"From the inside": how to attribute emotions to others
- Authors: Mitova, Velislava Atanasova
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2741 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007661 , Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Description: I argue that a specific version of Theory theory is necessary and sufficient for attributions and predictions of others' emotions. Theory theory is the view that we attribute and predict others' mental states on the basis of a (tacit) body of generalisations about mental states, their situational input, and behavioural output. Theory's antagonist, Simulation theory, is the view that we ascribe mental states to others by simulating - or running ' off-line ' - their doxastic, emotional, and contextual situations. My argument for Theory's necessity and sufficiency develops in three stages: First, I show that some version of Theory is necessary for predictions of all mental states on the basis of the ascriber's knowledge of the subject's other mental states. The linchpin of the arguments here consists of considerations from relevant similarity between the ascriber's and the subject's mental states. Simulation cannot provide criteria for such similarity, and so, I argue, predictions must advert to Theory. Second, I develop a sui generis model of emotions, according to which (i) emoticns' necessary objects and typical causes are concern-based construals; and (ii) emotions qua attitudes are (a) complex states embedded in a narrative structure, (b) characterised in terms of their object, their expressive behaviour, and their phenomenology. Third, I show that, considering the nature of the objects of emotions, some Theory is necessary for emotion-predictions and -attributions. Moreover, I develop a version of Theory, based on my analysis of emotions and narrative structures, and argue that this version of Theory is both necessary and sufficient for emotion-predictions and -attributions.
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- Date Issued: 2003
"Tell me how you read and I will tell you who you are": children's literature and moral development
- Authors: Van der Nest, Megan
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Children's literature -- Philosophy Children's literature -- Moral and ethical aspects Children's literature -- History and criticism Literature and morals Ethics in literature Reader-response criticism Moral conditions in literature Literature -- Study and teaching
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2722 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002852
- Description: It is a common intuition that we can learn something of moral importance from literature, and one of the ways in which we teach our children about morality is through stories. In selecting books for children to read a primary concern is often the effect that the moral content of the story will have on the morality of the child reader. In this thesis I argue in order to take advantage of the contribution that literature can make to moral development, we need to teach children to read in a particular way. As a basis for this argument I use an account of moral agency that places emphasis on the development of moral skills - the ability to critically assess moral rules and systems, and the capacity to perceive and respond to the particulars of individual situations and to choose the right course of action in each - rather than on any particular kind of moral content. In order to make the most of the contribution that literature can make to the development of these skills, we need to teach children to immerse themselves in the story, rather than focusing on literary criticism. I argue that, contrary to the standard view of literary criticism as the only form of protection against possible negative effects, an immersed reading will help to prevent the child reader from taking any moral claims made in the story out of context, and so provide some measure of protection against possible negative moral effects of the story. Finally I argue that there are certain kinds of stories - recognisable by features that contribute to a high literary quality - that will enrich the experience of an immersed reading, and will therefore make a greater contribution to moral development than others.
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- Date Issued: 2010
A satrean account of the role of social narratives in the identity-formation and self-conception of the queer and intersex subject
- Authors: Phillips, Bianca Jewel
- Date: 2017
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/41554 , vital:25101
- Description: Successful, fully-fledged identity-formation and positive self-conception are contingent on the availability and sufficiency of social narratives. Following a Sartrean account of the human subject, identity will be shown to depend on externally-derived features (termed facticity). Facticity contains both material and social components. This thesis will show the two to be inextricably interlinked, and in so doing endorse Judith Butler's view that the material comes to us already seeped in social meaning. The interactive relationship between the discursive and the material will be illustrated by examining the phenomenon of intersexuality, in which the prevailing narrative of a dichotomized two-sex system has, through surgical, hormonal, and psychological procedures, become written into the flesh of non-binary individuals. The absence of affirming, diverse, and pluralistic narratives surrounding intersexuality, coupled with the imposition of the two-sex script, has (negatively) affected the material experiences, and subsequent identity-formation, of intersex individuals. Given the reliance of identity on socially-constituted facticities, the pursuit of flourishing, dignity, and an authentic and cohesive sense of self requires inclusive and diverse social scripts. Drawing on Mirander Fricker, I will elucidate how lacunae in the hermeneutical resource have resulted in confusion, unhappiness, and a lack of proper self-conception for individuals belonging to subjugated groups. Conversely, the availability of positive, diverse, and inclusive narratives will be shown to allow for more self-aware, self-determined subjects. I will ground my advocacy of inclusive, diverse social narratives in an examination of the beneficial genesis and development of the identity politics present in LGBTQIA++ movements (such as "Out and Proud", recognition of queer identity, and the development of non-binary gender). Assuming that self-understanding, authenticity, and flourishing are ethical goods that are valued, inclusive and affirming narratives for subjugated groups will be shown to be a normative necessity.
