"From the inside": how to attribute emotions to others
- Authors: Mitova, Velislava Atanasova
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2741 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007661 , Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Description: I argue that a specific version of Theory theory is necessary and sufficient for attributions and predictions of others' emotions. Theory theory is the view that we attribute and predict others' mental states on the basis of a (tacit) body of generalisations about mental states, their situational input, and behavioural output. Theory's antagonist, Simulation theory, is the view that we ascribe mental states to others by simulating - or running ' off-line ' - their doxastic, emotional, and contextual situations. My argument for Theory's necessity and sufficiency develops in three stages: First, I show that some version of Theory is necessary for predictions of all mental states on the basis of the ascriber's knowledge of the subject's other mental states. The linchpin of the arguments here consists of considerations from relevant similarity between the ascriber's and the subject's mental states. Simulation cannot provide criteria for such similarity, and so, I argue, predictions must advert to Theory. Second, I develop a sui generis model of emotions, according to which (i) emoticns' necessary objects and typical causes are concern-based construals; and (ii) emotions qua attitudes are (a) complex states embedded in a narrative structure, (b) characterised in terms of their object, their expressive behaviour, and their phenomenology. Third, I show that, considering the nature of the objects of emotions, some Theory is necessary for emotion-predictions and -attributions. Moreover, I develop a version of Theory, based on my analysis of emotions and narrative structures, and argue that this version of Theory is both necessary and sufficient for emotion-predictions and -attributions.
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- Date Issued: 2003
In defence of moral objectivity
- Authors: McKaiser, Eusebius
- Date: 2003 , 2013-05-23
- Subjects: Ethics , Objectivity
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2740 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007599 , Ethics , Objectivity
- Description: This thesis examines the problem of moral objectivity, which is constituted by the ontological, epistemological and motivational challenges. It gradually develops an account of moral objectivity that has the dual function of dealing with the enemies of moral objectivity as well as giving a positive account of what moral objectivity is. It establishes these aims by arguing for the following theses. The first set of arguments show that relativist theories of ethics provide us with no forceful grounds for being sceptical about moral objectivity. The second set of arguments deepens the response to those who are sceptical about moral objectivity. It does so by showing in greater detail how rationality plays a substantive role in our practical deliberation, our notion of agency as well as our reactive attitudes. These arguments provide further reasons why we should have faith in the possibility of developing an adequate account of moral objectivity. The last set of arguments provides the positive account of moral objectivity. This positive account ends with the discussion of a paradigmatic moral fact that gives full expression (to the features of moral objectivity that have been articulated and defended.
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- Date Issued: 2003
Intelligent design and biology
- Authors: Ramsden, Sean
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Hume, David, 1711-1776 , Darwin, Charles, 1809-1882 , Paley, William, 1743-1805 , Dembski, William A., 1960- , Behe, Michael J., 1952- , Evolution (Biology) , Probabilities , Naturalism , Intelligent design (Teleology)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2739 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007561 , Hume, David, 1711-1776 , Darwin, Charles, 1809-1882 , Paley, William, 1743-1805 , Dembski, William A., 1960- , Behe, Michael J., 1952- , Evolution (Biology) , Probabilities , Naturalism , Intelligent design (Teleology)
- Description: The thesis is that contrary to the received popular wisdom, the combination of David Hume's sceptical enquiry and Charles Darwin's provision of an alternative theoretical framework to the then current paradigm of natural theology did not succeed in defeating the design argument. I argue that William Paley's work best represented the status quo in the philosophy of biology circa 1800 and that with the logical mechanisms provided us by William Dembski in his seminal work on probability, there is a strong argument for thr work of Michael Behe to stand in a similar position today to that of Paley two centuries ago. The argument runs as follows: In Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 1 I introduce the issues. In Section 3 I argue that William Paley's exposition of the design argument was archetypical of the natural theology school and that given Hume's already published criticism of the argument, Paley for one did not feel the design argument to be done for. I further argue in Section 4 that Hume in fact did no such thing and that neither did he see himself as having done so, but that the design argument was weak rather than fallacious. In Section 5 I outline the demise of natural theology as the dominant school of thought in the philosophy of biology, ascribing this to the rise of Darwinism and subsequently neo-Darwinism. I argue that design arguments were again not defeated but went into abeyance with the rise of a new paradigm associated with Darwinism, namely methodological naturalism. In Chapter 2 I advance the project by a discussion of William Dembski's formulation of design inferences, demonstrating their value in both everyday and technical usage. This is stated in Section 1. In Sections 2 and 3 I discuss Dembski's treatment of probability, whilst in Section 4 I examine Dembski's tying of different levels of probability to different mechanisms of explanation used in explicating the world. Section 