Understanding of biological teleology from a naturalistic perspective
- Authors: Abrahams, Sanaa
- Date: 2020
- Subjects: Teleology , Biology -- Philosophy , Evolution (Biology) -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/140534 , vital:37896
- Description: To the extent that teleological thinking is metaphysically suspect, many theorists attempt to shift the stigma of functional explanations by reducing function ascriptions, and aim thus to de-legitimise an appeal to teleological causal relations in an analysis of function. The point is to dispel the mystery which envelops the application of function concepts by reformulating biological functional explanations so as to dispense with teleology. My project is to interrogate the success with which teleological explanations have thus been eliminated in the biological sciences, and, over the course of this thesis, I conclude that a kind of teleological causation nevertheless remains the most adequate explanatory ground of natural products. My proposal is that functional explanations are causal explanations for the presence and maintenance of self-reproducing systems. I contend that, insofar as the attribution of function presupposes the valuation of a function-bearing system as a causal necessity for its constituent parts, functional explanation references distinct and irreducible holistic properties. Using Kantian metaphysics to frame the discussion, this thesis aims first to explore critically the subject of functional characterisations of biological phenomena, and second, the metaphysical basis of modern science. Its chief contributions to the philosophical function debate reside in proposing novel arguments in justification of what I consider is an improved formulation of an attempted definition of biological function, in which teleological causal powers are explicitly recognised and accommodated in functional explanation. Moreover, this thesis attempts a naturalistic reconstruction of the metaphysical entailments of the real causality of a whole
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- Date Issued: 2020
The trouble with culture : Plato's critique of poetry
- Authors: Ansell, James D'Olier
- Date: 2007 , 2013-07-25
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2733 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004460
- Description: In this thesis I argue that Plato's critique of poetry, taken in its proper context, is a serious and relevant critique of popular culture. In the first chapter I argue that the poetic reforms proposed in Books 2 and 3 and Book 10 of Republic stand at the front of a total reform of Greek culture. I argue for the consistency of Plato's whole argument and then I claim that if we get Plato's targets right, not fine art or literature, and focus on appropriate modern analogues then we can see why his critique is still important. If we share his claim that we are influenced by popular culture in important and often insidious ways and agree that culture can promote corrupt values, then we have accepted the core of Plato's challenge. If we find his solution distasteful, then the task is to come up with a democratic alternative. In the remaining two chapters I focus specifically on the challenge to the poets, putting the other reforms to the side. In the second chapter I consider a possible reply to the challenge focusing on the worth of the poetry that was expelled. I first look elsewhere in the Platonic oeuvre at the account of beauty in Symposium and Phaedrus but I argue that neither of them gives anything like aesthetic value that could be usefully applied to poetry. Next I look to some modern accounts of aesthetic value. I argue that while they might go some of the distance against Plato's challenge, they face a difficult task because it is not sufficient positing the value, an account is needed of their positive benefit. In the third chapter I turn to a more direct response to the challenge. Arguably Aristotle offers such a response in the Poetics, in terms of the notion of katharsis. I consider two interpretative candidates for katharsis. The first takes the benefit of poetry to be psychological - katharsis is a purgation of otherwise pathological emotions. I argue that this fails because it misunderstands precisely what Plato's concerns about poetry are, and, furthermore, this account could even be compatible with Plato's worries. The second interpretation takes the benefit of poetry to be ethical- katharsis is a type of ethical clarification which is beneficial in training our emotional responses. I claim that the clarification, and education, is worryingly conventionalist, and doesn't take seriously that Plato's target was popular culture and not great, educative literature. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Date Issued: 2007
Filling the gap : Nietzsche's account of authenticity as a supplementary ideal
- Authors: Baker, Michaela Christie
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Ethics , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Ethics, Modern , Normativity (Ethics) , Self-knowledge, Theory of
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2727 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003734 , Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Ethics , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Ethics, Modern , Normativity (Ethics) , Self-knowledge, Theory of
- Description: This thesis examines the ideal of authenticity: why we might want or need such an ideal, what such an ideal would look like, and what mechanisms we would need to ensure the successful operation of such an ideal. The thesis has three main parts. The first part of the thesis aims at motivating the need to look to authenticity as a supplementary ideal to normative moral theory. I do this by drawing a distinction between ethics and morality and arguing that there are important aspects of our lives (such as our relations to ourselves) our beliefs and projects) about which normative moral theory fails to give us guidance and about which an ethical ideal, namely that of authenticity, can provide us with the requisite guidance. The second part of the thesis elucidates Nietzsche's view of authenticity as eternal return. I argue that eternal return consists in holding a particular attitude to one's life - one's past, present and future. I then demonstrate that what is fundamental to successfully living authentically in accordance with eternal return is a rigorous search for self-knowledge. In the third part of the thesis I argue that, in order to achieve the self-knowledge necessary to being a successful authentic agent, one must acquire it through a process of dialogue with other agents. I give a model of self-knowledge as a dialogic encounter that provides two important mechanisms whereby such self-knowledge can be gained.
