Critical analysis of the 2007 public service strike and its impact on the evolution of formalised collective bargaining in South Africa
- Authors: Bhe, Vuyisile
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Collective bargaining -- South Africa , Dispute resolution (Law) -- South Africa , Strikes and lockouts -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Labor laws and legislation -- South Africa , Industrial relations -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10192 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1043 , Collective bargaining -- South Africa , Dispute resolution (Law) -- South Africa , Strikes and lockouts -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Labor laws and legislation -- South Africa , Industrial relations -- South Africa
- Description: Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act defines ’strike’ as the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different employers, for the purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and employee, and any reference to “work” this definition includes overtime work, whether it is voluntary or compulsory. According to Mcllroy: “As long as our society is divided between those who own and control the means of production and those who only have the ability to work, strikes will be inevitable because they are the ultimate means workers have of protecting themselves.” 1 The Constitutional Court justified the exclusion of a constitutional right to lock out and the inclusion of a constitutional right to strike by indicating that the right to strike is not equivalent to a right to lock out and is essential for workplace democracy. 2 The right to strike is essential to bolster collective bargaining and thereby to give employees the power to bargain effectively with employers. The employers on the According to the Constitutional Court employers enjoy greater social and economic power compared to individual workers and may exercise a wide range of power against workers through a range of weapons, such as dismissal, the employment of alternative or replacement labour, the unilateral implementation of new terms and conditions of employment, and the exclusion of workers from the workplace. To combat this and have a say in the workplace, the Constitutional Court held that “employees need to act in concert to provide them collectively with sufficient power to bargain effectively with employers and exercise collective power primarily through the mechanism of strike action”. The importance of the right to strike in creating workplace democracy is also reflected in a number of Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court judgments. other hand have economic strength that is used to bargain effectively. That is why the strike enjoys constitutional protection, whereas the lock-out does not. , Abstract
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
- Authors: Bhe, Vuyisile
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Collective bargaining -- South Africa , Dispute resolution (Law) -- South Africa , Strikes and lockouts -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Labor laws and legislation -- South Africa , Industrial relations -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10192 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1043 , Collective bargaining -- South Africa , Dispute resolution (Law) -- South Africa , Strikes and lockouts -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Labor laws and legislation -- South Africa , Industrial relations -- South Africa
- Description: Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act defines ’strike’ as the partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different employers, for the purpose of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and employee, and any reference to “work” this definition includes overtime work, whether it is voluntary or compulsory. According to Mcllroy: “As long as our society is divided between those who own and control the means of production and those who only have the ability to work, strikes will be inevitable because they are the ultimate means workers have of protecting themselves.” 1 The Constitutional Court justified the exclusion of a constitutional right to lock out and the inclusion of a constitutional right to strike by indicating that the right to strike is not equivalent to a right to lock out and is essential for workplace democracy. 2 The right to strike is essential to bolster collective bargaining and thereby to give employees the power to bargain effectively with employers. The employers on the According to the Constitutional Court employers enjoy greater social and economic power compared to individual workers and may exercise a wide range of power against workers through a range of weapons, such as dismissal, the employment of alternative or replacement labour, the unilateral implementation of new terms and conditions of employment, and the exclusion of workers from the workplace. To combat this and have a say in the workplace, the Constitutional Court held that “employees need to act in concert to provide them collectively with sufficient power to bargain effectively with employers and exercise collective power primarily through the mechanism of strike action”. The importance of the right to strike in creating workplace democracy is also reflected in a number of Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court judgments. other hand have economic strength that is used to bargain effectively. That is why the strike enjoys constitutional protection, whereas the lock-out does not. , Abstract
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
Dismissals within the context of collective bargaining
- Authors: Qotoyi, Thanduxolo
