Liberal aristocracy & the limits of democracy
- Authors: Wareham, Christopher
- Date: 2004
- Subjects: Plato , Aristocracy (Political science) , Liberalism , Democracy , Constitutional law , Civil rights -- Philosophy
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2725 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002855 , Plato , Aristocracy (Political science) , Liberalism , Democracy , Constitutional law , Civil rights -- Philosophy
- Description: I define and defend a non-democratic authority with the power to annul the decisions of democratic branches of government when such decisions infringe upon citizens’ basic rights and liberties. I refer to this non-democratic authority as Liberal Aristocracy. The argument for Liberal Aristocracy has two parts: the first part demonstrates that Liberal Aristocracy will arrive at decisions that further the moral end of sustaining citizens’ rights; the second part holds that Liberal Aristocracy is a moral means to this end. First, I discuss two existing arguments for non-democratic authorities – Platonic Aristocracy and Constitutional Court Judges. I claim that Plato’s argument is unsuccessful because it relies on controversial metaethical premises that are unlikely to provide a basis for rights. Liberal justifications of the power of Constitutional Courts are argued to be incomplete because they do not designate an authority that is qualified to decide when citizens’ rights are infringed by democratic branches of government. Nor do they show that such an authority is in fact required if citizens’ rights are to be protected. In order to supplement the liberal argument for the power of Constitutional Courts I develop an account of Liberal Aristocracy, which rests on the idea that Constitutional Court Judges should possess moral expertise. I claim that (i) moral expertise qualifies Judges to decide when citizens’ rights are violated by democratic decisions. Furthermore, I argue that (ii) decisions taken democratically will sometimes encroach on citizens’ rights. Claims (i) and (ii) are shown to justify the non-democratic authority of Liberal Aristocracy. The second part of the argument for Liberal Aristocracy examines arguments to the effect that only democratic procedures can be morally legitimate, even if other decision procedures arrive at outcomes that provide greater support for citizens’ rights. Three claims are offered in support of this idea. First, democracy is claimed to be necessary to support deliberation. Second, democracy is seen as the only procedure that can uphold the value of autonomy by securing citizens’ consent. Third, it is argued that non-democratic procedures will not recognise the equal status of citizens. I hold that these three claims are false and that Liberal Aristocratic procedures can be morally legitimate.
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- Date Issued: 2004
Lived bodies: women’s experience of sex and gender
- Authors: Lothian, Julie-Anne
- Date: 2014
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/69445 , vital:29538
- Description: This thesis will discuss the category of women, as a social group, through a phenomenological understanding of women’s subjective experiences. In arguing for the phenomenological perspective of the lived body, I show the ways in which other conceptions of women’s embodied subjectivity ultimately fail to provide comprehensive accounts of the lived experience of being a woman. I begin with an investigation into how biological determinists hypothesise women’s bodies as sexed. I then move to respond to Judith Butler’s poststructuralist feminist account of the gendered body. Finally, I argue that the embodied experience of being a woman is best explained as an ambiguous relationship between socially constructed expectations of femininity and biological materiality.
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- Date Issued: 2014
Making sense of ʺessenceʺ : a critical examination of the adequacy of the modern philosophical conception of ʺessenceʺ
- Authors: Ross, Allison
- Date: 2000
- Subjects: Essentialism (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2720 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002850 , Essentialism (Philosophy)
- Description: The idea that some sub-set of the properties of an object captures what it is to be that thing i.e. that it has an essence which is there to be discovered and about which we can be mistaken - is a commonsense assumption that we use all the time. However, philosophers of this century have regarded the realism about essence with skepticism, arguing that we impose essences on things by the way we define our concepts as opposed to discovering them. Essences are supposedly characteristics of our concepts rather than of objects in the world. This was the orthodox view until a group of philosophers of language developed the theory of direct reference. They claimed that proper names and certain other words refer non-connotatively which entails that the real properties of objects are crucial to the establishment of the reference of such terms. It can be shown that the properties involved in reference determination must be all and only the necessary properties of those objects. This discovery has been taken to mark the rehabilitation of the notion of essence, with an object’s essence being taken to be that set of properties which it must have in all possible worlds in which it exists. I will argue that the theory of direct reference is correct up to the point at which it assimilates the necessary properties of objects to their essences. I will show that the set of an object’s necessary properties cannot fulfill the role reserved for the concept of essence in metaphysical hypotheses concerning the nature of objects. I will go on to show that a sub-set of a thing’s necessary properties can fulfill this role and I will suggest that we identify the members of this sub-set by testing their ability to furnish the kinds of explanations we expect from essences. I will demonstrate how this can be done using the Aristotelian idea that the notion of essence is required in order to explain how it is that objects can persist through change.