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- Date Issued: 2004
Patents, pills, poverty and pandemic: the ethical issues
- Authors: Brown, Walter
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Ethics , AIDS (Disease) -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , AIDS (Disease) -- Moral and ethical aspects , HIV infections -- South Africa , HIV infections -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , Social responsibility of business , Pharmaceutical industry -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2705 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002835 , Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Ethics , AIDS (Disease) -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , AIDS (Disease) -- Moral and ethical aspects , HIV infections -- South Africa , HIV infections -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , Social responsibility of business , Pharmaceutical industry -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Description: This thesis argues that corporations qua corporations are moral agents sui generis and hence capable of being held morally responsible. I argue that corporations qua corporations are responsible for the actual and foreseen consequences of their actions. I analyse normative theories and the different proscriptive responsibilities they place on moral agents and hence corporations. I examine Kantianism, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. I argue for a unique normative ethical theory that incorporates reasoning from all three of the normative theories. I argue for a broad range of reasons to factor into deciding whether an act is ethical or not. One of the claims of this thesis is that ethical theories must incorporate an agent’s motivation, intention and character traits as relevant to deciding on whether an action is ethical or not. My thesis argues for an indispensable role for the virtues while at the same time incorporating impartial beneficence and universal rationality from utilitarianism and Kantianism. This position I, following the literature, refer to as moderate virtue theory. Having established corporate qua corporate responsibility I question the pharmaceutical corporation’s practice of patenting life saving medication during a state of pandemic in poor countries. The moderate virtue theory position prioritises contexts and the actual human condition and criticises normative theories that attempt to give universal, abstracted answers to ethical problems. It is for this reason and the current (2003) HIV/AIDS pandemic that I focus on a particular context. I examine the practice of patenting life saving medication within South Africa and argue, applying moderate virtue theory, that this act cannot be justified. I argue that a pharmaceutical corporation that patents life saving medication in South Africa cannot justify that action and thus is morally responsible for that action. I also argue that corporations patenting HIV/AIDS medication in South Africa have unethical motivations and intentions.
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- Date Issued: 2003
Describing behaviour: a philosophical analysis
- Authors: Bunting, I A
- Date: 1966
- Subjects: Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2744 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1009991 , Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Description: Questions revolving around the possibility and justifiability of reductive analyses of the concept 'not', lie at the heart of many of the problems in the philosophical interpretation of not-descriptions. In this thesis, I wish to show, by discussing various problems in the logic of not-descriptions, that, and why, reductive analyses must be unsatisfactory.
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- Date Issued: 1966
Reason and eros
- Authors: Chalmers, W D
- Date: 1967 , 2014-06-09
- Subjects: Philosophy , Love , Reasoning
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2748 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013331
- Description: This study is not intended as a work of research into any existing body of philosopny. It is, rather, an independent inquiry into the origins and the objective of philosophical activity. In this it assumes the somewhat enigmatic role of a philosophy of philosophy.