5 is my analysis of the logic of the formal statement of the design argument according to Dembski. In Section 6 I encapsulate objections to Dembski. I conclude the chapter (with Section 7) by claiming that Dembski forwards a coherent model of design inferences that can be used in demonstrating that there is little difference between the way that Paley came to his conclusions two centuries ago and how modem philosophers of biology (such as I take Michael Behe to be, albeit that by profession he is a scientist) come to theirs when offering design explanations. Inference to the best explanation is demonstrated as lying at the crux of design arguments. In Chapter 3 I draw together the work of Michael Behe and Paley, showing through the mechanism of Dembski's work that they are closely related in many respects and that neither position is to be lightly dismissed. Section 1 introduces this. In Section 2 I introduce Behe's concept of irreducible complexity in the light of (functional) explanation. Section 3 is a detailed analysis of irreducible complexity. Section 4 raises and covers objections to Behe with the general theme being that (neo-) Darwinians beg the question against him. In Section 4 I apply the Dembskian mechanic directly to Behe's work. I argue that Behe does not quite meet the Dembskian criteria he needs to in order for his argument to stand as anything other than defeasible. However, in Section 5 I conclude by arguing that this is exactly what we are to expect from Behe's and similar theories, even within competing paradigms, in the philosophy of biology, given that inference to the best explanation is the logical lever therein at work. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Date Issued: 2003
Involuntary consent
- Authors: Futter, Dylan Brian
- Date: 2013-05-24
- Subjects: Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) Responsiblity Free will and determinism Theory (Philosophy) Social ethics Blame
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2742 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007846
- Description: In this dissertation I take exception with a widely held philosophical doctrine, according to which agents are only blameworthy for the bad actions they have chosen to bring about. My argument strategy is to present cases in which agents are blamed for involuntary actions that are not in any way connected to their culpable and voluntary choices. These failures correspond, I suggest, to occasions of culpable ignorance where agents have been negligent or careless. More specifically, I claim that violations of natural duties of respect and consideration, and certain acquired role-type duties, are blamed without any voluntary consent. If my examples are persuasive, then the point is reached where a normative principle of 'voluntary consent' does not in fact coincide with people's actual practices and 'considered judgements'. In the final sections of the dissertation, I argue against the plausibility of keeping the principle and revising our judgements. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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Patents, pills, poverty and pandemic: the ethical issues
- Authors: Brown, Walter
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Ethics , AIDS (Disease) -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , AIDS (Disease) -- Moral and ethical aspects , HIV infections -- South Africa , HIV infections -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , Social responsibility of business , Pharmaceutical industry -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2705 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002835 , Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Ethics , AIDS (Disease) -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , AIDS (Disease) -- Moral and ethical aspects , HIV infections -- South Africa , HIV infections -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , Social responsibility of business , Pharmaceutical industry -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Description: This thesis argues that corporations qua corporations are moral agents sui generis and hence capable of being held morally responsible. I argue that corporations qua corporations are responsible for the actual and foreseen consequences of their actions. I analyse normative theories and the different proscriptive responsibilities they place on moral agents and hence corporations. I examine Kantianism, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. I argue for a unique normative ethical theory that incorporates reasoning from all three of the normative theories. I argue for a broad range of reasons to factor into deciding whether an act is ethical or not. One of the claims of this thesis is that ethical theories must incorporate an agent’s motivation, intention and character traits as relevant to deciding on whether an action is ethical or not. My thesis argues for an indispensable role for the virtues while at the same time incorporating impartial beneficence and universal rationality from utilitarianism and Kantianism. This position I, following the literature, refer to as moderate virtue theory. Having established corporate qua corporate responsibility I question the pharmaceutical corporation’s practice of patenting life saving medication during a state of pandemic in poor countries. The moderate virtue theory position prioritises contexts and the actual human condition and criticises normative theories that attempt to give universal, abstracted answers to ethical problems. It is for this reason and the current (2003) HIV/AIDS pandemic that I focus on a particular context. I examine the practice of patenting life saving medication within South Africa and argue, applying moderate virtue theory, that this act cannot be justified. I argue that a pharmaceutical corporation that patents life saving medication in South Africa cannot justify that action and thus is morally responsible for that action. I also argue that corporations patenting HIV/AIDS medication in South Africa have unethical motivations and intentions.
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- Date Issued: 2003