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- Date Issued: 2000
Moral reform and the desiderata of responses to wrongdoing: the production of a "morally autonomous person freely attached to the good"
- Authors: Waller, Heath Frederick
- Date: 2004 , 2013-06-14
- Subjects: Victims of crimes -- Attitudes , Criminals -- Rehabilitation , Punishment -- Psychological aspects , Social ethics , Punishment
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2730 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1003805 , Victims of crimes -- Attitudes , Criminals -- Rehabilitation , Punishment -- Psychological aspects , Social ethics , Punishment
- Description: Moral reform is a neglected response to wrongdoing that has been incorrectly portrayed as a practice involving illegitimate treatment of wrongdoers and as totally unsatisfying to those theorists advocating backward-looking practices such as retributive punishment. A clear explanation of the ethical legitimacy and practical necessity of the reformative techniques moral reform involves has been missed, and this paper details the design of moral reform proper in order to fill this gap in punishment theory. The moral reform of an offender is identified as a desideratum of responses to wrongdoing and it is explained what moral reform ought to entail. The claim that moral reform qualifies as the overriding aim of responses to wrongdoing is argued for on the grounds that this practice is capable of achieving all the established ends of responses to wrongdoing. The legitimate desiderata of our practices are identified as those usually selected as the ends of punishment practices, and moral reform must accomplish these if it is to be accepted. Moral reform is shown to realise the goals of punishments as the fortunate effects of what is done to achieve an offender's moral improvement and of what reformees do in taking responsibility for their actions. The suffering involved in moral reform receives particular emphasis since the practice will never satisfy unless it accommodates the widely-held intuition that the offender must suffer sufficiently as a consequence of his wrongdoing. Moral reform is further portrayed as the most meaningful practice for its ability to satisfy the appropriate needs and desires victims have in response to their victimization. A central claim of the thesis is that moral reform best serves the victim, since it most effectively relieves the victim's emotional responses to wrongdoing and is as adept as punishment at the expression of these same emotions. Reformers advocate a constructive response to wrongdoing that benefits all affected parties. , KMBT_363 , Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in
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- Date Issued: 2004
Patents, pills, poverty and pandemic: the ethical issues
- Authors: Brown, Walter
- Date: 2003
- Subjects: Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Ethics , AIDS (Disease) -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , AIDS (Disease) -- Moral and ethical aspects , HIV infections -- South Africa , HIV infections -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , Social responsibility of business , Pharmaceutical industry -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2705 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002835 , Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 -- Ethics , AIDS (Disease) -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , AIDS (Disease) -- Moral and ethical aspects , HIV infections -- South Africa , HIV infections -- Treatment -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects , Social responsibility of business , Pharmaceutical industry -- South Africa -- Moral and ethical aspects
- Description: This thesis argues that corporations qua corporations are moral agents sui generis and hence capable of being held morally responsible. I argue that corporations qua corporations are responsible for the actual and foreseen consequences of their actions. I analyse normative theories and the different proscriptive responsibilities they place on moral agents and hence corporations. I examine Kantianism, utilitarianism and virtue ethics. I argue for a unique normative ethical theory that incorporates reasoning from all three of the normative theories. I argue for a broad range of reasons to factor into deciding whether an act is ethical or not. One of the claims of this thesis is that ethical theories must incorporate an agent’s motivation, intention and character traits as relevant to deciding on whether an action is ethical or not. My thesis argues for an indispensable role for the virtues while at the same time incorporating impartial beneficence and universal rationality from utilitarianism and Kantianism. This position I, following the literature, refer to as moderate virtue theory. Having established corporate qua corporate responsibility I question the pharmaceutical corporation’s practice of patenting life saving medication during a state of pandemic in poor countries. The moderate virtue theory position prioritises contexts and the actual human condition and criticises normative theories that attempt to give universal, abstracted answers to ethical problems. It is for this reason and the current (2003) HIV/AIDS pandemic that I focus on a particular context. I examine the practice of patenting life saving medication within South Africa and argue, applying moderate virtue theory, that this act cannot be justified. I argue that a pharmaceutical corporation that patents life saving medication in South Africa cannot justify that action and thus is morally responsible for that action. I also argue that corporations patenting HIV/AIDS medication in South Africa have unethical motivations and intentions.
