


The teenagers of Tumahole




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


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The nature of *Work In Progress*, which is to stimulate debate and present views on a wide range of issues, ensures that the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the editorial collective.

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On January 11, South Africa's minister of home affairs and of communications, Stoffel Botha, warned *Work In Progress* that an examination of the publication was underway in terms of state of emergency regulations.

Over a year before, Botha had warned *WIP* that unless it ceased 'systematic publication of subversive propaganda', he would act against it.

The January 11 warning involved possible closure of *WIP* for up to six months, or imposing a pre-publication censor - a state official with powers to censor the contents of the publication.

Over the next weeks, enormous support was expressed for *WIP* and its publishing policy. This came from editors of mainstream newspapers, trade unions, political organisations, religious bodies and a host of other interests and organisations.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions noted that 'censorship of *WIP* is a direct attempt to stifle free and open debate, and to prevent the flow of information so vital to the building of democracy'. The National Union of Mineworkers said that 'every issue of *WIP* that does not come out will be a loss to our members', while the National Council of Trade Unions referred to the publication's 'intelligent and fearless analysis of the political, social and labour trends in our country'.

From within the media world, *Business Day* editor Ken Owen spoke of *WIP* as a 'reliable, intelligent and ethically impeccable publication', while Tertius Myburgh of the *Sunday Times* called *WIP* 'an invaluable source of information which deserves to be heard by all who are interested in serious affairs in South Africa'.

Representatives of foreign governments strongly condemned proposed action against *WIP* and other publications, and a number made direct representations to the South African government.

Two weeks after Botha's warning, *WIP* responded to his threat of closure in a 40-page memorandum dealing with the emergency regulations in general, and the nature of the publication in particular. Botha turned down a suggestion that he meet with a delegation from the publication - and then a blanket of silence descended.

By mid-February, two publications warned at the same time as *WIP* had been suspended for three months, and *WIP* began pushing Botha to respond

to the representations made.

Finally, on March 2, Botha's office informed *WIP*'s publishers that no action was being contemplated in terms of the media emergency regulations.

It is not for *WIP* to speculate on why the minister has chosen to act against some publications, and not others. The media emergency regulations involve arbitrary decisions and personal opinion. There is little point in seeking logic within arbitrariness.

But it is worthwhile re-stating *WIP*'s position on publishing: that not only do all South Africans have the right to be fully and accurately informed by a wide range of opinions, debates and analyses and reporting. In addition, freedom of speech of its nature guarantees the right of publication - and the right of readers to be exposed to diversity and contradiction.

WIP has always been happy to allow readers to make their own choices on the basis of a wide range of information and views. This is the opposite of propaganda, which seeks to impose one view while suppressing others. In this battle for survival with the ministry of home affairs *WIP* has no doubt which side supports the publication of systematic propaganda.

This edition of *WIP* is unavoidably late - held back until the outcome of the threatened closure had been finalised.

No action is currently contemplated against the publication in terms of media emergency regulations at present - although the state still has much in its arsenal.

But *WIP* intends surviving - and sees a long-term future for its publishing programme. One part of this future is financial stability - a crucial component of independent publishing.

Ensuring financial stability, together with ever-increasing costs in paper, printing, reproduction and postage have forced *WIP* to raise its rates. But these increases are modest - way below rates of inflation - and in some cases are the first for over three years.

The editors thank all those who supported *WIP* in its most-recent battle for survival - and look forward to ongoing and increasing support from the most important component of any publication: its readers.



A Swapo Youth League rally in October 1988 - their message is very clear

The bumps along Namibia's road to freedom

As Namibia lurches towards independence, several issues have emerged which could impede a smooth transition in the months ahead. The following is a brief outline of some of the points of disagreement, accompanied by quotes from some of the key actors in the Namibian settlement plan:

1 South Africa is insisting that the voting age be 21 years, not 18. Swapo and the Namibian National Students' Organisation (Nanso) say this is a ploy to exclude the thousands of militant youth activists who support the liberation movement.

* SA Administrator General Louis Pienaar: 'In South Africa, the term adult means people over 21. As far as I am concerned, the voting age should be 21'.

* Nanso President Paul Kalenga: 'Probably 30 percent of the voting population is aged between 18 and 21, and the majority are politicised activists working in the Swapo Youth League and in Nanso - they are militant Swapo members. South Africa is trying to exclude these people from voting, lowering the number of votes for Swapo'.

* Swapo Deputy National Chairperson Dan Tjongarero: 'They know this age group is a militant pro-Swapo portion of the population: one has to ask whether the election will still be free and fair if this is accepted'.

2 South Africa is insisting that the qualifying period of residence for voting be as short as possible. There is evidence that Unita rebel troops and South African troops are being registered as 'citizens' to boost the anti-Swapo vote.

* Pienaar: 'My own choice is to make the residence period as short as possible, something like 12 months'.

* Executive of the Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN): 'Unita members are being issued with Namibian citizenship to enable them to vote against Swapo'.

* Tjongarero (speaking at a Swapo rally in Windhoek): 'Attempts are being made to enlarge the numbers of those who are going to vote for the enemy in the elections, to make sure

Swapo does not get a two thirds majority (and be able to be the outright government). Many of the South African troops who have done military service here have been issued with Namibian identity documents'.

3 The notorious Koevoet counter insurgency unit - 'credited' with 70 percent of all guerilla deaths and allegedly responsible for some of the worst atrocities in the war - has supposedly been disbanded and its members integrated into the regular police force. But there is ample evidence (including some seen by this writer) that the members of the unit have simply donned new uniforms. The 3 000 Koevoet men will form almost half the Namibian police force of 6 300 assigned to 'maintain law and order' in the transition process.

* Pienaar: 'Koevoet no longer exists. The unit has dissolved completely, and the men have been sent for retraining (as regular policemen). Some could not be retrained, and they will not have the rank of policemen with powers of arrest'.

* Major General Dolf Gouws, commissioner of the SWA Police: 'Swapo were not the enemy, they were criminals. All criminals are the enemy of the police, and when they stop being criminals, they are no

longer the enemy ... Everybody in this unit was a policeman before, they are trained policemen, they will help maintain law and order'. Gouws said in a separate interview with the Times of Namibia that the policing role would keep them employed and 'prevent them taking up arms against Swapo'.

* Tjongarero: 'If Koevoet have been trained to be killers, if they have been trained to be extermination squads, if their only training was towards the extermination of Swapo, one wonders whether the stain on their brains can be diminished in just four months'.

* Legal Assistance Centre director David Smuts: 'I have serious doubts about Koevoet's ability to be impartial ... Untag (the United Nations monitoring force in Namibia) will have to be extremely vigilant as to what Koevoet is doing during the elections, and they don't seem to have sufficient people to do that'.

* Security police chief inspector Derek Brune: '(The challenge facing the Koevoet men) is basically to live in normal society again and to operate as normal members of society, and not as people whose primary aim is to hunt trained terrorists, but to be able to react in a



Swapo's Dan Tjongarero on SA's proposal to change the voting age: '... one has to ask whether the election will still be free and fair'.

normal fashion in a normal situation ... No person was ever arrested or kept in detention on an illegal basis (by Koevoet) whatsoever'.

4 Swapo, in its economic policy document, says it will not expropriate white farms which are productive and useful to the economy. But those farms which are lying idle, used as tax loopholes or

owned by absentee landlords will be expropriated, and their owners paid out.

* Independent economic consultant Eric Lang, himself a farm owner: 'I think the agricultural sector has not been making its just contribution to the state revenue. Development must start taking place in the rural areas. I believe land that is just being used as weekend hunting lodges is not

Broederstroom three face terrorism charges

Three alleged members of an Umkhonto we Sizwe unit are due to face charges of terrorism in the Pretoria Regional Court.

In addition, Damian de Lange, Ian Robertson and Susan Donnelly face 15 charges of attempted murder, malicious injury to property, and unlawful possession of hand grenades, bombs, arms, explosives and ammunition. De Lange also faces three counts of arson or attempted arson.

The charges follow a dramatic police raid on a Broederstroom

smallholding during May 1988, when four residents were detained, and a vast arsenal of arms, explosives and ammunition allegedly impounded by police.

Seventeen of the charges faced by the accused relate to a March 1 1988 attack on a South African Air Force bus in Benoni. On this date the accused are alleged to have caused an explosion damaging the bus, a private motor vehicle and a number of houses. The state claims that the accused attempted to murder the occupants of the bus, who were members of the SAAF.

The accused are alleged to have possessed a vast quantity of military hardware. They stored the equipment in a number of places: at their Broederstroom house; in the Kalahari Gemsbok Park; the Buffelspoort Dam; and Pretoria. The hardware included, according to the

state's indictment:

- * hand grenades;
- * limpet mines;
- * mortars;
- * a SAM 7 ground-to-air missile;
- * Makarov, Walther and Colt pistols;
- * AK 47 and AKM rifles;
- * a machine gun;
- * mini-limpet mines;
- * explosives and ammunition.

Accused number 1, Damian de Lange, faces charges of arson and attempted arson arising out of three attacks on Progressive Federal Party offices during May 1981. There is no suggestion that these attacks were carried out on behalf of the ANC, and the state alleges that De Lange only joined the ANC after these 1981 incidents.

According to the charge sheet, De Lange and Robertson entered South Africa during July 1986 to



Left, Swapo's Publicity Secretary Hidipo Hamutenya, and right, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Nico Bessinger in Vienna in 1987

making a contribution to the economy and should be looked at very critically'.

* Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging leader Hendrik van As: 'We are definitely going to fight (this issue), and we will take up the weapons we need at the moment we need them'.

* Farmer Hendrik Kotze: 'If Swapo tries to take away our farms, the majority of white people will

become white terrorists in their own country'.

5 Swapo says it will want to buy significant shares in the mining houses (figures of 49 and 50 percent are being mentioned) and use their share of the profits to build a secondary manufacturing sector which will help reduce the country's dependence on mining. At present,

Namibia imports 80 percent of its needs and exports 80 percent of its products. The mines contribute one third of the gross domestic product, provide 85 percent of the exports, and pay just under half the country's total taxes.

* CDM diamond mine executive director Abel Bower: 'We have no problems with Swapo, we can live with them'.

* Rossing Uranium general manager Dr Michael Bates (whose company's share of the gross domestic product is between 17 and 20 percent): 'Rossing is looking forward to working in an independent Namibia. We sell uranium on the world market and as a result of the Namibian association with South Africa, sanctions have been having quite an impact on us. So we are looking forward to an end to that international pressure'.

6 The SADF is touring the country, telling people not to vote for Swapo and offering to rebuild homesteads.

* Democratic Turnhalle Alliance leader Dirk Mudge: 'Every time the military tells people to vote for the DTA, it's another vote for Swapo'.
Tony Weaver

establish an Umkhonto unit. De Lange operated as commander of the unit, while Robertson was the commissar. In August 1987, Donnelly - a British citizen - joined the unit as its communications officer, maintaining contact between the ANC and the unit. Communication systems included telephonic and radio link ups, and the use of codes.

Until the arrest of its members in May 1988, the unit was allegedly involved in the following activities:

- * reconnaissance of military and political targets with the aim of carrying out attacks on these targets;
- * establishment of munitions caches;
- * an experimental explosion against a high-voltage pole in Kliprivier, near Vereeniging;
- * a November 1987 attack against a communications mast in Linksfield, Johannesburg;
- * an attack on a South African Air

Force bus carrying personnel through Benoni. In addition, the state alleges that both De Lange and Robertson underwent military instruction in ANC training camps.

For a few weeks after the raid on Broederstroom, police sources were unusually forthcoming about the course of their investigations into the unit's activities. Police confirmed that a fourth member of the unit - Hugh Lugg - had also been arrested in Broederstroom, and although Lugg remains in police custody, he has not been charged.

In addition, police sources claimed that a fifth member of the unit, Paul Annagarn (check spelling) had left the unit after a conflict within it, and had subsequently been interned in an ANC punishment camp. ANC sources strongly denied this, and it was only some months later that Annagarn's father withdrew his

allegation that the ANC had killed his son.

Press and other speculation was fuelled by the selective release of information by police sources, and various dramatic claims were made about the unit's activities - most of which do not appear in the charge sheet.

Observers of ANC military trials have expressed surprise that - apart from one count of terrorism - the accused are charged with common law offences ranging from attempted murder to possession of arms and ammunition.

In particular, the state's failure to charge any of the accused with treason, and the scheduling of their trial in a regional, rather than supreme court, has raised eyebrows - especially after the extravagant claims made at the time of the Broederstroom raid.

WIP correspondent.

The murder of teenage activist Stompie Seipei focused attention on the small Free State township of Tumahole, where Seipei and a group called the Fourteens transformed the nature of local protest politics. JO-ANNE COLLINGE looks at the politicisation of Seipei and his fellow fighters, and their decision to challenge the authorities.

Stompie Seipei, killed at the age of 14, was accompanied to his grave in Tumahole cemetery by a mass of children singing freedom songs.

