the heart of George M. Wilson’s dense and penetrating book is a bit of sophisticated phenomenology concerning our experience of narrative fiction films [Chs 2–4]. This phenomenological claim he calls the ‘Imagined Seeing Thesis’. When we watch narrative fiction films, we imagine that we are seeing real motion picture shots of the fictional events being portrayed.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2013
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275711 , vital:55072 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.818044"
- Description: Although its subtitle refers to an ‘epistemology of movies’, the claim at the heart of George M. Wilson’s dense and penetrating book is a bit of sophisticated phenomenology concerning our experience of narrative fiction films [Chs 2–4]. This phenomenological claim he calls the ‘Imagined Seeing Thesis’. When we watch narrative fiction films, we imagine that we are seeing real motion picture shots of the fictional events being portrayed.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2013
The art of dying
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275722 , vital:55073 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2012.743217"
- Description: In this paper, I explore what Jean Améry calls the ‘aesthetic view of death’. I address the following three questions. To what extent, and how, do we take an aesthetic view of death? Why do we take an aesthetic view of death? Third, for those whose deaths are impending and have some choice over how they die—most prominently the elderly and the terminally ill—what would it mean for them to take an aesthetic view of their own impending deaths, and, in particular, what would it mean for them to act in the light of such a view?
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
- Authors: Jones, Ward E
- Date: 2012
- Subjects: To be catalogued
- Language: English
- Type: text , article
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/275722 , vital:55073 , xlink:href="https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2012.743217"
- Description: In this paper, I explore what Jean Améry calls the ‘aesthetic view of death’. I address the following three questions. To what extent, and how, do we take an aesthetic view of death? Why do we take an aesthetic view of death? Third, for those whose deaths are impending and have some choice over how they die—most prominently the elderly and the terminally ill—what would it mean for them to take an aesthetic view of their own impending deaths, and, in particular, what would it mean for them to act in the light of such a view?
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2012
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