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- Date Issued: 2017
Achieving a realistic utopia: Rawls, realization, and the task of political philosophy
- Authors: Terlazzo, Rosa Elizabeth
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Political science -- Philosophy Justice -- Philosophy Utopias -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2721 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002851
- Description: In this thesis I argue that the tradition of political philosophy which follows in John Rawls's footsteps is obligated to concern itself not only with the realizability, but also with the realization, of justice. Although Rawls himself expresses a commitment only to the former of these, I argue that the roles which he assigns to political philosophy require him to take on the further commitment to realization. This is because these roles are meant to influence not only political philosophers, but the citizens of the wider community as well. The realistically utopian role, which I take to be the central one, requires political philosophy to inspire in that population a hope which I argue that realizability alone cannot provide. Given the deep revisions regarding the political nature of justice as fairness which Rawls made on the basis of realizability concerns, I argue that his theory must in this case be committed to a similar revision. The hope which political philosophy is meant to provide is simply not realizable until the discipline concerns itself centrally with the task of realization.
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- Date Issued: 2010
Against supererogationism
- Authors: Van Niekerk, Jason Bradley
- Date: 2006
- Subjects: Supererogation , Supererogation -- History , Values , Ethics -- History
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2731 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004268 , Supererogation , Supererogation -- History , Values , Ethics -- History
- Description: In this thesis, I argue that we have no reason to accept the existence of a category of supererogatory moral goods: that is, good acts that carry no pressure to bring them about. Despite the counterintuitive nature and suspicious provenance of the concept, Supererogationism is the orthodoxy in Ethics, and I examine promising but unsuccessful responses to it by Peter Singer and Kwame Gyekye. Responding in particular to David Heyd's Supererogationism - but also to J. O. Urmson, Susan Wolf, and Jonathan Dancy - I develop an account of the principle "Good implies Ought" that does not entail absurd over-obligation. I argue that this Anti-Supererogationist model stands up to the four strongest arguments against such a position, and that it embraces a more accurate account of the relation between values and oughts than Supererogationists are capable of supplying. Finally, I sketch a detailed eudaimonist account of the principle umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu - that our commitment to the good of others stems from our flourishing being caught up with theirs.
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- Date Issued: 2006
An examination of Aristotelian modality
- Authors: Munshi, Salma
- Date: 1986
- Subjects: Aristotle , Modality (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2703 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001978
- Description: From introduction: A popular misconception regarding Aristotle's views on modality is that Aristotle adhered to the doctrine of no unrealized possibilities. According to this doctrine, all possibilities are realized in time; in other words, if it is possible that something could happen, then at some time it is the case that that happens. For example, if it is possible for Socrates to escape from prison, then there will be a time at which Socrates will actually escape from prison. On this view, the possible and the actual co-incide; whereas there is abundant evidence that Aristotle was careful to maintain a distinction between the possible and the actual.
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- Date Issued: 1986
Animal suffering in factory farming and the best way to prevent it
- Authors: Watkins, Gareth
- Date: 2005
- Subjects: Vegetarianism -- Moral and ethical aspects Food animals -- Moral and ethical aspects Animal rights Animal welfare Animal welfare -- Moral and ethical aspects Vegetarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2728 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003736
- Description: This thesis moves beyond the traditional approaches of how we ought to treat animals, and instead concentrates on the best strategy for preventing animal suffering in the farming industry. Chapter 1 considers the question of how we can know that animals feel pain, and concludes not only that it is rational to believe that they can, but also that this is a significant fact. Chapter 2 then analyses one possible strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering, namely demi-vegetarianism. For a number of reasons, however, this strategy is found to be flawed, therefore Chapter 3 analyses a second possible strategy, namely vegetarianism, and concludes that this is, in fact, the best strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering in the farming industry.