The burial was fitting for a young activist whose prominence lay not only in the manner of his death (he was murdered in Soweto within days of his alleged abduction by members of the Mandela United Football Club) but in his role as a leader of Tumahole's 'youth army', the Fourteens. Speakers at the funeral referred repeatedly to Stompie as a martyr. They looked beyond the immediate circumstances of his death to the broader political strife which pushed him out of his home town.

They spoke of his prominent role in the militant Fourteens; of his detention at the age of 11; of his alleged torture; of the schools which closed their doors in his face, forcing him to leave home for Soweto to further his schooling.

For the mourners of Tumahole, the Fourteens were a familiar part of their recent past. Many of the funeral crowd had patrolled the streets with Stompie, who was certainly more than one-among-equals. But to them he was not the disturbing 'boy general' who set outsiders wondering at his very existence.


The teenagers of Tumahole




The Fourteens were a direct product of the violence that hit the township outside Parys after residents decided to resist the imposition of rent increases in July 1984.

Protests and boycotts by Tumahole

high school pupils were a feature of this period. They were fuelled by the presence of a headmaster who was nicknamed 'Release' for his frequent use of the phrase, 'I am going to release (expel) you from school' - a



Residents of Tumahole pay their last respects to the 'boy general'



Above: Stompie Seipei
Below: Some of the Fourteens



phrase used, it seems, at the slightest provocation.

In contrast to the familiar police theory which portrays children as tools manipulated in the hands of their radical elders, a senior



At the graveside

Tumahole activist recalled how the spiral of conflict sucked in the young as it twisted its way through the township.

'The high school boycott made the primary schools become aware that

their brothers were fighting', the activist explained. 'Most of the time I met these young pupils between standards one and six and I asked them, "Why don't you go to school". And they actually cited what was happening at the high school. They said, "No, our brothers are not going to school and our sisters are not going to school, so we are also doing it. And some of our brothers have been detained. They have been taken. And until such time as they have been released we are not going back to school". So it started.

'At most of the civic meetings the young people wanted to be right in the forefront. They were highly impressed with freedom songs from the students and even from some of the middle-aged people - they *knew* these songs. Later small children started to adopt a hostile attitude to the police, because of the teargassing and sjambokking. They were just sjambokked at random when pupils started boycotting schools and when they started to burn school property'.

The Fourteens, he said, began almost spontaneously during this ferment among pupils.

'The Fourteens started with the boycott of schools. Pupils of a particular school would move from one school to another, and this would lead to stonethrowing - they would throw stones on the school roofs.

'One of the Fourteens told me how they had been chased by police after stoning a school. A group of 40 to 50 ran to one house (to hide) and met there. They didn't actually know each other by then. But at that particular stage they decided to have their own group and they called it the Fourteens. That was more or less their age - between 12 and 15 years.

'After their meeting they just wanted to take some sort of action - just destruction. Police would go for them. They'd come out of jail. The same thing happens again. It was their allegation that they had been electrically shocked, so now they're determined to go forward and smash the police. They are very brave and very angry. With those who are doing standard five or form one, one expects them to be politically aware. But with the Fourteens - doing standard one, two or three - they are not so aware. What they are aware of is that they hate to see policemen. And they don't want councillors because coun-



Thousands of Tumahole residents attended Stompie's funeral

cillors are alleged informers.

'When the primary schools were imitating their brothers from the high school, they were also influenced by the chanting of songs. All the time they were having slogans. During 1985 the children were definitely the people who were composing some of the slogans. Kids of about 12 years know the slogans better than we do.

'So students and pupils were just taking their own direction and we actually wanted to talk with them and advise them that this is not a good way to go about things. But what they told us is: the police are not doing anything to you. We are the only ones to feel the punch and the pinch. We are the only ones. So leave us to do whatever we think is best for us.

'I've seen a lot of kids in Tumahole and other townships. The most important thing regarding the violence is the actions of the police - the sjambokking and assaulting of students. If there is a riotous situation they shoot, sjambok or beat people. Even innocent people are being attacked at that particular time.

'Psychologically they are influencing the children to join those who are sort of radical - or whatever. So the majority of students are now supporting any political organisation which is seen to be fighting against the government. Because they were innocent and they were assaulted.

'Young children were actually prepared to risk their lives in physical conflict because they were the ones



Mrs Mandela's football club has been linked to Stompie's death

assaulted by the police. Initially, when we members of the civic and the youth congress were arrested, we were not assaulted. The police treated us in a very special way.

'Now small children of 12, 14 or 16 years would definitely be assaulted. This made them hold a negative attitude to the police. We said all the time in our meetings that we are calling on people to be obedient to the law and we should fight for our rights using a non-violent method. 'So the children said, "No man, there is no more time for intellectualising in the struggle. The likes of Mandela and Luthuli were actually talking to the boers for a long time. But the very same police are actually the perpetrators of all this. So we see them as our enemies".

'They would say: "You, the civic members, are merely talking. So now we are going to take over. We have seen that we have been assaulted for

nothing. So it is better to be arrested for doing something". So that's why there was the stone-throwing, policemen's houses burnt down'.

These thoughts, coming from a senior activist and resident of the township, are vastly different from the official view of the Fourteens set forth by Major Johan Fouche, liaison officer for the Northern Free State, in an interview with *Beeld* (March 8 1989).

According to the *Beeld* article, 'The two radical groups which incited unrest, the Tumahole Civic Association and the Tumahole Youth Congress, noted that their leaders between the ages of 18 and 25 years were being sent to jail after committing violent actions. These sentences deterred members and prospective members and the movements lost support.

'Leaders of the movements realised it would be better to make use of youngsters under the age of 14 because they would only get corporal punishment if they were convicted and would be able to resume their activities immediately', states *Beeld*.

Fouche is quoted as saying that the Fourteens were used to cause chaos during unrest and funerals: 'When businesses were set alight and stoned, this gang usually moved in to plunder and rob. Also, during stayaways this gang - which eventually grew to be a force of 350 - carried messages and intimidated those who wished to go to work so that they joined the strikers.

'The Under Fourteens (sic) were also used to distribute pamphlets, while stonethrowing and incitement were their strong points. During unrest they were responsible for the building of barricades in the streets and the burning of tyres. Like most other similar gangs they instilled fear by threatening one and all with the so-called necklace. The Under Fourteens (sic) were very successful. They were accepted by the black community of Tumahole as part of the community and were well concealed when they needed to be'.

Fouche described the Fourteens as 'the only viable youth gang' in the Free State area. 'It seems their lifespan was much longer than that of other rural groups because Parys is near to the Reef and the Vaal Triangle and they were regularly visited and motivated by radicals from these areas'.

A right move at the wrong time



How will the new party relate to the mass democratic movement?

The idea of a predominantly-white, liberal party bridging the divide between parliamentary politics and mass anti-apartheid action appears to be waning in the run-up to the launch of the main vehicle for the idea, the Democratic Party. A WIP correspondent reports.

The fact that people see the logic of working together does not mean they have to enjoy it - or even like each other. And the three predominantly-white, centre-liberal South African parties which will merge on April 5 to become the Democratic Party clearly don't.

Ever since the idea of a merger between South Africa's three liberal white parliamentary parties was first raised, the most obvious similarity between them has been their intense

dislike for each other.

The oldest of the three is the Progressive Federal Party (PFP). Formed 30 years ago as the Progressive Party breakaway from the United Party, it has gone through two name changes, and rather more policy shifts. It has also seen its support among white voters change dramatically. Stable until 1974, it grew rapidly until the early 1980s, becoming the official opposition (the biggest opposition party in parliament) in 1977, and then losing support steadily after the abrupt resignation in 1986 of party leader Frederick van Zyl Slabbert and party chair Alex Boraine.

Slabbert's justification for his resignation clearly defined the crisis facing white opposition parties in the changed political environment brought about by the huge growth of non-racial popular opposition in the mid-1980s. Operating in the tri-cameral parliament, Slabbert and his PFP colleagues were part of an institution rejected by the dominant elements of the broad anti-apartheid bloc of which the PFP claimed to be part. Slabbert said he was resigning to work towards bridging the divide between the democratic voices inside parliament and the predominantly-

black democratic forces outside it.

Several PFP MPs followed Slabbert out of the party - although not out of parliament. Most joined Wynand Malan's National Democratic Movement (NDM), a party explicitly attempting to bridge the gap. Others, like Jan van Eck, followed the example of PFP provincial councillor 'Comrade Molly' Blackburn by establishing close working relationships with the popular movement.

In doing so they challenged a basic article of PFP faith: that white opponents of apartheid could best achieve their aim by concentrating their energies in parliament. Operating as independents, Van Eck and others began using parliament to articulate the opinions and demands of the majority of South Africans denied a parliamentary voice of their own.

In 1987, with the country deeply divided, the PFP collapsed into the gulf between the major contending forces, losing its official opposition status to the surging far-right Conservative Party of Andries Treurnicht. From having the support of two out of ten white voters - compared to the Nats' five out of ten - the PFP now has the support of less than one in ten.

IF THE PRESS CAN'T TELL US, WHO WILL?

Shell believes that a free press is a cornerstone of democracy.



Working to make a difference now.

The turbulence of the mid-1980s cracked the mould of white politics. A majority of white Afrikaners broke with their traditional political voice, the National Party, to back either the far-right CP or parliamentary parties to the Nats' left, to explore ways of stopping the disintegration of white South African society.

English-speaking South Africans, traditionally more liberal, had already been breaking ranks in the 1970s. The 1980s hastened the process, with thousands crossing the language divide to back PW Botha and his policy of harsh repression plus limited reform.

These convulsions rocked the National Party, too. Having lost 22 members of parliament - and thousands of its supporters - to the CP five years earlier, Botha saw the other wing of his party twisting out of shape under the political pressure of the times.

This time, however, he managed to limit the scope of the rebellion, isolating reformist MP Wynand Malan. Malan had made the mistake of believing the reformist rhetoric of his party leaders, and broke with them over their refusal to take reform to its logical conclusion by negotiating with the leaders thrown up by the 1984 rebellion, and with probably the one opposition force able to claim leadership of anti-apartheid opinion, the African National Congress.

Other cracks appeared in the National Party monolith; and out of one emerged Denis Worrall, a former Wits University lecturer who had joined the National Party as a senator. When the senate was abolished, Worrall was sent to London as Pretoria's ambassador, where he is probably best remembered for his aggressive defence of the police slaughter of 21 mourners at a funeral in Langa in the Eastern Cape during 1985.

An articulate advocate of Botha's 'reforms' while in London, he is widely believed to have quit the post and returned home to contest the 1987 general election because he was refused a cabinet post rather than because of any basic opposition to apartheid.

While the PFP was the apparently-logical place for liberal opponents of the government, particularly those



ABOVE: Worrall - offering risk-free transition and a free market.

BELOW: Malan - his NDM holds 3,65% of white support



committed to parliamentary opposition, neither Worrall nor Malan sought affiliation. They aimed to confront and defeat the ruling party, not merely to express criticisms. In that, although in not much else, they found common ground - and initiated talks about a new, leaner and hungrier party to oppose the government.

But when it came to methods, there was very little common ground to be found. Malan, deeply influenced by the popular mood, saw the need for a parliamentary party deeply rooted in a broad democratic front; Worrall, coming from the splendid isolation of diplomatic life, remained wedded to the idea of change from above.

In other areas too, they differed

sharply. Very much the child of his background, Worrall is almost indistinguishable, in his economic philosophies, from rightwing Western politicians, favouring an unfettered freedom for capital to make profits.

Malan, in many senses, has retained a traditional National Party view - controlling the economy to serve the people, rather than the reverse. Only his view of who constitutes 'the people' has changed: no longer the Afrikaner volk, but all South Africans. Like many of the Afrikaner intellectuals who have flocked to his banner, he is a social democrat, favouring a South African variation on Western welfare states.

A split was inevitable - and it came quickly. The 'unity talks' collapsed: Malan established the NDM, and Worrall began stomping the country to raise support for his Independent Party (IP).

The PFP watched helplessly as the two upstarts began eating into its support, already dipping badly. Less terminally affected, the National Party was nevertheless concerned as both began to gnaw into its base in a way the PFP had never managed.

For both parties, the timing was good: traumatised by almost a decade of vigorous mass resistance, most white South Africans had seen their belief in the viability of permanent white political domination shattered. By 1988 even the CP was unable to persuade almost half of its supporters that its policies were enforceable. In other parties an even higher number recognised that some form of 'power-sharing' with the majority was inevitable. The major pillar of white political thinking had been cracked.

Worrall, virtually a one-man show, compiled an attractive policy package for white South Africans worried by the economic implications of this drift towards political egalitarianism.

He offered a risk-free transition. His unwavering support for 'the free market' meant, in effect, that the major elements of white economic privilege would survive political change. Shorn of its rhetoric, the IP message read like a yuppie T-shirt: 'Don't worry, be happy'.

Attracted by Worrall's slick presentation and his licence-to-print-money economic policies, big

business quickly filled his campaign chest. They, and one out of every ten white voters, also liked the fact that Worrall saw Kwazulu's Gatsha Buthelezi - another advocate of risk-free revolution - as the most significant articulator of black demands.

