Control and vulnerability : reflections on the nature of human agency and personhood
- Authors: Paphitis, Sharli Anne
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: Self-control , Vulnerability (Personality trait) , Self (Philosophy) , Social psychology , Cognitive science , Frankfurt, Harry G., 1929- -- Criticism and interpretation , Watson, Gary, 1943- -- Criticism and interpretation , Mele, Alfred R., 1951- -- Criticism and interpretation , Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Criticism and interpretation
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:2750 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1018671
- Description: Following the writings of philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson, and Alfred Mele, in this thesis I defend some central claims of the self-control view of human agency. However, I not only defend, but also supplement this view in the following two ways. First, drawing on work by Mary Midgley and Sigmund Freud I advance the claim that self-control requires the experience of internal conflict between an agent’s motivations and intentions. Second, drawing on insights from Simone de Beauvoir and Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as recent research in social psychology and cognitive science, I will argue in this thesis that self-control and vulnerability are inextricably intertwined with one another, and that as a result both are to be seen as constitutive of human agency. While it is the capacity for self-control that marks us out as human agents, I argue that it is also our uniquely human vulnerability which distinguishes our agency from the kind of agency which we might attribute to other potential or actual forms of sentience. Further, while the concepts of human agency and personhood are typically conflated in the analytic tradition of philosophy, in this thesis I will show that there are good reasons for understanding these two concepts as subtly distinct from one another. The term personhood, I will argue, can fruitfully be understood in substantive rather than purely formal terms. A person, in the superlative sense, is to be understood as someone who exercises their agency well; and, as such, persons are answerable to a number of normative prescriptions. Following Midgley, Nietzsche and Martha Nussbaum, I argue against Frankfurt’s normative prescription for personhood in the form of what he calls ‘wholeheartedness’, and offer four normative prescriptions for personhood of my own.
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- Date Issued: 2015
Environmental conflict resolution: a critical analysis of the role of interests and value
- Authors: Mweshi, John
- Date: 2015
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/55842 , vital:26740
- Description: This thesis intends to contribute to an enhanced understanding of environmental conflicts and their resolution. To accomplish this task the thesis will ascertain the role that value and interests play in environmental conflicts in order to establish an adequate basis upon which they can be resolved. In the process, the thesis will also examine three different approaches, namely, the Standard Approach; the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) framework; and the Structured Decision Making (SDM) approach. First, the standard approach is informed by the understanding that focusing on interests instead of human values makes the resolution of conflicts more tractable. In contrast, this thesis argues that an exclusive focus on interests, in the context of environmental conflict resolution, is inadequate in some important respects because there are other factors to be considered such as the environmental impacts at the root of the conflict. Second, the thesis examines the focus on impacts that characterises EIAs. It argues that this approach remedies the limitations of the standard approach insofar as impacts are understood in terms of object value. However, the EIA approach does not provide much guidance on how to deal with conflicting human values. Third, taking into account the fact that the standard approach does not address the question of object value, while the EIA addresses object value but does not deal directly with human values, the thesis examines the SDM approach to environmental risk decisions. The thesis argues that while the SDM approach claims to deal with conflicts involving human values head-on, it does not provide a viable alternative in terms of environmental conflict resolution. This is because it fails to recognise the key distinction between human values and object value despite acknowledging the presence of multiple value dimensions as a major obstacle to value trade-offs and therefore to the resolution of value conflicts. Finally, the thesis recommends an adequate basis upon which environmental conflicts can be resolved.
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- Date Issued: 2015