Understanding of biological teleology from a naturalistic perspective
- Authors: Abrahams, Sanaa
- Date: 2020
- Subjects: Teleology , Biology -- Philosophy , Evolution (Biology) -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/140534 , vital:37896
- Description: To the extent that teleological thinking is metaphysically suspect, many theorists attempt to shift the stigma of functional explanations by reducing function ascriptions, and aim thus to de-legitimise an appeal to teleological causal relations in an analysis of function. The point is to dispel the mystery which envelops the application of function concepts by reformulating biological functional explanations so as to dispense with teleology. My project is to interrogate the success with which teleological explanations have thus been eliminated in the biological sciences, and, over the course of this thesis, I conclude that a kind of teleological causation nevertheless remains the most adequate explanatory ground of natural products. My proposal is that functional explanations are causal explanations for the presence and maintenance of self-reproducing systems. I contend that, insofar as the attribution of function presupposes the valuation of a function-bearing system as a causal necessity for its constituent parts, functional explanation references distinct and irreducible holistic properties. Using Kantian metaphysics to frame the discussion, this thesis aims first to explore critically the subject of functional characterisations of biological phenomena, and second, the metaphysical basis of modern science. Its chief contributions to the philosophical function debate reside in proposing novel arguments in justification of what I consider is an improved formulation of an attempted definition of biological function, in which teleological causal powers are explicitly recognised and accommodated in functional explanation. Moreover, this thesis attempts a naturalistic reconstruction of the metaphysical entailments of the real causality of a whole
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2020
- Authors: Abrahams, Sanaa
- Date: 2020
- Subjects: Teleology , Biology -- Philosophy , Evolution (Biology) -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/140534 , vital:37896
- Description: To the extent that teleological thinking is metaphysically suspect, many theorists attempt to shift the stigma of functional explanations by reducing function ascriptions, and aim thus to de-legitimise an appeal to teleological causal relations in an analysis of function. The point is to dispel the mystery which envelops the application of function concepts by reformulating biological functional explanations so as to dispense with teleology. My project is to interrogate the success with which teleological explanations have thus been eliminated in the biological sciences, and, over the course of this thesis, I conclude that a kind of teleological causation nevertheless remains the most adequate explanatory ground of natural products. My proposal is that functional explanations are causal explanations for the presence and maintenance of self-reproducing systems. I contend that, insofar as the attribution of function presupposes the valuation of a function-bearing system as a causal necessity for its constituent parts, functional explanation references distinct and irreducible holistic properties. Using Kantian metaphysics to frame the discussion, this thesis aims first to explore critically the subject of functional characterisations of biological phenomena, and second, the metaphysical basis of modern science. Its chief contributions to the philosophical function debate reside in proposing novel arguments in justification of what I consider is an improved formulation of an attempted definition of biological function, in which teleological causal powers are explicitly recognised and accommodated in functional explanation. Moreover, this thesis attempts a naturalistic reconstruction of the metaphysical entailments of the real causality of a whole
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2020
Ethics of climate change: a normative account
- Authors: Afolabi, Abiodun Paul
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Climatic changes Senegal Saint-Louis , Climatic changes Moral and ethical aspects , Cultural property Senegal Saint-Louis , Ethics Senegal Saint-Louis , Applied ethics , Environmental justice Senegal Saint-Louis , Philosophy, African , Normativity (Ethics)
- Language: English
- Type: Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192864 , vital:45272 , 10.21504/10962/192864
- Description: Consider, for instance, you and your family have lived around a place where you enjoyed the flora and fauna of the land as well as the natural environment. Fishing and farming were pleasant activities for your family, and anyone in the community not only to survive but thrive. Your neighbours and the people in the community pride themselves so much in their farming abilities and fishing techniques. Suddenly things start taking a different turn because of rising sea level and changing weather pattern. First, your land began to give way because of sweeping erosion, and later the riverbank serving the community starts drying up. Your neighbour could not hold their own in this grim condition as they started relocating. You even witnessed some of your family and friends leaving the community and you later heard that they have become climate refugees. To put it all together, you were told that what you are experiencing is one of climate change effects. You were told that the loss of the place that you once cherished is not an act of God but the result of the reckless flaring of greenhouse gasses harmful to the environment by some powerful but polluting nations. What will you do? This might sound like a fairy tale. In reality, this is the story of the people of Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts in Senegal, captured by the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative.1 Their situation has been described as ‘living on the edge’ because for centuries, Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts, home to around 230,000 inhabitants, also known as the ‘Venice of Africa’ has been protected from the pounding Atlantic waves by the ‘Langue de Barbarie,’ a narrow, 30 km peninsula at the mouth of the Senegal river. However, the low-lying sandy spit of land along this World Heritage site is itself rapidly disappearing in the present. This is the consequence of a changing climate and other man-made problems such as illegal sand-mining and over-development. Today, the southern part of the Langue de Barbarie is an island, and the village of Doune Baba Dieye is under more than a metre of water. The villagers have become climate refugees, forced to live in temporary camps on the mainland. Not only have they lost their homes, but they have also lost significant cultural heritage like the farming and fishing culture tied to this place. The ethical considerations that emerge from climate change impacts on the world’s cultural heritage are varied. However, it seems not as self-evident in the way that research on climate change ethics has been framed around economic interest and direct threats to human life and other species. Even when they mention climate impacts on heritage sites around the world, those of Africans have been side-lined. For instance, the impact of climate change on small island nations like Tuvalu, Kiribati2 have gained much traction in climate change discourse, but we do not get to see stories of Africans whose cherished cultural heritage are affected by climate despoliation. How do we respond to this intractable challenge? This is a question of justice and, to be more precise, climate justice. Many principles and proposals for climate justice have been put forward, but the insufficient attention to the vulnerabilities or loss of cultural heritage values of Africans, which is a critical aspect of their social realities, make these theories less persuasive on a global level. This thesis, then, fills this gap in the literature by suggesting that the failure to take cognizance of the injustice in neglecting cultural heritage values when dealing with the burden of climate change is the effect of three problems. One, the value of culture is less understood in this environmental age. Hence, cultural values are excluded or made to be secondary in consideration of principles of climate justice. Second, the idea of Personhood has been neglected in climate ethics and climate justice discourse. Yet, this idea of Personhood can be an enabler of climate justice in that a realization of the significance of cultural heritage to the wellness of the human persons in Africa, makes it loss morally reprehensible. Third, those whose cultural heritage is significantly affected do not get represented in the debate about sharing the burden of climate change. This dissertation thereby builds upon the general findings of the past about anthropogenic climate change, its causes and consequences. Adopting a discursive normative framework, I also address the significance of cultural heritage in this contemporary environmental age and discuss the global justice implications of cultural heritage loss to climate change. This dissertation further provides a critique of mainstream climate justice theories, especially their marginalization of the cultural dimension of climate change. In this regard, the metaphor - ‘cultural storm’ was deployed to argue that climate justice discourses have neither factored the deep socio-cultural impact of climate change nor do they draw on the cultural understanding of justice in putting forward their theories. Given the nature of the indirect, cumulative, and interconnected invisible losses to cultural heritage from climate change, it seems unlikely that they can be addressed by simple tweaks of the climate justice status quo. This dissertation proposes that the idea of personhood in African philosophy, can be conceived to ensure climate justice live up to its expectations in a world of diverse persons dealing with a complex phenomenon like climate change. It argues that a cultural dimension of climate ethics has implications for how mitigation, adaptation and compensation plans should be furthered for global climate justice. At the foundation of my argument, I suggest that what is needed in climate justice discourse is a commitment to explore new and innovative alternatives that will produce an inclusive global climate treaty that is sensitive to the cultural heritage assets that is destroyed by climate change in Africa. This will require a multi-dimensional framework that allows fundamentally different kinds of values and benefits to be given equal visibility and standing in global climate negotiations. The dissertation proceeds in six chapters. In the first chapter, I discuss how climate change denies, damage and destroys cultural heritage values in Africa and argue that it is unjust to ignore this dimension of climate change impact, particularly on the African continent. In the second chapter, I critically discuss the normative value of cultural heritage in an environmentally sustainable and morally appropriate way for this global age. I argue that what is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage is a significant cultural asset that ought to be seriously considered in climate ethics. The third chapter addresses the global justice implications of the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage by climate change that must be paid attention to. In chapter four, I evaluate the plausibility of some of the mainstream climate justice proposals. I offered a different possible critique of current approaches to climate justice to show how they have furthered cultural injustice. The critique of current climate justice theories that I offer, stems from an uninspiring approach that belies logic permitting the sacrificing of that which is connected to others wellbeing as well as the implicit assumptions and the limitation of the idea of justice that undergird these climate justice theories. I offer, in chapter five, a plausible climate ethics theory that recognizes culturally embedded ideas of justice and empower all stakeholders to build by themselves, lives that are, in the light of these ideas, deemed to be adversely impacted by climate change. This theory advances a socio-cultural perspective to climate change which could provide a nuanced basis for understanding and addressing global climate duties that will be sensitive to the loss of cultural heritage. Specifically, I apply the African conception of personhood, to provide a normative basis for a different but intuitive understanding of the cultural dimension of climate ethics. In the final chapter, I discuss how this theory can be applied to rethink current global responses in the form of mitigation, adaptation and compensation in such a way that it takes seriously the impacts of climate change on Africa’s cultural heritage and values. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
