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**XENOPHOBIA IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN THE
NELSON MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE.**

BY

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF**

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ABSTRACT

The central thesis pursued in this study is that xenophobia and its violent manifestation thrive in post-apartheid South Africa owing to contextual dynamics chiefly characterized by normlessness and weak law enforcement. The scourge of xenophobia and its attendant violent reaction to the presence of foreign citizens in immigrant receiving countries, such as post-apartheid South Africa, is not only a threat to global peace and security, but also an impediment to achieving our full humanity and a common future. Therefore, this study aimed to investigate the contexts and manifestations of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. The study endeavoured to achieve the following objectives: to explore the underpinnings of xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa; to expound the manifestations of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa; to investigate the effectiveness of agents of social control in dealing with xenophobia; to suggest interventions to address xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, and to discuss, if any, integration deficits experienced by foreign nationals. The overarching theoretical framework that was utilised in this study was constituted by the following frames: labelling theory of deviance; social control theory of deviance; learning theory of deviance; and social construction theory – these are theoretical frames situated in the theoretical field of sociology of deviance. The multi-faceted and complex nature of the phenomenon under investigation evidently necessitated a methodological approach and design strategy involving the utilisation of a qualitative research approach and methodology. Qualitatively, the data was collected through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, key informants' interviews, and secondary data sources. The study revealed, amongst other things, that: the expression of the xenophobic sentiment and associated violence in contemporaneous post-apartheid South Africa was underpinned and driven by a potpourri of factors, amongst which are negative attitudes, perceived competition, perceived fear and illusions, inflammatory xenophobic rhetoric from government representatives, national

identity, and afrophobia; and that xenophobia manifested itself through violent behaviour, prejudice and discriminatory behaviour, hatred, labelling, and impunity. Another revelation of this study was that immigrants (particularly black African immigrants) were socially constructed as deviants by society and official agents for social control purposes. Once labeled, the label sticks with disastrous and violent consequences. This situation is exacerbated by the liminal status that immigrants, particularly Black African immigrants, occupy in the post-apartheid South African context. Additionally, the study revealed that law enforcement agents were perceived to be ineffective in dealing with xenophobia, and violence. In response to the findings the following recommendations are made: training and capacitating agents of social control; conscientising society about migration policies vis-à-vis the rights of foreign nationals; coming out with novel strategies to job creation; inculcating the spirit of Ubuntu in young children; embracing the pan-African spirit ; making immigration policies more humanising; mainstreaming xenophobia in social and learning institutions' curricula; and engaging in perennial research on xenophobia.

DECLARATION

I, Vusumzi Duma, hereby declare that this thesis entitled “*Xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa: A case study in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality, Eastern Cape*” is my original work and has never been submitted in any other institutions, and that, all the sources used in this document have been acknowledged.

Signature



Date: 18/05/2022

Witnessed by Supervisor

Professor Simon M. Kang’ethe

Signature



Date: 24 May 2022

DEDICATION

I dedicate this research project to my parents, George (deceased) and Florence Duma, and to all the members of my extended family who have supported me in this intellectual journey.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank GOD for guiding me throughout this journey.

I also want to thank my supervisor, Professor S.M Kang'ethe, for directing this study to a successful conclusion.

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CHAPTER ONE

ORIENTATION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The central thesis pursued in this study is that xenophobia and its violent manifestation thrive in post-apartheid South Africa owing to a dynamic context chiefly characterized by normlessness and weak law enforcement. The scourge of xenophobia and its attendant deviant and violent reaction to the presence of foreign citizens in immigrant receiving countries is not only a threat to global peace and security, but also an impediment to achieving our full humanity and a common future. It is an undeniable fact that the expansion of the global capitalist system has not only cultivated a multinational system of production and circulation of commodities, but has also had the concomitant consequence of promoting global migration and accelerated the perennial circulation of transnational migrants. The accelerated circulation of people has, in turn, resulted in the deposition of millions of immigrants in various immigrant-receiving countries. The rapid flows of immigrants have elicited different reaction in terms of reception and treatment of immigrants – in global, continental, and national contexts. In the global context, the deposition of waves of immigrants has been accompanied by a staggering upsurge of racism, xenophobia, and contemporaneous struggles and conflicts over the meaning of a nation (Brodkin, 2000; Ariely, 2011; Thomas and Clarke, 2013) and the issue of citizenship and national membership (Wimmer, 1997; Neocosmos, 2006). The intensification of these struggles may reach genocidal and holocaustic proportions. The pogrom-like attacks of Muslims in Bosnia, as well as the incendiary murders of Jews in Germany epitomise the dreadful effects of the circulation of people and rising xenophobia. The movement of people across international boundaries and within countries, and the conflicts arising from this, is also something that the African continent has witnessed.

If one casts their one's eyes in continental Africa, xenophobia has sometimes taken the form of ethnic cleansing as well as actions aimed at genocide. Nyamnjoh (2006) argued that globalization was a process that had been characterized by accelerated flows and, paradoxically, accelerated closures. He (2006: 2) opined that in the African continent: "The flow of goods, people, and capital has only exacerbated the insecurities and anxieties of locals and foreigners alike, bringing about an even greater obsession with citizenship and belonging". The manifestation and dynamics of xenophobia in this context have evinced in struggles between the 'insiders and outsiders' (Nyamnjoh, 2006) over what Wimmer (1997) refers to as the 'collective goods of the state'. The point I am attempting to asseverate here is that the mass circulation of people coupled with the dissolution of boundaries has not only hardened local attitudes towards foreign nationals, but has also simultaneously triggered violent and deviant strategies of excluding those deemed to be nonindigenous. Mamdani (2010) argues that there was a time when conflicts between the indigenous and nonindigenous resulted in the latter running in the direction of home, but now, the tendency is for them to fight it out – the trend is for the nonindigenous to arm themselves in self-defense. How has xenophobia manifested itself in the South African national context?

Nowhere in Africa have we witnessed the most intense and violent episodes of xenophobic violence than in South Africa (Commeey, 2008). The shocking waves of the 2008 and the current 2015 post-apartheid xenophobic practices directed to especially immigrants of African origin paint a bleak and a gloomy picture for the South African nation and its future relations with its neighbours. It is highly probable that South Africa will be revisited by the most deviant, violent, and virulent forms of xenophobia. There are numerous contextual factors that underpin the dynamics and expression of xenophobia and its associated evils of chauvinism and violence. Firstly, the country's weakening law enforcement system provides a perfect context for the

fermentation, sprouting, and proliferation of the xenophobic sentiment. Secondly, after 20 years of South Africa attaining independence, the triple challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment continue to rear its ugly head in the midst of the black majority. This unwarranted situation has stimulated a heightened sense of economic vulnerability and insecurity among the native population. This, in turn, has engendered opposition by the natives towards non-natives deemed to be an economic threat – whether this threat is real or imagined. Thirdly, in the South African context, immigrants (particularly black African immigrants) are socially constructed as deviants by society and official agents for social control purposes. Once labeled, the label sticks with disastrous and violent consequences. This situation is exacerbated by the liminal status that immigrants, particularly Black African immigrants, occupy in the post-apartheid South African context. Fourthly, the ‘wave of denialism’ that pervades much of current government thinking about the state of xenophobia in South Africa can be regarded as a contributing factor to fanning further the flames of xenophobia. Finally, many scholars have talked about xenophobia, ‘the point is how to eradicate it’. If the epidemic is left unattended, the consequences will be too ghastly to contemplate. Painstakingly, Xenophobia has the capacity to reverse the democratic gains made by South Africa, negatively affect investor confidence, and put the country at risk of being summoned to the ICC for committing crimes against humanity. All these point to the fact that South Africa has a grave problem.

1.2. PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

In this section, some of the relevant literature on the subject matter is reviewed at a preliminary level. A detailed review of related literature accompanied the substantive study sequel to this chapter. I briefly reviewed related empirical and theoretical studies conducted in South Africa and

in other parts of the world in endeavoring to understand the diverse manifestation of the complex and multi-faceted phenomenon of xenophobia.

1.2.1. Globalisation, immigration, and xenophobia

Extant theoretical literature (Harrison 1999; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Kersting, 2009) has extensively documented the interface between the expansion of the global capitalist system and consequent deposition of millions of trans-migrants, and how this, in turn, had triggered a virulent anti-immigrant sentiment and violence in immigrant-receiving countries. Harrison (1999) argued how the process of globalisation had tightly integrated the world into a nexus of transnational fields, and yet how the self-same ‘integrated world’ had produced, with heightened intensity, differences (Adesina, 2019) in cultural and racial identities. In a similar vein, Kersting (2009) submitted that the global economic order had greatly enhanced the mobility of capital and labour (Segal, 2019), triggering international migration on an unprecedented scale, and simultaneously reinvigorating national identities and local cultures. In short, this meant that globalisation had constructed a system in which borders reflexively open for capital and close for people (Younge, 2015). Missing from these theoretical discourses was a tendency to ignore the fundamental contradictions of globalisation – overzealous promotion of the free movement of commodities that is accompanied by aggressive policies aimed at restricting the free movement of people. These discourses also tended to be limited in that they did not address the issue of how macro-structural processes influenced the actions and behaviour of micro-agents in society. In other words, by exploring the interface between economic globalization and the consequent deposition of millions of trans-migrants, and how this, in turn, triggered a virulent anti-immigrant sentiment and violence in immigrant-receiving countries. Therefore, this study examined how the xenophobic attitudes which individuals harbour, and the violent xenophobic behaviour could be explained in terms of

macro-structural factors. Following this heuristic path helped this researcher to advance explanatory models on xenophobia.

1.2.2 Xenophobia, racial prejudice and national identity

Extant empirical studies on xenophobia and violence in South Africa report that South Africans do not treat all immigrants and migrants the same. Attitudes have been particularly inhospitable towards black African immigrants (Dodson & Oelofse, 2000; Crush, 2000). South Africans are not only highly xenophobic and opposed to immigration, also, certain groups of immigrants are at the receiving end of discrimination, intolerance and violence. Why, in the words of MacLaughlin (1999, cited in in Ormrod et al. 2018), do we obtain a situation where there is a ‘vilification of some immigrants’ and the concomitant glorification of others? These studies on xenophobia and violence in South Africa have not examined this variation further by conducting an in-depth analysis to investigate what aspects of race and nationalism influence xenophobic attitudes towards foreign citizens. Such an analysis will have to extend to examining how South Africa’s history of racial prejudice continues to influence the categorisation and hierarchising of people in society – a history that ‘involved a wholesale re-identification and differentiation of peoples’ (Mamdani, 2010).

1.2.2. Poverty and growing social inequality

Immigrants have been deposited in socioeconomic contexts characterised by high levels of poverty and inequality. In such contexts, the arrival and settlement of immigrants has evoked protests from locals that the new arrivals will ‘compete’ for jobs and welfare resources with them. Furthermore, this thesis may not augur well with the locals who may feel betrayed by their government and the foreigners. Several cross-sectional have reported the perception that black African immigrants, in

particular, are responsible for stealing jobs, ‘causing crime’ in the country, and ‘bring disease’ (Dodson & Oelofse, 2000; Crush, 2000). Another study by Facchini et al. (2011) investigated the determinants or drivers of individual attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa utilising individual-level data from the 1996 2001 and 2007 rounds of the World Values Survey. More specifically, this study empirically investigated the question of whether individual attitudes on migration are affected by the potential labour market competition of migrants towards natives. The study concluded that the impact of economic factors was positive and significant. The preceding studies present the danger of the ‘ecological fallacy’, that is the error where an analysis of aggregated group data is utilised to draw conclusions about an individual. Studies that accentuate the ‘competition for jobs’ argument also absolve the army of xenophobes from taking responsibility for their inhumanity towards foreign citizens. One dangerous implication of this kind of a research argument is that it is the state or government that is guilty of xenophobia and not the people – the state bears responsibility for the xenophobic and violent reactions of the people (Jalusic, 2002, Akinola, 2018a). In fact, this research argument is just a proxy for a much more sinister process that usually unfolds in immigrant-receiving country context: the process of socially constructing immigrants as people who ‘steal jobs’, ‘drain the receiving country’s welfare system’, and ‘bring diseases and crime’. This constructed rhetoric is often accompanied by the utilisation of derogatory epithets to label foreign nationals. These labels would work despite the absence of an essence in them (Appiah, 2009). There is a need to investigate how the process of constructing immigrants in this way drives the negative public sentiment towards immigrants in South Africa.

1.2.3. Xenophobia and deviance

According to Polzer and Takabvirwa (2010), since the 2008 xenophobic events, sporadic and intermittent bouts of xenophobic violence and other forms of deviant behaviour continue to be

directed at foreign nationals living in South Africa. Several studies (Cawo, 2011; Charman & Piper, 2012; Vromans et al. 2011) have investigated xenophobic violence in South Africa. They have found out that the anti-foreigner sentiment against African foreign citizens may not be xenophobic, but rather be underpinned by widespread criminality and local people's disregard and flagrant violations of the laws of the country. These findings are embedded in 'culture of crime' argument. The 'culture of crime' thesis is as good as it goes, but it leaves a particular gap – it does not explain how the process of socially constructing immigrants as deviants sets the stage for the latter to be labelled, stigmatized, and then violated – the present study wishes to address the particular gap that exists in both empirical and theoretical literature pertaining to xenophobic violence. This study will propose a processual model explanation of xenophobic violence by utilising insights from classical sociological theories of deviance. Such a proposed model will explain how certain socio-economic conditions often lead people to label others as deviants with disastrous and violent consequences (Clinard & Meier, 2010). What is the problem?

1.3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Globally, regionally and in national contexts, xenophobia remains a very serious and cancerous worm that needs to be annihilated altogether if ever the world community is going to have a perpetual and a sustainable peace. Apparently, the environment of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa, in the contemporary epoch, suggests that the phenomenon could be embedded in various (or serious) underlying contexts. This study wishes to find out the underpinnings or the drivers of the contemporaneous state of xenophobia in South Africa, and how different shades of xenophobia manifest themselves. The study needs to find out how effective are the agents of control in dealing with xenophobia as well as what interventions are in place to address xenophobia in South Africa. Lastly, the study would like to explore the integrations experiences of foreign

nationals. I believe that empirical investigations of these aspects are likely to bring to the fore how xenophobia in the post-apartheid South Africa is experienced as well as come with interventions to address it.

1.4.RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES

1.4.1. Aim

The aim of this study is to investigate the contexts and manifestations of South African post-apartheid state of xenophobia, with the following specific objectives:

1.4.2. Specific objectives

- To explore the underpinnings of xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa;
- To expound the manifestations of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa;
- To investigate the effectiveness of agents of social control in dealing with xenophobia;
- To suggest interventions to address xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa; and
- To discuss, if any, integration deficits experienced by foreign nationals.

1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What underpins the contemporaneous state of xenophobia in South Africa?
- How does xenophobia manifests in contemporary South Africa?
- How effective are the agents of control in dealing with xenophobia?
- What interventions are in place to address xenophobia in South Africa?
- What are the integrations experiences of foreign nationals?

1.6.STUDY ASSUMPTIONS

Payne (2014) defines a hypothesis as a tentative statement about a relationship between variables, and a statement that one aims to accept or reject at the end of their research. Put differently, it is a statement that a researcher creates in order to assist him or her to predict a certain outcome. It is therefore an educated guess about a predicted outcome (Strode 2015). A hypothesis is testable and can be shown to be correct or incorrect. Through the process of hypothesis testing, the researcher is able to determine whether his or her speculation or prediction was correct or incorrect. A hypothesis is, therefore, a statement that specifies a relationship between two or more variables: Hypotheses are utilised by researchers pursuing a quantitative methodological path, and delving more deeply into this subject is beyond the realm of this study.

In the current investigation, I elected to use ‘study assumptions’ instead of hypotheses owing to the fact that the study is qualitative research approach.

According to Bezuidenhout (2014), an assumption may be defined as an unconfirmed initial statement about the nature of human existence, phenomena, and a theory or a belief in a theory. I simply assumed that something was true or false without any evidence. This assumption, therefore, was just an unproven, or not yet tested, beliefs about phenomena or issues. In the current investigation, I had made the following assumptions:

- Xenophobia in South African context is underpinned by deviant disposition;
- Poverty and its ramifications remain a critical driver of xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, and
- Xenophobia is exacerbated by the ineffectiveness of the agents of social control.

1.7.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The literature on the phenomenon of xenophobia straddles many intersecting theoretical traditions, conceptual frame, and disciplinary boundaries. Consequently, a study of this nature had to employ various theoretical frames to substantiate the empirical and theoretical arguments that were pursued in this investigation. The overarching theoretical framework that was utilised in this study was constituted by the following frames: labelling theory of deviance; social control theory of deviance; learning theory of deviance; and social construction theory – these are theoretical frames situated in the theoretical field of sociology of deviance. Additionally, owing to the multi-faceted nature of the phenomenon under investigation, eclectic conceptual frames gleaned from the discourses of globalization and the nationalism are also utilized.

1.7.1. Sociological theories of deviance

Clinard and Meir (2004, cited in Meier 2018) are of the view that deviance also refers to differentiation, and the conditions that promote differentiation in society also promote deviance. Conditions that increase differentiation also likely boost the degree and range of social stratification by increasing the number of criteria for comparing people. Those comparisons often result in invidious distinctions, or ranks, that identify some characteristics as more highly valued than others. Edwin Lemert (1981), cited in Barmaki (2019) concurs with above viewpoint by arguing that ‘deviance’ deals with differentiation – how people become differentiated. Any attempt to understand xenophobia and violence directed towards black African immigrants in South Africa has to examine this phenomenon from the theoretical perspective derived from the sociology of deviance. Specifically, the sociological models of deviance focus on how social structure generates deviance. Most importantly, they point to the fact that deviance is a socially constructed phenomenon – it is a socially created condition. In this dissertation research, three specific

sociological theories of deviance are going to be utilised to explain the phenomenon of xenophobia and violence against immigrants in South Africa: the labelling theory; control theory of c attitudes, and the learning theory of deviance. Black African immigrants are *labelled* so as to be *controlled*, and their *human rights violated* by the host society. Clinard and Meir (2004 cited in In Meier 2018) contended that labelling theory proffered a processual explanation of deviance in that it stressed the importance of the process through which society defined acts as deviant and the role of negative social sanctions in influencing individuals to engage in subsequent deviant acts. This theory accentuates the dynamics of social definitions that label particular activities or persons as deviant, and the role official agents of social control play in this. The process of labelling and categorizing certain people as deviants performs important social control functions. Clinard and Meir (2004 cited in Meier 2018) contended that the control theory of deviance based its arguments on the central principle that deviance resulted from an absence of social control or restraint. Control theorists propose different causes for this lack of control, but they agree that a reduction on control – for whatever reason – will generate more deviance by freeing people to follow their ‘natural’ inclinations”.

Specifically, the learning theory of deviance contends that deviant or criminal behaviour is learned from within subculture and among peers. One of the well-known proponents of the learning theory of deviance is Edwin Sutherland (1939) who came up with an explanation of deviance which he termed ‘differential association’. The gist of Sutherland’s theory of ‘differential association’ is that people learn to be deviant by interacting with significant others. Finally, eclectic conceptual frames gleaned from the discourses of economic globalization and national identity were used to buttress the dominant theoretical framework utilized in this study.

In conclusion, by utilizing the dominant theoretical frames derived from the sociology of deviance, I was able to comprehend how societally-constructed processes of labelling and demonizing of others consequently lead to their humanity being violated with disastrous and violent consequences.

1.8.METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH APPROACHES

The multi-faceted and complex nature of the phenomenon under investigation evidently necessitated a methodological approach and design strategy involving the utilisation of a qualitative research approach. The qualitative approach was the most appropriate methodology to use in the sense that this study sought to understand, explore and describe people's behaviour, themes in behaviours, attitudes or trends; or relations between people's actions (Davis 2014). A qualitative research approach is a valuable methodological option to utilise when empirically examining complex phenomena. This is a methodological path which enabled me to unveil and unearth the internal logic of individuals that potentially affects human attitudes and behaviours. A qualitative approach to research allows a researcher to uncover the real, but sometimes hidden, underpinnings of a social phenomenon (Davis 2014). By digging deeper and deeper into the intrinsic realm, a researcher is able to shed light and illuminate the meaning of the complex phenomenon under investigation. The methodology to be utilised in this investigation includes the research design, the methods of data collection, and data analysis.

1.8.1. Research design

Given the interdisciplinary nature of the research problem, and the qualitative approach chosen to investigating it, I decided to utilise a case study design to satisfy the qualitative approach. This is where a few samples have been investigated to generate in-depth data on the thinking, attitudes,

views of people on the contexts of xenophobia and other concomitant ramifications surrounding it (Creswell 2014).

1.8.2. Research methods

This investigation on the diverse contexts, dynamics, and manifestation of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South African society was conducted using a variety of complementary research methods: The qualitative research design employed in this investigation necessitated the utilisation of a number of data-collection methods, namely in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and secondary data methodologies.

1.8.2.1. In-depth interviews

In-depth interviewing was utilised as a technique for gathering data in this investigation. The technique of in-depth interviewing was linked to the purpose of the study in that it was intended to enable the researcher to unearth the underpinnings and manifestations of South African post-apartheid state of xenophobia. The research strategy of utilising this data-gathering method of in-depth interviewing was based on both ontological and epistemological grounds (Minichiello et al. 2008). In other words, my understanding of what is ‘social reality’ and how it ought to be studied influenced the selection of this research method. One possible advantage of this strategy was that it facilitated a highly interactive role, on the part of both the researcher and the informant, which in turn, generated a mutually collaborative approach.

1.8.2.2. Focus group discussion

Focus Group Discussion method of data-collection was used in this investigation as it was ideally suited to obtaining relevant data on how labelling and demonising of foreign nationals is inextricably linked to xenophobia.

1.8.2.3 Secondary data sources

The secondary data sources were obtained from published journals in social science journals, books, and media sources. This was an appropriate method to use in exploring the underpinnings and manifestations of South African post-apartheid state of xenophobia. Documents can serve to confirm, buttress, rebut, and contradict data that has been gathered through other means (Salkind 2003, Tight 2019). Media reports on xenophobia, for example, are a veritable treasure trove for researchers interested in unearthing the contextual and dynamic underpinnings of xenophobia. It would have been a chimera to ignore these legitimate sources of data.

1.8.3. Research instrument

1.8.3.1. Interview guide

An interview guide, consisting of unstructured questions, was employed as a primary data-gathering instrument in gathering qualitative data. The unstructured questions contained in the interview guide were framed in a way that would create a conversation between the informant and the researcher. This conversation allowed me to pose questions to informants with a view to learning and eliciting more information about their views, opinions and beliefs (Strydom and Bezuidenhout, in duPlooy-Cilliers et al. 2014) about the phenomenon of xenophobia. This conversational approach will, in turn, offer sufficient opportunity for clarification of points, and detailed explanation of issues and factors that informants think underpin the phenomenon of xenophobia.

1.8.4. Population under study

The study population consisted of all South African citizens and foreign nationals who were eighteen years or older. The population included all men and women living in both the urban and

rural areas of South Africa, as well as people in institutionalised settings such as students studying at institutions of higher learning in the country. The population, as a standard practice, excluded South Africans who were incarcerated, and those who were hospitalised. The study population also included provincial and local government officials who acted as agents of social control and law enforcement.

1.8.4.1. Research domain

This investigation on the context and manifestations of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa was conducted at the Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan municipality. The municipality was selected as a study area because it had recently bore witness to the spate of xenophobic and violent attacks on foreign nationals and their businesses.

1.8.5. Sampling methods and procedure

A non-probability sampling method was utilised in this investigation. Based on the overarching purpose of this study, namely to investigate the contexts and manifestations of South African post-apartheid state of xenophobia, the samples for the qualitative design data were selected purposively. I used my judgement to select, for inclusion in the final sample, individuals who were knowledgeable about the clear and present danger posed by xenophobia to foreign nationals. The sampling universe normally included all citizens age 18 and older. As a standard practice, people living in institutionalised settings, such as students in dormitories, patients in hospitals, and persons in prisons or nursing homes were excluded.

1.8.5.1. Sample selection criteria and procedure

In this investigation on the contexts and manifestations of xenophobia, I utilised the following criteria in selecting the final samples: all South African citizens and foreign nationals who were

eighteen (18) years or older; foreign nationals who have lived in the country for at least two years with previous immigration experience/record. In addition to these variables, the informants were selected for a number of reasons, namely that they were agents of social control, agents of law enforcement, they had knowledge about the dangers of xenophobia, and for their readiness to participate in this survey on xenophobia, be they South African or foreign nationals.

1.8.5.2. Unit of Analysis/Sample size

The following stakeholders/informants were interviewed: 50 foreign nationals; 42 members from the local population. In addition, key informant in-depth interviews were conducted with one provincial Department of Home Affairs official (Home Affairs officials, as agents of social control, play an important role in the process of social differentiation), two councilors from the ruling and opposition political parties, and one official from the local office of the South African Police Services (agents of law enforcement are critical in efforts directed at combating the scourge of xenophobia). Several different versions of the interview guide were administered to each of these individuals, and stakeholder-specific questions were included. In addition, two focus group discussion interview guides were administered to a group of five individuals consisting of academic staff, postgraduate students who were foreign nationals, ordinary people, and law enforcement officials (these individuals were knowledgeable about the clear and present danger posed by xenophobia to foreign nationals and locals). The details about the size and who was included in the study sample are presented Table 1 and Table 2 below.

Table 1.1: Interview table

No	Interview sample	Inclusion/exclusion criterion	No. of Informants interviewed

1	Foreign nationals	knowledge about the dangers posed by xenophobia and willingness to participate in the study	50
2	Locals	knowledge about the dangers posed by xenophobia and willingness to participate in the study	42
3	Provincial Home Affairs official	Agent of social control	1
4	Political parties		2
5	South African Police Services	Agent of law enforcement	1
TOTAL			96

Table 1.2: Focus Group Interview table

No	Focus Group Interview sample	Inclusion criterion	No. of Informants interviewed
1	Foreign nationals	knowledge about the dangers posed by xenophobia and willingness to participate in the study	5
2	Locals	knowledge about the dangers posed by xenophobia and willingness to participate in the study	5
Total			10

1.8.6. Data presentation and analysis

In specific terms, thematic analysis was used with the assistance of coding to expedite analysis of data obtained. In this method of data analysis, researchers normally examine written documents or

transcriptions of recorded verbal communications (Minichiello et al. 2008). In essence, thematic analysis refers to any technique for making inferences by systematically and *objectively* identifying themes, and special characteristics of messages (Berg and Lune 2018). Specifically, both the *manifest content* and the *latent content* of messages were analysed. In other words, the *surface structure* present in the message and the *deep structural* meaning conveyed by the message were looked at in the interpretation of messages (Berg & Lune 2018). The issue is that whenever a researcher interprets passages of transcripts, the researcher can choose to do either manifest or latent content analysis, or both. As the researcher reads between the lines, he or she must ask whether his or her reading is consistent with the informant's perspective (Minichiello et al. 2008). In analysing the qualitative data, I summarised, collapsed and reorganised the data in order to discover concepts and themes contained within it.

1.9.SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This investigation of the context and manifestations of South African post-apartheid state of xenophobia, and the inhumanity and violence wreaked by this phenomenon, is significant for a number of reasons. First, an approach to understanding the phenomenon of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa cannot ignore the complex process of how the social construction of immigrants as deviants drives the negative public sentiment towards them. Very few studies have extended their analysis to include the complex reality of how labelling and stigmatisation of foreign citizens undergirds the expression of xenophobia and the concomitant virulent violence. Therefore, there is a clear deficit in studies that aim at examining the link between labelling, xenophobia, and violence.

Secondly, this study adds a new heuristic tool to the existing explanations of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. This study immerses the explanation of xenophobia in the classical

sociological theories of deviance, particularly the control theory of deviance whose central thesis is that deviance results from an absence of social control or restraint. The enforcement of the law by the agents of social control is, therefore, critical in efforts directed at combating the scourge of xenophobia and violence. A societal environment where there is a general absence of social control or restraint is likely to cultivate and promote a climate conducive to the spread and perpetuation of xenophobia and violence.

The third reason why this study is significant is that in the contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, xenophobia is a topical issue that requires continuous investigating and explaining. The present study was significant in the sense that it made contribution in that direction. The more we study the scourge of xenophobia, the better we will become in minimising its destructive effects. Thus, the significance of this study is that it adds to the body of knowledge regarding xenophobia and violence. This information could be helpful to government officials, civil society, and researchers as they strive to unearth the root causes of xenophobia, and strategies to minimise it.

Fourthly, as was stated in the review of related literature section, most of the studies in the area of xenophobia in South Africa treat the causes of xenophobic violence as something that is psychological and cultural, and not societally or structurally induced. The analytical path to be chosen for this proposed study helped address this apparent shortcoming of the extant theoretical and empirical literature on xenophobia.

Finally, one of the significant and potential contributions of this proposed study was to propose strategies for combating xenophobia, violence, and general antipathy towards certain categories of immigrants by searching for answers from the sociology of deviance.

1.10. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This investigation on the contexts and manifestations of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa observed a number of packages of ethical considerations. First, the researcher complied with the regulations of the University of Fort Hare governing research with humans. Permission was sought, and obtained, from the University of Fort Hare to ethically me to carry out this investigation (Ethical clearance certificate number – REC-270710-028-RA Level 01). Secondly, study participants were formally informed about the purpose of this investigation, and this researcher ensured that they clearly understood what was required of them during their participation (Louw, 2014). Afterwards, the consent of the study informants to participate in this study was requested. A consent form guaranteeing the rights of the participants in this study was developed, and each participant was asked to familiarise him/herself with it before signing. The completion of the consent form was a clear indication that the participant agreed to voluntary participate in this investigation.

Thirdly, an important concern for study participants is the protection of their identity and sensitive information about themselves (Louw, 2014). Therefore, it was imperative for this researcher to assure study participants confidentiality and anonymity. Study participants were requested, at all times, not to provide any personal and confidential information by which they could be identified. In addition, I undertook not to record the names of the study participants at any stage of the investigation, and not to match their identity to their research response (Louw, 2014). Fourth, the current investigation was guided by a basic ethical consideration of ensuring that no study participant suffered harm or injury. I ensured study participants that they were under no obligation to respond to interview questions that their personal dignity was injured. Lastly, the informants were informed of how the data was to be stored and used (Babbie, 2015), and feedback on the

findings of this investigation was provided to all the study participants by way of written documents.

1.11. THE STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

Chapter One: Orientation and Background of the study

This chapter provided the introduction and background to this study.

Chapter Two: Immigration Policy in South Africa: A Brief Summary

This chapter summarised the policy environment regulating immigration in South Africa.

Chapter Three: The Context of Xenophobia and Afrophobia in South Africa

This chapter discussed the context of xenophobia and afrophobia in South Africa.

Chapter Four: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

This chapter presented the theoretical framework utilized in this investigation.

Chapter Five: Research Methodology and Research Design

This chapter discusses research methodology, and research method utilised in this study.

Chapter Six: Data Analysis, Presentation and Interpretation

In this chapter, the collected empirical evidence was presented, analysed, discussed, and interpreted.

Chapter Seven: Study Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter discussed conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

IMMIGRATION POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA: A BRIEF SUMMARY

2.1. INTRODUCTION

The reviewing of literature pertinent to this investigation proceeded along these dimensions: first, a brief summary of the policies regulating immigration into South Africa was provided (chapter 2); second, some eclectic theoretical and empirical insights on the dynamic contexts and factors underpinning the expression of the xenophobic sentiment in South Africa were discussed (chapter 3) and; third, the diverse theoretical and conceptual frames utilized to buttress the empirical findings of this investigation were elaborated (chapter 4).

Conventional literature review chapters usually attempt to immerse the topic under investigation into the extant theoretical and empirical discourses. The literature review chapters demonstrated that the researcher was conversant with the theoretical, empirical, and conceptual debates that informed the research problem. I argued that there were two ways of reviewing literature: the first one was to do so thematically, and the second way was ‘to play the greatest hits from ‘Saturday night fever to Staying alive’. In other words, one can review literature by examining the main thematic ideas focusing on a particular topic, or the greatest works of individual scholars who wrote on a specific subject.

I believed that any literature review exercise should demonstrate the fact that one is conversant with the theoretical discourses within which the research topic was immersed. In developing this point further, Howard (2014:101) stated that the main purpose of literature review was “... to put the research study at hand into perspective, to determine what previous scholars have written on the topic as well as to identify the main models and theories that are relevant to your research

study. The purpose is also to discover any relevant material that could enhance the research”. Although I did let this statement speak for itself, it was imperative to accentuate the fact that the literature review chapter should exhibit evidence that the researcher was familiar with the theoretical, conceptual, and empirical discourses within which the research topic was situated. In addition, Creswell (2014) opined that a literature review aimed at providing a framework for establishing the importance of the study. I wished to amend Creswell’s comments by stating that the ideal aim of this literature review chapter was to endeavour to immerse the empirical problem into extant theoretical and empirical discourses by way of reviewing relevant literature. A corollary of the preceding purpose was to provide theoretical substantiation to the empirical evidence that was utilised in this investigation. In order to improve the heuristic value of this literature review, the researcher simultaneously conducted theoretical and thematic types of literature review. Moreover, the interdisciplinary nature of this investigation on the diverse contexts and dynamic manifestations of xenophobia evidently necessitated a review of literature that straddled many intersecting theoretical traditions, and disciplinary boundaries. Consequently, a study of this nature had to employ various theoretical frames to substantiate the empirical and theoretical arguments that were pursued in this investigation. No study of xenophobia would do justice to this topical issue without examining the legal and policy framework that regulated the movement and reception of immigrants in destination countries

2.2. POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Surveying the entire policy landscape in which the regulatory framework on immigration is grounded is beyond the purview of this dissertation. Instead, what I did was to proffer the contours of such a policy landscape. The policy environment and the subsequent legislative arrangements originating from it constitute a bedrock upon which the societal construction of immigrants should

be viewed. This policy environment would determine either the positive or negative evaluations of immigrants in the host country. I commenced the discussion of the environment which influenced immigration policies by focusing on two contrasting worldviews.