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- Date Issued: 2003
Personal autonomy : philosophy and literature
- Authors: Vice, Samantha Wynne
- Date: 1999
- Subjects: Autonomy (Philosophy) , Ishiguro, Kazuo, 1954- -- Remains Of The Day , James, Henry, 1843-1916. Portrait of a lady
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2723 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002853 , Autonomy (Philosophy) , Ishiguro, Kazuo, 1954- -- Remains Of The Day , James, Henry, 1843-1916. Portrait of a lady
- Description: Gerald Dworkin's influential account of Personal Autonomy offers the following two conditions for autonomy: (i) Authenticity - the condition that one identify with one's beliefs, desires and values after a process of critical reflection, and (ii) Procedural Independence - the identification in (i) must not be "influenced in ways which make the process of identification in some way alien to the individual" (Dworkin 1989:61). I argue in this thesis that there are cases which fulfil both of Dworkin's conditions, yet are clearly not cases of autonomy. Specifically, I argue that we can best assess the adequacy of Dworkin's account of autonomy through literature, because it provides a unique medium for testing his account on the very terms he sets up for himself - ie. that autonomy apply to, and make sense of, persons leading lives of a certain quality. The examination of two novels - Kazuo Ishiguro's The Remains of the Day and Henry James's The Portrait of a Lady - shows that Dworkin's explanation of identification and critical reflection is inadequate for capturing their role in autonomy and that he does not pay enough attention to the role of external factors in preventing or supporting autonomy. As an alternative, I offer the following two conditions for autonomy: (i) critical reflection of a certain kind - radical reflection, and (ii) the ability to translate the results of (i) into action - competence. The novels demonstrate that both conditions are dependent upon considerations of the content of one's beliefs, desires, values etc. Certain of these will prevent or hinder the achievement of autonomy because of their content, so autonomy must be understood in relation to substantial considerations, rather than in purely formal terms, as Dworkin argues.
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- Date Issued: 1999
Pessimism and the secular problem of evil
- Authors: Ruiters, Siphamandla
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Good and evil , Pessimism , Optimism , Secularism , Quality of life
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190111 , vital:44964
- Description: How should we respond to the prevalence of ubiquitous evil? In this thesis, I present two responses to the secular problem of evil. The secular problem of evil exists because we want to live good lives, but we are all existentially vulnerable to evil. Consequently, we can think of various ways in which evil's existence poses a problem for us. When faced with such evil, I distinguish two responses that we may adopt, namely, optimistic or pessimistic responses to the secular problem of evil. These responses may be understood as stances that we may adopt about the relative evil and goodness in the world. Once I have made a thorough evaluation of the discussion around the secular problem of evil and the responses, I will suggest that pessimism is an appealing and appropriate response that we should adopt. To achieve the aims of this thesis, I will first clarify the kind of evil at stake in this thesis and then explain how philosophers have historically responded to this problem. Secondly, I will focus on the contemporary discussion on the secular problem of evil and show the responses are optimistic responses. Finally, I will provide a case against optimism and then show why pessimism is the most appealing and appropriate response. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
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- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Practicing conciliation: Towards a practical application of the Equal Weight View
- Authors: Hartley, Danyel Jordan
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Knowledge, Theory of , Opinion (Philosophy) , Verbal self-defense , Epistemics , Interpersonal relations , Equal Weight View
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/188341 , vital:44745
- Description: The Equal Weight View is a frequently discussed position in the philosophy of disagreement. It holds that when someone disagrees with an epistemic peer, they should adjust their belief to be closer to their peer’s belief. While the reasons for adopting this response to disagreement have been debated, there has been less discussion about its utility as a tool for handling real-world disagreements. In this thesis I pursue a version of the Equal Weight View which is useful in practice. I argue that traditional applications of the Equal Weight View do not reflect its underlying principles when they are used to resolve real-world disagreements. I develop an idealized application of the Equal Weight View that addresses the problems traditional applications face in real-world scenarios. Unfortunately, addressing these problems results in an application that is unrealistically cognitively demanding. The application trades being insensitive to the environment it would be used in for being insensitive to the limits of its user. I suggest that we might be able to save the idealized application and work around those limits by either externalizing or simplifying the most demanding aspects of the application. Externalization is best achieved by making use of some kind of computer assistance. Simplification involves replacing taxing data tracking and computation with heuristic methods. While neither approach is ideal, I argue that both get us closer to resolving disagreements in accordance with the underlying principles of the Equal Weight View than traditional applications do. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