- Authors: Afolabi, Abiodun Paul
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Climatic changes Senegal Saint-Louis , Climatic changes Moral and ethical aspects , Cultural property Senegal Saint-Louis , Ethics Senegal Saint-Louis , Applied ethics , Environmental justice Senegal Saint-Louis , Philosophy, African , Normativity (Ethics)
- Language: English
- Type: Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/192864 , vital:45272 , 10.21504/10962/192864
- Description: Consider, for instance, you and your family have lived around a place where you enjoyed the flora and fauna of the land as well as the natural environment. Fishing and farming were pleasant activities for your family, and anyone in the community not only to survive but thrive. Your neighbours and the people in the community pride themselves so much in their farming abilities and fishing techniques. Suddenly things start taking a different turn because of rising sea level and changing weather pattern. First, your land began to give way because of sweeping erosion, and later the riverbank serving the community starts drying up. Your neighbour could not hold their own in this grim condition as they started relocating. You even witnessed some of your family and friends leaving the community and you later heard that they have become climate refugees. To put it all together, you were told that what you are experiencing is one of climate change effects. You were told that the loss of the place that you once cherished is not an act of God but the result of the reckless flaring of greenhouse gasses harmful to the environment by some powerful but polluting nations. What will you do? This might sound like a fairy tale. In reality, this is the story of the people of Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts in Senegal, captured by the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative.1 Their situation has been described as ‘living on the edge’ because for centuries, Saint Louis Atlantic Coasts, home to around 230,000 inhabitants, also known as the ‘Venice of Africa’ has been protected from the pounding Atlantic waves by the ‘Langue de Barbarie,’ a narrow, 30 km peninsula at the mouth of the Senegal river. However, the low-lying sandy spit of land along this World Heritage site is itself rapidly disappearing in the present. This is the consequence of a changing climate and other man-made problems such as illegal sand-mining and over-development. Today, the southern part of the Langue de Barbarie is an island, and the village of Doune Baba Dieye is under more than a metre of water. The villagers have become climate refugees, forced to live in temporary camps on the mainland. Not only have they lost their homes, but they have also lost significant cultural heritage like the farming and fishing culture tied to this place. The ethical considerations that emerge from climate change impacts on the world’s cultural heritage are varied. However, it seems not as self-evident in the way that research on climate change ethics has been framed around economic interest and direct threats to human life and other species. Even when they mention climate impacts on heritage sites around the world, those of Africans have been side-lined. For instance, the impact of climate change on small island nations like Tuvalu, Kiribati2 have gained much traction in climate change discourse, but we do not get to see stories of Africans whose cherished cultural heritage are affected by climate despoliation. How do we respond to this intractable challenge? This is a question of justice and, to be more precise, climate justice. Many principles and proposals for climate justice have been put forward, but the insufficient attention to the vulnerabilities or loss of cultural heritage values of Africans, which is a critical aspect of their social realities, make these theories less persuasive on a global level. This thesis, then, fills this gap in the literature by suggesting that the failure to take cognizance of the injustice in neglecting cultural heritage values when dealing with the burden of climate change is the effect of three problems. One, the value of culture is less understood in this environmental age. Hence, cultural values are excluded or made to be secondary in consideration of principles of climate justice. Second, the idea of Personhood has been neglected in climate ethics and climate justice discourse. Yet, this idea of Personhood can be an enabler of climate justice in that a realization of the significance of cultural heritage to the wellness of the human persons in Africa, makes it loss morally reprehensible. Third, those whose cultural heritage is significantly affected do not get represented in the debate about sharing the burden of climate change. This dissertation thereby builds upon the general findings of the past about anthropogenic climate change, its causes and consequences. Adopting a discursive normative framework, I also address the significance of cultural heritage in this contemporary environmental age and discuss the global justice implications of cultural heritage loss to climate change. This dissertation further provides a critique of mainstream climate justice theories, especially their marginalization of the cultural dimension of climate change. In this regard, the metaphor - ‘cultural storm’ was deployed to argue that climate justice discourses have neither factored the deep socio-cultural impact of climate change nor do they draw on the cultural understanding of justice in putting forward their theories. Given the nature of the indirect, cumulative, and interconnected invisible losses to cultural heritage from climate change, it seems unlikely that they can be addressed by simple tweaks of the climate justice status quo. This dissertation proposes that the idea of personhood in African philosophy, can be conceived to ensure climate justice live up to its expectations in a world of diverse persons dealing with a complex phenomenon like climate change. It argues that a cultural dimension of climate ethics has implications for how mitigation, adaptation and compensation plans should be furthered for global climate justice. At the foundation of my argument, I suggest that what is needed in climate justice discourse is a commitment to explore new and innovative alternatives that will produce an inclusive global climate treaty that is sensitive to the cultural heritage assets that is destroyed by climate change in Africa. This will require a multi-dimensional framework that allows fundamentally different kinds of values and benefits to be given equal visibility and standing in global climate negotiations. The dissertation proceeds in six chapters. In the first chapter, I discuss how climate change denies, damage and destroys cultural heritage values in Africa and argue that it is unjust to ignore this dimension of climate change impact, particularly on the African continent. In the second chapter, I critically discuss the normative value of cultural heritage in an environmentally sustainable and morally appropriate way for this global age. I argue that what is lost when climate change affects cultural heritage is a significant cultural asset that ought to be seriously considered in climate ethics. The third chapter addresses the global justice implications of the destruction of Africa's cultural heritage by climate change that must be paid attention to. In chapter four, I evaluate the plausibility of some of the mainstream climate justice proposals. I offered a different possible critique of current approaches to climate justice to show how they have furthered cultural injustice. The critique of current climate justice theories that I offer, stems from an uninspiring approach that belies logic permitting the sacrificing of that which is connected to others wellbeing as well as the implicit assumptions and the limitation of the idea of justice that undergird these climate justice theories. I offer, in chapter five, a plausible climate ethics theory that recognizes culturally embedded ideas of justice and empower all stakeholders to build by themselves, lives that are, in the light of these ideas, deemed to be adversely impacted by climate change. This theory advances a socio-cultural perspective to climate change which could provide a nuanced basis for understanding and addressing global climate duties that will be sensitive to the loss of cultural heritage. Specifically, I apply the African conception of personhood, to provide a normative basis for a different but intuitive understanding of the cultural dimension of climate ethics. In the final chapter, I discuss how this theory can be applied to rethink current global responses in the form of mitigation, adaptation and compensation in such a way that it takes seriously the impacts of climate change on Africa’s cultural heritage and values. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Foucault, historicism and political philosophy
- Allsobrook, Christopher John
- Authors: Allsobrook, Christopher John
- Date: 2006
- Subjects: Foucault, Michel, 1926-1984 Sartre, Jean Paul, 1905-1980 Political science -- Philosophy Power (Philosophy) Existential phenomenology Knowledge, Theory of History -- Philosophy Historicism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MPhil
- Identifier: vital:2726 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003073