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- Date Issued: 2005
Arguments for other minds
- Authors: Dowling, Dolina Sylvia
- Date: 1989
- Subjects: Mind and body -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2702 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001977
- Description: If I am aware of my own mental states by introspection (a) How can I know that other people have minds? and (b) How can I know what their mental states are? These are two of the questions with which I will be concerned in this dissertation. I discuss five different attempts to deal with them. (i) The claim that we can know that other people have minds by an argument from analogy. I show a number of serious flaws in Russell's and other versions of this argument. (ii) Malcolm's thesis that the criteria by which we apply mental terms to others are just different from the criteria one applies in one's own case. I argue that Halcolm's accounts of both first- and third-person criteria are not adequate. (iii) I consider Strawson claim that 'persons' is a primitive concept and that behavioural criteria are "logically adequate" for determining the correctness of statements about the mental states of others. I argue that both of his key concepts are underanalysed. (iv) A quite different attempt to answer our questions (a) and (b) is given by the empirical realist who argues that knowledge claims about other minds are best understood as hypotheses in a wider psycho-physical theory. I show that the major fault in Putnam's version of empirical realism is that he overlooks the subjective character of (iii) our mental states. (v) Finally I consider the claim, due to Nagel, that a conception of mental states is possible which incorporates both subjective and objective aspects of the phenonemon. I speculate that with a great deal of development this approach might hold the answer to our questions.
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- Date Issued: 1989
Challenging retributivist intuitions
- Authors: Hawkes, Jonathan
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Lex talionis Punishment -- Philosophy Restorative justice
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2711 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002841
- Description: Can punishment, a practice which involves the deliberate infliction of suffering, be justified? Retributivists and consequentialists argue that punishment can be justified, whereas abolitionists argue that it cannot. Retributivists argue that punishment is justified because wrongdoers deserve it, whereas punishment is justified for consequentialists because it is beneficial for society. A popular form of abolitionism is restorative justice, which is the view that all those affected by crime (perpetrators, victims and members of society) should be reconciled. In this thesis I argue that retributivist justifications for punishment are mistaken, and argue in favour of a consequentialist view. I also argue that consequentialism can accommodate the valuable features of restorative justice while avoiding the challenges faced by it. My arguments against retributivism will turn on a thought experiment. The experiment is designed to draw out the fundamental retributivist intuition that people who cause harm deserve to suffer harm in return, yet excludes most of the principles retributivists would use to justify the intuition. I will go on to argue that, even if the retributivist considerations did apply to the experiment, they would still not justify the claim that wrongdoers deserve to be punished. Most of the retributivist considerations are, therefore, not necessary for the intuition, and none of the considerations are sufficient for it. The retributivist considerations are, I contend, rationalisations, as the claim that wrongdoers deserve to suffer is based, not on good reasons, but on an unreliable intuition. I shall argue that the consequentialist considerations, while not being necessary, are sufficient for the claim that wrongdoers should be punished, and they should be punished, I maintain, in the interests of preventing greater harm from occurring.