2.3. TWO CONTRASTING WORLDVIEWS

These two philosophical worldviews, which are polar opposites, could help us comprehend the policy environment pertaining to immigration and the contextual dynamics that underpin the manifestations of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. A worldview is nothing else but a set of assumptions (which may be true or false) that people hold (Vidal, 2008), either consciously or subconsciously, concerning how the world is fundamentally made up. People may be harbouring these true or false ideas about the world in a consistent or inconsistent manner. Matthews (2016) expatiates on this by arguing that a worldview or cosmology is something that serves to orient a community to its world, in the sense that it defines, for the community in question, the place of humankind in the cosmic scheme of things. Such cosmic orientation tells the member of the community, in the broadest possible terms, who they are and where they stand in relation to the rest of creation. A community of people, for example, may be oriented towards the idea that they are ‘God’s chosen people on Earth’, and their racial purity ought to be strongly preserved in order for them to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. Needless to say, such a community of people will maximise efforts directed at preventing at all costs contact with those deemed not to belong to such a community. The crux of the argument I am making here is that immigration policies are conceived or born out of a complex interplay or relationship between cosmology or worldview and the socio-ecological habitat in which the host people live. The boundaries of such a habitat could either be marked by rigidity or elasticity in terms of determining community membership.

2.3.1. ‘Sedentarism’ versus ‘nomadism’

In the light of the preceding comments, it is not surprising to observe that throughout human history, all sedentary populations in various societies and communities have attempted to exercise some controls over the movements and behaviour of nomadic populations. In pursuance of such a goal, these sedentary populations (Riccio, 2000; Oeppen, 2016) developed policies whose intentions were to ‘insulate’ and protect the primordial identity and cultures of the sedentary populations against the ‘corrupting’ influence of the cultures of the nomads. The preceding essentialist notion of ‘sedentarism’ was grounded on the worldview of individualism— a worldview which bred anti –Traveller racism. This worldview disparaged people who led nomadic lifestyles by travelling the world. These people were denigrated as barbarians and ‘immorals’ who were prone to licentious behaviour. In supporting the preceding idea, McLaughlin (1997 cited in Fanning, 2018) suggested that nomadism, including transhumance, and seasonal migration, were characteristics of ‘barbarous’, underdeveloped and ‘uncivilised’ societies. The ‘autochthons’ who inhabit the contemporary post-apartheid South Africa also denigrate those fellow foreign-looking nomads travelling into the country. The ‘indigenes’ contend that people with such nomadic lifestyles had no place in the civilised and democratic post-apartheid South Africa. This is the environmental context within which the preceding worldview operates, and it is premised on what Connell (1997 cited in Kang’ethe and Duma, 2014) calls the twin notions of ‘global difference’ and ‘progress’.

2.4.THE NOTION OF THE ‘OTHER’

In developing this thesis, I now borrow Connell’s (1997 cited in Kangethe and Duma, 2014) idea of ‘global difference’ – a notion that was often conveyed by a discussion of the so-called ‘origins’. Conservative social scientists writing on this theme often argue that there are some members of

the human race (for example, Africans) who are still trapped in the first stages of the process of evolution. In order for these people to get out of their miserable condition, they would have to imitate and emulate the Europeans who have already passed through this stage for them to become civilised. Expressed in its most rudimentary and simplistic form, the idea of ‘global difference’ goes like this: *we* are at an advanced stage, and *they* are in the original stage where *we* were before. *We* are the ‘metropole’ and *they* are the ‘Other’. In these essentialist discourses, the ‘Other’ is often perceived to be ‘culturally different’ from the ‘*we*’. In Wimmer’s opinion (2015), what we obtain here is the perception of incompatibility and unbridgeable cultural distance. The sedentary population, in this instance, would pursue a policy approach aimed at restricting interaction between itself and the nomadic groups who were viewed as ‘culturally indigestible’.

2.5. Restrictionist versus admissionist immigration policy preferences

Restrictionist or exclusionary immigration policies (Peberdy, 2001; Hultgren, 2014) constitute a fertile climate for constructing those deemed to be ‘other’ as deviants or criminals. The presence of the ‘other’ is regarded as something that could potentially lead to degeneracy and contamination of the host community’s total way of life. Evidently, a country in which a restrictionist immigration policy environment is pursued would encourage the cultivation of a climate resulting in the process of differentiation between the local and immigrant populations. This would be a fertile climate for the production and proliferation of negative constructions of immigrants.

Other immigrant-receiving communities took a different approach to that of restrictionism - they pursued admissionist (Ford et al. 2015) policy preferences. These communities permitted the travelling groups to blend into the host population, and thus become fully integrated. This policy guideline was predicated on the worldview that the integration of the new arrivals would help to improve the host population stocks in dynamic ways, resulting into the rebirth and renewal of host

communities. A collectivist worldview is predicated on the following assumptions: that all racial and ethnic groups are equal, and belong to a common humanity; that people are interdependent on one another, and should live in harmony with each other, and that cooperation with, and mutual co-existence with other cultural groups is of paramount significance. The ideological values underpinning the collectivist worldview are, amongst others, mutual empathy and provision of a sense of belonging and family. The reception of immigrants in these countries would assume a more liberal, inclusive (Ford et al. 2015) and admissionist approach.

I argue that modern states have not veered off widely from this 'beaten paths' of utilising policy instruments to control and regulate the movements of immigrant arrivals. In fact, immigration policy preferences in major immigrant-receiving countries have oscillated or vacillated between a restrictionist approach and an admissionist one. The policy outcome of these two approaches has been the evolution of legislative instruments designed either to ostracise or integrate immigrants in host communities. It is against this brief background that the various international, continental, and national policy and legal instruments utilised to deal with migration should be looked at. I now wish to examine global, continental, and national conventions and protocols that regulate the movement of people across national boundaries.

2.6. MAJOR UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON MIGRATION

The proper point of departure for assessing and appreciating fundamental policies that regulate the movement of people across international boundaries is to revisit the United Nations' (UN) conventions and principles which define the fundamental rights of migrants. Such an exercise would hopefully assist me in ascertaining whether post-apartheid South Africa's policies and legislation meet the requirements or standards set out in the United Nations' conventions. The 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and the updated Protocol adopted in 1967 are

key documents that prescribe the duties and responsibilities of member states in ensuring the protection of the fundamental rights of international human migrants.

2.6.1. 1951 Convention

The preamble of the 1951 Convention accentuates the legal protection, other forms of assistance, and the universal human rights that refugees (Barichello, 2016) should obtain from all the host nations that have ratified this convention. Most importantly, the preamble of this truly universal instrument accentuates the international legal obligation for all host countries not to force refugees to return to a country where they fear persecution. Specifically, the articles constituting this Convention address a number of issues pertaining to the following: non-discrimination; wage-earning employment; housing; public education; freedom of movement; administrative assistance; access to courts; self-employment; social security benefits, and many other personal, juridical, welfare; employment, and administrative matters (Sharpe & Namusobya, 2012). A perusal of this Convention evidences a clear intent to protect the material and moral interests of immigrants in the host country.

2.6.2. International Convention on the protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and members of their Families

Another policy instrument that the United Nation has developed to assist the international community to deal with immigration is the International Convention on the protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and members of their Families whose enforcement came in 2003. This Convention guarantees to international migrant workers the following: human rights; basic freedoms; due process; equality with nationals; right to privacy; transfer of earnings; right to information; freedom of movement; equality with nationals, and other rights. The intention of this Convention is to protect migrant workers and members of their families from exploitation, and the violation of their human rights. What about ratification?

2.6.3. Ratification of UN conventions

It should be immediately pointed out most countries have already ratified these conventions. However, I argue that it is not sufficient that these conventions be ratified, they must actually be implemented effectively. It also needs to be pointed out that it would be wishful thinking to assume that the declaration of these rights by an international organisation automatically means that these will be observed in practice by the host countries. However, such a situation must not be allowed to detract us from the many instances where the effective implementation of these rights have been advanced by the solid work of some international agencies in the area of refugee law and policies. In addition, the issue of ratification has spawned a number of problems some of which continue to feature in global policy debates on international migration. One such problem is that despite some countries ratifying these international conventions, they continue to cultivate policy environments that encourage the violation of the fundamental rights of migrants.

2.7. AFRICAN UNION CONVENTIONS

In continental Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1969 adopted the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (Okoth-Obbo, 2001). This convention was entered into force in 1974, and is modelled after the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees. The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa comprises of a number of articles that deal, amongst others, with issues relating to non-discrimination, voluntary repatriation, and cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In fact, this Convention was meant to be the effective regional complement in Africa of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees. Just like the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees, the overall intent of the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa is not only to accord refugees and immigrants fundamental human rights, but also to help in normalising their lives in the host country by

restoring their dignity of which they had been stripped. In short, these international conventions are vital in the restoration of the human dignity of immigrants, and in their integration in the immigrant-receiving country.

2.8.SOUTH AFRICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY

2.8.1. Brief commentary on the history immigration policy in apartheid South Africa

The immigration policy environment in South Africa, and the public sentiment towards immigrants, cannot be fully comprehended without reference to the country's apartheid past. Various immigration policies developed by the state from the middle of the twentieth century right up until the onset of the post-apartheid South Africa reflect the state's clear intention to utilise race in determining admission into the country. The latter view is buttressed by Crush and McDonald (2001) who stated that South Africa's twentieth-century immigration policies under white minority rule rested on the following four pillars: racist policy and legislation; the exploitation of the migrant labour from neighbouring countries; tough enforcement legislation, and the repudiation on international refugee conventions. The selection and admission of immigrants was based on race (Segatti & Landau, 2011) where white immigrants were, for example, admitted because they were 'culturally digestible' and could easily be assimilated into the white racial group. Groups of immigrants deemed to be 'non-assimilable', especially Africans, were made to feel unwelcome. Immigrants from Asian countries, and other black immigrants who were skilled, were admitted to the country as 'honorary whites' (Crush & McDonald, 2001; Park, 2008). In short, white persons (and those 'similar to whites') were or could become immigrants in South Africa, and Africans were never welcomed as immigrants to South Africa because they deviated from the racial norm. The latter could only come to the country as contract workers who were employed in the mining industry to meet its insatiable labour demands – they could only come and reside in the country as

sojourners. The preceding White governments encouraged European immigration because white immigrants were perceived as more 'desirable' by the authorities relative to Jews, Asians and African immigrants.

2.8.2. Immigration policy in the post-apartheid period

After the demise of apartheid in 1994, immigration policy was reoriented to reflect the new political and national dispensation in the country. It is generally agreed by most scholars writing on this subject that contemporary immigration policies no longer use racial criteria or considerations in regulating who should or should not immigrate to the country. However, the researcher should hasten to add that the legacy bequeathed by apartheid immigration policies of the last century still influenced contemporary immigration policies (Peberdy, 2001; Klotz, 2012). The point that I am trying to asseverate is that existing immigration policies continue to produce a hierarchy of preferred groups of immigrants.

2.8.3. Aliens Control Act (Act 96 of 1991), and the issue of 'alienness'

The introduction of the Aliens Control Act (Act 96 of 1991) ensured that admission status would predominantly be granted only to white immigrants instead of black immigrants. Even the very terminology used in this Act 'aliens' evidenced the racist intent of the apartheid government to create a 'fortress South Africa' so as to barricade the entrance to prevent marauding 'aliens' (read black migrants) from entering. The 'Aliens', who were presumably from other unknown planets, had not only to be alienated or eliminated, but also prevented from roaming about and ravaging planet South Africa. The utilisation of the term 'alien' in immigration policy and law not only results in the classification of persons as aliens, as opposed to citizens (Johnson, 1997; Choane et al. 2011), but is also something that can result in the eradication of the 'invasive alien plant' and the promotion of the rhetoric of autochthony (Geschiere, 2009).

Furthermore, the deployment of the terminology of alienness has significant legal, social, and political importance (Johnson, 1997; Choane et al. 2011). In a legal sense, foreign citizens would come to be viewed as non-citizens with limited rights. Such a tenuous legal status, often associated with the deployment of pejorative imagery, influences negative attitudes and discriminatory behaviour towards those persons which immigration policy defines as non-citizens or ‘aliens’. In short, the term ‘alien’ serves to dehumanise persons, and legitimise their mistreatment and suffering in an immigrant-receiving country (Johnson, 1997; Dick, 2011).

2.8.3.1. The register and immigration policy

The register used in the Aliens Control Act of 1991, therefore, not only influenced the restrictionist bent in immigration policy and law in South Africa, but also served as a basis for the legal and social construction of black migrants as ‘illegals’, ‘intruders’, ‘barbarians’ and ‘undesirables’. The register (in sociolinguistics, a register means language used for a particular purpose, or in a particular social context or setting) utilised in immigration policy is intended to represent immigrants and refugees not only as ‘alien invaders’, but also as a threat to societal security. Writing about shore asylum-seekers, Pickering (2001) commented that Australia was awash with, swamped, and weathering the influx of waves and waves of immigrants. These waves of immigrants consisted of aliens, queue jumpers, illegal immigrants, people smugglers, boat people, and jumbo people. These immigrants continued to slip through, sneak in and invade Australia with false papers or no papers. They imported to that country exotic diseases, sicknesses, and criminal gangs. Pickering (2001) exhorted Australia to respond nationally with the navy and armed forces so as to deter, lock up, and detain these immigrants.

Pickering’s views (2001) were quoted to try and substantiate the fact that the register utilised in a particular country in framing immigration policy is evidently intended to convey representations

of immigrant as aliens who threaten homeland security. A similar register is also used in framing new immigration policy in South Africa which contains the terminology of ‘undesirable persons’ – defined as those who overstay their visas. The use of the term “undesirables” is intended to justify restrictive practices when dealing with immigrants in the context of societal security (King, 2004). In short, the register used in South African immigration policy and law has helped to create a policy environment that sought to aggressively restrict black immigration while simultaneously encouraging white immigration to South Africa. Black migrants were not only cast as ‘Aliens’, but also as deviants in an otherwise ‘normal’ South Africa.

This façade of ‘normalcy’ was disrupted during the transition to a post-Apartheid South Africa. This transition witnessed the arrival of waves of black immigrants to South Africa, who, this time had a determined zeal to cast away their sojourner status previously accorded to them by the apartheid government. Most of the new arrivals were undocumented (Trimikliniotis et al. 2008). To deal with this ‘new migration in the new South Africa’, the Aliens Control Act was amended both in 1995 and in 1996. Peberdy (2001) stated that these amended acts stipulated, amongst other things, that all applications for immigration and work permits had to be made from outside South Africa to prevent people from using visitors’ visas to look for work. In addition, the applicants also had to start paying large non-refundable fees for applications for permanent residence and for temporary residence permits. Evidently, the intention was to target certain immigrants originating from targeted countries and nationalities. Immigration policies are still designed to control and exclude millions of migrants coming into South Africa. Despite the exclusionary policies, migrants continue to come to the country in large numbers.

2.8.4. Immigration Act 13 of 2002

In 2002, the state introduced new legislation (Immigration Act 13 of 2002) which was amended in 2004 and 2007, and in 2011 (Crush, 2011), and these were accompanied by various revised Immigration Regulations, which came into operation in 2014. One of the intentions of these new policies was to encourage an integrationist approach to managing immigration, while simultaneously attempting to prevent the ‘undesirable’ (the legal word used to refer to those who are not wanted in the Republic), and those trying to “play” with the immigration system. The irony is that those whom the law deems and define to be ‘undesirable’ constitute the majority of black migrants originating from continental Africa. Landau (2004) refers to this new legislation as the ‘laws of (in) hospitality’. These are ‘inhospitable’ policies and laws because despite the fact that South Africa evolved a human rights-based immigration policy and legislation, and ratified the major United Nations refugee conventions, there continued to be endemic corruption associated with the determination of refugee status; the distribution of identity documents; the illegal denial of social services, and irregular policing practices (Landau, 2004). The point that the researcher wishes to asseverate here is that in spite of the fact that South Africa prides itself of being a constitutional, and a democratic state, it has created a policy and legal immigration regime that has fostered undemocratic and unconstitutional practices towards black migrants. The consequence of all of this, therefore, is that we now obtain a bifurcated policy environment where there is a gap between the articulated policy and its implementation.

This gap between policy articulation and implementation is widening as more black migrants arrive in the country. I argue that this gap creates some ‘ambivalence’ or a ‘dualist approach’ in the sense that this constitutes a serious indictment on South Africa’s cosmopolitan spirit, enshrined in the constitution and its proclaimed adherence to the spirit of the United Nation’s conventions,

and the country's simultaneous narcissistic regression to the apartheid legislative policies of restricting immigration from continental Africa.

In exploring further this perceived ambivalence and ambiguity regarding immigration policy and law in South Africa, I maintain that the country is less enthusiastic about supporting large numbers of immigrant arrivals. At the same time, South Africans romanticise about its so-called 'rainbow nation' identity' – a public myth which implies that South Africa is a unique 'nation' which is constituted by a fusion of diverse cultures and people (a 'nation' which welcomes all irrespective of their origin, creed, race, and religion). This researcher's argument is buttressed by Comaroff and Comaroff (2001: 252) who wrote: "Yet the state is itself an ambiguous actor in this drama. On one hand, it strives volubly to uphold the standards of liberal universalism, insisting on the uncompromising protection of human rights; on the other, it sometimes contributes, wittingly or not, to the mood of xenophobia".

2.8.5. The role of dominant social groups in policy formulation

It is important to accentuate the role of the dominant social groups in the law-making and policy formulation processes. In almost all the countries of the world, the formulation and implementation of immigration policies and laws reflects the interests and values of the dominant classes. The post-Apartheid South African society is no exception to this rule. Policies are lines or course of action that are pursued by any government concerning what it is going to do or how it is going to deal with a particular social issue (for example, social security, immigration and crime). What is significant to note is that state interventions (Söhn, 2013) and immigration policies affect the life chances of individuals and groups, and their status in society. In addition, social policies play a crucial role in the determination of public attitudes towards some particular groups in society. Policies affect legislation, and often reflect the core values of the dominant classes and groups in

society. In fact, a society's legal system, through which laws and constitutions are derived, always reflects relationships of power. In advancing this argument, this researcher was supported by Dunk (2012) and Chimni (2010) who viewed a country's legal system as reflecting the segments of society, in terms of social class, which dominated the law-making process. In other words, which class's specific interests become embodied in laws that are then projected as an expression of national will and imposed upon everyone"? The preceding comments resonate with the Marxian perspective regarding the sociology of law. An orthodox Marxian perspective of law takes as its point of departure the notion that the roots of law are located in bourgeois property relations. The classical Marxist conception of the law is that it is another superstructural element (Leiter, 2015) whose genesis could be traced back to the economic system. This researcher hastens to add that Karl Marx did recognise the fact that, during certain periods in the evolution of the bourgeois society, the law-making process can become an autonomous process free from the machinations and manipulations of the dominant and propertied classes in society. Such instances of relative autonomy though did not last long as certain social classes would reassert their dominancy in the law-making process. My accentuation of this point is intended to buttress or reinforce the idea that dominant classes in society legislate to suit their political and social interests. The law-making process, therefore, plays a very crucial role in the legal construction and immigrants as the 'other'.

A cursory glance at the history of law in South Africa shows that those who have been responsible for immigration policy and law-making originated from the dominant political and economic groups that controlled the South African state. Policy and law-making in the sphere of immigration has, for example, reflected the economic and political interest of these dominant groups. Chimni (2010) in support of this idea, argued that most laws clearly reflect the needs and interests of those classes or social groups who control the dominant economic and social institutions in a country.

These social groups and classes, for example, influence state immigration policies and are often principal movers and beneficiaries of immigration law regimes. They are deep structures that entrench rules and systems of belief which sustain the domination of subaltern peoples (Chimni 2010). Moreover, these dominant social and political groups and classes have always utilised the register of alienage in framing immigration policy, and the consequences of that has been the production of a hegemonic representations of certain groups of immigrants as ‘aliens’, ‘illegals’, ‘intruders’, ‘barbarians’ and ‘undesirables’. In other words, these dominant groups have, through the utilisation of this immigration register, performed the function of assigning labels to foreign persons. These representations of immigrants are simultaneously designed to construct ‘our normality’ against ‘their abnormality’ (Laclau, 2000), and ‘our indigeneity’ against ‘their alienness’ (Sharma, 2020). By so doing, these dominant groups in society have not only sought to shape the attitudes of locals towards foreign citizens, but also influence the former’s behaviour towards the labelled people. These representations also promote discourses and popular meanings about the labelled immigrant groups endangering ‘homeland security’. These representations of immigrants are also intended to make people ‘strange’, and that, in turn, feeds into the fetishisation of indigeneity movements which are growing in the contemporary world. Most importantly, such discourses play a significant role in that they enable the postcolonial state to produce state power, and conjure up national unity (Comaroff & Comaroff 2001), while simultaneously being challenged by a restless population still eagerly waiting for the benefits of freedom or the ‘collective goods’ (Wimmer, 1997; Lakimova (2018) to be distributed to them.

2.8.6. Restructuring of the South African immigration laws

I contend that South African immigration policy, laws, and regulations needed to be restructured because they are constructed in a manner so as to marginalise immigrants from continental Africa.

The implementation of these policies and laws produces a situation in which black migrants, in particular, are treated as ‘undesirables’, ‘illegals’, ‘criminals’, ‘irregulars’. Such official labels stick with disastrous consequences on the victims. In this instance, the law and policy actively and regularly irregularises migrant people – this policy environment makes immigrant people illegal (Klaaren & Ramji, 2001; Bacon, 2009). The processes of policy formulation and law-making are, therefore, critical in the construction of ‘illegals’ or those perceived to be deviating from the country’s laws (deviants). Policy and law in this context are designed to provide legitimating mechanisms (Cejas, 2007), and semantic artillery that could be deployed in the process of ‘othering’ foreign citizens in South Africa, thus constructing immigrant alterity and rejection. It must be remembered that the process of promulgating policy and law is in itself largely determined by the prevailing post-Apartheid societal context in which the dominant classes in society legislate to suit their political and social interests.

2.8.7 Concluding remarks

The aim of this chapter was to succinctly narrate, in broad strokes, the environment that shapes and influences immigration policies in global, regional, and national contexts. The United Nations convention on refugees remain the international norms that member states wish to model their policies on immigration. Although member states have ratified these conventions, some continue to interpret and apply them in ways that infringe on the fundamental rights and dignity of migrants. This has tended to create an underlying tension between the United Nation’s global power, and the member states’ rights to assert their sovereignty in promulgating legislative instruments to deal with immigration. Notwithstanding that, some member countries legal systems, such as South Africa, have advanced legislation whose consequence has been to legally construct and redefine

migrants as 'unwanted persons' or 'undesirable persons'. Such legal constructions of immigrants have laid a fertile soil for their 'othering' in post-Apartheid South Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONTEXT OF XENOPHOBIA AND AFROPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

3.1.INTRODUCTION

Historically, South Africa has borne witness to intermittent episodes of xenophobia. In the post-apartheid South African context, intermittent, dark and violent clouds of xenophobia have circumstantially emerged from the horizon blighting the colours of the ‘rainbow nation’. The phrase ‘rainbow nation’, a term whose coinage is attributed to Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, embodied a vision of a country whose citizens would live harmoniously in aesthetic (Mpofu, 2019) and peaceful co-existence. Metaphorically speaking, Evans (2010) contended that the colours of the rainbow aptly described the diverse cultures and racial groups that constituted post-apartheid South Africa, and the ‘rainbow’ served as a sign of God’s oath never to wreak vengeance on humanity again. Indubitably, the colours of the rainbow symbolized inclusivity and diversity that were supposedly to be central ingredients in the constitution of the post-apartheid South African society. There are numerous, complex, multifaceted, and diverse contextual dynamics underpinning the manifestation and expression of the xenophobic sentiment in South Africa are. But before I could delve deep and discuss the contextual factors that have shore up xenophobia in South Africa, I need to clear the conceptual confusion between ‘xenophobia’ and ‘afrophobia’- the conceptual confusion between the two concepts was problematic as it made it difficult to comprehend the full contextual dynamics, manifestations, and the multi-facetedness of the phenomenon under investigation.

3.2.CLEARING THE CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION – IS IT XENOPHOBIA OR AFROPHOBIA?

3.2.1. Is it xenophobia?

Despite the frequent research attention and academic discourse on the term ‘xenophobia’, and its horrendous effects on both the perpetrator and the victim, the understanding of this complex phenomenon remained deeply confusing. The genesis of this confusion laid in the fact that there was a contextual variation in the expression of xenophobia. In the Nazi era, its expression took a virulent form of racism accompanied by a Holocaust. In the Eastern European societies that underwent transition after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc, the expression of this phenomenon was characterised by a regression to ferocious nationalisms (Adam & Moodley, 2020), and an upsurge of expressions of ethnic identity, ethnic nationalism and ethnic conflicts. In continental Africa, the Rwandan experience still reminded us of the painful genocidal violence that visited the country. In South Africa, a particular form of xenophobia, often accompanied by wanton violence, had targeted black African immigrants originating from continental Africa - prompting some scholars such as Matsinhe (2011) and Mbembe (2015) to simply refer to this as ‘Afrophobia’ (fear and hatred of African by other Africans or simply ‘black on black racism’. There was probably no societal phenomenon that had suffered more from lack of conceptual clarity than the term xenophobia-this was a problem that doggedly persisted despite the burgeoning scholarship and research on this topic. Now, perhaps the important question was: “Are the concepts of ‘xenophobia’ and ‘Afrophobia’ ‘variations of the same theme’? There was a need to clarify the differences and similarities between the two – a requirement to get the definitional issues out of the way before we could think clearly and straight about the problem under investigation. Moreover, a systematic comparison of the concepts of ‘xenophobia’ and

‘Afrophobia’ did not only render clearer the differences between them, but also assisted in determining the heuristic value of each concept.

3.2.2. Xenophobia and Afrophobia: A comparison of the concepts

Kang’ethe and Duma (2013) are of the view that the concept ‘xenophobia’ originates from the Greek word ‘*xenos*’ which means a ‘stranger’ or a ‘foreigner’, and ‘phobos’ denotes phobia - an irrational fear of persons or groups who are regarded as ‘outsiders’. ‘Xenophobia’ is a term that is frequently invoked by scholars, politicians, and the media to describe the intolerance and antagonism against African migrants in post-Apartheid South Africa (Steenkamp, 2009). Xenophobia is a complex phenomenon with pinching and horrendous effects. However, one of its components is the irrational fear among the locals that could lead to distrust of, and violent reaction to, strangers (Kang’ethe and Duma, 2013). Xenophobia, therefore, connotes developing pangs of hatred, anger, jealous, and condescending attitudes towards immigrants, coupled with violent behaviour, irrespective of whether these vices are held by an individual or an institution. It is important to note that any attempt to define this term has to take into cognisance the fact that the xenophobic attitude is closely related to discriminatory, aggressive, and violent behaviour. In fact, there is an inextricable relationship between the xenophobic attitude and violent behaviour.

3.2.3. Other definitions of ‘xenophobia’

There are various other definitions of xenophobia that are advanced by some scholars (Frederickson 2002; MacDonald and Jacobs 2005; Crush and Ramachandran 2014), and such definitions accentuate a deep dislike or hatred of the unknown foreign citizens or so-called ‘non-nationals’- the so-called ‘nationals’ fear ‘non-nationals’ whom they perceive to be different. The self-same scholars also agree with the researcher that the expression of the xenophobic attitude is

accompanied by violent behaviour and other discriminatory actions. What is implicit in the foregoing definitions of xenophobia is the assumption that the problem of xenophobia is located in the ‘mind’ of the xenophobe. In short, these definitions seem to psychologise xenophobia – that is, they seem to explain the phenomenon of xenophobia in psychological terms. I want to caution against this intellectual tendency of locating the determinants of xenophobia in the narrow confines of psychology (a theoretical pathway that might lead scholars and government officials to view xenophobia as a psychological phenomenon that ought to be examined at the individual level instead of the structural level) (Bonilla-Silva 1997; 1999, cited in Lewis et al. 2019). I contend that a materially-based explanation for why xenophobia occurs has to be sought. I am, therefore, of the view that the causes of xenophobia do not reside in the individual mind, but are to be found in the social structure and the overarching superstructure. I reason that the causes of xenophobia are both structural and superstructural, and not psychological. In fact, the determinants of this phenomenon ought not to be excluded from the foundation or structure of the social system, and its corresponding super structural apparatus. These are the theoretical issues that a definition of xenophobia should take into consideration.

3.2.4. Manifest versus latent forms of xenophobia

I assert that a broader definition of this complex phenomenon should encompass a distinction between *manifest* and *latent* forms of xenophobia. It was the American sociologist Robert Merton (1968 cited in Macionis 2013) who first drew our attention to important distinction. By ‘manifest functions’, Merton meant the recognizable, obvious, visible, and intended consequences of a social structure. The latent functions are the unintended, unforeseen consequences of social structures. Flowing from this Mertonian distinction, I argue that the phenomenon of xenophobia also exhibits manifest and latent forms. Manifest forms of xenophobia are clearly evident when overt

expressions of the phenomenon are on display. The expression and manifestation of the latent forms of xenophobia tend to be covert, subliminal, and subtle. Latent forms of xenophobia tend to be rife in an environment which one symbolic interactionist theorist Erving Goffman (1959 cited in Macionis 2013) characterises as the '*back stage*'.

The complexity of the phenomenon of xenophobia is often evidenced in the diverse manifestation of this phenomenon in different contexts – for example, in certain contexts, the manifestation of xenophobia assumes a racial dimension, whereas in others, it assumes an ethnocentric dimension. In contemporary Israel, for example, the reception of Africans originating from East Africa has been characterised by a strong anti-African racism. Furthermore, the Jewish immigrants who arrived in South Africa in the past were the targets of anti-immigrant racial prejudice. At the dawn of the previous century, there existed 'hollanderhaat' (anti-Dutch prejudice) – ethnic prejudice by Afrikaners directed at immigrant Hollanders (Kuitenbrouwer, 2012). At times, and in other contexts, both the racial and ethnocentric manifestations of xenophobia can be enveloped into one anti-immigrant sentiment. This is evidenced by the racial and ethnic prejudice directed at the so-called travellers, gypsies, and the Roma populations in western European societies. These populations have been the targets of prejudice, and became victims of hostility and discrimination. In fact, this is part of what is called 'anti-Traveller racism' discourse (MacLaughlin, 1999; Fanning 2002; Fanning, 2018) with heavy social Darwinist undertones, which systematically prioritise nomadism over sedentarism. In such discourses, MacLaughlin (1999) said that immigrants are treated as 'social anachronisms' in an otherwise settled and sanitised society (in Staniewicz and Van Hout, 2012). There can be little doubt that much of the enmity and outright rejection experienced, in particular, by black African immigrants in post-apartheid South Africa have been due to prejudice and xenophobia. I am making a fair assumption that prejudice and xenophobia

have frequently triggered violent conflicts between South African nationals and black African immigrants. Flowing from the preceding comments, it is reasonable to assume that perceptions of cultural supremacy and racial superiority are inextricably linked to the xenophobic sentiment or anti-immigrant animosity.

Finally, in attempting a definition of xenophobia, I ought to make a distinction between the subtle, overt or aversive, ambivalent, and subliminal forms of xenophobia.

3.2.5. Other forms of xenophobia

‘Subtle xenophobia’ tends to be expressed covertly, and can be a more sophisticated form of xenophobia. Subtle xenophobia, just like subtle racism, is the modern form of xenophobia that is distant and indirect (Pettigrew, 1998, Pettigrew, 2008). In addition, subtle xenophobia is comprised of the following ingredients: defense of the traditional values of the cultural or national group; an exaggeration of the cultural differences (Sears et al. 2000; Wilson and Nielsen 2011) between ‘locals’ and foreign citizens and a complete lack of favourable attitudes towards foreign citizens. ‘Aversive xenophobia’, however, is overt, direct, and blatant. Blatant forms of xenophobia seem to be premised on the faulty primordial presumption that there are fundamental biological, racial, ethnic, and cultural differences between foreign citizens and members of the ‘in-group’ that one belongs to.

I argue that ‘ambivalent xenophobia’ combines both aversive and sympathetic tendencies. This type of xenophobia is characterised by both positive and negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policies. ‘Ambivalent xenophobia’ stems from a contradiction between a host country’s promises of liberty and freedom to all citizens, and the denial of these rights to foreign citizens. The South African context epitomises this ambivalence in the sense that on the one hand,

South Africans hold strong values that favour equality and opportunity for all. On the other hand, immigrants from neighbouring countries enjoy few rights and little legal protection (Crush, 2000; Crush et al. 2013), and are the victims of anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination.

Subliminal xenophobia' involves an unconscious criticism of foreign citizens, and is not expressed in direct ways. It is a form of xenophobia that is shown through rationalisation. An example of this would be someone who professes to be a staunch defender of the fundamental economic, political, and cultural rights of foreign citizens in South Africa, and suggest that giving jobs to South Africans first than to foreign citizens should be the priority. There is a tendency for us to hear a lot about xenophobia when it is expressed in explicit and crude ways. At times, xenophobia is expressed subconsciously below the level of conscious thinking – beneath the surface. This is called 'subliminal xenophobia' which occurs in instances when one does not mention xenophobia, or even denies that she or he is xenophobic, but simultaneously uses language that suggests a subtle xenophobic attitude. When xenophobia is expressed at the subconscious level, the person ducks the issue of xenophobia for fear of not wanting to alienate other xenophobes. Subliminal xenophobia is 'hidden' within the person. It is internalised, and the person might express this type of prejudice without even knowing it. Subliminal xenophobia exists internally in all of us, and it is virtually impossible to avoid harbouring xenophobic attitudes. However, the only thing we have to do as human beings is to attempt to look hard inside ourselves with a view to trying to examine and modify our attitudes. It is at this juncture that xenophobia needs to be differentiated from Afrophobia? Are these the 'two sides of the same bloody coin'? Both scholars and public commentators have utilised 'xenophobia' and 'Afrophobia' alternately in popular and academic discourses – implying that they mean the same thing. However, 'Afrophobia', to which I now turn to, does not mean the same thing as 'xenophobia'.

3.3. DEFINING ‘AFROPHOBIA’

In the South African nomenclature and political parlance, the term ‘Afrophobia’ refers to Afro-xenophobic attitudes and hatred directed at immigrants originating from continental Africa. In other instances, this term is utilised to refer to South Africans’ display of negative attitudes and hostility towards other Africans. A more simplistic explanation refers to ‘Afrophobia’ as ‘black-on-black racism’ or anti-Black racism. A variety of definitions of this term have been proffered by a number of scholars. Isike and Isike (2012) define ‘Afrophobia as ‘Africa’s fear and hatred of itself’. Michael (2015) describes ‘Afrophobia’ as hostility, antipathy, contempt and aversion expressed directly, and through institutional and legal means, towards people with a background in sub-Saharan Africa, and those belonging to the African diaspora. Deducing from the preceding definitions, it seems logical to infer that ‘Afrophobia’ refers to a deep dislike or hatred of the unknown foreign citizens from the African continent who are perceived to be different and culturally indigestible. It is a form of antipathy often accompanied by exclusionary practices and racist violence.

