

**Rural underdevelopment in the former Ciskei with specific reference to
Glenmore village.**

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Master of Arts.**

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This thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted previously for any degree at any university.

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Abstract.

This thesis examines development changes that took place in Glenmore after 1994. To examine such change one needs to have a concise historical understanding of the situation in Glenmore before democracy. The aim of the work is to critique development at a local, rural level, pinpointing the major changes, if any, that came with the incorporation of the former homeland of Ciskei (and thus Glenmore village) with South Africa. These people were forcibly resettled in 1979 for political and economic reasons. Their situation then was one of dire poverty; it is argued here that even with democracy, their history of underdevelopment has continued.

The reason for this continued underdevelopment is the structure of the former reserves. The overall political context has changed in South Africa but the most important aspect with regard to the development of the homelands: land, has not. At the central level, the government has churned out a wide variety of development policies, which due to the prevailing political and economic context of the times are fraught with inconsistencies. The example used here to show some of these inconsistencies is the 1997 White Paper on Land Reform. This confusion at the central level with regard to the perceived future of South Africa has managed to adversely affect the rural areas and their development. There very well might be policies in abundance to improve the life-world of the rural poor, but there are inconsistencies between this policy and actual practice. With regard to Glenmore the confusion in the present government's central development policy is arguably the main reason for the underdevelopment of the village. The inconsistencies in policy such as the 1997 White Paper on Land Reform, have meant that the structure of the reserves has not changed. Vital issues such as land tenure and ownership have not been dealt with.

The study thus shows that unless the structure of the homeland system which is predominantly based on issues of land, is changed, genuine social and economic development will not take place in areas like Glenmore.

Preface.

Acknowledgments: Most of all I would like to thank the people of Glenmore who were patient and helpful for the duration of this work. I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Fred Hendricks, for putting up with my numerous questions and problems. I would also like to thank him for instilling excitement in me with regard to rural development, without which, this work would not have been fun and thus probably not be finished today. For assisting me in the collection of material on Glenmore I would like to thank Black Sash, Rhodes University librarians and Professor Whisson. I would also like to thank Vanessa Vasques for constant editing and proofreading.

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Chapter one: Introduction.

1.1. Goals of the research.

This study of rural development in Glenmore aims to provide a basis from which to determine whether or not democracy resulted in positive social and economic change for this village.

1.2. The study area: - Glenmore village in Tyefu location, Peddie district.

The area of study is situated in Tyefu location, Peddie district within the Eastern Cape¹. Before incorporation of the homelands into South Africa, Glenmore was situated in the Ciskei. The reserve system as initiated by the Glen Grey Act of 1894 (Lacey,1981:4) and re-enforced by the land legislation of 1913 and 1936 set aside and differentiated between areas for black and white settlement. Eighty seven percent of the land was for white settlement and use, whilst the remaining eighty percent of the population was allowed the use of thirteen percent of the land (Lacey,1981). The division of land in this manner resulted in the forced resettlement of vast numbers of blacks who had settled in white South Africa. The Ciskei was for black settlement and as such served as a destination for such forcibly removed blacks. Glenmore village is the result of such social engineering and those who live in the village all have roots elsewhere.

From the late 1960's onwards the South African State began to strictly enforce homeland policy. The reserve boundaries were more rigidly defined and influx control tightened in attempt to curb black urbanisation, squatting and farming in white South Africa (Hindson,1987 and Posel,1991). In relation to the Ciskei, in 1971 the government began a process of consolidation and enlargement so as to be able to move blacks out of white South Africa and into this area. A number of white farms were bought in the King Williams Town, Kieskammahoek and Peddie areas for this expansion (Horrell,1969:19). The government sought to consolidate the seventeen separate pieces of land that were then the Ciskei into one area in the reserve region. Farmers in the then Victoria East district, which was to be included in the homeland, began to panic and many looked to sell their land.

¹ See figures 1 & 2 for maps of the said areas.

FIGURE 2.

Map showing Glenmore in Tyefu Location, Peddie District.



In 1976 Glenmore farm was chosen as the site of a township project, blacks from within South Africa were to be resettled or dumped here. The owner of the farm, Mr. Knott, was at this time rearing cattle and had some land under irrigation (Maclennan, 1987: 17-18). His land, which prior to the enforcement of the National States Constitution Act had allowed for five thousand orange trees and some grapes under intensive irrigation, was bought for R283 000 by the government (Maclennan, 1987: 18) and “it was proudly announced that a R26 million township would be built at Glenmore over five years. The scheme was, to say the least, grandiose: 5000 houses, 5 schools, 3 clinics, 2 halls, workshops, a police station and sports facilities were to be built” (S.P.P, 1983:284). Glenmore had been chosen to be the ‘finest African township in the Republic’ (Maclennan, 1987:10-14). It was to be a shining example of how separate development of the races could and in fact should work. Glenmore township would legitimise the States plans with regard to forced removals. However in reality the area was “densely populated... and so drought prone that the people [were] unable to subsist off the land; it was a truly depressed area” (Maclennan, 1987:13). Yet the plans for the township continued and Glenmore would be established and left to the Ciskei government to maintain.

“Some 250 families from Klipfontein, and about the same number from Coega, Colchester and other small settlements between the Great Fish River and Port Elizabeth” were dumped in this area (Whisson, 1981:74). It was mainly those who “had become redundant in officialdom’s terms” that were moved (Albany Black Sash, 1979:1), and it was made known by the state that the same fate awaited all the other so called ‘black spots’ in other white areas and redundant farm workers in white South Africa.

The situation in Glenmore was one of dire poverty and in the mid 1980’s members of the community put it plainly saying, “please take us out of this hole we are burning” (Maclennan, 1987:105); “and sir there is one more thing, we are very hungry” (Whisson, 1981:74). In 1986 the community was indeed taken out of this particular hole only to be placed in another. Their wooden prefabricated homes on the bank of the Fish River were exchanged for two roomed brick homes in a rural township at their present site, approximately five kilometers from the Fish River, 47 km North East of Grahamstown and 28km West of Peddie (Zondani; 1995: 1). The flat land these people had been resident on since their initial removal was seen to be of value by the Ciskei government for commercial irrigation. This

move proved to be no respite for the people of Glenmore. Due to population increase and the resultant pressure and overuse of land and having no alternative fuel source but wood, the natural resource base has been seriously depleted (Ainslie; 1998: 56-60). Agriculture thus became difficult without irrigation, and up until today there is still no sustainable mode of subsistence available to the population in Glenmore. It is true that when they were moved the “township was not meant to be viable in the sense of its residents having jobs on the spot” (MacLennan; 1987: 16). The promises of ‘border industries’ made by the South African State had been political rhetoric to quell rising opposition to their plans for forced removals. No such industries were set up around Glenmore, theirs was a community that was simply dumped in desolation. They were a surplus supply of labour that was no longer needed by South African capital, and it was safer for the State to move them out of ‘white’ South Africa to squash rising black political mobilisation.

Thus after five years of democracy it seems to me that a poignant question is - how did the incorporation into South Africa and democracy affect their situation, if at all? And are there those who are still “hungry”? (Whisson; 1981: 74). Some might argue as Pilger (1998) does, that “the political decisions made by the ANC have ensured the continuation of great suffering in the absence of a minimal strategy of redistribution”. In other words, in South Africa, economic apartheid has replaced its previously legal counterpart producing the same results for the same people. This study analyses whether this is the case, or whether the people of Glenmore have benefitted from the political changes since 1994?

1.3. Fieldwork and Methodology.

In Glenmore I was introduced to Miss Nosipho Radu, secretary of the Glenmore Development Forum. Miss Radu provided me with accommodation in the village and some insight as to who it was I should be looking to interview and how. Upon my arrival Mr. Sonwabo Velile Kom, a matriculant who was at the time unemployed, also befriended me. He agreed to assist me in my interviews in the capacity of guide and interpreter.

I began my stay in Glenmore by visiting the site of the original village and familiarising myself with the present site to which the village was moved in 1986. For the first five days I attempted to get a feel for Glenmore, so to speak, and to allow the community to become familiar and comfortable with my presence and objectives. I also used this time to identify focus groups, which would be important in

fulfilling my purpose in the village. It was also a time during which I attended church services and was introduced by Velile Kom to those groups in the community whom I was interested in. Having studied Xhosa beforehand, these initial days were also used to practice and learn various mannerisms and customs such as greetings and the behavior expected from one of my age and social standing, which would be of importance for my interviews. I then arranged meetings with individuals, both in focus groups and as individuals, from the following groupings: community leaders, political organisations, farmers, youth, women and long-term residents of Glenmore. I questioned and interviewed these people as to the history and present development prospects of the village and the most significant changes since 1994.

I was told that those who had been questioned and with whom interviews were arranged were, as most in Glenmore are, tired of filling out pieces of paper of which they never hear anything. Three relatively big surveys have been administered in Glenmore since 1995².

Thus, this mode of research was ruled out. After testing and using a tape recorder I found that people, especially the elders spoke less and more abruptly when they were speaking into the recorder. After many debates with numerous respondents I decided that informal semi-structured interviews both with individuals and focus groups, where I would take written notes would suit both the research and the respondents best. The size of the focus groups were kept small in order to evoke longer and more in depth answers. The individual interviews were then used to verify or supplement these group sessions, and to allow me to come up with an interview guide to use in the focus group discussions.

Most of those identified and selected for questioning on the development history of Glenmore, the changes since democracy and the development prospects were fully conversant in English. However for the sake of respect and utter clarity it was decided after the first focus group meeting that questions be asked in English, translated into Xhosa and the reply given in either language. This would allow the respondents to choose a language that they were most comfortable with. All written answers would then be analysed by myself and Velile Kom after the interview to ensure nothing had been missed or misunderstood.

² One in 1995, Titled 'Glenmore community profile' by the development studies unit at the Institute for Social and Economic Research [ISER]. A second in 1998, 'Glenmore village report' done as part of the sustainable development project by Inxuba Conservation and Economic Forum in partnership with ISER. 1999 - Glenmore has been involved this year in a 'questionnaire survey' done by ISER in the whole of the lower Fish River Valley, with regard to fresh water fishing as a livelihood.

In terms of other research methods, as a participant observer I attended various meetings and functions in Glenmore. The meetings included those of the Glenmore Development Forum, Eastern Cape Small Business Unit, a fact finding meeting attended by the Amatola District Council, the Transitional Rural Council, the Development Forum and Interim Committee. I also attended numerous internal league football matches, several social functions at the community braai stand and a beer drink with some of the older men. All in all this served as an attempt to demystify the research process and “ensure a fuller understanding of and commitment to the research problem at hand by all involved” (Van Vlaenderen; 1995: 1).

I found it comforting on the whole, that due to my youth and obvious lack of financial backing, community members did not expect me to assist them financially. Those who had provided me with accommodation in the village told me that nothing was expected from me in return for their time and patience besides publicising their plight and documenting their struggle for a better life (Radu and Mqikela, 1999: personal communication), which to this day is not yet over.

Documentary research was also done in Cory Library, Black Sash and numerous articles were obtained from Professor Whisson who had also done work in the area. Other research done in the area was also gathered from the Institute for Social and Economic research in Grahamstown and analysed.

1.4. Chapter outline.

Chapter two on *resettlement* situates the study both theoretically and historically. The structure of the reserve system shall be fully discussed in an attempt to situate the reserves in the overall context of South Africa. This will necessitate a discussion of the rationale for the creation of these structures to gain insights in to why and how they were used by the country. This rationale is only important in so far as it helps to explain the resultant structure of the reserves.

The argument presented is that given the rationale for the reserves, they were structured in such a way as to make social and economic hardship inevitable. The reserves did not always serve a specific purpose and the rationale for their existence is not constant through the ages. One thing which is though, is the degree to which land was alienated from the masses. The overall structure of the reserves has been more or less constant although their use was determined by power relationships within and between the state, capital and black opposition. The conclusion here, being that the suffering in the reserves after resettlement is directly linked to the question of land security and availability which characterised the reserve

This chapter then goes on to examine the nature of the changes being made by the new democratic government to overcome the injustices of the past. The 1997 White Paper on Land Policy shall be examined to ascertain whether or not those in the former reserves can expect any genuine change with regard to land. The chapter concludes by showing that due to several inconsistencies in current development land policy the division of land in South Africa remains biased against those in the reserves. The predominant reserve structure has not changed with the new political dispensation.

Chapter three investigates local level change in Glenmore village. The case study examines social and economic conditions both before and after 1994. The aim is to establish whether or not the incorporation of the homelands (Ciskei) with South Africa resulted in positive change. Following from the argument in Chapter 2, this chapter relates conditions in Glenmore to the nature of land division in South Africa and the reserve system. It concludes by showing that due to inconsistencies in policy formulation, the structure of the reserves have not changed and therefore underdevelopment in villages such as Glenmore continues.

Chapter four is the *conclusion and implications* for Glenmore. This chapter concludes that there have been positive changes for Glenmore since 1994, but the overall structure of the reserve remains the same. This structure, based primarily on land shortages for blacks, was from the very start destined to promote underdevelopment due to the amount of land on which the reserves were built. In conclusion, this chapter goes on to show that the 1997 White Paper on Land Reform is fraught with inconsistencies, inhibiting any change it may have been written to improve. The consequences and implications of the above conclusion is that because Glenmore village has been used as a case study, and is reflective of most of the reserves throughout South Africa, unless the structure of all the reserves are changed, underdevelopment will continue to be rife within South Africa.