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- Date Issued: 1967
Form and substance in R.M. Hare's utilitarianism
- Authors: Coetzee, Pieter Hendrik
- Date: 1992
- Subjects: Hare, R. M. (Richard Mervyn) -- Ethics , Utilitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2706 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002836 , Hare, R. M. (Richard Mervyn) -- Ethics , Utilitarianism
- Description: Throughout his career as moral philosopher Hare has insisted that there is a rational way of arriving at substantive moral judgements. Hare develops this view - first presented in ' The language of morals' (1952) and ' Universalizability' (1955) - into the claim that rational agents are required to adopt utilitarian solutions to moral disputes. In ' Freedom and reason ' (1963) this claim is defended with reference to the view that the formal features of moral language (universalizability and prescriptivity)commit moral agents to a certain method of reasoning, and that this method of reasoning, when conjoined with facts about people's desires and preferences, leads us to accept substantive moral judgements consistent with those required by a form of utilitarianism. This view features throughout Hare's subsequent work, but the argument for it undergoes change. This means change in the defence of the claim that the meta-theory Universal Prescriptivism is consistent with a form of normative utilitarian theory, as this claim is argued for in 'Ethical theory and utilitarianism' (1976) and 'Moral Thinking' (1981). I shall endeavour to trace the chronological development of Hare's thinking, and will concentrate on developments in the argument for a theory of act-utilitarianism. I shall argue that the argument for utilitarianism gives rise to two major problems which arise from a specific feature of the argument, namely, the attempt to run the resolution of bi-lateral and multi-lateral cases of conflict along lines analogous to the resolution of conflict in the single-person case. Hare's argument requires that a decision-maker must identify the person with whom he reverses roles as himself, and that he must be prepared to concede that the things his recipient has good reasons for wanting are also reasons for him to want the same things. I argue that it is not possible to make coherent sense of the identity of the person in the reversed-role situation and that the motivational states a decision -maker is expected to deem 'his own' are not properly states of himself. If I am right, the 'identity'-question sits at the root of a motivational gap in Hare's theory.
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- Date Issued: 1992
Generating shared interpretive resources in the mathematics classroom: using philosophy of mathematics to teach mathematics better
- Authors: De Lange, Laura
- Date: 2017
- Subjects: Mathematics -- Study and teaching , Mathematics -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/4293 , vital:20645
- Description: Every student has a unique mathematical lived experience: a unique amalgamation of ideas about mathematics, exposure to mathematical concepts and feelings about mathematics. A student's unique set of circumstances means that not every explanatory account of mathematics will cohere with her previous experiences. For an explanation to have explanatory potential, it must provide an account which coheres with the other beliefs a student has about mathematics. If an explanation has no such coherence, it will not be recognisable as an explanation of the phenomenon of mathematics for the student. Our explanatory accounts of mathematics and mathematical knowledge are our philosophies of mathematics. Different philosophies of mathematics will better explain different sets of mathematical lived experiences. In this thesis I will argue that students should be exposed to a multiplicity of philosophies of mathematics so that they can endorse the philosophy of mathematics which has the most explanatory potential for their particular set of mathematical lived experiences. I argue that this will improve student understanding of mathematics. The claims inherent in any given philosophy of mathematics, when combined with other stereotypes or prejudices, can work to unjustly exclude members of subordinated groups, such as poor, black or female students, from mathematical participation. If we want to avoid reinforcing and reinscribing prejudicial claims about people in the mathematics classroom, we need to be aware of how a certain philosophy of mathematics can exclude certain students. In this thesis I will be defending the idea that, as mathematics educators, we should diversify the way we see mathematics so that we decrease this exclusion from mathematics. In order to diversify the way in which we see mathematics so as to decrease unjust exclusion, members of subordinated groups should be encouraged to share their mathematical experiences in a space sensitive to the power dynamics present in the mathematics classroom. These accounts can then be combined with existing philosophies of mathematics to create new ways of making sense of mathematics which do not unjustly exclude members of subordinated groups.
