"From the inside": how to attribute emotions to others
- Authors: Mitova, Velislava Atanasova
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2741 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007661 , Emotions (Philosophy) , Theory (Philosophy)
- Description: I argue that a specific version of Theory theory is necessary and sufficient for attributions and predictions of others' emotions. Theory theory is the view that we attribute and predict others' mental states on the basis of a (tacit) body of generalisations about mental states, their situational input, and behavioural output. Theory's antagonist, Simulation theory, is the view that we ascribe mental states to others by simulating - or running ' off-line ' - their doxastic, emotional, and contextual situations. My argument for Theory's necessity and sufficiency develops in three stages: First, I show that some version of Theory is necessary for predictions of all mental states on the basis of the ascriber's knowledge of the subject's other mental states. The linchpin of the arguments here consists of considerations from relevant similarity between the ascriber's and the subject's mental states. Simulation cannot provide criteria for such similarity, and so, I argue, predictions must advert to Theory. Second, I develop a sui generis model of emotions, according to which (i) emoticns' necessary objects and typical causes are concern-based construals; and (ii) emotions qua attitudes are (a) complex states embedded in a narrative structure, (b) characterised in terms of their object, their expressive behaviour, and their phenomenology. Third, I show that, considering the nature of the objects of emotions, some Theory is necessary for emotion-predictions and -attributions. Moreover, I develop a version of Theory, based on my analysis of emotions and narrative structures, and argue that this version of Theory is both necessary and sufficient for emotion-predictions and -attributions.
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- Date Issued: 2003
"Tell me how you read and I will tell you who you are": children's literature and moral development
- Authors: Van der Nest, Megan
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Children's literature -- Philosophy Children's literature -- Moral and ethical aspects Children's literature -- History and criticism Literature and morals Ethics in literature Reader-response criticism Moral conditions in literature Literature -- Study and teaching
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2722 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002852
- Description: It is a common intuition that we can learn something of moral importance from literature, and one of the ways in which we teach our children about morality is through stories. In selecting books for children to read a primary concern is often the effect that the moral content of the story will have on the morality of the child reader. In this thesis I argue in order to take advantage of the contribution that literature can make to moral development, we need to teach children to read in a particular way. As a basis for this argument I use an account of moral agency that places emphasis on the development of moral skills - the ability to critically assess moral rules and systems, and the capacity to perceive and respond to the particulars of individual situations and to choose the right course of action in each - rather than on any particular kind of moral content. In order to make the most of the contribution that literature can make to the development of these skills, we need to teach children to immerse themselves in the story, rather than focusing on literary criticism. I argue that, contrary to the standard view of literary criticism as the only form of protection against possible negative effects, an immersed reading will help to prevent the child reader from taking any moral claims made in the story out of context, and so provide some measure of protection against possible negative moral effects of the story. Finally I argue that there are certain kinds of stories - recognisable by features that contribute to a high literary quality - that will enrich the experience of an immersed reading, and will therefore make a greater contribution to moral development than others.
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- Date Issued: 2010
A satrean account of the role of social narratives in the identity-formation and self-conception of the queer and intersex subject
- Authors: Phillips, Bianca Jewel
- Date: 2017
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/41554 , vital:25101
- Description: Successful, fully-fledged identity-formation and positive self-conception are contingent on the availability and sufficiency of social narratives. Following a Sartrean account of the human subject, identity will be shown to depend on externally-derived features (termed facticity). Facticity contains both material and social components. This thesis will show the two to be inextricably interlinked, and in so doing endorse Judith Butler's view that the material comes to us already seeped in social meaning. The interactive relationship between the discursive and the material will be illustrated by examining the phenomenon of intersexuality, in which the prevailing narrative of a dichotomized two-sex system has, through surgical, hormonal, and psychological procedures, become written into the flesh of non-binary individuals. The absence of affirming, diverse, and pluralistic narratives surrounding intersexuality, coupled with the imposition of the two-sex script, has (negatively) affected the material experiences, and subsequent identity-formation, of intersex individuals. Given the reliance of identity on socially-constituted facticities, the pursuit of flourishing, dignity, and an authentic and cohesive sense of self requires inclusive and diverse social scripts. Drawing on Mirander Fricker, I will elucidate how lacunae in the hermeneutical resource have resulted in confusion, unhappiness, and a lack of proper self-conception for individuals belonging to subjugated groups. Conversely, the availability of positive, diverse, and inclusive narratives will be shown to allow for more self-aware, self-determined subjects. I will ground my advocacy of inclusive, diverse social narratives in an examination of the beneficial genesis and development of the identity politics present in LGBTQIA++ movements (such as "Out and Proud", recognition of queer identity, and the development of non-binary gender). Assuming that self-understanding, authenticity, and flourishing are ethical goods that are valued, inclusive and affirming narratives for subjugated groups will be shown to be a normative necessity.