‘Afrophobia’, therefore, is a kind of global racism or prejudice directed at African immigrant groups with the intention to dehumanise them, and to violate their dignity and person. Afrophobia is similar to the dominant doctrine of ‘biological racism’ which held that Blacks were intrinsically different from and inferior to Whites, and thus incapable of living as equals among them. This doctrinal view is reminiscent of the ‘Jim Crow ideology’ and system of legalised discrimination in America.

Momodou and Paascoët (2016) argued that ‘Afrophobia’ is based on socially constructed ideas of ‘race’, implying deep historical roots that reflect the groundless belief that certain ‘racial’ groups

are biologically and/or culturally inferior to others. This attitude of racial superiority and racial/ethnic purity is frequently buttressed by an administrative apparatus designed to institutionalise racist practices of exclusion, discrimination, and stigmatisation. In addition, such an administrative apparatus will also ensure differential and unequal access to scarce commodities like employment opportunities, housing, education, and justice. Just like colonisers who regarded themselves as evangelists whose mission was to ‘civilise’ the ‘natives’, the ‘Afrophobes’ consider Africans from continental Africa and the diaspora as ‘phobogenic objects’ with incommensurable and ‘primitive’ cultures who should ‘stay in their place’ and assimilate the culture of the established group. The phobogenic object is what Connell (1997) and Matsinhe (2011) refer to as the ‘other’. The conception of the ‘phobogenic object’ or the ‘other’ is embedded in the process of global capitalist expansion (imperialism) which spawned the societal evils of global racism, apartheid, and related form of phobia. A corollary of the preceding thesis is the idea of miscegenation or racial/ethnic mixing – it was believed that race mixing was going to result into the degeneracy of the white races’ culture (Connell, 1997; Manrique, 2016). In a similar vein, mixing with the ‘phobogenic objects’ was going to lead into the ‘hybridisation’ of the ‘Afrophobes’ culture – this is something that had to be prevented at all costs even if it meant the deployment of violent methods to achieve this aim.

3.3.1. Afrophobia as an underpinning of xenophobia

African immigrants originating from continental Africa or who belong to the African diaspora were regarded by members of the established groups as ‘filthy, sub-human’, and ‘two steps behind civilisation’. In this kind of a discourse, it was often argued that contact between these groups will lead to the pollution of the established group’s culture. Members of the established group should, therefore, avoid any form of contact with those who were deemed to be ‘outsiders’ as this would

result in contamination, pollution, and degeneracy. Matsinhe (2011) contended that the widespread feeling among the established groups was that contact with members of an outsider group would result in contamination and anomy. The point asseverated here is that intergroup contact will result in what this researcher calls ‘species degeneracy’. Another point that is implied in Matshinhe’s comments is that of the preservation of ‘genetic purity’ and ‘species authenticity’ (Olwig 2003; Simberloff 2012). Intergroup contact would lead to the falsification or ‘adulteration’ of the culture of the established group. It is something that may be ecologically harmful. In making this argument, I am further supported by Weidema (2000) and Simberloff (2012) who are of the view that ecological harm can occur at species level (i.e. through competition and displacement of native species or predation on native species, in addition to causing the spread of parasites and pathogens. In addition, Mooney (2005) and Simberloff (2013) contended that ‘alien species’ may promote disease, destroy the environment, deplete environmental resources, and engage in other destructive behaviours. One can draw some parallels between this discourse and the myth that immigrants ‘steal the jobs’ of local South Africans, rape women, import disease, and commit crime. This, therefore, invites members of the established group to subjugate and manipulate the ‘phobogenic objects’ or ‘alien species’ so as to render the latter an ‘invisible minority’ in the host country. In extreme situations, this will also be an invitation to seek a final solution by exterminating the ‘invasive plants’.

To recapitulate, ‘afrophobia’ is a socially constructed phenomenon whose foundational pillars include an attitude that some racial groups are biologically and/or culturally inferior to others; an accompanying perception that members of the ‘outsider group’ are filthy and sub-human; the ecological damage caused by coming into contact with the ‘phobogenic objects’, and the need not only to eradicate the invasive species but also to uproot or exterminate it. These key constituent

elements of ‘Afrophobia’ are also present in ‘anti-semitism’, and ‘hollanderhaat’. These are all forms of prejudice and discrimination directed at specific racial or ethnic groups. In the final analysis, the concept of ‘xenophobia’ has more heuristic value than that of ‘Afrophobia’. Why? In order to better comprehend the diverse and multi-faceted contextual factors driving xenophobia and its manifestations, it appears to me that the utilisation of the broader analytical lens of xenophobia would be required rather than the narrow analytical lens of ‘Afrophobia’. In conclusion, the conflation of the concepts of ‘xenophobia’ and ‘Afrophobia’ would obstruct efforts to study and analyse the underpinning causes and the horrendous effects of this phenomenon by drawing from the comparative experiences documenting the encounters between nationals or ‘locals’ and immigrants in multicultural countries.

3.4. SELECTED HISTORICAL ‘SHADES’ OF XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICA

This section discusses the selected dark episodes of xenophobia that have occurred in South African history. I utilise the metaphor of a shade to refer to these episodes of xenophobia. A metaphor is a figure of speech or a language expression in which a word or term is applied to something to which it is not literally applicable in order to suggest some similarity. In a metaphorical sense, shades appear in different sizes, cover small and large areas, and some quickly pass on while others remain stationary. All shades have one consequence – they tend to blight the human landscape by preventing the ‘sunshine of peace and common humanity’ from shining through. These various shades of xenophobia are hollanderhaat, anti-Semitism, and ‘afrophobia’.

3.4.1. Hollanderhaat

A cursory glance at South Africa’s past would reveal that there have been deep-seated biases and hatreds of racism and xenophobia, and these related forms of hatred remain bitterly entrenched.

The existence and proliferation of a strong xenophobic sentiment is not a new feature of the South African mass public. At the dawn of the previous century, there existed ‘hollanderhaat’ (anti-Dutch prejudice) – prejudice by Afrikaners directed at immigrant Hollanders. Kuitenbrouwer (2012) contends that much of this hollanderhaat was the result of differing backgrounds of many emigrants from the Netherlands and the local Afrikaners. These emigrants from the Netherlands were coming from a cosmopolitan environment, and they arrived in a South Africa that was predominantly rural, conservative, and characterised by patriarchal values (Kuitenbrouwer, 2012). It was a South Africa where people led a lifestyle that was influenced by a particular type of a religion which the German sociologist (Max Weber), called ‘Calvinism’. According to the Weberian thesis, a particular variety of Calvinist religion, namely Protestantism promoted an important doctrine of ‘predestination’ (Carroll, 2009) – the idea that one’s fate on earth is predestined, and there is nothing one can do about this. But, the Calvinists did not just ‘sit down and accepted this’. They began to ask themselves the question of what they can do on earth to achieve **salvation** (to be among the **Chosen**, the **Elect**). They reasoned that if somebody worked hard, was frugal, saved his money, carefully invested his money, did not lead a hedonistic way of life, then, it was more likely that that person will be among the Chosen or the Elect. This is the essence of the Protestant Ethic.

The followers of Calvinism, therefore, began to work hard, and they did not enjoy the fruits of their labour by pursuing a luxurious way of life. Instead, they ploughed back their profit into their work. Ultimately, this led to a rapid accumulation of wealth. Thus, the Voortrekkers and the Republican Afrikaners conceived of themselves as an ‘elected’ and covenanted people – God’s chosen people on earth. The Voortrekkers and the Republican Afrikaners believed that they were elected by God to fulfil a certain purpose in the world. This is what Schutte (1999) and Dobošová

(2009) referred to as ‘primitive Calvinism’- an ascetic way of life based on stinginess or thrift, hard work, and coupled with the view that strict adherence to these values would bring one salvation. They gradually developed a neo-Calvinist lifestyle dedicated to working hard on the land, and the accumulation of wealth. Similarly, what the Afrikaners or Boers (the term ‘Boers’ is not used in a derogatory sense here, but is used in its Dutch sense to mean ‘farmers’) regarded themselves as God’s Chosen people, and they held negative views regarding the newly arrived immigrants from Holland.

The Afrikaners accused the Dutch of behaving badly, drinking too much, and of cursing publicly. They regarded these forms of behaviour as the antithesis of the Protestant teachings and behaviours. Afrikaners adhered to a strict religious and moral code of self-denial which was the exact opposite of the ‘joy of living’ which was characteristic of the Hollanders. Spencer (2015) contended that familial sentiments towards Netherlands were not often shared by the Boers within the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Dutch immigrants to their republics were referred to as *Hollanders*, thusly distinguishing these people as *uitlanders* (outsiders) to their society and there developed among some of the Boers what is termed *Hollanderhaat*- a term which meant hatred directed towards white immigrants who originated from Holland or the Netherlands. The language deployed here was meant not only to construct these immigrants from the Netherlands as ‘outsiders’ or *uitlanders*, but it was also intended to convey the meaning that they were ‘unwanted’ and not welcome. It must be remembered here that the language not only shapes people’s thoughts, but it also influences how one should behave towards the persons assigned a certain name. The foregoing environment formed a palatable environment for xenophobia and its manifestations. It is significant to note that this type of hatred (*hollanderhaat*) was manifesting itself in a context of

economic hardship which was experienced by the Afrikaners and voortrekkers (Kuitenbrouwer, 2012).

A context of economic vulnerability and unequal access to material resources precipitated the sprouting and proliferation of xenophobia and related forms of hatred. In a similar vein, the manifestation of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa is occurring in a context characterised by exacerbated levels of economic inequalities. The majority of the population (mainly black South Africans) remain imprisoned and trapped in the margins of the mainstream economy. It is not surprising to observe that the most virulent and ferocious bouts of xenophobia are likely to manifest themselves in the most economically-depressed areas of post-Apartheid South Africa. This is a critical contextual factor that underpins the manifestation of the xenophobic sentiment in post-Apartheid South Africa.

This shade or shadow of xenophobia (*hollanderhaat*) did not engulf the entire South African society. It occurred only in the two independent Boer republics – the Transvaal (sometimes referred to as the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) and the Orange Free State republics. Commenting about the ‘imported Hollanders’ (Bosgra, 2008) who were brought to South Africa by Paul Kruger (the President of the Transvaal republic), Abrahamse and Clarke (2014) indicated that the arrival of ‘Kruger’s Hollanders’ was looked upon with mixed feelings. Some felt that it was necessary to modernise the Boer Republic, but such a process ought to be exclusionary in the sense that the Dutch immigrants did not or could not become benefactors of modernisation because they were regarded as non-citizens. Accompanying the exclusionary impulses of voortrekker nationalism was the tendency to construct and demonise Dutch immigrants as filthy vagrants and thieves. The intensity of xenophobia and animosity directed towards the ‘imported Hollanders’ was strong despite the fact that many of them were skilled people. One of the familiar elements

utilised to construct these immigrants from the Netherlands is that they were ‘priggish’ – in other words, people who thief or steal (Bosgra, 2008). This resonates with the contemporary discourses of immigrants who are perceived to be stealing jobs meant for ‘locals’ – it is remarkable to note that the register used has not changed. It is also amazing to note that this discourse of constructing immigrants as ‘stealing jobs’ has ‘stood the test of time’ because echoes of this discourse still reverberate in contemporary immigrant-receiving societies all over the world. It is indeed one of the manifestations of xenophobia in the post-apartheid South Africa. Writing about the causal factors that underpinned this antagonism towards the ‘imported Hollanders’, Schutte (2007) was of the view that ‘Hollanderhaat’ was stimulated by the attempts of Afrikaner nationalism to assert itself in the 1920. In other words, some of the reasons for this brand of antagonism xenophobia are located in the attempts by chauvinistic Afrikaner nationalism to assert itself by stressing its autonomy and, simultaneously, undermining the contribution of the Dutch heritage in the construction of Afrikaner nationalism. There is scarcity of documented evidence attesting to the fact that ‘hollanderhaat’ was accompanied by violence towards immigrants from the Netherlands. This was not so when the shadow of anti-Semitism visited South Africa.

3.4.2. Anti-Semitism

General historiography on Jews in South Africa has documented a strong anti-immigrant sentiment that was directed at Jewish immigrants in the beginning of the twentieth century. Shain (2009) has provided a systematic account of the genesis, development, and the dynamics of the anti-Jewish sentiment in South African political and social culture. ‘Anti-Semitism’ refers to hostility (as expressed in sentiments, attitudes, or actions) rooted in the general population toward Jews as a collectivity (Brustein and King, 2004). In the present study, anti-Semitism is used to refer to a specific type of xenophobia that was directed at Jewish immigrants in South Africa. This type of

prejudice was racist and defamatory (Shain, 2009), and was often accompanied by violence and arson (Coetzee, 2005). This type of xenophobia is invariably linked to the history of the persecution of Jews for at least two millennia (Brustein and King, 2004). In the South African context, anti-Semitism and hostility towards Jews rose exponentially a few decades after the occurrence of the mineral revolution that triggered economic growth, and modernisation in the country. As the Jewish community grew, both in numbers and influence, so did the level of prejudice and hostility against Jews in South Africa (Shain, 2009). Negative images and stereotypes of Jews were constructed, and these formed a bedrock for the proliferation of anti-Jewish attitudes and discrimination.

Shain (2009) has documented stereotypical thinking against Jews in South Africa, and he argues that with the influx of Eastern European Jews in the late nineteenth century, an anti-Jewish stereotype was quick to emerge. Moreover, Jews were associated with the ‘dark side’ of city life, namely prostitution and illicit liquor selling. A sinister stereotype was that of the Jew as cosmopolitan financier who was inextricably linked to the notion of so-called Jewish international finance. These constructed images of Jews soon captured the Afrikaner public imagination, and were an invitation for the latter to launch violent attacks against the ‘common enemy’ – the Jew. Jewish immigrants, therefore, were deemed to be ‘undesirable’ inhabitants of the Union. They therefore suffered different shades of the ramifications of xenophobia. In post-Apartheid South Africa, the reception of African immigrants almost echoes that of the Jews in the sense that the former are also victims of a specific type of xenophobia (Afrophobia) that is specifically directed at them.

3.4.3. Afrophobia

Afrophobia is threatening to be a larger, stationary, and an enduring shade of xenophobia in South Africa's history of xenophobia. The term 'Afrophobia' refers to Afro-xenophobic prejudice directed at immigrants originating from continental Africa. In more simplistic terms, Afrophobia refers to 'black-on-black racism' or anti-Black racism. The contemporary form of xenophobia, which is obtained in South Africa, has assumed Afrocentric and Afro-xenophobic dimensions. The current 'shade' of xenophobia in South Africa has an Afrophobic dimension. In all the recent episodic outbursts of xenophobia in South Africa, the perennial target and victim has been the black African immigrant. The pogrom-like attacks of African immigrants, as well as the incendiary murders of Somali shopkeepers and members of their families and friends in the Eastern and Western Cape provinces have gained continental and international infamy. Several findings in surveys (Danso and McDonald 2001; Mattes et al. 2000; Crush and Ramachandran, 2014) have not shown liberalising tendencies in attitudes towards immigrants. Instead, a hardening took place in these attitudes, and prejudice and discrimination against immigrants are pervasive.

3.4.3.1. Afrophobia directed at black African migrants

Black African migrants originating from continental Africa have been accused of importing disease (the myth of migrants as disease-carriers) and crime into contemporary post-apartheid South Africa. At this juncture, it is instructive for me to cite the words of one senior official of the governing political party in post-Apartheid South Africa in order to illustrate how this false myth is still paddled. The former Minister of Health remarked that undocumented immigrants are overburdening the country's health systems and cause overcrowding resulting in infection control starting to decline (Heleta et al. 2018). In this context, the immigrant is constructed as a transmitter of communicable disease who poses a threat to public health in the host community.

These are familiar constructions of immigrants which, as I have argued earlier on, are frequently in circulation in many immigrant-receiving countries. For example, the erstwhile Republican Party senator of the United States of America, Patrick Buchanan, had accused immigrants of increasing the crime rate, negatively affecting environmental quality, and of importing disease. He said that these were biological traits and cultural behaviours that threatened to destroy the racial purity of American society (Buchanan, 2007).

3.4.3.2. Afrophobia, impurity, and alienhood

Further, immigrants were viewed as originating from ‘inferior races’, and their presence in the host country was regarded as threatening to dilute the ‘purity of the superior race’. Similar prejudicial stereotypes have been expressed about black immigrants in South Africa. Former president Jacob Zuma, in an open letter to Mia Couto (Mozambican writer and poet), stated that there were also accusations that foreign nationals committed crimes such as drug peddling and human trafficking, and that they took the jobs of locals as employers preferred them since they were prepared to take lower wages (Zuma, 2015). There were also complaints about free government housing that was secured by foreign nationals. Zuma then goes on to say that the government emphasised that none of these grievances justified any form of violence against foreign nationals. The former South African president was commenting, amongst other things, on the prejudicial and negative stereotypes about immigrants that are in frequent circulation in postcolonial South Africa – in particular those migrants originating from the African continent. In addition, Adepoju (2003) has contended that South Africans are increasingly directing their xenophobic anger at the immigrants from other African countries accusing them of stealing their jobs, houses, culture, and their women. I contend that there seems to be a deliberate association of immigrants with all the social

ills and vices affecting the post-Apartheid societal establishment – unemployment, crime, HIV/AIDS, and other social problems.

The demonisation of immigrants in post-Apartheid South Africa is a visible and continuing reality, and Comaroff and Comaroff (2002) write about the new ‘spectre’ that is evolving in post-Apartheid South Africa: a growing mass, a shadowy alien-nation, of immigrant black workers from elsewhere on the continent. These new immigrants are not only subjected to the most overt forms of xenophobia, but are also accused of disrupting local relations of production and reproduction. The immigrants are incessantly accused of usurping scarce jobs and resources, fostering prostitution, and spreading HIV/AIDS. The migrants have been openly harassed and demonised on South African public spaces, and were regarded as ‘nightmare citizens’ whose ‘rootlessness’ and presence threaten the rapidly diminishing prosperity of the indigenous population. This demonisation of immigrants has triggered calls for action to be taken against the ‘demons’ accused of disrupting local relations production and reproduction by usurping scarce jobs and resources. This unequivocally lays bare a proliferative environment for xenophobia and its concomitant ramifications. This demonisation of immigrants is an important ingredient in the production and perpetuation of violent xenophobia. This is also something that serves to embolden the autochthons’ proclivities to display xenophobic attitudes and violent behaviour. The comments, cited below, typify the autochthons’ predisposition to xenophobia.

Joubert (*in* Mail and Guardian 2008) reported on one shrill and dangerous call that was made that Somali Spaza shop-owners had to stop ‘taking away livelihoods’ of local small business owners, and should return to Somali. If Somali immigrants did not heed this call, a civil war would erupt in post-apartheid South Africa. The caller also indicate that the Somali traders were Arabs who were in the country illegally. These disturbing views reflected a clear and ever-present danger of

violence against immigrants in South Africa. The accusatory tone embodied in these remarks was sufficient to fan the fires of xenophobic violence.

Afrophobia has not only been an enduring shade of xenophobia in South Africa's history of xenophobia, but it has been a shade of xenophobia that has wrought dark clouds of xenophobia accompanied by torrential rains of pogrom-like violence. Furthermore, this shade of xenophobia has blighted the South African landscape of 'rainbowism' characterised by a peaceful co-existence among what the Senegalese writer calls as 'God's bits of wood'. In conclusion, this last shade of xenophobia, with its attendant pinching and horrendous consequences, that has visited South Africa has to be continuously and constantly be investigated in order to comprehend its underpinnings and enduring presence. The present investigation aimed to contribute in that direction. How does the phenomenon of xenophobia manifest itself, not only in the context of post-apartheid South Africa, but in the entire global village?

3.5. MANIFESTATIONS OF XENOPHOBIA

Owing to the multi-facetedness of the phenomenon of xenophobia, it is not perplexing to observe that its manifestation varies from context to context. In the majority of instances, there is a contextual variation in the expression of xenophobia. In explaining how xenophobia manifests itself, I now make a distinction between the subtle, overt and aversive manifestations of this phenomenon, and covert and subliminal manifestations of xenophobia.

3.5.1. Overt manifestations of xenophobia

3.5.1.1. The German holocaust

There are many ways in which xenophobia can overtly manifest itself. For instance, in the Nazi era and context, the expression of xenophobia took a virulent form of racism (an ideological view

of the superiority of one group over another) which was accompanied by a Holocaust (Haas, 2008). Adolf Hitler and his followers believed that European Jews were not deserving membership to the so-called Aryan race because they were biologically and racially inferior. European Jews possessed inherited biological features that made them to be intellectually and physically inferior to the members of the Aryan race. This belief was a constituent ingredient of a broader Nazi ideology which was premised on the view that there were significant biological differences among the races of humankind, and any form of miscegenation would lead to biological degeneracy of the Aryan race, and have other deleterious consequences (Weikart, 2013). Another critical ingredient of the Nazi ideology was the belief that members of the so-called Aryan race were ‘God’s chosen people on Earth’. Nazism, therefore, embodied a form of racism- the belief that members of the Aryan race were innately superior and Jews were inferior (Hertog, 2020). In addition, the Nazi racists believed that things like intelligence, industry, and other important traits were biologically inherited and therefore unalterable. The Nazi ideology subsequently bred aggressive hatred and attitudes towards members of the Jewish community (Landau, 2016).

These racist and xenophobic attitudes were frequently accompanied by discrimination, and became institutionalised in the German society – that is, they became embedded in Germany’s institutions (in schools, workplace and other institutions) (Weikart, 2013). When this racist manifestation of xenophobia was institutionalised in Germany, established statutory and administrative mechanisms were employed to keep the Jewish minority in a subordinate position. In this way, German society institutions were used to reward members of the Aryan race with great economic, political and social opportunities, while punishing the Jewish minority group through denial of access to such benefits (Weikart, 2013). Jews in Germany, therefore, were not equal to the members of the so-called Aryan race in terms of power, prestige, and economic resources, and

were differentially-ranked in each of these significant social variables (Hertog, 2020). Adolf Hitler's political party, which held superior power in the German society, succeeded in establishing a system of inequality by imposing their will upon the less-powerful Jewish minority group. Jews experienced various forms of injustice – in the courts, in schools, in the workplace, and in communities. Perhaps the most overt historical form of injustice that the Jews suffered occurred after Hitler's declaration and subsequent implementation of the infamous 'final solution to the Jewish question'. All the members of the Jewish minority group that Hitler and his cohorts could find were headed to concentration camps where they were shot, and their corpses were incinerated in the gas chambers (Russell, 2019). The intent here was evidently to exterminate and annihilate the biologically-defective and inferior Jews so as to prevent any contamination, falsification or 'adulteration' of the German race. In short, xenophobia can manifest itself in a racist manner, and have holocaustic consequences.

Sometimes, xenophobia can overtly manifest itself through national chauvinism and pride (Huddy & Del Ponte 2019). This was the case with regard to the collapse of authoritarian and totalitarian systems that occurred in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Gellner, 1995; Van Mol and de Valk, 2016). These historical events triggered unprecedented rates and high levels of migration, extremism, and xenophobia in Eastern Europe. For instance, there were pogrom-like attacks of Muslims (Adanır, 2016) in Bosnia, as well as the incendiary murders of other immigrant minorities which gained continental and international infamy. Bosnia, a country which was mostly made up of Muslims and a Serb minority had just declared its independence from the former Yugoslavia (Kang'ethe and Duma 2013). In response to this declaration of independence, Slobodan Milosevic (the former President of both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia) attacked Bosnia's capital city of

Sarajevo. In scenes of orgiastic pogroms reminiscent of the German Holocaust, Milosevic unleashed a reign of terror on Bosnian Muslims through mass shootings, detention of men and boys in concentration camps, and random shootings of innocent civilian and children by Serbian snipers. Moreover, Milosevic and his cohorts utilised the favourite weapon in the arsenal of those usually engaged in ethnic cleansing experiments – the rape of women and girls (Borneman, 1998; Di Lellio and Kraja, 2020). In April 2001, Slobodan Milosevic was charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Court, but he died before the Court could give a verdict in his trial.

3.5.1.2. The Rwandan genocide

Rehearsals of these scenes of genocide and ethnic cleansing have also taken place in the African continent. In continental Africa, the Rwandan experience still reminds the world of the painful genocidal violence that visited the country. Expatriating on the latter viewpoint, Osuntokun (2011) stated that the killing of a million Tutsis by Hutus in 1994 in a genocidal campaign was the worst form of xenophobia in modern time. The Rwandan experience evidently demonstrated the fact that sometimes racial antipathy between groups in society could metamorphosise into violent xenophobia and wanton crime. Furthermore, there was also ethnic cleansing exercises carried out by the Janjanweed Arab militia, bolstered militarily and financially by the Khartoum government (De Maio, 2014), which resulted in the death of thousands of Darfurians, and millions of people of African descent who were internally displaced. By citing these cases, the fact I am attempting to asseverate here is that in certain African contexts, the overt manifestation of xenophobia has sometimes proceeded along the dimensions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. In South Africa, a particular form of xenophobia, often accompanied by wanton violence, has targeted African immigrants originating from continental Africa. In post-Apartheid South Africa, the overt manifestation of xenophobia has been characterised primarily not only by strong negative attitudes

towards foreign nationals, but also by violent killings, looting and burning of their property. Another characteristic feature of how xenophobia manifests itself in the post-Apartheid context is that the negative attitudes and violence are mainly directed at a particular racial group – mainly non-South African blacks. Solomon and Kasaka (2014 cited in Dassah 2015) lamented that the phenomenon of xenophobia in South Africa had the racial undertones. More specifically, black migrants who originate from other African countries, including those from Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states, were frequently victims of violent xenophobia, whereas white immigrants of any nationality were welcome, and seemed to be immune from xenophobic violence.

3.5.1.3. Prejudice and discrimination as a manifestation of xenophobia

Overt prejudice and discrimination form a palatable environment for xenophobia. Prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behaviour towards foreign nationals in many immigrant-receiving countries are prevalent, and are an overt manifestation of xenophobia. The literature on prejudice and discrimination towards immigrants is predominantly bi-directional – some theoretical explanations focus on the economic roots of prejudice, whereas other theories direct our attention to the cultural underpinnings (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) of these phenomena. Explanations of prejudice and discrimination that locate the roots of these phenomena in the economy emphasise competition over scarce socioeconomic resources (such as jobs), and immigrants are perceived to be posing a threat – immigrants are perceived to be posing a threat to locals who are attempting to access these scarce economic goods. The cultural theories of prejudice accentuate the threat posed by the ‘cultural ‘indigestibility’ of immigrants – something that poses an existential threat to the ‘purity’ of the host culture.

Prejudicial attitudes towards immigrants are accompanied by discriminatory behaviours – particularly in the socioeconomic domain. Nowhere do immigrants experience discrimination that in the workplace. In many European countries, non-Caucasian immigrants experience noticeably poorer outcomes than do Caucasian immigrants (Dietz, 2010). Indeed, non-Caucasian immigrant workers would bear the brunt of employment discrimination in the workplace relative to Caucasian immigrants. This discrimination would also be extended beyond the workplace. Immigrants would be differentially treated when it comes to the accessing of other socioeconomic resources like housing, education and health benefits. Sometimes, overt manifestations of prejudice and discrimination may mutate into hatred of immigrants.

3.5.1.4. Hatred as a manifestation of xenophobia

Hate is inhuman, and has the potential to be injurious, and cause immense psycho-social damage to the victim. Hate cultivates seeds of discord, animosity, and enhance the spirit of taking vengeance. Hatred has evidently manifested itself in many episodes of xenophobia across the world. Xenophobia does not only refer to the fear of strangers or foreign nationals, it also denotes hatred of these people. Duncan (2017) has argued that hate is so indubitably the single most significant causal element of *the* xenophobic, racist and sexist activities. Duncan (2017) contends that hatred is characterised by hypervigilance for lapses or failings in an object is deemed to be problematic. Hatred, therefore, is a phenomenon that is so destructive. Hatred is a kind of a generalised anger that makes people to want to annihilate those deemed to be problematic. Fischer et al. (2018) stated that in order to prevent future painful offenses by the hated group, the aim of the hatred sentiment is to eliminate the hated groups of people from their environment. Hatred is a powerful sentiment that permanently destroys relationships between people. Hate, therefore, is

an enduring sentiment that is so destructive, and can translate to violent behaviour towards the hated group of people.

3.5.1.5. Violent behaviour as a manifestation of xenophobia

Violence is the intentional use of force that is directed at inflicting profound physical, psychological, and emotional harm. In the context of xenophobia, violence is usually accompanied by criminal activities. Violent behaviour, in a climate of xenophobia, usually take the form of ‘collective violence’ targeting specific groups of foreign nationals. Of all the types violence (interpersonal and self-directed), ‘collective violence’ is the most indiscriminate, barbaric, and heinous type. ‘Collective violence’ is also largely influenced by the so-called ‘laws of the jungle’ – it draws heavily from animalistic forms of justice. Collective forms of violence are expressed with impunity, and involves licentious criminal behaviours exhibiting complete disrespect of human dignity. According to Lang (2020), perpetrators of collective violence allegedly dehumanise their victims.

When violent behaviour manifests itself in xenophobic conflicts, the xenophobes’ intention is clearly not only to maim or kill, but also to dehumanise their victims. In such ‘rituals of dehumanisation’, the frenzied mobs of xenophobes usually revel in desecrating the bodies of victims, sing, and dance around the remains. Incidence of collective violence against foreign nationals, in the post-apartheid South African context are not uncommon. The now infamous 2008 deadly xenophobic episode epitomised an instance of collective violence directed at foreign nationals. Writing about this episode, Solomon (2019:156) said: “Mobs armed with makeshift weapons roamed the streets of townships, proudly declaring to the media that they would kill any ‘foreigners’ they found. In what became the most widely circulated image of the violence, a

Mozambican man was burned alive”. This illustrates the barbaric, and grotesque nature of collective violence often directed at foreign nationals in host countries.

3.5.2. Covert manifestations of xenophobia

3.5.2.1. Subtle xenophobia

Subtle xenophobia tends to be expressed covertly, and can be a more sophisticated form of xenophobia. Subtle xenophobia, just like subtle racism, is the modern form that is distant and indirect (Pettigrew, 1998, Arancibia-Martini et al. 2016). This type of xenophobia refers to a form of immigrant prejudice that surfaces in less direct ways whenever it is safe, socially acceptable, or easy to rationalise (Van Hiel and Mervielde, 2005). Subtle xenophobia appears to be very difficult to identify owing to its hiddenness and covertness. This form of xenophobia manifests itself in numerous ways that are more subtle and indirect. In addition, this form of xenophobia tends to manifest itself in ways that make it difficult to recognise and combat (Rodriguez et al. 2009). This researcher argues that subtle xenophobia can manifest itself in a situation where indigenes appear to tolerate the presence of foreign citizens without abandoning their xenophobic attitudes. Subtle xenophobia can also manifest itself in a way that allows a person to express anti-immigrant prejudice while remaining socially desirable. In short, subtle xenophobia is characterised by a non-prejudiced expression of xenophobia. Those who harbour this type of xenophobia will profusely deny that they are xenophobic, and yet continue to systematically practice discriminatory behaviour against foreign citizens. One can draw some parallels between subtle xenophobia and ‘colour-blind racism’. Colour-blind racism allows whites to appear ‘not racist’, preserve their privileged status, blame African-Americans for their low status, and to aggressively criticise any institutional attempt to ameliorate racial inequality (Bonilla-Silva and Forman, 2000; Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich, 2011). Locals would therefore profess to be xenocentric whilst they would fiercely

oppose any societal endeavours to remove barriers impeding foreign citizens from accessing political, economic, and social rights in the host country.

3.5.2.2. 'New and modern' forms of immigrant prejudice

Subtle xenophobia appears to manifest itself as a 'new and modern' forms of immigrant prejudice. This non-prejudice expression of prejudice has three dimensions. Expatriating on this form of prejudice, Pettigrew and Meertens (1995 cited in Arancibia-Martini et al. 2016) suggest that subtle prejudice need to be revealed by three more covert components, each of which is expressed in ways deemed normative and acceptable in western societies. The first is *the defence of traditional values*. Victim blaming is often involved. Outgroup members are seen to act in unacceptable ways, and not to perform in ways necessary to succeed. What is regarded as acceptable and necessary behaviour is construed in terms of the in-group's traditional values. The second component entails *the exaggeration of cultural differences*. Instead of invoking genetic inferiority, subtle prejudice attributes outgroup disadvantage to cultural differences.

The third component denies positive emotional responses toward members of the out-group. This feature does not admit negative feelings toward the out-group – only the more covert denial of positive emotions. In a similar vein, subtle xenophobia embodies these three dimensions of subtle prejudice. Subtle xenophobia includes the ethnocentric notion that immigrants, who are deemed to belong to the out-group, are not succeeding in the host country precisely because they harbour faulty and defective cultural orientations which are diametrically opposed to the in-group's traditional values. This type of xenophobia tends to overstate or exaggerate actual group differences, and portrays immigrants as a people apart. Subtle xenophobia, or what this researcher refers to as 'clandestine xenophobia' or xenophobia in disguise, is still xenophobia, nonetheless – a form of 'racism without race'. It is a 'new style of xenophobia' that is an integral component of

the anti-immigrant rhetoric pervading every nook and corner of the immigrant-receiving societies. The second dimension of subtle xenophobia which focuses on the overstatement of cultural differences is analogous to what Verena Stolcke (1999, in Werbner 2013) refers to as ‘cultural fundamentalism’. Cultural fundamentalism is a cultural rhetoric that accentuates differences of cultural heritage and their incommensurability. The gist of this cultural discourse is that there are insurmountable essential cultural differences among cultural groups, and these groups should be kept separate for their own good. Sometimes, xenophobia can manifest itself amongst immigrant minorities in the host country.

