Against supererogationism
- Authors: Van Niekerk, Jason Bradley
- Date: 2006
- Subjects: Supererogation , Supererogation -- History , Values , Ethics -- History
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2731 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004268 , Supererogation , Supererogation -- History , Values , Ethics -- History
- Description: In this thesis, I argue that we have no reason to accept the existence of a category of supererogatory moral goods: that is, good acts that carry no pressure to bring them about. Despite the counterintuitive nature and suspicious provenance of the concept, Supererogationism is the orthodoxy in Ethics, and I examine promising but unsuccessful responses to it by Peter Singer and Kwame Gyekye. Responding in particular to David Heyd's Supererogationism - but also to J. O. Urmson, Susan Wolf, and Jonathan Dancy - I develop an account of the principle "Good implies Ought" that does not entail absurd over-obligation. I argue that this Anti-Supererogationist model stands up to the four strongest arguments against such a position, and that it embraces a more accurate account of the relation between values and oughts than Supererogationists are capable of supplying. Finally, I sketch a detailed eudaimonist account of the principle umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu - that our commitment to the good of others stems from our flourishing being caught up with theirs.
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- Date Issued: 2006
Externalism, self-knowledge and explanation
- Authors: Flockemann, Richard
- Date: 2013-06-11
- Subjects: Burge, Tyler Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Self-knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2743 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1008060
- Description: In recent years, much attention has been given to the question of whether content externalism is compatible with an account of self-knowledge maintaining that we have an epistemically privileged access to the content of our propositional mental states. Philosophers who maintain the two are incompatible (incompatibilists) have put forward two majors types of challenge, which I call - following Martin Davies - the Achievement and Consequence Problems, which aim to demonstrate that self-knowledge cannot be reconciled with externalism. These challenges have spawned a great deal of literature, and a diverse range of arguments and positions have emerged in response. In this dissertation, I intend to focus on examples of these different avenues of response, and show how none of them are adequate. In the first chapter, I lay the groundwork for the debate, setting up how externalism and self-knowledge are to be understood, and outlining both the incompatibilist challenges as well as the available responses to them. In the second chapter I examine these responses in more detail, concluding finally that the best available response is Tyler Burge's. Burge has two arguments that together establish his compatibilist position. First, he shows that even if externalism is true, our judgements about our occurrent thoughts are immunejrom error. This establishes that our judgements about our thoughts must be true. Second, he offers a transcendental argument for self-knowledge, arguing that our access to our mental states must be not only true, but non-accidentally true, in a way sufficient for genuine knowledge. This establishes that we possess the correct epistemic entitlement to our thoughts. In the third chapter, I argue Burge's arguments do not, in fact, give us good reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge to be compatible. This, I argue, is because B urge relies upon a transcendental argument, which, in this context, cannot establish that we have self-knowledge if externalism is true. All it establishes, I argue, is that we do possess self-knowledge. And this is insufficient to establish that externalism and self-knowledge are compatible. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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Food, philosophy and love
- Authors: Ristic, Nevenka
- Date: 2006 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Plato -- Symposium , Food -- Philosophy , Eating (Philosophy) , Love -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2738 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007478 , Plato -- Symposium , Food -- Philosophy , Eating (Philosophy) , Love -- Philosophy
- Description: This thesis is a metaphilosophical investigation into how food can be handled philosophically. The first chapter considers the question of whether food can be the subject matter of philosophy, and concludes that there are three possible ways: Foodist Philosophy, Philosophy of Food, and Philosophy and Food. This thesis focuses on the category Foodist Philosophy. The second chapter develops an account of foodist philosophy: it is a style of philosophy that assumes that our food and eating practices are fundamental aspects of the human condition. The third chapter analyses Plato's concept of love in the Symposium and these conclusions are objected to in a foodist critique in the fourth chapter. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Date Issued: 2006
Foucault, historicism and political philosophy
- Authors: Allsobrook, Christopher John
- Date: 2006
- Subjects: Foucault, Michel, 1926-1984 Sartre, Jean Paul, 1905-1980 Political science -- Philosophy Power (Philosophy) Existential phenomenology Knowledge, Theory of History -- Philosophy Historicism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MPhil
- Identifier: vital:2726 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003073
- Description: This thesis defends an ontological and epistemological account of Michel Foucault's post-structuralist philosophy, to argue that political philosophy needs to take into account the historical and political contingency of subjectivity and discourse. I show that by addressing the historical and political contingency of knowledge, Foucault's work overcomes the flaw of foundational epistemology in political philosophy, which treats true discourse as universal and disinterested. In doing so I hope to have to refuted the mainly positivistic and humanist schools of thought that lay claim to universal and foundationalist notions, by demonstrating the extent to which their misgivings about Foucault's work are informed by and founded upon an unjustified a-historicism. The thesis is composed of three chapters, the first of which deals with an ontology of the subject, the second, with an ontology of social relations, and the last with epistemology. In each chapter I use dialectical analysis to reveal how interests necessarily mediate subjectivity, social relations, and knowledge. The first two chapters defend Foucault's conception of power, by way of an analysis of the relations between Foucault's work and Sartre's existential phenomenology. I show how both Foucault and Sartre successfully address the problem of historicism for political philosophy with their respective conceptions of human freedom. The final chapter defends Foucault's conception of the relations between power and discourse, to show how it overcomes the a-historicism of universal, foundational epistemology. These three chapters demonstrate the importance of accounting for historicism in political philosophy. Claims to universal interest, because knowledge is conditioned by conflicts of interest, often mask political domination. It is important, then, to remember, in political philosophy, that knowledge is evaluative and interested, reflecting historically and politically mediated evaluations. One should be suspicious of ' natural facts' , used to justify actions or beliefs, thereby masking the choices that inform them. I have used the work of Michel Foucault to motivate this claim.