By late last year, with the IP within spitting distance of achieving a larger support base than the PFP, and with rumours of an early election in the first half of 1989, it was clear that none of the three parties would emerge in time as the uncontested voice of white liberal opinion.

Part of the urgency was the apparently unstoppable growth of support for the CP, which claimed more support than the three parties combined: 22,8% for the CP, and 22,5% for the three.

The notion of unity was already in the air and, under pressure from their

backers - particularly Anglo-American which, always the cautious investor, had reportedly bankrolled all three - the IP, PFP and NDM began talking about unity.

Aside from their doctrinal differences, several stumbling blocks remained. Despite its status as the incredible shrinking man of South African politics, the PFP brought into the talks the only functioning national political machine - neither of the others could boast more than isolated regional pockets of organisation. Because of this, the PFP was unable to shake its arrogant assumption that it was the senior partner.

Malan and Worrall were understandably less than respectful of a party which, despite its organisational strength, was actually dying on its feet; the differing views quickly

developed into a dispute over the leadership of the alliance.

Unity talks almost collapsed in January when the PFP attempted to force its leader, Zach de Beer, on the new party. The other two leaders countered that they would rather sink their mutual hostility and accept dual leadership than allow themselves to be swallowed by what would become no more than a renamed PFP. Only the intervention of rugby boss Louis Luyt and former *Rapport* editor Wimpie de Klerk kept the talks going.

By agreement, the three will form a collective party leadership until a follow-up conference later this year.

Meanwhile, the yet-to-be-born party has already achieved its most obvious objective: replacing the CP as the second-biggest white party. Not that this has much to do with the Democratic Party or its three ele-



white South Africans (the NP's major support base) wanted Botha to stay on - one percent more than wanted him to go. Although the survey did not break down opinions by parliamentary party affiliation, the figures suggest that well over half of Nat supporters wanted him to stay;

* A survey commissioned by the newspaper *Rapport* found that NP support is growing while the far-right Conservative Party is losing support. This is despite recent revelations of a series of massive corruption scandals involving several NP and government figures;

* The number of white voters 'highly satisfied' with the government's performance has never been higher than it was in January under Botha.

Nor do the policies of FW de Klerk - Botha's successor as NP leader and the man likely to replace him as president - explain why he is being hailed by some sections of the media as a reformist saviour.

Since taking over the

Why Botha's clinging to power

A lot has been written about why PW Botha should get out of politics. But all of it contradicts what Nat supporters say: Botha's doing a good job.

It's not often easy to agree with President PW Botha. But right now - amid all the National Party fury over his refusal to resign as president - it is a little easier than usual.

Since Botha's stroke in late January, he has been under intense pressure to quit, both as leader of the NP and as president. Shortly after his stroke (reportedly his second, al-

though the first, in 1985, was never publicly acknowledged) he resigned as party leader; but as WIP was going to press, he was still clinging to the presidency - vowing to return to office.

From Botha's point of view, his stubbornness is understandable:


* An opinion poll by the Sunday Star showed that 43% of Afrikaans-speaking

ments. A January poll by *Rapport* newspaper shows that while the three parties have neither gained nor lost since the talks began, holding a consistent 22,5% of the white vote, the CP has slipped badly - under pressure from the Nats - from 22,8 to 20,3%.

Within the alliance, however, there has been a marked shift: the PFP has dropped 1,3% to 8,7%. Malan's NDM holds 3,65% (up from 3,4%), while Worrall is now the senior partner with 10,2% (up 1,1%).

Lack of enthusiasm for the arranged marriage, however, is clear. The number of people who would not vote at all - according to the survey - has jumped by 1,8% to 8,7%.

The survey also found that Democratic Party support is less than the sum of its parts. Divided, its elements command 22,5% of the white vote. As the Democratic Party - even



van Eck - keen on close links with extra-parliamentary forces

under Worrall, the most popular choice as leader - this figure slips to 21,1%.

Even these figures, however, do not demonstrate the depth of liberal hostility to the forced alliance. The *Rapport* survey shows that a Worrall-led Democratic Party would win the support of 7% of white voters currently backing the Nats. But 8% of liberal voters would simply stop voting, almost doubling the number who refuse to vote at all.

Thus, far from changing the face of white opposition politics, the Democratic Party would merely be moving the focus closer to the centre, picking up disgruntled Nat voters, but losing those on the left. This loss would push the party even closer to the centre, sucking it further into the tendency towards exclusive concentration on parliament as the vehicle for change.

And the bridge between white participatory politics and mass opposition will remain unbuilt.

party leadership, De Klerk has put forward a vision of his version of 'reform'. Distilled down to their essentials, there are three:

- * Under De Klerk, the National Party remains committed to defining political rights by skin colour. He is, however, prepared to consider dumping some lesser manifestations of apartheid - the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act, for example.

It should be noted, however, that while Botha was temporarily out of office, De Klerk and acting president Chris Heunis presided over the reintroduction of prosecutions under the Group Areas Act. For the past two years, there has been an informal ban on prosecutions of black people living illegally in 'white areas'. But March saw prosecutions in the Western Cape, Durban and Johannesburg;

- * In his first public speech as NP leader, De Klerk called for a 'great indaba' to debate the country's future. While United Democratic Front

general secretary Mohamed Valli points out that, with the country under State of Emergency rule, the result is likely to be 'quite a little indaba', the idea of such a gathering is not new: Botha himself suggested it last year. It was widely rejected then, and is unlikely to attract much support now;

- * Under De Klerk, the cabinet has agreed to examine the 'KwaNatal indaba' proposals for racially-determined power-sharing in Natal and KwaZulu. This marks the only change from Botha's thinking. But there appears to be less to it than meets the eye: Firstly, because the proposals have been decisively rejected by most opposition organisations, which are unlikely to feel much different if the cabinet gives the idea its stamp of approval. Secondly, the agreement to examine the proposals appears to have less to do with a genuine interest in trying new constitutional models than with attempting to undercut gains made by white opposition parties in Natal through their sup-

port for the 'KwaNatal indaba' proposals. Only in the area of foreign opinion does there appear to be some logic in the sudden enthusiasm for ditching Botha. More than any other government figure, Botha is seen internationally as personifying white South Africa's stubborn refusal to end racial oppression.

Although De Klerk, Heunis and other ministers have not been noticeable for their resistance to NP policy under Botha, visiting US Senators Sam Nunn and David Boren last year said they had found significant differences between Botha's views and those of many members of his cabinet. 'If Botha's view is seen as the only view of the government, that would encourage further punitive sanctions', Boren said afterwards. Meetings with Heunis, Foreign Minister Pik Botha and Justice Minister Kobie Coetsee had offered 'some hope', he said.

Support from Nunn and Boren will be crucial to the success of current attempts in the US Senate to intro-

duce further sanctions against Pretoria. If Pretoria can demonstrate that those Cabinet members who offered 'some hope' have become more influential than Botha, who offered none, this could weaken the sanctions initiative.

Similar perspectives hold for most of Pretoria's Western allies. However, if the new generation of NP leaders appear to offer nothing more than a slickly-presented rehash of past policies, the passing of Botha would not be that significant. Botha is the last veteran still in office of the National Party generation which took power in 1948. As such, he has had the authority to invoke past symbols of white domination - the unity of Die Volk, the Great Trek etc - to hold together an increasingly-divided white community.

'The next generation will be no less willing to keep the laager together', a senior member of the African National Congress said recently. 'But they will be less able'.

Wip Correspondent

Fighting for POW status - and life itself

Three soldiers of the African National Congress are facing death in a Delmas court. A WIP correspondent reports.

Few mourned the death of Orphan Chaphi. With his burly build and shaven head, 'Hlubi' - as he was known to most Soweto residents - was not a popular figure.

As a detective sergeant in Soweto's murder and robbery squad, Hlubi had made many enemies. The Witwatersrand CID chief at the time called him 'one of the most brilliant detectives in South Africa', and referred to his death as 'a severe setback to the police force'. In the year preceding Hlubi's death, he arrested 97 armed robbers, 34 murderers, 25 car thieves and ten other criminals wanted for serious crimes.

But it was not a bitter criminal who lay in wait outside Orphan Chaphi's Rockville house on the cold night of June 25, 1978. It was Obed Masina, a recently-recruited guerilla of the African National Congress, on one of his first missions.

Nearly 11 years on, Masina and three other ANC insurgents faced the death penalty in a Delmas court room.

These self-proclaimed soldiers of Umkhonto we Sizwe have refused to defend themselves against charges of high treason, terrorism and murder on the grounds that they do not recognise the authority of a South



Masina: 'Our refusal to participate stems from our belief that this court and this judicial system cannot operate independently from the political system within which it functions'.

African civilian court.

When their trial began on February 1, Obed Masina (36), Frans Ting-Ting Masango (28), Neo Griffith Potsane (26), and Joseph Elias Makhura (26) and, were alleged to form a highly-trained ANC assassination squad.

Masina, from Rockville, Soweto, has been an ANC member for 11 years, and received military training in Mozambique, Zambia and Angola.

Masango, of Mamelodi, joined the ANC nine years back and was trained in Mozambique, Zambia and East

Germany.

Potsane, of Dube township in Soweto, spent 11 years in ANC ranks and was trained in Mozambique, Angola, Zambia and East Germany.

And Makhura, from Soshanguve near Pretoria, joined the ANC in 1980, and underwent military training in Angola, Zambia and Tanzania.

When asked to plead on the opening day they refused to do so. The accused also informed presiding judge De Klerk that they would not be represented by counsel during their trial, although they had retained

the services of attorneys, who would keep a watching brief.

According to Masina, who explained why he and his co-accused refused to plead, the charges they faced were 'that we, in effect, allegedly committed certain acts with the intention to eradicate the apartheid system so that the majority of South Africans could participate in the making of the country's laws.

'Our refusal to participate in the proceedings stems from our belief that this court and this judicial system cannot operate independently from the political system within which it functions.

'Furthermore, all of us were held in solitary confinement without access to legal representation for eight months. During this period all of us were tortured and brutally assaulted. In the process information has been extracted from us by the security police, which will, in all certainty, be used against us.

'We, as members of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC, are involved in a war of national liberation. This is true. Also true is that the South African government and defence force leaders constantly state that South Africa is in a state of war. We as soldiers cannot and should not stand trial in a civilian court.

'We do not stand in isolation in our perception of South Africa and its political system. The international community has repeatedly condemned apartheid as a crime against humanity. In doing so, it has recognised the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa in pursuance of their human rights.

'As MK soldiers, we do not recognise this civilian court and accordingly refuse to plead to the charges'.


Three of the four accused have been found guilty of the assassinations of:

- * Hlubi Chaphi, who was regarded with hatred by an entire generation of Soweto students. It is alleged he was responsible for the injury and death of many young people in the conflict of 1976-87. Masina alone has been found guilty of this killing.

- * Constable Sinki Vuma of Mamelodi, who was gunned down in March 1986 in his house - the same

house which his colleagues defended by opening fire on a crowd in the aftermath of the Mamelodi Massacre of November 21, 1985. Masango has been found responsible for carrying out the killing.

- * David Lukhele, who was shot in his Mamelodi home in June 1986, and whose sister-in-law, Elizabeth Busiswe Dlodlu, was also killed in the attack. Lukhele was a passionate Swazi nationalist and worked tirelessly for the incorporation of the 'Swazi' bantustan of kaNgwane into Swaziland - a measure which Pretoria attempted to implement in the early 1980s, and which would have cost 800 000 South Africans their



Makhura - trained in Angola, Zambia and Tanzania

nationality. Potsane has been found guilty of carrying out this assassination, and of the murder of Lukhele's sister-in-law.

Other acts with which the four were charged included:

- * Placing a limpet mine outside a shopping complex in the Pretoria area of Silverton on July 4, 1986. The explosion occurred at about 5 pm, injuring 17 people.

The shopping complex is in the same street block as the Silverton police station, and the mine was placed at a bus stop about 250 metres

from the police station.

- * Planting a landmine on a dirt road in Soshanguve. The mine was detonated when a road grader passed over it on July 21, 1986. The driver of the grader was injured. According to the indictment the landmine was sited on a road which 'was identified as a target which was being used by military vehicles'. All four were linked to the planting of the landmine.

Surprisingly, the state dropped charges of treason against the accused as their trial neared completion. The charge of high treason centred on the accuseds' membership of and/or support for the ANC - an organisation aiming to 'overthrow or endanger the state authority of the Republic of South Africa' - and their conspiracy to commit the above acts to promote the aims of the ANC.

The accused initially faced various alternative charges, including the common law crimes of murder, attempted murder and malicious damage to property, and the statutory offence of terrorism. However, once the state dropped treason charges, three accused were found guilty on only the common law alternative counts, including murder, while all were convicted of attempted murder.

According to the state's indictment, the accuseds' military training involved the handling of firearms, conducting warfare, air defence and medical services.

'The accused received specific training overseas to act as an assassin (sic) squad in the Republic and to execute the orders of the ANC. The assassin squad's training included the identification and elimination of persons in the Republic.