- Description: This thesis defends an ontological and epistemological account of Michel Foucault's post-structuralist philosophy, to argue that political philosophy needs to take into account the historical and political contingency of subjectivity and discourse. I show that by addressing the historical and political contingency of knowledge, Foucault's work overcomes the flaw of foundational epistemology in political philosophy, which treats true discourse as universal and disinterested. In doing so I hope to have to refuted the mainly positivistic and humanist schools of thought that lay claim to universal and foundationalist notions, by demonstrating the extent to which their misgivings about Foucault's work are informed by and founded upon an unjustified a-historicism. The thesis is composed of three chapters, the first of which deals with an ontology of the subject, the second, with an ontology of social relations, and the last with epistemology. In each chapter I use dialectical analysis to reveal how interests necessarily mediate subjectivity, social relations, and knowledge. The first two chapters defend Foucault's conception of power, by way of an analysis of the relations between Foucault's work and Sartre's existential phenomenology. I show how both Foucault and Sartre successfully address the problem of historicism for political philosophy with their respective conceptions of human freedom. The final chapter defends Foucault's conception of the relations between power and discourse, to show how it overcomes the a-historicism of universal, foundational epistemology. These three chapters demonstrate the importance of accounting for historicism in political philosophy. Claims to universal interest, because knowledge is conditioned by conflicts of interest, often mask political domination. It is important, then, to remember, in political philosophy, that knowledge is evaluative and interested, reflecting historically and politically mediated evaluations. One should be suspicious of ' natural facts' , used to justify actions or beliefs, thereby masking the choices that inform them. I have used the work of Michel Foucault to motivate this claim.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2006
- Authors: Allsobrook, Christopher John
- Date: 2006
- Subjects: Foucault, Michel, 1926-1984 Sartre, Jean Paul, 1905-1980 Political science -- Philosophy Power (Philosophy) Existential phenomenology Knowledge, Theory of History -- Philosophy Historicism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MPhil
- Identifier: vital:2726 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003073
- Description: This thesis defends an ontological and epistemological account of Michel Foucault's post-structuralist philosophy, to argue that political philosophy needs to take into account the historical and political contingency of subjectivity and discourse. I show that by addressing the historical and political contingency of knowledge, Foucault's work overcomes the flaw of foundational epistemology in political philosophy, which treats true discourse as universal and disinterested. In doing so I hope to have to refuted the mainly positivistic and humanist schools of thought that lay claim to universal and foundationalist notions, by demonstrating the extent to which their misgivings about Foucault's work are informed by and founded upon an unjustified a-historicism. The thesis is composed of three chapters, the first of which deals with an ontology of the subject, the second, with an ontology of social relations, and the last with epistemology. In each chapter I use dialectical analysis to reveal how interests necessarily mediate subjectivity, social relations, and knowledge. The first two chapters defend Foucault's conception of power, by way of an analysis of the relations between Foucault's work and Sartre's existential phenomenology. I show how both Foucault and Sartre successfully address the problem of historicism for political philosophy with their respective conceptions of human freedom. The final chapter defends Foucault's conception of the relations between power and discourse, to show how it overcomes the a-historicism of universal, foundational epistemology. These three chapters demonstrate the importance of accounting for historicism in political philosophy. Claims to universal interest, because knowledge is conditioned by conflicts of interest, often mask political domination. It is important, then, to remember, in political philosophy, that knowledge is evaluative and interested, reflecting historically and politically mediated evaluations. One should be suspicious of ' natural facts' , used to justify actions or beliefs, thereby masking the choices that inform them. I have used the work of Michel Foucault to motivate this claim.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2006
The trouble with culture : Plato's critique of poetry
- Authors: Ansell, James D'Olier
- Date: 2007 , 2013-07-25
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2733 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004460
- Description: In this thesis I argue that Plato's critique of poetry, taken in its proper context, is a serious and relevant critique of popular culture. In the first chapter I argue that the poetic reforms proposed in Books 2 and 3 and Book 10 of Republic stand at the front of a total reform of Greek culture. I argue for the consistency of Plato's whole argument and then I claim that if we get Plato's targets right, not fine art or literature, and focus on appropriate modern analogues then we can see why his critique is still important. If we share his claim that we are influenced by popular culture in important and often insidious ways and agree that culture can promote corrupt values, then we have accepted the core of Plato's challenge. If we find his solution distasteful, then the task is to come up with a democratic alternative. In the remaining two chapters I focus specifically on the challenge to the poets, putting the other reforms to the side. In the second chapter I consider a possible reply to the challenge focusing on the worth of the poetry that was expelled. I first look elsewhere in the Platonic oeuvre at the account of beauty in Symposium and Phaedrus but I argue that neither of them gives anything like aesthetic value that could be usefully applied to poetry. Next I look to some modern accounts of aesthetic value. I argue that while they might go some of the distance against Plato's challenge, they face a difficult task because it is not sufficient positing the value, an account is needed of their positive benefit. In the third chapter I turn to a more direct response to the challenge. Arguably Aristotle offers such a response in the Poetics, in terms of the notion of katharsis. I consider two interpretative candidates for katharsis. The first takes the benefit of poetry to be psychological - katharsis is a purgation of otherwise pathological emotions. I argue that this fails because it misunderstands precisely what Plato's concerns about poetry are, and, furthermore, this account could even be compatible with Plato's worries. The second interpretation takes the benefit of poetry to be ethical- katharsis is a type of ethical clarification which is beneficial in training our emotional responses. I claim that the clarification, and education, is worryingly conventionalist, and doesn't take seriously that Plato's target was popular culture and not great, educative literature. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2007
- Authors: Ansell, James D'Olier
- Date: 2007 , 2013-07-25
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2733 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004460
- Description: In this thesis I argue that Plato's critique of poetry, taken in its proper context, is a serious and relevant critique of popular culture. In the first chapter I argue that the poetic reforms proposed in Books 2 and 3 and Book 10 of Republic stand at the front of a total reform of Greek culture. I argue for the consistency of Plato's whole argument and then I claim that if we get Plato's targets right, not fine art or literature, and focus on appropriate modern analogues then we can see why his critique is still important. If we share his claim that we are influenced by popular culture in important and often insidious ways and agree that culture can promote corrupt values, then we have accepted the core of Plato's challenge. If we find his solution distasteful, then the task is to come up with a democratic alternative. In the remaining two chapters I focus specifically on the challenge to the poets, putting the other reforms to the side. In the second chapter I consider a possible reply to the challenge focusing on the worth of the poetry that was expelled. I first look elsewhere in the Platonic oeuvre at the account of beauty in Symposium and Phaedrus but I argue that neither of them gives anything like aesthetic value that could be usefully applied to poetry. Next I look to some modern accounts of aesthetic value. I argue that while they might go some of the distance against Plato's challenge, they face a difficult task because it is not sufficient positing the value, an account is needed of their positive benefit. In the third chapter I turn to a more direct response to the challenge. Arguably Aristotle offers such a response in the Poetics, in terms of the notion of katharsis. I consider two interpretative candidates for katharsis. The first takes the benefit of poetry to be psychological - katharsis is a purgation of otherwise pathological emotions. I argue that this fails because it misunderstands precisely what Plato's concerns about poetry are, and, furthermore, this account could even be compatible with Plato's worries. The second interpretation takes the benefit of poetry to be ethical- katharsis is a type of ethical clarification which is beneficial in training our emotional responses. I claim that the clarification, and education, is worryingly conventionalist, and doesn't take seriously that Plato's target was popular culture and not great, educative literature. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2007
Filling the gap : Nietzsche's account of authenticity as a supplementary ideal
- Authors: Baker, Michaela Christie
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Ethics , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Ethics, Modern , Normativity (Ethics) , Self-knowledge, Theory of
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2727 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003734 , Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Ethics , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Ethics, Modern , Normativity (Ethics) , Self-knowledge, Theory of
- Description: This thesis examines the ideal of authenticity: why we might want or need such an ideal, what such an ideal would look like, and what mechanisms we would need to ensure the successful operation of such an ideal. The thesis has three main parts. The first part of the thesis aims at motivating the need to look to authenticity as a supplementary ideal to normative moral theory. I do this by drawing a distinction between ethics and morality and arguing that there are important aspects of our lives (such as our relations to ourselves) our beliefs and projects) about which normative moral theory fails to give us guidance and about which an ethical ideal, namely that of authenticity, can provide us with the requisite guidance. The second part of the thesis elucidates Nietzsche's view of authenticity as eternal return. I argue that eternal return consists in holding a particular attitude to one's life - one's past, present and future. I then demonstrate that what is fundamental to successfully living authentically in accordance with eternal return is a rigorous search for self-knowledge. In the third part of the thesis I argue that, in order to achieve the self-knowledge necessary to being a successful authentic agent, one must acquire it through a process of dialogue with other agents. I give a model of self-knowledge as a dialogic encounter that provides two important mechanisms whereby such self-knowledge can be gained.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2004
