The artistic path to virtue
- Authors: Sher, Gavin
- Date: 2007
- Subjects: Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2732 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004370 , Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Description: Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.
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- Date Issued: 2007
The trouble with culture : Plato's critique of poetry
- Authors: Ansell, James D'Olier
- Date: 2007 , 2013-07-25
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2733 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004460
- Description: In this thesis I argue that Plato's critique of poetry, taken in its proper context, is a serious and relevant critique of popular culture. In the first chapter I argue that the poetic reforms proposed in Books 2 and 3 and Book 10 of Republic stand at the front of a total reform of Greek culture. I argue for the consistency of Plato's whole argument and then I claim that if we get Plato's targets right, not fine art or literature, and focus on appropriate modern analogues then we can see why his critique is still important. If we share his claim that we are influenced by popular culture in important and often insidious ways and agree that culture can promote corrupt values, then we have accepted the core of Plato's challenge. If we find his solution distasteful, then the task is to come up with a democratic alternative. In the remaining two chapters I focus specifically on the challenge to the poets, putting the other reforms to the side. In the second chapter I consider a possible reply to the challenge focusing on the worth of the poetry that was expelled. I first look elsewhere in the Platonic oeuvre at the account of beauty in Symposium and Phaedrus but I argue that neither of them gives anything like aesthetic value that could be usefully applied to poetry. Next I look to some modern accounts of aesthetic value. I argue that while they might go some of the distance against Plato's challenge, they face a difficult task because it is not sufficient positing the value, an account is needed of their positive benefit. In the third chapter I turn to a more direct response to the challenge. Arguably Aristotle offers such a response in the Poetics, in terms of the notion of katharsis. I consider two interpretative candidates for katharsis. The first takes the benefit of poetry to be psychological - katharsis is a purgation of otherwise pathological emotions. I argue that this fails because it misunderstands precisely what Plato's concerns about poetry are, and, furthermore, this account could even be compatible with Plato's worries. The second interpretation takes the benefit of poetry to be ethical- katharsis is a type of ethical clarification which is beneficial in training our emotional responses. I claim that the clarification, and education, is worryingly conventionalist, and doesn't take seriously that Plato's target was popular culture and not great, educative literature. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Date Issued: 2007