Animal suffering in factory farming and the best way to prevent it
- Authors: Watkins, Gareth
- Date: 2005
- Subjects: Vegetarianism -- Moral and ethical aspects Food animals -- Moral and ethical aspects Animal rights Animal welfare Animal welfare -- Moral and ethical aspects Vegetarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2728 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003736
- Description: This thesis moves beyond the traditional approaches of how we ought to treat animals, and instead concentrates on the best strategy for preventing animal suffering in the farming industry. Chapter 1 considers the question of how we can know that animals feel pain, and concludes not only that it is rational to believe that they can, but also that this is a significant fact. Chapter 2 then analyses one possible strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering, namely demi-vegetarianism. For a number of reasons, however, this strategy is found to be flawed, therefore Chapter 3 analyses a second possible strategy, namely vegetarianism, and concludes that this is, in fact, the best strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering in the farming industry.
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- Date Issued: 2005
The motivating force of moral beliefs
- Authors: Vos, James Antony
- Date: 2005 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Ethics , Ethics , Motivation , Practical reason , Rationalism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2729 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003804 , Hume, David, 1711-1776 -- Ethics , Ethics , Motivation , Practical reason , Rationalism
- Description: I investigate the issue of whether or not one's holding a moral belief is sufficient to motivate one to act as that belief prescribes. I argue that rational persons who hold a moral belief that is also a 'self-referential belief' will form a desire to act as that belief prescribes and thereby be motivated to act on the moral belief. I argue for this claim by, firstly, showing that the demand that moral judgements must be intrinsically motivating, Internalism, should only apply to rational persons, that is, the link between moral judgement and motivation can be broken in cases of irrationality. Secondly, I argue against the Humean claim that one cannot rationally form a desire simply because one believes that one ought to have that desire. This claim requires an investigation into a variety of views of Practical Reason and an argument concluding that Practical Reason is broader in scope than the Instrumentalist or Humean allows. I undertake this task in chapter 2. Thirdly, I argue that believing that I ought to perform a certain action will give me an internal commitment to perform that action, insofar as I am rational. I argue that an internal commitment is a form of desire. Once I recognise that I have a moral belief and an internal commitment, I will be motivated to act as that belief and commitment prescribe. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Date Issued: 2005