The appendices are an account of transcripts of interviews with members from the Glenmore community, those involved in development and administration; focus group meetings; and general meetings attended during my stay in Glenmore.

Section six is the *reference* section.

**Chapter two: - The Reserves, Resettlement and the Structure of Rural South
Africa.**

2.1. Introduction.

As a theoretical introduction to resettlement this chapter examines the predominant structure of the reserves in pre-democratic South Africa. In examining this structure it will be necessary to look into the logic or rationale behind the reserves and later, resettlement. Yet this rationale is only important for this discussion in as far as it helps clarify and expose the overall structure of the reserves. The rationale thus being identified as the main determinant and means of explanation of reserve structure and the resultant consequences.

The main argument being presented here is that, due to the continuous flux in power relationships between capital and the state, as well as within these two sectors, there is no single, persistent logic or rationale for the creation of the reserves. Depending on the context at a particular time in South Africa either politics or economics, and at times both influenced reserve structure (Posel,1991;267-271). Resettlement, as the argument progresses, is shown to have been one of the most direct moves by the apartheid state to re-enforce reserve policy at a time when their power base was secure. It was a move which determined the structure of rural South Africa. The history of the homelands is one intrinsically linked to this structure and most notably the alienation of land which defined this structure. It is furthermore shown that it is the structure of the reserves, with regard mainly to land, that have caused the untold suffering of those forcibly resettled from white South Africa.

The reserves had been structured large enough to maintain the African migrant as a class, and yet not large enough to allow this class to make do without having to work for wages (Wolpe,1980:301). In brief they had been structured for underdevelopment to ensure that most blacks would have to partake in wage labour.

2.2. The Reserves.

Attempts to control who should live where, and how they should live is a common thread running through South African history. In fact, one could go as far as to say that it is a theme that saturates South African history. The long term nature of the forced removals of blacks from predetermined areas took place on such a vast scale that it is a history that still plays a part in our present and in outlining our future.

As early as 1809 as MacLennan notes, several thousand Xhosa labourers had been forcibly relocated and bundled into so called 'Kaffir land' (1986:60-62). This left only those blacks who were less independent, and thus had to work for wages, in permanent residence near Cape Town, "apparently as a move to solve the labour problems in the Western Cape" (MacLennan, 1986:62). The more independent black families were unceremoniously removed from areas designated for white settlement. The logic was that if blacks became too independent the white settler community would be deprived of a constant labour supply. There were also fears that blacks who independently prospered would gain a foothold in what was 'white' South Africa. So they were simply moved from the area (MacLennan,1986:61-62).

The early 1890's saw the demand for labour once again outstrip supply, and numerous attempts were made to increase labour while keeping wages as low as possible. As Bundy (1979:113-115) notes it was an era in which a large number of the Capes' blacks achieved and retained a measure of economic independence and as such the wage labour force was insufficient for the times. With the passing of the Glen Grey Act, no 25 of 1894, codification of territorial segregation began. Lacey (1981: 4) argues that this act, which was at the very least the start to land segregation, led eventually to the creation of the homelands. She goes on to write that "the reserve policy which allowed whites that comprised 20% of the population to have 87% of the land was the policy based on the Glen Grey system" (Lacey, 1981:4). It was an Act that primarily addressed the issue of land in order to solve labour problems. The government provided for the allocation of four morgen plots on Glen Grey land on the basis of one man one plot only by individual quit rent tenure. This division of land in the Glen Grey area into private four morgen holdings would limit the numbers the land could carry thus indirectly forcing the surplus into the capitalist sector. Furthermore "[t]he land in the possession of one holder would in most cases be insufficient to provide a living for the whole family, and so some males would have to seek work" (Bundy, 1979:135). As Hendricks (1990:29-30) elaborates, this aforementioned individual quit-rent tenure did not equate with individual tenure in a freehold manner.

There were certain restrictions that came with land holding in the reserves. Primarily the holder could not sell the land. Secondly the land could be taken away if it were not being used, if the holder were charged for stock theft and for non payment of rent. "Provision of individual quit-rent holding of four morgan plots per household head should therefore be viewed, not in respect of a liberal commitment to a propertied

African class, but in terms of the exigencies of a chronic labour shortage on the mines and farms” (Hendricks,1990:30)

The act then went on to further address the issue of labour by insisting on succession of land by primogeniture, and making an attempt to impose a labour tax on those who could not prove they had been working for a wage (Hendricks,1990:29-30). It also ensured political control by denying Glen Grey allotment holders access to the common roll of voters. And lastly it allowed for other areas to be drawn into the system by proclamation. It was a system, which enforced the fact that only a certain number of blacks would have access to land; the rest must go out to work, a process that the law of succession by primogeniture seemed specially designed to assist. This in effect cemented segregation. The type of land holding and the fact that blacks could not own the land meant that these areas were further distinguished from so called ‘white’ South Africa (Lacey,1981:3-4).

There are numerous interpretations of this act, some of which are worth mentioning in relation to the preceding land acts that arose. The most common assertion being that the Glen Grey Act set the tone for continued segregation and implied what the boundaries were to be concerning black settlement in South Africa (Lacey,1981:4, Bundy, 1979 and Hendricks, 1990:33).

It is from this point and this law that the Native Land Act No 27 of 1913 and the 1936 Natives Trust and Land Act arguably sprung, and from which the idea of separate reserves for blacks originated. Before union in 1910 numerous laws had been passed to control squatting, regulate tenancies, impose taxes and rents with heavier penalties being imposed for the transgression of these. As Bundy writes “by the time of the Native Land Act of 1913 ... the Cape already possessed and employed a formidable battery of anti-squatter laws and had already done much to undermine the position of the squatter peasant in the Eastern Province” (in Hendricks, 1990:36). White commercial agriculture was being threatened by the independence of black sharecroppers and squatters, and the mines were also anxious about their labour supply (Hendricks,1990:34-35). The 1913 Land Act sought to re-emphasise the prohibition of blacks purchasing and holding land outside those areas defined as reserve areas. In terms of implementation it was not nationally successful, being inapplicable in the Cape (Lacey,1981:87-88), and as shown by van Onselen (1996), sharecropping or farming on the halves continued in most of the Western Transvaal for another fifty years. However, in those areas where the 1913 Act was enforced it had severe consequences. The main reason being that once again the amount of land set aside for blacks was “not

founded on the land needs of the Africans, but expediently based on the extent of unsettled areas and white interests” (Hendricks,1990:37).

The 1913 Land Act whilst echoing details from earlier legislation - went much further (Bundy in Murray & O’Regan, 1989:5). It formally divided South Africa into areas where blacks could use land (250952 km sq.), the reserves and the rest where they couldn’t purchase, hire or have any rights in land (1061000km sq.) (Human Awareness Program, 1989:C5). The act codified territorial segregation like never before in South Africa and also determined how blacks might live and work in white South Africa. By severely restricting the area of land for lawful African occupation and by stripping African cash tenants and sharecroppers of their land, the act forced a large number of the once independent African peasantry “to go out and work for others in order to live. The reserves were too small to maintain all Africans through farming. There was however enough land to maintain the migrant labour system and its rationalisation for paying low wages” (Human Awareness Program, 1989:C5).

By the 1930’s the adverse effects of trying to force so many people into so little space were becoming apparent. The land in the reserves had deteriorated to such an extent that viable agriculture was an impossibility. Agricultural yields had dropped and the increasing landlessness in the reserves threatened the political stability of the South African State and the basis of the migrant labour system. More laws were needed to keep things running ‘smoothly’ and legitimise the process of exploitation. The 1936 Act made provision for the release of more land to the reserves. The establishment of a native trust laid down conditions for the acquisition, tenure and disposal of land by this trust and finally prohibited the residence of natives on land outside the native areas, including the Cape in these provisions, with certain exceptions made for labourers. It was thus an act which, attempted to legitimise the process of segregation by giving more land to the black population, and re-enforcing the notion of territorial segregation by re-emphasising the terms upon which it was based (Davenport and Hunt, 1974; 44-46). Thus over a period of forty years the South African state had, for reasons of political and economic control, managed to create the reserves.

In terms of their economic use it is quite blatant that the reserves were a perfect way to increase surplus value. By allowing only those with employment into white South Africa, the cost of reproducing labour was minimised. The employer would only have to pay for one worker and not the whole family. There would also be no social security costs once employment was

terminated. Labour was further cheapened as there was not enough land for all in the reserves and this meant that there was a surplus of people who had no land to farm and thus needed wage labour. By cheapening labour power the capitalist proportionately increases his surplus value (Marx, K. 1977: 187-191, and Johnston, 1976:20-21). As to their political use, from the early 1900's to the last few years of apartheid, racial segregation had become the norm. Be it for political control as Yawitch (1981) and Murray and O'Regan (1989) argue, or for the maintenance of separate but equal development as was argued by numerous governments, it was control which many have noted was compatible to capitalism (Bundy, 1979: Lacey1981: Hendricks,1990:35).

The rationale for the creation of the reserves was however by no means constant and the drawing up of boundaries did not imply nationwide implementation. As to the rationale for the Land Acts that established the reserves, as far back as the Glen Grey Act Lacey (1981:2-4) shows how the various groupings of capital, namely agriculture and mining differed as to labour needs, thus also differing as to the required structure of the reserves. There were also different veins of thought within the state concerning the political function of the reserves. Therefore what resulted was a situation whereby the state in attempt to consolidate its power base tried to please as many of its constituents as possible. As the power relations changed between these groupings so the rationale for the reserves shifted between politics and economics (Posel, 1991:267-271). The impact of reserve policy was also not as widespread as many would believe, this as a result of the state enforcing the legislation in a flexible manner to appease the varying groups of capital and ideologies within the state. The impact of the Glen Grey act for example was limited to the Glen Grey areas, the labour tax it advocated was dropped and the Act had little practical effect on both labour and land (Hendricks,1990:31). This is the reason for the Acts that followed, to tighten up any inconsistencies that had been created. The one constant however in all this policy and lack of effective implementation was the overall structure of the reserves in relation to how the land would be held and the amount of land that was available for black occupation.

2.3. Resettlement.

The SPP report states, "the most comprehensive account available of resettlement in South Africa" (de Wet, 1994:360), lists various categories of forced removals, those of main concern here are the removals from "black spots"³ and farm removals with the specific intent of trying to focus on removal to the Ciskei.

³ Black spots refer to areas where black settlements had developed on rural or mission owned land, which fell outside the boundaries of areas authorised for African occupation in 1913 and 1936 (SPP, vol. 1:3).

It should be noted that the terms *forced removal* and *resettlement* shall be used in this work to refer to the removal from black spots, white farms and consolidation of the former Ciskei. As stated in the SPP report, the categories and type of movements are generally similar throughout the entire country, therefore by examining one case or region the rationale for such mass social engineering and the consequences will be easier to establish and expanded to cover South Africa as a whole. It must also be noted that in terms of the Ciskei, upon which a nominal independence was forced in 1981, the S.P.P report argues that it presented one of the worst cases of independent homeland. There was extremely high unemployment, little economic activity, dense population and a particularly repressive Bantustan government (S.P.P, vol1: 8). Here the most significant movement of people was from white rural areas and from black spots in the white corridor between Ciskei and Transkei as part of homeland consolidation between 1960 and the 1980's.

By the late apartheid era, a time Posel (1991:227) refers to as the second phase of apartheid, these laws of segregation were more seriously applied than before, serving to uproot and relocate well over three and a half million people (S.P.P, Vol1: 1). It was the second phase of apartheid, according to Posel (1991:227-232), in that the State began to seriously tighten up on black urbanisation and economic integration. The State had, since 1948, allowed for the sake of mining, agricultural and newly established manufacturing capital, taken the stance that black urbanisation and economic integration was needed for the growth of the economy. By the late 1950's influx controls were tightened as the State grew anxious over the level of black urbanisation. The political threat of an urban based black working class had escalated and after the Sharpsville shooting, these political anxieties were expressed in more rigid control over black urbanisation and settlement in 'white' South Africa.

The National Party (Nats) did not invent the idea of territorial segregation; they merely swelled police power, took power from the courts and totally abolished black human rights to enable them to enforce laws, which for a long time sat dormant as mere pieces of paper. So, although by the 1940's the reserves were overpopulated and agriculturally unproductive, from the 1950's onwards more and more blacks were being 'endorsed out' of white-claimed areas to the homelands (Nash & Charlton, 1981:4). It was now seen by the state as imperative to enforce homeland policy effectively, and they had both the physical and electoral power to do just this. And so started an era of mass social engineering, which as defined by Bundy, refers to social and economic restructuring to suit

politically defined goals (in Murray & O'Regan, 1989:8). More bluntly, but just as correct, "it means pushing large numbers of people around, forcing them to do things they don't want to do" (Murray & O'Regan, 1989:8).