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- Date Issued: 2017
Take my word for it: a new approach to the problem of sincerity in the epistemology of testimony
- Authors: Dewhurst, Therese
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Sincerity Philosophy Terminology Knowledge, Theory of Honesty
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2707 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002837
- Description: The epistemological problem of sincerity in testimony is often approached in the following way: We, as a matter of fact, accept utterances as sincere. We do so in the face of knowledge that people lie and deceive,and yet we still count these beliefs as good beliefs. Therefore there must be some reason or argument that we can cite in order to justify our acceptance of the sincerity of the speaker. In this thesis I will argue, contra this, that there is no reason, per se, that justifies our of a speakers sincerity: this is because recognition of the obligation to accept the sincerity is a necessary condition on the possibility of communication and interpretation. In the first three of the thesis I will argue against three of the main approaches to the problem by focusing on what I believe to be the strongest accounts of each: Elizabeth Fricker's reductionism, Tyler Burge's non-reductionism, and Paul Faulkner's trust account of testimony. In the final chapter I will put forward my positive account. I will argue that it is a constitutive rule of language that a speaker be sincere, and then make the further claim, that it is a constitutive rule of interpretation that the hearer take an utterance as sincere. On my account, successful communication does not just depend on a speaker making sincere utterances,but just as importantly,, on the hearer recognising an obligation to take those utterances as being sincere.
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- Date Issued: 2010
Arguments for other minds
- Authors: Dowling, Dolina Sylvia
- Date: 1989
- Subjects: Mind and body -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2702 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001977
- Description: If I am aware of my own mental states by introspection (a) How can I know that other people have minds? and (b) How can I know what their mental states are? These are two of the questions with which I will be concerned in this dissertation. I discuss five different attempts to deal with them. (i) The claim that we can know that other people have minds by an argument from analogy. I show a number of serious flaws in Russell's and other versions of this argument. (ii) Malcolm's thesis that the criteria by which we apply mental terms to others are just different from the criteria one applies in one's own case. I argue that Halcolm's accounts of both first- and third-person criteria are not adequate. (iii) I consider Strawson claim that 'persons' is a primitive concept and that behavioural criteria are "logically adequate" for determining the correctness of statements about the mental states of others. I argue that both of his key concepts are underanalysed. (iv) A quite different attempt to answer our questions (a) and (b) is given by the empirical realist who argues that knowledge claims about other minds are best understood as hypotheses in a wider psycho-physical theory. I show that the major fault in Putnam's version of empirical realism is that he overlooks the subjective character of (iii) our mental states. (v) Finally I consider the claim, due to Nagel, that a conception of mental states is possible which incorporates both subjective and objective aspects of the phenonemon. I speculate that with a great deal of development this approach might hold the answer to our questions.
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- Date Issued: 1989
Zusammenhangen and logical atomism in Wittgenstein's tractatus
- Authors: Dyer, Clive
- Date: 1982 , 2013-03-19
- Subjects: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2734 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1005929 , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. , Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951. Tractatus logico-philosophicus. , Logical atomism , Ontology
- Description: Introduction: The argument presented in this thesis is that Wittgenstein's answer to the question - as to how one. proposition can be generated out of another - can show a way in which the reconciliation between logical atomism and Zusammenhangen becomes obvious. In the Preliminaries an exposition of logical atomism and the Zusammenhangen thesis is given. The way in which the problem appears is then briefly exposed. The way towards a solution begins with the elucidation of Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and the truthfunctional analysis of a proposition. The problem is clarified in the question which now arises: i.e., given the truth-functional analysis of a proposition,. how can one proposition be generated out of another? The problem is then shown to vanish in the logical construction of a proposition and of propositions. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.53 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Date Issued: 1982
Shame is valuable
- Authors: Euvrard, Jonathan George
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Shame Ethics Self-evaluation
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2708 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002838
- Description: In this thesis I argue that shame is valuable because it contributes to the moral life by promoting coherence. I start by developing and defending a conception of shame. On my conception, rational shame involves a negative self-assessment, in which I am both the assessor and the object of assessment, and in which the standard of assessment is my own. I then develop a notion of coherence, and apply it to the relationship between values, and the relationship between values and actions. I also tie the notion of coherence to what I call “the moral life”. I then discuss two ways in which shame can work to promote coherence. Firstly, I describe a process of critical reflective self-assessment, and show how this is a particularly effective method of promoting coherence when coupled with shame. Secondly, I discuss the connection between my emotions and my values, arguing that this connection promotes coherence, and that shame works to reinforce this connection and thereby to promote coherence.