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- Date Issued: 2009
Collective forgiving
- Authors: Hamilton, Kelly
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Forgiveness -- Philosophy Collective behavior -- Philosophy Retribution -- Philosophy Reconciliation -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2709 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002839
- Description: Forgiveness is traditionally understood as a personal change of heart, in which an individual victim of a wrongdoing overcomes her resentment towards the perpetrator of that wrongdoing. Peter Strawson (1974) famously argued that resentment is a personal participant retributive reactive attitude, and the overcoming of such an attitude through forgiveness is itself a personal reactive attitude – in other words, forgiveness is an affective response to a wrongdoing by an individual victim, that is devoid of a retributive element. Because reactive attitudes are personal, it is argued that collectives – groups of individuals – cannot forgive, since collectives cannot, as collectives, hold reactive attitudes. I argue against this. I show that it is possible for collectives to hold attitudes in a way that is not reducible to individuals holding attitudes as individuals, and yet these attitudes still remain personal. Individuals exist within communities, and are interdependent on one another. Much of an individual‟s beliefs and attitudes depend on the collectives that she is a part of. I argue that an attitude is collective when it is deemed to be the appropriate attitude for members of the collective to hold. Members of the collective will take this attitude on as their own insofar as they identify themselves as members of the collective. Individuals hold the attitude, making the attitude personal, but since the individuals hold the attitude in virtue of their membership to a collective, the attitude is also collective. Given that forgiveness is itself a reactive attitude, and that collectives can hold attitudes, I argue that it is possible for a collective to forgive. Members of a collective will come to forgive when forgiveness is held up as the appropriate attitude for them, and once enough members have taken on the attitude of forgiveness as their own attitude, a collective can be said to have forgiven.
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- Date Issued: 2009
Control and authenticity: reflections on personal autonomy
- Authors: Paphitis, Sharli Anne
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Frankfurt, Harry G., 1929- -- Criticism and interpretation Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Criticism and interpretation Watson, Gary, 1943- -- Criticism and interpretation Self-control Authenticity (Philosophy) Autonomy (Philosophy) Self (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2717 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002847
- Description: Currently the most influential accounts of personal autonomy, at least in the Englishspeaking world, focus on providing conditions under which agents can be said to exercise self-control. Two distinct accounts of personal autonomy have emerged in this tradition: firstly, hierarchical models grounded in the work of Harry Frankfurt; and secondly, systems division models most famously articulated by Gary Watson. In this thesis I show the inadequacies of both of these models by exploring the problematic views of the self and self-control underlying each model. I will suggest that the problems faced by these models stem from the fact that they endorse a problematic fragmentation of the self. I suggest that a Nietzschean account of personal autonomy is able to avoid these problems. The Nietzschean account can largely, I show, be drawn from Nietzsche’s understanding of both the ‘man of ressentiment’ and his opposite, the sovereign individual. On this picture wholeness of self – rather than fragmentation of the self – is required in order for us to be most fully autonomous. Furthermore, this wholeness of self requires the kind of integrity which is opposed to the problematic fragmentation endorsed by Frankfurt and Watson.
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- Date Issued: 2010
Creating a new declaration of rights : a critical reconstruction of earth jurisprudence's global legislative framework
- Authors: Lenferna, Georges Alexandre
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: Universal Declaration , Rights , Earth , Environment , Ethics , Environmental law, International -- Research , Environmental law, International -- Philosophy , Environmental ethics -- Research , Nature conservation -- Law and legislation -- Research , Jurisprudence -- Research , Law -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2704 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001979
- Description: This thesis aims to critique the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and its underlying moral justification in order to provide a stronger and improved version of both. In Chapter 1 I explore what sort of moral justification is necessary to establish the Universal Declaration on firm grounds and explore its relation to environmental ethics and rights discourse. I argue that a non-anthropocentric perspective is necessary to justify the Universal Declaration’s rights. In Chapter 2 I explore the underlying justification of the Universal Declaration as discovered in the works of Cormac Cullinan and Father Thomas Berry. I argue that their ethical framework is indeterminate, has many ambiguities and uncertainties, and, among other problems, it does not provide a clear action-guiding framework. In Chapter 3 I develop an alternative justification for the Universal Declaration. I argue against many predominant moral theories, that in light of our best scientific and moral understanding we should expand the realm of moral concern to include all living beings, a moral theory I call Life’s Imperative. In Chapter 4 I illustrate that Life’s Imperative is a much stronger, more coherent justification for the Universal Declaration, one that coheres with both our best understanding of the natural world and our relation to it, and to an environmental ethic reflective of that relationship. Unfortunately many of the weaknesses in the current implicit justification of the Universal Declaration have also led to it enshrining rights that are themselves problematic. In order to address these issues, I revise its rights to accord with the stronger justification that I established in Chapter 3. The end result of doing so is a revised version of the Universal Declaration