These were the circumstances surrounding forced removals that took place from white South Africa to the homelands. The Nats had cemented the aforementioned existing legislation, and began in earnest to apply it. The homelands started being used, not as a measure for coercing people to work but as a dumping ground for surplus labour for which there was no longer any use. The use of the reserves was economic in that the South African State would not have to pay for social welfare for these so-called redundant workers, but also political in that the rationale of control was also realised. These reasons behind the forced removals of the 60's and 70's, can in my opinion, only be fully understood in terms of the entire historical process of segregation. Indeed, as Bundy (1979) notes, with the coming together of the market, the law and the army, the black independent peasant was dealt a death blow and the wage labourer created. It was however a death blow which was only fully administered after 1948 and apartheid. The Nationalist Party government enforced legislation which as Yawitch argues saw the "entrenchment of a new order which would ensure that all branches of the ruling groups, especially farming, would get the labour they needed in the form that they wanted, and that the problem of squatting, labour tenancy, urbanisation and unrest in rural areas could all be controlled" (1981:20). The stage had already been set for apartheid to work and for the further concentration of economic, social and political power in the hands of a white minority. Resettlement was the culmination of a method of segregation, which as Legassick argues, was compatible with the process of white South African capitalism (in Dubow, 1990: 1-3).

The production of a heightened surplus value due to the "ultra-exploitation" of black labour (Johnstone, 1976:20-21), coupled with the notion of political control was the rationale behind the early segregationist policy. At the time of the mass removals of the 60's and 70's these motives were still driving the Apartheid State. By this time industrial capital was competing for labour with both gold and agrarian capital, so the reserves were still fulfilling their role of supplying cheap labour. However, the rationale began to change focus, in that although the removals were still economically and politically driven; too much labour had positioned itself outside the Bantustans. With mechanisation and capitalist production being efficiency driven, less labour was needed;

there was a surplus of labour available. It was a surplus workforce created by previous land legislation; 1913 and 1936 which, had come back to haunt the state, in that now it was far larger and far more wage dependent than they had envisaged. They had also not yet been completely moved into the homelands that had been created, and waited for them since Glen Grey. This raised questions of control and economic dependence for the 'Nats'.

The solution was resettlement. The time had come to use the reserves for their initial purpose: to contain the natives. As Hindson (1987:x1) notes, a vast number of Africans had settled on the peripheries of urban centers, from where they could access the labour market with greater ease than from the reserves. Resettlement took place to quell the rising tide of black labourers who had settled in white South Africa. They bulldozed them out, packed them in trucks and took them to their own 'countries', which by then were small deserts. It was expected that this would dampen the cries for nationalism and for the franchise in that blacks had the vote, just not in South Africa. It would also remove the economical burden from the South African State, in terms of supporting such large numbers. Thus the rationale was still both economic and political, with a view to maintain the political and economic dominance of the minority in South Africa. The reserves, which had originally been created to supply cheap labour and allow for racial segregation, would now be used to hold and support all redundant and surplus labour. Still fulfilling their initial purpose, in that, a surplus of unemployed blacks would be kept here, allowing labour to be cheaper as the market was saturated with nothing for those in the reserves to do, in terms of subsistence, and ensuring territorial and thus political segregation.

2.4. Consequences of Resettlement.

Just as blacks were forced out of the reserves to create a labour supply, the redundant proletarians were forced back into these reserves. The largest categories of these forced removals, back to the reserves were people either being evicted from or leaving white farms (1.129 000 people) and black spot relocation (614 000 people), approximately 45% and 10% respectively (de Wet, 1994: 360). It should be remembered that the reserves were necessarily incapable of supporting these 'extras' since they had been created small enough to force people to work for wages, so subsistence agriculture for all would be impossible. The South African State had other ideas, and after the Tomlinson Commission of 1954, "the [stated] intention was to create economically viable, agricultural- based communities" (de Wet, 1994: 361). The charade of betterment began as the South African State attempted to legitimise the mass resettlement of the surplus labour that

had positioned itself outside the reserves. It was a charade in terms of the fact that betterment, as proposed by the Tomlinson Commission, would require the amount of land allocated to the reserves to be extended. The state had no intention of doing this as white commercial agriculture saw in any such extension of land for blacks as a direct threat to their agricultural dominance.

The State proclaimed that they were interested in combating erosion, conserving the environment and improving agricultural prospects. In reality the resettlement in question merely served to consolidate economic and political power in the hands of a minority and ideals of betterment provided a reason to do so.

People from black spots and white farms were removed onto trust land, consolidated with the homelands and became part of the betterment plan. This resulted mainly in the “disruption of peoples social and economic relationships, and changed the nature of their access to resources such as land, livestock and jobs - usually for the worse. Resettlement ... thus left many people vulnerable and at risk of impoverishment” (de Wet, 1994: 367).

The South African State had publicly washed its hands of the problem of all the excess unemployed labour and had attempted to legitimise the whole process with cries of environmental and agricultural protection. Both of these attempts failed in that the process of territorial segregation was never legitimised and the problem of the degradation of the former homelands has come back to trouble our present state.

Resettlement from the mid 20th century served in reality to minimise overheads related to capitalist labour with regard to pensions, health care and old age care, since all of these would be the responsibility of the residents themselves. It also served to tighten things up politically in that the cries for a black South Africa and the franchise for all would be further away, in fact, in separate countries altogether. For the blacks would now have to find some other means of survival in a place where there was no land, and the land that there was, was insufficient for the masses of people which had been resettled, resulting in “overcrowding of the homelands” (Croser, 1980:9). Underdevelopment of the homelands went hand in hand with this overcrowding and land shortages, allowing the State a great deal of both political and economic control. This being the

original rationale for the setting up of such areas. It would do to repeat the fact that the reserves and resettlement had served their purpose admirably.

South African politics have changed and the country is now regarded as democratic. The homelands have been incorporated with the rest of South Africa. Following hot on the heels of the transition there followed a number of laws which looked to undo the injustice of the past. One such piece of legislation which is of interest to this study is the 1997 South African White Paper on Land Policy.

The South African White Paper on Land Policy was published in 1997 by the Department of Land Affairs, after three years of democratic rule and after the new constitution had included various property clauses which prompted the drafting of the aforementioned paper. Namely that, “A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by and act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property, or to equitable redress. Secondly, the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. And lastly, a person whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by and act of parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure, or to comparable redress” (Hanekom, Foreword: 1997). It should be remembered that this same constitution, through the Bill of Rights also guarantees existing property rights. It was in this setting that the drafting of the White Paper on Land Policy occurred. There are contradictions here in that the constitution guaranteed existing property rights and then also placed the state under a constitutional duty to enable citizens to gain equitable access to land, security of tenure and provide redress to those dispossessed by past racially biased laws.

This raises questions of the parameters within which the government has set itself to work on land reform, do they have enough ‘space’ to effectively change the biased nature of land distribution in South Africa? This problem is mentioned in the paper, section 1.2.2 and is perhaps related to the concept of our newly won democracy. For it does indeed need to be recognised “that counter proposals by stakeholders are often difficult to reconcile and compromises have to be found” (1997: 5). It is such compromises that will possibly adversely affect the land reform programme.

At the most basic the white paper is said to set out the vision and implementation strategy for South Africa's land policy: "a policy that is just, builds reconciliation and stability, contributes to economic growth, and bolsters household welfare" (1997:v). This is the general overall theme of the paper and these are grand ideals indeed. It is made up of three main components, which are discussed specifically in section 4 under the heading of Land reform programmes. These are more specifically :- Redistribution (section 4.3-4.12) which is to make it possible for poor and disadvantaged people to buy land with the help of a settlement/land acquisition grant. Restitution (section 4.13-4.14), which involves returning land (or otherwise compensating victims) lost since June 1913 because of racially discriminatory laws. And land tenure reform (section 4.15-4.20), aims to bring all people occupying land under a unitary, legally validated system of land holding. However, these components are discussed throughout the entire document, under a perhaps more general yet prevalent theme, that of undoing more than a century's worth of both possessory and territorial segregation.

The white paper is therefore suggested by its drafters to be "the cornerstone in the development of our country" (1997: xvi), in that it will contribute to reconciliation, stability, growth and development (1997: 7). Herein arguably lies the cure to all the questions of land equity and economic efficiency which predominate the development arena in South Africa at present. Yet again, there are obvious contradictions within these aims and the actual macro level policies they stem from. Section 2.2 clearly states that basis of the land reform programme, its scope and its content were driven by the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), this was a predominantly humanist social development programme promoting equity. However, the new macro level policy within which the state must now implement the programme of land reform is largely a neo-liberal free market efficiency driven document: the Growth Education and Redistribution Policy (GEAR). So we have a programme which is said to be primarily based on the RDP and expected to work effectively under GEAR, another aspect of contextual contradictions. Is this another democratic compromise?

Another more specific legislative hitch in the white paper is that it enables and is expected to work in conjunction with "other laws (too numerous to list here), which relate directly and indirectly to land, but which are managed/administered by other departments or other tiers of government" (1997:37, box 4.1). This proliferation of numerous laws complicates the entire process and

presents problems as to which department is responsible for what aspects of land reform. Again raising questions of efficiency, and the ideals of land reform in regard to its practicality.

As mentioned earlier, section 4:- land reform programmes, contains the main elements of land reform, distribution, restitution and tenure reform, it is thus in my opinion the central section the of the white paper. It is also however, in this section 4.21-4.26 that the financial grants of the land reform programme are found. Another aspect of the reform programme that poses certain problems. Various grants are available for those who qualify under conditions set out in section 4.22 and these grants can also be made on their behalf. This surely opens up the procedure to a certain degree of possible corruption, in that there is in the paper an allowance for 'middle men' so to speak. An opening which may possibly allow for the manipulation of this facility by the more educated over the less educated rural and urban poor, for who the grants are supposed to be. Also in regard to this section on financial grants for the land reform programme, one finds that the various grants are overlapping, in that for example the Settlement/land acquisition grant can be used across the board for those applying for redistribution, restitution and tenure reform. This although minimising the amount of legislation needed for separate more specific grants, creates a certain degree of confusion in that the distinctions created from section 4.1-4.20 between the three sub-programmes are now somewhat blurred.

It is possibly the one section in the paper that needed to be more specific and in depth, in that the fiscal issues involved in land reform are possibly more important in determining the success of the programme than are the reminders of how discriminatory the past regime was. Less space should have been taken up by Policy issues, section 3 and institutional arrangements, section 6, and more by Budgetary issues, section 3.26, and financial issues of the programme, section 4.21. And this for the simple reason that on proper examination of what is set out in the aforementioned sections, section 3 on land policy issues contains far too much repetition of the three legs land reform stands on (redistribution, restitution and tenure reform), and arguments for the three aspects of reform, the former are then again fully explained in section 4. Section 6 also contains those aspects of reform, the wide range of expected service providers related to land reform, the integrated approach to land reform and the need for constant assessment which have been somewhat alluded to throughout the paper and are then discussed in full in this section, again slightly repetitive. Institutional arrangements could very well have been dealt with in conjunction with public land management and administration, leaving both space and time to deal with more critical issues

of finance. Instead one finds that there is a great deal of unnecessary repetition of ‘Why’ land reform and not enough practical ‘how’, this serves to further complicate a document which already carries almost too much on its shoulders in terms of widespread expectations.

There is however, some aspects of section 6 which are a welcome sight, section 6.14 and 6.15 on land information. For there is a definite need for the attempts of the legislators in regard to land distribution to be conveyed to the general public if the programme is to be a success.

In conclusion the white paper on land reform should develop into an incredibly important piece of South African legislation, it aims to deliver on the one aspect of development in the country which has been at the center of segregation and inequality for over a century. Thus land reform is needed if we are to progress as a democratic country. However, as is the case with most legislative processes it is not a case of writing and then simply implementing the law. There will, by necessity, be a learning phase in which those aspects which fit in to the prevailing context will be able to be implemented whilst those which do not fit or do not have widespread support will either remain pipe dreams or undergo a shift in focus. Yet, on the whole, it is a paper which needs some clarification, simplification and which also needs to take the prevailing socio-economic climate into more consideration before cementing some of its perhaps unattainable ideals in law. As it is, and in the prevailing context, this policy has not affected the overall reserve structure, in a widespread manner as was expected by its drafters.

2.5. Conclusions.

The preceding chapter shows that resettlement resulted in social and economic underdevelopment of the reserve population. The reserves to which blacks were forcibly removed had been designed in the early twentieth century to ensure this very thing. For by ensuring underdevelopment in the reserves, allowing no real chance of agricultural and economic sustainability, white farmers, miners and manufacturing were ensured a cheap labour supply. Resettlement served to remove the threat of political upsurge by urbanised blacks, as there had been too many blacks moving to urban and peri-urban centers to look for work. Resettlement also managed to appease both liberals and staunch Afrikaners alike within the state itself. For the liberals blacks would now have land and the vote and for those who envisaged complete segregation, resettlement was to be the manner in which South Africa would detach itself from black labour, eventually resulting in economic separation of the races. There were numerous motives for resettlement and a

deciding factor was that the state had cleverly accumulated power allowing it to engage in such social engineering.

The rationale for resettlement does not follow a predetermined strategy or plan, The state made tactical decisions based on their power and the prevailing social and economic climate. The one thing that does remain constant however is the dominant structure of the reserves. The ratios of land set aside for white and black remained more or less constant from 1913, and the basis of the homeland system as established by the Glen Grey Act was merely further entrenched and clarified to suit the needs of apartheid. The structure of the reserves, determined mainly by land legislation resulted in the underdevelopment of these areas. Resettlement ensured further underdevelopment as the structure remained the same whilst numbers increased.