3.6. INTER-MINORITY XENOPHOBIA

Inter-minority xenophobia refers to the manifestation of prejudicial attitudes and discrimination that occur between various immigrant minorities in various immigrant-receiving countries. Prejudiced thinking accompanied by discriminatory behaviour do occur between minority immigrant groups (White and Saikkonen, 2017) in the host society. Sometimes, this phenomenon is referred to as minority-on-minority xenophobia – the focus being on how immigrant minority groups view one another. This is a type of xenophobia among the victims themselves where the ‘victims become the victors’. A rudimentary view of inter-minority xenophobia accentuates the fact that it is a form of prejudice and discrimination that several immigrant minorities exhibit towards each other. Immigrant minorities experience inter-minority xenophobia and prejudice and discriminatory behaviours emanating from the so-called ‘indigenes’. It is the considered view of this researcher that the contemporary projects of socially constructing of immigrants as the ‘other’ are not the exclusive prerogative of the ‘indigenes’, but are also ‘rehearsed and performed’ by the immigrants themselves in certain contextual settings. Viewed in this light, anti-minority xenophobia, therefore, disrupts our orthodox and received assumptions concerning the

commonalities amongst victims of xenophobia created by their experience of being an immigrant. I maintain that this form of hatred is a strand of the multi-faceted and complex phenomenon of racism and xenophobia, and requires further investigation and study.

It is a strand of xenophobia with scant research attention (Hindriks et al. 2014) and documentation in both the African and South African contexts. In these latter contexts, inter-minority xenophobia is still in a nascent state of development, and is going to require further conceptual and theoretical elaboration. This dearth in the literature on inter-minority xenophobia is due to the fact that major discourses (both theoretical and empirical) focusing on the topic of xenophobia are overwhelmingly biased towards an examination of the intergroup attitudes and relations between the members of the sedentary populations and the newly arrived immigrants. The paucity of scholarship on inter-minority xenophobia in the South African context extends across all academic disciplines. This scarcity in literature is undoubtedly driven by the fallacious assumption premised on the notion that inter-minority xenophobia cannot, and ought not to, exist among immigrant minorities owing to the fact that they share the same pain of xenophobia. However, what this obscurantist view deliberately hides, and fails to take into cognisance, is the ways in which prejudice among immigrant minorities may contribute to the maintenance of general xenophobia in the host society. A corollary of the preceding thesis is that this type of xenophobia may provide the xenophobes with socio-cultural materials they utilise in the process of constructing immigrants as ‘others’.

In order to broaden our understanding of inter-minority xenophobia, this researcher is going to borrow from the conceptual models that have been utilised to study inter-minority relations both in North American and European societies. Such models have, for example, examined the following questions and issues: whether some minorities are more xenophobic than others, and if

so why? What drives hostility among groups who share not only minority status in a receiving state or community, but also ethnic, religious, and cultural background? (Alexseev, 2008); how inter-minority racism may feed into hierarchisation of minorities, and their segmented assimilation (Shah, 2008) or integration into the host country? Research on inter-minority racism has also yielded some useful insights on how members of immigrant minority groups view each other as direct competitors for scarce economic and political resources (McClain and Stewart, 2014) – and the potential for the eruption of violence ensuing from this competition. Another insight relates to how inter-minority racism may militate against efforts directed at fostering cooperation, solidarity, and cohesion among immigrant minorities in the host country. The latter attributes are significant ‘coping and resiliency resources’ that enable immigrants to withstand xenophobic assaults in host nations.

3.6.1. Manifestation of inter-minority xenophobia

Inter-minority xenophobia may manifest itself both in overt and aggressive ways, as well as in subtle and covert ways. Overt manifestations of inter-minority xenophobia may border on naked forms of aggression, sadism and rabid barbarism. The covert expressions of inter-minority xenophobia may be characterised by concealed, disguised and seemingly pernicious forms of racism and xenophobia (Schiffer and Wagner, 2011). These covert manifestations of this type of inter-minority xenophobia may operate in an innocuous or seemingly harmless way, but the results may be grave and ruinous. Inter-minority xenophobia, whether overtly or covertly expressed, may lead to rampant discrimination among immigrant minority groups. Discrimination triggered by inter-minority xenophobia can occur on a small-scale basis such as when an immigrant who arrived earlier on in the host country treats the ones who recently arrived in a disdainful manner. For example, a Zimbabwean immigrant who had long arrived and became financially rich in South

Africa would make disparaging remarks about a Ugandan immigrant (who was practising as a traditional healer), with the result that the former shuns all forms of contact with the latter. Large-scale discrimination induced by inter-minority xenophobia can result in immigrants assigned the 'undesirable' status to be negatively viewed and discriminated against by other immigrant accorded a preferential immigration status in the host country. These are not just mundane manifestations of inter-minority xenophobia, but rather are indicative of the deep scars of the global racist ideologies left of in the psyche of the victims of these antipathies. In addition, the existence and proliferation of inter-minority xenophobia serves to validate the construction and maintenance boundaries and re-manufactured differences among the members of the global human race. Finally, inter-minority xenophobia perpetuates and entrenches hierarchical arrangements of peoples in society, and the domination of certain groups of peoples by others.

Such inter-minority xenophobia and discriminatory behaviour have the potential not only to impact on relations among immigrant groups, but also to reinforce general xenophobia. However, inter-minority xenophobia might occasion a societal context in which mainstream xenophobic bigotry can become transferable to immigrant groups who are seeking acceptance from the majority population (Philip et al. 2010). They (Ibid.) continue, citing the internationally-acclaimed American novelist (Toni Morrison): "... in order to become part of the mainstream, immigrants must participate in negative appraisals..." of members of the other immigrant groups. By so doing, immigrant groups will be borrowing and utilising inherited discourses that have, and continue to, negatively appraise certain groups of immigrants as 'aliens' or 'undesirables'. The rehearsals and re-enactment of the encounters between the 'indigenes' and the 'aliens' will occur. To utilise a Marxist (in Tucker 1978) terminology, members of the immigrant minority groups would be '... using racist slogans of the past, and wearing the uniform of the dead colonial and racist masters'

(Karl Marx though employed this terminology for a completely different doctrinal purpose and task). In short, at the core of inter-minority xenophobia is the presumption that for an immigrant to become an accepted member of the host society, she or he needs to participate in the vilification of other immigrants.

In conclusion, members of one immigrant minority group might see themselves as being in competition with those of another group over scarce resources. This competition, whether it is real or perceived, may trigger negative attitudes (including xenophobia) and conflict among immigrant minority groups in the host society. In this situation, inter-minority xenophobia and conflict among immigrant groups may be a consequence of contestation for power and control over economic and social goods. This could make the immigrant minority group to get caught up in a vicious cycle of protracted battles and skirmishes aimed at getting the attention, admiration, and support of the so-called ‘indigenes’ in the host society. Consequently, such internecine conflicts among immigrant minorities may hobble, if not obstacle, government and civil society efforts to integrate them into post-apartheid South Africa.

3.7. POLITICS AND XENOPHOBIA

3.7.1. Xenophobic rhetoric from government representatives underpins xenophobia

A cursory glance at the history of most immigrant-receiving societies evinces the existence of a strong relationship between politics, immigration, and xenophobia. Baldwin-Edwards and Schain (1994) and Eger and Valdez (2015) are of the view that immigration has emerged as a powerful political issue throughout all of Western Europe. In both Western Europe and the United States of America, politicians and government ministers have promoted an inflammatory rhetoric of the large flows of immigrants entering Europe as something that poses a threat to national security.

One of the major issues that perennially features in the manifestos of political parties contesting national elections has been, and continues to be, that of reducing immigration levels. Marine Le Pen's political party (Front National) secured a sizeable chunk of the vote in the recent French presidential elections after having aggressively campaigned on a ticket of patriotism and reduction of legal immigration (Gougou and Persico, 2017). In North America, specifically in the United States of America, Donald Trump was elected president after he promised to build a border wall between Mexico and his country. The president believed that the border wall would deter immigrants from Mexico from illegally crossing the southern border of the United States of America. In fact, the politics of immigration and xenophobia have birthed anti-immigrant political parties, and xenophobic politics in some Western European societies. In post-apartheid South Africa, there appears to be a relationship between politics, immigration, and xenophobia.

Neocosmos (2010), in his book (From "Foreign Natives" to "Native Foreigners": Explaining Xenophobia in Post-apartheid South Africa), has commented on the role that politicians and state institution play in the making of a culture of xenophobia in South Africa. Elaborating on the point above, Neocosmos (2010) has contended that there was an authoritarian culture that permeated all repressive apparatuses of the post-apartheid state, and that authoritarianism was directed particularly towards non-citizens of African origin. One of the reasons for the continued existence of this authoritarian culture is that it is a consequence of state practices left untransformed from South Africa's apartheid past. To illustrate the preceding point, let us consider the remarks allegedly made by the former minister of health (Dr. Aaron Motsoaledi): "The weight that foreign nationals are bringing to the country has got nothing to do with xenophobia... it's a reality. Our hospitals are full, we can't control them. When a woman is pregnant and about to deliver a baby you can't turn her away from the hospital and say you are a foreign national... you can't. And

when they deliver a premature baby, you have got to keep them in hospital. When more and more come, you can't say the hospital is full now go away... they have to be admitted, we have got no option – and when they get admitted in large numbers, they cause overcrowding, infection control starts failing” (in Mbhele, 2018). These remarks evidently indicate an authoritarian tendency of wanting to control the utilisation of state resources by denying certain group of people access to them. In addition, the comments by the minister capture the essence of the interface between politics, immigration, and xenophobia in the South African post-apartheid context.

Expatriating on this interaction between politics and xenophobia, I cited the comments made by a senior member of the ruling political party (African National Congress) who indicated that the issue of undocumented foreigners was a concern of the general society. This official stated that if these undocumented immigrants committed crime, it would not be possible for law enforcement to arrest and fingerprint them (in Modjadji, 2019). Deducing from the preceding political rhetoric, it seems reasonable to assume that how the ruling political party handles this issue could possibly have a bearing on public sentiment towards immigrants. Perhaps, this brand of political rhetoric could have the potential to inflame xenophobic prejudice and violence towards undocumented immigrants – especially those originating from Africa. It is also becoming evident that post-apartheid South Africa has the potential to become an ‘immigrant nation’, and it is common in such countries to find politicians employing political rhetoric that could foment racial and xenophobic hatred. In post-apartheid South Africa, xenophobia has become an emotive issue and it is my considered view that leaders must instead promote a solution-oriented political rhetoric. Incendiary political rhetoric re-awakens and re-invigorates the xenophobic sentiment and hatred of foreign nationals in the host country.

In the present study, I deemed it necessary to examine how the issues of immigration and xenophobia were inextricably intertwined with politics. In addition, I looked at how the politics of immigration and xenophobia had been constructed, and the consequences of that construction for foreign citizens in immigrant-receiving societies like post-apartheid South Africa. In pursuance of the task at hand, I examined the role that politics play in arousing and perpetuating the scourge of xenophobia, and its concomitant violent and deviant manifestations. In order to elucidate the arguments to be developed here, I borrowed insights from the literature focusing on the politics of ‘purity’, and the politics of ‘alienhood’.

3.8. POLITICS AND OTHERING

Neocosmos (2010) was now quoted at length to indicate the intricate relations between politics and xenophobia. He (2010:111) contended that the process of ‘nation-building’ (whether explicit or implicit), “... is not simply about the creation of ‘national unity’ around a common political project, but it is also about demarcating that unity from others – from ‘foreigners’. The opposition citizen-foreigner denotes both the creation of a new community as well as the exclusion of some from community. As this community is based not only on a common ‘identity’ but also on legal prescriptions (rights and duties) and socioeconomic benefits (access to social services, bank loans, etc.), it is certainly not ‘imagined’ but materially experienced. It is not only an ideological, but also a fundamentally socio-material object embedded in social relations and is experienced as such, most obviously by ‘strangers/foreigners’ who are excluded from community rights and access to resources”. Two significant insights could be discerned from the preceding commentary.

A primary insight is that human beings have always displayed a natural inclination towards nation-building, and have depended on ‘other’ people to lend credence to their own project of national existence. These projects of ‘constructing’ or ‘imagining’ a nation (Conversi, 2012) have

inevitably necessitated a boundary-demarkation process between in which some people are defined as not belonging to the 'human collective' or nation. One of the integral components of the nation building process has been the construction of myths about the 'collective', and narratives that demonise those identified and defined as not belonging. These myths are frequently framed in hagiographical language that idealises or idolises the 'collective'. Simultaneously, narratives that have a racial, prejudicial, and xenophobic tinge will crop up as part of the nation-building. The point that I am attempting to arrive at is that political leaders play a pivotal and a consolidative role in this process of nation-building. How? Leaders (be they Presidents, councillors, chiefs, and other leaders) perform this role by promoting a common identity so as to improve cohesion within the collective, and cultivating hatred for the 'other'.

A secondary insight derived from Neocosmos' comments is that 'strangers/foreigners' pose a threat to the 'collective goods', and this justifies their exclusion and alienation from the 'collective'. The exclusionary behaviour of the 'collective' is premised on the assumption that the 'strangers/foreigners' are endeavouring to unduly benefit from the 'public goods' owned by the 'collective'. Political leaders often cultivate and promote an attitude that any interaction with these 'strangers/foreigners' must be avoided, and the latter's attempts to 'thieve' from the public purse of 'collective goods' must be sternly resisted. By so doing, this enables political leaders to quell the restive local members whom they have been promised unfettered or unbridled access to 'collective goods'. The latter viewpoint is echoed in the thesis advanced by the Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) and Comaroff (2010) that in the post-colony, many political leaders have dismally failed in provisioning the domestic population with the promissory benefits of 'freedom and independence' (jobs, houses, free education and other benefits). This, in turn, has created a persistent and perennial fear among the ruling political elites that there would be a volcanic public

uprising led by the restive domestic population. The ruling political elites are aware of the possibility for such an uprising to occur in post-apartheid South Africa. How do political leaders react to this situation?

The crass reaction of political leaders has been to utilise a diversionary strategy of ‘fanning the flames of hatred’ towards the ‘strangers/foreigners’. By refocusing the anger of the domestic population towards ‘strangers/foreigners’, these political leaders manage to divert attention away from themselves. This is the cardinal role that political leaders play in the project of ‘othering’ those identified as ‘strangers/foreigners’. The recently cited comments attributed by the current minister of health in post-apartheid South Africa exemplify this process of ‘othering’ immigrants. When the minister of health in post-apartheid South Africa ‘others’ immigrants, he is casting them as ‘alien species’ who are invading South African hospitals. In pursuance of this process of ‘othering’, political leaders ‘wear the uniform of the mythical national heroes’, and use slogans from the past history of the collective. This lays the ground for the aggressive cultivation of the ‘politics of alienhood’ which becomes symbiotically enmeshed with the ‘politics of purity’.

3.9.ALIENHOOD, PURITY, AND XENOPHOBIA

3.9.1. Nation-building projects and the discourses of the “other”

Xenophobia emerges through the process of regulation and legalisation of the alien body and identity (Marciniak, 2006). The construction of alien identities, which is an integral component of nation-building projects, is frequently associated with stigmatisation, destitution and trauma. Mavroudi (2010) contended that the history of nation-state building has often coincided with reactionary and xenophobic constructions of the ‘Other’ as, for example, barbaric and uncivilised. Nation-building experiments simultaneously involve inclusionary and exclusionary objectives.

Attempts to create a post-apartheid 'rainbow nation' have been accompanied by aggressive efforts to exclude those deemed as not belonging ('outsiders'). Therefore, those who are regarded as 'outsiders' often become identified and labelled, and become perceived as a threat to the constructed and/or imagined 'nation'. The 'insiders' may then come to believe that if they are to live in a democratic post-apartheid society, their first patriotic duty should be to 'eject' the 'outsiders' from South Africa. Such attempt to 'eject' may take the form of xenophobia and violence towards those essentially identified as 'outsiders', or lead to wholesale expulsion of certain immigrant minority groups. The point asseverated here is that the genesis of alienhood sprouts from nation-building projects that are rooted in essentialist constructions of identity.

In addition, Mavroudi (2010) argued that migrants and those in diaspora, and their cross-border connections have been seen as unsettling the perceived homogeneity of the nation, creating identities that are more 'in-between' –complex identities that are seen as 'beyond' the nation. Consequently, the so-called 'outsiders' are sometimes seen as problematic and 'odd'. Their presumed 'oddity' is premised on the erroneous notion that immigrant identities 'do not fit any of the colours of the rainbow' in post-apartheid South Africa. Nation-building projects are often accompanied by homogenising discourses that construct the migrant as 'different', 'alien', and problematic. Homogenous explanations (Busakwe, 1997; Bieber, 2018) of who belongs to the 'nation' often lead to 'closed definitions' and understandings, and can have disastrous consequences for those who are defined as 'outsiders'. Political leaders play a crucial role in the construction and assemblage of the migrant as an 'alien'. The word that political leaders use can have disastrous and deadly consequences. Politicians help to provide the cognitive and vocabulary armoury to the 'native' which the latter utilise in his or her mundane encounters with the so-called 'alien'. In addition, such armoury influences and shapes the manner in which the 'native' will react

to the presence of the ‘alien’. Needless to say, at the centre of the ‘dramaturgical encounters’ between the ‘alien’ and the ‘native’ are the politicians who stand to derive both national and political benefits from all of this. At this juncture, the researcher wishes to explore the twin notions of ‘alienhood’ and ‘purity’.

3.9.2. ALIENHOOD

In nationalism and citizenship scholarship, the notion of an ‘alien’ refers to a ‘human foreigner’, and to a foreigner from the outer space – the latter usually depicted in science-fiction movies. The term ‘alien’ evokes an image of someone who is sub-species, sub-human, or ‘two-steps behind evolution’. In contemporary discourses of immigration, racism, and xenophobia, the immigrant is frequently constructed as an impure ‘alien’ threatening to ‘invade’ the country. The immigrants are often depicted as dreaded, dirty, horrible, and disgraceful people who are invading the host country with the sole purpose of changing its ‘way of life’. In fact, the construction of national identity and the ‘nation’ itself is inextricably interwoven with the emergence and subsequent proliferation of racism, xenophobia, and other forms of prejudice. The point being argued here is that there is a natural correlation or interdependence between the building of the ‘nation-state’ and the xenophobic construction of those deemed as not belonging, or as ‘aliens’. Nation-building projects naturally involve homogenous constructions of national identity which result in reactionary and xenophobic constructions of others as ‘aliens’.

Marciniak’s (2006) conceptualisation of alienhood was instructive here. She contended that alienhood is rooted in an understanding of it as a legally sanctioned discursive and disciplinary apparatus that classifies immigrants, refugees, and border-crossers in relation to a particular territory. If one examines the etymological origins of the word ‘alien’ – that is, if one looks at a chronological account of the birth and development of this word, and changes in its meaning- one

would come to understand it to mean any “... person belonging to another family, race, or nation; a stranger, a foreigner; one separated, or excluded from (the citizenship and privileges of a nation)” (Marciniak, 2006: 38). Viewed in this sense, an alien would be regarded as a foreigner who is permitted to settle in the host country, and whose presence is tolerated. In this situation, the alien would be accorded all the freedoms to access the full economic and political benefits offered by the host nation. In addition, the prospects of the alien to become ‘assimilated’ in the host nation are good. In brief, the alien is somebody who occupies an ambiguous status – that of being outside the community, and yet permitted and tolerated to settle in the same community. In this preceding conceptualisation of alienhood, the construction of what Marciniak (2006) calls ‘hygienic’ immigrant identity would flourish. Clearly, in the context described above, certain groups of aliens would be deemed to be ‘pure’, desirable, useful, and standing a good chance of being properly assimilated in the host nation. These groups of immigrants (in most cases, white immigrant groups from the Western Europe) would be regarded as ‘pure’ and non-pollutant, and would not disturb the native landscape.

3.9.3. Discourses of purity, impurity, and xenophobia

Discourses on ‘purity’ borrow heavily from disciplines such as plant geography, plant ecology and plant sociology. According to Groening and Wolschke-Bulmahn (2003), many professionals and lay people who are interested in nature, landscape and gardens assume that what they believe are so-called indigenous or native plants are unquestionably better than those labelled as non-native or exotic. Pure or indigenous plants contribute to the maintenance of order, harmony, and tranquillity in the natural landscape. Contrastingly, foreign or non-native plant species not only bring disorder and pollution, they also pose a danger to the ‘native’ landscape. Elaborating on this notion of ‘native plants’, Gould (in Groening and Wolschke-Bulmahn, 2003) stated that ‘natives’

are only those organisms that first happened to inhabit, and kept a footing in a place. In this contextual situation, ‘natives’ (read first-comers) rationally conceived of themselves as being morally superior and living in ecological harmony with their surroundings. All those who came late in this place are regarded as interlopers who tend to exploit and disturb the ‘ecological harmony’ of the place. What is explicit in the preceding commentary is the idea that foreign plants are aggressive interlopers who are intruding in the harmonious space of the native plants. These foreign or ‘exotic’ plants do not only exhibit invasive and aggressive behaviours, but they are also ‘weedy’. Consequently, if the development and proliferation of these exotic plants is left unchecked, this may lead to the contamination and subsequent destruction of the ‘native’ plants. One implication that this researcher could draw from the preceding discourses is that foreign nationals in post-apartheid South Africa are regarded as ‘exotic species’ who may contaminate the health of the local population. If the presence of the foreign nationals (especially those not documented) is left unchecked, the consequences for the ‘indigenes’ may be too aghast to contemplate. Therefore, native plants (the ‘indigenes’) which are pure, peaceful and non-aggressive need to be protected.

These are ideas that form one of the constituent elements of what are called ‘blood and soil nationalisms’ which recently promoted aggressive and violent forms of xenophobia in Europe. These kinds of nationalism simultaneously encouraged ‘rootedness in the soil’ while calling for the eradication of the ‘invasive plants’ or ‘marauding invaders’. Homogenising constructions of nationhood are not only obsessed with the idea of ‘national purity’, but such constructions of the ‘nation’ also trigger reactionary racism and xenophobia directed at those classified as ‘impure’. In these nation-building discourses and practices, purification and pollution come to be associated with natives and foreign citizens respectively. Definitions of what or who is pure, clean or natural

would include a process that is connected to ideas about what or who belongs naturally (Gremaud, 2014) in the ‘native’ land. In these debates about national purity and xenophobia, the idea that is frequently accentuated is that it is not just the mixing of the genetic structures of both native and exotic plants that must be avoided, it is also the mixing of peoples that is also alluded to. This mixing of species might lead to species contamination, and subsequent species contamination and degeneration.

I am interested in a different conceptualisation of the word ‘alien’ which is characterised by hateful slurs, and egregious categorisations of the others. Of particular interest to me is what these societal labels do to a foreign person, and how such labels injure those labelled as aliens. Marciniak (2006) is of the view that such injury may differ in its force and consequence depending on the ethno-racial assignment of an alien. For instance, relative to white immigrants, when black African immigrants have been assigned such a label, the consequences of injury to their person may be too aghast to contemplate. In the conceptualisation of alienhood, foreignness is deeply embedded in strangeness, inadequacy, inferiority, even illegitimacy--all connected to the issue of birth and origin (Marciniak, 2006; Marciniak and Bennett, 2018). The negative social construction of immigrants and the injurious consequences that this invite will be discussed *in extenso* in the next chapter. For now, I want to elaborate on the association between alienhood, exile, liminality, pollution, and impurity.

3.10. EXILE AND LIMINALITY

3.10.1. Defining the term ‘liminality’

Before examining the interface between exile and liminality, I first want to expatiate on the meaning of the term ‘liminality’. It was Arnold van Gennep (1909) who first introduced this term

in scholarly discourses (Neumann, 2012). He utilised this term when he studied the ‘rites of passage’ that individuals have to go through in a particular culture. These ‘rites of passage’ involve rituals of transition from one societal position to another (or from one situation to another), and are characterised a series of three stages - separation, margin (or limen), and incorporation. Victor Turner (1967, 1969) appropriated this van Gennep passage theory, and applied it in the field of anthropology (Neumann, 2012). Expanding on this viewpoint, Turner (2008) said that Victor Turner had viewed liminality as a ‘the threshold place’, the lintel, and the limen. Van Gennep had studied and analysed large numbers of the world’s cultural rituals concerned with transformation. Victor Turner recognised these rituals as incongruous or anomalous moments which were ‘in and out of time’, and did not belong to the prevailing social structure. These were threshold events, which he later termed as the ‘crack in the mirror’. In Victor Turner’s view, what appeared in those rituals was a celebration of in-between-ness itself. In-between-ness, the stage in the middle of change, had a strange character, and was out of this ordinary world. The critical issue to note in the preceding remarks is that of ‘in-between-ness’ – the liminal period or stage.

3.10.2. Victor Turner’s views on ‘liminality’

Victor Turner spent a great deal of time explaining the liminal period, and argued that this was a stage in which the status of individuals in a social structure was ambiguous and indeterminate. He (1995; 2008) asserted that the attributes of liminality or of liminal personae (“threshold people”) are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Victor Turner believed that liminal individuals are neither here nor there, and they were betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial. Turner was of the view that liminality was frequently likened to death, invisibility, darkness and wilderness. Furthermore,

Victor Turner reasoned that liminal entities had no status, property, insignia, and secular clothing which indicated rank or role, position in a kinship system. Liminality, therefore, could be understood as a state of suspension in which an individual is detached or separated from an original group, but still cannot be inducted into a new group and become fully consummated (Turner, 2008). Viewed in this sense, liminal persons remain at a neophytic stage awaiting structural classification and consummation. A liminal person remains in the margins of the social structure, and outside the process of social categorisation – unclassified, unconsummated, contradictory, and dangerous (Turner, 2008). This is one cardinal characteristic of liminal persons – their ambiguous status and role in the social structure.

Another characteristic of liminal beings is that they are associated with darkness, death, decomposition, catabolism, and danger. These symbolisations elucidate the idea that the presence of liminal persons in the community is polluting (Ehrlich, 2019), erosive, malignant, metastatic, and dangerous. Liminality, as the antithesis of structure, calls for adaptive responses to contain and control its spread by those in charge of maintaining the structure. Liminal individuals are perceived to be not only ‘unclear and unclean’, but also as dangerous. This idea that there are some ‘dangerous classes’ or groups in society has been usurped by political leaders to justify a range of policies on how to deal with these classes. This justifies the fact that xenophobia is usually a deeply underlying phenomenon whose roots may be deeply embedded in people’s bone marrow. The question I want to pose at this juncture is: how is liminality related to migration and xenophobia?

3.10.3. Migration, exile, and ‘liminality’

The act of migrating to another place inevitably induces both the exilic and liminal conditions. The individual finds himself or herself torn between two countries. In most extreme situations, an individual may be compelled to leave his or her country of origin, and decide to settle in a foreign

country where his or her presence is deemed as undesirable. In short, the individual may be forcefully ejected from their domicile countries, and still face the same rejection in the destination country. This places him or her in a state of liminality. Leung (2011) opined that exile was a liminal state, and whether that condition was induced voluntary or involuntary, the process of being exiled was one where an individual was removed from a place of origin (a homeland). When that happened to an individual, he or she would enter a period of liminality definitely between leaving one's origin and resituating himself or herself in a new country. Furthermore, Leung (2011) regarded an exile as belonging to neither country nor state, and that the exiled person's placement was defined by displacement from a place of origin or homeland. The person's exilic condition was characterised by various states of hybridity: freedom and imprisonment, origin and destination, and utopia and dystopia. These states of hybridity explained the liminal condition of the exilic being. Some powerful insights could be gleaned from the above commentary.

In short, the point I am making here is that the exilic location of immigrants induces a condition of liminality – an exile belongs to neither country. Exiled immigrants are, therefore, people *in limbo* (Pew Research Centre, 2017) – they continue to wander around and vacillate between acceptance and rejection. This is the situation that exiled immigrants find themselves in the post-apartheid context. They cannot go back to the country of origin, and simultaneously yearns to belong to the host country – both these countries reject them. While the two countries decide on their status, they remain suspended in a liminal space between rejection and acceptance. Secondly, an exile's thoughts of being liberated from the oppressive conditions in the homeland soon results in his or her deterritorialisation – the immigrant becomes not embedded in any social, politico-cultural space. Although hybridity may advance the situation in which the immigrant finds himself or herself, it may also result in a precarious condition. In other words, whilst an exile may celebrate

the hybridity of his or her condition of being deterritorialised, at the same time, such a condition may invite ‘alienhood’. In addition, politicians may exploit the liminal condition of the exile by linking it to discourses of pollution and impurity.

3.11. LIMINALITY, POLLUTION, AND IMPURITY

A critical aspect of the political discourses of liminality, hybridity and alienhood is the relationship between these and the notions of purity and impurity. Leung (2011) stated that the dichotomy of purity vis-à-vis filth is inherent in distinguishing the difference between two states. Leung (2011) argued that purity could be defined as authenticity, literal cleanliness, or clarity and ultimately represent goodness. Filth could be defined as contamination, pollution, literal filth, or ambiguity/hybridity and could ultimately represent evil. Furthermore, Leung (2011) contended that the natural reactions to this polar pair were to protect and strive towards the good of purity and defend against evil of pollution. In the post-apartheid context, immigrants are often equated with dirt, disease, and pollution. The remarks earlier on attributed to the minister of Health in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa – that when undocumented immigrants are admitted in large numbers, they cause overcrowding, and infection control starts failing – clearly evidence the view harboured by some that immigrants are indeed ‘disease-carriers and pollutants’. Therefore, there is an urgent need in the contemporary post-apartheid society to ‘get rid’ of ‘these pollutants’. The latter view constitutes a dangerous rhetoric reminiscent of the ‘immigrant as pollutant’ metaphor that the media in host countries often perpetuate. It becomes a popular rhetoric about immigration that operates by constructing metaphoric representations of immigrants, and portraying them as a ‘societal problem’ that requires a particular ‘urgent solution’.

In advancing her arguments, Leung cited the works of Mary Douglass (2002) and Katarzysna Marciniak (2006) to buttress her ideas. Utilising insights from the work of Mary Douglass (2002

cited in Duschinsky et al. 2016), one can begin to understand why some political leaders have used pollution beliefs to liken immigrants to ‘dirt’ that threatens to pollute societal order and cleanliness. This makes xenophobia to be a product of political thought among the community leadership. Immigrants, particularly those originating from the African continent, are seen as deviating from the norms and values of a ‘sanitised and sterilised’ post-apartheid society – they ‘deviate’ from the ‘normal’ cultural, social, and health conditions of the host society. By associating and equating African immigrants with ‘dirt’, the implication is that they threaten to ‘soil’ the sanitised post-apartheid society. Epidemiologically speaking, foreign African nationals are perceived as ‘immigrant vectors’ carrying dangerous bacterial and parasitical viruses which they will then transmit to their ‘post-apartheid hosts’. This may elicit a variety of responses from the ‘post-apartheid hosts’ ranging from avoidance of interacting with African foreign nationals to extreme reactions like wanting to ‘eradicate’ them from the ‘sanitised’ post-apartheid society. The ‘post-apartheid hosts’ may come to believe that by ‘weeding out’ these immigrant groups, a ‘sanitised society’ will be able to offer abundant jobs, houses, and other societal benefits.

3.11.1. Purity and impurity

Writing about purity and impurity, Douglas (in Duschinsky et al. 2016) has argued that dirt is essentially a harmful disorder, and it offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organise the environment. Dirt ‘is a matter out of place’ Douglas (2002 cited in Duschinsky et al. 2016) – African immigrants, just like deviants, are viewed as being misplaced, unsuitable, indigestible, messy, unfit, inapposite, and disarranged. The presence of dirt (read African immigrants) or impure matter in our homes or country makes the owners or ‘post-apartheid hosts’, to not only feel unrelaxed, but also to want to remove the ‘grime and grease’ - to ‘sanitise’ the post-apartheid society by eradicating ‘dirt’. The owners or post-apartheid hosts would

be attempting to re-order the interior of the household to conform to the idea of cleaning and purifying ‘natural spaces’. The latter viewpoint has similar undertones with the functionalist argument that the social system perpetually attempts to maintain equilibrium, and whenever that state of order is disrupted, society itself expends energy in the direction of restoring equilibrium. Dirt brings danger, disequilibrium, pollution, and disease to the household or host country. This is the foundational pillar upon which the ‘immigrant brings diseases’ discourses are premised. These discourses justify the fact that xenophobia and its concomitant ramifications are a consequence of deeply rooted thoughts, actions and norms, and possesses a political, and a social dimension.

3.11.2. Abjectivity

To further explicate this notion of impurity, I now bring Krivesta’s (1982) concept of ‘abjection’. For Kristeva (1982), an exile is one who ‘*dejects*’, ‘*separates*’, and ‘*situates*’ oneself – someone who ‘*strays*’ instead of getting his or her ‘bearings’ or sense of knowing where one is. Theorising the abject, Krivesta (1982 cited in Topak, 2021) contended that it lied outside, beyond the set, and did not seem to agree to the latter’s rules of the game. Even though it lied from outside and was banished, the abject did not cease to constantly challenge its master. The abject, therefore, was what disturbed identity, and what did not respect borders (Duschinsky, 2013). Abjection was a condition of being wretched, contemptible, unidentifiable, and that which transgresses social-cultural boundaries. The abject was something to be scared of, and it was “... the impure, ineffable, disgusting, horrifying, illicitly desirable, outside of logic, rejected by classification...” (Duschinsky, 2013: 712). In fact, abjection was symbiotically linked to impurity. The meaning of abjection did not refer to lack of cleanliness and pure health *per se*, but to a condition in which the exile defied boundaries, and transgressed the socio-cultural barriers. Furthermore, abjection was that which was anomalous within an identity, and system order (Duschinsky, 2013). The exile was

abjected, rejected, and jettisoned because he or she did not conform to homeland values and norms. The abject were perceived as a threat to societal order and identity. In the post-apartheid context of migration and xenophobia, the abject were those African immigrants who were not accepted in the social order. Krivesta (in Topak, 2021) said that the abject were the primers of people's culture – those people not belonging to one's group and who were still trapped in the earliest stages of one's culture. Liminality, abjection and impurity are all often linked to the notion of pollution in xenophobic discourses.

3.11.3. Impurity, Abjection, and Pollution

Marciniak (2006) has argued that orthodox Western-centric discourses on immigration have portrayed immigrants as having indiscreet, 'quivering' and 'leaking' bodies. Their bodies and selves vibrate tremulously, and emit pollution in the 'homeland'. Immigrants are 'leaking radioactive material' that threatens to corrupt and contaminate the culture of the 'homeland'. Immigrants, particularly non-white immigrants, are depicted as unwanted pollutants (Marciniak, 2006) that threaten to contaminate the host society. A most extreme and obnoxious version of this notion is advanced by a former United States of America senator - Patrick Buchanan (2007) - who contended that what he termed the 'armies of immigrants' originating from Mexico and the African continent have 'polluted' states or provinces lying at the Southern border of that country. Furthermore, Buchanan (2007) insinuated that the 'armies of immigrants' have, when they trekked from the Southern border to the North of the country, left behind garbage and debris. Buchanan (2007) argues that the arrival and settlement of the so-called 'armies of immigrants' would lead to overpopulation and environmental degradation of the country's air, land, and water resources.