- Authors: Baker, Michaela Christie
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Ethics , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Ethics, Modern , Normativity (Ethics) , Self-knowledge, Theory of
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2727 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003734 , Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Ethics , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Ethics, Modern , Normativity (Ethics) , Self-knowledge, Theory of
- Description: This thesis examines the ideal of authenticity: why we might want or need such an ideal, what such an ideal would look like, and what mechanisms we would need to ensure the successful operation of such an ideal. The thesis has three main parts. The first part of the thesis aims at motivating the need to look to authenticity as a supplementary ideal to normative moral theory. I do this by drawing a distinction between ethics and morality and arguing that there are important aspects of our lives (such as our relations to ourselves) our beliefs and projects) about which normative moral theory fails to give us guidance and about which an ethical ideal, namely that of authenticity, can provide us with the requisite guidance. The second part of the thesis elucidates Nietzsche's view of authenticity as eternal return. I argue that eternal return consists in holding a particular attitude to one's life - one's past, present and future. I then demonstrate that what is fundamental to successfully living authentically in accordance with eternal return is a rigorous search for self-knowledge. In the third part of the thesis I argue that, in order to achieve the self-knowledge necessary to being a successful authentic agent, one must acquire it through a process of dialogue with other agents. I give a model of self-knowledge as a dialogic encounter that provides two important mechanisms whereby such self-knowledge can be gained.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2004
The fiction of scarcity: conceptualising scarcity in terms of global justice
- Authors: Brotherton, Michelle
- Date: 2022-04-07
- Subjects: Scarcity Philosophy , Distributive justice , Political science Philosophy , Philosophy , Justification (Ethics) , Fallacies (Logic)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/294526 , vital:57229 , DOI https://dx.doi.org/10.21504/10962/294526
- Description: This thesis intends to contribute to the discourse on global justice as it pertains to resources, the distribution of resources, and the allocation of resources. The focus is on the concept of scarcity. I examine scarcity for how it is understood, interpreted, and applied in the literature on global justice. This thesis argues that scarcity lacks conceptual clarity in the discourse on global justice and argues that if scarcity is misconstrued, the consequences can be severe. Conceptual clarity is thus necessary to ensure that scarcity is properly referred to in the discourse on global justice so that scarcity is not erroneously used when justifications are sought for material deprivation and consequent human suffering. In the process, I will also examine how scarcity is used as a justification in instances of material deprivation and why this is problematic. Given the lack of conceptual clarity regarding scarcity, I argue that reliance on scarcity as justification may be erroneous. The conflation of absolute scarcity and relative scarcity may amount to a category mistake. This thesis purports to clarify scarcity conceptually in the context of global justice. In doing so, I recommend that a resource-centric approach to resource scarcity is adopted to accurately account for the scarcity status of resources. A resource-centric approach to resource scarcity based on a more nuanced understanding of scarcity avoids the potential category mistake. Such an approach ensures that material deprivation and consequent human suffering are not wrongfully attributed to scarcity. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-04-07
- Authors: Brotherton, Michelle
- Date: 2022-04-07
- Subjects: Scarcity Philosophy , Distributive justice , Political science Philosophy , Philosophy , Justification (Ethics) , Fallacies (Logic)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/294526 , vital:57229 , DOI https://dx.doi.org/10.21504/10962/294526
- Description: This thesis intends to contribute to the discourse on global justice as it pertains to resources, the distribution of resources, and the allocation of resources. The focus is on the concept of scarcity. I examine scarcity for how it is understood, interpreted, and applied in the literature on global justice. This thesis argues that scarcity lacks conceptual clarity in the discourse on global justice and argues that if scarcity is misconstrued, the consequences can be severe. Conceptual clarity is thus necessary to ensure that scarcity is properly referred to in the discourse on global justice so that scarcity is not erroneously used when justifications are sought for material deprivation and consequent human suffering. In the process, I will also examine how scarcity is used as a justification in instances of material deprivation and why this is problematic. Given the lack of conceptual clarity regarding scarcity, I argue that reliance on scarcity as justification may be erroneous. The conflation of absolute scarcity and relative scarcity may amount to a category mistake. This thesis purports to clarify scarcity conceptually in the context of global justice. In doing so, I recommend that a resource-centric approach to resource scarcity is adopted to accurately account for the scarcity status of resources. A resource-centric approach to resource scarcity based on a more nuanced understanding of scarcity avoids the potential category mistake. Such an approach ensures that material deprivation and consequent human suffering are not wrongfully attributed to scarcity. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-04-07
Patents, pills, poverty and pandemic: the ethical issues
- Authors: Brown, Walter
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Ethics , AIDS (Disease) -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , AIDS (Disease) -- Moral and ethical aspects , HIV infections -- South Africa , HIV infections -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , Social responsibility of business , Pharmaceutical industry -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2705 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002835 , Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Ethics , AIDS (Disease) -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , AIDS (Disease) -- Moral and ethical aspects , HIV infections -- South Africa , HIV infections -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , Social responsibility of business , Pharmaceutical industry -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Description: This thesis argues that corporations qua corporations are moral agents sui generis and hence capable of being held morally responsible. I argue that corporations qua corporations are responsible for the actual and foreseen consequences of their actions. I analyse normative theories and the different proscriptive responsibilities they place on moral agents and hence corporations. I examine Kantianism, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. I argue for a unique normative ethical theory that incorporates reasoning from all three of the normative theories. I argue for a broad range of reasons to factor into deciding whether an act is ethical or not. One of the claims of this thesis is that ethical theories must incorporate an agent’s motivation, intention and character traits as relevant to deciding on whether an action is ethical or not. My thesis argues for an indispensable role for the virtues while at the same time incorporating impartial beneficence and universal rationality from utilitarianism and Kantianism. This position I, following the literature, refer to as moderate virtue theory. Having established corporate qua corporate responsibility I question the pharmaceutical corporation’s practice of patenting life saving medication during a state of pandemic in poor countries. The moderate virtue theory position prioritises contexts and the actual human condition and criticises normative theories that attempt to give universal, abstracted answers to ethical problems. It is for this reason and the current (2003) HIV/AIDS pandemic that I focus on a particular context. I examine the practice of patenting life saving medication within South Africa and argue, applying moderate virtue theory, that this act cannot be justified. I argue that a pharmaceutical corporation that patents life saving medication in South Africa cannot justify that action and thus is morally responsible for that action. I also argue that corporations patenting HIV/AIDS medication in South Africa have unethical motivations and intentions.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
- Authors: Brown, Walter
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Ethics , AIDS (Disease) -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , AIDS (Disease) -- Moral and ethical aspects , HIV infections -- South Africa , HIV infections -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , Social responsibility of business , Pharmaceutical industry -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2705 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002835 , Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Ethics , AIDS (Disease) -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , AIDS (Disease) -- Moral and ethical aspects , HIV infections -- South Africa , HIV infections -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , Social responsibility of business , Pharmaceutical industry -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Description: This thesis argues that corporations qua corporations are moral agents sui generis and hence capable of being held morally responsible. I argue that corporations qua corporations are responsible for the actual and foreseen consequences of their actions. I analyse normative theories and the different proscriptive responsibilities they place on moral agents and hence corporations. I examine Kantianism, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. I argue for a unique normative ethical theory that incorporates reasoning from all three of the normative theories. I argue for a broad range of reasons to factor into deciding whether an act is ethical or not. One of the claims of this thesis is that ethical theories must incorporate an agent’s motivation, intention and character traits as relevant to deciding on whether an action is ethical or not. My thesis argues for an indispensable role for the virtues while at the same time incorporating impartial beneficence and universal rationality from utilitarianism and Kantianism. This position I, following the literature, refer to as moderate virtue theory. Having established corporate qua corporate responsibility I question the pharmaceutical corporation’s practice of patenting life saving medication during a state of pandemic in poor countries. The moderate virtue theory position prioritises contexts and the actual human condition and criticises normative theories that attempt to give universal, abstracted answers to ethical problems. It is for this reason and the current (2003) HIV/AIDS pandemic that I focus on a particular context. I examine the practice of patenting life saving medication within South Africa and argue, applying moderate virtue theory, that this act cannot be justified. I argue that a pharmaceutical corporation that patents life saving medication in South Africa cannot justify that action and thus is morally responsible for that action. I also argue that corporations patenting HIV/AIDS medication in South Africa have unethical motivations and intentions.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2003