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- Date Issued: 2013
Dennett's compatibilism considered
- Authors: Puttergill, Julian Gatenby
- Date: 1997
- Subjects: Dennett, Daniel Clement , Intentionality (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2718 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002848 , Dennett, Daniel Clement , Intentionality (Philosophy)
- Description: My basic concern in this thesis is to examine the details behind Dennett's attempt to reconcile the notions of mechanism and responsibility. In the main this involves an examination of how he tries to secure a compatibilism between mechanistic and intentional explanations by developing a systematised conception of intentional explanation. I begin by briefly discussing the various notions needed for understanding what is at stake in the area and where the orthodoxy on the matter lies. As such the first three sections of the work are not focussed on Dennett's work itself and playa stage-setting role for the deeper work to follow. These notions include the likes of the rationale behind attributing moral responsibility, agency and action, mechanism and mechanistic explanation, and intentional explanation. I suggest that the basic intuition regarding mechanism and responsibility is such that the two are seen to be incompatible with each other. The main reason for this lies in an intuition that mechanism undermines intentional explanation and so renders the notion of action largely empty. Action, I show, is at the heart of our attribution of responsibility and is dependent on intentional explanation. Having presented these issues, I turn to the details of Dennett's 'intentional systems theory'. I argue that Dennett attempts to avoid the intuition that mechanism is incompatible with responsibility by developing a specialised account of intentional explanation. Dennett calls it the intentional stance. r highlight the two important features of this intentional stance, namely rationality and intentionality. r show that Dennett's position on rationality and intentionality is such that it does allow him to secure an explanatory compatibilism between mechanism and his sort of intentional explanation. I argue, however, that his sort of intentional explanation does not fulfil our requirements for ascribing agency or moral responsibility. This is accomplished in part by developing alternative conceptions of the two notions. Out of this I develop a different sort of intentional stance, which I call the folk stance. I show finaIly that Dennett's compatibilist move is incapable of being applied to the folkstance from which we do in fact make attributions of responsibility, and so conclude thatDennett fails to make the case for reconciling mechanism and responsibility.
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- Date Issued: 1997
Describing behaviour: a philosophical analysis
- Authors: Bunting, I A
- Date: 1966
- Subjects: Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2744 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1009991 , Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Description: Questions revolving around the possibility and justifiability of reductive analyses of the concept 'not', lie at the heart of many of the problems in the philosophical interpretation of not-descriptions. In this thesis, I wish to show, by discussing various problems in the logic of not-descriptions, that, and why, reductive analyses must be unsatisfactory.
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- Date Issued: 1966
Desert
- Authors: Harper, Sean Julian
- Date: 2000
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2710 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002840 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Theory of justice , Ethics
- Description: This thesis examines the idea of desert as expounded in the work of John Rawls, and some of the implications of this conception of desert for moral and political philosophy. In this work, I analyse a series of arguments against retaining this particular conception of desert.I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently diminishes the force of Rawls’ argument for desert, while many of them do state, and I argue that they are correct in doing so, that this conception of desert is dangerous for political or moral philosophy to maintain. I argue that the moral, political and legal implications of accepting this account of desert severely undermine various institutions of differential treatment, and indeed, moral assessment. I regard it as obvious that societies must, on occasion, treat members of those societies differently, for moral, as well as practical reasons. The Rawlsian account of desert, and the account of responsibility on which it rests, however, will endanger the legitimacy of such procedures. I argue further that the Rawlsian account of desert requires that differences in wealth, and inheritance of wealth, influence and privilege be diminished, if not abolished, if we are to talk of any form of desert meaningfully. I argue that this is a strength of Rawls’ account, and further that any account of desert that is true to the philosophical tradition of the concept will require similar steps to be taken. The primary aim of this thesis is to show that Rawls’ arguments against desert are serious ones, both in terms of strength and scope, and that they must be addressed. I intend to show that these arguments are founded on strong moral intuitions, and that it is plausible that these intuitions may need revision. Finally,I intend to show that desert is an important moral and political concept, and that the disciplines of moral and political philosophy will be impoverished by the absence this concept. This absence, I will argue, is a natural consequence of the acceptance of the Rawlsian arguments.