A similar strand of thought – pregnant with the preceding Buchananian insinuations - exists in the post-apartheid society. Echoes of this Buchanan thought are reflected in the comments, which were

cited earlier on, attributed to the former minister of health (Dr. Aaron Motsoaledi). Media reports had quoted the minister as saying that when immigrants got admitted in large numbers in local hospitals, they caused overcrowding, and infection control started to fall. Implicit in these comments is the enduring association of immigrant with dreadful diseases, and dangerous pathogens. Undocumented immigrants, in particular, are not only regarded as ‘disease-carriers’, but also have other characteristics that bear bad omens signifying ‘impurity’ (Suttner, 2018). In these discourses of immigration and disease in the post-apartheid society, the presence of foreign immigrants (especially undocumented immigrants) constitutes the introduction of ‘impurities’ – a situation that would eventually lead to defilement and pollution. Deducing from the preceding commentary, it is evident that immigrants are viewed not only as ‘invasive species’, but also a danger to homeland peace and security. The Zulu king (King Goodwill Zwelithini) has compared immigrants to fleas or lice (The Worldpost, 2015). The construction of undocumented immigrants as ‘impure’ in the post-apartheid society – a process usually spearheaded by politicians – will soon eventuate in a need to remove danger (violently if possible). I, therefore, maintain that politicians influence the discourses of the undocumented immigrants as ‘disease-carriers’. They provide the vocabulary armoury and the labelling tools that are utilised by the xenophobes in the construction of undocumented immigrants as being ‘impure’. Politicians, however, would not only deny this, but also the fact that the public utterances they make regarding the issues of undocumented immigrants are xenophobic.

3.12. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS ON THE DRIVERS OF XENOPHOBIA

A ‘conceptual framework’ is composed of related concepts and propositions that are derived from empirical research. A conceptual framework attempts to explain and clarify presumed relationships between concepts. The following conceptual ‘frames’ to be briefly explained here

are: perceived competition, bolstering the socioeconomic needs of the people, ‘economic laxity’ thesis, ‘weakening the bargaining power of local workers’ argument, and ‘denialism’.

3.12.1. Perceived competition as an underpinning of xenophobia ‘competition thesis’

Explaining the logic of the ‘competition thesis’, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2016: 332) stated that “... this model contends that increased presence of immigrants in a community is likely to prompt fears of competition (whether actual or perceived) over social and economic resources. Fear of competition, in turn, engenders negative attitudes toward immigrants Likewise - and consistent with the logic embodied in the competitive threat model - individuals of low socioeconomic position are more likely to express negative attitudes toward immigrants than individuals of high socioeconomic status, owing to a fear of competition derived from their social and economic vulnerability”. There are two important issues advanced in this thesis: the first is that the presence of immigrants in the host country is likely to trigger a threat (whether real or imagined) that these new groups are competitors for employment, housing, welfare benefits, and other societal goods; the second issue is that this perceived threat from new immigrants is likely to be felt more by those occupying a low socio-economic position in the host country.

The ‘competition argument’ - the thesis that xenophobia stems from an intense and violent rivalry between migrant and indigenous groups - has both been thoroughly validated and rebutted in extant theoretical and empirical discourses on xenophobia. Andreas Wimmer (1997, in Chinomona and Maziriri, 2015) has argued that the intensity of hate and violent conflict need not depend on real competition on the job market, but on the ‘perception’ of threat. The ‘competition argument’ is as good as it goes in the sense that it does not advanced our understanding of the key structural and economic factors contributing to the multi-faceted nature of xenophobia. As a consequence, the twin social evils of unemployment and poverty continue to corrode the quality of life and the

personal character of many of the country's citizens who were historically disfranchised and poor. This structural or societal situation provides a fertile ground for the emergence, fermentation, and subsequent eruption of xenophobic sentiment towards African immigrants many of whom are also poor. A perception sprouts among the locals who find themselves in this structural condition that black African immigrants, in particular, are responsible for stealing jobs, 'causing crime' in the country, and 'bring disease' (the latter perception, often bandied about without any attempt at empirical substantiation (Dodson and Oelofse, 2000; Crush, 2000; Crush and Ramachandran, 2014). In augmenting this theoretical perspective, the critical issue here is not the putative competition for, and intense rivalry over economic opportunities, but the failure of the social structure to produce employment opportunities.

3.12.2. Bolstering the socioeconomic needs of the people

The contemporary post-apartheid South African government could make an intervention through bolstering the socioeconomic needs of the people so as to mitigate the perception of real or perceived threat. Perhaps, the unfulfilled economic dreams of the transition (Kang'ethe and Duma, 2013) from Apartheid to non-racial and democratic South African society have not been fulfilled. One of the fundamental underpinnings of this transition was the idea embodied in the famous Freedom Charter document - that was drawn up by the Congress of the People in Kliptown (in 1955) - that there shall be work and security, and that the state shall recognise the right of all to work and draw full employment benefits. That dream appears to have been deferred. The country has not been able to grow the economy and produce jobs for the majority of its citizens who are poor. Unemployment and poverty contribute to xenophobia especially when South Africans illusionary think that foreign nationals are enjoying a modest state of socioeconomics. Poverty and its concomitant ramifications - such as apathy, anger and hunger, bitterness and denial – constitute

a favourable environment for the fermentation and proliferation of the xenophobic sentiment. In order to decontaminate and defuse such an environment of xenophobia, the contemporary post-apartheid South African government need to intervene to change the socioeconomic history of the country. A concomitant argument accompanying the ‘bolstering of the socioeconomic needs of the people’ thesis is that of economic laxity.

3.12.3. Economic laxity as a driver or underpinning of xenophobia

Economic laxity (not to be confused with economic laziness or ‘lazy African’ colonial stereotype), displayed by South Africans, has created a rich environment for xenophobia. Economic laxity or lack of ability hard work may cause, and increase, socioeconomic inequalities between groups in society. In many immigrant-receiving countries of the world, migrants tend to put more hours in the labour market. The economic realities that pushed them out of their countries motivates and pressurises them to over-perform. This is especially true for those immigrants originating from poverty-stricken countries. Furthermore, the pressure to remit money to their families back home, cultivates hard-work virtue in them. Sadly, many South African workers earn low wages because of their inability to put in more hours in the labour market. The knowledge that immigrants are earning higher wages than them has sparked jealousy, and anger among South African workers—this is a fertile ground for xenophobia. At times, this jealousy and anger has been accompanied by an accusation that foreign national workers are weakening the bargaining power of local workers.

3.12.4. Weakening the bargaining power of local workers

Foreign national workers are sometimes accused of undermining the bargaining power of local workers. What is a fair bargaining power? A fair bargaining power matches the wages with prevailing economic demands. This means that workers get wages that are sufficient to meet their

socioeconomic demands. This lowers the opportunity of exploitation of workers. A weaker bargaining power means that people are paid wages that do not meet their socioeconomic demands. Perhaps why migrants negatively impact the bargaining power is because in most countries of the world, migrants are considered a cheap source of labour. Marino et al. (2015) have argued that the availability of the surplus labour of foreign workers depresses the wages of local union members, and might weaken trade unions' bargaining power. A weakened bargaining power would result in a decline in local workers' salaries, decline in union density, job retrenchment threats, and an increase in the rate of unemployment and inflation.

3.12.5. Denialism

I regard 'xenophobia denialism' as referring specifically to any claim that there is no xenophobia directed towards African immigrants in post-apartheid South Africa. 'Xenophobia denialism', just like Holocaust denialism, is often accompanied by a discourse and propaganda (Bauer, 2020) which denies the historical reality of an event or occurrence. Although there are various forms of denialism, what is common among these is that they include not only denial, but also distortion of the historical reality of the occurrence of xenophobia. Host governments and their politicians frequently deploy the discourses of 'xenophobia denialism' so as to attempt to minimise its impact, and potentially horrendous consequences. Governments and politicians resort to the discourses of denialism in an attempt to minimise, banalise, and relativise (Wistrich, 2012) the occurrences of xenophobia so as to cast doubt on the authenticity of what happened. Holocaust denialism was not only about denying the 'historical truth' that the Nazis exterminated the Jews, but also an attempt to exonerate or exculpate Germany of any responsibility for crimes committed against humanity. In the Rwandan conflict, the denial of the genocide of the Tutsi was meant to enable the guilty to

escape punishment. The discourses of denialism have also become prevalent in post-apartheid South Africa especially during or after episodic outbursts of violent xenophobia.

Orthodox government explanations of the ferocious and violent assaults on foreign migrants, particularly black African migrants, posit that such attacks are not incidences of xenophobia, but are simply wanton acts of criminality. Consider the following remarks attributed to the Ethekwini Municipality and the Malawian High Commission: “Both the municipality and the Malawian High Commission are in agreement that the incidents that led to Malawian nationals being chased out of their homes are not xenophobia but were criminally motivated as their belongings were stolen by the angry mob ... the municipality said in a statement” (in Savides, 2019). Sekhotho (2017) cited remarks attributed to the former President of the Republic of South Africa (Mr. Jacob Zuma) who said: “I think we love using phrases in South Africa that at the time cause unnecessary perceptions about us. I think we are not [xenophobic], it’s not the first time we’re with the foreigners here”. The rhetoric of ‘xenophobic denialism’ is often invoked each time there is an outbreak of this scourge. Determined and persistent ‘xenophobic denialism’, especially when accompanied by ineffectual state responses to xenophobic outbreaks, can result in the proliferation of hate crimes against foreign nationals. This researcher believes that ‘xenophobic denialism’ is a calculated attempt by politicians and government officials to disguise a virulent form anti-immigrant hatred, and an egregious brand of xenophobia. ‘Xenophobia denialism’ may eventually result in the condonation and trivialisation of xenophobic hatred and violence targeting foreign nationals in contemporary South Africa. In addition, ‘xenophobia denialism’, just like its evil cousin ‘AIDS denialism’, would, if left unchallenged, result in an increasing prevalence and incidence of xenophobic hatred and violent crimes against foreign citizens in the post-apartheid society.

According to Crush and Ramachandran (2014), the core argument of what they term ‘xenophobic denialism’ is that xenophobia plays no role in fanning the fires of violence against migrants and refugees in post-Apartheid South Africa. The tone of denialism is captured in a 2008 address made by President Thabo Mbeki when he paid tribute to the victims of xenophobic violence: “What happened during those days was not inspired by possessed nationalism, or extreme chauvinism, resulting in our communities violently expressing the hitherto unknown sentiments of mass and mindless hatred of foreigners – xenophobia ... I heard it said insistently that my people have turned or become xenophobic ... I wondered what the accusers knew about my people which I did not know. And this I must also say—none in our society has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia” (in Gordon, 2015: 506). This ‘xenophobic denialism’ continues to characterise government responses to xenophobic flare-ups in post-Apartheid South Africa. It continues to shape government policy and action when dealing with scourge of xenophobia. ‘Xenophobic denialism’ is something that can result in government passivity and inertia when confronted with the problem of xenophobia – something that eventually lead to loss of limb and life.

3.12.6. Integration of Immigrants

The International Organisation for Migration (2011) defined integration as “The process by which migrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups....[Integration] refers to a two-way process of adaptation by migrants and host societies...[and implies] consideration of the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies, of access to different kinds of services and the labour market, and of identification and respect for a core set of values that bind migrants and host communities in a common purpose”. Integration, therefore, is a process of including or incorporating immigrants into the social and economic life of the host society. Social integration

of immigrants usually lags behind economic integration of immigrants in immigrant-receiving countries (Laurentsyeve and Venturini, 2017). This might be due to the fact that immigrants differ from the native population in terms of cultural and social facets. The field of immigrant integration is too vast, and it is beyond the purview of this investigation to navigate it. Suffice to say that the integration of the immigrants into the host society is becoming more difficult.

Undoubtedly, the process of integrating immigrants into the host nation is complex, and could yield some immense social and economic dividends for the host country. The current Chinese President, Xi Jinping, said, at the opening of opening ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation: “.... civilisation thrives with openness and nations prosper through exchange” (in Xinhua News 2017). Indeed, when a host country opens its border, and permit exchange of people and economic commodities, it will prosper economically and socially. However, the opposite is true when a host country attempts to limit or block such exchange. In order for the host country to fully realise the economic and social benefits of immigration, it has to develop and implement effective immigrant integration programs. Such endeavours may be thwarted or obstructed by a variety of factors such a hostile community reception, and a language barrier.

3.12.7. Hostile community reception

Undoubtedly, the level of hospitality that an in-migrant is accorded in the host country determines his or her socio-psychological well-being. If a visitor is not offered water, warm food, a place to sleep, and general help on arrival at one’s home, that would leave deep and permanent emotional and psychological scars on both parties. The reasons for the hostile reception of immigrants in the host country may not be economic, but cultural. Explaining the hostile reception of South Asian immigrants in a British settlement (West Yorkshire), Swift (2019: 15) said: “... competition for

work and state resources cannot explain opposition to immigration, and this would persist even in conditions of full employment and well-funded welfare provision. Furthermore, while the language of hostility sometimes invoked material factors, most of the complaints against immigrants were couched in ‘cultural’ terms. In other words, cultural, and not material, factors underpinned the hostile reception of South Asian immigrants. A hostile reception of in-migrants in a country affects the quality of integration, and by extension, the heartily acceptance of immigrants. It is this researcher’s contention that a correlation exists between hostile community reception and levels of xenophobia in the host country.

3.12.8. Language barrier

It is patently true that language similarities attract acceptability, facilitates sharing, and foments trust. Language similarity is a strong ingredient of integration. The converse is true that language barrier can foment mistrust, have a repulsion effect, hinder relationships, and obscure cordiality. Proficiency in one of the languages used in the host country provides the immigrant with a portal for entering the host nation. Dollmann et al. (2018) have argued that being proficient in the language of a new country is perhaps the most important precondition for the successful integration of immigrants in various other integration aspects, like educational and vocational success, interethnic relations and ethnic identify formation. The inability to speak, or unfamiliarity with, a local language, may be a serious impediment preventing immigrants from becoming fully integrated into the social, and economic life of the host countries. This language barrier might be, and can be, used as a wedge of xenophobia.

3.13. VARIEGATED CONTEXTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF XENOPHOBIA

3.13.1. Negative attitudes and xenophobia

Unquestionably, xenophobia is a multi-faceted phenomenon driven by an assortment of factors like negative attitudes, illusory perceptions, poverty and unemployment, racism, incendiary political rhetoric, national identification and patriotism among several other factors. The factors underpinning or driving xenophobia are diverse and dynamic, and are also influenced by the context within which this phenomenon occurs.

Negative attitudes harboured by locals towards immigrant groups are strongly associated with xenophobia. Negative and hostile attitudes towards immigrants are prevalent in immigrant-receiving countries. The proliferation negative attitudes in the host population – for example, ‘immigrants are criminals, thieves, human traffickers’ – could be could be a sufficient ingredient in fanning the flames of xenophobia hatred. Such hostile and negative attitudes are particularly aggressive and intense in light of the global economic downturn and jobs crisis (Tunon and Baruah, 2012). The toxicity of these hostile and negative attitudes is enhanced when they are intertwined with preconceived fears and illusions about immigrants. Negative and hostile attitudes in immigrant-receiving countries do matter because they contribute to an environment in which discrimination and the unfair treatment of foreign nationals are tolerated.

Disturbingly, these hostile and negative attitudes have the potential to become minacious especially when harboured by the youth. Beller (2020) examined trends in xenophobia according to age, time period, and birth cohort, utilising population statistic of Germany. He found, amongst other things, that xenophobia increased strongly with age. This study was confirming the truth that the youth in many immigrant-receiving countries do harbour negative attitudes towards foreign

nationals. If these negative attitudes are not addressed, they will remain active catalysts of future episodes of xenophobia. There are negative attitudes that associate foreign nationals with crime, and these also drive xenophobia.

3.13.2. Criminal disposition among foreign nationals

Globally, negative attitudes association foreign nationals with crime in immigrant-receiving countries are commonplace. Adelman et al. (2017) stated that in the United States of America, immigrants were allegedly to have a propensity for crime, and this was a common theme in the political discourse surrounding state and federal immigration law enforcement. In fact, there has always been an alleged correlation between the arrival of immigrants in a country, and the idea that consequently the crime rate will increase. In the United States of America, for example, negative attitudes that characterise Mexican migrants as criminals, drug smugglers, rapists, and disease-carriers are rife. In the post-apartheid South African context, black African migrants have been viewed as human traffickers, drug-smuggles, disease-carriers, car-hijackers and bank robbers among other labels. These negative attitudes indicate that foreign nationals are involved in criminal disposition that inflames members of the host nation against them. There is, however, no study which found support for the immigration and crime connection. Linking immigrants with certain attributes of crime also induces (not in a mechanistic way) among the members of the host country preconceived fears that are illusionary.

3.13.3. Preconceived fears and illusions

When immigrants are associated with crime and evil, it makes local people to approach them with fear, anxiety, suspicion, and illusions. One most common stereotype about immigrants, which brings preconceived fears, is that they are the agents of terrorism – they import terror into an otherwise tranquil host country. For instance, the recent influx of asylum-seekers and refugees

from Syria to Europe has rekindled old preconceived fears about immigrants as agents of terrorism. De Coninck (2020) argued that these fears were exacerbated by the following reported terrorist incidents: the Manchester Arena bombing in May 2017, the Brussels subway and airport bombings in March 2016, and the Nice transport truck attack in July 2016. These attacks were often attributed to Islamic extremists who were suspected – but rarely proven – to have entered Europe undetected among the large flow of asylum seekers and refugees”. What De Coninck (2020) is reporting here is echoed in the age-old stereotype that people of Muslim origin are associated with terrorism in the Western world.

Another common preconceived fear of immigrants is that they bring disease into the host country, and pollute the environment. Marciniak (2006) has argued that orthodox Western-centric discourses on immigration have portrayed immigrants as having indiscreet, ‘quivering’ and ‘leaking’ bodies. Their bodies and selves are regarded as vibrating tremulously, and emitting pollution in the ‘homeland’. Immigrants are ‘leaking radioactive material’ that threatens to corrupt and contaminate (Cisneros, 2008) the culture of the ‘homeland’. In short, members of the local population fear that immigrants are ‘impure’ and bring disease and calamity in the host country. The researcher will return to this theme of impurity later on in this chapter. Evidently, these unfounded fears may be sufficient to trigger ‘retaliatory attacks’ on immigrants camouflaged as xenophobia.

3.14. CONCLUSION

This chapter reviewed literature related to the contexts and manifestation of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. It clarified the conceptual confusion between afrophobia and xenophobia, discussed, amongst other issues, the policy environment regulating immigration. The chapter

discussed the underpinnings and manifestations of xenophobia, and immigrant integration. The chapter also discussed much of the literature on xenophobia and other forms of immigrant prejudice was is nested within broader theoretical discourses on politics and xenophobia; alienhood; purity, pollution, and impurity, abjection, and liminality. The next chapter (chapter 3) completed the review of literature by discussing the theoretical framework that has been utilized in this investigation.

CHAPTER FOUR

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

4. INTRODUCTION

The central thesis of this chapter can be summarised as follows: (1) that immigrants are socially constructed as ‘deviants’ or ‘misfits’ – labels that often elicit violent reaction from the local xenophobes; and (2) upon arrival in destination countries, their reception is characterised by xenophobia, racism, exclusionary nationalism. The social construction of immigrants as ‘deviants’ ‘denuded’ them of their humanity, and made them targets of scorn, ridicule, and violence. To develop and dissect this thesis, I examine the broader literature on the interface between the sociological theories of deviance, social construction theory, and xenophobia. This literature straddles many intersecting theoretical traditions, and disciplinary boundaries. Owing to the multifaceted nature of xenophobia, eclectic insights gleaned from the broader theoretical discourses of globalization, international migration, race, and nationalism are also utilized to buttress the dominant theoretical frames. This chapter begins with an examination of the dominant theoretical frames that have been employed to substantiate the empirical and theoretical arguments pursued in this investigation- sociological models of deviance.

4.1 DEVIANCE AND XENOPHOBIA

Xenophobia was a socially constructed form of deviance which was abnormal, aberrational, corrosive, and deadly. Immigrants were not only racially constructed, they were also socially constructed as ‘deviants’ or ‘misfits’ – labels that often elicited violent reaction from the local xenophobes. What is deviance?

4.1.1 Definition and meaning of deviance

Within the disciplinary field of sociology, multiple definitions of the concept ‘deviance’ abound. In this research dissertation, the researcher shall employed a definition offered by Franzese (2015) who said that deviance involved the violation of social norms and encompassed the differences in behaviours, values, attitudes, lifestyles, and life choices among individuals and groups. The definition chosen here shared many commonalities and similarities with other definitions. First, it pointed out that deviance was a departure, deviation, non-conformity to societal norms that usually drew or invited strong social disapproval. It was imperative that a significant number of people in society identified and interpreted the behaviour as unacceptable and deviant. Non-conformity to social norms elicited the application of societal sanctions which were intended to control deviance. The second commonality in this definition revolved around the issue of differentiation – the issue of how people became differentiated and ‘othered’. This, therefore, pointed to the fact that society was heavily implicated in the construction of people as deviants. This was the theoretical argument that I pursued in this chapter. What is the process of social differentiation?

Elaborating on this issue of social differentiation, Rubington and Weinberg (2008) said that sociologists who focused on the social differentiation of deviants generally made the following assumptions: first, they assumed that when people and groups interacted, they communicated with one another by means of shared symbols (verbal and body language, style of dress, etc.); secondly, they assumed that deviance could best be understood in terms of this process, that deviant labels were symbols that differentiated and stigmatised the people to whom they were applied, and finally, sociologists using this approach assumed that people act on the basis of such constructions. It was precisely this interactionist perspective on deviance that focused on social construction that this researcher wished to apply to an understanding of the expression of xenophobia and violence

in post-Apartheid South Africa. However, before I could do that, a discussion of the three specific sociological theories of deviance (labelling theory, learning theory, and social control theory) that were going to be utilised to explain the phenomena of xenophobia and violence in post-Apartheid South Africa was in order.

4.2 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF DEVIANCE

Three sociological models of deviance were now going to be examined with a view to relating them to how societally constructed processes of labelling and demonising of foreign citizens in post-apartheid South Africa consequently led to their humanity being violated with disastrous and violent consequences. The first sociological model of deviance to be discussed was labelling theory.

4.2.1 Labelling theory

The gist of the labelling theory was that societal members themselves were active participants in the construction of other people as deviants. The origins of this interactionist perspective on deviance could be traced back to the works of Edwin Lemert (1967), Edwin Schur (1965), and Howard Becker (1964). The fundamental tenets of this perspective are captured in the following remarks by Howard Becker (1964 cited in Krohn and Lopes, 2015: 315) who wrote: “Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labelling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act a person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender’. The deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label”. First, what was implied in the preceding comments was the fact that deviance was produced through the interactions of both non-deviants and deviants. The second implication that one could draw from these comments was that the act

of labelling was performed by some powerful groups in society. Thirdly, once the 'deviant' label was applied, it stuck to those to whom it was intended. Finally, the consequences of labelling could be disastrous for those to whom the label was attached. Labelling was frequently accompanied by stigma. What is stigma?

Scheyett (2005) said that the term '*stigma*' came from the Greek language, referring to a mark made by a pointed instrument or brand, and stigma was a sign, usually cut or burned into the body which indicated the status of a discredited individual such as a slave, traitor, or criminal. Adding to this definition and aetiology of the term 'stigma', Link and Phelan (2001) stated that stigma existed when the following interrelated components converged: first, people distinguished and labelled human differences; secondly, dominant cultural beliefs linked labelled persons to undesirable characteristics – to negative stereotypes; thirdly, labelled persons were placed in distinct categories so as to accomplish some degree of separation of 'us' from 'them', and fourth, labelled persons experienced status loss and discrimination that led to unequal outcomes.

Deducing from the preceding commentary, it appeared that stigma was firmly implanted in societal attitudes, and because of this those negatively stigmatised were socially marginalised and discriminated against. Stigmatising attitudes were often associated with discriminatory behaviours. Given the fact that stigma originated from societal attitudes, it was not surprising to note that those stigmatised suffered social ostracisation, rejection, marginalisation, isolation, and even physical violence. In addition, those stigmatised and discriminated against found it extremely difficult to access significant societal benefits like health, education and housing. One very crucial consequence of labelling was that it resulted in differentiation, categorisation, stigmatisation, and vilification. Once labelled, a group of people became differentiated from the 'rest' of society, was compartmentalised into a 'category', and this inevitably attracted stigmatisation from the members

of the public. To understand how this process of stigmatisation operated, I borrowed Link and Phelan's notion of 'stigma power'. Link and Phelan (2014) contended that when people had an interest in keeping others down, in one way or another, stigma was a resource that allowed them to obtain the ends they desired. This resource was called 'stigma power', and it referred to instances in which stigma processes achieved the aims of stigmatisers with respect to the exploitation, management, control or exclusion of others (Link and Phelan, 2014). 'Stigma power', therefore, gave those who labelled others as 'deviants' the power to 'keep them away' and to 'keep them down', and to exclude them from accessing the material benefits that society offered. In fact, stigmatisation led to the devaluation, denunciation, and degradation of people. Stigma corroded character, personal dignity, and human worth. Finally, language played a pivotal role in the development, transference, and transmission of labels. Scheyett (2005) asserted that one of the leading exponents of symbolic interactionism (George Herbert Mead) had proposed that language in the context of a social relationship creates symbols, and that interactive social symbolisation process created meaning, which did not exist prior to or outside of such a process. The critical issue here was that language performed a critical function in the labelling and stigmatisation of people in society. The process of labelling, categorisation, and stigmatisation of people as deviants performed significant social control functions.

4.2.2 Control theory of deviance

The theoretical crux of this perspective was that deviance resulted from an absence of social control or restraint. Control theorists proposed different causes for this lack of control, but they agreed that a reduction on control – for whatever reason – generated more deviance by freeing people to follow their 'natural' inclinations. All known human societies practised some kind of social control in order to maintain stability in the social system. Social control referred to the

systematic ways in which a society endeavoured to discourage and punish behaviour that deviated from social norms and regulations. All societies had evolved methods and mechanisms designed to deal with behaviour that violated social norms. Clinard and Meier (2010) declared that social control implied deliberate attempts to change behaviour, and like a deviant event it sought to limit, social control was a process. Clinard and Meier (2010) continued and claimed that there were two basic processes of social control: first, the *internalisation of group norms* which encouraged conformity through socialisation, and secondly, social reaction influenced conformity through *external pressures* in the form of *sanctions from others* in the event of anticipated or actual nonconformity to norms. One critical issue that one could discern from these comments was that the process of social control involved the application of sanctions to encourage conformity, and to punish deviation, to norms. I did not provide a rendition of the many variations of the social control theory of deviance because doing so would have been beyond the purview of this investigation. Instead, I wanted to identify and briefly discuss two aspects of social control theory that had a direct bearing on the contexts and manifestations of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa.

The first aspect pertained to the application and enforcement of formal social controls. This was what Clinard and Meier (2010) stated that formal social controls involved societal institutional organs like the police, courts, and correctional system, and agencies (such as churches, business and labour groups, educational institutions, clubs, and other organisations). The institutional organs of society incorporated formal sanctions, these sanctions were administered by people who occupied particular positions or roles within those institutions. These people were commonly known as *agents of social control* since their duties included administration of controlling sanctions (Clinard and Meier, 2010). The point that I was attempting to arrive at was that the agents

of social control were a ‘vital cog’ in the process of social control, and specifically in the administration and enforcement of sanctions.

The second aspect of social control theory related to the fact that the administration and enforcement of sanctions was a process that was influenced by racial, cultural, national, and other social distinctions. Heitzeg (2015) argued that a closer examination of the mechanisms of social control revealed that the type of social control exerted had much less to do with the deviation in question, and much more to do with the demographics of the deviant. Race, class, and gender were inextricably bound up with the definition and control of deviance to the extent that the privileged and empowered ‘norm’ was white, male, financially well-off, heterosexual, and adult, and people of colour, women, the poor, GLBTIQ+ persons, and the young became ‘the Other,’ the ‘abnormal,’ the ‘deviant’ (Heitzeg, 2015). Without belabouring this point, the issue here was that the ‘matrix of domination’ – constituted by race, culture, and nationality – shaped the way systems and mechanisms of social control operated in society. In addition, agents of social control played a significant role in the creation and reinforcement of deviance. For example, the manner in which the police and courts dealt with those who violated the laws during periodic outbreaks of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa could potentially influence the latter to become even more xenophobic and violent. At this juncture, I proceeded and discussed the socialisation or learning theory of deviance.

4.2.3 Socialisation or learning theory of deviance

A specific variety of the social learning theory of deviance, namely differential association – was going to be examined in this section. The reason for the choice of this theoretical perspective was because its fundamental tenets seemed to corroborate one of the central arguments pursued in this investigation – that was, the argument that xenophobes learned to be deviant. The learning theory

of deviance contended that deviant or criminal behaviour was learned from within subculture and among peers. One of the well-known proponents of the learning theory of deviance was Edwin Sutherland (1939) who came up with an explanation of deviance which he termed ‘differential association’. The gist of Sutherland’s theory of ‘differential association’ was that people learnt to be deviant by interacting with significant others. A succinct exposition of the main assumptions of this perspective was provided by Gray *et al.* (2015: 3-4) who stated: “According to Sutherland, criminal behavior, like any other form of human behavior, is learned.... This learning occurs through interaction with intimate personal groups such as friends and family. This involves the direct association with individuals who engage in certain forms of conduct, as well as the exposure to different sets of values and norms as a consequence of such an association. This learning includes both the specific techniques for committing the criminal offense, as well as the “mind set” for engaging in crime (e.g., attitudes and values)”. What these authors have stated required no further elaboration, and perhaps the only issue that might merit re-emphasis was the notion that the etiological foundations of conformity and deviance stemmed from the fact that people learnt to conform to societal norms, or to deviate from them. People learnt to become deviant through interaction, association, and communication with others who were already deviants. How was deviance related to xenophobia and violent behaviour?

4.3 THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN DEVIANCE AND XENOPHOBIA

A social construction approach provided a useful model for examining the intersection between deviance and xenophobia. Before this researcher could discuss this intersection, a concise overview of the major assumptions that underlay social construction theory were in order. Social construction theory originated from the ‘postmodern turn’ in the social sciences and humanities. It could be regarded as an antidote to positivistic thinking which was characterised by essentialist

ideas and practices. Social construction theory or social constructivism emphasised the construction of reality. Reality was something that was constructed during the process of interaction between actors in society. Jackson and Sorensen (2006: 164-165) put it this way: “In social theory, constructivists emphasise the social construction of reality. Human relations ... consist of thought and ideas and not essentially of material conditions or forces According to constructivist philosophy, the social world is not a given: it is not something ‘out there’ that exists independent of the thoughts and ideas of the people involved in it Everything involved in the social world of men and women is made by them”. Implicit in these comments was the central assumption of social construction thought that ideas and attitudes were conceived, moulded, and constructed during the course of social interaction. How did this constructivist assumption bear on the explanation of the intersection between deviance and xenophobia?

I borrowed from the conceptual framework of ‘othering’ to explain this intersection. Explaining the concept ‘othering’, Grove and Zwi (2006) stated that ‘othering’ defined and secured one’s own identity by distancing and stigmatising an(other), and the person or group being ‘othered’ experiences this as a process of marginalisation, disempowerment and social exclusion. Relating these comments to immigration, deviance, and xenophobia, this meant that immigrants were differentiated from the rest of community, race and nation. In brief terms, they were ‘othered’. In many destination countries, immigrants were then differentiated from the ‘mainstream’ community – they were set apart or constructed as the ‘other’. Metaphorical language played a crucial role in the process of ‘othering’. Immigrants were often constructed as a ‘threat to our sovereignty’, and to ‘our national security’. Grove and Zwi (2006) had observed that the adoption of metaphors of threat, of natural disaster, of invasion, of war, and of contagion, had helped construct people in an impersonal, destructive and destabilising light. Examples of frequently

bandied metaphors are *swarms*, *tides*, *waves*, *flood*, *overrun*, and *swamp* (Grove and Zwi 2006). A concomitant of differentiation and othering was labelling and stigmatisation.

When immigrants had been ‘set apart’, differentiated, distanced from ‘us’, the mainstream communities dressed them up with undecorated labels, and ‘unembroidered’ definitions of who they really were as human beings. The application of those labels resulted in immigrants becoming stigmatised in numerous ways. Infamous examples reflecting the stigmatisation of foreign citizens in post-Apartheid South Africa were the following: ‘they’ drained ‘our’ country’s economy and welfare system; ‘they’ were ‘terrorists’; ‘they’ were responsible for the increase in crime rates and drug use, and ‘they brought disease to our country’. Stigmatising perceptions of immigrants in other destination countries were that they were an ‘economic burden’, a ‘problem’ and were ‘unwelcome and ungrateful’ people (Klocker, 2004). Constructing immigrants in this manner made them clear targets of xenophobic and violent abuse by members of the ‘mainstream’ communities. By being constructed in this manner, immigrants were ‘set up’ as targets which local xenophobes could take violent potshots at. The fact was once an immigrant was labelled, stigmatised, and discriminated; it set up the person as a target of ridicule, social scorn, and physical abuse. It made an immigrant a ‘dangerous weed’ worthy of being eradicated from the ‘national’ botanical garden. These ‘weeding out’ efforts had often resulted in outbreaks of deadly xenophobic violence.

In post-Apartheid South Africa, antipathy towards black foreign nationals had grown, and this had been accompanied by a disturbing rise in incidents of anti-immigrant violence. Many of these incidents of anti-immigrant violence which often included physical abuse, and attacks against migrant properties, had been directed at black migrants of African origin. An increase in the incidence of anti-immigrant violence had given rise to a popular explanation of xenophobia that

falsely claimed that this rise in violent xenophobia was due to the nefarious intentions and activities of criminals (the co-called ‘criminal element’ in discourses of xenophobia). Oftentimes, the post-Apartheid South African government, facing considerable domestic and international pressure, had introduced specialised police task teams and inter-Ministerial committees to probe the phenomenon of violent xenophobia. Although this had been commendable, I argued that move was not very good because it did not involve probing how societally constructed processes of labelling and demonising of immigrants consequently led to their humanity being violated with disastrous and violent consequences. The point was that xenophobia, just like other forms of hatred like racism, was a socially constructed form of hate.