Describing behaviour: a philosophical analysis
- Authors: Bunting, I A
- Date: 1966
- Subjects: Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2744 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1009991 , Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Description: Questions revolving around the possibility and justifiability of reductive analyses of the concept 'not', lie at the heart of many of the problems in the philosophical interpretation of not-descriptions. In this thesis, I wish to show, by discussing various problems in the logic of not-descriptions, that, and why, reductive analyses must be unsatisfactory.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1966
- Authors: Bunting, I A
- Date: 1966
- Subjects: Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2744 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1009991 , Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Description: Questions revolving around the possibility and justifiability of reductive analyses of the concept 'not', lie at the heart of many of the problems in the philosophical interpretation of not-descriptions. In this thesis, I wish to show, by discussing various problems in the logic of not-descriptions, that, and why, reductive analyses must be unsatisfactory.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1966
Reason and eros
- Authors: Chalmers, W D
- Date: 1967 , 2014-06-09
- Subjects: Philosophy , Love , Reasoning
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2748 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013331
- Description: This study is not intended as a work of research into any existing body of philosopny. It is, rather, an independent inquiry into the origins and the objective of philosophical activity. In this it assumes the somewhat enigmatic role of a philosophy of philosophy.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1967
- Authors: Chalmers, W D
- Date: 1967 , 2014-06-09
- Subjects: Philosophy , Love , Reasoning
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2748 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013331
- Description: This study is not intended as a work of research into any existing body of philosopny. It is, rather, an independent inquiry into the origins and the objective of philosophical activity. In this it assumes the somewhat enigmatic role of a philosophy of philosophy.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1967
Form and substance in R.M. Hare's utilitarianism
- Authors: Coetzee, Pieter Hendrik
- Date: 1992
- Subjects: Hare, R. M. (Richard Mervyn) -- Ethics , Utilitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2706 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002836 , Hare, R. M. (Richard Mervyn) -- Ethics , Utilitarianism
- Description: Throughout his career as moral philosopher Hare has insisted that there is a rational way of arriving at substantive moral judgements. Hare develops this view - first presented in ' The language of morals' (1952) and ' Universalizability' (1955) - into the claim that rational agents are required to adopt utilitarian solutions to moral disputes. In ' Freedom and reason ' (1963) this claim is defended with reference to the view that the formal features of moral language (universalizability and prescriptivity)commit moral agents to a certain method of reasoning, and that this method of reasoning, when conjoined with facts about people's desires and preferences, leads us to accept substantive moral judgements consistent with those required by a form of utilitarianism. This view features throughout Hare's subsequent work, but the argument for it undergoes change. This means change in the defence of the claim that the meta-theory Universal Prescriptivism is consistent with a form of normative utilitarian theory, as this claim is argued for in 'Ethical theory and utilitarianism' (1976) and 'Moral Thinking' (1981). I shall endeavour to trace the chronological development of Hare's thinking, and will concentrate on developments in the argument for a theory of act-utilitarianism. I shall argue that the argument for utilitarianism gives rise to two major problems which arise from a specific feature of the argument, namely, the attempt to run the resolution of bi-lateral and multi-lateral cases of conflict along lines analogous to the resolution of conflict in the single-person case. Hare's argument requires that a decision-maker must identify the person with whom he reverses roles as himself, and that he must be prepared to concede that the things his recipient has good reasons for wanting are also reasons for him to want the same things. I argue that it is not possible to make coherent sense of the identity of the person in the reversed-role situation and that the motivational states a decision -maker is expected to deem 'his own' are not properly states of himself. If I am right, the 'identity'-question sits at the root of a motivational gap in Hare's theory.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1992
- Authors: Coetzee, Pieter Hendrik
- Date: 1992
- Subjects: Hare, R. M. (Richard Mervyn) -- Ethics , Utilitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2706 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002836 , Hare, R. M. (Richard Mervyn) -- Ethics , Utilitarianism
- Description: Throughout his career as moral philosopher Hare has insisted that there is a rational way of arriving at substantive moral judgements. Hare develops this view - first presented in ' The language of morals' (1952) and ' Universalizability' (1955) - into the claim that rational agents are required to adopt utilitarian solutions to moral disputes. In ' Freedom and reason ' (1963) this claim is defended with reference to the view that the formal features of moral language (universalizability and prescriptivity)commit moral agents to a certain method of reasoning, and that this method of reasoning, when conjoined with facts about people's desires and preferences, leads us to accept substantive moral judgements consistent with those required by a form of utilitarianism. This view features throughout Hare's subsequent work, but the argument for it undergoes change. This means change in the defence of the claim that the meta-theory Universal Prescriptivism is consistent with a form of normative utilitarian theory, as this claim is argued for in 'Ethical theory and utilitarianism' (1976) and 'Moral Thinking' (1981). I shall endeavour to trace the chronological development of Hare's thinking, and will concentrate on developments in the argument for a theory of act-utilitarianism. I shall argue that the argument for utilitarianism gives rise to two major problems which arise from a specific feature of the argument, namely, the attempt to run the resolution of bi-lateral and multi-lateral cases of conflict along lines analogous to the resolution of conflict in the single-person case. Hare's argument requires that a decision-maker must identify the person with whom he reverses roles as himself, and that he must be prepared to concede that the things his recipient has good reasons for wanting are also reasons for him to want the same things. I argue that it is not possible to make coherent sense of the identity of the person in the reversed-role situation and that the motivational states a decision -maker is expected to deem 'his own' are not properly states of himself. If I am right, the 'identity'-question sits at the root of a motivational gap in Hare's theory.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1992
Self-inquiry: Comparing Plato and Patanjali
- Authors: Coughlan, Daniel Michael
- Date: 2021-10
- Subjects: Plato , Patañjali , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Comparison (Philosophy) , Justification (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190066 , vital:44960
- Description: At its most effective my research hopes to re-affirm the central value and importance of self-inquiry. That is, I hope to echo the familiar call of the wise to know thyself. Of the many mouths and temple walls that have lent authority to this precept there is perhaps no mouth more important than one’s own. To know thyself is the task and responsibility of the individual. In order to arrive at the point where I can re-affirm its value I explore the nature of self-inquiry with the help of Plato, Patanjali and a comparison between them. I propose two general senses in which we might understand self-inquiry and seek to bring out the core problems faced by each. We find an account of these two senses and the relationship between them in both Plato and Patanjali, so too, though less obviously, in the comparison between them. The comparison provides the opportunity for reflecting on the ground that it moves from and depends on, the common ground we assume between the two compared philosophers/ies. I contend that this ground is ultimately the comparer, one’s self. The consequence is that the comparative project and the project of self-inquiry both meet and are mutually beneficial. The three together; Plato, Patanjali, and the comparison between them help us account for nature of self-inquiry in helping us to better understand the relationship between the two senses in which we can come to understand and think about it. In the first sense, self-inquiry is cast as the examination of one’s life. In the second sense, we are invited to consider the possibility of an unmediated knowing of the examiner, an unmediated self-knowing. With a better understanding of what self-inquiry is I stand to conclude by re-affirming its value. , Thesis (MPhil) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10
- Authors: Coughlan, Daniel Michael
- Date: 2021-10
- Subjects: Plato , Patañjali , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Comparison (Philosophy) , Justification (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190066 , vital:44960
- Description: At its most effective my research hopes to re-affirm the central value and importance of self-inquiry. That is, I hope to echo the familiar call of the wise to know thyself. Of the many mouths and temple walls that have lent authority to this precept there is perhaps no mouth more important than one’s own. To know thyself is the task and responsibility of the individual. In order to arrive at the point where I can re-affirm its value I explore the nature of self-inquiry with the help of Plato, Patanjali and a comparison between them. I propose two general senses in which we might understand self-inquiry and seek to bring out the core problems faced by each. We find an account of these two senses and the relationship between them in both Plato and Patanjali, so too, though less obviously, in the comparison between them. The comparison provides the opportunity for reflecting on the ground that it moves from and depends on, the common ground we assume between the two compared philosophers/ies. I contend that this ground is ultimately the comparer, one’s self. The consequence is that the comparative project and the project of self-inquiry both meet and are mutually beneficial. The three together; Plato, Patanjali, and the comparison between them help us account for nature of self-inquiry in helping us to better understand the relationship between the two senses in which we can come to understand and think about it. In the first sense, self-inquiry is cast as the examination of one’s life. In the second sense, we are invited to consider the possibility of an unmediated knowing of the examiner, an unmediated self-knowing. With a better understanding of what self-inquiry is I stand to conclude by re-affirming its value. , Thesis (MPhil) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2021-10