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- Date Issued: 2000
Determinism and reactive attitudes: reflections on our alleged unrenounceable commitments
- Authors: Kelland, Lindsay-Ann
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Free will and determinism Responsibility
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2713 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002843
- Description: There seems to exist a tension between our metaphysical and phenomenological commitments in the free will debate. On the one hand, I argue that at the metaphysical level we cannot coherently defend the belief that we are morally responsible in the sense that we deserve to be rewarded and punished for our actions, where desert-entailing moral responsibility is the primary understanding of moral responsibility presupposed in the free will debate. I argue that we are responsible for our actions but only in the weaker sense, termed ‘attributability’ by Gary Watson. On the other hand, we are allegedly unrenounceably committed at the phenomenological level to conceiving of, and treating, ourselves and one another as morally responsible beings in the desert-entailing sense. P. F. Strawson famously defends this claim in his seminal work, ‘Freedom and Resentment’. In my thesis I will set out this tension by exploring both commitments in turn. I then aim to show that the tension can be dissolved by arguing, contra P. F. Strawson, that our phenomenological commitment is not in fact unrenounceable. The dissolution of this tension entails, I argue, that we must examine our conception of self and other. We must explore the implications of adopting a position which denies that we are morally responsible beings for our life-hopes, personal feelings, inter-personal relationships and projects. Most importantly, I argue that we must renounce our current retributive condemnatory practices which are based on the unjustified belief that we are morally responsible beings.
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- Date Issued: 2009
Does the construction of ‘rapeable’ bodies constitute an instance of hermeneutical injustice?
- Authors: Weiffenbach, Michaela
- Date: 2020
- Subjects: Zuma, Jacob -- Trials, litigation, etc. , Rape -- Philosophy , Women's rights -- Africa , Women, Black -- Social conditions -- Africa , Masculinity -- Africa , Men, Black -- Africa -- Psychology , Justice (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/145708 , vital:38460
- Description: This thesis argues that within the conventional imagination of the West, identity functions in a way that particular forms of embodiment are characterised by the experience of endured sexual vulnerability, which I argue is best understood as the construction of ‘rapeable’ bodies (Cahill 2001, 120). By this, I mean that the threat of rape is contingent upon the social and political construction of one’s identity as vulnerable. In virtue of this particular way of constructing the embodiment of certain subjectivities, there is an instance of hermeneutical injustice conferred (Fricker 2007, 114). I inquire into the function and meaning of stereotypic generalisations, prejudice and rape myths embedded within the dominant framework of the West and show how language and representation constructs these identities as ‘rapeable’. Furthermore, I consider how collective hermeneutical discourses construct Blackness, specifically Black masculinities and the construction of the ‘un-rapeable’ Black femxle body. To see how these ideas are congruous the prominent example that occurred in South Africa in 2005, namely, the Jacob Zuma rape trial comes to mind. One relevant feature of the case is that it shows how identities of race are constructed in the aftermath of apartheid and points to a Western collective imagination resistant to change. In addition, it demonstrates the triad of interrelatedness holding between the self-world-other, a relationship constituted mutually by the self and the socially constructed interpretations of identity and embodiment (du Toit 2009, 58). Lastly, the construction of ‘rapeable’ bodies is an example of how discursive narratives construct particular identities as vulnerable through rendering particular embodied subjects as sexually irrelevant and hermeneutically obscured.
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- Date Issued: 2020
Equality, resources and primary goods: Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls on the currency of egalitarianism
- Authors: May, Simon James Peter
- Date: 1996
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Dworkin, R M , Law -- Philosophy , Law -- Political apsects , Equality , Justice , Jurisprudence
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2714 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002844 , Rawls, John, 1921-2002 , Dworkin, R M , Law -- Philosophy , Law -- Political apsects , Equality , Justice , Jurisprudence
- Description: In this thesis I compare the work of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls within the context of the 'equality of what?' debate. I argue that the Rawlsian paradigm offers a much more flexible defence of a resourcist approach to egalitarianism than Dworkin's theoI)' of' equality of resources'. I argue that Dworkin's fundamental distinction between persons and circumstances is flawed because it involves commitment to a view of the person which belongs in the realm of' comprehensive moral doctrines', rather than in the realm of a political theory of justice. I also argue that an alternative distinction between choice and luck, expressed in the 'luck-neutralising aim' of egalitarianism, is inappropriate since it too involves transgressing political constraints on theories of justice. Rawls's utilisation of primary goods in his theory of justice is supported by considerations derived from the work of Thomas Scanlon. The schematic picture of relative urgency which Scanlon advances provides the rationale for the use of primary goods, and also allows us to discriminate . between compensation for handicaps and compensation for expensive tastes. Scanlon's schematic picture also frees the utilisation of primary goods from criticisms raised by Amartya Sen. Lastly, I discuss arguments advanced by Susan Hurley which enable an interpretation of Rawls's original position device which is independent of the luck-neutralising aim. Her arguments are extended as a criticism of Dworkin's hypothetical insurance market.