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- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Prolegomena to ubuntu and any other future South African philosophy
- Authors: Prinsloo, Aidan Vivian
- Date: 2014
- Subjects: Ubuntu (Philosophy) , Political science -- Philosophy , Philosophy, African , Social values -- South Africa , Social values -- South Africa -- Philosophy , Place (Philosophy)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2747 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013092
- Description: In this thesis I consider ubuntu as a metonym for the particularly African features of South African philosophy. Given that Mbembe critiques African philosophy in general as having failed because it has been subsumed under two unreflective political movements in African thought, I consider whether or not the concept of ubuntu escapes his critique. After developing criteria for measuring the success of any philosophical concept, I conclude that ubuntu is unsuccessful. I then identify the political constraints placed on ubuntu that lead to its failure. These constraints arise from having to validate Africa as a place of intellectual worth. Considering the role of place in these constraints, I argue that a far more productive approach to ubuntu (and South African philosophy in general) is to explicitly incorporate this place into our philosophical project. I use the conceptual framework developed by Bruce Janz to provide a systematic account of place that can be used in formulating South African philosophy. I add to Janz, arguing that philosophy is a response to a particular feature of place: the mystery. By incorporating place into ubuntu, I am able to start developing a philosophical concept which can fulfil the political constraints placed on ubuntu without sacrificing its philosophical integrity. I suggest that ubuntu remains an interesting concept primarily because it promises to respond to the fragmentation of the South African place. I conclude by arguing that ubuntu should be used as the basis for a civic religion which responds to the fragmentation of the South African place. This civic religion will give rise to a significantly distinct philosophical tradition which should not succumb to Mbembe’s critique.
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- Date Issued: 2014
Reason and eros
- Authors: Chalmers, W D
- Date: 1967 , 2014-06-09
- Subjects: Philosophy , Love , Reasoning
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2748 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1013331
- Description: This study is not intended as a work of research into any existing body of philosopny. It is, rather, an independent inquiry into the origins and the objective of philosophical activity. In this it assumes the somewhat enigmatic role of a philosophy of philosophy.
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- Date Issued: 1967
Redefining success : social justice and the ends of business
- Authors: Zorn, Gwendolyn Philippa
- Date: 2014
- Subjects: Success Social justice Success in business Social responsibility of business Business ethics Corporate profits
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2745 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1012061
- Description: Success in business is for the most part defined in financial terms and, because of this, business operations are almost entirely, if not entirely, directed to this end. The principle behind this rationale has been informed by the thought that the best contribution businesses can make to social justice is to focus on the bottom line. By appealing to enlightened self-interest and the high premium people place on freedom, neoliberal economists like Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek argue that maximising profits is necessarily socially responsible. And, moreover, that not to pursue this end is socially irresponsible. Social responsibility is the ultimate justification that thinkers such as Friedman and Hayek appeal to when claiming that the business of business is to maximise profit. Yet this position is internally inconsistent. The position is ultimately justified by what is socially just but this means that in fact social justice, and not profit-making, ought to be the end of business. I shall argue that taking this commitment seriously involves rejecting the idea that the aim of business is to maximise profits. This is not to say that businesses should not make profits, rather it implies that this feature is not what ultimately makes them successful. The central contribution of this project is to resolve the contradictions embedded in the traditional approach to business by arguing that the primary aim of business is the promotion of social justice. To this end success in business needs to be redefined so that it reflects the achievement of its ultimate ends and not simply its instrumental means (profit) to the realisation of these aims. We ought then to revise our fundamental assumptions about the structures and policies that are necessary for business to achieve its real end of social justice.