With democracy land legislation changed its focus and now the government has professed to be interested in overcoming the gross inequality with regard to the racial division of land. The 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy was drafted with such intentions. However the vast inconsistencies in this document will, to my mind, ensure that the reserve structure remains as it had been before incorporation of the homelands.

Chapter Three:- Glenmore: The story of underdevelopment.

3.1. Introduction.

The following chapter is a local level case study of development changes in Glenmore village. Various social and economic variables will be examined in relation to the overall structure of the reserves both before and after democracy. This will allow any changes in development to be pinpointed and in doing so provide a basis from which to determine whether or not there has been positive change in the homelands since 1994.

The variables to be examined in relation to the overall reserve structure include agriculture, employment and the provision of basic services such as housing, health, water and education. The case study begins with the birth of Glenmore in 1979, examining how the structure of the reserve (Ciskei) affected social and economic development up to 1994.

The next section traces the development changes since the democratic transition. The situation in Glenmore today is examined to show any changes at a local level. The main aim here being to establish whether or not this incorporation resulted in positive change at a local level for former reserve dwellers.

3.2. Glenmore then.

From the outset it should be realised that the story of Glenmore is not unique. There are numerous such resettlement sites in Tyefu location and indeed in the rest of the former Ciskei. As MacLennan notes (1987, XI) “in the year of the Glenmore move alone, more than 70 000 Africans were shifted by the government”. As with most of these forced removals, the people moved to Glenmore were mainly unemployed, pensioners or seasonal employees, and were regarded by the then department of Rural Relations as squatters, on black-spots or excess labour on white farms in South Africa (Albany Black Sash, 1979). The grand scheme, was to move up to 200 000 people to Glenmore at a cost of approximately R20 million (S.P.P, 1885, Vol.2: 284; Henderson, 1979 and MacLennan, 1987: 13). First temporary wooden houses would be built to house those who would help with the construction of the ‘real’ township. This township was to be a point in case for the South African State and advance the ideology of separate development. In retrospect, State rhetoric as to the nature of the township was intended to appease opposition to the planned forced removals. In 1978 the director of the Eastern Cape Administration Board, Mr. Louis Kock informed the Grahamstown public, many of whom were

against the planned removals, that “each home would have running water, flush toilet, electricity and all main roads and bus routes would be tarred” (in Representations on the Glenmore removals, Glenmore Action Group, 1979). There would also be job opportunities in a proposed canning industry and in local administration. In reality none of these services were provided and there were no jobs in any booming border industries.

It would also do to mention that there were numerous places from which people were to be moved to Glenmore. The vast majority as noted by the Surplus Peoples Project (S.P.P. Vol. 2: 282) were resettled from the Kenton-On-Sea/Klipfontein area, Coega and Colchester, near Port Elizabeth. Small groups were also moved from Middledrift, Keiskammahoek, Chalumna and Hillside near Fort Beaufort (Forbes, 1980:19). This shows the diversity concentrated in such a small place, thus making it difficult to create feelings of community within Glenmore. As Zondani (1995:2) writes, “[f]rom the start things were not good at Glenmore because of lack of homogeneity amongst the groups, violent clashes between different groups was common”. This put paid to any ideas of an efficient local administration and the jobs herein.

As to the geography of the area chosen, Glenmore had previously been regarded as the “largest and best area of irrigable land in the then Victoria East district” (MacLennan, 1987:17). However since 1971 it had only been partially irrigated and used predominantly for stock rearing. After the National States constitution act of 1971 allowed self governing status to be given to the homelands several white farmers had left the area. Glenmore had been purchased by a Mr Knott, who had stocked the hills with cattle and had over two hundred hectares under irrigation. In 1974 Glenmore farm was bought from him and then leased back to him until work began on the township in 1976 (MacLennan,1987:17-18). This confusion as to the status of the land had led to it being underutilised and land that had once supported 5000 orange trees and a number of grape vines (MacLennan,1987:17), was in1979 simply described as poor by the Surplus People Project (1985:282). Without thorough irrigation the area known for its harsh climate was regarded as having poor agricultural potential. For those moved to Glenmore “the Fish River scrub and shale provided a sharp contrast to the green coastal hills of Kenton, and to the rich lush, farming lands of Coega and Colchester” (S.P.P. 1885, Vol.2: 282). 3000 people were the first ‘installment’ moved from the aforementioned places to Glenmore and as confirmed by the Eastern Cape government almost all the 500 temporary houses were full as of the 25th May 1979

(S.P.P, 1985, Vol. 2. E.C: 292). Glenmore would be a model township and the “finest in the Republic” (MacLennan, 1987: 13).

The reality was that the social and economic conditions related to this move were severe and resulted in the degradation of the life-world of those moved. People lost many things during the move such as furniture, livestock and also their sense of belonging. Social and economic conditions were severe and it seemed that only the strong would survive. This is somewhat of a paradox in that those who were moved were known to be the old, the disabled and the very young, all those who could no longer work for wages in white South Africa, the weak. As MacLennan argues (E.P. Herald. 8 June 1979), the history of Glenmore dated back to 1913. As long as blacks were offered labour in white South Africa they could be resident there. “As soon as they became no longer fit for work or superfluous in the labour market they were expected to return to the territory of the national unit where they fit in ethnically” (E.P. Herald. 8 June 1979). Glenmore was simply another case of white vested interests and black redundancy being disguised by the notion of separate development (Albany Black Sash. M.S. 1979). The fact was that any blacks that had gained a foothold in white South Africa became a threat to the system of territorial segregation and had to be dealt with. They were thus termed ‘economically redundant’ and moved to make room for those involved in meaningful wage labour. As the Chairman of the Glenmore Action Group wrote of those moved to Glenmore “the initial plan was to move out economically redundant households to make room for families which included municipal workers” (Davenport, 1979: M.S.). The amount of land given to those who were resettled was typical of the reserve system in that, as noted in chapter two, it would be enough to maintain the class but not enough for them to subsist entirely off the land (Wolpe,1980:301). In terms of Glenmore 5000 people were expected to make a living on land that had belonged to but one farmer.

On the 7th of June 1979 the Eastern Province Herald published a story that “Eleven people from Glenmore, most of them children, have died in the last two months.” There were widespread claims of vast unemployment and hunger and “doubts about the viability of the proposed ... township” began to be expressed by the Eastern Cape Administration Board, (E.P. Herald, May 10, 1979). As the S.P.P wrote, “conditions suffered in the initial weeks at Glenmore were nothing short of critical” (1885, Vol. 2 E.C, 293). Fortunately the Albany Black Sash, a religious anti-apartheid group, Glenmore Action Group, Rhodes University academics and the Eastern Province Herald publicised these peoples rights. The

Glenmore Action Group went even further, obtaining a grant from World Vision, fund-raising locally and making several trips to Glenmore to distribute food and blankets (Glenmore Action Group, 16 July 1979, meeting and Forbes,1980:19). There was thus a great deal of negative publicity (Evening Post, 11 July 1999; E.P. Herald, 10 May, 7 and 8 June 1979), as the aforementioned activist groups showed opposition to the further moves planned. The result being that no more mass resettlement took place to the twenty million Rand township that had originally been on the cards for Glenmore.

However, those already moved would have to cope as there were no intentions of moving them back to areas within 'white' South Africa. The land both at Coega and Klipfontein had provided for a diversification of livelihoods. "At Klipfontein, Colchester and Coega some kept stock and many grew vegetables- often on a scale large enough to supplement their incomes via limited commercial activity" (S.P.P. 1985:296). These people had either participated in sustainable subsistence agriculture, or as Maclellan (1987:5) notes they had seasonal jobs. Those from Kenton-On-Sea and the surrounding coastal areas also had the option of fishing for subsistence. Thus these people who had been in some manner self-sufficient from whence they had come were now struggling to stay alive (Glenmore Action Group, 2 April 1979, Representation on the Glenmore removals). "Most families [had] supplemented their occasional cash income by growing vegetables and in good years selling what they could not eat. Some even kept livestock" (Maclellan, 1987: 5). The move to Glenmore changed this situation in that subsistence agriculture was no longer a viable option to supplement any cash income. As the Surplus Peoples project reported "begging borrowing and sharing were the only avenues open to many to eke out a precarious existence" (1985:293).

Housing .Health and education.

With its label as a transit camp the original site of Glenmore consisted of 500 prefabricated, wooden sheds lined with chicken wire. These sheds were said to provide better shelter than the previous zinc shacks and mud homes of the resettled people, however there was in reality little difference. The houses "were bitterly cold in winter, scorching in summer and most leaked during the rains" (S.P.P, 1985, Vol.2: 304).By February of 1980, twenty six of these houses had flooded (Forbes,1980:19), showing the appalling quality of these structures. Regardless of the state claiming this site to be temporary, the sheds became permanent homes for these people.

Each shed also had a bucket toilet and twenty homes shared one tap positioned at eighty-meter intervals along dirt roads (S.P.P.1985:304).

The education level was poor, only thirty percent of the population had completed Standard Five, and there was only one primary school in the village, which did little to solve this problem (S.P.P, 1985, Vol.2: 304-305). Those who wanted to attend high school, had to travel to other schools in the district.

Three clinics were promised, at the time of removal, only one of these had been built. It was run by “few trained nurses and a doctor who pays a weekly visit” (S.P.P, 1984, Vol.2: 305). Still as mentioned earlier, within weeks of people being moved, deaths related to the brackish water and poor nutrition were recorded (Forbes,1980:19). These deaths showed the incapacity of the clinic and its inability to deal with the prevailing health conditions in Glenmore. The fact that eleven children had died as of February 1980 from malnutrition (Forbes,1980:19), also highlights the inability of the people of Glenmore to make a health living from the land.

Agriculture.

Agriculture in Glenmore was at this stage non existent, and for those who had managed to subsist off the land in areas such as Coega and Klipfontein (MacLennan,1987:5), this avenue to survival was closed off. As the Surplus Peoples Project reported “many who had supplemented their incomes at Coega and Klipfontein with livestock and crops were now denied this source with little or no compensation” (1985:293).The land was not suitable for dry-land farming. The water from the Fish River was too saline and to make matters worse the number of people now settled on the land had led to severe pressure on the natural resources. Half of the people interviewed by the S.P.P (1985:296) claimed that they had ‘much more’ land, 40% claimed to have ‘more’ land and the remaining 10% said that they had the same amount of land at their previous locality. There was thus on the whole less land than these people had been accustomed to at Glenmore, making agriculture all the more difficult. As one resident put it “There is not enough land here. Even the available land is infertile” (S.P.P.1985:297). No one had been thus far able to grow maize and other vegetables. Even cattle and other livestock of those few who had managed to move with them had begun to die, mainly due to ticks and poisonous iris in the area (S.P.P, 1985, Vol.2. E.C: 293). To be exact these animals died at the rate of “two per day for the first couple of weeks from this poisonous weed” (Forbes,1980:19). Both animal rearing

and viable subsistence agriculture were thus virtual impossibilities. The reserve structure, based on minimal land for blacks, ensured the underdevelopment of the village. “Although 70% of all those interviewed claimed to be involved in agricultural production to some degree the small quantities and poor quality of crops make this figure somewhat less impressive. Minute plots, infertile soil and little water gave scant cause for optimism” (S.P.P.1985:297).

The Glenmore Action Group investigated the question of obtaining land for agricultural development through irrigation. They also reported that foreign bodies were interested in sponsoring viable agricultural projects at Glenmore. It was however discovered that there were major political problems, in that there was a great deal of uncertainty as to how and for what purposes the land was to be administered. This involved the Ciskei, and the Department of Co-operation and Development (Glenmore Action Group, Minutes of meeting 16 July 1979). Thus, although being promised water from the Orange-Fish River scheme, there was no readily available land for the suggested irrigation schemes at Glenmore. As mentioned in Chapter two, the reserves had been created small enough to force blacks to work for wages and subsistence agriculture for all would be impossible. No extra land had been allocated to these areas and resettlement thus meant that those moved to villages such as Glenmore would, by State design, find it hard to subsist off the land. The reserve structure in relation to land was maintained regardless of the fact that with resettlement the numbers expected to live on this land had increased. Agriculture was never supposed to work successfully and by examining Glenmore one finds that indeed it did not.

Employment.

In Glenmore there was no employment, as the government had said there would be. The Surplus Peoples Project showed that from late 1979, only 42.5% of the population was employed, 23.25% was unemployed whilst 34.25% were inactive (1985:298). Furthermore only approximately 12% of the employed work locally, the rest were dependent on the migrant labour system (S.P.P, 1985, Vol. 2). Again, as with agriculture, one finds that Glenmore fitted perfectly into the overall reserve system. For to create a cheap source of labour; there should by necessity be a large number of unemployed people without other sustainable options for survival. This was the case in Glenmore. As quoted in MacLennan (1987: 105) by a then resident “[w]hen we complain about starvation we are told to go and work in the cities. When we get to the cities we are told to go back because we do not belong there”. Employment opportunities were few and

far between and it seemed the government had forgotten its promises of jobs and a better life for those being moved to Glenmore. The reason put forward by the State for this high unemployment was that the camp was new and the people had not acquainted themselves with the labour channels and employment opportunities (SPP, 1985:299). However it was also noted by the Glenmore Action Group that although farmers were looking for seasonal labourers people had not turned up to work (Minutes of meeting 16 July 1979). This raised questions of the willingness of these people to work and their dependence on the state. More specifically and directly related to the rationale for resettlement, this would underlie the fact that the majority of those moved were indeed the weak and the redundant. They were more unable to work than unwilling.