So far in this chapter, I believed that I had assembled a formidable theoretical arsenal (sociological theories of deviance, and social construction theory) to account for the scourge of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa. However, the theoretical arsenal that was going to be utilised to explain xenophobia could not be complete without including a few conceptual frameworks that had also been employed by other researchers working in the same area.

4.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS ON XENOPHOBIA

4.4.1 Economic globalisation

The term ‘globalisation’ was frequently deployed in both popular and scholarly discourses to denote the operation of global economic, political, and cultural forces which functioned to produce inter-connectedness and inter-dependence amongst the countries of the world. The term though remained a nebulous concept owing to the different meanings and interpretation that people attached to it. The nebulosity of this concept was further aggravated by the ever-present intellectual contestation and de-contestation over the real meaning and impacts thereof. I do not wish to wade into this territory of debates over epistemology and knowledge claims as this fell way beyond the

purview of this chapter and investigation. Instead, what I want to discuss is how economic globalization precipitates and enhances global flows of commodities and migrants.

The process of globalisation is closely linked to the proliferation of economic activities that occur across transplanetary and supraterritorial spaces. In common parlance, the term 'globalisation' is often taken for granted to mean the spread of economic activity on a global scale. Even more scholarly work on this theme have emphasised the importance of the economic determinants of globalisation. Economic structures, processes, and practices have been flagged to be central in the process of globalisation. Orthodox views on globalisation explained this term as a process of international economic integration arising from the interchange of world products. Those (Greider, 1998; Mittelman, 2000; Kaplinsky, 2013) who regarded globalisation as an economically-driven process argue, amongst other things, that the magnitude and scale of global economic interactions and activity have reached unprecedented levels. Bairoch (2000) argued that globalisation concerned an economic phenomenon implicating a strong international connection. Globalisation referred to a situation wherein industrial and commercial companies as well as financial institutions increasingly operate internationally, in other words, beyond national borders. That went hand-in-hand with an increase in mergers and the acquisition of industrial, commercial and financial companies, leading to an increase in the global range of large, multinational companies and to a lessening of the role of nation-states (Bairoch, 2000). The overall consequence of this has been an increase in foreign trade, international investment, international finance, and economic integration of the world economy.

Orthodox economic narratives of globalisation also pointed to the rising magnitude and scope of capital and trade flows as evidence of the manifestation of economic globalisation (Kaplinsky, 2013). Capital and trade flows continue to grow at a rapid rate, but the largest beneficiaries of this

are the wealthiest nations. The latter countries occupy the commanding heights of the global economy. In fact, the manner in which world trade is organised and structured reinforces the hegemonic economic dominance of the wealthiest countries over the less developed ones. Pieterse (2000) noted that while the development gap between the advanced economies and newly industrialised economies had narrowed, the gap between these and most developing countries was widening. In fact, the gap between the promise and performance of globalisation was disappointingly widening. I postulated that there was a tendency for the process of economic globalisation to lead to the centralisation and concentration of wealth and capital in few rich countries. Pieterse (2000) support this contention when he argued that while globalisation was often characterised as 'truncated globalisation' or 'Triadisation' - concentrated in the triad of Western Europe, North America and Japan - economic wealth and capital had become concentrated in few individual countries which had now monopolised these resources. A concomitant consequence of this monopolisation had been the rising immiseration and pauperisation of millions of people who inhabited the developing world.

Another feature of economic globalisation is the occurrence of the phenomenon of de-industrialisation in the economically depressed countries of the global village. Deindustrialisation occurs when there is a haemorrhaging of jobs in the manufacturing sector (Winant, 2019) of the economy owing to the globalisation of a country's economy. The globalisation of economic life in many developing countries has often encompassed industrial restructuring. Industrial restructuring has, in turn, produced escalating rates of joblessness, destroyed sustainable livelihood strategies (Winant, 2019), and brought problems of social organisation in many developing countries. The phenomenon of de-industrialisation is strongly correlated with the declining rates of unionisation – something which contributes to shrinking and stagnating wages of those who still have jobs in

developing countries. All of this, in turn, has precipitated the large and ever-increasing flows of migratory movements of people from economically-depressed countries to the developed ones in search of new and better livelihoods.

4.4.2 The globalization of international migration, and xenophobia

In more general terms, this section examined the phenomenon of international migration and how it interfaced with xenophobia. In more general terms, international migration refers to the movement of people across international boundaries – a process that is triggered by a variety of factors. With increasing globalisation which has brought accelerated interconnectedness of the world, national and international movements of people have become frequent and heightened. Any kind of movement of people across international borders or within a country can be regarded as migration. Nijenhuis and Leung (2017) stated that migration was inherently linked to globalisation. The worldwide integration of economic, political, cultural and social flows, and processes have resulted in a changing role of geography and distance. Frequently, those involved in these movements included refugees escaping prosecution, displaced and uprooted persons owing to internecine conflicts, and migrants who perpetually searched for better economic opportunities. For those who migrated, the process generally ranked as one of the greatest events of their lives.

International migration should not be treated as a process that was autonomous from other major global processes. The point this researcher wanted to make here was that one should adopt a global perspective when looking at migration. In advancing the utilisation of a global lens in studying social phenomena, Sklair (1995; 2016) stated that social scientists should make the whole world a legitimate object of knowledge, and not only study a single society (nation-state). Viewed from this perspective, it seemed reasonable to state that the process of globalisation that accompanied the internationalisation of a country's economy may have possibly led to rapid flows of not only

goods but also of people across borders. Sassen (1990: 2019) postulated that the expansion of export manufacturing and export agriculture in LDCs, both of which were inseparably related with direct foreign investment from highly industrialised countries, have mobilised new segments of the population into regional and long-distance migrations. In other words, the opening-up of a country's economy to the flow of capital goods, services and information could probably result into the creation of conditions that could mobilise people into migration. Thus, the formation of economic links between countries could subsequently serve as bridges for international migration.

As has been argued earlier on, the economic dimension of globalisation has resulted in people leaving their homes in search for better economic opportunities, both within and outside of their own homeland. Economic globalisation has put a new spin on global migration causing global uprootedness and human displacement of an unprecedented scale Čiarnienė and Kumpikaitė (2008), owing to the fact that it exacerbated inequality among nations. Economic desperation and deprivation have forced millions of people to leave their economically depressed homeland in search of better economic opportunities in Europe and North America. The reality is that the free flow of goods between countries has been accompanied by the increasing human migration across international borders. The globalisation of migration has paralleled the globalisation of economic life (Čiarnienė and Kumpikaitė, 2008). In fact, the process of economic globalisation has transformed the world to become more migratory. Guo (2013) argued that globalisation and migration were inextricably intertwined, and where migration was a response to globalisation, globalisation accelerated migration.

In fact, the relationship between these two processes has been fraught with much tension and contradiction. First, although it seemed that the process of globalisation has encouraged the mobility and migration of people, only a few countries have offered the 'welcome mat' to migrants,

and the rest have adopted a ‘fortress approach’ - fortifying their borders, detaining immigrants, and sending migrants back against their will, to their countries of origin. When countries followed this approach of closing the legal migration corridors, immigrants would still come. They would be emboldened to experiment with desperate measures of trying to penetrate the ‘fortresses by, for example, attempting to cross the Mediterranean in rickety and overloaded boats to reach Europe. Undocumented Mexican migrants would, for example, risk their lives by enduring furnace-like desert heat to get into the United States of America.

The second reason I said the relationship between these two processes was fraught with much tension and contradiction was because of the fact that they have been accompanied by an upsurge of racist and ethnic tension. The growth of capitalism on a world scale had sparked massive movements of people, and triggered a desire for racial and ethnic homogeneity (Brodin, 2000; Macedo and Gounari, 2006) and purity. Although globalisation had been characterised by a trend toward human integration (Pieterse, 2000), the dark underbelly of this process had the aggressive re-articulation of racism, xenophobia, and difference. Macedo and Gounari (2006) argued that the exponential increase of xenophobia throughout the world had been caused, in large measure, by neoliberal policies producing economic dislocation that had impelled millions of the world’s poor to seek economic relief by migrating from rural to urban areas, and from poor to rich countries. The previous comments evidently pointed out that there had occurred a ‘globalisation of racism and xenophobia. The intersection of globalisation and migration had elevated the temperature of racism and xenophobia to abnormal and violent levels. There had, of course, contextual variation in terms of how this situation played itself out in different countries. I now turn attention to the phenomena of ‘race’ and ‘nation’ which were intertwined with contemporary discourses on xenophobia.

4.4.3 Race and xenophobia

The term 'race' referred to social groups which differed in terms of physical attributes which were accorded societal significance (Murji and Solomons, 2015). A more cogent definition of race was offered by William Julius Wilson (1973 cited in Bobo, 2017); he argued that racism was an ideology of racial domination or exploitation that (1) incorporated beliefs in a particular race's cultural and or inherent biological inferiority and (2) used such beliefs to justify and prescribe inferior treatment for that group. Xenophobia and racism have manifested themselves in those countries which had attracted substantial numbers of immigrants – especially those from poor African countries. In such countries, the immigrants have been targeted because they originated from a different race and culture. Earlier on, this researcher argued that there was a direct relationship between racism, nationalism, and xenophobia. The articulation and expression of xenophobic sentiments and violence were influenced by racism, nationalism and its related constructs.

Racism is a form of prejudice - a rigid opinion about a category of people (for example, a racial or ethnic group) based on its members real or imagined characteristics (Rattansi, 2020). Prejudice is a pre-judgement that persists even in the face of contrary evidence. It is an irrational generalisation. In short, racism, just like xenophobia, is a form of prejudice that is based on social significant physical differences (Rattansi, 2020). Racism is, like all forms of prejudice, frequently accompanied by stereotypical thinking. Stereotypes are 'pictures in the head' that members of one group form of other groups, and are motivated by an ethnocentric bias to enhance one's own group and to disparage out-groups (Sigelman and Tuch, 1997; Brown, 2010). What was implied in the comments was that stereotypes were fixed, simplistic, distorted cultural generalisation about social groups and categories of people. A stereotype is an exaggerated description and belief (Brown,

2010) often applied to every person belonging to some racial or ethnic category. As can be deduced from this brief discussion, racism and stereotypical thinking involved some categorisation and labelling of people.

International migration, spurred by the spread of global capitalism, had elicited torrential racism and xenophobia, and had frequently been accompanied by calls and attempts by the host country to cleanse the ‘nation’ of ‘impurity’ and ‘contamination’ brought in by the new arrivals. Immigrants arriving at host countries had been met by racism and discrimination, and by aggressive and exclusionary nationalism that promoted alienage, exclusionary citizenship, and difference. In framing the debate around the interface among these phenomena (economic globalisation, migration racism, national identity, and xenophobia, I would like to borrow from Karen Brodtkin’s (2000) article entitled “*Global capitalism: What's race got to do with it?*” She (2000) stated that the capitalist economic system now had a power perhaps greater than ever in its history to cross, even to dissolve, national boundaries, but this had simultaneously generated a staggering upsurge of racial, ethnic, and religious conflict mainly within nations.

4.4.4 Nation, nationalism and national identity

Just like racism, globalization, ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ were equivocal concepts. The semantic bodies of knowledge dealing with nationalism, nation, and identity were multidisciplinary and polyvalent. It was not my intention in this discussion to attempt an extensive exploration of, and an exegesis on, these bodies of knowledge. That was beyond the purview of this investigation. Instead, I restricted myself to a brief outline of some aspects of nationalism, such as national identity, are related to xenophobia. In spite of the existence of a burgeoning scholarship on ‘nationalism’, defining this concept was not a straight-forward, and easy task to do. Nationalism, nationality and nation had all proved difficult to define, let alone to analyse (Anderson, 2006).

In fact, there was no agreement on what the term nationalism meant, and this was because of the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon. At the outset, it was fair for this researcher to make this comment that – just like ‘races’, ‘nations’ too are constructed, and nationalism was undergirded or underpinned by a particular ideology. Smith (2010: 5-6) said that: “It was really only during the last century that the term nationalism acquired the range of meanings that we associate with it today. Of these usages, the most important are: (1) a process of formation, or growth, of nations; (2) a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation; (3) a language and symbolism of the nation; (4) a social and political movement on behalf of the nation; (5) a doctrine and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular”.

Some aspects of nationalism, such as national identity, are symbiotically linked to the expression of xenophobia in numerous immigrant-receiving countries. Omelchenko et al. (2015) pointed out that national identity may be understood as a very subjective and personally meaningful complex of representations, feelings and dispositions relatively common to a group of people who had defined themselves as a nation. From the above, the nebulosity of the concept was evident. Some scholars defined ‘national identity’ by focusing on cultural attributes, while others stressed the importance of personal and cognitive features. This was confirmed by Degler (2002) who said that the sense of identity that a people or a government arrive at could be a slippery concept, and not infrequently a changing one. National identity was just a form of identification with the ‘nation’ – it helped people to make sense of who they were, and who did they think they were. National identity was a social construct, and – McCrone (2002) maintained that it was constructed in the process of everyday life. To help bring some clarity to this concept, McCrone (2002) introduced to the notion of ‘identity markers’ – and those ‘identity markers’ were, amongst others, place of

birth, ancestry, place of residence, length of residence, upbringing/education, name, accent, physical appearance, dress, behaviour and commitment/contribution to place.

The relationship between economic globalisation, racism, nationalism, and xenophobia was also permeated by an idea borrowed from plant biology – the notion of ‘species invasion’ and fear of contamination. Plant biologists had long documented the issue of how the introduction of ‘alien’ plants in local environments could have deleterious consequences on indigenous ones. Invasion biologists and restoration ecologists frequently sounded out warnings about the ecological threats posed by invasive species. Pejchar and Mooney (2009) summarised the impacts of invasive species as follows: invasive alien species (IAS) were key drivers of human-caused global environmental change; were widely heralded as the second greatest agent of species endangerment and extinction after habitat destruction, particularly on islands, and IAS were also inflicting serious impacts on the ecosystem processes that were fundamental to human well-being. In brief, non-native species were not ‘natural’, they endangered the local environment, and they should be managed and controlled (or eradicated if necessary).

Simberloff (2012) added that ‘alien’ species were a threat to the very existence of native species, a threat to the existence of community-level biodiversity, and caused economic damage. What was covertly implied in these discourses of invasive species were three critical issues that related to migration, xenophobia, and racism – the notions of ‘undesirability’, ‘contamination’, and management or control. One could draw some parallels between the idea of ‘exotic’ plants that were not desirable, and the portrayal of immigrants as undesirable elements in the host countries. The notion of ‘undesirable immigrants’ was usually perpetuated and disseminated in societal discourses that portrayed them as incendiaries of social and environmental ills. In these discourses, the ‘undesirability’ of immigrants was carried out through their being personified as drug-dealers,

terrorists, disease-carriers, criminals, parasites and other undesirable labels. ‘Undesirability’, therefore, implied not only ‘un-assimilability’, but also danger. This idea of ‘undesirability’ was also reflected in comments made by Simberloff (2003: 187) who talked about the domestication of European versus African honeybees in the United States bee culture: “In short, these European bees are the quintessential family organisms, just as WASPs presumably form the quintessential human family. The Africanized bees, which are far less domesticated towards humans, are also far less domestic: they tend to abscond at higher rates than European bees.... African bees are potential rapists.” Here, it was evident that Africanised bees were so wantonly maligned as rapists, aggressive species, and not domesticable. Accompanying these discourses of ‘undesirability’ were those of ‘fear of contamination’ and pollution.

The characterisation of immigrants as pollutants and contaminants was an idea that borrowed heavily on racist science rooted in Social Darwinism. It was an idea that was premised on the assumption that immigrants were ‘germ carriers’, and the need to ‘immunise’ the host nation from being contaminated by ‘dangerous outsiders’. Theorising ‘immunity’, Bird and Short (2017: 303-304) had this to say about the immune system: “It serves as a template for distinguishing between the self and the other. Unfortunately, this distinction is most often articulated in terms of the “normal” and the “pathological,” that is, the permanent opposition between defensive antibodies and invading antigens ... Antigens generate antibodies, not the other way around. Antigens are the genesis and source of the antibodies. In other words, difference is represented as a pathological disease against which the self must not only defend itself but also define itself ... the immune system represents the point where the self and the other come into contact. It is the *nexus*”.

Borrowing knowledge in the fields of biopolitics, biopower, and thanatology, Bird and Short (2017) added that in order to affirm the lives of insiders, in terms of the cultural and biological

integrity of their identity and the quality of their lives, they must be immunised from foreign contamination. Fears of contamination originated from these kinds of discourses about the human species, pathogens, and disease. Deducing from the previous comments, contamination and immunisation perspectives embodied the most the most odious, insidious, and callous forms of racism. Immigrants and other ‘outside groups’ were not only viewed as biologically defect, they were also regarded as posing a contamination risk to the biologically superior host population. The most logical thing to do was then to exclude and eradicate the ‘dangerous pathogens’ from the host environment. In the sphere of immigration, this meant developing policies directed at achieving the latter goal. A perusal of many host countries’ immigration policies evidenced concerns about contamination and immunisation. Immigration policies and legislation had been utilised as a mechanism to deal with the perceived threat of miscegenation and contamination, and this had translated to the exclusion of certain groups of immigrants.

4.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have proposed and discussed labelling theory, social control theory, and learning theory as the dominant theoretical frames - gleaned from the sociology of deviance - to be utilized for analysing the scourge of xenophobia and its attendant violent reaction to the presence of foreign citizens in immigrant receiving countries. In addition, eclectic conceptual frames derived from the discourses of economic globalization, migration, race, and nationalism were also used to buttress the dominant theoretical framework.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

5.1.INTRODUCTION

One of the current challenges confronting post-Apartheid South Africa is that of periodic visitations by the most intense xenophobic sentiment often accompanied by violent episodes of violence. The pandemic scourge of xenophobia and its attendant violence continue to punctuate social, political, and economic life in the post-Apartheid South Africa. The contexts and manifestations of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa is something that involves the interaction not only between the ‘indigenes’ and ‘non-nationals’, but also the complex socioeconomic, political, and legal relationships that characterise the postcolonial environment. The environmental context within which the ‘germ’ of xenophobia crops up is a complex one which then makes it extremely difficult to apportioning credit to one cause of this form of prejudice. In developing the latter viewpoint, I want to borrow insights from Charles Rosenberg who was an American germ theorist. Rosenberg (1979), cited in Kunitz (1987: 380), makes this observation; “The model of the body, and of health and disease. ... was all inclusive ... capable of incorporating every aspect of man's life in explaining his physical condition. Just as man's body interacted continuously with his environment, so did his mind with his body, his morals with his health. The realm of causation in medicine was not distinguishable from the realm of meaning in society generally”.

The idea accentuated in these remarks is that some diseases or social phenomena are influenced by a multiplicity of causes – ‘webs of causation’ or chains of causation’ (Kunitz, 1987). The cause of a particular disease or social pathology might be attributed to a variety of social conditions – the conception of multicausality. In a similar vein, complex and multi-faceted social problems like

xenophobia have multiple geneses. There are multiple and complex factors that contribute to the contextual dynamics and manifestations of xenophobia. When investigating this societal problem, I had to utilise a qualitative research approach.

My choice of utilising a qualitative research approach is borne out of the realisation that the phenomenon under investigation is both multi-faceted and complex in nature. The issue that I am attempting to explain is that the complex problem of xenophobia is determined or influenced by the interaction between various factors – factors which might be historical, socioeconomic, and cultural. In order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the contexts and manifestations of the complex phenomenon of xenophobia, it is imperative for me to employ a qualitative research approach. Elaborating on the use of a qualitative research methodology, Ryan et al. (2014: 82) said that this method a “...necessitates a multi-vocalic narrative – a richer, fuller exploration that reflects the complexities of researching lived experience. Developing a contextualised, thick, rich description of a cultural phenomenon requires an intentional depth of engagement”. Deducing from these comments, it seems evident that when a qualitative research approach has been employed in investigating complex phenomena (for example, xenophobia), ‘rich and thick’ narratives of the phenomenon under investigation are possible. This researcher will return to this theme in the subsequent sections of this chapter. I am now going to provide a description of the methodology and methods that have been utilised in this investigation.

In this chapter, the discussion of the methodology and methods used in this investigation is going to proceed in this direction: first, the methodology and research approaches is described; secondly, the research design adopted is explained and justified; in the third section, the methods and instruments of collecting data are specified; the third section of this chapter deals with the population and sampling issues; The penultimate section of this chapter explains how data has

been analysed, and the final section is devoted to a consideration of the ethical issues involved in this investigation.

5.2.METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH APPROACH

To recapitulate, the multi-faceted and complex nature of the phenomenon under investigation evidently necessitated a methodological approach and design strategy involving the utilisation of a qualitative research approach and methodology. In addition, the qualitative approach would be the most appropriate methodology to use in the sense that this study seeks to go beyond generalising from a sample of people to a larger population by seeking to “... understand, explore or to describe people’s behaviour, themes in behaviours, attitudes or trends; or relations between people’s actions...”(Davis, 2014). What is qualitative research? Creswell (2015) is of the view that qualitative research is an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. In my view, a qualitative research approach is a systematic empirical investigation into how a researcher studies things in the natural environment, and then attempts to interpret these phenomena in terms of how people attach meaning to them.

A research methodology is an overall strategy that an investigator uses to approach a research problem with a view to finding a solution to it. It includes not only the methods of gathering data about the research problem, but also the philosophical assumptions and principles that guide the way data should be collected and analysed. Research methodology “... refers to the process, principles and procedures by which a researcher approaches problems and seeks answers referring to the general way to research a topic, whereas method in the specific technique(s) being employed” (Sloan and Bowe, 2014: 1293). In a similar vein, Carr (2006: 422) stated that research methodology “Strictly speaking ... refers to the theoretical rationale or, to use Somekh’s term, ‘principles’ that justify the research methods appropriate to a field of study. So understood, a

methodology cannot be derived from research but instead has to be grounded in that form of *a priori* theoretical knowledge usually referred to as ‘philosophy’”. Research methodology, therefore, includes not only the methods, but also the manner in which the researcher approaches the research problem and seeks to find a solution to it. In the current study, this researcher utilised a qualitative research methodology and methods. There are a number of reasons why I elected to utilise a qualitative research approach.

First, this approach had helped me to explain the vexed and complex questions that the multifaceted phenomenon of xenophobia posed in a diverse post-apartheid context. Using a quantitative methodological research approach would not have yielded a comprehensive meaning and interpretation of how this phenomenon manifests itself in post-Apartheid South Africa. A qualitative research approach is a valuable methodological option to utilise when empirically examining complex phenomena. This is a methodological path which enables the researcher to unveil and unearth the internal logic of individuals that potentially affects human attitudes and behaviours. A qualitative approach to research allows the researcher to uncover the real, but sometimes hidden, underpinnings of a social phenomenon. The methodological stance that I have adopted in this investigation was not simply to describe the incidence and prevalence of the phenomenon of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa. Primarily, I was interested in unearthing the underlying and deep-rooted factors that drive the expression, manifestation of this phenomenon in the contemporary South African society. Utilising a quantitative methodological research approach would not have provided satisfactory answers to the research questions posed in this investigation.

The second reason that has made me to follow this methodological path (choosing to use qualitative research methodology) is because it enabled me to use a multi-pronged research

approach to explore and unearth the multiple factors that underpin the manifestation and contextual dynamics of xenophobia. As argued earlier on in this chapter, the environmental context within which the ‘germ’ of xenophobia crops up and spread is a complex one which then makes it extremely difficult to apportioning credit to one cause of this form of prejudice. In addition, there are complex conditions which are involved in producing multi-dimensional social pathologies like xenophobia. Unravelling these complex conditions requires a multipronged research approach to address multiple factors that drive the expression of the xenophobic sentiment. Such a methodological approach has enabled me to decipher the complex social, economic, and political inter-linkages underpinning xenophobia, and the societal construction of immigrants as deviants. The methodological approach that I adopted is predicated on one dominant paradigmatic tradition in social science research, namely interpretivism.

5.2.1. Interpretivism paradigm

The genesis of this paradigm could be traced back to the writings of one of the celebrated German social scientist – Max Weber. Schram (2017: 263) reiterates my point when he says that “The interpretive approach is also indebted to Weber. It emphasises Weber’s concern for understanding what social relations subjectively mean to the people being studied as opposed to explaining objectively what caused those relations to be the way they are”. In more specific terms, the roots of this paradigm originate from Weber’s notion of ‘*verstehen*’. Weber felt that sociologists had an advantage over natural scientists. That advantage resided in the sociologist’s ability to ‘understand’ social phenomena, whereas natural scientists cannot gain such an understanding of the behaviour of an atom or chemical compound. The German word for empathic understanding is ‘*verstehen*’. Literally, the term ‘*verstehen*’ translates as ‘empathic or human understanding’. In his view, the social sciences are concerned with the actions of human beings that presuppose they have an ‘inner

state'. Since the subject matter of the natural sciences does not possess 'empathic understanding' or *verstehen*. Weber argued that human beings, in contrast to the objects of nature, always rely on their 'understanding' of each other's actions and on the 'meanings'. In conclusion, Weber argued that human beings are frequently motivated in their choices by the values and beliefs they hold. We need to understand the subjective ideas and beliefs that people hold because it is these attributes that make them to act or behave in certain ways. The actions of individuals in society can be interpreted in terms of the values and beliefs that motivate them. In addition, it is also possible to develop empathy with the beliefs of others. In doing so, we may come to appreciate why people behave in the way that they do.

The interpretive research paradigm also originates from the theoretical ideas of symbolic interactionists (Georg Simmel, George Herbert Mead, Harold Garfinkel, etc.) working in the fields of sociology, hermeneutics, and semiotics. The major focus of symbolic interactionist perspective revolves around the ways in which people 'understand' and interpret their surroundings, and how people interact with one other in society, and the meanings they attach to such interactions. It is through such interactions that people in a given society begin to make sense out of reality, and arrive at the meaning of the world in which they live. The epistemological, ontological, and methodological assumptions of the interpretivist research paradigm drew heavily on the preceding insights from symbolic interactionism.

The point of departure in articulating the epistemological assumptions of the interpretivist paradigm is the notion that human beings are not objects. They have consciousness, and emotions which influence their interactions with others in society. Echoing my comments, du Plooy-Cilliers (2014:27) stated: "The main idea on which this paradigm rests is that people are fundamentally different from objects. Consequently, we cannot study human beings in the same way that we

study objects in the natural sciences because, unlike objects, human beings change all the time and the environment in which they find themselves constantly influences them”. Proponents of the interpretivist research paradigm assume that reality is something that is constructed, and interpreted by people in their constant interactions with others. It is not something that is ‘out there’, and objective. On the contrary, reality is a social construction, and is subjective. Green (2017:375) argues that “In the interpretivist epistemology, all knowledge and reality are created through social interactions between people and their world, and is developed within a social context ... Hence, meaning and truth are not discovered, as in the positivist epistemology, but rather constructed”. Meaning and truth cannot be determined objectively, but are rather socially constructed. Meaning is created by individuals during the course of their messy, complex, and dynamic interactions in society. Consequently, meaning and truth are characterised by subjectivity, relativism, and reflexivity.

The ontological stance of interpretivism is that “... reality is a social construction and that it is dependent on the meanings that people ascribe to their own experiences and interactions with others. According to the interpretivists, the social world is what people perceive it to be. It is fluid and fragile and changes as people’s perceptions change” (du Plooy-Cilliers, 2014:29). People construct meaning during the course of their interaction with others, and they make sense of reality on their own. Meaning is embedded in people’s experiences derived from the process of social interaction. Deducing from the preceding, it seems reasonable to state that for the interpretivists, social reality is individually constructed. In fact, there exists multiple social realities. In terms of methodology, interpretivists endeavour to investigate, interpret, and understand social reality from the standpoint of those individuals who construct it. In support of this researcher’s contention, Scotland (2012: 12) added: “Interpretive methodology is directed at understanding phenomenon

from an individual's perspective, investigating interaction among individuals as well as the historical and cultural contexts which people inhabit Individual constructs are elicited and understood through interaction between researchers and participants ... with participants being relied on as much as possible Interpretive methods yield insight and understandings of behavior, explain actions from the participant's perspective ...” The latter point is significant to grasp – that the researcher strives to understand reality from the point of view of the participants or informants. Therefore, the ‘voices and interpretations’ of the people or ‘subjects’ are key. In summary, the ‘clarion call’ made by interpretive methodologists is that the ‘voices’ of the people should be the ‘epicenter’ around which the whole process of research revolves. In conclusion, the interpretivist paradigm has been given extensive treatment here owing to the fact that the whole methodological design of this investigation gravitates around it. The methodology that has been utilised in this investigation included the research design, the methods of data collection, and data analysis.

5.2.2. Research design

A research design is the overall plan or structure of an investigation or study. Leavy (2017: 8-9) said: “Architects design plans to build physical structures. When an architect designs a house or a building, his/her ultimate goal will dictate decision-making.... I think of research design as the process of building a structure, or plan, for your research project. Whereas architects have many general structures with which they work – single-family homes, multifamily homes, non-residential buildings, and the like – social researchers have five primary structures with which they work. In social research we call these *approaches to research design*. There are five major approaches to research reviewed in this text, namely quantitative, qualitative, mixed methods research, art-based research, and community-based participatory research”. The point explained

here is that a research design is an overall methodological strategy adopted by the researcher to address the research questions. Furthermore, a research design will influence not only the selection of data collection methods, but also how the collected data will be analysed and interpreted. A research design, therefore, involves the general strategy to be utilised by the researcher in conducting the investigation. I decided to utilise a case study design to satisfy the qualitative approach. This is where a few samples will be investigated to generate in-depth data on the thinking, attitudes, views of people on the contexts of xenophobia and other concomitant ramifications surrounding it.

The aim of utilising this method is to derive an in-depth and heightened understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. Echoing this researcher's point, Choy (2014: 102) argues that the "...primary strength of the qualitative approach ... is the ability to probe for underlying values, beliefs, and assumptions". This means that the qualitative approach has the potential ability to explore or 'dig deep' for meaning that people attach to words and actions in society. This approach, therefore, aims at providing a 'rich understanding of social reality'. McCusker and Gunaydin (2015: 537) add that the qualitative approaches "...generally aim to understand the experiences and attitudes of ... the community ... These methods aim to answer questions about the 'what', 'how' or 'why' of a phenomenon rather than 'how many' or 'how much', which are answered by quantitative methods. If the aim is to understand how a community or individuals within it perceive a particular issue, then qualitative methods are often appropriate".

5.2.3. Research methods

This investigation on the diverse contexts, dynamics, and manifestation of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South African society was conducted using a variety of complementary research

methods. To satisfy the qualitative research design, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and secondary data methods were used.

5.2.3.1. In-depth interviews

In-depth interviewing was utilised as a technique for gathering data in this investigation. The technique of in-depth interviewing was linked to the purpose of the study in that it was intended to enable the researcher to unearth the context and manifestations of South African post-apartheid state of xenophobia. In-depth interviewing was the primary technique used to gather data from a variety of stakeholders in this investigation – officials from the Department of Home Affairs, members of the South African police services, and members of the selected political parties. The research strategy of utilising the data-gathering method of in-depth interviewing was based on both ontological and epistemological grounds (Minichiello et al. 2008). In other words, the researcher's view of what is social reality and how it ought to be studied has influenced the selection of this research method. One advantage of this strategy was that it did facilitate a highly interactive role, on the part of both the researcher and the informants, which, in turn, generated a mutually collaborative approach.

5.2.3.2. Focus group discussion

Focus Group Discussion method of data-collection were used in this investigation as it was ideally suited to obtaining relevant data on how labelling and demonising of foreign nationals is inextricably linked to xenophobia. Starr (2014: 241) said that; “Focus groups are semi-structured group-discussion sessions, where a facilitator raises questions for participants to discuss, and predictable conversational dynamics (plus specific methods used by the facilitator) help bring out majority and minority perceptions, opinions, views and experiences within the group”. The focus group conversations yielded a ‘rich’ tapestry of views and opinions that were exclusively distilled

from the experiences of informants. The utilisation of this method proved to be very effective in eliciting ‘thick’ responses especially from a small group of foreign nationals. The reason for this could probably have been due to the latter group’s experiences with the phenomenon of xenophobia.

5.2.3.3 Secondary data sources

The secondary data sources were obtained from published journals in social sciences, books, and media sources. This was appropriate method to use in exploring the context of the interface between economic globalisation, migration and xenophobia. Documentary materials are an authentic source of information in social research. Documents can serve to confirm, buttress, rebut, and contradict data that has been gathered through other means (Salkind, 2003). Media reports on xenophobia, for example, are a veritable treasure trove for researchers interested in unearthing the contextual and dynamic underpinnings of xenophobia. It would been a chimera to ignore these legitimate sources of data. The documentary materials did not only serve to anchor this study theoretically, but also assisted in making sense out of the empirical evidence that was gathered.

5.2.4. Research instruments

5.2.4.1. Interview guide

An interview guide, consisting of unstructured questions, was employed as a primary data-gathering instrument in gathering qualitative data. The unstructured questions contained in the interview guide were framed in a way that created a conversation between the informants and this researcher. This conversation allowed the researcher to pose questions to informants with a view to learning and eliciting more information about their views, opinions and beliefs (Strydom & Bezuidenhout, in duPlooy-Cilliers et al. 2014) about the phenomenon of xenophobia. This conversational approach, in turn, offered sufficient opportunity for clarification of points, and

detailed explanation of issues and factors that informants thought underpinned the phenomenon of xenophobia.

5.2.5. Population under study

The study population consisted of all South African citizens and foreign nationals who were eighteen years or older. The population included all men and women living in both the urban and rural areas of South Africa, as well as people in institutionalised setting such as students studying at institutions of higher learning in the country. The population, as a standard practice, excluded South Africans who were incarcerated, and those hospitalised. The study population also included provincial and local government officials who act as agents of social control and law enforcement, and local leaders of selected political parties.

5.2.5.1. Research domain(s)

This investigation on the context and manifestations of xenophobia in post-Apartheid South Africa was conducted at the Nelson Mandela Bay metropolitan municipality. The municipality was selected as a study area because it had recently bore witness to the spate of xenophobic and violent attacks on foreign nationals and their businesses.

5.2.5.2. Sampling methods and procedure

A nonprobability sampling method was utilised in this investigation. Based on the overarching purpose of this study, namely to investigate the contexts and manifestations of South African post-apartheid state of xenophobia- the samples for the qualitative design data were selected purposively. I used his judgement to select, for inclusion in the final sample, individuals who were knowledgeable about the clear and present danger posed by xenophobia to foreign nationals. The sampling universe normally included all citizens age 18 and older. As a standard practice, people

living in institutionalised settings, such as students in dormitories, patients in hospitals, and persons in prisons or nursing homes were excluded.