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Employees -- Dismissal of -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Unfair labor practices -- South Africa , Collective bargaining -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10223 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1039 , Employees -- Dismissal of -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Unfair labor practices -- South Africa , Collective bargaining -- South Africa
- Description: Competitive forces in the market force employers to change the way they operate their businesses. The changes that employers have to make often demand an alteration of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. By law employers are not permitted to unilaterally effect changes to the employee’s terms and conditions of employment. They have to obtain the consent of the affected employees. This is where collective bargaining fits in. The employer has to negotiate with the employees. One way in which through the process of collective bargaining an employer can exert pressure on the employees to accept the changes is to effect a lock-out. Under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 within the context of a lock-out, an employer was permitted to use conditional dismissal as a bargaining weapon. This conditional dismissal had to be coupled with an offer of reemployment should the employees accept an employer’s demand. In essence, the lock-out had a bite in the form of the conditional dismissal. This made the lock-out quite effective. The 1995 Labour Relations Act prohibits in no uncertain terms the use of a dismissal as a means of compelling employees to accept an employer’s demand in any matter of mutual interest. Within the collective bargaining context, dismissal is not a legitimate option. The employer only has the lock-out as a tool of compulsion. The definition of a lock-out in terms of this Act does not accommodate the use of dismissal. This makes the lock-out option to be less potent than it was under the 1956 Labour Relations Act. However, employers are permitted to dismiss on operational grounds, provided that they follow a fair procedure. Terms and conditions of employment greatly feature in the operational requirements of a business. If the employees’ terms and conditions of employment are not responsive to the operational requirements of the business and they are unwilling to accept changes to those terms, the employer has the right to dismiss them. The employer will not be dismissing the employees as a way of inducing them to accept the changes. He will instead be dismissing them on the basis of operational requirements. iv The question that then arises is how should a dismissal that is intended to compel employees to accept an employers demand (falling within section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Labour Relations Act be distinguished from a dismissal that is genuinely based on operational requirements as contemplated by section 188(1)(a)(ii). Doesn’t the fact that section 187(1)(c) explicitly prohibits the use of dismissal within the context of collective bargaining give rise to some tension with section 188(1)(a)(ii) which categorically gives employers the right to dismiss on operational grounds. The decision of the Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metals v NUMSA has stated that there is no tension whatsoever between the two sections. The court has also ruled that the dismissals that are hit by section 187(1)(c) are those dismissals that are accompanied by an offer of reemployment. According to the court, this offer is indicative of the real purpose of the employer, namely to compel employees to accept his demand. Dismissals not accompanied by an offer of re-employment are on the other hand a true reflection of the fact that the employer is indeed dismissing the employees for operational requirements. This literal interpretation of the meaning and scope of section 187(1)(c) has the potential of opening the floodgates. Instead of resorting to the use of the lock-out to secure the agreement of employees in the collective bargaining process, employers now have a potent tool in the form of a dismissal. As long as the employer makes it abundantly clear that the dismissal is final and irrevocable, he is free from the claws of section 187(1)(c). Given the fact that the lock-out option is not always effective, employers may find it hard to resist the temptation to use the threat of permanent dismissal as a bargaining chip. It is an option that is emasculated by the fact that in an employer initiated lock-out the use of replacement labour is prohibited. The threat of not just a conditional dismissal but a permanent one may force employees to capitulate to the employer’s demand during negotiations. This would effectively render negotiations about changes to terms and conditions of employment a farce. The employer would have an upper hand. The implications of this narrow interpretation are quite far-reaching. The long held view that dismissal is not a legitimate weapon of coercion in the collective bargaining process is under serious challenge. Only conditional dismissals are illegitimate in the collective bargaining v arena. Permanent dismissals are permitted. This negates the very purpose of the collective bargaining process. This study seeks to examine the anomalies that flow from this interpretation of the meaning of section 187(1)(c). The study further investigates if this interpretation is not at odds with what the legislation really intended to achieve by enacting this clause. The study also explores ways in which the sanctity of collective bargaining could be restored. Recommendations are made to that effect.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
- Authors: Qotoyi, Thanduxolo
- Date: 2009