This is after all the reason people were moved out of white South Africa, because they did not have or could not get gainful employment. The unemployment situation is also directly related to the idea of the reserves, and later resettlement, being used to create a cheap surplus labour force. There was no land for subsistence agriculture and those moved had few options. Thus they would work and for wages far below their actual value. Those that were unable to work, were now easier to control whilst problems related to unemployment had been moved out of 'white' South Africa.

After seven years of such stark deprivation and living in pre-fabricated wooden homes, in 1986 the residents of Glenmore village, were moved yet again. The flat land alongside the Fish River, where they had been settled, was viewed by the Ciskei government as valuable for its extension of the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme (T.I.S), which had until then only been functioning as far as the neighboring village of Ndwayana. As the S.P.P showed (1985, Vol. 2 E.C. 308), Glenmore residents, who until then had been forgotten, were unceremoniously moved to the present site. They were resettled by the Ciskei government approximately four kilometers from the original 'dumping' site. This place was in a much more hilly area, where each household was to be given a plot for farming whilst the better land on the banks of the Fish River would go towards the plan for a Greater Tyefu irrigation scheme. This plan was a process not guaranteed to provide sufficient opportunities for all those in Glenmore, both in terms of jobs or irrigated land of their own for farming (Maclennan, 1987: 102-104).

Ulimoco, the former Ciskei agricultural parastatal, did indeed extend the T.I.S to the flat irrigable land alongside the Fish River (Kingwill, 1997: 5). They “employed a number of Glenmore families and supplies of fresh vegetables were sold to local companies” (ISER, 1998: 8). It was a move that saw this community moving into better built two roomed brick homes and using pit latrines instead of buckets. The community now receives a mix of water from the Glenboyd pipeline, (Orange and Fish River water). They also got land set aside for farming in the form of the food plots. It seemed as if the opportunities for development had been improved, yet the administrative chaos, along with vast unemployment in the village persisted. Food rations which were still being received from the government, became a means of survival as did the fertilizer and seeds, given for food plot agriculture. This is an indication of just how severe the conditions were. Food rations were only given to desperate families, so if most of a village depends on these for survival it would imply that most of the village is desperate. Secondly, dry land agriculture was not regarded as a viable option. Those people in Glenmore who were not employed by the T.I.S, attempted dry land agriculture with seeds and fertilizers received by the government. Though Glenmore remained in a poor state, nobody who mattered seemed to care. There were at this point no clear central policies that would promote the development of such resettlement villages.

From 1986 until 1994, various improvements were made in terms of overall development with specific relation to agriculture, health, education and administration. At a local level the Glenmore Community Authority (GCA) took over the administration from the steering committee and became more involved with the development parastatal Ulimoco (Zondani, 1995:2). The Glenmore Community Authority received grants from the South African government. These funds which were distributed by the Ciskei government were supposed to be used for administration, the creation of employment and development in the area. Poultry, piggery and irrigated agriculture were the main areas of prospective development. The infrastructure for these was supplied in terms of, housing for animal breeding, pumps and pipes for agriculture and initial assistance for maintenance (Zondani, 1995:11-12). The Ciskei government was now undoubtedly responsible for the people, in that the official boundary for the homeland was the Fish River. Yet, as shown by the S.P.P (1985), this government was one of the most corrupt and tyrannical of the homeland system. Glenmore, although now having recognised opportunities for development was still faced with numerous constraints. The Tyefu irrigation Scheme finally reached these people, not only to help them in terms of subsistence or

family agriculture, but also for efficient commercial production run by a parastatal of this corrupt state. There was some clarity as to who was responsible for these people at a central level. Yet, the Ciskei state did not have the practical know how or the capacity to promote development at a local level. The Glenmore community was again forgotten at this present site. Glenmore village thus shows how the economic and political rationale for the reserves and resettlement and the structure this influences affected social and economic development in the reserves. To put it crudely, Glenmore served its purpose admirably. Designed for underdevelopment, Glenmore fulfilled its role, it's being a history of wage dependency and agricultural impossibilities.

3.3. Glenmore now.

Glenmore is a village that today houses approximately 4000 people. It is part of the larger South Africa, and has been for the last 'democratic' five years. The people have the franchise, and the right to democratic governance, but most social and economic conditions are the same as before their incorporation with South Africa. Since 1986 and the move to the present site, development opportunities have increased, but the land shortages and overall structure of the reserves remains the same. With democracy came a plethora of legislation heralded as the driving forces of positive change. With regard to land and the structure of rural South Africa possibly the most important document has been the 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy. It has however been shown in chapter two that the reserve land structure shall remain as it was prior to 1994, due to the various inconsistencies in this policy. This section examines how this overall context with regard to land has affected Glenmore, if at all.

Housing, health, education.

Most of the information in this section is qualified by personal experience during my stay in Glenmore as I was living with the residents and know first hand how it is to live in the area.

The health services provided in Glenmore today are somewhat reminiscent of those of old. The clinic is still as before 1994 run by three full time nurses. Doctors used to visit on a weekly basis, but these visits have become less regular due to a shortage of doctors (Zondani, 1995: 50). This clear lack of capacity is shocking. There is no permanent doctor and serious injuries must be treated elsewhere. The clinic which is a well built structure is in need of repair as there are sections of the roof missing which were blown off in a heavy storm earlier in the year.

The situation is markedly better with regard to education. There are three schools, and a crèche: Mandela Educare Center, Mzimcane Lower Primary, Quqambile Higher Primary and Qhayiya High School. Although badly dilapidated with broken windows being the norm at all, these schools cater for the children and their development in Glenmore. Outsiders staff them and after visiting these during term time, I found them to be a positive aspect of Glenmore's future development. This is a vast change from how things used to be, as mentioned in the previous section on education post primary school students had to travel in order to go to school. In 1997 it was stated in a needs analysis survey that over 90% of the children in Glenmore attended school (Masifunde, 1997: 3). This means that most of the young people in the village will be given some form of education, and with this a chance to improve their situation. However, one of the teachers argued that it was sad to see people finishing school and then sitting at home, as jobs were scarce. He suggested a technical or vocational course be started in high school.

Agriculture.

There are numerous opportunities for agricultural development in Glenmore. As noted in the previous section on Glenmore before 1994, the land in this district can only be used for sustainable agriculture if it is intensively irrigated. The area boasts natural resources such as irrigable land and water. The T.I.S proved that irrigation may provide a form of irrigated agriculture in the village. Until 1995/6 this scheme managed to produce food crops for local farmers and residents as well as a small surplus for sale (Kingwill, 1997: 1; ISER, 1998: 8). Although there is both water and land available to make this land profitable, or even make it yield enough for the people's own subsistence, irrigation from the Glenboyd is necessary in this drought prone area. The white farmers evidence this across the Fish River as they manage to partake in efficient agriculture, but only by thoroughly irrigating their fields. These fields are in the same geographical area as Glenmore and would be expected to have the same type of soils and rainfall. These farms do not show signs of serious land degradation, and thus differ from Glenmore in this respect. This shows that the number of people settled in Glenmore is directly related to the degradation of the natural resources to the point whereby agriculture is not a viable option. Water as Mr. Nonyande (Amatola Water Board in Glenmore) stated is available in abundance. For irrigation, a mix from the Orange and Fish Rivers can be used to irrigate the surrounding lands. However no irrigation projects have been started due to the uncertainty as to the nature of land holding and ownership in the area (Kingwill, 1997:1). As one resident mentioned "we will never make much out of the land because we do not own the piece of plot

given to us. There is still confusion amongst the people as to who the land belongs to” (Phillip Skidd Bonisile, 1999. Personal communication). These people would like to own the land they live on and farm, ownership would create a degree of certainty and they would not be moved as easily as they were in 1985. “We want to own even our homes, like my TV it is mine I have papers” (Xundulu, 1999; personal communication).

As shown by Mr. Xundulu, who has been in Glenmore since 1979, water from the Glenboyd pipeline can be used for home gardening. There are two taps on every street that draw water from the reservoir for household use and service approximately ten households. Mr. Xundulu has an efficient home garden at the back of his residential plot. He has been able to extend his plot as he lives on the perimeter of the village and thus has a slightly more space than most Glenmore residents for gardening. Due to the fact that he had more land, his was one of the most successful of such gardens, which produced vegetables for both consumption and the feeding of several pigs. He assured me that there were several smaller gardens in the actual village, but that most people still followed the rule that they must only plant in the food plots. Relying on the food plots, according to Mr. Xundulu was a mistake in that due to mechanical problems there was often a shortage of water. At his home garden he could draw water by the bucket for his vegetables as long as there was water to drink from the taps. Although his home garden is smaller than his food plot, he sees the home garden as more successful, due to both the availability of water all the time and also the distance which he has to walk to his plot, all of which are situated a considerable distance from the residential area. The food plots have been over cultivated and as such the yields had for the last couple of years been declining (Mr Xundulu,1999). Several residents noted the fact that even though they could successfully plant in their residential yards, there was not enough space to make this a means of subsistence (Mr Bonisile, Mr Vol and Mr Kom, 1999;personal communication). Again this proves that apart from those who are able to extend their home gardens as Mr Xundulu has done, there is too little land for agriculture to be seriously undertaken in the residential part of the village. Compounding this is the all too clear fact that the food plots are not fertile enough and big enough to provide a constant means of survival. Therefore, both the home gardens and the food plots are not sufficient for sustainable agricultural production. Mr Van Vol, who has been living in Glenmore since 1979 put it thus; “Sometimes there is not enough to feed my family because the plots are too small” (1999, personal communication).

The question of land with regard to its agricultural usage is more confusing than it first seems. Many would argue that there is not enough land, yet due to the low numbers of livestock in the village, the surrounding land, although hilly is not being fully utilised, either for horticulture or animal rearing. The food plots and the original site of Glenmore are also not being fully utilised. Thus land is available for agriculture, either for subsistence (food plots) or even capitalist production (irrigable land of old site). For a place with minimal amounts of land there is a great deal of it sitting idle. Research was being done to bring another 80 hectares of land under irrigation for Glenmore and Ndwayana, which would indicate the availability of land (Kingwill, 1997: 1). Lastly, with regard to other agricultural resources, there are those in Glenmore who are willing and able to partake in farming. This shows available human resources that can be used to promote agricultural development. A form of development which will coalesce and positively affect rural development, for as the Amatola District Councilor Mr. Somyo stated in a meeting with administration in Glenmore, agriculture is seen by the government as the primary mode of uplifting the lives of rural poor (personal communication, 1999). Glenmore is thus seen as having the needed resources to allow agriculture to make a marked improvement in the village (Kingwill, 1997 & ISER, 1998). Nothing has yet been done in regard to developing these resources.

At the time of my visit to the village it was mentioned by Mr. Fikile Ntethe, a member of the Glenmore Development Forum in his capacity as the secretary of Glenmore Agricultural Development Forum, that the Tyefu irrigation scheme was to be reopened. Jobs would be provided to the residents on the land of the old site. However the community is waiting for the Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs, or local government to provide them with some certainty as to the rights they have to the land before they become involved in any development programmes involving the said land. It was not certain which department was responsible, resulting in the considerable delay. Another resident, Mr. Welcome Gqamane, Training and Liaison Manager for CDEC consulting engineers was also sourcing funding to get the planned irrigation scheme underway. As with the re-opening of the scheme, nothing positive had been heard in this regard at the time I left Glenmore in September 1999. There were thus several plans afoot to start irrigating this land and engage some of the residents in Glenmore in commercial agriculture. Of course, there is not enough land for all the residents to be involved in commercial agriculture and to my mind it would be better to plan such schemes with the intention of providing subsistence to these people. This prioritisation of efficiency over equity is

one that is common at the level of policy, in that even within the Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs it is a common debate. There are those in this department who are keen to establish a black commercial farming class, whilst on the other hand others would like to see the emphasis being put on the interests of the rural poor. (Mail and Guardian,2000: vol 16 no 1). Such ideological fallouts concerning the point of land reform have led to the predominant reserve structure being maintained, whilst legislators and politicians debate which path is better.

The reality today is that agriculture in Glenmore is not a capitalist enterprise and would not be able to support pensioners and all those who are unemployed. The relationship between the number of people in the village and the amount of irrigable land would not allow for commercial agriculture to be a way out of the poverty for all the unemployed, old and disabled that the apartheid government moved. It should be remembered that although commercial agriculture was a viable option to the previous owner of the land before 1974, there was at that stage only one family occupying the land. Today there are over five hundred families who occupy this same piece of land. Food that is grown is for subsistence only and in many cases the food plots are not being used. The main reason for this lack of concrete action to promote some form of agriculture is the confusion surrounding land administration and tenure (Kingwill,1997:2). The land does not belong to individuals or the people as a whole. It is still regarded as State land, and is administered through communal ownership by the Glenmore Community Authority. There is no single recognised tribal authority in the village as all the people are from different areas and as such have different chiefs and leaders from their places of origin. There is thus no security of tenure. Compounding this is the fact that there is no certainty at a local level as to which government department is responsible for land distribution.