Generating shared interpretive resources in the mathematics classroom: using philosophy of mathematics to teach mathematics better
- Authors: De Lange, Laura
- Date: 2017
- Subjects: Mathematics -- Study and teaching , Mathematics -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/4293 , vital:20645
- Description: Every student has a unique mathematical lived experience: a unique amalgamation of ideas about mathematics, exposure to mathematical concepts and feelings about mathematics. A student's unique set of circumstances means that not every explanatory account of mathematics will cohere with her previous experiences. For an explanation to have explanatory potential, it must provide an account which coheres with the other beliefs a student has about mathematics. If an explanation has no such coherence, it will not be recognisable as an explanation of the phenomenon of mathematics for the student. Our explanatory accounts of mathematics and mathematical knowledge are our philosophies of mathematics. Different philosophies of mathematics will better explain different sets of mathematical lived experiences. In this thesis I will argue that students should be exposed to a multiplicity of philosophies of mathematics so that they can endorse the philosophy of mathematics which has the most explanatory potential for their particular set of mathematical lived experiences. I argue that this will improve student understanding of mathematics. The claims inherent in any given philosophy of mathematics, when combined with other stereotypes or prejudices, can work to unjustly exclude members of subordinated groups, such as poor, black or female students, from mathematical participation. If we want to avoid reinforcing and reinscribing prejudicial claims about people in the mathematics classroom, we need to be aware of how a certain philosophy of mathematics can exclude certain students. In this thesis I will be defending the idea that, as mathematics educators, we should diversify the way we see mathematics so that we decrease this exclusion from mathematics. In order to diversify the way in which we see mathematics so as to decrease unjust exclusion, members of subordinated groups should be encouraged to share their mathematical experiences in a space sensitive to the power dynamics present in the mathematics classroom. These accounts can then be combined with existing philosophies of mathematics to create new ways of making sense of mathematics which do not unjustly exclude members of subordinated groups.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2017
- Authors: De Lange, Laura
- Date: 2017
- Subjects: Mathematics -- Study and teaching , Mathematics -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/4293 , vital:20645
- Description: Every student has a unique mathematical lived experience: a unique amalgamation of ideas about mathematics, exposure to mathematical concepts and feelings about mathematics. A student's unique set of circumstances means that not every explanatory account of mathematics will cohere with her previous experiences. For an explanation to have explanatory potential, it must provide an account which coheres with the other beliefs a student has about mathematics. If an explanation has no such coherence, it will not be recognisable as an explanation of the phenomenon of mathematics for the student. Our explanatory accounts of mathematics and mathematical knowledge are our philosophies of mathematics. Different philosophies of mathematics will better explain different sets of mathematical lived experiences. In this thesis I will argue that students should be exposed to a multiplicity of philosophies of mathematics so that they can endorse the philosophy of mathematics which has the most explanatory potential for their particular set of mathematical lived experiences. I argue that this will improve student understanding of mathematics. The claims inherent in any given philosophy of mathematics, when combined with other stereotypes or prejudices, can work to unjustly exclude members of subordinated groups, such as poor, black or female students, from mathematical participation. If we want to avoid reinforcing and reinscribing prejudicial claims about people in the mathematics classroom, we need to be aware of how a certain philosophy of mathematics can exclude certain students. In this thesis I will be defending the idea that, as mathematics educators, we should diversify the way we see mathematics so that we decrease this exclusion from mathematics. In order to diversify the way in which we see mathematics so as to decrease unjust exclusion, members of subordinated groups should be encouraged to share their mathematical experiences in a space sensitive to the power dynamics present in the mathematics classroom. These accounts can then be combined with existing philosophies of mathematics to create new ways of making sense of mathematics which do not unjustly exclude members of subordinated groups.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2017
Take my word for it: a new approach to the problem of sincerity in the epistemology of testimony
- Authors: Dewhurst, Therese
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Sincerity Philosophy Terminology Knowledge, Theory of Honesty
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2707 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002837
- Description: The epistemological problem of sincerity in testimony is often approached in the following way: We, as a matter of fact, accept utterances as sincere. We do so in the face of knowledge that people lie and deceive,and yet we still count these beliefs as good beliefs. Therefore there must be some reason or argument that we can cite in order to justify our acceptance of the sincerity of the speaker. In this thesis I will argue, contra this, that there is no reason, per se, that justifies our of a speakers sincerity: this is because recognition of the obligation to accept the sincerity is a necessary condition on the possibility of communication and interpretation. In the first three of the thesis I will argue against three of the main approaches to the problem by focusing on what I believe to be the strongest accounts of each: Elizabeth Fricker's reductionism, Tyler Burge's non-reductionism, and Paul Faulkner's trust account of testimony. In the final chapter I will put forward my positive account. I will argue that it is a constitutive rule of language that a speaker be sincere, and then make the further claim, that it is a constitutive rule of interpretation that the hearer take an utterance as sincere. On my account, successful communication does not just depend on a speaker making sincere utterances,but just as importantly,, on the hearer recognising an obligation to take those utterances as being sincere.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2010
- Authors: Dewhurst, Therese
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Sincerity Philosophy Terminology Knowledge, Theory of Honesty
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2707 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002837
- Description: The epistemological problem of sincerity in testimony is often approached in the following way: We, as a matter of fact, accept utterances as sincere. We do so in the face of knowledge that people lie and deceive,and yet we still count these beliefs as good beliefs. Therefore there must be some reason or argument that we can cite in order to justify our acceptance of the sincerity of the speaker. In this thesis I will argue, contra this, that there is no reason, per se, that justifies our of a speakers sincerity: this is because recognition of the obligation to accept the sincerity is a necessary condition on the possibility of communication and interpretation. In the first three of the thesis I will argue against three of the main approaches to the problem by focusing on what I believe to be the strongest accounts of each: Elizabeth Fricker's reductionism, Tyler Burge's non-reductionism, and Paul Faulkner's trust account of testimony. In the final chapter I will put forward my positive account. I will argue that it is a constitutive rule of language that a speaker be sincere, and then make the further claim, that it is a constitutive rule of interpretation that the hearer take an utterance as sincere. On my account, successful communication does not just depend on a speaker making sincere utterances,but just as importantly,, on the hearer recognising an obligation to take those utterances as being sincere.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2010
Reforging Ockham’s Razor: an enquiry into the ontology of parsimony arguments
- Authors: Dichmont, Thomas
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Logic , Metaphysics , Ontology , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemology , Philosophy and science , Occam's razor
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406736 , vital:70303
- Description: Nearly every philosopher in English-speaking world has heard of Ockham’s Razor, which is given in one of two ways, don’t multiply entities beyond necessity and all things being equal choose the simpler explanation. Yet it is unclear from the scholarship whether the use of Ockham’s Razor is justified in science and philosophy. However, if it can be shown to ‘get’ us truth, it would gain an unequivocal justification, as disputes that are continued after the parties to the substantive truth of one or the other are defined as frivolous. Alternative, one may contend that explanation could have other criteria of success. The implication of a direct connection between the razor and truth comes with ontological commitments, namely a commitment to realism (about universals) and philosophical theism. This is contrary to the razor’s use as a tool of nominalism and naturalism. I argue in this thesis there that the only possible non-circular justification for Ockham’s Razor is truth and that therefore certain philosophical positions are excluded from using the razor to animate their positions. There is an additional, second criteria for the success of our inquiry, namely the justification must in some way be consistent with the razor, which means the chosen explanation for the razor, must be simpler than any of its rivals and not have superfluous entities, otherwise our justification would be contrary to the advice of the razor. We are presented with a Scylla and Charybdis type problem, we avoid a circularity on the one hand and on the other we must not contradict the razor itself, these are contrary intellectual impulses. So firstly I will look at disciplines outside philosophy for some initial inspiration. If we could answer this question in a ‘non’ philosophical way, the problem would have solved itself in a way that require little change of practice. If lawyers or scientist can account for the razor properly, there is not really a problem of justification, at least not a philosophical one. Second, I consider the realist and theist positions, namely an argument of Aristotle’s in the Posterior Analytics and part of Aquinas’ On the Divine Simplicity. Further, I consider the work of Ockham as a nominalist. Lastly, I consider modern and contemporary philosophy, in the form of Hume, Quine and Sober (a modern writer on the razor). The aim here is to ‘stress test’ the philosophical resources of the various systems and analyse the results to see if they can produce a non-circular result. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