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- Date Issued: 1996
Externalism, self-knowledge and explanation
- Authors: Flockemann, Richard
- Date: 2013-06-11
- Subjects: Burge, Tyler Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Self-knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2743 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1008060
- Description: In recent years, much attention has been given to the question of whether content externalism is compatible with an account of self-knowledge maintaining that we have an epistemically privileged access to the content of our propositional mental states. Philosophers who maintain the two are incompatible (incompatibilists) have put forward two majors types of challenge, which I call - following Martin Davies - the Achievement and Consequence Problems, which aim to demonstrate that self-knowledge cannot be reconciled with externalism. These challenges have spawned a great deal of literature, and a diverse range of arguments and positions have emerged in response. In this dissertation, I intend to focus on examples of these different avenues of response, and show how none of them are adequate. In the first chapter, I lay the groundwork for the debate, setting up how externalism and self-knowledge are to be understood, and outlining both the incompatibilist challenges as well as the available responses to them. In the second chapter I examine these responses in more detail, concluding finally that the best available response is Tyler Burge's. Burge has two arguments that together establish his compatibilist position. First, he shows that even if externalism is true, our judgements about our occurrent thoughts are immunejrom error. This establishes that our judgements about our thoughts must be true. Second, he offers a transcendental argument for self-knowledge, arguing that our access to our mental states must be not only true, but non-accidentally true, in a way sufficient for genuine knowledge. This establishes that we possess the correct epistemic entitlement to our thoughts. In the third chapter, I argue Burge's arguments do not, in fact, give us good reason to suppose externalism and self-knowledge to be compatible. This, I argue, is because B urge relies upon a transcendental argument, which, in this context, cannot establish that we have self-knowledge if externalism is true. All it establishes, I argue, is that we do possess self-knowledge. And this is insufficient to establish that externalism and self-knowledge are compatible. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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Filling the gap : Nietzsche's account of authenticity as a supplementary ideal
- Authors: Baker, Michaela Christie
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Ethics , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Ethics, Modern , Normativity (Ethics) , Self-knowledge, Theory of
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2727 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003734 , Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Ethics , Authenticity (Philosophy) , Ethics, Modern , Normativity (Ethics) , Self-knowledge, Theory of
- Description: This thesis examines the ideal of authenticity: why we might want or need such an ideal, what such an ideal would look like, and what mechanisms we would need to ensure the successful operation of such an ideal. The thesis has three main parts. The first part of the thesis aims at motivating the need to look to authenticity as a supplementary ideal to normative moral theory. I do this by drawing a distinction between ethics and morality and arguing that there are important aspects of our lives (such as our relations to ourselves) our beliefs and projects) about which normative moral theory fails to give us guidance and about which an ethical ideal, namely that of authenticity, can provide us with the requisite guidance. The second part of the thesis elucidates Nietzsche's view of authenticity as eternal return. I argue that eternal return consists in holding a particular attitude to one's life - one's past, present and future. I then demonstrate that what is fundamental to successfully living authentically in accordance with eternal return is a rigorous search for self-knowledge. In the third part of the thesis I argue that, in order to achieve the self-knowledge necessary to being a successful authentic agent, one must acquire it through a process of dialogue with other agents. I give a model of self-knowledge as a dialogic encounter that provides two important mechanisms whereby such self-knowledge can be gained.
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- Date Issued: 2004