The most notable observation is that of desolation on one side of the Fish River, and the opulence on the other. Glenmore is dry and barren whilst across the river, farms are irrigated and lush. Across the river there is certainty as to land ownership and holding whilst in Glenmore confusion as to land reform and related issues serves to prolong underdevelopment. Both sides of the Fish river are now South African territory but the differences which served to distinguish these areas during and before apartheid still exist. The question of how land is divided and held is still for those in Glenmore a stumbling block to their agricultural development.

Employment.

Tyefu location as a whole, still shows a large proportion of unemployed people as is evident from a survey conducted in Glenmore (Masifunde,1997) which shows that close to fifty percent of the Glenmore population was unemployed. More recently a questionnaire carried out in the lower Fish River valley (Tyefu location) by the ISER in 1999 discovered that up to 94% of the respondents in the sample were unemployed (ISER, 1999). There is very little work in Glenmore itself and most of the people are dependant on pension payouts received by family elders (E.P Herald,19.4.1999). The nature of resource degradation in the Tyefu location has also been clearly documented in research conducted by Ainslie (1995:14) in the area. Although much has changed for these people in terms of a new political dispensation, the nature of life in Glenmore has remained for the most part as hard as it has always been. There are still no jobs and the land is getting worse as time goes by, Glenmore is a difficult place to live. In a community profile conducted by an ISER researcher in 1995 it was concluded that as was the case prior to incorporation, the main problems in Glenmore were unemployment and dependency (ISER, 1995). Nine years after the community had lost their status as a transit site, a most of them were still unemployed and relied on the state for the provision of “food rations, free food plots plus seed and equipment” (1995:14).

Glenmore residents employed in full time wage labour are still migrants. There were never any real ‘border’ industries, and residents must travel to nearby urban areas and farms to find work. Most of the youth and middle aged in Glenmore thus move away to places where there is work, and rural to urban migration is common amongst those looking, and able to work. This is proven by the fact that since visiting Glenmore a number of people involved in interviews such as Miss Nosipho Radu, Sonwabo Kom, Fikile Ntethe and Linda Kom amongst others have left the village for the urban areas to look for work. Most of those aforementioned were involved in development initiatives or local administration, thus further incapacitating the development of the village. Also, as stated by the GCA after an internal census was completed there are approximately four thousand people in Glenmore today (personal communication, 1999). In 1997 the total population was measured as approximately six thousand (Masifunde, 1997: 2). This is an opportunity for development, as numbers within Glenmore decrease and the possibility of extra income increases. Yet, this is dependent on the willingness and ability of people to

send money home and to get urban jobs. In some cases as I found out the youth would leave after completing standard ten to find jobs in the urban areas, and no money would be sent home on a regular basis. It would be misleading to simply argue that the ability to leave Glenmore and find work is a development opportunity for the village, yet it does present these people with an option for survival in the new dispensation.

It is mainly pensioners, school children and those who cannot get jobs who are permanent in Glenmore as shown in a survey by the ISER (1995), 56% of Glenmore residents are pensioners, and 15% are permanently employed outside of Glenmore. This aspect has not changed in that it is still a place for excess and redundant labour. For these people there is no escape and Glenmore is home. Their only possible source of subsistence being a family wage, a pension or work on the 'food plots', and their only hope for a meaningful life is that their available resources are used to their full potential. Glenmore has not experienced positive change in terms of the employment statistics of the village. It is very much as it has always been, a village housing a surplus supply of cheap labour. For to offset the underdevelopment in the village those who leave to look for work are often willing to accept lower wages than most urbanites.

3.4 Conclusion

This case study of Glenmore examines but one facet of a multi-dimensional problem; land in regard to rural development. Glenmore's history is a history of underdevelopment, from 1979 to present times this village has existed in a state of deprivation. It is underdevelopment which stems directly from the *raison d'être* for the racial division land in South Africa.

The people in Glenmore were forcibly resettled in 1979 to land which was obviously insufficient. This led to vast underdevelopment of both the village and its inhabitants.

Today the structure of the homelands has not changed, and the inconsistencies at central level in regard to policy ensure that it will not change in the immediate future. Along with this structure/ land insufficiency, underdevelopment persists. It is still underdevelopment based on the nature of the reserve system and resettlement. People are still dependent on wage labour as yields from subsistence agriculture prove insufficient.

Until the history of uneven land division and issues of ownership and tenure are overcome, it is likely that this underdevelopment will continue to be the case. Glenmore's future is thus directly related to its past and the structure of the homelands. These areas, designed for underdevelopment, still exist and continue in much the same manner to negatively affect development. Democracy and the incorporation of the Ciskei with specific regard to Glenmore has not, as was expected heralded immediate positive change. There is still a story of underdevelopment.

Chapter Four:- Conclusions and Implications.

This thesis has been an investigation into the nature of change in Glenmore village resulting from its incorporation into South Africa. The foremost conclusion is that there might very well have been positive changes, as those in Glenmore are accepted as South African citizens and their movement is no longer restricted to within the homeland. However in the main, the overall reserve structure remains the same. It is this structure based primarily on and around land that has been the biggest stumbling block of development in these areas or rural South Africa. The amount of land set aside for blacks in the reserves before 1994 was such that underdevelopment was ensured. For political and economic reasons the South African State sought to contain blacks in as little space as possible. This reserve structure is directly related to underdevelopment. Chapter two clearly shows that the reserves had been structured so as to prevent agriculture from becoming a means of subsistence for blacks. They had also been structured to ensure a constant supply of labour to the towns and farms, since some would have to work to supplement the poor agricultural production. Coupled with resettlement this structure resulted in social and economic deprivation for the majority of South Africans. Resettlement was the culmination of reserve structure being more seriously enforced, and as the numbers on the land increased so too did the underdevelopment of these people.

Since 1994 and incorporation of the homelands into South Africa, this structure has not changed. Land percentages and the nature of land holding in the former reserves was expected to change, as the 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy came into play. However, the inconsistencies in this policy will arguably inhibit such change. The nature and timing of the transition to democratic rule meant that various compromises were made. These compromises have affected how timeously changes with regard to land took place and will continue to take place.

In Glenmore there is to this day a great deal of uncertainty as to the ownership and administration of land. The planned irrigation schemes for the flat land alongside the Fish River have been held back over uncertainty over the nature of land holding and ownership.(Kingwill: 1997). People still do not have enough land to partake in viable, subsistence agriculture. There are no border industries and migrant labour is very much a part of their lives. It is a situation that resembles the initial state of the reserves and is related directly to the previous State's rationale for territorial segregation.

This thesis has thus argued that until the structure of rural South Africa (the reserves) is adjusted to allow the majority a 'fair' share of land, the story of underdevelopment in places such as Glenmore will continue. At the most basic level there needs to be a certain degree of certainty as to land ownership and the nature of land holding in the former reserves for genuine development to take place. Of course, the policies may very well be in place to affect such changes, but as has been shown to be the case with the 1997 White Paper on Land Policy, there are inconsistencies which will make positive change more illusive than was expected.

The study shows that there is a gap between policy and practice, which serves to keep the reserves as they were prior to 1994. The spirit of reconciliation and negotiations had served to change the ideal of democracy at a central governing level, whilst that held by the people was left intact. The people were offered that which it became impossible to deliver. The concrete form of democracy that has come into being is similar to apartheid rule, in that it serves to entrench segregation, but on an economic level. Protecting the market whilst at grass root level the people are still waiting, and dreaming of the democracy that the government promised it could deliver.

A clear example of these contradictions caught in policy is the White Paper on Land Policy. The government has said that it is committed to a genuine land reform programme. However the programme that is encapsulated in this White Paper is market driven, "on a willing-seller willing-buyer basis" (Department of Land Affairs, 1997). Again the government has tried to link efficiency with equity in this document and it is proving to be a much harder task in practice than it seemed on paper. This is evidenced by the fact that the 30% in five years redistribution figure has finally been dropped as it was never going to be met if efficiency of the market was a priority.

Interviews, focus group meetings and community meetings attended.

Agriculture.

This section contains the questions posed to those involved in some way in agriculture in Glenmore. The aim is to investigate the present state of agriculture (with particular regard to small-scale subsistence agriculture), the recent developments and the foreseen possibilities. All of those involved in interviews have a 'food plot', as they are referred to in Glenmore. The size of the food plot as measured using builders tape:- 40m x 43m. These are positioned in a fenced enclosure situated behind Glenmore, roughly half a km away from the village. Each house in Glenmore is allocated one food plot, which are for several residents the chief means of production.

Name:- Phillip Skidd Bonisile.

Age:- Pensioner.

Where were you originally from, and were you a farmer there? I was moved to Glenmore in 1979, from Colchester. I was doing just jobs I had no full time work. I was not farming but I was growing some few things in my garden, just to eat, like a spinach and some maize.

What do you use this food plot for, to make money or just to eat? These things I grow are just for eating. *Mr. Bonisile's was one of the very few plots which was in use.* My donkeys had carried water and I have half my plot planted with cabbage, spinach and a few pineapple. All of which is for subsistence. I own no other animals and that is why I must work here so hard or I will not eat.

In your opinion is the soil in the area good for agriculture? The soil is good but I do not have any implements to work with and without water the soil is hard. For me I would like to plough, so I need tools and support or help from department of agriculture.

I would also like to keep some animals but our yards are too small for me to keep anything but my donkeys. If I want to do farming seriously then I must have more space.

Is there enough water? There are many problems with my situation here and my plot, there is no water because the engine is still not pumping. Not because there is no water, but because the engine is not pumping.

In your opinion what is the biggest setback to agricultural development? I think we will never make much out of the land because we do not own the piece of plot given to us. There is still confusion amongst the people as to who the land belongs to. This means that people are not willing to make much out of land that is not theirs.

Since 1994, when people voted has much changed here in Glenmore? Since 1994, nothing much has changed from what it used to be . The government is still far away from our needs. We have many things here we have water and we have some land, but we do not have some help to organise ourselves. We are a lost community.

Name:- Mrs. Nolindiwe Majamani.

Age:-She was not a pensioner. But receives a grant for a dead husband.

Where were you originally from, and were you a farmer there? Moved to Glenmore in 1979, from just outside Grahamstown. I was not farming, my husband had a job and then when he died I was planting a little like I do now , but also surviving on a grant.

What do you use this food plot for, to make money or just to eat? Now there is nothing planted in my food plot , but in August I would be planting maize, sweet potatoes, pumpkin and cabbages. My family lives on what I am planting and what decides to grow here. But the piece of land is not big enough to make a good living off of it. If there is a tractor for R40 then there is water I can grow enough to eat and to feed some chickens and pigs.

Again she stressed the need for implements and fertilizers, we want to plant so that we can eat but it is hard to plant without tools and it is hard for things to grow without fertilizers..

Name:-Mr. Van Vol.

Age:-fifty years of age, He is not a pensioner.

Where were you originally from, and when were you moved to Glenmore? He was moved to Glenmore in 1979 from Alexandria.

Do you survive solely on the food plot, or do you have other means of subsistence? Apart from working on the food plots I am also a basket maker .

What do you use this food plot for, to make money or just to eat? But in my plot I am growing cabbage, maize spinach and tomatoes, this is still not enough to feed my family. Because seed costs money and I do not make enough money from selling baskets anymore, so I do not have enough seed.

What are the problems with regards to water in Glenmore? The biggest problem is that there is water but no-one is fixing the engine so there is no water, this happens a lot these last few years.

In your opinion is the soil in the area good for agriculture? This is a problem because the land here in these food plots is good and when I plant everything grows, but it needs to be ploughed deeper with a proper plough discs.

What other problems do you experience with regard to your food plot? My biggest needs is tools , like forks and spades so that my plot can be worked easier.

In your opinion what is the biggest set back to agricultural development? Other than the problem with water is the fact that the food plots are not big enough, there is not enough space to make a good living off of the plots. Sometimes there is not even enough to feed my family because the plots are too small.

Since 1994, when people voted has much changed here in Glenmore? Since 1994 and democracy, for me personally I think that here in Glenmore nothing has changed much . I voted in 1994 and now in 1999, but things are just getting worse. Look there is the pump, these days that thing is either broken or not pumping properly, the piping is damaged, so the soil is getting bad and losing the nutrients and getting hard. The harder I work here now the less and less I get.

Name:- Sorry Arendse,

Age:- estimated own age to be about 80yrs:- Pensioner.

Where were you originally from, and were you a farmer there? Orange grove, I was moved as late as 1996, when the neighboring game reserve was being established. I was working on a farm but only for seasonal jobs, I used to grow some food. In Glenmore I have one food plot,*[which at the time of interviewing was in disuse. He was waiting for a tractor which would be on hire for forty Rand so that he could plough..]*

What do you use this food plot for, to make money or just to eat? I grow maize or potatoes and beans. He mentioned that there is a community restriction on multi cropping on the same plot. None of this is for sale, there is not enough space on the plots to plant lots of crops even if multi cropping were allowed. We use the things we grow to mainly feed our chickens and pigs. Yet before this year we could get something to eat from the plots.