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- Date Issued: 2009
Externalism, self-knowledge and explanation
- Authors: Flockemann, Richard
- Date: 2013-06-11
- Subjects: Burge, Tyler Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Self-knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2743 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1008060
- Description: In recent years, much attention has been given to the question of whether content externalism is compatible with an account of self-knowledge maintaining that we have an epistemically privileged access to the content of our propositional mental states. Philosophers who maintain the two are incompatible (incompatibilists) have put forward two majors types of challenge, which I call - following Martin Davies - the Achievement and Consequence Problems, which aim to demonstrate that self-knowledge cannot be reconciled with externalism. These challenges have spawned a great deal of literature, and a diverse range of arguments and positions have emerged in response. In this dissertation, I intend to focus on examples of these different avenues of response, and show how none of them are adequate. In the first chapter, I lay the groundwork for the debate, setting up how externalism and self-knowledge are to be understood, and outlining both the incompatibilist challenges as well as the available responses to them. In the second chapter I examine these responses in more detail, concluding finally that the best available response is Tyler Burge's. Burge has two arguments that together establish his compatibilist position. First, he shows that even if externalism is true, our judgements about our occurrent thoughts are immunejrom error. This establishes that our judgements about our thoughts must be true. Second, he offers a transcendental argument for self-knowledge, arguing that our access to our mental states must be not only true, but non-accidentally true, in a way sufficient for genuine knowledge. This establishes that we possess the correct epistemic entitlement to our thoughts. In the third chapter, I argue Burge's arguments do not, in fact, give us good reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge to be compatible. This, I argue, is because B urge relies upon a transcendental argument, which, in this context, cannot establish that we have self-knowledge if externalism is true. All it establishes, I argue, is that we do possess self-knowledge. And this is insufficient to establish that externalism and self-knowledge are compatible. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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Involuntary consent
- Authors: Futter, Dylan Brian
- Date: 2013-05-24
- Subjects: Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) Responsiblity Free will and determinism Theory (Philosophy) Social ethics Blame
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2742 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007846
- Description: In this dissertation I take exception with a widely held philosophical doctrine, according to which agents are only blameworthy for the bad actions they have chosen to bring about. My argument strategy is to present cases in which agents are blamed for involuntary actions that are not in any way connected to their culpable and voluntary choices. These failures correspond, I suggest, to occasions of culpable ignorance where agents have been negligent or careless. More specifically, I claim that violations of natural duties of respect and consideration, and certain acquired role-type duties, are blamed without any voluntary consent. If my examples are persuasive, then the point is reached where a normative principle of 'voluntary consent' does not in fact coincide with people's actual practices and 'considered judgements'. In the final sections of the dissertation, I argue against the plausibility of keeping the principle and revising our judgements. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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Collective forgiving
- Authors: Hamilton, Kelly
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Forgiveness -- Philosophy Collective behavior -- Philosophy Retribution -- Philosophy Reconciliation -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2709 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002839
- Description: Forgiveness is traditionally understood as a personal change of heart, in which an individual victim of a wrongdoing overcomes her resentment towards the perpetrator of that wrongdoing. Peter Strawson (1974) famously argued that resentment is a personal participant retributive reactive attitude, and the overcoming of such an attitude through forgiveness is itself a personal reactive attitude – in other words, forgiveness is an affective response to a wrongdoing by an individual victim, that is devoid of a retributive element. Because reactive attitudes are personal, it is argued that collectives – groups of individuals – cannot forgive, since collectives cannot, as collectives, hold reactive attitudes. I argue against this. I show that it is possible for collectives to hold attitudes in a way that is not reducible to individuals holding attitudes as individuals, and yet these attitudes still remain personal. Individuals exist within communities, and are interdependent on one another. Much of an individual‟s beliefs and attitudes depend on the collectives that she is a part of. I argue that an attitude is collective when it is deemed to be the appropriate attitude for members of the collective to hold. Members of the collective will take this attitude on as their own insofar as they identify themselves as members of the collective. Individuals hold the attitude, making the attitude personal, but since the individuals hold the attitude in virtue of their membership to a collective, the attitude is also collective. Given that forgiveness is itself a reactive attitude, and that collectives can hold attitudes, I argue that it is possible for a collective to forgive. Members of a collective will come to forgive when forgiveness is held up as the appropriate attitude for them, and once enough members have taken on the attitude of forgiveness as their own attitude, a collective can be said to have forgiven.