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- Date Issued: 2017
Achieving a realistic utopia: Rawls, realization, and the task of political philosophy
- Authors: Terlazzo, Rosa Elizabeth
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Rawls, John, 1921-2002 Political science -- Philosophy Justice -- Philosophy Utopias -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2721 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002851
- Description: In this thesis I argue that the tradition of political philosophy which follows in John Rawls's footsteps is obligated to concern itself not only with the realizability, but also with the realization, of justice. Although Rawls himself expresses a commitment only to the former of these, I argue that the roles which he assigns to political philosophy require him to take on the further commitment to realization. This is because these roles are meant to influence not only political philosophers, but the citizens of the wider community as well. The realistically utopian role, which I take to be the central one, requires political philosophy to inspire in that population a hope which I argue that realizability alone cannot provide. Given the deep revisions regarding the political nature of justice as fairness which Rawls made on the basis of realizability concerns, I argue that his theory must in this case be committed to a similar revision. The hope which political philosophy is meant to provide is simply not realizable until the discipline concerns itself centrally with the task of realization.
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- Date Issued: 2010
African linguistic phenomenology as illustrated through the Setswana language
- Authors: Modisakeng, Lemogang
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Uncatalogued
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/425089 , vital:72208
- Description: Embargoed. Expected release date 2025. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
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- Date Issued: 2023-10-13
Afro-communitarianism and the nature of reconciliation
- Authors: Oelofsen, Rianna
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: Ubuntu (Philosophy) Reconciliation -- South Africa Communitarianism -- Africa Philosophy, African
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:2736 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1006809
- Description: In this dissertation I sketch a conception of personhood as understood from within an Afrocommunitarian worldview, and argue that this understanding of personhood has implications for understanding the concept of reconciliation. Understanding ‘being human’ as a collective, communal enterprise has implications for how responsibility, justice, forgiveness and humanization (all cognate concepts of reconciliation) are conceptualized. In line with this understanding of reconciliation and its cognate concepts, I argue that the humanization of self and other (according to the Afrocommunitarian understanding of personhood) is required for addressing the ‘inferiority’ and concurrent ‘superiority’ racial complexes as diagnosed by Franz Fanon and Steve Biko. These complexes reach deeply within individual and collective psyches and political identities, and I argue that political solutions to protracted conflict (in South Africa and other racially charged contexts) which do not address these deeply entrenched pathologies will be inadequate according to an Afrocommunitarian framework.
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- Date Issued: 2013
Against supererogationism
- Authors: Van Niekerk, Jason Bradley
- Date: 2006
- Subjects: Supererogation , Supererogation -- History , Values , Ethics -- History
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2731 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004268 , Supererogation , Supererogation -- History , Values , Ethics -- History
- Description: In this thesis, I argue that we have no reason to accept the existence of a category of supererogatory moral goods: that is, good acts that carry no pressure to bring them about. Despite the counterintuitive nature and suspicious provenance of the concept, Supererogationism is the orthodoxy in Ethics, and I examine promising but unsuccessful responses to it by Peter Singer and Kwame Gyekye. Responding in particular to David Heyd's Supererogationism - but also to J. O. Urmson, Susan Wolf, and Jonathan Dancy - I develop an account of the principle "Good implies Ought" that does not entail absurd over-obligation. I argue that this Anti-Supererogationist model stands up to the four strongest arguments against such a position, and that it embraces a more accurate account of the relation between values and oughts than Supererogationists are capable of supplying. Finally, I sketch a detailed eudaimonist account of the principle umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu - that our commitment to the good of others stems from our flourishing being caught up with theirs.