In your opinion is the soil in the area good for agriculture? The soil is fertile enough although when the government used to provide fertilizers things grew better. *He would like the new government to provide them with tractors seeds and fertilizer if they are to grow anything. Also needs transport and markets.*

What are the problems with regard to water in Glenmore? *There was also at this time no water being pumped to the food plots, although there is an engine and piping. Maintenance has been sloppy and thus there is no water.*

Since 1994, when people voted has much changed here in Glenmore? Since 1994 things for us here have got worse , there is plenty confusion as to who should be running things. I mean we don't know who should be doing what, especially with regard to our water in the food plots.

What is the biggest setback to agricultural development? Well for me there are many problems the biggest is for me that we do not have enough land and because of this we do not have a real chance of doing something for ourselves. We must live on a pension or someones wages but we can not be really farmers.

Name:- Mr. Tatase Xundulu.

Age:- 46, Security guard at the clinic.

Mr. Xundulu has lived in Glenmore since 1979, and was moved from Alexandria. I questioned him because he had a large and successful home garden probably the biggest of its kind within Glenmore, most of the other families only planted in the food plots. The garden plots are merely the extra space if any in the residents' residential sites.

Why do you keep the garden, what do you do with the produce collected from your garden? I am very interested in agriculture, because if you do it properly like me then you can save a lot of money. I do not sell any of my produce but we eat it at home. The food plots used to work to feed people, but only just about, they were never really that efficient. Most people like me have a few pigs, chickens and maybe some goats, to try to make living easier.

Why don't you work on the food plots? I don't work in the food plots because I think that my home garden is more successful because the water I use, and the soil is better, the water up there has too much salt. The soil also is not too good, although some of the plots closer to the pump house have good soil.

Since 1994, when people voted has much changed here in Glenmore? Since 1994 there has not been much change in agriculture , if I am not mistaken things have just got worse. For example help was given in the form of fertilizer and seed at the food plots by Provincial Government but this stopped in 1998. If we are allowed to move to the site of the old Glenmore perhaps agriculture can be better. We can grow citrus, and with the help of extension services and education Glenmore can survive on agriculture

What other problems do you see within the community? The problem also is that the food plots belong to the community we want to own our own land. We want to own even our homes, like my TV it is mine I have papers.

Water supply.

Name:- Mr. M Nonyande.

How long have you been in Glenmore? *Has been stationed at Glenmore since 1997 and is employed by the Amatola Water Board, who had taken over responsibility at the first of July 1999.* The plant opened in 1986, Initially we were getting water from the Fish river but this water was too brackish and so we were cut off. We now get a mix of water from the Orange river and the Fish river, via a channel.

The food plots on the other hand are getting water from the line itself, Glenboyd. The pump to take water out to the plots was run by ULIMOCO. It is not working now due to electrical problems, it needs attention as it is very old. Due to mechanical faults I don't see this thing lasting much longer. At the moment there is a great deal of anger over this pump situation, since now only the closer plots can get a supply of water and thus those who own the further plots are complaining bitterly. Thus it has been decided the if only some can get water then none should get water and the closer plots do not get water from the line. Last year when the pump stopped working people were unable to plough as the soil in this region is very hard when dry.

What are the problems with regard to water in Glenmore? The main problem with regard to the situation with water, is that there is a problem of maintenance of small things like a pump. At least now it is better since Amatola water board took over from the department of water affairs. The Amatola Board is much better at providing services.

Yet here in Glenmore we need a bigger plant. At Ndwayana they are irrigating as they have pressure but here we have no pressure and thus need to pump. For me it is a question of planning, this place was not planned very well, especially were they put this water station in relation to the food plots. It is always green here when the pump is working and these people need the plots as a source of livelihood. You can't just settle people where there is no source of livelihood. Another problem is the sewerage system, I mean there is water but not yet a proper system and all the houses are in an arranged fashion, in summer the system we have now is very unhygienic.

We need financial and technical assistance to run that pump. It seems as if the government has isolated these people, we can't have a thing like that.

Focus group meeting with Mr. Kom, his son Sonwabo, Bongani Mclimba, Nosipho Radu and Mr. Xundulu.

During this focus group meeting I asked those present to explain to me the state of agriculture in Glenmore and the problems and possible solutions. Those selected are all long standing residents of Glenmore, and are in some way involved with its development. It shall be written in paragraph form and it should be remembered that all those mentioned above have access to a food plot. Also that since this was an open discussion it will be futile, both time and space wise to quote individuals.

The general consensus amongst the participants was that although there were not many home gardens in Glenmore,(a home garden being defined as the small piece of land which some people cultivate within the settlement and not in the region of the food plots) those that put effort in to this form of farming for subsistence could make enough not to have to go to the food plots, or to supplement that which they got from the plots. However as Mr. Kom pointed out not all the houses in Glenmore have enough space to make a reasonable home garden. Also depending on the number of people in the family and number of houses in Glenmore (Mr. Kom has three homes in Glenmore, all of which come with a food plot. The houses are not his per se but belong to family members or friend who are not staying in Glenmore, he thus farms their plots.) So the expected gains from the food plots could very well differ from household to household. For instance Nosipho does not involve herself in agriculture, for her it is more viable to engage in small business, she sells fruit and snacks from her home, and is also the dealer for card electricity in Glenmore. Farming is thus not undertaken on a widespread basis. And those who can make a better living doing other things are not farming seriously. For Mr. Xundulu, his food plot was no longer viable as the soil has deteriorated so badly. For him his home garden is very successful, and together with his nightwatchman job at the clinic he is making ends meet. He feels sorry for those middle age people who are depending on their foodplots without another job, it is hard. The food plots are very small and they cannot grow enough crops on those pieces of land to live well. There has been no money given to the people since 1996 for implements and seed, and therefore farming in Glenmore is at its worst, especially since the pump has not been working. For these people the saddest thing to do with agriculture in their village is that just across the Fish River there are large white farms which are always green always with water, why can't their land be so productive, it would make things much easier.

For them the solution was for the government to help them in some way, either educate them as to how they should be farming, give them tools, tractors, seeds and fertilizers. Or to simply extend their land holdings in the food plots and fix up the irrigation system. They say that they have all the resources, water, land and labour, they need to be shown how best to use these before it is too late and these resources are wasted.

Related observations at the food plots.

There is a pump station to irrigate the food plots, water is available, however the pump was at the time not working.

There was also a great deal of dilapidated equipment, such as plastic piping, aluminum piping, zinc sheeting, etc.

There is also a large zinc store room, no longer really in use, as pointed out by my guide.

Glenmore has all the infrastructure and a great deal of resources, human, water and land, but these are not being used to their full potential due to the fact that there is no one to service or maintain the equipment. It also seems as if people don't really have a choice, agriculture is an essential supplement to their livelihoods, but they need to have bigger plots of land to make a suitable living and they also need to have the assurance of owning the land. This will give them the motivation to work harder at agriculture and make it a viable wage of earning a living.

Administration.

This section contains all the interviews with those in some way involved in the administration of Glenmore, and the meetings attended between various groups of administration. The aim was to investigate the current state of administration, community cohesion and participation, and to examine these with particular reference to development efforts of these various organizations.

Name:- Mr. Mgcini Wopa.

Age:-48yrs.

Where were you originally from and when were you moved? Was moved from the Albany district, to Glenmore in 1979.

Occupation and position held in Glenmore? *Interviewed in his capacity of a long standing resident of Glenmore and , Chairperson of the Glenmore development Forum and the secretary of the interim committee.*

What is the nature of local administration in Glenmore? The Glenmore development forum was formed in 1995, yet collapsed soon after this , reformed in January of 1999. It includes all organisations in Glenmore :- ANC, PAC, Farmers association, youth development, women's league, interim committee. And operates with the intention of improving the opportunities of those in Glenmore. We are not fully responsible for administration in Glenmore but are involved in a process of development and upliftment.

The functions of the Development Forum is to empower the community with skills and create self reliance and to develop the human resources. At the moment they are trying to reorganise the community as there is much administrative chaos and conflict around the status of Glenmore. The most current issue is as mentioned the status of Glenmore, are we a village or a township, do we fall under a TLC, or a TRC. The forum is busy discussing these issues with the local government in Peddie.

We would also like to see the revival of the irrigation scheme which collapsed in 1994. Ulimoco used to run the schemes under the Tyefu Irrigation Scheme.

Ownership of land is indeed a big issue, in 1997 we had begun to arrange certain land reform attempts, however these were stopped by internal conflict. At the moment all the land is state land. We also tried at one stage to form a trust to lease the land from government this too failed due to internal wrangling, over questions of leadership and power.

Was 1994 a turning point for Glenmore? Since 1994 there is no change, instead the conflict developed, not the community. In 1995 we had electricity installed through the card system , 1996 saw the pipeline from the Orange river installed, for the connection to Glenmore the Glenmore community authority was responsible, 1997 the Ixuba Conservation and Economic Forum was started by the ISER. This was perhaps for me the only really positive step, although it is taking long to see results. ISER did some research around the possible co-operation with the neighboring game reserve. Glenmore is now a member of this Ixuba conservation forum, with the objectives of establishing co-operation with the game reserve to assist and empower the communities around the game reserve. There are good links between the ISER and Glenmore but we need more action and less talk people want to see results. In 1998 some people were selected and trained in Grahamstown, to run small businesses but we have not been advised of the results.

What is relationship like with local Government? We are under the Amatola District council which is in Bisho. But at the moment there is no change on the cards. what's happening is that we are still discussing status. Local government referred us to the local TRC in Peddie. Glenmore is demarcated in the Peddie district. Meetings started with the TRC in 1998 but still there is no definite answer as to the status of Glenmore. However the problem lies within the community it is quite clear that the community must unite first. I think the community must choose to be rural or urban. You see we have both a rural and an urban background in Glenmore/ we are urban and rural living together, that is the way we were moved, yet in demarcation we are rural. We have good opportunities for agriculture, yet the layout is urban. What is needed now is for local government to assist us.

What are the main administrative problems in Glenmore? The first and most important problem is ownership. You see here, I own this house yet I don't have title deeds. Of course this is standing in the way of development. Also the land, we don't own our own land. The land we occupy is state land. Even these food plots we are working, we are not sure, we don't have these title deeds. All this uncertainty leads to blockages for development. Maintenance and services are another administrative problem, streetlights, it is very difficult for me to say that people must pay for these services when there are no jobs again here we need help from the government.

Another big thing standing in the way of proper administration and development is the community cohesion. Before 1994 people were united, there was no issue of status and there was no section 21 company. These conflicts started after 1994, and the main issue of conflict was the section 21 company that was formed in 1995. This is where things went wrong and this issue was never fully explained to the community, now these allegations of mismanagement of funds leads to conflict within the community. There is thus lots of conflict, all stemming from section 21, there are those in the community that are for the section 21 and those against it. Also affecting this cohesion as I mentioned is the status of Glenmore. As I said we are discussing our status with local government at the moment, yet here there are again two groups: those who want administrative functions to be taken over by the TLC and those that want to fall under the TRC.

Name:- Mr. Jalisile Mqikela.

Age: 27.

Where were you originally from, and when were you moved? Originally from Seven Fountains, moved, or rather, dumped on the road in 1979.

Occupation and position held in Glenmore? *Interviewed in his capacity as Chairperson of the Interim Committee and secretary of the Development Forum and involved in Eastern Cape small business unit (Glenmore branch).*

What is the nature of local administration in Glenmore? At the moment we are trying to get organised administratively. However, we have lots to overcome, there has been a great deal of fraud, vandalism and theft related to the administration in Glenmore, for example a community vehicle was burned in 1996, large amounts of money have disappeared and positions of power have been used for personal gain. Yet, the Interim Committee and Development Forum are trying to work together to resolve our administrative impasse.

Was 1994 a turning point for Glenmore? Yes, it was a turning point because there was too much conflict, but there was also new blood in the administration. My saddest thing is that around the time and just after the elections ANC activists were keen to educate us as to how to vote and about municipalities, they haven't been back, to educate us that is. It was also a turning point because people thought that we could control our own destiny, we were wrong. For example, as funds dried up agriculture dried up, there were no seeds, no tractors and we had a debt to Eskom, this meant that Glenmore began dry up as well. We realised we need financial assistance without this we cannot control our lives.

What is relationship like with local Government? As Chairperson of the Interim Committee we wish to have a good relationship with government. Our plan of action however, is to find out which government organisation or which level of government we are to be in contact with. Since, if we don't know our status then it is impossible to know which area of government we fall under. So far we have attended many meetings with local government. In fact since 1994 we reported the mismanagement of funds to them and because there was internal strife in Glenmore government and their auditors were unable to stop this money being used in the wrong way. In 1997 and 1998 local government came many times to advise us of the advantages and disadvantages of TLC Vs TRC, yet this was not done thoroughly and even I am a little confused as to the differences between these and where Glenmore fits in. Because of this Masifunde advised us to form Glenmore Development Forum. The plan here was to educate people about status i.e. tell them about TLC's and TRC's. This was done through work shops and people agreed they were under a TRC. However, the section 21 company also adds confusion and many people believe that falling under a TLC would be better. Thus from 1995 to 1999 we have been discussing this issue of status and still we have no official status. We have no title deeds, nothing, we don't

know what we are. We cannot get a loan from a bank and even NGO's say that leave Glenmore aside since they have no status.

What are the main administrative problems related to development in Glenmore?