'The training of the accused also included the mobilisation and/or politicisation of the masses'.

It is alleged that Masina and Masango entered South Africa in February 1986 and that Potsane and Makhura followed at a later, unspecified, date. They are said to have had a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition and to have taken accommodation in Mamelodi and Winterveld.

In each attack, after they had identified a target, they reported to the ANC and received clearance to proceed, the state alleges.

The first Delmas treason trial - involving UDF and black consciousness leaders - was notable for the high profile personalities in the dock. But the second treason trial in this town features accused whose backgrounds are obscure but who are charged with killing men who loomed large and controversially within their communities.

The personal histories of the men in the dock at Delmas vary, some showing clear signs of political commitment before disappearing from home while others did not.

Obed Masina, at 36 years the oldest of the four, had little interest in liberation politics before leaving the country to seek educational opportunities at the end of 1977. He was the oldest surviving son in a large Soweto family and was obliged to leave school in Form I to help support the family.

At the age of 24, he managed to return to school. Two years later the fury of 1976 descended on Soweto and Masina's hopes of completing his schooling were in shreds.

Frans TingTing Masango of Mamelodi was involved in overt political work before he left the country in 1977. The event which precipitated his leaving was the execution of ANC guerilla Solomon Mahlangu. Masango had campaigned strongly against the hanging and had chaired the vigil for Mahlangu when the execution was carried out. He left the country soon after the vigil because there were signs that the security police wanted him. He was 19 years old.


Neo Griffith Potsane was one of the generation of Soweto 1976. He was involved in student protests, including the historic march of June 16, and was shot through the ear in 1977. His assailants travelled in the infamous 'green car' - a light green Chev which was known to cruise the streets of the township leaving injured youths in its wake. Many of the 1976 generation describe how the occupants of the vehicle - black men and white men, dressed in plain clothes but widely believed to be policemen - would travel with their shotguns projecting from the car's windows.

The fourth accused, Joseph Makhura, comes from a rural family. He grew up on a farm in the Brits area

north-west of Pretoria, living in a mud hut with no electricity and no source of purified water. He left the country in 1979, when he is alleged to have joined the ANC.

The first assassination mentioned in the Delmas trial indictment is that of Chaphi. At the time of his assassination, the *Post* newspaper recalled that he had played 'a leading role in suppressing unrest after the '76 disturbances and has been the target of student abuse and hatred'. Several reports mentioned a petrol-bomb attack on his house during the conflict of 1976-77.

Although Hlubi was attached to the



Potsane - found guilty of assassinating Swazi nationalist David Lukhele

murder and robbery squad, young Soweto residents claim he played a quasi-security role during the 1976 uprising. Nearly 13 years after the uprising, few have forgotten the name Hlubi and most recall that he evoked terror among students.

Even as an 'ordinary policeman' he was known to resort freely to the use of his gun. One newspaper report remarked that he had sent 'hundreds of criminals to jail - and many to the grave'.

David Lukhele, assassinated in June 1986 in his Mamelodi home, was a bantustan politician and avid proponent of ethnic development. His dearest wish was to see the 'Swazi' bantustan of kaNgwane (which is only partly inhabited by Swazis) handed over to Swaziland.

He campaigned vigorously for this right up to his death. Press reports at

the time recorded that he was shot shortly after returning from a trip to Swaziland to further this cause.

At the time of his death Lukhele was deputy president of the Inyatsi ya Maswati National Movement and secretary of the Swazi Council of Chiefs of South Africa. He was instrumental in setting up the tribal authority on which the bantustan was based and attempted to coax Swazis living on farms within 'white' South Africa to move into the area destined to become kaNgwane.

During May 1986 a pamphlet distributed in the townships quoted Lukhele as saying that Enoch Mabuza's Inyandza National Movement had failed to take 'sticks to fight the students like Inkatha is doing in kwaZulu'. Lukhele denied he was responsible for the pamphlet, but within a month he had been gunned down in his Mamelodi home and his sister-in-law had died with him.

The final assassination victim listed in the indictment is Constable Sinki Vuma of Mamelodi. He too was shot inside his home in March 1986.

Vuma was unpopular among township youth. His death provoked young Mamelodi residents to rewrite a popular song by Yvonne Chaka Chaka so that they announced: 'Sinki is dead'.

He was also disliked by the taxi fraternity because he had implemented disruptive halt-and-search procedures even before the state of emergency was proclaimed. He is alleged to have shot a taxi driver in a moving vehicle, which then crashed - killing the driver.

Vuma's home was attacked and set alight on November 21, 1985, the day of the Mamelodi Massacre when police opened fire on thousands of peaceful rent demonstrators, killing at least 12 and injuring scores. Members of the police force rushed to extinguish the blaze at Vuma's house and at least one, Constable Philmon Morudu, fired into the crowd, according to evidence at the inquest on the massacre victims.

Senior ANC member Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, recently sentenced in Pretoria to 20 years for treason, commented after judgment: 'I wonder in future whether freedom fighters should bother to even stand trial'.

Not only was he placed in the dock as a result of unlawful abduction from his home in Swaziland, Ebrahim wrote, but his hand-over to the security police in Pretoria was 'followed by police torture to the point where I nearly lost my mind. When complaining of torture, we always face the problem in court that it is only our word against the testimony of the police. Our experience, or our perception, is that the courts are always inclined to accept the testimony of the police witnesses. Are we not entitled to question whether the courts are not giving the police a free hand to continue with their inhuman torture of political detainees'.

Increasingly, ANC guerillas placed on trial are seeking to counter the case against them on moral grounds, arguing that theirs is a just struggle, waged by an internationally-recognised liberation movement against a racist regime and that, in terms of the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, they should be treated as prisoners of war, not common criminals.

Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions on the conduct of war includes in its definition of international armed conflicts those 'armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination'.

The 1977 Protocols had the effect of extending provisions of the original Conventions - including provisions on the treatment of prisoners of war - to struggles against colonial and race rule. Previously they had applied only to wars between nations.


Various resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly have been cited as evidence of the claim that the ANC is widely seen as a force engaged in a battle for self-determination and that the South African government qualifies pre-eminently as a 'racist regime'.

These include the 1975 resolution of the General Assembly in which it was affirmed that 'the racist regime of South Africa is illegitimate and has no right to represent the people of South Africa and that the national liberation movements are the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South

African people'.

Already in 1973 the General Assembly had accepted the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress as authentically representative of the majority of South Africans.

The UN endorsement of the justness of the ANC armed struggle is contained in a 1980 resolution of the General Assembly, to the effect that the Assembly 'reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movement by all available means, including armed struggle for the seizure of power by the people, the elimination of the apartheid regime and the



Masango - found guilty of assassinating Mamelodi constable Sinki Vuma

exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of South Africa as a whole'.

The South African government cannot be bound by treaty to implement the provisions, for although it signed the Conventions in 1949 it did not ratify the Protocols when they were adopted in 1977 nor has it become party to them at any stage since then. For the provisions of the Protocols to be binding it is necessary that the nation against which the liberation movement is pitted be a party to the conventions.

And, although the ANC delivered an undertaking to the International Red Cross in Geneva in 1980 that the ANC would 'wherever practically possible' abide by the Conventions and Protocols, this falls short of the requirement that the undertaking be deposited with the Swiss Federal

Council.

Three young ANC guerillas will face death when presiding judge De Kock hands down sentence in his Delmas court room. They have not contested the state's allegations concerning their activities, and Justice de Kock is obliged to pass the death sentence on the murder charges unless extenuating circumstances are found. The fourth accused, Joseph Makhuru, has been found guilty on 19 counts of attempted murder, all arising from the landmine blasts at Silverton and Soshanguve.

It remains unclear why, just prior to judgment, the prosecution withdrew treason charges against all accused. But perhaps a clue can be found in a similar withdrawal of treason charges against a group of alleged ANC guerillas and members in the Western Cape, and the introduction of statutory terrorism as a charge.

Treason, of its nature, is a profoundly political act. It involves rejection of the state's authority and right to govern, and can only be committed by those who owe allegiance to the state. Where citizens charged with treason have no vote, and are barred from participating in the election of the government, the focus of defence and mitigation often shifts to an attack on the state's legitimacy. And those who commit treason against a state based on minority rule and a limited franchise must always be seen as political offenders, not criminals.

In dropping treason charges against the Delmas trialists, the state may be aiming to depoliticise the trial, and the inevitable reaction which will follow any imposition of death sentences. Murder, after all, is often viewed as a common law crime, not a political offence.

But the nature of the charges initially faced by the accused, their refusal to participate in trial proceedings, and their acknowledgement of being ANC soldiers make it clear that their actions, and their trial, are profoundly political.

That is how most will respond to the passing of any death sentences on the Delmas three, regardless of clumsy state attempts to 'depoliticise' resistance to a society based on apartheid and minority rule.

Working for co

Over the last year two major trade unions, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the National Union of Metal Workers (Numsa), have assisted in the development of co-operatives for dismissed and retrenched workers. These include producer co-ops making bricks and T-shirts, and consumer co-ops in the form of retail outlets.

Most of these union-linked co-ops have emerged from dismissals and retrenchments of industrial workers. They represent a defensive strategy aimed at maintaining the organisation of unionised workers, meeting minimal welfare needs and perhaps providing examples of worker control. Many of the co-ops not linked to unions have developed as part of organisational campaigns to transform or eradicate apartheid.

One recent co-operative development involves a joint venture between a trade union and major employer. The employer, Frame Group's Consolidated Cotton Corporation (CCC), has put up over R2-m in start-up money for the co-op and will supply it with material. The co-op will be registered as a company, Zenzeleni Clothing (Pty) Ltd, and the shares will be held in a trust fund run by the union, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (Actwusa).

The co-operative will provide employment for workers laid off as part of CCC rationalisation, and is an entirely new exercise in job creation. Planning started in October 1988 and production is expected to begin in July this year. Initially, 300 workers will be involved in producing T-shirts, protective clothing, sheets and pillow cases. These workers - all union members - will elect shop stewards to represent them on matters at the workplace.

The co-operative has employed four experienced managers, but control will be in the hands of trustees nominated by the members of Actwusa. The

Workers' co-operatives can become viable business enterprises, collectively owned and democratically controlled by those who work in them. But South Africa's fledgeling co-operative movement faces major challenges and questions. GEORGINA JAFFEE introduces the growing debate on worker co-operatives in South Africa.

managers, Frame representatives and union representatives will be accountable to the trustees.

Glen Cormack, the manager appointed by the union, says the aims of the project are 'job creation and to show that there is a major role for democratically-controlled production and distribution processes'.

Cormack explained that Frame will benefit from the project through the sale of material to the co-op 'and through the development of a positive public image associated with job creation for workers by workers'.

The growing interest in co-operative initiatives needs to be understood within the current economic and political context. Increased levels of unemployment and social dislocation caused by repression have led many organisations to look for ways of providing employment and involving people in activities.

And the growth of a trade union movement, community organisations, youth and service groups has provided the organisational base from which to form and promote co-operatives.

Co-operatives are also being considered by black business groups, community organisations and a variety of institutions concerned with job-creation programmes and economic development. Some co-operative projects have been sponsored by social responsibility funds of large corporations, others by local banks and foreign donor agencies.

The diverse groups sponsoring and initiating co-ops have different social and political agendas. Co-operative strategies worldwide have shown that they can play a contradictory role in social change. Co-operatives, like any other social movement, can mobilise

Below and right: Twananani co-op in Gazankulu ; Top right: Tlari bead-workers co-op - Gazankulu; Bottom right: Tiakeni Textiles co-op, SA's oldest co-op.



and empower their members for the radical restructuring of society - or they can be part of reformist strategies of the state or dominant classes. With different organisations participating in co-operative development, a debate is developing over the aims and effects of co-operatives in the current South African context.

In addition to this, co-ops in many parts of the world have failed because of lack of capital, skill, and inability to compete in the market. The absence of capital and these skills is a huge obstacle in the way of co-operative development.

Collective change



the first co-op in England in 1844 and subsequently accepted by the International Co-operative Alliance is that a co-op is owned and controlled by the worker-members.

Control by any other organisation - even a trade union body - re-organises this principle. Co-ops developing from trade unions will have to debate this crucial issue of ownership. Outside ownership may have implications for the implementation of full worker control and democracy - and Zenzeleni will be an interesting case study in this regard.

Co-op practices, and the problems facing local co-ops, were examined in detail at a workshop run by the Labour and Economic Research Centre (Lerc) last September. At the workshop, Ian Cherrett - who has been involved in co-operative development in Southern Africa and Latin America - drew attention to the 'internal enemies' of a co-op. He called these 'welfarism', or 'the concrete expression of paternalism which is the belief that the less well-off in society are like children, unable to look after themselves'.

Funders and service organisations often end up feeling sorry for those they are supporting, and do not demand the minimum standards necessary for self-reliance, according to Cherrett. In the end co-ops can become dependent on the organisations and develop their own form of welfarist attitudes, which 'undermine from the beginning the chance of a vibrant, self-confident, self-reliant co-op movement'. For the number of service groups assisting in the development of co-ops, this is a major challenge: finding ways to assist people with development of skills without generating welfarist tendencies.