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- Date Issued: 2006
Intellectual achievement in pursuit of true belief
- Authors: Shapiro, Lucy Deborah
- Date: 2006 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Delusions , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemics , Truth
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2735 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005955 , Delusions , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemics , Truth
- Description: The practice of inquiry, in which we seek and pursue true beliefs by forming justified beliefs, is important to us. This thesis will address two questions concerning the significance of this practice. These are the question of what explains our preference for this particular belief-forming practice, and whether this value can be explained by the value of true belief alone. To answer these questions I will examme a variety of our intuitive commitments to particular values, assuming their general accuracy. I will use an inference from the goal of a practice to the value of a practice, an inference based on the assumption that when we pursue something it is valuable. I will discuss our intuitive commitments to the value of justification. I will also rely on the implications of the presence of pride and admiration in relation to the outcome of an inquiry (especially in situations where a belief is difficult to form). By using this methodology, I will argue for three sources of value that explain the unique significance of the value of inquiry. The first is the value of its unique role in our being able to form reliably true beliefs. Second, I will argue for Wayne D. Riggs' account of epistemic credit; Riggs defends the value of our being responsible for true beliefs, they are our achievements. Third, I will argue for an additional the value of delivering a skilful epistemic performance, another kind of achievement. I will show that although the value of true belief plays a role in explaining some of the values, the third value for inquiry is independent of the value of true belief. This means that there are intellectual rewards, which can be gained from this practice, that extend beyond the value of true belief. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Date Issued: 2006
The dynamics of difference: oppression, cross-cultural liberation and the problems of imperialism and paternalism
- Authors: Oelofsen, Marianna Christina
- Date: 2006
- Subjects: Oppression (Psychology) , Culture conflict , Multiculturalism , Political ethics , Imperialism , Paternalism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2716 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002846 , Oppression (Psychology) , Culture conflict , Multiculturalism , Political ethics , Imperialism , Paternalism
- Description: This dissertation defends an account of oppression and supports a specific means of engaging with oppression cross-culturally. The project examines whether it is defensible to interfere in other cultures at all. Both the cultural relativist and the neo-imperialist approaches are argued to be an inadequate response to the question of whether it is defensible to interfere in other cultures, as both these approaches neglect the autonomy of the agents concerned. This project has two related goals. It first advances an answer to the question ‘what is oppression?’ An account of oppression is developed which will enable oppression to be identified cross-culturally. In order to start constructing an approach which will be adequate to respond to the question of interference, it is necessary to consider a means of identifying oppression crossculturally. The second objective is to examine the possibility of non-imperialistic and nonpaternalistic cross-cultural liberation projects. The first aim (advancing an account of oppression), is executed through arguing for an ethical framework which will be helpful in this context, and arguing for an account of oppression derived from this framework. The second aim (examining the possibility of non-imperialistic and non-paternalistic liberation), is carried out in two parts. The first part responds to two standard objections from cultural relativism, which would accuse a universal account such as mine of imperialism and paternalism. The first objection claims that a universalist account neglects historical and cultural difference, while the second objection claims that it neglects autonomy. In responding to these objections, it is noted that while my responses prove, theoretically, that a universal account of oppression need not lead to imperialism or paternalism, there is a danger that the account could become imperialistic and paternalistic in its application. With the intention of dealing with this problem, I advance a methodology of cross-cultural understanding which would reduce the likelihood of imperialism and paternalism in liberation projects. This notion of cross-cultural understanding is the most important contribution of this project. The objective is not to give practical judgments on when a specific liberation project is in fact paternalistic or imperialistic, but rather to propose guidelines which would need to be applied to each particular instance.
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- Date Issued: 2006