Filling the gap : Nietzsche's account of authenticity as a supplementary ideal
- Authors: Baker, Michaela Christie
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Ethics , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Ethics, Modern , Normativity (Ethics) , Self-knowledge, Theory of
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2727 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003734 , Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Ethics , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Ethics, Modern , Normativity (Ethics) , Self-knowledge, Theory of
- Description: This thesis examines the ideal of authenticity: why we might want or need such an ideal, what such an ideal would look like, and what mechanisms we would need to ensure the successful operation of such an ideal. The thesis has three main parts. The first part of the thesis aims at motivating the need to look to authenticity as a supplementary ideal to normative moral theory. I do this by drawing a distinction between ethics and morality and arguing that there are important aspects of our lives (such as our relations to ourselves) our beliefs and projects) about which normative moral theory fails to give us guidance and about which an ethical ideal, namely that of authenticity, can provide us with the requisite guidance. The second part of the thesis elucidates Nietzsche's view of authenticity as eternal return. I argue that eternal return consists in holding a particular attitude to one's life - one's past, present and future. I then demonstrate that what is fundamental to successfully living authentically in accordance with eternal return is a rigorous search for self-knowledge. In the third part of the thesis I argue that, in order to achieve the self-knowledge necessary to being a successful authentic agent, one must acquire it through a process of dialogue with other agents. I give a model of self-knowledge as a dialogic encounter that provides two important mechanisms whereby such self-knowledge can be gained.
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- Date Issued: 2004
Knowing what we can't believe
- Authors: Viedge, Nikolai
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Reason , Reasoning , Truth , Explanation
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2724 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002854 , Reason , Reasoning , Truth , Explanation
- Description: The aim of this thesis is to examine what affect, if any, finding an argument both unanswerable yet unbelievable has on three purported first-person doxastic constraints. The three proposed constraints are the principle of truth, the principle of adequate reason and the principle of epistemic explanation. In Chapter 1, I lay out the claim of each of these constraints; differentiate them from one another, examine under what conditions they can be said to apply and provide what I take to be the strongest arguments for each of them. In Chapter 2, I explicate what I mean by finding an argument unanswerable yet unbelievable. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I detail how it is that finding an argument unanswerable yet unbelievable could constitute a threat to each of these constraints. I conclude that while the principle of adequate reason is undermined in the face of this threat, both the principle of truth and the principle of epistemic explanation fail to be undermined by this challenge.
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- Date Issued: 2004
Liberal aristocracy & the limits of democracy
- Authors: Wareham, Christopher
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Plato , Aristocracy (Political science) , Liberalism , Democracy , Constitutional law , Civil rights -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2725 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002855 , Plato , Aristocracy (Political science) , Liberalism , Democracy , Constitutional law , Civil rights -- Philosophy
- Description: I define and defend a non-democratic authority with the power to annul the decisions of democratic branches of government when such decisions infringe upon citizens’ basic rights and liberties. I refer to this non-democratic authority as Liberal Aristocracy. The argument for Liberal Aristocracy has two parts: the first part demonstrates that Liberal Aristocracy will arrive at decisions that further the moral end of sustaining citizens’ rights; the second part holds that Liberal Aristocracy is a moral means to this end. First, I discuss two existing arguments for non-democratic authorities – Platonic Aristocracy and Constitutional Court Judges. I claim that Plato’s argument is unsuccessful because it relies on controversial metaethical premises that are unlikely to provide a basis for rights. Liberal justifications of the power of Constitutional Courts are argued to be incomplete because they do not designate an authority that is qualified to decide when citizens’ rights are infringed by democratic branches of government. Nor do they show that such an authority is in fact required if citizens’ rights are to be protected. In order to supplement the liberal argument for the power of Constitutional Courts I develop an account of Liberal Aristocracy, which rests on the idea that Constitutional Court Judges should possess moral expertise. I claim that (i) moral expertise qualifies Judges to decide when citizens’ rights are violated by democratic decisions. Furthermore, I argue that (ii) decisions taken democratically will sometimes encroach on citizens’ rights. Claims (i) and (ii) are shown to justify the non-democratic authority of Liberal Aristocracy. The second part of the argument for Liberal Aristocracy examines arguments to the effect that only democratic procedures can be morally legitimate, even if other decision procedures arrive at outcomes that provide greater support for citizens’ rights. Three claims are offered in support of this idea. First, democracy is claimed to be necessary to support deliberation. Second, democracy is seen as the only procedure that can uphold the value of autonomy by securing citizens’ consent. Third, it is argued that non-democratic procedures will not recognise the equal status of citizens. I hold that these three claims are false and that Liberal Aristocratic procedures can be morally legitimate.
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- Date Issued: 2004
Moral reform and the desiderata of responses to wrongdoing: the production of a "morally autonomous person freely attached to the good"
- Authors: Waller, Heath Frederick
- Date: 2004 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Victims of crimes -- Attitudes , Criminals -- Rehabilitation , Punishment -- Psychological aspects , Social ethics , Punishment
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2730 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003805 , Victims of crimes -- Attitudes , Criminals -- Rehabilitation , Punishment -- Psychological aspects , Social ethics , Punishment
- Description: Moral reform is a neglected response to wrongdoing that has been incorrectly portrayed as a practice involving illegitimate treatment of wrongdoers and as totally unsatisfying to those theorists advocating backward-looking practices such as retributive punishment. A clear explanation of the ethical legitimacy and practical necessity of the reformative techniques moral reform involves has been missed, and this paper details the design of moral reform proper in order to fill this gap in punishment theory. The moral reform of an offender is identified as a desideratum of responses to wrongdoing and it is explained what moral reform ought to entail. The claim that moral reform qualifies as the overriding aim of responses to wrongdoing is argued for on the grounds that this practice is capable of achieving all the established ends of responses to wrongdoing. The legitimate desiderata of our practices are identified as those usually selected as the ends of punishment practices, and moral reform must accomplish these if it is to be accepted. Moral reform is shown to realise the goals of punishments as the fortunate effects of what is done to achieve an offender's moral improvement and of what reformees do in taking responsibility for their actions. The suffering involved in moral reform receives particular emphasis since the practice will never satisfy unless it accommodates the widely-held intuition that the offender must suffer sufficiently as a consequence of his wrongdoing. Moral reform is further portrayed as the most meaningful practice for its ability to satisfy the appropriate needs and desires victims have in response to their victimization. A central claim of the thesis is that moral reform best serves the victim, since it most effectively relieves the victim's emotional responses to wrongdoing and is as adept as punishment at the expression of these same emotions. Reformers advocate a constructive response to wrongdoing that benefits all affected parties. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Date Issued: 2004