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- Date Issued: 2006
An examination of Aristotelian modality
- Authors: Munshi, Salma
- Date: 1986
- Subjects: Aristotle , Modality (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2703 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001978
- Description: From introduction: A popular misconception regarding Aristotle's views on modality is that Aristotle adhered to the doctrine of no unrealized possibilities. According to this doctrine, all possibilities are realized in time; in other words, if it is possible that something could happen, then at some time it is the case that that happens. For example, if it is possible for Socrates to escape from prison, then there will be a time at which Socrates will actually escape from prison. On this view, the possible and the actual co-incide; whereas there is abundant evidence that Aristotle was careful to maintain a distinction between the possible and the actual.
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- Date Issued: 1986
Animal suffering in factory farming and the best way to prevent it
- Authors: Watkins, Gareth
- Date: 2005
- Subjects: Vegetarianism -- Moral and ethical aspects Food animals -- Moral and ethical aspects Animal rights Animal welfare Animal welfare -- Moral and ethical aspects Vegetarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2728 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003736
- Description: This thesis moves beyond the traditional approaches of how we ought to treat animals, and instead concentrates on the best strategy for preventing animal suffering in the farming industry. Chapter 1 considers the question of how we can know that animals feel pain, and concludes not only that it is rational to believe that they can, but also that this is a significant fact. Chapter 2 then analyses one possible strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering, namely demi-vegetarianism. For a number of reasons, however, this strategy is found to be flawed, therefore Chapter 3 analyses a second possible strategy, namely vegetarianism, and concludes that this is, in fact, the best strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering in the farming industry.
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- Date Issued: 2005
Anonymous testimony and epistemic responsibility
- Authors: Ajiboro, Aderonke Adeyinka
- Date: 2023-10-13
- Subjects: Anonymity , Assertion , Credibility , Truthfulness and falsehood , Responsibility , Testimony (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Doctoral theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/432286 , vital:72858 , DOI 10.21504/10962/432286
- Description: In this thesis, I examine anonymous testimony in both offline (face-to-face) and online (internet and social media) interactions and the epistemic concerns it raises in relation to belief, knowledge, justification, and normative assessments of assertions. I discuss anonymous testimony as involving a relation between the hearer and the content of the testimony in comparison to ordinary cases where the speaker of an assertion is known. In anonymous testimony, the hearer has the burden of epistemic responsibility to arrive at a testimonial belief or arguably acceptance. The hearer is also accountable for the anonymous testimony in the event of re-assertion. I also assess the norms of assertion for anonymous testimony and argue that knowledge, truth, and belief norms that apply in cases where the speaker is known should not be applied to cases of anonymous speakers. Epistemologists have paid little attention to anonymous testimony and its implications on the norms of interaction. This is a study in the epistemology of testimony and it aims at providing further understanding of the epistemic responsibility of hearers of anonymous testimony. In Chapter One, I argue that anonymous testimony can be appropriately described as testimony; where the properties of an assertion to induce belief in the hearer are sufficient to describe the assertion as testimony. I examine the kinds of anonymity and the burden of epistemic responsibility for the hearer. I introduce basically anonymous testimony in offline and online contexts of interaction. A basically anonymous testimony occurs where, at the instance of receiving testimony and making an epistemic decision on it, the speaker is unidentifiable to the hearer. In Chapter Two, I discuss the kinds of epistemic attitudes hearers may have when they receive anonymous testimony. I discuss reductionism, antireductionism, and entitlement theory as accounts of the justification for believing testimony. I argue that acceptance is the appropriate attitude and the entitlement theory provides a basis for accepting anonymous testimony. I also argue that practical reasons are a sufficient to accept anonymous testimony. Also, I discuss the possibility that a hearer of anonymous testimony can make a wrongful presumption by assigning an identity to a person as the speaker of an anonymous testimony. This can cause harm to the ‘person’ of the presumed speaker such as an unwarranted credibility assessment of the person by other people in the community. I also argue