At the Lerc workshop, several organisations articulated unrealistic and idealistic expectations of the role co-ops can play; for example some believe that socialism can be built through multiplying the number of co-ops in society. Roger Etkind, who is employed by the Sarmcol workers' co-operative in Natal, explained why this

But co-operative organisation and production is not exclusively about income generation. A worker-controlled co-op is based on principles of open membership, democratic control, limited interest on share capital, fair distribution of profits, education and co-operation with other co-ops. Co-ops thus provide an opportunity for members to develop independence, responsibility and confidence.

Co-ops enable their members to gain knowledge of production and distribution. Viable co-ops have the potential to increase the overall empowerment

of members. In this way they are completely different from small businesses where there is a built-in inequality between employer and employee, and no potential for workers to learn anything beyond the requirements of the job.

Throughout the world there are different co-operative models with many ending up similar to conventional state-run enterprises, or capitalist concerns incorporating worker participation. When closely examined, workers in these cases are not really in control of the enterprise - yet they retain the name co-operative.

One of the principles developed by

is not the case: socialism involves a society where the members of that society make democratic choices on what is produced. In capitalist society the operation of the market regulates production and distribution.

Co-ops are forced to operate inside a capitalist market, and are not independent of the laws which govern any capitalist business. They also have a negligible impact on society or the economy as a whole.

Co-ops can, however, choose what to produce, and co-operative labour ceases to be a commodity to be bought and sold, hired and fired. Workers own and control the co-op. For Etkind, co-ops can only be an experiment in socialism in a very limited way. They can allow workers to experience 'taking control of the whole process of production'. Only if this is achieved can these concrete experiences be lessons for a future planned economy.

At the workshop, it became clear that a number of organisations assumed that co-ops could provide a complete solution to unemployment. This was challenged by several participants, among them a member of NUM, who made it clear that the union does not see co-ops in this way; they can only help lessen the effects of growing structural unemployment. 'The only way to solve unemployment is to strive for a socialist society, because unemployment demands a political and economic solution', the NUM member said. But 'co-ops can provide a means of survival and help defend the working class against the worst ravages of capitalism', argued the unionist.

Most groups at the workshop felt co-ops could help people survive economically while at the same time contribute to building a more equitable and democratic society. Co-ops can teach people the necessary skills to achieve these goals.

Hazel Gocela from Masibambane Co-operative Forum in Cape Town, which assists in co-operative development, argued that 'if workers own the means of production and have control of the means of production, this provides a foundation from which to obtain economic power'. For her, future political liberation will not necessarily ensure that everyone will benefit; but co-ops can

play an important role in the struggle for greater economic liberation.

According to Philip Dladla, chair of the Sarmcol Workers Co-operative which started in 1985 after 1 000 workers were dismissed from BTR Sarmcol, building Sawco was a difficult experience. The dismissed workers had few skills, little education and no experience in running a business. But Dladla argued that Sawco had taught members about democratic organisation: 'We have learnt what it means to give mandates; how to control those we give mandates to; and how to make sure they report back on what they have done. Co-ops can show that workers' control can work - that there is an alternative to capitalism'.

The major issue surrounding co-operative development is that of economic viability. James Taylor, a co-operative developer from the Montague-Ashton Community Centre (MAG), argued at the workshop that the greatest benefit to be gained from a co-op is the opportunity to earn a fair wage for a day's labour. This has an effect on the individual's ability to participate fully and positively in other aspects of community life.

Similarly, Roger Etkind argued that most people joined co-ops because they wanted a reasonable standard of living. Even if people joined co-ops for ideological reasons, 'daily life starts to wear away at the commitment if the price is a very low standard of living. People cannot live by ideology alone'.

But how possible is it to develop a viable co-operative sector in South Africa, where capitalist production is well developed and there is a severe shortage of skilled personnel?

Co-operative development requires major assistance in product choice, financial planning, marketing and skills training. Most people becoming involved in co-ops at the moment have few skills, have been marginalised by the economic system, or are in positions of economic inferiority. Co-operative members will be seriously challenged over how and where to learn these skills.

Zenzeleni has taken the decision to employ managers; Glen Cormack, for example, was previously personnel director at Tiger Oats baking

division. It may be realistic at this stage for co-ops to employ managers who are accountable to the workers. In the long-term, however, it will be important for management skills to be transferred to co-op members.

Co-ops may have to work closely with corporate training programmes, institutions involved in small business development and other services in the formal sector as one way of guaranteeing their success. Although this has not yet been fully debated by the emergent co-operative movement, it is a pressing and important problem.

Worker co-ops are emerging in a context where there is enormous emphasis on small business development within the framework of deregulation and free enterprise. Worker co-ops are based on very different principles from small businesses. However, some organisations are using the term 'co-operative' to refer to a whole range of activities, some of which bear no resemblance to an accurate definition of a workers' co-operative.

Co-ops face the danger of degenerating into small businesses, especially in a context where many organisations and interests are actively promoting small business. To avoid this process, co-ops will need the support of educational programmes which will enable the membership to understand the differences between co-ops and small businesses.

Basic educational programs which include literacy and numeracy will also be required if co-ops are going to be successful; democracy and workers' control cannot be built if participants are not in a position to take part in decision making. And literacy and numeracy are crucial in this regard.

The past few weeks have seen a number of meetings between representatives from Cosatu-linked co-ops. These meetings are to start working on issues such as the constitution of co-ops; ownership and control; marketing strategies; registration; and legal status. The next year will without doubt see further ongoing debate on the role of co-ops, as well as the birth of new projects.



Into the wilderness of mirrors

DAVID NIDDRIE looks at the path security police spy Olivia Forsyth followed in her attempts to infiltrate the African National Congress.

James Jesus Angleton, one-time head of counter-espionage for the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), called it 'the wilderness of mirrors'.

For Peter Wright, who spent his life trying to catch Soviet spies in Britain's MI5 security service, it is 'the place...where...lies are truth, truth lies, and the reflections leave you dazzled and confused'.

For Olivia Forsyth, Pretoria's secret soldier, it was a place where she discovered the meaning of being out in the cold.

It was a place where the approval and protection with which she was wooed into the secret army vanished when she needed it most. And where her friends and comrades sent her out alone and unarmed to face the enemy

- not once but again and again and again.

The lonely, unhappy teenager who left home to escape the chilly indifference of her mother, found ten years later that she was no closer to what she sought.

South Africans have been subjected to a barrage of interpretations of 'Operation Olivetti' in which Forsyth, police agent RS 407, was sent to infiltrate the African National Congress (ANC). Most of the interpretations have portrayed Forsyth as a daring, dramatic and exotic super-spy. Uncontested details are sparse. But the various accounts touch each other at enough points to give a relatively clear outline of what actually happened.

Forsyth left Pietersburg in 1978 to study at the University of the Witwatersrand. Her motivation, in the strangely formal language of the

statement she gave to the ANC after her capture, was: 'I wanted to be independent, particularly of my mother; if I could remove any dependence...I could develop relationships on an independent basis'.

The break was not easy. By the end of her first year on campus she had developed anorexia nervosa. And in her desperate need for new relationships, she found the willing support of bookmaker George Skordi, who gave her R50 a month towards the rent of her flat in Braamfontein. In exchange, says Forsyth, he demanded sex. She says she refused. He says he never asked. In any case, he continued sending her money for several months.

Forsyth continued her lonely route through university, completing her BA in 1980 and, the next year, joining the department of foreign affairs as a clerk. There she was easy game for Craig Williamson, a police major and deputy head of the recently-established police intelligence unit, department G1, who was trawling for likely security police agents. Williamson had been exposed two years earlier after graduating from campus spy to police agent in the Switzerland-based International University Exchange Fund. If her psychological profile made Forsyth an ideal agent - dependent and eager to please - she had an additional attraction for Williamson. He had been spotted as a future spy while still at school and carefully cultivated by Johan Coetzee, a friend of the Williamson family.

Forsyth's mother's second marriage was into the Brune family - Olivia became a distant cousin to Derek Brune, a police spy at Wits with Williamson. Forsyth was snapped up by the security police and, after several months of training, emerged the following year in Rhodes University's journalism department.

In the small-town incestuousness of Grahamstown, she moved steadily towards the centre of student politics - disappearing regularly every week to report her progress to an 'uncle' in Port Elizabeth.

Her record is impressive:

- * she chaired the Nusas (National Union of South African Students) local committee;
- * she served on the Rhodes students' representative council;
- * she edited the campus paper, *Rhodeo*;

- * she chaired the local End Conscription Campaign (ECC) structure;
- * she was elected treasurer of the campus women's group; and
- * she edited the Grahamstown *Voice* community paper.

These credentials and a growing reputation for promiscuity - motivated, according to an ex-colleague, by a need for affection rather than as a calculated tactic for winning confidences - enabled her to get relatively close to some important individuals in United Democratic Front (UDF) structures in the Eastern Cape.

This access may have been her crowning achievement as Agent RS 407: she told the *Sunday Times* shortly after returning to South Africa that 'the possibility exists' that she could testify in future court cases - one of them, in all likelihood, the long-awaited treason trial of UDF leaders in the Eastern Cape.

Even at Rhodes, however, she did not escape unscathed; suspicions were raised by student leaders - but she managed to divert attention by blowing other, apparently less valuable, spies: Andrew Hockley and John Handan.

But the suspicions lingered - at least in some circles. When she moved to Johannesburg in 1985 after completing her degree, she experienced some difficulty in gaining ready access to opposition organisations. Elsewhere, though, she retained sufficient credibility to be asked by members of the UDF-affiliated Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (Jodac) to give a reference on Joy Harnden, the journalism student Forsyth had recruited into the security police two years earlier. Harnden, a somewhat less competent agent, managed to find her way into both Jodac and ECC, but was spotted, quietly frozen out of important posts and finally expelled two years later.

Forsyth's handlers, meanwhile, were rethinking her future. She accepted a job in Johannesburg, then dropped it as the idea of 'Operation Olivetti' came together in Pretoria.

Forsyth was graduating to more serious spying. With what she later described as 'unshakeable...radical credentials' she was being pointed at the ANC.

The idea of 'Operation Olivetti' was simple: on behalf of the fictitious British-based company John

Fitzgerald and Associates (JFA), Forsyth would travel through the frontline states, recruiting journalists to write for a newsletter - similar to *Africa Confidential* or *SouthScan*. This would both give her - and the security branch - access to information, and would eventually put her in contact with the ANC.

To this end the team handling Forsyth set up a JFA branch office in Johannesburg, and in late 1985 the JFA Southern Africa representative, police agent RS 407, acquired a British passport (she was born in Britain) from the consulate there.

TRIP 1:

Forsyth then undertook a round trip through Harare, Lusaka and Dar es Salaam. From the embassy in Harare she got a second British passport, allowing her to travel the region freely.

She also began contacting journalists in Harare, asking them to write for JFA. This appears to have been her first mistake: the nature of their work makes journalists curious and suspicious people, and several began making inquiries about JFA.

Forsyth nevertheless made contact with the ANC - an official named 'Robert', whom later evidence suggests was a security operative. With her 'radical credentials', she offered her services. Although 'Robert' suggested she keep a low profile and avoid open contact with the ANC, she met Tom Sebina, the organisation's main media liaison official, in Lusaka.

On her return to South Africa, she and her handlers assessed her achievements, concluding that the trip had been only partially successful. She had made contact with the ANC, but they seemed keen on running her as an ANC agent inside South Africa. This would limit her potential to gather information, both as JFA correspondent and as an agent. In addition the extremely thin cover of JFA appeared about to collapse. Forsyth and her handlers decided, however, that JFA was still good for one more move. They agreed that it should 'instruct' Forsyth to establish an office in Harare, giving her an excuse to avoid being instructed to return to South Africa. They also felt she should begin to raise her own doubts about JFA in an attempt to

divert suspicion.

TRIP 2:

In December 1985 Forsyth returned to Harare, raising with 'Robert' the idea of moving to Zimbabwe. 'Robert' agreed but, in discussing Forsyth's new-found suspicions about JFA, another ANC official, 'Roger', introduced the first note of caution - saying an ANC investigation into JFA was not yet concluded.

It is not clear at exactly what point the ANC concluded that Forsyth was a plant. But by her own admission, she was in regular contact with Pretoria during her trips out of South Africa. Conventional security precautions would have required that the ANC keep at least a routine watch on her once she had made the offer to work for the organisation.

Such precautions enabled the ANC to identify another of Pretoria's little drummer girls, Odile Harrington. Evidence at Harrington's trial in the Zimbabwe Supreme Court indicates that the ANC undertook routine surveillance and, as a result, intercepted a letter to her handlers at John Vorster Square. Harrington is currently serving a 12 year sentence in Zimbabwe.