- Subjects: Employees -- Dismissal of -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Unfair labor practices -- South Africa , Collective bargaining -- South Africa
- Language: English
- Type: Thesis , Masters , LLM
- Identifier: vital:10223 , http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1039 , Employees -- Dismissal of -- Law and legislation -- South Africa , Unfair labor practices -- South Africa , Collective bargaining -- South Africa
- Description: Competitive forces in the market force employers to change the way they operate their businesses. The changes that employers have to make often demand an alteration of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. By law employers are not permitted to unilaterally effect changes to the employee’s terms and conditions of employment. They have to obtain the consent of the affected employees. This is where collective bargaining fits in. The employer has to negotiate with the employees. One way in which through the process of collective bargaining an employer can exert pressure on the employees to accept the changes is to effect a lock-out. Under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 within the context of a lock-out, an employer was permitted to use conditional dismissal as a bargaining weapon. This conditional dismissal had to be coupled with an offer of reemployment should the employees accept an employer’s demand. In essence, the lock-out had a bite in the form of the conditional dismissal. This made the lock-out quite effective. The 1995 Labour Relations Act prohibits in no uncertain terms the use of a dismissal as a means of compelling employees to accept an employer’s demand in any matter of mutual interest. Within the collective bargaining context, dismissal is not a legitimate option. The employer only has the lock-out as a tool of compulsion. The definition of a lock-out in terms of this Act does not accommodate the use of dismissal. This makes the lock-out option to be less potent than it was under the 1956 Labour Relations Act. However, employers are permitted to dismiss on operational grounds, provided that they follow a fair procedure. Terms and conditions of employment greatly feature in the operational requirements of a business. If the employees’ terms and conditions of employment are not responsive to the operational requirements of the business and they are unwilling to accept changes to those terms, the employer has the right to dismiss them. The employer will not be dismissing the employees as a way of inducing them to accept the changes. He will instead be dismissing them on the basis of operational requirements. iv The question that then arises is how should a dismissal that is intended to compel employees to accept an employers demand (falling within section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Labour Relations Act be distinguished from a dismissal that is genuinely based on operational requirements as contemplated by section 188(1)(a)(ii). Doesn’t the fact that section 187(1)(c) explicitly prohibits the use of dismissal within the context of collective bargaining give rise to some tension with section 188(1)(a)(ii) which categorically gives employers the right to dismiss on operational grounds. The decision of the Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metals v NUMSA has stated that there is no tension whatsoever between the two sections. The court has also ruled that the dismissals that are hit by section 187(1)(c) are those dismissals that are accompanied by an offer of reemployment. According to the court, this offer is indicative of the real purpose of the employer, namely to compel employees to accept his demand. Dismissals not accompanied by an offer of re-employment are on the other hand a true reflection of the fact that the employer is indeed dismissing the employees for operational requirements. This literal interpretation of the meaning and scope of section 187(1)(c) has the potential of opening the floodgates. Instead of resorting to the use of the lock-out to secure the agreement of employees in the collective bargaining process, employers now have a potent tool in the form of a dismissal. As long as the employer makes it abundantly clear that the dismissal is final and irrevocable, he is free from the claws of section 187(1)(c). Given the fact that the lock-out option is not always effective, employers may find it hard to resist the temptation to use the threat of permanent dismissal as a bargaining chip. It is an option that is emasculated by the fact that in an employer initiated lock-out the use of replacement labour is prohibited. The threat of not just a conditional dismissal but a permanent one may force employees to capitulate to the employer’s demand during negotiations. This would effectively render negotiations about changes to terms and conditions of employment a farce. The employer would have an upper hand. The implications of this narrow interpretation are quite far-reaching. The long held view that dismissal is not a legitimate weapon of coercion in the collective bargaining process is under serious challenge. Only conditional dismissals are illegitimate in the collective bargaining v arena. Permanent dismissals are permitted. This negates the very purpose of the collective bargaining process. This study seeks to examine the anomalies that flow from this interpretation of the meaning of section 187(1)(c). The study further investigates if this interpretation is not at odds with what the legislation really intended to achieve by enacting this clause. The study also explores ways in which the sanctity of collective bargaining could be restored. Recommendations are made to that effect.
- Full Text:
- Date Issued: 2009
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