- Authors: Dichmont, Thomas
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Logic , Metaphysics , Ontology , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemology , Philosophy and science , Occam's razor
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406736 , vital:70303
- Description: Nearly every philosopher in English-speaking world has heard of Ockham’s Razor, which is given in one of two ways, don’t multiply entities beyond necessity and all things being equal choose the simpler explanation. Yet it is unclear from the scholarship whether the use of Ockham’s Razor is justified in science and philosophy. However, if it can be shown to ‘get’ us truth, it would gain an unequivocal justification, as disputes that are continued after the parties to the substantive truth of one or the other are defined as frivolous. Alternative, one may contend that explanation could have other criteria of success. The implication of a direct connection between the razor and truth comes with ontological commitments, namely a commitment to realism (about universals) and philosophical theism. This is contrary to the razor’s use as a tool of nominalism and naturalism. I argue in this thesis there that the only possible non-circular justification for Ockham’s Razor is truth and that therefore certain philosophical positions are excluded from using the razor to animate their positions. There is an additional, second criteria for the success of our inquiry, namely the justification must in some way be consistent with the razor, which means the chosen explanation for the razor, must be simpler than any of its rivals and not have superfluous entities, otherwise our justification would be contrary to the advice of the razor. We are presented with a Scylla and Charybdis type problem, we avoid a circularity on the one hand and on the other we must not contradict the razor itself, these are contrary intellectual impulses. So firstly I will look at disciplines outside philosophy for some initial inspiration. If we could answer this question in a ‘non’ philosophical way, the problem would have solved itself in a way that require little change of practice. If lawyers or scientist can account for the razor properly, there is not really a problem of justification, at least not a philosophical one. Second, I consider the realist and theist positions, namely an argument of Aristotle’s in the Posterior Analytics and part of Aquinas’ On the Divine Simplicity. Further, I consider the work of Ockham as a nominalist. Lastly, I consider modern and contemporary philosophy, in the form of Hume, Quine and Sober (a modern writer on the razor). The aim here is to ‘stress test’ the philosophical resources of the various systems and analyse the results to see if they can produce a non-circular result. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
Arguments for other minds
- Authors: Dowling, Dolina Sylvia
- Date: 1989
- Subjects: Mind and body -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2702 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001977
- Description: If I am aware of my own mental states by introspection (a) How can I know that other people have minds? and (b) How can I know what their mental states are? These are two of the questions with which I will be concerned in this dissertation. I discuss five different attempts to deal with them. (i) The claim that we can know that other people have minds by an argument from analogy. I show a number of serious flaws in Russell's and other versions of this argument. (ii) Malcolm's thesis that the criteria by which we apply mental terms to others are just different from the criteria one applies in one's own case. I argue that Halcolm's accounts of both first- and third-person criteria are not adequate. (iii) I consider Strawson claim that 'persons' is a primitive concept and that behavioural criteria are "logically adequate" for determining the correctness of statements about the mental states of others. I argue that both of his key concepts are underanalysed. (iv) A quite different attempt to answer our questions (a) and (b) is given by the empirical realist who argues that knowledge claims about other minds are best understood as hypotheses in a wider psycho-physical theory. I show that the major fault in Putnam's version of empirical realism is that he overlooks the subjective character of (iii) our mental states. (v) Finally I consider the claim, due to Nagel, that a conception of mental states is possible which incorporates both subjective and objective aspects of the phenonemon. I speculate that with a great deal of development this approach might hold the answer to our questions.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1989
- Authors: Dowling, Dolina Sylvia
- Date: 1989
- Subjects: Mind and body -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2702 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001977
- Description: If I am aware of my own mental states by introspection (a) How can I know that other people have minds? and (b) How can I know what their mental states are? These are two of the questions with which I will be concerned in this dissertation. I discuss five different attempts to deal with them. (i) The claim that we can know that other people have minds by an argument from analogy. I show a number of serious flaws in Russell's and other versions of this argument. (ii) Malcolm's thesis that the criteria by which we apply mental terms to others are just different from the criteria one applies in one's own case. I argue that Halcolm's accounts of both first- and third-person criteria are not adequate. (iii) I consider Strawson claim that 'persons' is a primitive concept and that behavioural criteria are "logically adequate" for determining the correctness of statements about the mental states of others. I argue that both of his key concepts are underanalysed. (iv) A quite different attempt to answer our questions (a) and (b) is given by the empirical realist who argues that knowledge claims about other minds are best understood as hypotheses in a wider psycho-physical theory. I show that the major fault in Putnam's version of empirical realism is that he overlooks the subjective character of (iii) our mental states. (v) Finally I consider the claim, due to Nagel, that a conception of mental states is possible which incorporates both subjective and objective aspects of the phenonemon. I speculate that with a great deal of development this approach might hold the answer to our questions.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1989
Zusammenhangen and logical atomism in Wittgenstein's tractatus
- Authors: Dyer, Clive
- Date: 1982 , 2013-03-19
- Subjects: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2734 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005929 , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Description: Introduction: The argument presented in this thesis is that Wittgenstein's answer to the question - as to how one. proposition can be generated out of another - can show a way in which the reconciliation between logical atomism and Zusammenhangen becomes obvious. In the Preliminaries an exposition of logical atomism and the Zusammenhangen thesis is given. The way in which the problem appears is then briefly exposed. The way towards a solution begins with the elucidation of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and the truthfunctional analysis of a proposition. The problem is clarified in the question which now arises: i.e., given the truth-functional analysis of a proposition,. how can one proposition be generated out of another? The problem is then shown to vanish in the logical construction of a proposition and of propositions. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.53 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1982
- Authors: Dyer, Clive
- Date: 1982 , 2013-03-19
- Subjects: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2734 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005929 , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Description: Introduction: The argument presented in this thesis is that Wittgenstein's answer to the question - as to how one. proposition can be generated out of another - can show a way in which the reconciliation between logical atomism and Zusammenhangen becomes obvious. In the Preliminaries an exposition of logical atomism and the Zusammenhangen thesis is given. The way in which the problem appears is then briefly exposed. The way towards a solution begins with the elucidation of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and the truthfunctional analysis of a proposition. The problem is clarified in the question which now arises: i.e., given the truth-functional analysis of a proposition,. how can one proposition be generated out of another? The problem is then shown to vanish in the logical construction of a proposition and of propositions. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.53 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 1982
Shame is valuable
- Authors: Euvrard, Jonathan George
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Shame Ethics Self-evaluation
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2708 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002838
- Description: In this thesis I argue that shame is valuable because it contributes to the moral life by promoting coherence. I start by developing and defending a conception of shame. On my conception, rational shame involves a negative self-assessment, in which I am both the assessor and the object of assessment, and in which the standard of assessment is my own. I then develop a notion of coherence, and apply it to the relationship between values, and the relationship between values and actions. I also tie the notion of coherence to what I call “the moral life”. I then discuss two ways in which shame can work to promote coherence. Firstly, I describe a process of critical reflective self-assessment, and show how this is a particularly effective method of promoting coherence when coupled with shame. Secondly, I discuss the connection between my emotions and my values, arguing that this connection promotes coherence, and that shame works to reinforce this connection and thereby to promote coherence.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
- Authors: Euvrard, Jonathan George
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Shame Ethics Self-evaluation
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2708 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002838