- *Sample selection criteria and procedure*

In this investigation on the contexts and manifestations of xenophobia, the researcher utilised the following criteria in selecting the final samples: all South African citizens and foreign nationals who were eighteen years or older; foreign nationals who have lived in the country for at least two years, and previous immigration experience/record. In addition to these variables, the informants were selected for a number of reasons: as agents of social control; agents of law enforcement; knowledge about the dangers of xenophobia; South Africans and foreign nationals and who were prepared to participate in this survey on xenophobia.

- *Unit of Analysis/Sample size*

The following stakeholders/informants were interviewed: 50 foreign nationals; 50 members from the local population. Furthermore, key informant in-depth interviews were conducted with the following individuals: provincial Department of Home Affairs official; (Home Affairs officials, as agents of social control, play an important role in the process of social differentiation; two councilors from the ruling political and opposition parties, and one official from the local office of the South African Police Services (agents of law enforcement are critical in efforts directed at combating the scourge of xenophobia). Several different versions of the interview guide were administered to each of these individuals, and stakeholder-specific questions will be included.

In addition, two focus group discussion interview guide was administered to a group of five individuals consisting of academic staff, postgraduate students who were foreign nationals, local community members, and law enforcement officials (these individuals were knowledgeable about

the clear and present danger posed by xenophobia to foreign nationals and locals). The details about the size and who was included in the study sample are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 in chapter one.

5.2.6. Data presentation and analysis

In specific terms, content analysis was to be used in the coding and analysis of data obtained. In this method of data analysis, researchers normally examine written documents or transcriptions of recorded verbal communications. In essence, content analysis refers to any technique for making inferences by systematically and *objectively* identifying themes, and special characteristics of messages (Berg and Lune, 2018). Specifically, both the *manifest content* and the *latent content* of messages were analysed. In other words, the *surface structure* present in the message and the *deep structural* meaning conveyed by the message were looked at in the interpretation of messages (Berg and Lune, 2018). The issue is that whenever a researcher interprets passages of transcripts, the researcher can choose to do either manifest or latent content analysis, or both. As the researcher reads between the lines, he or she must ask whether his or her reading is consistent with the informant's perspective (Minichiello et al. 2008). In analysing the qualitative data, I summarised, collapsed and reorganised the data in order to discover concepts and themes contained within it.

5.2.7. Ethical considerations

This investigation on the contexts and manifestations of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa observed a number of packages of ethical considerations. First, I complied with the regulations of the University of Fort Hare governing research with humans. Permission was sought, and obtained, from the University of Fort Hare to clear me ethically to carry out this investigation (Ethical clearance certificate number – REC-270710-028-RA Level 01). Secondly, study participants were

formally informed about the purpose of this investigation, and I ensured that they clearly understood what was required of them during their participation (Louw, 2014). Afterwards, the consent of the study informants to participate in this study was requested. A consent form guaranteeing the rights of the participants in this study was developed, and each participant was asked to familiarise him/herself with it before signing. The completion of the consent form was a clear indication that the participant agreed to voluntarily participate in this investigation.

Thirdly, an important concern for study participants is the protection of their identity and sensitive information about themselves (Louw, 2014). Therefore, it was imperative for me to assure study participants confidentiality and anonymity. Study participants were requested, at all times, not to provide any personal and confidential information by which they could be identified. In addition, this researcher undertook not to record the names of the study participants at any stage of the investigation, and not to match their identity to their research response (Louw, 2014). Fourth, the current investigation was guided by a basic ethical consideration of ensuring that no study participant suffered harm or injury. I ensured study participants that they were under no obligation to respond to interview questions that their personal dignity was injured. Lastly, the informants were informed of how the data was to be stored and used (Babbie, 2015), and feedback on the findings of this investigation was provided to all the study participants by way of written documents.

5.3. CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the methodological path that was followed in investigating the context and manifestation of xenophobic sentiment in post-apartheid South Africa.

CHAPTER SIX

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, AND INTERPRETATION

6.1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, I discussed the methodology and methods that were employed in this investigation. I started by orienting the reader to the fact that there are multiple and complex factors that contribute to the contextual dynamics and manifestations of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. I researcher took a methodological decision that the study had to be entirely qualitative. The methodological path followed was justifiable given the complexity and the multi-faceted nature of the phenomenon under investigation.

The purpose of the present chapter was to present, analyse, discuss, and interpret the empirical evidence that was gathered utilising qualitative research methods. In this chapter, I analysed qualitative data (interview data from both foreign and South African nationals, focus group discussion data, and key informant interview data). Specifically, focus groups and key informant data were integrated into the empirical evidence gleaned from in-depth interviews. I endeavoured to provide an integrated presentation and analysis of these data. The collected empirical evidence was presented, analysed, discussed, and interpreted in terms of the following broad dimensions and themes: factors underpinning the xenophobic sentiment in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa; manifestations of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa; effectiveness of the agents of social control in dealing with xenophobia; interventions to address xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, and integration of foreign nationals into the contemporary post-apartheid South African society. The qualitative findings that the study generated were discussed and buttressed by existing literature. Moreover, the empirical findings from the qualitative analysis were substantiated by utilizing theoretical insights from literature sources straddling several

intersecting theoretical traditions. Theories, models, and conceptual frameworks were also used to corroborate and validate the findings.

The following samples were investigated: 50 foreign nationals; 50 members from the local population; focus group interviews with five foreign nationals and South African nationals respectively. In addition, key informant in-depth interviews were conducted with the following individuals: An official from the provincial Department of Home Affairs; two local government councilors from two political parties, and one official from the South African Police Services. The informants were identified as follows: foreign nationals (FN 1 – FN 50); South African nationals (SAN 1- SAN 42); Focus Group of foreign nationals (FGDFN1-5) and Focus group of South African nationals (FGDSAN 1-5); Home Affairs official (KIHA); two councilors from a political party (KIPPDA and KIPPANC), and one official from the South African Police Services (KISAPS). This is the demographic profile of the informants that emerged from the gathered empirical evidence.

6.2. SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF FOREIGN NATIONAL INFORMANTS

Sociodemographic factors or attributes (for example age, gender, education, marital status, religion, and years living in South Africa) are significant drivers of xenophobic attitudes and deviant behaviours. Social and demographic factors greatly influence some human decisions and attitudes on which they are grounded. This is the reason why this researcher obtained informants' sociodemographic characteristics such as age, gender, level of education, marital status, religion, and number of years the person has lived in South Africa.

Table 6.1: Socio-demographic characteristic of foreign national informants (n=50)

Characteristics	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Age		
18-28	18	36
29-38	18	36
39-48	6	12
49-58	7	14
Above 59	1	2
Gender		
Male	29	58
Female	21	42
Education		
No education	3	6
Prim. education	3	6
Sec. education	13	26
Tert. Education	31	62
Marital status		
Single	10	20
Married	25	50
Divorced	4	8
Never married	8	16
Widowed	3	6
Religious prefe		
Catholic	10	20
Anglican	9	18
Other	31	62
Years lived in		
0-5	22	44
6-10	17	34
11-15	7	14
More than 15yrs	4	8

6.2.1. Age of informants

In the sample of foreign nationals who participated in this investigation, the majority of the informants fell between the 18-28 and 29-38 age categories. Only 8 informants were aged 49 and

above. Table 5.1 above shows the distribution of foreign nationals by age. The inference that one can draw from Table 5.1 above is that the most likely to immigrate are evidently the young members of the foreign national population. This is supported by Mlambo and Mpanza (2019) who stated that continental Africa had witnessed an increasing trend in youth migration who constitute a somewhat large percentage of overall inter-African movements. International migration flows are usually dominated by the youth who are unemployed (Rakauskienė and Ranceva, 2014).

6.2.2. Gender distribution

This study also revealed that out of the 50 foreign nationals investigated, fifty-eight (58) percent (29) were males, while the remaining forty-two (42) percent (21) were females. In analysing the gender composition of foreign nationals who participated in this study, it is evident that there is a high number of male migrants relative to female immigrants. This is in line with orthodox views on immigration flows and patterns in the less developed countries that reveal high ratios of male immigrants compared to female immigrants – an empirical regularity that reflects the masculinisation of immigration flows and patterns. Ullah's (2017) views lent credence to this notion when he argued that the familiar pattern is for the husbands to leave their countries, work overseas for a period of time as long as they can stay and feel they are economically feasible and return to their families. Therefore, in many sending African countries, males have dominated international migration outflows (Souza, 2021).

6.2.3. Level of education

Information solicited from foreign national informants revealed that sixty-two (62) percent of them (31 out of 50) had attained a degree as their highest level of academic qualification at the time of this investigation. Furthermore, twenty-six (26) percent reported that they had secondary education, 6 percent said they had primary education, and only 6 percent indicated that they had

no education. As can be seen from Table 5.1, the majority of the foreign national informants were not only able to read and write, but they also had tertiary education – this evidently suggests that the majority of the immigrants who came to post-apartheid South Africa were well-educated and skilled. This also suggests that they were aware of the contextual issues that influence the manifestation of xenophobia. Furthermore, this empirical observation can be viewed as buttressing the fact that the initial decision to emigrate elsewhere is usually taken first by skilled and educated migrants (Bartolini et al., 2017) – particularly the young who feel compelled to circulate (Cairns, 2017). However, this finds exemption where migration is driven by phenomena such as droughts and wars (Selby et al., 2017).

6.2.4. Marital status

Half or fifty (50%) percent of the foreign national informants in this study are married while 20% are single. The other informants (16%) have never married, are divorced (8%), and widowed (6%). This empirical evidence suggests that recent immigrant flows into South Africa are predominantly characterised by family migration – a migration phenomenon whose nature and extent could be the subject of another empirical investigation. This finds support in a study on remittance behavior conducted by Makina (2013) who found that males and married persons make up a larger proportion of the remitters than females and single persons – a migration phenomenon whose nature and extent could be the subject of another empirical investigation. The phenomenon of marriage migration is becoming common precisely because migration often occurs around the life stage of emerging adulthood (Yeung and Mu, 2020). This researcher hastens to add the fact that the marital status of migrants may be influenced by the origin-country's culture (He and Gerber, 2020).

6.2.5. Religious preference

The sample of foreign nationals who participated in this study were also asked to indicate their religious preferences, and the results are displayed in Table 5.1 above. The most common response in the above frequency distribution is “Other”. In fact, the majority of foreign national informants (62%) identified themselves as belonging to other religious denominations besides being Christians (Catholic or Anglican). Although this may not definitely indicate the levels of religiosity among foreign nationals, these empirical data suggest that the sample informants identify with various religious groups. These religious groupings could be important vehicles that play a role in the process of immigrant settlement in host countries. Beek and Fleischmann (2020) have argued that there is an association between religiosity and integration outcomes. Foreign national informants do have some kind of religious affiliation and identification – this is an important factor that is likely to influence their level of integration into the host country

6.2.6. Number of years living in South Africa

An indicator of whether a foreign national has made South Africa a “home-away-from-home” (albeit the xenophobic and violent reception) is the number of years she or he has lived in the country. As can be discerned from Table 5.1, the majority (22) of the foreign national informants have lived in South Africa for 0 -5 years. Seventeen foreign national informants have lived in the host country for 6-11 years, while seven have lived in the country for 11-15 years. Only four foreign national informants have resided in South Africa for more than 15 years. These data suggest that the bulk of foreign nationals (78%) who participated in this study have resided in the country for not more than ten years. This may perhaps mirror the fact that immigration may have increased after the 1994 democratic dispensation in South Africa perhaps because of more liberalisation of the policy compared to the pre-independence era (Peberdy, 2019). These data also

revealed multifaceted reasons for staying in the host country for many years: first, the immigrants' accommodation to the country, and this gives credit to the country for being accommodative to immigrants. This advice may have been the direction of former president of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki (in Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2010), who indicated that immigration regulations had to be reviewed to ensure that the country was able to access scarce skills from the rest of the world, but with Africans being accorded a priority (Ellis and Segatti, 2011) before looking for them in Europe; second, this finding indicates the economic gains made by foreign nationals in staying in the host country for a number of years. This is the sociodemographic profile that emerged from interviews with foreign national informants. I now discuss and interpret the sociodemographic profile of South African national informants.

6.3.SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL INFORMANTS

As previously stated, social and demographic factors are inextricably linked to the xenophobic animus towards foreign nationals. I obtained South African informants' social and demographic features such as age, gender, level of education, marital status, religion, and language. There were only 42 (out of 50) South African nationals who agreed to be interviewed for this study. Table 5.2 below shows the sociodemographic characteristics of South African national informants.

Table 6.2: Socio-demographic characteristic of South African national informants (n=42)

Characteristics	Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
Age		
18-28	17	41
29-38	15	36
39-48	8	19
49-58	1	2
Above 59	1	2

Gender		
Male	17	40
Female	21	50
Other	4	10
Education		
No education	2	5
Prim. education	2	5
Sec. education	15	36
Tert. Education	23	54
Marital status		
Single	14	33
Married	16	39
Divorced	8	19
Never married	4	9
Widowed	0	0
Religious prefe		
Catholic	7	17
Anglican	6	14
Methodist	8	19
Zion	3	7
Other	18	43
La. Mar. Status		
Employed	10	24
Unemployed	29	69
Self-employed	3	7

6.3.1. Age of informants

The majority of South African national informants who agreed to participate in this study were within the age ranges of 18-28 and 29-38. There were eight informants who fell within the age range of 39-48. Only two informants were aged above 49. As can be observed from the data presented in this table, the majority of the study participants were young. This bears testimony to the demographic fact that many developing countries, like post-apartheid South Africa, have youthful populations. This is confirmed by Ssewamala (2015) who stated that less developed countries have a larger proportion of youth, and have higher fertility rates than advanced industrialized countries. Also, it is usually the unemployed young people who are in the forefront of xenophobic mobs in post-apartheid South Africa (Mago, 2018). The youth are also the ones

who could be ‘hoodwinked by the politicians (Kang’ethe, 2014), and be utilized as agents of violence. Furthermore, it is usually young people who are in the forefront of xenophobic mobs in post-Apartheid South Africa.

6.3.2 Gender distribution

This study also showed that out of the 42 South African national informants who participated in this investigation, 21 were females and 17 were males. Only 4 participants self-reported their gender to be ‘other’. From the empirical evidence presented in the above table, it is evident that females are over-represented in the study sample than males. The rationale for this over-representation is that women constitute the largest portion (51%) of the South African population. In other words, South Africa is a country that is not only young, but also female. Statistics South Africa (2019) states that 51,2% (approximately 30 million) of the population is female.

6.3.2. Level of education

The researcher also asked the study participants to indicate their level of education. Data collected from South African national informants reveal that 23 out of 42 had tertiary education, and 15 had secondary education. Only 4 participants reported that they had primary or no education at all. As can be observed from the data presented in Table 5.2, the majority of the study participants were well-educated. In addition, it can be inferred from the above table that the study participants had the ability to comprehend the contextual issues that influence the manifestation of xenophobia in contemporary post-Apartheid South Africa. In addition, although this population did not represent xenophobes, but their views and attitudes surrounding xenophobia in this study helped this researcher to dismiss the undocumented commonly-held belief (myth) that xenophobia was preponderantly advanced by people of low literacy levels. This was supported by Campbell et al.

(2018) who argued that formal education alone is not enough to erase xenophobia. Lancee and Sarrasin (2015) have also contended that higher educational attainment in itself seems to have no liberalizing effect of xenophobic attitudes. The myth that xenophobia is preponderantly advanced by people of low literacy levels needs to be further debunked by future researchers.

6.3.3. Marital status

Thirty-nine percent of the South African national informants in this study were married while 33% were single. The other informants (19%) were divorced, and some had never married (9%). This empirical evidence reflected the general marital history of South Africa. Apparently, South Africa has been experiencing a downward trajectory in marriage rates owing to an array of factors such as rising divorce rates, cohabitation, and intention to remain single. The decline in marriage rates, particularly among black Africans, is confirmed by Yarbrough (2015) who stated that African marriage rates continue to decline, with matrifocal families and therefore single parent households taking an upward trajectory (Kang'ethe and Mafa, 2014). Moore and Govender (2013) have also reasoned that the dramatic changes in patterns of marriage and family formation, leading to a decline in marriage rates, have been much more acute for Black South Africans than for White South Africans.

6.3.4. Religious preference

The sample of foreign nationals who participated in this study were also asked to indicate their religious preferences, and the results are displayed in Table 5.2 above. The most common response in the above frequency distribution is “Other”. In fact, the majority of South African national informants (43%) identified themselves as belonging to other religious denominations. We also observe from Table 5.2 that 7 informants said they were Catholic, 6 reported that they were

Anglican, 8 were Methodist, and 3 identified themselves as belonging to the Zion Christian Church. Although this may not definitely indicate the levels of religiosity among South African nationals, these empirical data suggest that the sample informants identify with various religious groups. In fact, religious identity is a significant demographic factor that may influence xenophobic attitudes in host countries. Religious identification, just like other forms of identity (national, racial, and ethnic identities), is positively associated with anti-immigrant prejudice. In fact, religious identity is a significant demographic factor that may influence the xenophobic animus in host countries, majorly integration. According to Zuckerman (2018), religious people are more likely to be welcoming than those who are not religious, more so to those ones of their religious grouping. Deslandes and Anderson (2019), however, caution that the role of religiosity in influencing attitudes toward migrants has yet to be completely validated.

6.3.5. Labour market status

The sample of South African nationals who participated in this study were also asked to indicate their labour market status, and the results are displayed in Table 5.2. As can be discerned from the table, the majority (29) of the South African national informants indicated that they were not employed. This finding is consistent with the fact that the current study is based in the Eastern Cape Province where the official unemployment rate is as high as 39.5% (Statistics South Africa 2019). Employment status, as an indicator of the socioeconomic status, is empirically associated with the negative xenophobic sentiment towards foreign national citizens. Expatriating on this association between labour market status and xenophobia, Classen (2017) contended that labour market status has somewhat unexpected effects on xenophobia. However, it needs to be emphasized that it is not South Africans who are unemployed and looking for work who are most hostile to immigrants, but, rather, those who are not in the labour force because they are no longer

looking for work. Indeed, the unemployed are significantly more likely to be prejudiced toward immigrants (Harris et. al., 2018). This is the sociodemographic profile that emerged from interviews with South African national informants. I now examine the main themes that are related to the research questions which emerged from the key informant interviews with foreign nationals.

6.4. BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILE OF THE KEY INFORMANTS

The table below presents the demographic profile of key informants from different governmental and non-governmental organisations in Nelson Mandela Bay. Out of sixteen (14) informants, four (10) participated in in-depth interviews; while ten (10) participated in focus groups discussions. The informants in this table have been code-named as follows: Focus group discussion of foreign nationals (FGDFN1-5), and Focus group discussion of South African nationals (FGDSAN 1-5); Home Affairs official (KIHA); two councilors from a political party (KIPPDA and KIPPANC), and one official from the South African Police Services (KISAPS). This is the demographic profile of the informants that emerged from the gathered empirical evidence.

Table 5.3: Biographical profile of the key informants

Government & Community	Code Names	Age	Gender	Race	Marital Status	Educational level	Occupational status
Department of Home Affairs	KIHA	35	F	Black	Married	Tertiary	Control Immigration Officer
South African Police Services	KISAPS	33	M	Black	Married	High School	Sergeant

Political party	KIPPANC	36	F	Black	Single	High School	Councillor – local Municipality
Political party	KIPDA	58	M	Coloured	Married	Tertiary	Councillor – District Municipality
Community	FGDFN1	33	F	Black	Married	Tertiary	University student
Community	FGDFN2	29	F	Black	Single	Tertiary	University student
Community	FGDFN3	39	F	Black	Married	Tertiary	Hair Salon owner
Community	FGDFN4	28	M	Black	Married	High School	Spaza shop owner
Community	FGDFN5	31	F	Black	Single	Tertiary	Shoemaker
Community	FGDSAN1	23	F	Black	Single	High School	Community member
Community	FGDSAN2	37	F	Black	Single	High School	Community member
Community	FGDSAN3	32	M	Black	Married	Tertiary	Primary school teacher
Community	FGDSAN4	26	M	Black	Single	High School	Community policing forum member
Community	FGDSAN5	24	M	Black	Single	Tertiary	University Student

6.4.1. Age of informants

Table 5.3 shows that the ages of all the key informants ranged from 21 to 58 years. This indicated that most of the key informants were young, with the exception of one informant from a political party who reported that his was aged 58. The youthful ages of the majority of key informants in this study reflected demographic fact that many developing countries, like South Africa, have youthful populations.

6.4.2. Gender

Table 5.3 shows that female key informants (8) outnumbered their male counterparts (6). This points to another demographic empirical reality that the populations of many developing countries tend to exhibit a higher proportion of females relative to males.

6.4.3. Race

Table 5.3 shows a preponderance of black participants fourteen (13) against only one (1) so-called coloured. Perhaps, this is because the study area is dominated by blacks. However, this possibly also points to the fact that violent episodes of xenophobia frequently occur in 'black' townships relative to those predominantly occupied by so-called coloured people.

6.4.4. Marital Status

The above Table 5.3 indicated that seven (50%) key informants were married while the other half were single. This empirical evidence did not suggest that the marital status of key informants, who participated in this investigation, influenced the way the participants responded to interview questions.

6.4.5. Education level

Table 5.3 indicated that eight (8) key informants had tertiary level of education while only six (1) had high school education. This reflects that most of the key informants possessed the knowledge to understand the key issues associated with the phenomenon of xenophobia in-depth. They could be trusted to do a modest analysis of the problem of xenophobia.

6.4.6. Occupational status

Table 5.3 showed that the key informants occupied different occupational statuses in different organisations. The implication of this was that the study was informed by a diverse group of key informants with different knowledge packages. This had an impact on data validity and diversity (Trevithick 2012).

6.5. THEMATIC FINDINGS

Table 6.4 Themes and sub-themes

Themes	Sub-themes
1. Factors Underpinning Xenophobia	Negative attitudes
	Perceived competition
	Competition as a mirage (sub-sub-theme)
	Preconceived fears and illusions
	National identity
	Xenophobic rhetoric from government representatives
	Criminal disposition among foreign nationals
	Weakening the bargaining power of local workers
	Afrophobia

	Economic laxity
2. Manifestations of Xenophobia	Violent behaviour
	Prejudice and discriminatory behaviour
	hatred
	Labelling
	Impunity
3. Effectiveness of Agent of Social Control	Police training
	Weaker community-policing practices
4. Interventions	Bolstering the socioeconomic needs of the people
	Restructuring of immigration laws
5. Integration	Hostile community reception
	Language barrier

6.5.1. Factors underpinning xenophobia

6.5.1.1. Negative attitudes

Factors that underpin and drive the scourge of xenophobia and its attendant violent reaction to the presence of foreign citizens in post-apartheid South Africa are myriad. This study commonly found that negative attitudes towards foreign nationals was one of the prominent drivers of xenophobia. The above finding was supported by the following comments from the informants:

FN20: “Overall, it has been hospitable especially across the academic sector and community. But most of the general community felt threatened, or mostly are hostile to the fact that you are a foreigner. Sometimes people find it difficult to accept you due to beliefs and myths brought about due to propaganda through social media”.

SAN2: “They should go back to their countries. We don’t want to compete with them for opportunities. Until the government addresses our problems

as locals, we cannot allow foreigners to come and take our opportunities. This is our country, and they have no right to come here and behave like we are equals”.

FGDSAN 1: *“Also, there is another point that I would like to make in that when it comes to foreign nationals, they are basically not the same to us as South Africans. South Africans do not treat them in the same way. For instance, when it comes to Nigerians, you think about people selling drugs, involved in money-laundering, and so on. But, when it comes to Ghanaians, you think about people driving taxis, operating businesses. I am trying to say the way South Africans interact with foreign nationals is influenced by the country of origin.”*

FGDFN 4: *“I think some South Africans regard us as people who are involved in criminal activities like selling drugs and human trafficking. Some community members, who are also my neighbours, have accused me of corrupting their children by selling drugs to them. I do not know why such an accusation is directed at me”.*

FCGDSAN4: *Indigents” - posing both territorial and existential space ownership threat.*

KISAPS: *I do not have any problems with these brothers. Most of them live in our communities, and people have accepted them as part of South Africa. The only problem I have is that some of them are rumoured to be selling drugs to our people and children”.*

The preceding comments evidently point out that the negative attitudes that South African locals harbour towards foreign nationals drive the xenophobic sentiment in the contemporary post-apartheid society. These negative attitudes have the potential to trigger the flames of xenophobic violence in the post-apartheid context. Study findings revealed that xenophobia was driven by negative attitudes. This finds immense support in an article by Kang’ethe and Duma (2013) who

argued that many xenophobes were moved into xenophobic mode by harbouring negative attitudes that they did not attempt to validate their genuinity. It is unfortunate that most of these attitudes are fictitious and illusionary, and this may mean that the true provocation into xenophobia may not be arrested. The same thought correlates with one of the findings of an experimental study conducted by Hellwig and Sinno (2017) which investigated how different types of immigrants were associated with different threats. One of the study results indicated that Muslim immigrants were viewed xenophobically in Britain because they were associated with negative cultural attitudes of their perceived maltreatment of women, and undermining their women's rights.

The same findings are echoed in various contemporary media reporting. For example, Mogapi (2019) (in Maeko, 2019), the executive director at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, said that the deeply entrenched xenophobic sentiments South Africans hold towards fellow Africans reflected an almost internalised hatred of themselves, and this was a deeply psychological issue.

Indeed, there is a strong association between negative attitudes and xenophobia. I believe that xenophobia can be tackled if adequate goodwill is in place from different stakeholders to facilitate a paradigm shift in attitudes especially among young people who are caught up in the wheels of xenophobia. This is also to address attitudinal deficits that breeds normlessness. Further, this researcher recommends the use of anomic theory in attacking societal illusionary thinking and attitudes (Colombo et al., 2012). This is because one cannot divorce the attitudes of xenophobes from the state of normlessness engulfing societies today. It is unfortunate that some respectable voices wielding immense power in the society and, who are supposed to be working on the attitudes of people, are dragging their feet in discouraging the state of normlessness and bouts of xenophobia, but have turned to be agents of xenophobia themselves. For example, one late

prominent traditional leader was caught in both local and global media likening African migrants to ‘itching bedbugs’ who should be hanged out in the sun (in British Broadcasting Corporation News, 2015). Further, if these negative attitudes are not addressed, they will remain active catalysts of xenophobia. I am worried that if this is not addressed, these negative attitudes will discourage documented foreign nationals from contributing to foreign direct investment in post-apartheid South Africa.

6.5.1.2. Perceived competition

The study finding overwhelmingly indicated that perceived competition was an important driver of the xenophobia with emotion-laden sentiments across the participants. The above finding was supported by the following sentiments from the informants:

SAN18: The South Africans feel they are indigent and disenfranchised, and living in wretched spaces and in a squalid environments, while the foreign nationals are enjoying. This cannot happen in our country”.

SAN37: They are a threat to our security because in South Africa, unemployment is too high. They are adding competition in chasing few jobs that are available”.

SAN24 “They come for greener pastures and are well-educated, and due to the principle of ‘comparative advantage”, they are preferred in the job market”.

FGDSA2: Foreign nationals undermine the bargaining power of South African workers power of South African workers.

FGDSA4: Foreign national business owners sell at low prices and thereby threatening the closure of South African businesses”.

The above comments evidently reflect the perception that foreign nationals are ‘competing’ with local South African for jobs, houses, and so on. This finds support from a study conducted by

Kang'ethe and Duma (2013) which found that real or perceived competition over socioeconomic resources was one of the underpinnings of xenophobia. However, this is a phenomenon that is ubiquitous across all the corners of the globe. According to Wimmer (1997) and Fourchard and Segatti (2015), xenophobia could be triggered by perennial struggles over what are called 'collective goods of the nation'. In support of the 'competition thesis', Kwak and Wallace (2018) used competitive threat theory - a theoretical perspective which argues that deteriorating economic conditions intensify economic competition with immigrants for scarce resources such as jobs, wages, and welfare benefits, thus contributing to anti-immigrant attitudes or prejudice. It is believed that the causes of the 2008 xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals which occurred in post-apartheid South Africa were attributed to poverty and competition over scarce resources. This lends credence to the ideas advanced by Comaroff and Comaroff (2002) who present an accusation that foreign nationals usurp local peoples' scarce jobs and resources. Comaroff and Comaroff (2002) and Pineteh (2017) advance the idea the migrants had been openly harassed and demonized on South African public spaces, and were regarded as 'nightmare citizens' whose 'rootlessness' and presence threaten the rapidly diminishing prosperity of the indigenous population. Further, the immigrants had been accused of disrupting local relations production and reproduction by usurping scarce jobs and resources. In some countries, this has taken a stringent dimension. For instance, before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, West Germany had erected a wall to prevent East German migrants from entering that country in order to, besides security reasons, deny them accessing its socioeconomic resources. That amounted to xenophobia. In more recent times, during the leadership tenure of Donald Trump, the United States of America took a decision to erect a wall so as to barricade Mexican migrants from freely gaining access to that country and its resources. Though the government presented this phenomenon as a security intervention, I construed it to

harbour xenophobic intent. In post-apartheid South Africa, a debate about erecting walls in all its borders to prevent undocumented migrants from gaining access to the country has been advanced, although it has not come to fruition (Vernon and Zimmermann, 2021).

I was attracted to the comments by a former government minister (Dr. Arron Motsoaledi) who lamented the contribution of foreign nationals in overwhelming the country's health facilities. The former health minister said: "Our hospitals are full, we can't control them. When a woman is pregnant and about to deliver a baby, you can't turn her away from the hospital and say you are a foreign national... you can't. And when they deliver a premature baby, you have got to keep them in hospital. When more and more come, you can't say the hospital is full now go away... they have to be admitted, we have got no option – and when they get admitted in large numbers, they cause overcrowding, infection control starts failing" (in Mbhele, 2018). These comments indicate the government bias that may be a stumbling block towards fighting xenophobia.

Perhaps a more recent episode concerning competition regards the entanglement between local and international truck drivers employed by freight companies. The Human Rights Watch (2019) reported that more than two hundred people – most of them foreign truck drivers – have been killed in South Africa since March 2018. This report was based on research conducted by the Road Freight Association, which represented road freight service providers. The preceding report evidently points to the fact that this competition has been horrific, deadly, and utterly xenophobic. The arguments above appear to attract the theoretical attention of one of the prominent theorists of nationalism - Ernest Gellner (1995) (in Baumgartl and Favell, 1995) – who argued that aspects of nationalism, racism and other forms of hatred like xenophobia have deep roots in the prevailing general social conditions of our time. In concluding the discussion of this sub-theme, I wondered how the problem of xenophobia is being solved because the phenomenon has become a year- in

and year- out phenomenon, with each year presenting different episodes of xenophobia which are both horrific and calamitous.

6.5.1.2.1. Competition as mirage

One study finding related to this sub-theme of ‘perceived competition’ is that the idea that foreign nationals compete with South Africans is a mirage or a farce. Foreign national informants commented:

FGDFN3: “South Africans allow foreign nationals to operate businesses that they will not be allowed to operate in their own country”.

FGDFN5: We have been favourably competing with local business people and this ignited their jealousy resulting in our shops being burned and vandalised”.

One political party key informant added:

KIPP1: “Yes, competition was there. But the way the competition is handled causes discontent among the locals with the government not forthcoming in defining the rights of foreign nationals ...”

The issue of competition - whether real or perceived - is an important driver of xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa. There are grey areas that the government needs to explain in terms of communicating the business borders between South Africans and foreign nationals’ vis-à-vis the rights and responsibilities of locals and foreign nationals.

6.5.1.3. Preconceived fears and illusions

Study finding from across stakeholders indicated preconceived fears and threat over the operations and behaviour of foreign nationals as a trigger of xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid

South Africa. The way foreign nationals handled things are awe-evoking, intriguing, and inexplicit in the face of South Africans. The following verbatims attest to these preconceived fears and threat:

SAN26: “We are in a panic mood that one day these foreigners are going to outnumber us and run our country”.

FGDSA1 “These people come in droves, and one day we will have a South Africa full of foreigners”.

FGDSA3: “If a war was to break out, South Africans may be defeated by foreign nationals. We need to be overly careful”.

FGDSA5: “We fear the rate at which foreign nationals acquire citizenship. If the trend continues, one day they will determine the country’s leadership”.

SAN25: Although these people are also Africans, I think that some of them are believed to eat other people”.

Undeniably, perceived fear and threat embedded within South Africans over the operations and behaviour of foreign nationals is likely to trigger episodes of xenophobia. Indeed, preconceived fears, anxieties, and illusions about people one does not understand well has been a framework for South Africans to launch xenophobic attacks. Further, the tendency to harbour preconceived fears is a ubiquitous phenomenon cutting continents and countries, South Africa notwithstanding (Momodou and Paascoët, 2016). When people do not understand the cultures, lifestyles, thinking, and attitudes of others, they tend to face them with fear, anxiety, and illusions (Colombo et al., 2012). Immigrants become phobogenic objects and, therefore, attracting labelling, stigmatization hatred, estrangement and victimization (Momodou and Paascoët, 2016) from South Africans. This is a platform of mistrust which can easily spark hatred, suspicion, and attacks of foreign nationals – this is a recipe for xenophobia. Fear is a great driver of illusions.

In the United States of America, there has been this perennial fear that Mexican migrants and other immigrant minorities bring disease, crime, and other mischievous acts not tolerable by the law (Pope, 2020). For example, the erstwhile Republican Party senator of the United States of America, Patrick Buchanan (2007), accused immigrants of increasing crime rate, negatively affecting environmental quality, and of importing disease. He said that these were biological traits and cultural behaviors that threatened to destroy the racial purity of American society. Another spate of fear in United States of America concerns the case of Muslims. After the September 2001 attacks, people of Muslim origin were regarded as smugglers, terrorists, murderers, and enemies (Pope, 2020). Perhaps a more elaborate impact of fear is presented by Feischmidt (2020) who stated that a central element of the politics of fear is the designation of individuals or groups of individuals as the enemy through the process of enmification. In the course of such process of enmification, immigrants are dispossessed of their human dignity. There are two modes of degradation – racisms and dehumanization. In the dehumanization mode of degradation, an immigrant is identified as the enemy belonging to the world of animals and, more specifically, to dangerous ones.