that making a credibility assessment of a presumed speaker constitutes harm to a proper epistemic assessment of the content. In Chapter Three, I discuss the possibility of trust relations between an anonymous speaker and a hearer. I argue that the hearer is solely responsible for making an epistemic decision from anonymous testimony. I argue that anonymous testimony can be relevant to a hearer given the value of its content. In Chapter Four, I discuss the applicability of knowledge, truth, belief, reasonable to believe and supportive reasons norms for the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. Hence, I argue that the supportive reasons norm, which acknowledges acceptance of an assertion, the relevance of contexts, and admits both epistemic and practical reasons to make an assertion, should guide the re-assertion of anonymous testimony. I also argue that a hearer should be epistemically conscientiousness for responsible re-assertion of received anonymous testimony. , Thesis (PhD) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2023
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- Date Issued: 2023-10-13
Arguments for other minds
- Authors: Dowling, Dolina Sylvia
- Date: 1989
- Subjects: Mind and body -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2702 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001977
- Description: If I am aware of my own mental states by introspection (a) How can I know that other people have minds? and (b) How can I know what their mental states are? These are two of the questions with which I will be concerned in this dissertation. I discuss five different attempts to deal with them. (i) The claim that we can know that other people have minds by an argument from analogy. I show a number of serious flaws in Russell's and other versions of this argument. (ii) Malcolm's thesis that the criteria by which we apply mental terms to others are just different from the criteria one applies in one's own case. I argue that Halcolm's accounts of both first- and third-person criteria are not adequate. (iii) I consider Strawson claim that 'persons' is a primitive concept and that behavioural criteria are "logically adequate" for determining the correctness of statements about the mental states of others. I argue that both of his key concepts are underanalysed. (iv) A quite different attempt to answer our questions (a) and (b) is given by the empirical realist who argues that knowledge claims about other minds are best understood as hypotheses in a wider psycho-physical theory. I show that the major fault in Putnam's version of empirical realism is that he overlooks the subjective character of (iii) our mental states. (v) Finally I consider the claim, due to Nagel, that a conception of mental states is possible which incorporates both subjective and objective aspects of the phenonemon. I speculate that with a great deal of development this approach might hold the answer to our questions.
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- Date Issued: 1989
Challenging retributivist intuitions
- Authors: Hawkes, Jonathan
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Lex talionis Punishment -- Philosophy Restorative justice
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2711 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002841
- Description: Can punishment, a practice which involves the deliberate infliction of suffering, be justified? Retributivists and consequentialists argue that punishment can be justified, whereas abolitionists argue that it cannot. Retributivists argue that punishment is justified because wrongdoers deserve it, whereas punishment is justified for consequentialists because it is beneficial for society. A popular form of abolitionism is restorative justice, which is the view that all those affected by crime (perpetrators, victims and members of society) should be reconciled. In this thesis I argue that retributivist justifications for punishment are mistaken, and argue in favour of a consequentialist view. I also argue that consequentialism can accommodate the valuable features of restorative justice while avoiding the challenges faced by it. My arguments against retributivism will turn on a thought experiment. The experiment is designed to draw out the fundamental retributivist intuition that people who cause harm deserve to suffer harm in return, yet excludes most of the principles retributivists would use to justify the intuition. I will go on to argue that, even if the retributivist considerations did apply to the experiment, they would still not justify the claim that wrongdoers deserve to be punished. Most of the retributivist considerations are, therefore, not necessary for the intuition, and none of the considerations are sufficient for it. The retributivist considerations are, I contend, rationalisations, as the claim that wrongdoers deserve to suffer is based, not on good reasons, but on an unreliable intuition. I shall argue that the consequentialist considerations, while not being necessary, are sufficient for the claim that wrongdoers should be punished, and they should be punished, I maintain, in the interests of preventing greater harm from occurring.