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- Date Issued: 2014
Reforging Ockham’s Razor: an enquiry into the ontology of parsimony arguments
- Authors: Dichmont, Thomas
- Date: 2022-10-14
- Subjects: Logic , Metaphysics , Ontology , Knowledge, Theory of , Epistemology , Philosophy and science , Occam's razor
- Language: English
- Type: Academic theses , Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/406736 , vital:70303
- Description: Nearly every philosopher in English-speaking world has heard of Ockham’s Razor, which is given in one of two ways, don’t multiply entities beyond necessity and all things being equal choose the simpler explanation. Yet it is unclear from the scholarship whether the use of Ockham’s Razor is justified in science and philosophy. However, if it can be shown to ‘get’ us truth, it would gain an unequivocal justification, as disputes that are continued after the parties to the substantive truth of one or the other are defined as frivolous. Alternative, one may contend that explanation could have other criteria of success. The implication of a direct connection between the razor and truth comes with ontological commitments, namely a commitment to realism (about universals) and philosophical theism. This is contrary to the razor’s use as a tool of nominalism and naturalism. I argue in this thesis there that the only possible non-circular justification for Ockham’s Razor is truth and that therefore certain philosophical positions are excluded from using the razor to animate their positions. There is an additional, second criteria for the success of our inquiry, namely the justification must in some way be consistent with the razor, which means the chosen explanation for the razor, must be simpler than any of its rivals and not have superfluous entities, otherwise our justification would be contrary to the advice of the razor. We are presented with a Scylla and Charybdis type problem, we avoid a circularity on the one hand and on the other we must not contradict the razor itself, these are contrary intellectual impulses. So firstly I will look at disciplines outside philosophy for some initial inspiration. If we could answer this question in a ‘non’ philosophical way, the problem would have solved itself in a way that require little change of practice. If lawyers or scientist can account for the razor properly, there is not really a problem of justification, at least not a philosophical one. Second, I consider the realist and theist positions, namely an argument of Aristotle’s in the Posterior Analytics and part of Aquinas’ On the Divine Simplicity. Further, I consider the work of Ockham as a nominalist. Lastly, I consider modern and contemporary philosophy, in the form of Hume, Quine and Sober (a modern writer on the razor). The aim here is to ‘stress test’ the philosophical resources of the various systems and analyse the results to see if they can produce a non-circular result. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2022
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- Date Issued: 2022-10-14
Robot Rights, an approach appealing to Animal Rights Theory
- Authors: Millin, Murray David
- Date: 2021-10-29
- Subjects: Artificial intelligence , Singer, Peter, 1946- , Dennett, D C (Daniel Clement) , Animal rights , Ethics , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992 Criticism and interpretation , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992. Bicentennial man , Asimov, Isaac, 1920-1992. Sally , Preference utilitarianism
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/191854 , vital:45172
- Description: This thesis proposes that Peter Singer’s theory of preference utilitarianism, which is designed to be universally applicable to humans and animals, can be applied to robots of a particular kind — such as those seen in Isaac Asimov’s work. I shall do this by using Singer’s conception of interests as a framework, and appealing to Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance to deal with methodological issues about other minds. I shall then apply those theories to Isaac Asimov’s Sally and The Bicentennial Man. These two narratives show the importance of the intentional stance as an ethical tool and provide an example of how we might talk about the interests of a robot. Sally’s behaviour and ethical status is examined according to how she is perceived, and so I shall investigate how various persons engage with her and why they do so in those manners. This narrative demonstrates the value of the intentional and design stance as methods to approach other minds problems with regards to ethical status. The Bicentennial Man’s Andrew allows us to look for interests in a more concrete way. I look to see how he situates himself in his world, as well as investigate how and why he makes the demand to be morally considerable. This will be done by examining his creativity, personal development and drive for mortality throughout the narrative. , Thesis (MA) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
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- Date Issued: 2021-10-29
Scientific theories : a philosophical analysis
- Authors: Schwerin, Alan Kenneth
- Date: 1979
- Subjects: Science -- Philosophy , Logical positivism , Realism
- Language: English
- Type: text , Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2701 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1001976
- Description: In this essay I have considered some of the philosophical problems involved in attempting to settle the question, What are scientific theories about? And in order to expose these problems, I have dealt with two influential responses to this question of the referents of scientific theories - namely, logical empiricism and realism.
