- Title
- Skewed interactions with evidence: a discussion of fixed sexually prejudiced beliefs
- Creator
- Kirkaldy, Hannah Tshirukhwe
- Subject
- Homophobia
- Subject
- Discrimination
- Subject
- Prejudices
- Subject
- Belief and doubt
- Date Issued
- 2017
- Date
- 2017
- Type
- Thesis
- Type
- Masters
- Type
- MA
- Identifier
- http://hdl.handle.net/10962/7279
- Identifier
- vital:21238
- Description
- In this thesis, I will argue that a challenge to the combatting of sexual prejudice (more commonly known as homophobia) through argument and evidence is that those on both sides of the issue are prone to a phenomenon known in psychology as confirmation bias. While the motivating concern of the thesis is sexual prejudice, and while I do discuss sexual prejudice throughout the thesis, I will focus mostly on confirmation bias, with the understanding that the picture I set out will have implications for combatting sexual prejudice at a later stage. The term confirmation bias refers either to the tendency to look for evidence which confirms one's already-held beliefs, or to engage differently with evidence based on whether or not you agree with its conclusion. After dissecting two paradigmatic experiments which explore these two kinds of confirmation bias, and arguing that they can be further broken down into sub-phenomena, I will focus on the latter kind, as I think it is the more relevant to sexual prejudice. Its essential effect on beliefs is to hold them steady in the face of evidence. In an attempt to explore the motivations we might have for engaging in this form of confirmation bias, I will argue that we can understand the tendency through a combination of a picture of beliefs as forming an interconnected web, and an understanding of the effect of affective elements on belief. Furthermore, given this motivational story, it is sometimes reasonable to hold beliefs steady. I will argue that finding the balance between giving up beliefs too easily in the face of contrary evidence, and holding onto them too rigidly, is an epistemic virtue. Finally, defending my picture from the objection that the mental states I discuss do not count as beliefs, I will argue that confirmation bias is a way of maintaining fixed beliefs.
- Format
- 75 pages
- Format
- Publisher
- Rhodes University
- Publisher
- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy
- Language
- English
- Rights
- Kirkaldy, Hannah Tshirukhwe
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