- Description: In this thesis I argue that shame is valuable because it contributes to the moral life by promoting coherence. I start by developing and defending a conception of shame. On my conception, rational shame involves a negative self-assessment, in which I am both the assessor and the object of assessment, and in which the standard of assessment is my own. I then develop a notion of coherence, and apply it to the relationship between values, and the relationship between values and actions. I also tie the notion of coherence to what I call “the moral life”. I then discuss two ways in which shame can work to promote coherence. Firstly, I describe a process of critical reflective self-assessment, and show how this is a particularly effective method of promoting coherence when coupled with shame. Secondly, I discuss the connection between my emotions and my values, arguing that this connection promotes coherence, and that shame works to reinforce this connection and thereby to promote coherence.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
Externalism, self-knowledge and explanation
- Authors: Flockemann, Richard
- Date: 2013-06-11
- Subjects: Burge, Tyler Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Self-knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2743 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1008060
- Description: In recent years, much attention has been given to the question of whether content externalism is compatible with an account of self-knowledge maintaining that we have an epistemically privileged access to the content of our propositional mental states. Philosophers who maintain the two are incompatible (incompatibilists) have put forward two majors types of challenge, which I call - following Martin Davies - the Achievement and Consequence Problems, which aim to demonstrate that self-knowledge cannot be reconciled with externalism. These challenges have spawned a great deal of literature, and a diverse range of arguments and positions have emerged in response. In this dissertation, I intend to focus on examples of these different avenues of response, and show how none of them are adequate. In the first chapter, I lay the groundwork for the debate, setting up how externalism and self-knowledge are to be understood, and outlining both the incompatibilist challenges as well as the available responses to them. In the second chapter I examine these responses in more detail, concluding finally that the best available response is Tyler Burge's. Burge has two arguments that together establish his compatibilist position. First, he shows that even if externalism is true, our judgements about our occurrent thoughts are immunejrom error. This establishes that our judgements about our thoughts must be true. Second, he offers a transcendental argument for self-knowledge, arguing that our access to our mental states must be not only true, but non-accidentally true, in a way sufficient for genuine knowledge. This establishes that we possess the correct epistemic entitlement to our thoughts. In the third chapter, I argue Burge's arguments do not, in fact, give us good reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge to be compatible. This, I argue, is because B urge relies upon a transcendental argument, which, in this context, cannot establish that we have self-knowledge if externalism is true. All it establishes, I argue, is that we do possess self-knowledge. And this is insufficient to establish that externalism and self-knowledge are compatible. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Authors: Flockemann, Richard
- Date: 2013-06-11
- Subjects: Burge, Tyler Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Self-knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2743 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1008060
- Description: In recent years, much attention has been given to the question of whether content externalism is compatible with an account of self-knowledge maintaining that we have an epistemically privileged access to the content of our propositional mental states. Philosophers who maintain the two are incompatible (incompatibilists) have put forward two majors types of challenge, which I call - following Martin Davies - the Achievement and Consequence Problems, which aim to demonstrate that self-knowledge cannot be reconciled with externalism. These challenges have spawned a great deal of literature, and a diverse range of arguments and positions have emerged in response. In this dissertation, I intend to focus on examples of these different avenues of response, and show how none of them are adequate. In the first chapter, I lay the groundwork for the debate, setting up how externalism and self-knowledge are to be understood, and outlining both the incompatibilist challenges as well as the available responses to them. In the second chapter I examine these responses in more detail, concluding finally that the best available response is Tyler Burge's. Burge has two arguments that together establish his compatibilist position. First, he shows that even if externalism is true, our judgements about our occurrent thoughts are immunejrom error. This establishes that our judgements about our thoughts must be true. Second, he offers a transcendental argument for self-knowledge, arguing that our access to our mental states must be not only true, but non-accidentally true, in a way sufficient for genuine knowledge. This establishes that we possess the correct epistemic entitlement to our thoughts. In the third chapter, I argue Burge's arguments do not, in fact, give us good reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge to be compatible. This, I argue, is because B urge relies upon a transcendental argument, which, in this context, cannot establish that we have self-knowledge if externalism is true. All it establishes, I argue, is that we do possess self-knowledge. And this is insufficient to establish that externalism and self-knowledge are compatible. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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Involuntary consent
- Authors: Futter, Dylan Brian
- Date: 2013-05-24
- Subjects: Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) Responsiblity Free will and determinism Theory (Philosophy) Social ethics Blame
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2742 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007846
- Description: In this dissertation I take exception with a widely held philosophical doctrine, according to which agents are only blameworthy for the bad actions they have chosen to bring about. My argument strategy is to present cases in which agents are blamed for involuntary actions that are not in any way connected to their culpable and voluntary choices. These failures correspond, I suggest, to occasions of culpable ignorance where agents have been negligent or careless. More specifically, I claim that violations of natural duties of respect and consideration, and certain acquired role-type duties, are blamed without any voluntary consent. If my examples are persuasive, then the point is reached where a normative principle of 'voluntary consent' does not in fact coincide with people's actual practices and 'considered judgements'. In the final sections of the dissertation, I argue against the plausibility of keeping the principle and revising our judgements. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
- Full Text:
- Authors: Futter, Dylan Brian
- Date: 2013-05-24
- Subjects: Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) Responsiblity Free will and determinism Theory (Philosophy) Social ethics Blame
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2742 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007846
- Description: In this dissertation I take exception with a widely held philosophical doctrine, according to which agents are only blameworthy for the bad actions they have chosen to bring about. My argument strategy is to present cases in which agents are blamed for involuntary actions that are not in any way connected to their culpable and voluntary choices. These failures correspond, I suggest, to occasions of culpable ignorance where agents have been negligent or careless. More specifically, I claim that violations of natural duties of respect and consideration, and certain acquired role-type duties, are blamed without any voluntary consent. If my examples are persuasive, then the point is reached where a normative principle of 'voluntary consent' does not in fact coincide with people's actual practices and 'considered judgements'. In the final sections of the dissertation, I argue against the plausibility of keeping the principle and revising our judgements. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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Kant and the experience of skepticism: rranscendental arguments, skepticism, and a version of the problem of the justification of foundational assumptions
- Authors: Grecia, Hadley
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Uncatalogued
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/425078 , vital:72207
- Description: Immanuel Kant is a key thinker in the History of Western Philosophy whose ideas continue to fascinate contemporary English-speaking academic philosophers. One such idea is Kant's conception of transcendental arguments. Although these arguments do not originate in Kant's philosophy, Kant's conception of them occupies a special place in the English-speaking literature on the topic. A growing trend in this literature is to claim that Kant's transcendental arguments are unique because they aim to achieve an anti-skeptical end through deductive means. I call the basic assumption behind readings of transcendental arguments like these the deductive/anti-skeptical assumption. This assumption claims that deduction is the best means to achieve an anti-skeptical end. In this thesis, I argue that accepting this assumption is one way to misinterpret transcendental arguments because—even though it seems compelling at first blush—it must be false. The resultant twist is that transcendental arguments cannot be deductive, which, in turn, means that understanding that Kant's transcendental arguments are not deductive in nature is itself no small detail for understanding the version of Kant's 'not-deductive' solution to skepticism developed here. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2023-10-13
- Authors: Grecia, Hadley
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Uncatalogued
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/425078 , vital:72207
- Description: Immanuel Kant is a key thinker in the History of Western Philosophy whose ideas continue to fascinate contemporary English-speaking academic philosophers. One such idea is Kant's conception of transcendental arguments. Although these arguments do not originate in Kant's philosophy, Kant's conception of them occupies a special place in the English-speaking literature on the topic. A growing trend in this literature is to claim that Kant's transcendental arguments are unique because they aim to achieve an anti-skeptical end through deductive means. I call the basic assumption behind readings of transcendental arguments like these the deductive/anti-skeptical assumption. This assumption claims that deduction is the best means to achieve an anti-skeptical end. In this thesis, I argue that accepting this assumption is one way to misinterpret transcendental arguments because—even though it seems compelling at first blush—it must be false. The resultant twist is that transcendental arguments cannot be deductive, which, in turn, means that understanding that Kant's transcendental arguments are not deductive in nature is itself no small detail for understanding the version of Kant's 'not-deductive' solution to skepticism developed here. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
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- Date Issued: 2023-10-13