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- Date Issued: 1979
Self-inquiry: Comparing Plato and Patanjali
- Authors: Coughlan, Daniel Michael
- Date: 2021-10
- Subjects: Plato , Patañjali , Self , Identity (Philosophical concept) , Comparison (Philosophy) , Justification (Theory of knowledge)
- Language: English
- Type: Master's theses , text
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/190066 , vital:44960
- Description: At its most effective my research hopes to re-affirm the central value and importance of self-inquiry. That is, I hope to echo the familiar call of the wise to know thyself. Of the many mouths and temple walls that have lent authority to this precept there is perhaps no mouth more important than one’s own. To know thyself is the task and responsibility of the individual. In order to arrive at the point where I can re-affirm its value I explore the nature of self-inquiry with the help of Plato, Patanjali and a comparison between them. I propose two general senses in which we might understand self-inquiry and seek to bring out the core problems faced by each. We find an account of these two senses and the relationship between them in both Plato and Patanjali, so too, though less obviously, in the comparison between them. The comparison provides the opportunity for reflecting on the ground that it moves from and depends on, the common ground we assume between the two compared philosophers/ies. I contend that this ground is ultimately the comparer, one’s self. The consequence is that the comparative project and the project of self-inquiry both meet and are mutually beneficial. The three together; Plato, Patanjali, and the comparison between them help us account for nature of self-inquiry in helping us to better understand the relationship between the two senses in which we can come to understand and think about it. In the first sense, self-inquiry is cast as the examination of one’s life. In the second sense, we are invited to consider the possibility of an unmediated knowing of the examiner, an unmediated self-knowing. With a better understanding of what self-inquiry is I stand to conclude by re-affirming its value. , Thesis (MPhil) -- Faculty of Humanities, Philosophy, 2021
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- Date Issued: 2021-10
Self-respecting practical reason: an analysis of self-respect and its implications for practical reason
- Authors: Roberts, Deborah Joan
- Date: 2002
- Subjects: Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen -- Ethics , Ethics, Modern -- 20th century , Self-esteem
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2719 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002849 , Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen -- Ethics , Ethics, Modern -- 20th century , Self-esteem
- Description: What should I do? As long as I am aware of the relevant facts of the situation and deliberating soundly, Bernard Williams argues that I should do what I want to do. It makes no sense to say that there are reasons that are fixed objects of concern, or values, that exist for an agent regardless of what she is in fact motivated to do. Reasons, for Williams, are hypothetical. I argue that he takes this view of practical reason because of a prior answer to the question “How should I live?”. A universal account of the good life would mean an account of values, or interests, that all human beings should have. Williams thinks it is not possible to give a universal account of the good life for human beings; any such account must be constructed out of the particular reasons of a community. But, he takes a constructivist view of the good life because he thinks that to be universal an account of the good life would have to be objective. Since objectivity cannot be achieved, he argues, neither can universality. Williams is only half right. That objectivity is not possible is inconsequential. A foundation for ethics has to be internal, but this does not preclude it being universal. I develop such a foundation based on the Aristotelian conception of human nature. A life cannot be wholly good if it is not self-respecting. Moreover, self-respect fits the framework for the specification of the good life that this foundation provides: I argue that self-respect can be shown to have a structure which provides an account of real interests - reasons that are objects of fixed concern. As such, reasons recognise rather than construct the good, making categorical reasons possible. A person can have a reason to change or act, even if reason itself cannot effect that change or action. Thus, I can be wrong about what I should do not only by being wrong about what would count as a satisfaction of my interests, but also by being wrong about what my interests are.
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- Date Issued: 2002
Shame is valuable
- Authors: Euvrard, Jonathan George
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Shame Ethics Self-evaluation
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2708 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002838
- Description: In this thesis I argue that shame is valuable because it contributes to the moral life by promoting coherence. I start by developing and defending a conception of shame. On my conception, rational shame involves a negative self-assessment, in which I am both the assessor and the object of assessment, and in which the standard of assessment is my own. I then develop a notion of coherence, and apply it to the relationship between values, and the relationship between values and actions. I also tie the notion of coherence to what I call “the moral life”. I then discuss two ways in which shame can work to promote coherence. Firstly, I describe a process of critical reflective self-assessment, and show how this is a particularly effective method of promoting coherence when coupled with shame. Secondly, I discuss the connection between my emotions and my values, arguing that this connection promotes coherence, and that shame works to reinforce this connection and thereby to promote coherence.