Communication is the biggest problem. As you see there is conflict within the community over our status, thus there is no communication amongst us. There is also no communication with local government for example government says that the rural areas life blood lies in agriculture yet our irrigation infrastructure sits idle. We are also unsure about the land we are working on. We work on the land but it belongs to the state, we need ownership of the land. We have the infrastructure, so why don't local government use it, or help us use it.

Name:- Mr. Mzimkhulu Nkone

Age:- 27yrs

Where were you originally from, and when were you moved? Moved to Glenmore in 1979 from Coega.

Occupation and position held in Glenmore? *Interviewed in his capacity as Chairperson of the ANC youth league, organiser of the youth development committee and Chairman of the community policing forum. Thus is also on the development forum. He told me that there are no other political parties active in Glenmore , and although they were invited to take part in the development forum no parties came forward thus the only political party taking part is the ANC.*

What is the nature of local administration in Glenmore? At the moment one might see no changes as far as admin is concerned, but we have been given a chance since 1994 to make those changes that we as a community think we need to make. There has been a lot of conflict between the people in Glenmore since the first elections. Some were ready to take over , but did it in the wrong way so we had various factions arguing for power. At the moment we have the so called interim committee and the development forum that are the main bodies who are trying to sort out the administrative problems and our relationship with the new government .

Was 1994 a turning point for Glenmore? There were many changes since 1994, for instance we the youth fought for a sports ground, we got it, although it was not exactly what we had hoped for but we got one after making ourselves heard at all the meetings. There has also been a community hall built since 1994, it is used for weddings and funerals and the like. In 1994 we also got responsibilities, with democracy came the responsibility to run our own affairs which many people did not know how to do,

this is why we are forever waiting for the government in this place. Too many of the people here do not know how to use this responsibility.

What is relationship like with local Government? Ah well this is another problem, we do not see as much as we need to of local government. They haven't been to the community to really hear our needs, usually they are just assuming what are our needs. For example the highlight, when this thing fell it damaged some property and needed to be urgently removed . We reported this to the TRC, they didn't respond we went to them twice to ask for some help or just advice, still no response. We then finally after much running about went to public works who removed the light.

What are the main administrative problems related to development in Glenmore? For me the main problem that stops development in Glenmore is the split in the community between those who want to be under the TRC or TLC, this has caused too many problems. And there was a stage that also within Glenmore no-one knew who was in charge of what. At the moment we are still in the process of building committees who will be responsible for the whole community. As part of the ANC I think that we have a lot to do in this place. Because of the previous scandals of corruption the people in Glenmore would rather work with the government. I think that the present government has community support. What we should do is allow the Amatola district council to audit our books, then we need to start over as a community, we can move from there. There is lots of hope in Glenmore people in the community want to be in the forefront of change yet I think that they need to be given some direction. Like the youth are very interested in what's happening in Glenmore. Those who cant leave to go to the towns want this place to get better. We can make Glenmore better, but only if we work together young and old.

Name:- Mrs. Patricia Ndise.

Occupation and position held in Glenmore? *Interviewed in her capacity as the Chairperson of the ANC women's league which was formed in Glenmore in 1995.* It aims to help and support those women who are in need and to uplift women as a whole in the community.

Was 1994 a turning point for Glenmore? I for one have not seen so much changes in Glenmore since 1994. For us women the greatest change is that we don't pay at the clinic, and the government had started giving bread[1 slice] to school children. But nothing really in terms of widespread development. Yet there is lots of women trying to get involved and they are the ones really trying.

What are the main administrative problems related to development in Glenmore? The government promised that there would be delivery but until now there has been nothing, this is a problem because the people will lose faith in the new government. There is no action just words. People have lost hope or are losing it fast too many promises have been broken. I think that people need employment and opportunities to survive, farming is not going very well here because there is not enough land and most of us are living off one wage or somebody's pension. We can do manual labour, fixing the roads etc. We also need lots of communication between our committees here and the government to solve our problems. Overall I am not happy as not enough women are given the chance to make things better, we need to get things started in the home, educating the people in terms of development and governance. *(She herself did not know about the section 21 company or the problems to do with the status of Glenmore).*

Name:- Miss Nosipho Radu.

Age:-26.

Where are you originally from, and when were you moved? Originally from Conaught Farm, moved to Glenmore in 1985. *Since this interview she has left Glenmore to find work.*

Occupation and position held in Glenmore? *Unemployed and interviewed in her capacity as member of the Development Forum, secretary of the Interim Committee. Also previously involved with Masifunde.*

What is the nature of local administration in Glenmore? At the moment the interim committee and the development forum are the only two administrative bodies functioning within Glenmore. However, you don't really see what is being provided. So far what we have done is to assess the development needs and attempt to plan for future development.

The interim committee has tried to unite the community yet needs to get more community input. Since the maladministration in the past people are not so interested, most adults and older people have lost hope in the administration, they have no faith.

Was 1994 a turning point for Glenmore? 1994 was a turning point as there has been lots of organisations in conflict for power in Glenmore. Therefore this has restricted development, even outside organisations have kept their distance. Another vital change is that for me there have been more and more people leaving Glenmore, kids going to school in the urban areas whilst the older generation dies off and

my generation goes to town to look for work. Glenmore is dying. We thought that after 1994 we would get irrigation, municipal jobs, and NGO projects but none of this has happened.

What is relationship like with local Government? There is no real relationship as they always tell us about transport problems when we ask them to come here, and not our whole committee can go there, but our development forum goes to Peddie more often than they come here. The main reason or need for us to communicate is the status of Glenmore. However, we still don't know since 1994 who is responsible or who should be running Glenmore.

What are the main administrative problems in Glenmore? The main administrative problem is that although there has been many questionnaires and surveys by ISER and Masifunde there has been no one to carry out or to thoroughly organise this information into reality. The reason for this being the conflict. Also government themselves seem to be confused as to what they want us to do.

Name:- Mr. Fikile Ntethe.

Age:-27.

Occupation, and position held in Glenmore:- Reserve policeman at Tyefu police station, Member of Glenmore development forum in his capacity as Secretary of Glenmore agricultural development, GLAD. Who are primarily involved in trying to re-open the irrigation scheme, which involved Glenmore and Ndwayana Villages. I questioned him mainly about the administration in Glenmore. And how this has effected agriculture if at all.

What is the nature of local administration in Glenmore? In 1994 The Glenmore community authority was in charge of the overall administration of Glenmore including the irrigation scheme. They built us a crèche, a football ground and a community office.

1995 the scheme was stopped, 1996, Glenmore transformation committee with the help of Glenmore property protectors took over accusing the GCA of mismanagement of funds, funds which came from the previous government. We have got no funding from the present government.

Prior to 1994 there was some anxiety as to what would happen to the funds of Glenmore the predominant opinion of the leaders was that they would be taken by the new ANC government.

Therefore upon the advice of a consultant they were informed to create a section 21 company. This is where the mal administration began, Money was given to each household in December of 1996, even those who had moved out of Glenmore came to collect this R1500.

1997 tried starting a case against the transformation committee. They were ousted from the office for two weeks by the interim committee, and auditors called in only to find that all the paperwork had been removed. These auditors and government officials were told lies and chased out of Glenmore, so too was local government when they came to talk to the locals to investigate the bad blood in the community. By 1998 the transformation committee had stopped going to the office.

Was 1994 a turning point for Glenmore? For me the 1994 elections have meant one thing and one thing only, disaster, as there was too much confusion as to our future and those in office were scared of losing their position. Many people thought things would get better but since the Trust /company was formed there has been no accountability and even today the fact that so much money was wasted creates conflict among the community. For agriculture this has been bad as now there is no trust of numerous initiatives as the community thinks that those in charge have something to gain, we need to create this trust and come together if agriculture is to work.

Meetings attended with various administrative bodies in Glenmore.

Meeting of development forum. The development forum was set up after advice from Masifunde. It is a forum which brings together all the major stakeholders in Glenmore, who have development objectives or administrative functions.

Present:-

ANC Representatives in Glenmore.

Interim Committee.

Education.

Farmers association.

Youth Development.

Women's Interest Groups.

Eastern Cape small business unit.

Agenda:- The meeting was being held to discuss the most recent development initiatives and the plan of action for the future.

This began with a report back on the previous meeting with the TRC and the position with regard to the status of Glenmore. The question still being posed was, What is Glenmore, a village or a township, rural or urban, TRC or TLC?

All the major stake holders were informed that the TRC had suggested that there is a pressing need to go to the people in the community to see what it is they want. The people need to be informed and educated such that they can make an informed decision. As to the status of Glenmore it was decided that a general community meeting needed to be held to gauge what it was that the community wanted. It was mentioned also that the government would need the community to decide clearly as to what was the position with the section 21 company. It was called the Glenmore community trust and yet the community themselves are not members. The TRC had made it quite clear that they would be unable to give money to a private company for community development. Thus the status of the village and its involvement with the section 21 company had, and continued to jeopardise their development. It was also something that all stakeholders regarded as the main issue for the development forum to overcome.

The most recent development initiative was the proposed building of a funeral parlor. Various applications had been put in as to who was to run this business, and where it was to be situated. Questions as to who was to benefit, the community or the individual were also raised, how many jobs were expected to be created, and the associated costs. None of these was answered in full although it was stated that if this was to go ahead then there must be definite gains for the community. It was decided that the forum would have to go back to their respective interest groups within the community to inform them as to the options they have as a community. Yet it was also pointed out that this forum was already representative and thus were in a position to make decisions for the people. And that nothing would get done if they were constantly going back to the community at large for them to decide. The development forum Jalisile said needed to show the community some action and not spend too much time talking.

The last item of business was the vandalism of post boxes which had been taking place recently. Some boxes are now not working as they had been forced open and damaged, it was mentioned that there was a definite need of security. The boxes were the initial responsibility of the RDP programme, and yet now with no-one doing anything to safeguard or maintain them this had fallen on the community. It was now up to the development forum, and its members of the main stakeholders in Glenmore to educate the youth about the importance of these boxes and also monitor the boxes.

After discussing these issues at length, with no definite solutions given, it was decided to hold another meeting soon after the general community meeting where they would get the community's input on all

these issues. The meeting was then closed with a prayer from the Chairman of the Glenmore Agricultural development forum.

Meeting of all major stake holders and local government.

Present:-

Amatola district councilor- Mr. Somyo.

Chairman of the TRC.

Interim committee.

Development forum.

Women's League.

Commission of five!

Glenmore Agricultural development forum.

The administration in Glenmore had asked for advice on the following issues.

Status of Glenmore, Section 21 company, Alleged mismanagement of funds , prospects for development.

There had also been a number of written complaints received from one Mr. Mafani, who had single-handedly set up the commission of five, he was most interested in prosecuting those who had allegedly misused funds in Glenmore, under the pretense of administering these funds. However at the beginning of the meeting Mr. Mafani was not present.

The question of status was said to be one which can easily be resolved through the process of communication. The community was said by local government to have to decide. There was also the question of legal demarcation, which would mean that perhaps Glenmore would not in fact have a choice.

However this issue was not fully covered by the local government representatives. It was left as the priority of those in Glenmore, they were to canvass support from the community to back up what it was they wanted.

As to the section 21 company which had been formed prior to the 1994 elections, it was stated that there were too many bad implications surrounding this. Local government said that Glenmore had enclosed themselves by doing all this. They had distanced themselves from government and held back their own development due to the conflict this company had brought with it. The solution suggested was to look carefully at this company and if need be dissolve the said company. The section 21 does indeed allow Glenmore to raise funds but it also needs checks and balances, also human resource development so that you have competent people handling money.

With regards to the general development of Glenmore it was stated that there is good infrastructure in Glenmore, and that they as a community need to use this. People are responsible for themselves, Glenmore has water and lots of it. There fore Agriculture must be the way forward. However The Amatola District Councilor stated very clearly that government would no longer pour in money and other resources where there is no community involvement and commitment. A new beginning was needed for Glenmore. And with this there is the need to formalise the roles of the numerous committees. There are a number of development prospects in Glenmore , but there is also too much conflict. and we as local government need to deal with a collective that is accountable to the community , not individuals who have problems with other individuals.

Mr. Mafani who came late then raise some issues of his so called commission.

He sidetracked the meeting by asking where the 26 million Rand that was in Glenmore had got to. This caused the meeting to fall apart somewhat as Mr. Mafani called for Glenmore to be audited, in fact for the Heath Commission to investigate the old administration. It was obvious from the support that he received that this issue has long died down and the majority in Glenmore are looking forward unlike Mr. Mafani who is determined to remain in the past. It was at this junction that Mr. Somyo answered saying that it was these outbursts that had shattered the community spirit. And that it was obvious that the community was being misled by such vindictive factions.

It was also stated that Mr. Mafani had missed the main part of the meeting and as such could not really expect others to sit and listen whilst the same aspects were discussed.

(After the meeting I asked around about the Commission Of five only to find out that it is simply Mr. Mafani and several unelected school leavers with matric that are in this commission. Many said that it was just a personal vendetta and even the other members were not really aware as to the function of the Commission.

Finally the meeting came to an end with local government promising to keep in touch and also making the statement that the future and the solutions to all the problems discussed lie in Glenmore. And they must take more responsibility for their community and themselves.

Also visited the clinic; where although allowed to look around denied an interview with the sister in charge.

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