Forsyth was a more experienced agent than Harrington, but she was operating in hostile territory for the first time. Forsyth was, nevertheless, allowed to return to South Africa, where her handlers reluctantly concluded that the JFA cover was blown. But they also felt Forsyth could turn its failure to her advantage, repeating her own suspicions about JFA to divert possible suspicion towards her. It was a repeat of the Rhodes scam, in which she fingered Hockley and John Handan.

Forsyth and her handlers had high hopes for the operation. A month later, on January 19, 1987, Forsyth returned to Harare, planning to stay for six months. She was walking straight into a trap.

TRIP 3:

For four weeks Forsyth continued operating until, on February 16, the ANC pounced. Subjected to tough interrogation, Forsyth cracked, admitting to being a police spy. Under ANC

control, she contacted her handlers in South Africa the next day. In a subsequent statement to the ANC, she admits telling them: 'I was being sent to an unknown destination for about three weeks, for ANC people to decide where I was to be deployed and possibly to receive some basic training'.

Instead, she was taken to Lusaka for debriefing during which she blew several other spies, according to the ANC. Among them was Harnden, then achieving limited success in infiltrating ECC and Jodac, and Billy van Zyl, a police lieutenant operating undercover in Botswana.

Forsyth was attempting a tactic which had worked for her in the past - betraying others to save herself.

However, she remained fiercely loyal to her handlers, the men who had become the caring family she had never had. To preserve the security police operation she tried to persuade the ANC that during her years underground she had changed. She was now against apartheid and unhappy to be working for a racist regime, she said.

From this point on, the ANC had nothing to lose. They had in their control a police agent who had already given them vital information, and had blunted a major SB operation. And Forsyth was indicating her willingness to go home and spy on the SB. Common sense and standard espionage practice dictated that they would never trust Forsyth, or give her access to any information that mattered. But her change of heart *might* be genuine - in which case the ANC would gain a spy in the heart of South Africa's security service. Either way they came out ahead.

Forsyth was duly dispatched back home, 'the spy sent to spy on her masters'. The ANC, however, attempted to ensure that Forsyth's handlers did not decide to dump the whole thing - holding out as bait the possibility of sending the newly-purified Forsyth to the Soviet Union or East Germany for espionage training.

Forsyth's return to South Africa precipitated even greater tension among her handlers - already divided over control of the operation and with too much time, energy and prestige invested in the operation to kill it. Originally, in Grahamstown, Forsyth was run by a Major Oosthuizen and

his immediate superior, Brigadier Gerrit Erasmus. When she moved up to Johannesburg, they followed, moving to John Vorster Square. When the idea of 'Operation Olivetti' was mooted, police protocol over division of responsibility required that Derek Brune, by then a police major and Williamson's replacement in G1, be brought in.

Prior to this, Brune had been increasingly resentful of the Erasmus-Oosthuizen team's successes with Forsyth and other spies: intelligence gathering was G1's beat, and, technically, plain SB officers like Erasmus and Oosthuizen should have stayed out of it, Brune argued. Forsyth was, in any event, part of G1 - she suggests in statements to the ANC (extracts of which the ANC released



Forsyth in Grahamstown in 1985

last month), that she was its 'trump card'.

Brune attempted to seize control of the operation and claim whatever successes Forsyth achieved as his own.

Both sides in the administrative dispute, however, were pushing for results. Several senior police officers ('the brigadiers', according to Forsyth) were unhappy with the vast expense of an operation which had so far produced few concrete results.

In her report to her handlers, it is not clear whether Forsyth even acknowledged that she had been blown. In subsequent written statements to the ANC, she suggests she said nothing - limiting her report to saying JFA was under suspicion and should be dumped.

In her own account, drafted in January this year and with the benefit of hindsight, Forsyth suggests she actually wanted to be blown, that it was part of a long-term plan, known as

'Operation Yurchenko'.

Segeyevich Yurchenko, the man after whom Forsyth claims the operation was named, was a senior officer in the Soviet Union's KGB. He defected to the CIA in 1985, but defected back to the Soviet Union a year later.

While it is conceivable that Forsyth's handlers initiated such an operation, it is difficult to see what the point would be. By her own admission, Forsyth gained little information of value about the ANC, either before this point or after. Double agents - spies who have switched sides - are notoriously untrustworthy: having switched once, they could do so again. Intelligence agencies generally prefer to use them as sources of information and intelligence rather than the other way around. And if the SB could learn from Yurchenko, so could the ANC.

A final point is the name itself: to name an operation involving a triple agent after one of the world's best-known triple agents, would be foolish. It is similar to naming Olivetti 'Operation Infiltrate-Olivetti-into-the-ANC'.

Several trials over the past two years have demonstrated that the ANC has successfully run agents into the Security Branch. If, through agents not yet captured, the ANC picked up even a hint of an operation called 'Yurchenko' it would probably take no more than a few minutes to finger Forsyth.

'Yurchenko' thus bears all the hallmarks of a pseudo-operation constructed after the fact, to cover up an embarrassing failure.

It seems far more likely that the Forsyth Saga developed more along the lines Forsyth suggested in her statements to the ANC.

On her return to South Africa in May 1986, she told her handlers that JFA was blown but that she was making progress.

They were particularly taken with the idea of one of their agents receiving training in East Germany or the Soviet Union - they had taken the ANC bait, and been hooked.

Oosthuizen instructed Forsyth to downplay the failure of JFA in her written report to her handlers (something he would have been unlikely to do if Olivetti was merely a cover for Yurchenko) and to emphasise the chances of training.

The search for post-apartheid policies

Policy studies groups have been set up at most major South African universities to explore post-apartheid policies and strategies. But there has been little debate over the role they can play in moving beyond apartheid society. CEDRIC DE BEER and ERIC BUCH - both members of the Centre for the Study of Health Policy at Wits University's Department of Community Health - look at the limits and potentials of policy studies.



Policy studies can help promote change. But they cannot be a substitute for organisation and political struggle. The last few years have seen the flourishing of policy studies groups, usually attached to universities. These include general policy studies, such as the Wits Business School's centre, as well as sectoral units looking at health, education or welfare policy.

Different terms are used to describe this field of work. Some talk about development studies, some about post-apartheid research, and others about policy studies. But the purpose of the work is more important than the words used to describe it.

We use our experience of health policy studies to discuss the use and purpose of policy studies in general and how they contribute to the struggle for democracy and social justice in South Africa.

Questions which often arise in policy study units include: 'What is people's education?'; 'What is meant by workers' control of factories?'; 'How can equality between men and women be achieved?'; and 'What can be done to ensure that every South African has a decent home?'

Policy studies try to provide answers to these questions, and to help organisations of the democratic movement

identify strategies for promoting change.

Policy studies can, therefore

* help in the development of a clear vision of a future society;

* prepare for the period of post-apartheid reconstruction; and

* contribute to the development of strategies for change appropriate to present conditions.

Policy studies can *help* promote change, and develop a vision of the future. But they cannot substitute for organising and political struggle. Policy studies by themselves can change nothing; they become valuable only when put to use by a progressive movement.

In 1955 the Congress of the People adopted the Freedom Charter as a description of the kind of society the delegates would like to have lived in. This charter remains the most popular and best-known vision of a future South Africa, and has served as a rallying point for generations of activists.

For example, the charter calls for a preventive health scheme run by the state; and for free medical care and hospitalisation for all, with special care for mothers and young children.

But the charter does not explore the best way of providing affordable health care of reasonable quality to all South Africans.

Through their work at the Centre for the Study of Health Policy, members have come to believe that this can only be achieved within the framework of a national health service (NHS).

They have thus started to investigate in more detail how such a service could work.

This involves questions like:

* can an NHS be run efficiently so that it does not cost the state too much?

* how can it be made democratic, so that it is accountable to the community it serves?

* how can different kinds of health workers be encouraged to work together as a team to provide health care for all, rather than competing with each other as they do at the moment?

* how can nurses be freed from the oppression they presently suffer so that they can contribute fully to health care for all?

This work on a national health service is helping to develop a clearer vision of goals and awareness of the possibilities in the struggle for a people's health service.

Hopefully this will enhance the efforts of progressive health organisations to spread the vision of a people's health service to as many health workers as possible. The demand for a national health service can then take its rightful place on the political agenda.

Increasing numbers of health workers will come to see the value of a national health service and that it can only be fully realised in a democratic society. They may thus be encouraged to play a more active role in progressive movements for change.

An end to apartheid will not automatically mean jobs for the unemployed, or health care in expensive private hospitals

Policy studies can ensure that visions of the future are compatible with what that future can offer. A realistic sense of what will be possible under a future democratic government committed to increasing equality among all South Africans is important. Popular expectations should not be blocked; but neither should a belief be encouraged that an end to apartheid will suddenly allow everyone to have the best of everything. South Africa is not a poor country, and has enough material resources for all to be healthy and well-fed. But it is also not a rich nation.

The end of apartheid will not automatically enable all to live in luxury houses and drive expensive cars. Nor will there suddenly be jobs for all the unemployed, or health care in expensive private hospitals. One aspect of studying health policy is thus to determine how a future health service can be made to work well for us all, within the limitations a post-apartheid government will inherit.

For example, a future national health service cannot plan on the availability of an unlimited number of doctors. The state will not be able to train and pay them. This may mean that anyone who is sick will first see a nurse trained to diagnose and treat illness - and only if the nurse decides it is necessary, will the patient be referred to a doctor or a hospital.

This kind of limitation precludes a demand that everyone should have the automatic right to see a doctor when ill. Unrealistic demands could create expectations that a future government would not be able to meet.

The importance of developing a clear vision and future direction has been reinforced in meetings with health workers from Zimbabwe, Nicaragua and Mozambique. They tell of the difficulties of trying to build a 'people's health service' in newly-liberated countries. They had little idea where to start, and wished they had started thinking about the real meaning of a 'people's health service' before their countries achieved independence. Not only could they have planned better; they could have done a lot of work prior to liberation.

Frelimo coined the phrase 'A luta continua' - the struggle continues - in the early days of Mozambican independence. Frelimo was not talking about the war against Renamo bandits which was to come; it was saying that independence and formal political power are only one step along the road to total liberation. The slogan warns that the struggle to build democracy and create social justice just begins when a popular government takes power.

The day after a new government has taken power in South Africa, all the inequalities caused by apartheid will still exist; the under-developed bantustans, the squatter camps, the townships, the inequalities between black and white, the level of unemployment - none will disappear overnight.

And in trying to lead the process of change towards a just society, the new government could face other major difficulties. For example, South Africa may face serious economic strains as a result of years of political conflict, right-wing sabotage and terrorism, and a shortage of skilled manpower.

There are two ways policy studies can help to overcome these obstacles to transformation:

* by providing - in advance - information a post-apartheid government will need to make the best use of resources to meet legitimate demands; and

* by facilitating action now that will help to reduce the size of these problems in the future.

Policy studies related to medical doctors provides a good example of how these contributions may occur.

South Africa's powerful medical profession is generally conservative, and likely to oppose the creation of a national health service. If an NHS was forced on them as they are today, many doctors might leave the country, while others might try to sabotage the democratic health service. A new government would have to decide how to deal with this problem. It could move slowly in the creation of a national health service, trying to win and keep the support of most doctors; or it could act rapidly - and risk losing many doctors and their skills which a health service requires. Both of these options are unsatisfactory. What policy researchers can offer is assistance in finding a better solution which will both allow rapid change, and encourage most doctors to participate in an evolving health service.

This involves surveys among doctors to see how strongly they would oppose an NHS, how many might leave, and how they could be encouraged to stay and contribute. Policy researchers can also help by working out how to run a health service if a large number of doctors do suddenly leave the country.

Another important area involves convincing doctors that an NHS is a desirable option. If they can be convinced of that now, more are likely to help implement changes in a national health system.

In this way, policy studies can provide the necessary vision of the future and prepare for social change and reconstruction.

A third value of policy studies lies in the development of strategies for change.

Political struggle is not just about the transfer of political power from the apartheid regime to majority popular representation. It also involves the building of a democratic future today, even while living under undemocratic and authoritarian conditions. That is why students and parents demand improvements in the education system

now; why health workers demand that hospitals should be desegregated now; why trade unions demand better wages now, not just in some post-apartheid future. In organising to achieve these demands, organisations are strengthened. They not only win short-term victories that begin to build the future; they also gain the strength needed to make other demands.

Unions have built their strength organising around short-term demands concerning wages, working conditions, representation and recognition, safety at the workplace, and so on.

Policy studies cannot substitute for political struggle, but they can help develop strategies for change

They have won victories, won support, gained in strength, and developed the power to confront the larger issues.

Other progressive organisations have started to act along similar lines. The National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), for example, has presented educational demands on behalf of students and their parents, and civic associations have started to negotiate around rent and other local issues.

Progressive policy studies can contribute to this process in at least three important ways:

* by offering the detailed analysis of the system which progressive organisations need;

* by identifying weak points in the system; and

* by working with progressive groups to develop strategies for action.

The health sector offers useful examples in all three cases.