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- Date Issued: 2009
Collective forgiving
- Authors: Hamilton, Kelly
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Forgiveness -- Philosophy Collective behavior -- Philosophy Retribution -- Philosophy Reconciliation -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2709 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002839
- Description: Forgiveness is traditionally understood as a personal change of heart, in which an individual victim of a wrongdoing overcomes her resentment towards the perpetrator of that wrongdoing. Peter Strawson (1974) famously argued that resentment is a personal participant retributive reactive attitude, and the overcoming of such an attitude through forgiveness is itself a personal reactive attitude – in other words, forgiveness is an affective response to a wrongdoing by an individual victim, that is devoid of a retributive element. Because reactive attitudes are personal, it is argued that collectives – groups of individuals – cannot forgive, since collectives cannot, as collectives, hold reactive attitudes. I argue against this. I show that it is possible for collectives to hold attitudes in a way that is not reducible to individuals holding attitudes as individuals, and yet these attitudes still remain personal. Individuals exist within communities, and are interdependent on one another. Much of an individual‟s beliefs and attitudes depend on the collectives that she is a part of. I argue that an attitude is collective when it is deemed to be the appropriate attitude for members of the collective to hold. Members of the collective will take this attitude on as their own insofar as they identify themselves as members of the collective. Individuals hold the attitude, making the attitude personal, but since the individuals hold the attitude in virtue of their membership to a collective, the attitude is also collective. Given that forgiveness is itself a reactive attitude, and that collectives can hold attitudes, I argue that it is possible for a collective to forgive. Members of a collective will come to forgive when forgiveness is held up as the appropriate attitude for them, and once enough members have taken on the attitude of forgiveness as their own attitude, a collective can be said to have forgiven.
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- Date Issued: 2009
Concerning Marya Schechtman’s narrative account
- Authors: Simuja, Clement
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Schechtman, Marya, 1960- Criticism and interpretation , Narrative inquiry (Research method) , Identity (Psychology) , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Self , Individuality
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190748 , vital:45024
- Description: The persistence of personal identity stands at the heart of many human practices, such as paying individuals for their work or holding people responsible for their actions. As such, it seems important that theories of personal identity are able to account for the practical implications of continuity of personal identity. Mindful of the practical importance of personal identity, Marya Schechtman (1994) argues that her narrative view only accounts for the four features that persons must possess. Any account of personal identity is supposed to make persons capable of possessing these features. She then posits her narrative self-constitution view as an account of personal identity she feels is capable of explaining the link between personal identity and certain features of persons. In this thesis project, I present how the narrative views, as described by Schechtman and others, are interpretive enterprises and that this leads them to a potentially devastating conclusion. The narratives must be constructed from something, and I argue that it is memory. But empirical facts about memory do not allow for it to persist in a quantitative way, but rather in a qualitative way, much like persons. Upon making this argument, I further argue that if mainstream psychological views is correct, this reduces the persistence of memory to resemblance relations. And memory is the building blocks of narrative. If this is the case, then narrative is also reduced to resemblance relations. Narrative, therefore, does not persist through time in a non-qualitative way, and one is better off accepting a psychological theory by virtue of parsimony. Ultimately, I argue that Schechtman and narrative theorists may save narrative views by adopting what I call as a ‘causal narrative view’. A causal narrative view will encapsulate all of the relevant features of the typical narrative view, including the emphasis on construction, but will also add the addendum that narrative states must be placed in a causal relation to each other. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
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- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Conscientious objection and the concept of worship
- Authors: Moulder, James Edward
- Date: 1977
- Subjects: Conscientious objectors -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Conscientious objectors -- South Africa , Conscientious objection , Conscientious objection -- Religious aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:2749 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013555
- Description: [Preface] " ... the focus of this inquiry is limited to some of the connections between conscientious objection in South Africa and the worship and imitation of Christ. More specifically, at the most general level this essay is an attempt to explore six questions: What kind of conscientious objection does South African law allow? Why are some conscientious objectors only conscientious noncombatants? Why are some Christians conscientious noncombatants? Is it appropriate to worship Christ? Does Romans 13 undermine conscientious noncompliance? And is there a prescription for servile compliance? These are, however, not the only questions which are raised in this essay. Nor are they the only questions which can and need to be asked. But they are the questions which interest me. In addition, they have not received as much attention as they deserve".