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- Date Issued: 2009
Desert
- Authors: Harper, Sean Julian
- Date: 2000
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2710 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002840 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Description: This thesis examines the idea of desert as expounded in the work of John Rawls, and some of the implications of this conception of desert for moral and political philosophy. In this work, I analyse a series of arguments against retaining this particular conception of desert.I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently diminishes the force of Rawls’ argument for desert, while many of them do state, and I argue that they are correct in doing so, that this conception of desert is dangerous for political or moral philosophy to maintain. I argue that the moral, political and legal implications of accepting this account of desert severely undermine various institutions of differential treatment, and indeed, moral assessment. I regard it as obvious that societies must, on occasion, treat members of those societies differently, for moral, as well as practical reasons. The Rawlsian account of desert, and the account of responsibility on which it rests, however, will endanger the legitimacy of such procedures. I argue further that the Rawlsian account of desert requires that differences in wealth, and inheritance of wealth, influence and privilege be diminished, if not abolished, if we are to talk of any form of desert meaningfully. I argue that this is a strength of Rawls’ account, and further that any account of desert that is true to the philosophical tradition of the concept will require similar steps to be taken. The primary aim of this thesis is to show that Rawls’ arguments against desert are serious ones, both in terms of strength and scope, and that they must be addressed. I intend to show that these arguments are founded on strong moral intuitions, and that it is plausible that these intuitions may need revision. Finally,I intend to show that desert is an important moral and political concept, and that the disciplines of moral and political philosophy will be impoverished by the absence this concept. This absence, I will argue, is a natural consequence of the acceptance of the Rawlsian arguments.
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- Date Issued: 2000
Challenging retributivist intuitions
- Authors: Hawkes, Jonathan
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Lex talionis Punishment -- Philosophy Restorative justice
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2711 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002841
- Description: Can punishment, a practice which involves the deliberate infliction of suffering, be justified? Retributivists and consequentialists argue that punishment can be justified, whereas abolitionists argue that it cannot. Retributivists argue that punishment is justified because wrongdoers deserve it, whereas punishment is justified for consequentialists because it is beneficial for society. A popular form of abolitionism is restorative justice, which is the view that all those affected by crime (perpetrators, victims and members of society) should be reconciled. In this thesis I argue that retributivist justifications for punishment are mistaken, and argue in favour of a consequentialist view. I also argue that consequentialism can accommodate the valuable features of restorative justice while avoiding the challenges faced by it. My arguments against retributivism will turn on a thought experiment. The experiment is designed to draw out the fundamental retributivist intuition that people who cause harm deserve to suffer harm in return, yet excludes most of the principles retributivists would use to justify the intuition. I will go on to argue that, even if the retributivist considerations did apply to the experiment, they would still not justify the claim that wrongdoers deserve to be punished. Most of the retributivist considerations are, therefore, not necessary for the intuition, and none of the considerations are sufficient for it. The retributivist considerations are, I contend, rationalisations, as the claim that wrongdoers deserve to suffer is based, not on good reasons, but on an unreliable intuition. I shall argue that the consequentialist considerations, while not being necessary, are sufficient for the claim that wrongdoers should be punished, and they should be punished, I maintain, in the interests of preventing greater harm from occurring.