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- Date Issued: 2009
Skewed interactions with evidence: a discussion of fixed sexually prejudiced beliefs
- Authors: Kirkaldy, Hannah Tshirukhwe
- Date: 2017
- Subjects: Homophobia , Discrimination , Prejudices , Belief and doubt
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: http://hdl.handle.net/10962/7279 , vital:21238
- Description: In this thesis, I will argue that a challenge to the combatting of sexual prejudice (more commonly known as homophobia) through argument and evidence is that those on both sides of the issue are prone to a phenomenon known in psychology as confirmation bias. While the motivating concern of the thesis is sexual prejudice, and while I do discuss sexual prejudice throughout the thesis, I will focus mostly on confirmation bias, with the understanding that the picture I set out will have implications for combatting sexual prejudice at a later stage. The term confirmation bias refers either to the tendency to look for evidence which confirms one's already-held beliefs, or to engage differently with evidence based on whether or not you agree with its conclusion. After dissecting two paradigmatic experiments which explore these two kinds of confirmation bias, and arguing that they can be further broken down into sub-phenomena, I will focus on the latter kind, as I think it is the more relevant to sexual prejudice. Its essential effect on beliefs is to hold them steady in the face of evidence. In an attempt to explore the motivations we might have for engaging in this form of confirmation bias, I will argue that we can understand the tendency through a combination of a picture of beliefs as forming an interconnected web, and an understanding of the effect of affective elements on belief. Furthermore, given this motivational story, it is sometimes reasonable to hold beliefs steady. I will argue that finding the balance between giving up beliefs too easily in the face of contrary evidence, and holding onto them too rigidly, is an epistemic virtue. Finally, defending my picture from the objection that the mental states I discuss do not count as beliefs, I will argue that confirmation bias is a way of maintaining fixed beliefs.
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- Date Issued: 2017
Take my word for it: a new approach to the problem of sincerity in the epistemology of testimony
- Authors: Dewhurst, Therese
- Date: 2010
- Subjects: Sincerity Philosophy Terminology Knowledge, Theory of Honesty
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2707 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1002837
- Description: The epistemological problem of sincerity in testimony is often approached in the following way: We, as a matter of fact, accept utterances as sincere. We do so in the face of knowledge that people lie and deceive,and yet we still count these beliefs as good beliefs. Therefore there must be some reason or argument that we can cite in order to justify our acceptance of the sincerity of the speaker. In this thesis I will argue, contra this, that there is no reason, per se, that justifies our of a speakers sincerity: this is because recognition of the obligation to accept the sincerity is a necessary condition on the possibility of communication and interpretation. In the first three of the thesis I will argue against three of the main approaches to the problem by focusing on what I believe to be the strongest accounts of each: Elizabeth Fricker's reductionism, Tyler Burge's non-reductionism, and Paul Faulkner's trust account of testimony. In the final chapter I will put forward my positive account. I will argue that it is a constitutive rule of language that a speaker be sincere, and then make the further claim, that it is a constitutive rule of interpretation that the hearer take an utterance as sincere. On my account, successful communication does not just depend on a speaker making sincere utterances,but just as importantly,, on the hearer recognising an obligation to take those utterances as being sincere.
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- Date Issued: 2010
The artistic path to virtue
- Authors: Sher, Gavin
- Date: 2007
- Subjects: Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , MA
- Identifier: vital:2732 , http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004370 , Aristotle -- Nicomachean ethics , Virtue , Ethics , Fiction , Narration (Rhetoric)
- Description: Most people share a strong intuition that there is much to be learned from great literature and other forms of narrative art. This intuition is, however, philosophically contentious. Plato was the first to argue against the possibility of learning anything from narrative art, but he founded a tradition that persists to the present day. I will engage in this debate in order to examine the role narratives might be able to play in acquiring virtue on Aristotle's ethical account, as it is presented in Nicomachean Ethics. I will claim that narratives have so long seemed a problematic source of learning because philosophers have traditionally approached the issue in the wrong way. They have typically tried to show how we might acquire propositional knowledge through our engagement with art, but this approach has failed because of insoluble problems involved in satisfying the justification criterion. Fictions may be rescued from their problematic status by realising that what we truly get from them is, instead, a type of knowledge-how. I will argue that Aristotelian virtue is itself a kind of knowledge-how and so the type of learning that takes place in engaging with narratives has a role to play in its acquisition and exercise. Virtue depends on types of reasoning that are themselves kinds of knowledge-how and which are employed and improved in engaging with narrative art. These types of reasoning will be described as conceptual, emotional and imaginative understanding. I will show how each is important in relation to virtue and how each is a kind of knowledge-how that may be improved through exposure to narrative art.
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- Date Issued: 2007