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- Date Issued: 1977
Control and authenticity: reflections on personal autonomy
- Authors: Paphitis, Sharli Anne
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Frankfurt, Harry G., 1929- -- Criticism and interpretation Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Criticism and interpretation Watson, Gary, 1943- -- Criticism and interpretation Self-control Authenticity (Philosophy) Autonomy (Philosophy) Self (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2717 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002847
- Description: Currently the most influential accounts of personal autonomy, at least in the Englishspeaking world, focus on providing conditions under which agents can be said to exercise self-control. Two distinct accounts of personal autonomy have emerged in this tradition: firstly, hierarchical models grounded in the work of Harry Frankfurt; and secondly, systems division models most famously articulated by Gary Watson. In this thesis I show the inadequacies of both of these models by exploring the problematic views of the self and self-control underlying each model. I will suggest that the problems faced by these models stem from the fact that they endorse a problematic fragmentation of the self. I suggest that a Nietzschean account of personal autonomy is able to avoid these problems. The Nietzschean account can largely, I show, be drawn from Nietzsche’s understanding of both the ‘man of ressentiment’ and his opposite, the sovereign individual. On this picture wholeness of self – rather than fragmentation of the self – is required in order for us to be most fully autonomous. Furthermore, this wholeness of self requires the kind of integrity which is opposed to the problematic fragmentation endorsed by Frankfurt and Watson.
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- Date Issued: 2010
Control and vulnerability : reflections on the nature of human agency and personhood
- Authors: Paphitis, Sharli Anne
- Date: 2015
- Subjects: Self-control , Vulnerability (Personality trait) , Self (Philosophy) , Social psychology , Cognitive science , Frankfurt, Harry G., 1929- -- Criticism and interpretation , Watson, Gary, 1943- -- Criticism and interpretation , Mele, Alfred R., 1951- -- Criticism and interpretation , Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Criticism and interpretation
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Doctoral , PhD
- Identifier: vital:2750 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1018671
- Description: Following the writings of philosophers such as Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson, and Alfred Mele, in this thesis I defend some central claims of the self-control view of human agency. However, I not only defend, but also supplement this view in the following two ways. First, drawing on work by Mary Midgley and Sigmund Freud I advance the claim that self-control requires the experience of internal conflict between an agent’s motivations and intentions. Second, drawing on insights from Simone de Beauvoir and Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as recent research in social psychology and cognitive science, I will argue in this thesis that self-control and vulnerability are inextricably intertwined with one another, and that as a result both are to be seen as constitutive of human agency. While it is the capacity for self-control that marks us out as human agents, I argue that it is also our uniquely human vulnerability which distinguishes our agency from the kind of agency which we might attribute to other potential or actual forms of sentience. Further, while the concepts of human agency and personhood are typically conflated in the analytic tradition of philosophy, in this thesis I will show that there are good reasons for understanding these two concepts as subtly distinct from one another. The term personhood, I will argue, can fruitfully be understood in substantive rather than purely formal terms. A person, in the superlative sense, is to be understood as someone who exercises their agency well; and, as such, persons are answerable to a number of normative prescriptions. Following Midgley, Nietzsche and Martha Nussbaum, I argue against Frankfurt’s normative prescription for personhood in the form of what he calls ‘wholeheartedness’, and offer four normative prescriptions for personhood of my own.