A detailed analysis is needed of the system. For example, nurses are the largest group of workers in the health sector, but they are a conservative sector which has not played its part in the struggle for change. There are current moves to organise nurses, and research

into their non-participation in and attitudes towards trade unions can provide organisers with the detailed information they require to choose the most appropriate organising strategy.

Policy studies can also help to identify weak points in the system. Knowing where the system is weak identifies where pressure can be applied to force changes. For example, the present health care system is broken up into many different pieces: ten 'homeland' departments of health, three 'own affairs' departments, a general affairs department, local authority health services, provincial health services, services for Africans, for whites and so on. The system is confused, fragmented, and very expensive. The state cannot easily defend this apartheid-based health care system. This creates the space to reveal problems caused by apartheid health care, and to win new allies in the call for a single national health service.

Finally, policy studies can contribute to the development of strategies for action by community groups. For example there are community structures which hope to run campaigns demanding better health care. They understand the grievances of their members, and policy studies can help them understand the nature of the system they are tackling, give them information to make their campaign more effective, help them to formulate the most appropriate demands and, if necessary, undertake the specific studies or investigations they require to develop their position. This support can also help them offset attempts by the authorities to confuse or defuse the issues and thereby undermine their campaigns.

This article has focused exclusively on the value of policy studies. But there are other issues that need to be confronted, including the relationship between the researcher and the community, the resources required to do adequate policy studies, and the need for research to be of the highest scientific standards.

Clearly there is a value in policy studies which can contribute to effective organisation. But they are not a substitute for effective organisation, and policy research can never be a substitute for the political and community leadership which is part of organising for change.

Towards a single labour federation

On March 4 and 5 worker representatives from 43 unions met at a workers' summit to discuss their opposition to the Labour Relations Amendment Act (LRA), and more importantly, to put national union unity firmly on the agenda for 1989. This indicated some optimism after a difficult year for labour in 1988.

Although unions have been able to operate more or less as they did before the new LRA was implemented late last year, the future of the labour movement is definitely under threat. The state and capital are bent on smashing trade union militancy and further eroding the right to strike. It is in this climate that unions have come together with a more positive and mature attitude to working-class unity.

More than 700 worker delegates joined forces at the summit, held at Wits University. The meeting - the first of its kind in this country - made concrete recommendations and proposed a plan of action for dealing with the LRA.

In his opening address, Cosatu president Elijah Barayi pointed out the significance of the meeting: 'Many things have kept us apart, but our coming together is a powerful statement that our differences are nothing compared to our commitment to working-class unity'.

And Mlindelwa Kwelemtini, representing 11 Nactu affiliates, noted that 'unity is an ongoing process and a hazardous task. The battle cannot be won easily or the victory gained cheaply.'

'As it is now, the first move by Nactu affiliates has already caused ripples', he said, referring to the affiliates' decision to attend the summit despite Nactu's absence.

Ironically it was Nactu which initiated the call for a summit, and its 11th-hour decision to pull out caused divisions in its own ranks - apparently exacerbated by ideological differences between Africanist and black consciousness adherents.

The Nactu decision could affect the future unity of the federation.

Although Mlindelwa stated that the 11 unions attending the summit did so as 'full-blooded Nactu affiliates' and not as 'rebels', the possibility does exist of broader unity being forged between Cosatu and individual Nactu affiliates, rather than Nactu as a federation.

One of the major focuses of the summit was the extension of

of a new LRA. This version of the LRA - which will extend rights to sectors currently excluded from the act - will be submitted to employer groups by May 2. If employers fail to make positive progress towards meeting the demands within 30 days, the unions will declare a national dispute and ballot for a national strike.

The summit also recommended that unions explore ways of not using the industrial court, which has lost credibility among workers. It further suggested that workers and the community should be mobilised around the campaign, and that it should be linked to the Unemployment Insurance Fund Campaign. This campaign is intended

to mobilise support for 'a living UIF', with vastly improved benefits, in much the same way as the Cosatu Living Wage Campaign.

Interestingly, the structure of the summit meant that debates around the LRA went directly back to union membership. Since the three-day stayaway last year, opposition to the act took the form of negotiations between union leadership, lawyers and capital, with little or no worker participation. Because of this, action on the ground largely collapsed.

The summit, with only worker participation irrespective of union or federation, aims to base the campaign on the factory floor. Full-time trade union officials were excluded from



The worker summit - a step towards union unity

bargaining rights to workers in sectors such as agriculture and state structures, who are not covered by the existing LRA. As Lawrence Phate of the Orange-Vaal Workers Union said: 'While most of you have been struggling against amendments to the LRA, farmworkers are not even covered by the original act. Add to this over half a million state workers, one million domestic workers and half a million para-statal workers. We must include these sectors in any campaign around the LRA'.

This call was taken up in the plan of action prepared at the summit, in terms of which a committee was appointed to coordinate the drafting

the summit apart from a small secretariate, whose only task was to record and translate the minutes of the proceedings. This aspect of the summit gave meaning to the concept of working-class leadership. Also noticeable was the equal representation given to Cosatu and Nactu unions.

The LRA is the major focus for the labour movement this year, and even unions normally considered conservative are joining ranks with militant workers in their struggle.

The workers' summit, one of the most significant demonstrations of worker unity in South Africa to date, is seen as the start of a process of

building a single union federation for all workers in South Africa.

Industrial action since the LRAA

During the period under review (October 15 1988 to February 24 1989) WIP monitor recorded the following:

- * Number of legal strikes - 18
- * Number of workers involved - 9 390
- * Number of illegal strikes/ stoppages excluding public sector strikes - 15
- * Number of workers involved - 13 997.



Cosatu - still demanding a living wage

Together with the public sector strikes, the number of workers engaged in industrial action exceeded 40 000. The momentum of industrial action has remained more or less the same since June last year, with no significant change in the pattern of strike action. This means the number of legal strikes has not necessarily increased since the LRA was amended.

According to the WIP monitor, over 95 % of strikes were over wages and working conditions. Unions traditionally followed procedures and embarked on legal action.

In the public sector, the tendency towards wildcat strikes is continuing, spreading rapidly to all provinces.

Recent cases involved Sarhwi/railway and harbour workers, Nehawu/hospital workers and others employed by the Natal Provincial Administration and HWU/hospital workers. As yet, no company has succeeded in suing unions for damages during strike action, although threats have been made - the most recent case being Ccawusa and Benoni Spar Food Hyper, where the company is attempting to sue the union for R40 000 for profits lost during an allegedly illegal strike.

Repression and attacks

Attacks on the labour movement continue unabated. Union offices throughout the country are visited on a regular basis, in some cases up to three times a week. These visits involve police looking around offices making comments, or the questioning of workers or unionists - either in the offices, or at police offices. WIP's repression monitor noted over 17 cases of police visits to union offices around the country. There were three cases of union offices destroyed in arson attacks.

There has also been an upsurge in anonymous pamphlets being sent to workers. A recent one, *Trade Union Update*, very cleverly slandered NUM, and *Trade Union Tit Bits* attacked several unions.

Police intervention in strikes has been on the increase since last year. There were at least five cases of police intervention during strike situations. Recent cases included the SAB/Fawu strike, Nampak Paper Industries/Ppwawu and Nampak Corrugated Industries/Ppwawu.

Retrenchments and relocations

The number of companies moving to deregulated zones or the homelands has increased since last year, particularly among smaller companies. Some businesses prefer operating in the homelands - where there are bans on trade unions,

exemptions granted in terms of minimum wages, and lower standards in working conditions, health and safety conditions, and employment benefits.

But with relocation comes retrenchment - in most cases the entire South African-based workforce. Workers end up without jobs and minimal retrenchment payments. Some bosses have offered to maintain their workforce, but have done little to assist with their relocation costs. In a case involving Numsa and Sidley Manufacturing, the company offered to take 94 employees to Pietersburg, where it was relocating in a deregulated zone. But the company was not prepared to provide housing for the workers and their families.

At least eight companies relocated during the period under review, and over 800 workers were retrenched as a result. With the increase in this trend, unions are looking at formulating conditions for companies intending to relocate.

The Industrial Court

In the past, unions had some faith in labour law; but since September 1, this seems to have faded. Labour lawyer John Brand said his company has noted a decrease in court applications from unions, while employers seem to be flooding the courts. The main reason for this seems to be the ease with which employers can obtain court interdicts against strikes and other industrial action under the new LRA. Two noted cases involve BTR Dunlop/Numsa and Transportation Motor Spares/ Uamawu. In the first case, the court intervened in a legal strike and granted the company a court order barring the strike.

In the second case, the court granted the company an interim order against a strike and the union was given only two hours after receipt of the order to comply with it. The company dismissed the workers two hours after the order was delivered to union offices. In this case, where the court has legally approved of a dismissal - without giving the union ample time to respond.

Strikes and Disputes: October 14, 1988 to February 24, 1989

| Strikes and Disputes: TRANSVAAL | | | | |
|--|---------------------------|---------|----------------|---|
| Company | Union | Workers | Date | Events and outcome |
| Almex Elandsfontein | Numsa | 200 | 30.10.88 | More than 200 jobs were lost with the closure of Barlow Rand's Aluminium Extrusion Company, Almex. The union was forced to accept a retrenchment package which included four week's pay, one week's pay per year of service and one week ex-gratia pay. |
| Angus Hawken Rosslyn | Numsa | 60 | 24.02.89 | About 60 workers at Angus Hawken were retrenched when they refused to move to Bophuthatswana with the company. The company was relocating to Magwase in the homeland. There the average wage in the industry is R1 per hour and trade unions are forbidden. A retrenchment package was negotiated between Naawu and the company in 1987 when the Company first announced its intention to close its Rosslyn factory. |
| Benoni Spar Food Hyper Benoni | Ccawusa | 50 | 06.02.89 | Benoni Spar Food Hyper, the fourth company to attempt suing unions using the 'damages clause' in the Labour Relations Act, issued Ccawusa with a R40 000 letter of demand. The claim was for profits lost during an alleged illegal strike. The union's attorneys were handling the matter. |
| Bophuthatswana Transport Holdings Pretoria | Tawu | 400 | 01.11.88 | Bophuthatswana Transport holdings and Tawu concluded a recognition agreement covering the union's members in the company's Pretoria branch. The agreement followed a long battle between Tawu and the company. In 1987 the entire workforce went on strike in Bophuthatswana and in Pretoria over recognition and 200 strikers in Bophuthatswana were detained. However, employees in Bophuthatswana are still not covered by the present recognition agreement. |
| Bosal Africa Plant 1 Pretoria | Numsa | 500 | Nov 1988 | Numsa declared a dispute over the company's intention to sub-contract its transport division. Five workers faced retrenchment if the company sub-contracted. The union decided to hold a ballot to determine workers' feelings. |
| Bosal Africa Plant 1 Pretoria | Numsa | 500 | 09.02.89 | Workers stopped work and demanded the dismissal of a white manager whom they allege used a company vehicle and employees during working hours to do private jobs. Workers resumed work after six hours when management agreed to investigate the matter. |
| BMW & 5 other multinationals | IMF | | Jan 1989 | BMW, Bosch, Hella, Mercedes-Benz, Siemens and Volkswagen - West German multinationals operating in South Africa - have agreed in principle to accept the IG Metall code of conduct for labour relations for South African subsidiaries. SEE BRIEFS - WIP 56/67 |
| Elida Ponds | CWIU | 250 | 06-07.02.89 | This Unilever subsidiary obtained a court interdict against strikes and overtime bans by CWIU members. Workers had been protesting management's refusal to proceed with wage negotiations. In October last year the union proposed wage negotiations, but management insisted on discussing the issue of overtime bans at the company instead. At the time, workers in one department were on an overtime ban over a problem with their manager. |
| Ellerines | Ccawusa | 1 500 | Feb 1989 | Ccawusa claimed Ellerines was in the process of retrenching 1 500 employees at over 200 stores without negotiating with the union. Ellerines management denied that there was any 'organised retrenchment' and said each store made independent decisions about employing or retrenching staff. The company had a national staff complement of 7 400 at 291 stores. |
| Eskom | NUM/Numsa/EWU | 24 000 | Dec 1988 | After arbitration Eskom and three unions reached a wage settlement. The unions disputed a 10% increase granted to general workers in July last year, which brought the minimum wage to R612 a month. In terms of the agreement, general workers were given an additional 2% backdated to July 88, and a further 5% increase effective from January 1, 1989. The minimum wage was increased from R612 a month to R653,50 a month. |
| Eskom | Numsa/NUM/13 other unions | 5 300 | Nov 1988 | Eskom and 13 of the 15 unions recognised by the company reached agreement on a retrenchment package. Retrenched workers received compensation amounting to seven twelfths of their annual wage or 5% of the accumulated basic wage. Numsa and NUM, representing 20% of the unionised workforce, rejected the package. They said Eskom gave inadequate reasons for retrenchments and made no effort to discuss alternatives. The Cosatu unions proposed a reduction in working hours from 45 hours a week to 40 hours. |
| Everite Fibre Cement Division | CAWU | 3 000 | 10.02.89 | Everite Fibre Cement Division, a Swiss multinational, implemented its wage offer after reaching deadlock with the union, despite the union's application for a conciliation board to resolve the dispute. Workers demanded hourly wage increases of R1,03 across the board; a 40-hour working week; June 16 as a paid public holiday; and a 35% reduction in the production rate in the moulded goods department. Everite implemented wage increases of between 50 and 78 cents depending on workers' grades. The union was awaiting a conciliation board hearing. |
| G & W Base & Industrial Minerals | CWIU | 220 | 07-08.02.89 | Workers staged a two-day stoppage demanding the re-instatement of a dismissed worker. Prior to the stoppage workers embarked on a legal overtime ban. |
| Haggie Rand Germiston and Jupiter | Numsa | 1 800 | 19.09-28.10.88 | The six-week lockout at Haggie Rand ended after a settlement in which management increased its wage offer by 5c an hour in exchange for the withdrawal of a service bonus offer. During the dispute the company, known to be a union basher, threatened to dismiss 1 800 workers who refused to accept the wage offer and asked 800 workers to vacate the company hostel. |

| | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------|---------|----------------|---|
| Kelloggs Springs | Fawu | 162 | Sept 1988 | Believing that the LRAA distorted the balance of power against unions, Kelloggs management undertook - in writing - not to implement certain clauses of the Labour Relations Act. The relevant clauses include: the entire unfair-labour-practice definition; time-scales for applying for conciliation boards; the clause giving parties the right to object to publication of industrial court judgements; the assumption that unions - unless they can prove the contrary - are to be accountable for the unlawful actions of individual members, officials and office bearers, thus facilitating civil action for damages against them. |
| Kwanda Door Frames Marble Hall | Seiwusa | 1 | 15.02.82 | Frank Maebel, chairman of Nactu's shop steward executive committee in Marble Hall, was dismissed for holding a lunch hour meeting to discuss the injuries workers had sustained while on duty. Management accused Maebel of organising strikes and fired him after he refused to sign a declaration admitting this. |
| Memix Carbonless Krugersdorp | Ppwawu | 100 | 13.02.89 | Legally-striking workers were granted a supreme court order allowing them access to the company canteen after management had refused to allow them in. The company failed to obtain an order to evict the strikers. Ppwawu was demanding an increase of R2 across the board against management's offer of 50c to 70c. Memix is owned jointly by Mondi and Nampak. |
| Nashua Midrand | Ccawusa | 51 | Oct 1988 | The supreme court ordered 51 striking workers at Nashua to stop interfering with the conduct of the business, and intimidating or assaulting workers. Nashua obtained the court order in a bid to end the strike, which it claimed was causing the company damages of R45 000 per day through lost sales. |
| National Forsyth Isando | Numsa | 141 | 09.12.89 | The company retrenched 141 workers and relocated in Qwa Qwa. Workers were offered two weeks pay per year of service up to 15 years and a sum of R500 for time worked thereafter. |
| Panorama Bookshop Pietersburg | Mwasa | 16 | 11.02.89 | Panorama Bookshop refused to negotiate a recognition agreement with Mwasa until the union stated its position on sanctions and disinvestment. The union declared an official dispute and applied for a conciliation board. Initially the company insisted the union's correspondence should be in Afrikaans. After agreeing that correspondence could be in English, the company said that unless the union clarified satisfactorily its position on sanctions, it would not proceed with recognition negotiations. Mwasa has been trying to get the company to negotiate since October 1987. |
| Penrose Press Johannesburg | Mwasa | 150 | 13.02.88 | Mwasa referred this wage dispute to the Industrial Council for the Printing and Newspaper Industry. Management's final offer was R24 a week across the board against the union's demand of R80 a week. The minimum wage at the company stands at R115 a week. |
| Pepsi | Fawu | | Nov 1988 | Fawu and Pepsi reached an agreement in an attempt to get around some clauses in the LRAA. The agreement provides for the following: compulsory and binding arbitration over any dispute of right; deadlocks in negotiations over substantive issues, such as wages, must be referred to mediation, thus ignoring LRA procedures to refer disputes to conciliation boards. If mediation fails the parties are obliged to meet at least once more, following which, having given 10 days notice, industrial action could be taken. Pepsi has also undertaken not to dismiss strikers provided they follow the agreed procedures and adhere to detailed behavioural standards. |
| Perskor | Mwasa | 212 | 30.01.89 | Perskor obtained a suspension of a January 23 supreme court ruling ordering it to re-instate 212 workers with pay, pending a review application. The workers were dismissed last June after a four-day wage strike. By January Perskor had employed another workforce to replace the strikers. |
| Photra Johannesburg | Ppwawu | 110 | 24.10-12.12.88 | Workers ended a seven-week legal strike after accepting a wage offer of R110 across the board and a minimum wage of R700 per month. The increase was backdated to September 1, 1988. Management tried to break the strike by using white and coloured scabs and announcing retrenchments. The union fought against the retrenchments, but could not save 21 workers' jobs. |
| Samcor Pretoria | Numsa | 3 000 | 16-18.11.88 | Three thousand workers downed tools for three days over management's failure to dismiss two foremen allegedly caught stealing, saying senior staff and workers should face the same disciplinary procedures and penalties. The dispute was referred to arbitration. |
| Seifsa | Metal unions | 350 000 | Feb 1989 | Annual wage negotiations in the metal industry scheduled to start on March 20 will cover 24 000 more workers than last year. Trade unions submitted proposals for increases of up to 98%, and in an unusual development Seifsa also submitted a series of demands. Numsa proposed a R5 an hour minimum wage for the industry. This amounted to a 65% increase, including a 17% increase for artisans in the top grade. Numsa will be representing 105 000 workers this year. The CMBU proposed increases ranging from 20% for the top grade to 24,5% for the bottom grades. Eawtusa proposed a minimum rate of R6 an hour, amounting to a 98% increase on the current minimum. Seifsa proposed: a clause protecting employers from being compelled by unions to negotiate company level agreements; scrapping the 10-hour-a-week limitation on overtime work; and removing restrictions related to the employment of artisans. Negotiations were due to commence on March 20. |
| Sentrachem | Sacwu | 3 000 | Nov 1988 | Last February's landmark industrial court decision which found Sentrachem guilty of wage discrimination, has been set aside by the supreme court. At the time, the industrial court ruling was seen as a precedent for other employers who practice racial wage discrimination. The supreme court upheld the IC finding that racial discrimination is an unfair labour practice but found insufficient evidence to prove that Sentrachem was guilty of practicing it. However, Sentrachem's undertaking to spend money to get rid of wage discrimination showed the company's acknowledgement of discrimination, said David John, who gave the IC ruling. |
| Shell and Mobil subsidiaries | CWIU | 275 | Feb 1989 | Two hundred and seventy five of the 300 CWIU members at Shell and Mobil plants voted in favour of industrial action over the demand for industry-level bargaining. Workers at Shell Chemicals and Mobil refinery in Durban declined to vote as 'they were not |

Strikes and Disputes: MINES

| Company | Union | Workers | Date | Events and outcome |
|------------------------------------|---------|---------|-------------|--|
| Bracken, Buffelsfontein and Leslie | NUM | 4 500 | Jan 1989 | NUM declared disputes with three Gencor mines over the retrenchment of 4 500 miners. NUM claimed the retrenchment negotiations were made in bad faith and that inadequate notice of retrenchment was given. The mines failed to consider NUM's proposed alternatives aimed at minimising the retrenchments. NUM was also not satisfied with the severance payouts. |
| Chamber of Mines | MWU | | Oct 1988 | In the first labour appeal court case filed by the Mineworkers Union, the court upheld the industrial court judgement that the union had committed an unfair labour practice by refusing to allow its members to train coloured workers as winding engine drivers. |
| Chamber of Mines | CMU | | Jan 1989 | A dispute between the Chamber of Mines and the CMU over the de-racialisation of the Mine Employees Pension Fund was expected to be referred to industrial court after a conciliation board failed to resolve the dispute. The CMU refused to admit black, coloured and Indian employees to the fund if they held jobs for which whites were qualified. |
| De Beers Premier Mine | MWU/NUM | 1 133 | Nov 1988 | The industrial court rejected an urgent application by Premier Mine for an order compelling 1 113 workers to work 'reasonable and fair' overtime. The court ruled that the workers' refusal did not represent an unfair labour practice. |
| Ergo | NUM | | Nov 1988 | In a controversial judgement the industrial court ruled that Ergo committed an unfair labour practice last year by offering employees a bonus if they waived their right to strike over a wage dispute. The court ordered Ergo to make up the discrepancy between strikers and non-strikers pay, which would cost the company R530 000. The case arose out of the August 1987 wage strike, where management backdated a proposed increase by a month for non-strikers. |
| Mintek | NUM | 250 | 05-18.01.89 | Two hundred and fifty out of 280 Mintek employees went on strike demanding a 30% wage increase and the granting of June 16 and May 1 as paid holidays. After a two-week strike workers accepted increases of between 14% and 22% backdated to July 88. |
| Phalaborwa Mining | NUM | 2 000 | Feb 1989 | Phalaborwa Mining and NUM reached a wage agreement which the union views as a good start to its 1989 living wage campaign. Increases ranging from 13,5% to 23% were granted, setting the minimum monthly wage at R650. The agreement also provides for improved service and shift allowances, recognition of traditional doctors, improved annual leave, paid leave on May 1 and unpaid leave on June 16. |
| Zincor | NUM | 600 | Oct 1988 | Goldfields Zincor and NUM reached a wage agreement ending a three-week lockout imposed by the company. The union accepted the company's final wage offer a 12% increase on the current minimum; a death benefit scheme and a shift allowance. |

Repression and attacks: October 14, 1988 to February 24, 1989

OCTOBER

07.10.89 - NUM's regional OFS office was raided and documents were removed. A union official was taken in for questioning.

31.10.88 - Cosatu's Wits regional secretary, Ariel Mabalane, and Julia Frans, a Ccawusa member, were picked up by security police in Katlehong. Mabalane was released the next day but Frans was held under Section 29 of the emergency regulations.

NOVEMBER

The Springs Cosatu office was raided and two Cosatu diaries confiscated.

Police ransacked the Kimberley Cosatu regional office. The staff were packed into one room and questioned about union activities.

15.11.88 - Temba Mabusa, a full-time Fawu shop steward at Funa Foods, was detained for a few hours and released after being questioned.

25.11.88 - Union offices occupied by CWIU, TGWU, Fawu, Numsa, Sadwu and Ppwawu were burned in an arson attack.

DECEMBER

17.12.89 - East London union offices belonging to Actwusa, Fawu and CWIU were set alight. Fawu and CWIU recently moved in after their offices were burned in November. Fire did not cause extensive damage.

25.12.88 - Cosatu local chairperson in East London, Billy Shiyani, Sadwu organiser Jeff Wabena and Human Rights lawyer Hintsa Sikwisa were shot and seriously wounded. Two of their female companions were shot dead. The incident occurred in East London.

28.12.88 - A Lieutenant Pelser visited NUM's Klerksdorp regional office claiming that workers had intimidated a white woman in town. He threatened to arrest a union official.

29.12.88 - Lieutenant Pelser, accompanied by another security policeman visited the Klerksdorp office again.

JANUARY

NUM's regional Free State leadership were taken in for questioning. Security police wanted to know about NUM's year plan for 1989.

Richard October, a Ppwawu organiser, was briefly detained and interrogated during a strike at Nampak Corrugated containers in Epping. Four workers were also arrested during the strike and released on R500 bail each.

Security police visited the Cosatu Regional Office in Port Elizabeth several times in January.

Police visited the Cosatu regional office in Kimberley and arrested a Sarhwa organiser. He was released after a few hours of questioning. A week later, the police arrived again and took the regional secretary in for questioning.

The offices of CWIU, Actwusa and Fawu in Trade Union House in East London were completely destroyed in a second arson attack on the building.

01.01.89 - Security police raided Nactu's Pietersburg offices.

11.01.89 - Security police visited the Watervaal homes of two Bawusa officials and threatened to detain them if uprisings in the township should occur.

13.01.89 - Lieutenant Pelser again visited NUM's Klerksdorp office and questioned union officials.

22.01.89 - Cosatu Regional Congress in Port Elizabeth was watched by police who parked out-

side the hall.

29.01.89 - Police were again present outside the hall during the continuation of the Cosatu Regional Congress in Port Elizabeth.

30.01.89 - Cosatu's regional chairperson in the Western Cape, Lookington Ndongeni, was arrested on suspicion for robbery. A few days later, he found several policemen looking around his back yard late at night.

FEBRUARY

08.02.89 - Security police visited Cosatu's Kimberley office again and took Onious Digetsi, a Nehawu organiser, in for questioning. The same evening security police searched Digetsi's house using metal detectors.

08.02.89 - NUM organiser, Arthus Mohale, was stopped by security police in Galeshwe township and ordered out of his car at gunpoint. Security police spent a long time searching his car.

09.02.89 - Cosatu research and information officer, Raghmat Omar, was detained for two days and released on R500 bail. He is still awaiting charges.

16.02.88 - Security police visited the Cosatu regional office in East London.

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