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- Date Issued: 2009
The role of the instrumental principle in economic explanations
- Authors: Hoffmann, Nimi
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Consumer behaviour Utility theory -- Economic aspects Economics -- Sociological aspects Marginal utility
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2712 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002842
- Description: Economic explanations tend to view individuals as acting to satisfy their preferences, so that when given a choice between goods, individuals choose those goods which have greater utility for them – they choose those goods which they believe can best satisfy their preferences in the circumstances at hand. In this thesis, I investigate how utility theory works when it is used to explain behaviour. In theory, utility is a positive concept. It is intended to describe and explain an individual’s behaviour without judging or justifying it. It also seems to be regarded as non-hypothetical, for it explains an individual’s behaviour in terms of preferences which need not be shared by others, but may be wholly particular to her. This implies a distinctive way of approaching people’s behaviour as isolated from and immune to the judgements of a community, for utility cannot be used as a common standard by which we judge an individual’s behaviour as better or worse, appropriate or inappropriate. I argue that this theoretical treatment of utility is substantially different from the practice of using utility to explain behaviour. In the first place, when utility is used to explain behaviour as preference-guided, it treats this behaviour as rational action. An explanation of rational action is, however, necessarily governed by the instrumental principle. This principle is normative – it stipulates the correct relation between a person’s means and her ends, rather than simply describing an existing relation. The principle is also non-hypothetical – our commitment to the principle does not rely on the possession of particular ends, but on having ends in general. The instrumental principle therefore acts as a common standard for reasoning about how to act, so that when we explain an agent’s behaviour as rational action, we expect that her action will conform to standards that we all share in virtue of having ends. Thus, I contend, in order to explain the rational actions of an individual, marginal utility necessarily appeals to the judgements of a community.
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- Date Issued: 2009
Determinism and reactive attitudes: reflections on our alleged unrenounceable commitments
- Authors: Kelland, Lindsay-Ann
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Free will and determinism Responsibility
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2713 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002843
- Description: There seems to exist a tension between our metaphysical and phenomenological commitments in the free will debate. On the one hand, I argue that at the metaphysical level we cannot coherently defend the belief that we are morally responsible in the sense that we deserve to be rewarded and punished for our actions, where desert-entailing moral responsibility is the primary understanding of moral responsibility presupposed in the free will debate. I argue that we are responsible for our actions but only in the weaker sense, termed ‘attributability’ by Gary Watson. On the other hand, we are allegedly unrenounceably committed at the phenomenological level to conceiving of, and treating, ourselves and one another as morally responsible beings in the desert-entailing sense. P. F. Strawson famously defends this claim in his seminal work, ‘Freedom and Resentment’. In my thesis I will set out this tension by exploring both commitments in turn. I then aim to show that the tension can be dissolved by arguing, contra P. F. Strawson, that our phenomenological commitment is not in fact unrenounceable. The dissolution of this tension entails, I argue, that we must examine our conception of self and other. We must explore the implications of adopting a position which denies that we are morally responsible beings for our life-hopes, personal feelings, inter-personal relationships and projects. Most importantly, I argue that we must renounce our current retributive condemnatory practices which are based on the unjustified belief that we are morally responsible beings.
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- Date Issued: 2009
Skewed interactions with evidence: a discussion of fixed sexually prejudiced beliefs
- Authors: Kirkaldy, Hannah Tshirukhwe
- Date: 2017
- Subjects: Homophobia , Discrimination , Prejudices , Belief and doubt
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/7279 , vital:21238
- Description: In this thesis, I will argue that a challenge to the combatting of sexual prejudice (more commonly known as homophobia) through argument and evidence is that those on both sides of the issue are prone to a phenomenon known in psychology as confirmation bias. While the motivating concern of the thesis is sexual prejudice, and while I do discuss sexual prejudice throughout the thesis, I will focus mostly on confirmation bias, with the understanding that the picture I set out will have implications for combatting sexual prejudice at a later stage. The term confirmation bias refers either to the tendency to look for evidence which confirms one's already-held beliefs, or to engage differently with evidence based on whether or not you agree with its conclusion. After dissecting two paradigmatic experiments which explore these two kinds of confirmation bias, and arguing that they can be further broken down into sub-phenomena, I will focus on the latter kind, as I think it is the more relevant to sexual prejudice. Its essential effect on beliefs is to hold them steady in the face of evidence. In an attempt to explore the motivations we might have for engaging in this form of confirmation bias, I will argue that we can understand the tendency through a combination of a picture of beliefs as forming an interconnected web, and an understanding of the effect of affective elements on belief. Furthermore, given this motivational story, it is sometimes reasonable to hold beliefs steady. I will argue that finding the balance between giving up beliefs too easily in the face of contrary evidence, and holding onto them too rigidly, is an epistemic virtue. Finally, defending my picture from the objection that the mental states I discuss do not count as beliefs, I will argue that confirmation bias is a way of maintaining fixed beliefs.
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- Date Issued: 2017