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- Date Issued: 2015
Creating a new declaration of rights : a critical reconstruction of earth jurisprudence's global legislative framework
- Authors: Lenferna, Georges Alexandre
- Date: 2013
- Subjects: Universal Declaration , Rights , Earth , Environment , Ethics , Environmental law, International -- Research , Environmental law, International -- Philosophy , Environmental ethics -- Research , Nature conservation -- Law and legislation -- Research , Jurisprudence -- Research , Law -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2704 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001979
- Description: This thesis aims to critique the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and its underlying moral justification in order to provide a stronger and improved version of both. In Chapter 1 I explore what sort of moral justification is necessary to establish the Universal Declaration on firm grounds and explore its relation to environmental ethics and rights discourse. I argue that a non-anthropocentric perspective is necessary to justify the Universal Declaration’s rights. In Chapter 2 I explore the underlying justification of the Universal Declaration as discovered in the works of Cormac Cullinan and Father Thomas Berry. I argue that their ethical framework is indeterminate, has many ambiguities and uncertainties, and, among other problems, it does not provide a clear action-guiding framework. In Chapter 3 I develop an alternative justification for the Universal Declaration. I argue against many predominant moral theories, that in light of our best scientific and moral understanding we should expand the realm of moral concern to include all living beings, a moral theory I call Life’s Imperative. In Chapter 4 I illustrate that Life’s Imperative is a much stronger, more coherent justification for the Universal Declaration, one that coheres with both our best understanding of the natural world and our relation to it, and to an environmental ethic reflective of that relationship. Unfortunately many of the weaknesses in the current implicit justification of the Universal Declaration have also led to it enshrining rights that are themselves problematic. In order to address these issues, I revise its rights to accord with the stronger justification that I established in Chapter 3. The end result of doing so is a revised version of the Universal Declaration
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- Date Issued: 2013
Dennett's compatibilism considered
- Authors: Puttergill, Julian Gatenby
- Date: 1997
- Subjects: Dennett, Daniel Clement , Intentionality (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2718 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002848 , Dennett, Daniel Clement , Intentionality (Philosophy)
- Description: My basic concern in this thesis is to examine the details behind Dennett's attempt to reconcile the notions of mechanism and responsibility. In the main this involves an examination of how he tries to secure a compatibilism between mechanistic and intentional explanations by developing a systematised conception of intentional explanation. I begin by briefly discussing the various notions needed for understanding what is at stake in the area and where the orthodoxy on the matter lies. As such the first three sections of the work are not focussed on Dennett's work itself and playa stage-setting role for the deeper work to follow. These notions include the likes of the rationale behind attributing moral responsibility, agency and action, mechanism and mechanistic explanation, and intentional explanation. I suggest that the basic intuition regarding mechanism and responsibility is such that the two are seen to be incompatible with each other. The main reason for this lies in an intuition that mechanism undermines intentional explanation and so renders the notion of action largely empty. Action, I show, is at the heart of our attribution of responsibility and is dependent on intentional explanation. Having presented these issues, I turn to the details of Dennett's 'intentional systems theory'. I argue that Dennett attempts to avoid the intuition that mechanism is incompatible with responsibility by developing a specialised account of intentional explanation. Dennett calls it the intentional stance. r highlight the two important features of this intentional stance, namely rationality and intentionality. r show that Dennett's position on rationality and intentionality is such that it does allow him to secure an explanatory compatibilism between mechanism and his sort of intentional explanation. I argue, however, that his sort of intentional explanation does not fulfil our requirements for ascribing agency or moral responsibility. This is accomplished in part by developing alternative conceptions of the two notions. Out of this I develop a different sort of intentional stance, which I call the folk stance. I show finaIly that Dennett's compatibilist move is incapable of being applied to the folkstance from which we do in fact make attributions of responsibility, and so conclude thatDennett fails to make the case for reconciling mechanism and responsibility.
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- Date Issued: 1997
Describing behaviour: a philosophical analysis
- Authors: Bunting, I A
- Date: 1966
- Subjects: Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2744 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1009991 , Human behaviour -- Philosophy , Analysis (Philosophy)
- Description: Questions revolving around the possibility and justifiability of reductive analyses of the concept 'not', lie at the heart of many of the problems in the philosophical interpretation of not-descriptions. In this thesis, I wish to show, by discussing various problems in the logic of not-descriptions, that, and why, reductive analyses must be unsatisfactory.
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- Date Issued: 1966