Perceptions that a group of migrants are impure has been a historical trigger of xenophobia. The case of the Roma people in Europe exemplifies this. The Roma people in Europe have often been ‘othered’ as aliens who are impure, deviant, and dangerous. Consequently, the Roma people have suffered societal exclusion, condemnation, and political oppression (Tudor (2018). Writing about purity and impurity, Douglas (2002) argued that dirt was essentially a harmful disorder, and it offended against order. Eliminating dirt was not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organize the environment. Dirt ‘is a matter out of place’ (Douglas, 2002) – something that deviates from the normal. To buttress the notion of dirt and impurity advanced by Mary Douglas,

Duschinsky, (2013) invoked the notion of ‘Abjectivity’ which refers to something to be scared of – something that is impure, ineffable, disgusting, horrifying, illicitly desirable, outside of logic, rejected by classification. Therefore, impure and abject people ought to be rejected, jettisoned, and eradicated. Further, this perception on impurity has the effect of the migrants being perceived as deviant worthy of being corrected by the instruments of law (agents of social control). Perhaps this validates the utilisation of the social control theory of deviance which argues, amongst other things, that race, class, and gender are inextricably bound up with the definition and control of deviance (Heitzeg, 2015). Without belabouring this point, the issue here is that the ‘Other’ must be societally controlled, sanctioned, and dominated.

In the South African context, anecdotal information presents the following behaviours among the foreign nationals that are believed to bring fears and hatred. They spread incurable diseases; they are impure, and therefore pollute the environment; they are engaged in drug and human trafficking to spoil our children; and they cannibalize. Further, the fear among the South African long-distance truck drivers that they are going to lose jobs to the foreign nationals has, in the recent past, hit headlines. This has resulted in the local truck drivers engaging with the South African Police Service as they surge to attack foreign nationals employed by companies operating in the Road Freight and Logistics Industry (Human Rights Watch, 2019). To this end, Nemakonde (2020) reported in the Citizen newspaper that the South African Police Service investigated a case of a horrific murder, attempted murder and malicious damage to property after a man (a foreign national) was shot and killed, another one injured, and a truck set alight in Leondale, East of Johannesburg. This epitomises the actions which South Africans can undertake owing to their preconceived fears that foreign nationals are taking their jobs and livelihoods.

Inopportunately, authoritative sources from government have elevated the preconceived fears among the South Africans that some dangerous crimes that the country is facing are attributable to foreign nationals. This saw the former minister of police pointing fingers to the Zimbabweans as culprits. He also expressed that Zimbabweans immigrants were coming in droves and therefore overwhelming the country's resources and space. He raised concern that some of the immigrants run away from military and they come and promote criminality in South Africa. He pointed out that the country was in danger as the Zimbabwean ex-soldiers were likely to be robbing banks and promoting criminality. He also stated that upon such Zimbabweans committing felonies of any kind, it was not possible to trace them. This is because they enter into South Africa illegally (Mbalula, in Tandwa, 2017). Though at anecdotal phase, the fear advanced by some South Africans is that foreign nationals will soon outnumber the South Africans, out-vote them, and therefore take the reins of the country's government. Though this sounds irrational and fictitious, it is too tempting for ordinary South Africans to want to rise up against the foreign nationals. The above arguments find theoretical substantiation in labelling theory of deviance that suggests that when one has been assigned a label of being a criminal, the label sticks and it attracts hatred and xenophobia (Oni and Okunade, 2018).

6.5.1.4. National identity

Study findings indicated that national identity was a critical factor influencing xenophobic attitudes towards foreign nationals. The following comments evidence this:

SAN2: "They should go back to their own countries. We do not want to compete with them for opportunities. Until the government addresses our problems as locals, we cannot allow foreigners to come and take our opportunities. This is our country, and they have no right to come here and behave like we are equals".

SAN23: “These people must go back to their countries – especially the Nigerians and Zimbabweans.

SAN38: Foreign migrants should stay in their countries of origin. South Africans do no go to flood other countries”.

FCGDSA1: “This country should not just allow every Zimbabwean to come here...”

KIPP2: “South Africa should not allow Somalians to open a business.

Another sub-finding emerging from this main finding is that there were some pockets of South Africans who were diametrically opposed to the views of those who expressed a strong sense of national identity. The comment below attest to this fact:

SAN5: “Immigrants are immigrants no matter the continent they come from. It is a poor mind-set that looks higher on some people than others. The immigration problem must not be South-Africanised ...”

Glaringly, national identification has a stake in the level of xenophobia towards foreign nationals. However, apparently the xenophobic attitudes of South Africans appear to have Afrophobic (anti-African) undertones where they see black African immigrants as culprits who threaten their access to the ‘benefits of the nation’. Nationalism, and its related constructs like national identity and patriotism, are inseparable from xenophobia (Restrepo, 2019). It is an undeniable fact that aspects of nationalism such national identity, patriotism, jingoism, culture are inextricably linked to the expression of xenophobia, with those people not embracing these aspects of nationalism believed to exhibit a national deficit of being viewed as outcasts, assigned labels, and being prone to pogrom-like attacks (Kangethe & Duma 2013). Cases of national identity deficits were demonstrated in Eastern Europe when xenophobia became fatalistic. Further, the correlation between xenophobia and nationalism was demonstrated by fatalistic attacks between the Serbians

and Yugoslavian (between 1992-1995) that attracted the global condemnation in the late twentieth century (Kang'ethe and Duma, 2013). More than twenty thousand people died during these attacks (Subotic, 2019). Another case of how national identity contributes to xenophobia concerns the attempt to exterminate the German Jews (Kogan, 2017). The Germans, in their gusto to exterminate Jews because they were deemed to be impure, turned genocidal that killed an estimated six million Jews. In continental Africa, the dangerous mix of xenophobia and national identity has sometimes taken the form of ethnic cleansing and genocidal actions. In the Rwandan context, for example, the xenophobia-driven genocide was triggered by heightened ethnic/national identity conflicts (Ndushabandi and Schmidt, 2021). Xenophobia was interwoven with genocide against the Tutsi amid rape and slaughter (Lischer, 2019). Elaborating on the ferocity and barbarity of the genocide, Thompson (2018) reported that the Hutu extremist leaders allowed Hutu militia to use machetes, studded clubs or garden hose to kill friends, neighbours, colleagues, and even family members. These were the most heinous and horrendous deeds that could result from xenophobia induced by national and ethnic identity conflicts.

In post-apartheid South African context, issues of national identity triggering xenophobia have been illuminating. Voices targeting Somalian and wishing them to go back to their own country have been growing louder. They are accused of being war-mongers who have left their country in an ungovernable state only to come here as tricksters exhibiting unhealthy business practices. Joubert (2008) (in Mail & Gurdian, 2008) reported on one shrill and dangerous call that was made in the Western Cape Province against members of Somali community. The call was spearheaded by Nafcoc's Western Cape Secretary, Mandise Njoli, who lamented that members of the Somali after engaging in fighting civil wars in their own countries then come to South Africa to destabilize the livelihood of the local South Africans. He indicated that it was of paramount importance for

South Africans to devise strategies to purge them out of South Africa. He also suggested that members of the Somali community deserved to be in refugee camps and not to freely mingle with the ordinary South Africans. This is because local South Africans feared doing business with them because of their disguised identity. Mandise Njoli also reminded that the South African democracy that the South Africans paid so dearly was of no use to the ordinary South Africans. There was also a worrisome affair that members of the Somali community come into the country with nothing and the next minute they have stocked shops and fridges.

Further episodes on national identity driving xenophobia is demonstrated by authoritative sources associating heavy crimes with Zimbabwean nationals. For instance, a former Limpopo provincial chief police officer, briefing a parliamentary portfolio committee of safety and security, stated that foreign nationals were ‘flooding South African towns and cities and causing a great number of problems with crime. They need to be arrested so as to protect the resources that are intended for South African citizens (IRIN, 2010). These comments indicate that identification with the nation drives xenophobic attitudes even among government representatives. The above arguments seem to agree with the theoretical insights that emerged from the work of some scholars investigating the interface between national identity and xenophobia (Hjerm, 1998; Hjerm, 2001; McAllister, 2018).

6.5.1.5. Xenophobic rhetoric from government representatives (incendiary rhetoric)

Study findings established a diametrically opposed findings with a majority supporting them whilst a few did not. For those who supported, the following verbatims attest to this:

FGDSA1: “I think the comments attributed to King Goodwill Zwelithini, and widely reported in print and online media, that foreign nationals must go back to their countries of origin were correct. I fully support that. If we

want to reduce s of criminality in South Africa, then these people must be sent back to their own countries”.

SAN37: “I think king Goodwill Zwelithini spoke for us as South Africans. Foreign nationals are a threat to our country”.

KIPP2: “I cannot remember this comrade or politician who said that some immigrants not documented, and if they commit a crime, how will we get their fingerprints..... Although this comrade was misunderstood by many people, I think he was talking sense”.

FGDSA4: “Some of our government ministers understand our problem”.

On the contrary, those who oppose that, most of whom are foreign nationals, had this to say:

FN21: “These rhetorics are toxic. South Africans need to realise much they need their foreign brother and sister”.

FGDFN2: We do not know where this bitterness came from among South Africans. The African countries overwhelmingly supported the ANC’s struggle for liberation”.

FGDFN4: “These rhetorics advanced by politicians who are desperate to politically hood wink their electorate that South Africa cannot live without their African brothers and sisters”.

In the same vein, South African nationals said:

FN: “People like King Zwelithini have their own agenda. It is a pity that people like King Zwelithini should be an ambassador for peace between us and our fellow Africans”.

FN: These rhetorics are made in bad faith. How many South Africans live in other African countries?”

Unequivocally, incendiary political rhetoric has the potential to spark the eruption of xenophobia, and fan the flames of associated violence. Observably, political rhetoric as a driver of xenophobia is not only a preserve of South Africa, but is a ubiquitous phenomenon, cutting across regions, and continents. For example, in Western Europe, politicians and government ministers have used inflammatory political rhetoric as a wedge of xenophobia by portraying large flows of immigrants entering Europe as a threat to national security. Further, in many European countries, one of the major issues that perennially features in the manifestos of political parties contesting national elections has been, and continues to be, that of reducing immigration levels – something that has also been accompanied by a strong xenophobic sentiment. In the South African context, inflammatory political rhetoric that triggers xenophobia has also been promoted by government and political party representatives. The politicians are propagating this political rhetoric under the guise of protecting national security and interests. This researcher believes that these political representatives promote political rhetoric more so during electioneering to hunt for votes (Anderson-Nathe and Gharabaghi, 2017). This political rhetoric could be reckless, toxic and dangerous. I believe that government representatives and politicians are using this inflammatory political rhetoric to hoodwink the citizens' after having failed to provide them with the promissory benefits of freedom and independence. By so doing, this enables political leaders to quell the restive local members whom they have promised unfettered or unbridled access to the 'collective goods of the nation'. The latter viewpoint is echoed in the thesis advanced by Comaroff (2010) that in the post-colony, many political leaders have dismally failed in provisioning the domestic population with the promissory benefits of 'freedom and independence' (jobs, houses, free education, and so on).

In contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, instances of politicians and government representatives utilizing incendiary political rhetoric to inflame xenophobia are not uncommon. For instance, the secretary-general of the ruling political party (African National Congress) was reported to have stated that the issue of undocumented foreigners was raised by the general society in South Africa. That is why the ANC wants to focus on it and deal with it once and for all... If they are undocumented when crime happens, you can't even get these people. You can't get their fingerprints. [This is about] the safety of the country. It is not being opportunistic. We are listening to the cries of our people" (in Modjadji, 2019). Further, the former Mayor of Johannesburg was reported to have said that any foreign national who is in the city illegally must be prepared to face the law, and the government was not going to tolerate criminality (Haffejee, 2016). Another example of xenophobic political rhetoric concerns the statements which were attributed to one late prominent traditional leader who likened foreign nationals to 'head lice and ticks which South Africans were supposed to remove and place in the sun' (Govender, 2015). Such reckless statements from government representatives may fuel the actions of xenophobes and make them to interpret these statements as a license to take the law into their own hands on matters related to xenophobia. The arguments above are confirmed by labelling theory of deviance which postulates that the act of labelling, which is often accompanied by stigmatization, is performed by some powerful groups in society (Krohn and Lopes 2015). The above arguments are also confirmed by social construction theory. Ideally, proponents of constructivism argue that the process of socially constructing a group of people involves 'othering', and utilizing metaphorical language (Grove and Zwi, 2006). Immigrant groups are often constructed as a 'threat to our sovereignty', and to 'our national security'. Evidently, government representatives play a crucial role in the process of 'othering' immigrant groups.

6.5.1.6. Criminal disposition among foreign nationals

Findings from South African nationals (SAN); focus group discussion involving South African nationals (FGDSAN), and key informant (KISAPS) – with the exceptions of foreign nationals who did not contribute answers to this theme, indicate that foreign nationals are involved in criminal disposition that inflames South Africans against them. This is attested by the following:

SAN18: “These Nigerians cannot leave their country, and come and sell drugs to our children. We must deal with them harshly”.

SAN26: “We hate Nigerian criminals because when they are caught they bribe the police, and nothing happens to them. We must do justice and deal with them”.

SAN35: “These foreign nationals use our girls to get papers like permanent residence. We must get rid of them”.

FGDSA3: “Our government knows exactly that it is people from Mozambique who come here to hijack cars. Why is it so difficult for our government to put an end to this?”

Unquestionably, the belief that foreign nationals are involved in criminal disposition amid failure of the justice system, is believed to inflame the South Africans to be against foreign nationals. Although labelling foreign nationals as criminals is a global practice, South Africa has not been left behind (Oni and Okunade, 2018). Some isolated sources in the United States of America had accused immigrants of increasing the crime rate, negatively affecting environmental quality, and of importing disease. Patrick Buchanan said that these were biological traits and cultural behaviors that threatened to destroy the racial purity of American society (Buchanan, 2007). Further, the former USA president of the United States of America, Donald Trump) has been caught by the global, continental, and national media as labelling Mexican migrants as criminals. According to

Verea (2018), former President Donald Trump, had characterized Mexican migrants as criminals, drug smugglers, rapists, and ‘bad hombres’.

Sources from the post-apartheid South African government seem to link migrants with criminality. The South African Human Rights Commission (2017) reported that the former Deputy Police Minister had been cited by the media accusing foreign nationals of engaging in various forms of crime like hijacking of buildings and illegal trade. Whether the Deputy-minister’s views were based on official crime statistics or not is a moot point. The fact is that the comments clearly associated foreign nationals with crime. This criminal disposition may trigger acts of xenophobia by South Africans making them jealous, wanting to take revenge, and so on.

Opportunely, the above arguments fulfil some of the underpinnings of labelling theory, one of the theoretical frames utilized in this investigation. One very crucial consequence of labelling is that it results in differentiation, categorization, stigmatization, and vilification (Link and Phelan, 2014). Labelling and demonizing of foreign citizens in post-Apartheid South Africa consequently lead to their humanity being violated with disastrous and violent consequences – a situation that is likely to be aggravated by their liminal status.

6.5.1.7. Weakening bargaining power of local workers

With a lone voice of a foreign national, locals engaged in interviews, focus groups discussion, and key informants overwhelmingly accuse foreign workers for undermining the bargaining power of local workers. The only lone voice of foreign national (FN15) uttered these comments:

FN15: “The locals accuse us of accepting low wages that they themselves cannot take. Our economic situation makes us to accept underpayment. This sets us in a conflict path with the local workers”.

SAN7: “These people are spoiling our working lives. They are even prepared to anything offered by the employer which we ourselves can accept. They are messing our bargaining power. Something has to be done about that”.

SAN23: “Some employers would rather employ foreign national because they are prepared to take peanuts. They take advantage of some gaps that exist in the labour laws domain”.

KIPP2: “We have a problem with our labour laws. It is high time that unions advocate for fair wages for everyone to stop underpayment.

FGDSA4: “Something has to be done with foreign national workers. They must be stopped from taking low wages that spoil our job market and concomitant bargaining power”.

Evidently, the position of foreign nationals accepting low wages and under-employment negatively affects the South Africans power to negotiate for modest and fair wages with the result that South Africans see foreign nationals as a threat to their economic survival and sustenance - a rich and palatable environment for xenophobia. What is a fair bargaining power. A fair bargaining power matches the wages with prevailing economic demands (Mishel 2012). This means that workers get wages that are sufficient to meet their socioeconomic demands and lowers the opportunity of exploitation of workers (Marino et al. 2015). A weaker bargaining power means that people are paid wages that do not meet their socioeconomic demands. According to Mishel (2012), the erosion of collective bargaining can be expected to generate a greater wage inequality. Historically, this drives frustrations such as economic marginalization, economic disenfranchisement and attracts frequent and intermittent labour strikes (Marino et al., 2015). In addition, the effect of migrants becoming a source of cheap labour exacerbates this problem and inadvertently foments xenophobic response from the workers – a fertile ground for xenophobic

proliferation. Evidently, any attempt to interfere with the bargaining power attracts rebellion and repulsion. Perhaps why migrants negatively impact the bargaining power is because in most countries of the world, migrants are considered a cheap source of labour (Farris, 2015). This has ramifications on the labour equilibrium in an immigrant country (Mishel, 2012). When the labour is excessive compared to job opportunities, employers take advantage by lowering the wages. This means that when a society experiences a labour glut, it negatively impacts upon the labour equilibrium with the effect of tinkering the wage balance downwards (Duggan, 2013). This agrees with some underpinnings of orthodox Marxist thinking on the role played by the ‘reserve army of labour’ in pushing down the wages of employed workers. Farris (2015:3) argues that migrants occupy a special place in this ‘reserve army of labour’, and “Since the nineteenth century, migrants have continued to constitute the lion’s share of supply of the industrial reserve army, a situation enabling employers in the host countries to maintain wage discipline and to inhibit working-class solidarity...”. When we obtain this situation, employed local workers become disgruntled and enraged. Disgruntled and experienced local workers, used to a decent standard of living, now find themselves having to compete with younger immigrants in the stagnant pool of labour. The legitimate anger of local workers at the way that capitalists have thrown them out of decent jobs, becomes misdirected into dangerous rage against immigrant workers (Duggan, 2013).

In the global context, Milkman (2019) reports that in the state of Pennsylvania, trade unions organizing in the construction industry, which was dominated by American-born white males, were vehemently opposed to those construction firms which hired undocumented workers. In fact, they routinely reported such undocumented workers to immigration officials. Milkman (2019) says that these trade unions did this because they (like many ordinary Americans) were convinced that the presence of migrant workers in the labour market, and especially the undocumented ones,

lowered wages and took jobs away from the Americans (Milkman, 2019). In contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, employers have utilized labour brokers to source for cheap labour of migrant workers (casual workers) from neighbouring countries. By so doing, employers have striven to make their companies profitable at the expense of pushing workers' wages downwards (Hamann and Bertels, 2018). These arguments are in alignment with some of the phenomenon of de-industrialization raised by the theorists of globalization. Evidently, globalization is associated with the evolution of the capitalist system characterized by economic practices that transcend national territories (Inglis and Thorpe, 2012; Ratha et al., 2015). Further, the phenomenon of de-industrialization is strongly correlated with the declining rates of unionization – something which contributes to shrinking and stagnating wages of those who still have jobs in developing countries. Indeed, the phenomenon of migrants taking lower wages due to their economic vulnerabilities negatively affect South Africans bargaining power with the effect that they are disenfranchised, and discontented to the extent of responding xenophobically to migrant workers.

6.5.1.8. *Afrophobia*

All stakeholders, in one accord, agreed that contemporary xenophobia in South Africa took the form of Afrophobia (black-on-black hatred). The following sentiments testify to this:

SAN17: “We have a problem with Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, Nigerians, and Somalians. These people are a menace to our livelihood.....

SAN31: “These black Africans must go to their own countries. We do not go to their countries”.

FGDSAN3: These Africans from neighbouring countries are coming here in droves”.

KIHA: “We do not have problems with people coming from Germany, Britain, United States of America, and Europe. The problem is our African brothers”.

From the above, it is poignantly clear that the post-apartheid state of xenophobia has taken the route of afrophobia. Conceptually, afrophobia is a form of xenophobia advanced by South African blacks towards black African immigrants (Matsinhe, 2011). The phenomenon of afrophobia is a legacy bequeathed to black South Africans by the abhorrent apartheid system. Whether by design or default, the apartheid system has had the effect of infectiously transmitting the phenomenon of hatred on black South Africans (Nyamnjoh, 2006). The latter end up consciously or unconsciously embracing hatred towards black African migrants (Matsinhe, 2011). This is paradoxically surprising because of the assistance that liberation movements received from African countries before the dawn of democracy (Mbeki, 2001). Afrophobia presented a human rights abuse and injustice against humanity.

Perhaps, a serious ramification of afrophobia is that it is associated with alienhood, deviance, and invasion (Ochonu, 2020). This implicitly means that black African immigrants are construed by Afrophobes as aliens- unwanted people believed to be coming from another planet (Ochonu, 2020). Further, afrophobia is associated with the notion of sub-humanity. Perhaps, another fascinating paradox is the fact that black South Africans appear to preserve some respect for white South Africans in tandem with other non-black migrants from all over the world (Matsinhe, 2011). From the global lenses, Afrophobia can be compared to inter-minority xenophobia – migrant-to-migrant form of hatred which could be driven by multifarious factors such as insecurity, competition for superiority, dominance, and so on (McClain and Stewart, 2014). Literature abounds about instances of inter-minority racism and xenophobia between African-Americans and Asian-Americans in the United States of America (Oliver, 2010). Glaringly, the contemporary

post-apartheid South Africa manifests many episodes of afrophobia. There is evidence that black South Africans display some hatred towards their compatriots from other African countries. A leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) was reported in the media to have insinuated that all foreign nationals who are within the country and do not ought to be ‘assisted’ by the government return to their original countries (Chigumadzi, 2019).

Another former minister of Home Affairs in post-apartheid South Africa was reported to have stated that poor and unskilled immigrants (many of whom come from the African continent) should be prevented, by any means, from settling in South Africa- even if this is labelled anti-African behaviour (Dadoo, 2019). More recently, afrophobia reared its ugly head in a school in Cape Town where a grade-10 student at a public school in Cape Town (who came to South Africa in 2009 with her family from the Democratic Republic of Congo) was severely beaten by fellow students who thought she did not deserve to be elected as a class monitor (Human Rights Watch, 2020). This glaringly revealed to the world the depth and breadth of afrophobia. It also revealed that afrophobia had a cascading effect moving from parents to children. I could explain all these disturbing episodes of afrophobia by borrowing insights from theories of racism and afrophobia. Afrophobia (black-on-black hatred) is a form of racism – cultural racism - which “...is primarily justified in a language of culture and ethnicity (assumed religious, linguistic and identity incompatibilities) rather than based on the justifications of assumed biological inferiority common to previous racisms like colonial racism ...” (Siebers and Dennissen, 2015:471). The essence of this form of racism is that black South Africans are culturally (not racially) different and superior relative to other black African immigrants. I am worried that the bloodshed through afrophobia is a lot. This means that if it is not checked, it will continue to rear its ugly head. This will jeopardise peace and

tranquillity in Africa. Indeed, afrophobia is perfidious, and imposes a serious developmental lacuna.

6.5.1.9.Economic laxity

Pointedly, a few pockets of foreign nationals, in tandem with few locals, were of the opinion that economic laxity, displayed by South Africans, created a rich environment for xenophobia. To the contrary, a bulk of South Africans could not buy that perception. This is because of the perception that locals, upon failing to achieve what foreign nationals have achieved, they developed a spate of jealousy and hatred - this is a rich environment for xenophobia. However, there were those who were diametrically opposed this view as indicated below:

FN30: “The problem is that South Africans want ‘free’ things from the government, and they do not want to toil”.

FN44: “South Africans do not appear to appreciate the value of the investment made by foreign nationals, they take for granted this investment. South Africans do not realise that through these investments, we contribute to the livelihood of South Africans. This is why they can easily vandalise our shops”.

SA17: These people pretend as if they are good business people, we just do not think that these people are hard working. They could be agents of other forces detrimental to this country”.

SA25: It is not just these foreigners are hard-workers. They are tricksters. They are mercenaries. Do you have any empirical evidence to prove that foreign nationals are more hard working than South Africans...”

Pointedly, a few pockets of foreign nationals, in tandem with few locals, were of the opinion that economic laxity displayed by South Africans, created a rich environment for xenophobia. To the contrary, a bulk of South African could not buy that perception. This is because of the perception that locals, upon failing to achieve what foreign nationals have achieved, developed a spate of jealousy and hatred (Mpofu and Barnabas, 2016). This is a rich environment for xenophobia. Indeed, economic laxity runs counter to the laws of productivity in which the input in terms of labour also determines productivity (Syverson, 2011). This implies that in an ideal world, a bona fide hard-working person attracts higher wages than slack or lowly productive workers (Sheng et al., 2019). Sadly, many South African workers earn low wages because of inadequate training (Feder and Yu, 2020). The knowledge that immigrants are earning higher wages than them has sparked jealousy and anger (Mpofu & Barnabas, 2016) – this is a fertile ground for xenophobia. Observably also, in many countries of the world, migrants tend to put more hours in the labour market (Friberg, 2012). When asked to describe her mental state during the most challenging times of her integration in the American workplace, one Kenyan woman stated that as an immigrant, she: “...encountered a lot of hatred, we have to persist and work extra hard than a normal person because first you have your accent, then you have your colour and everything that I own I had to really fight for it” (Kabiuku, 2017:103). These comments clearly reflect perceptions that immigrant workers work hard relative to the native-born workers (Friberg, 2012). The converse may not be true. Perhaps, the fact that they are not with their families and have few friends allows them to have more time than the locals. Evidently, immigrant workers also feel insecure and compensate by working harder. Further, the economic realities that pushed them out of their countries motivates and pressurises them to over-perform (Hammond, 2010). This is especially true for those immigrants originating from poverty-stricken countries (Hammond, 2010). Further,

the pressure to remit money to their families back home, cultivates a hard-working virtue in them (Castañeda, 2013). The locals also feel threatened especially when they realise that these people are remitting money to their countries. This offers an opportunity for a xenophobic wedge between the two groups.

In many countries of the world, immigrants are usually engaged in two sets of jobs. In fact, there is abundant empirical literature documenting the participation of immigrant workers in multiple jobs. Elaborating on multiple jobholding, Pouliakas (2017) contended that multiple job-holding can facilitate transitions between occupations or be an effective incubator of entrepreneurial activities, increasing an individual's chances of changing careers. From the preceding, the important issue to note here is that immigrants may hold multiple jobs not because of monetary reasons, but for reasons related to job satisfaction, and acquirement of new job skills.

I contend that many years of economic marginalization in the face of apartheid was a result of creation of a pool of labourers who find it difficult to control and manage factors of production compared to migrants who may be possessing modest skills. I have observed on the ground that most South Africans would rather seek employment rather than create jobs (Naong, 2011) – a negative virtue bequeathed to them by the apartheid regime. In the face of galloping unemployment in South Africa, most South Africans find themselves economically idle – moving up and down looking for employment. On the contrary, many immigrants tend to manufacture their own jobs, and that makes them ever-occupied. This contrast creates economic envy and enmity – a situation that triggers xenophobia.

Another crucial factor that may be contributing to economic laxity is the entrenchment of the culture of welfare grants (Gutura and Tanga, 2015). Although these grants are intended to cushion the impacts of poverty, they have manifested unintended ramifications. While many families are

able to meet basic amenities, this unintentionally creates a culture of relaxation and laxity to the effect that many are not motivated to work (Dawson and Fouksman, 2020). This has borne a culture of dependency syndrome (Kang'ethe, 2018). The adherents of the dependency syndrome always feel jealous to the hard-working migrants to the extent that they would wish to harm them. People who are not economically engaged are not ready to compete with hard-working ones, but are inopportune ready to engage in war with them, and hence an opportunity for xenophobia. Indeed, dependency syndrome is a negative factor of production. This finds relevance to the learning theories of deviance that argue that deviant behaviours are learned phenomena. People learn to be economically lax, deviant, and to display xenophobic disposition.

6.5.2. Manifestations of xenophobia

The following sub-themes underpin the manifestation of xenophobia: violent behaviour; prejudice and discriminatory behaviour; hatred; labelling, and impunity.

6.5.2.1. Violent behaviour

Various stakeholders (SAN and FGDSA) supported the use violence as a way of discouraging the presence of foreign nationals in South Africa, while the key informants in tandem with the foreign national informant were indifferent. The following verbatims are a testimony this:

SAN33: We are in a predicament and voiceless in the face of these foreign nationals yet the government is not helping out. We have to take the route of violence as an intervention to address this quagmire”.

SAN37: We have been made vulnerable by these undocumented immigrants and yet nobody comes to listen to us. That is why we take the law into our hands to purge them out”.

SA38: Talking to the government to rescue us in the face of these foreign nationals has not yielded any dividend. We have to resort to the use of force”.

FGDSA5: “I am ready to join my brothers and sisters who loot Spaza shops because these people sell us expired food items, and they overprice”.

FN10: “The locals are volatile and have a propensity to vandalise, and they are volatile. Upon slight provocation, they inadvertently resort to taking the law into their hands. They easily vandalise, loot, and can easily murder”.

KISAPS: “South African are using xenophobia as a platform to commit crime. As agents of social control, we treat them just like every other criminals”.

I would like to preface my general substantive discussion of the above comments by first noting that South African ‘locals’ have the propensity to be xenophobic and behave deviantly because they learn about this from others (from their ‘.... Brothers and sisters...’) – this is the central tenet of the socialization theory of deviance. Unequivocally, the bulk of the above verbatims confirm that South Africans manifest a propensity to violence that drives xenophobia. Psychologically, violence is a state in which the mind is incensed, and has lost psycho-emotional balance. This situation drives irrationality, and triggers a disposition of revenge, and hatred (Trevithick, 2012). Violence makes people to be amenable to anger, revenge and harm. Only when a violent person achieves his/her goal that his emotions subside. Violence causes harm when it is ventilated. A horrific episode of xenophobic violence was displayed in the German Holocaust that reared its ugly head in Germany. Svoboda (2016) reported about Jewish deportees who were incinerated and exterminated in the engine-exhaust gas chambers in Treblinka camp. Elaborating on the methods

of killing utilized by the executioners, Arad et al (1999) (in Russell, 2019) cite the remarks made by a Nazi chemist who reported that in order to get the execution finished as quickly as possible, the driver pressed down on the accelerator as far as it was possible. As a result, the persons to be executed died of suffocation and could not doze off as was planned. The chemist continued to narrate that if his execution plans were meticulously followed and the levers are adjusted, death would have happened faster and effectively. This would have prevented the sight of distorted faces and excretions that formed the sight of the dead people. These narratives depict the violent methods that were used by the Nazi executioners to annihilate Jewish victims. They also reflect the state of mind of a violent individual – a state of mind exhibiting delusional ideation, psychological dysregulation Novaco (2011), callousness, and complete disregard for the dignity of human life. In the Yugoslavia genocidal episode, the preferred methods of killing used by pogrom perpetrators were murder, rape, body mutilation, and forcible displacement. In continental Africa, the Rwandan genocidal episode demonstrated the most horrendous effects of xenophobic violence (directed at Tutsis). Puri (2020:5) stated that one of the participants in the Rwandan genocide said the following: “Everyone was hired at the same level for a single job – to crush all the cockroaches”. Puri (2020) argued that the machetes were used as a weapon of choice since the participants knew how to ‘weed’ their gardens. Moreover, the use of machetes required no special training since machetes are weapons of force not precision (Puri, 2020).

In the post-apartheid South Africa, episodic bouts of violent xenophobic behaviour directed at foreign nationals are frequent. One of the most graphic displays of violent behaviour towards foreign nationals was the “necklacing” of a Mozambican migrant during the 2008 xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa. It was a ‘ritual of dehumanization’ (Astashkevich, 2018), and a symbol of shame when “... a Mozambican man called Mugza was rounded up by locals in

the Ramaphosa informal settlement, near Johannesburg. They wrapped him in his only possessions, blankets, and set him alight. While he burned, the locals danced, laughed, cheered, and jeered. Burnt beyond recognition, he was transported to his Mozambican village for burial (Commeey, 2008, Steenkamp, 2014). The frenzied mob of xenophobes who participated in this orgy of violent behaviour typify the clear and present dangers of the element of violence in episodic bouts of xenophobia. All these episodes are horrendous and border on crimes against humanity. All these arguments satisfy the theoretical lenses of social constructivism and the labelling theory of deviance which contend that by constructing immigrants as the ‘other’, this makes them clear targets of xenophobic and violent abuse by members of the ‘mainstream’ communities. By being constructed as the ‘others’, immigrants are ‘set up’ as targets which local xenophobes can take violent potshots at. The fact is once an immigrant is labelled, stigmatized, and discriminated (Link and Phelan, 2014), it sets up the person as a target of ridicule, social scorn, and physical abuse. It makes an immigrant a ‘dangerous weed’ worthy of being eradicated from the ‘national’ botanical garden. These ‘weeding out’ efforts have often resulted in outbreaks of deadly xenophobic violence.

6.5.2.2. Prejudice and Discriminatory behaviour

Research participants established the phenomenon of prejudice and discrimination against foreign nationals in various life domains. The comments below testify to this:

FN21: “We foreign nationals do not favorably compete with South Africans in the job market. Despite our credentials, we do not get the job. It is given to a South African”.

FN32: “Foreign nationals suffer numerous prejudices”.

FN42: “I am student who has suffered academic discrimination. Despite being members of the larger student fraternity, foreign national students

find it hard to secure a bursary as we are told that these have been reserved for local students”.

FN49: “I was employed as a lecturer with a PhD only to realise that my colleague, with whom we were hired in the same position but with lower qualifications, still earned more than myself”.

Definitely, xenophobia blatantly manifests itself towards foreign nationals in various domains of their social lives. Prejudice and discrimination are historical phenomena. They manifest themselves in all spheres of life- social, cultural, religious, and so on (Fiske, 2017). Prejudice and discrimination are common facets in the world of migrants. They connote all forms of denial especially of resources, failure to be offered a job, failure to be offered any other social position based on colour, race, class, gender, and national origin, devaluation of one’s humanity, and human rights (Trevithick, 2012). Prejudice and discrimination form a palatable environment for xenophobia. Prejudicial attitudes, labels and discriminatory behaviour towards foreign nationals in many European countries are prevalent. Specifically, the more virulent forms of prejudice and discriminatory behaviour are directed at the Roma people. Falck (2020) is of the view that the living conditions of Roma migrants living in Scandinavian countries are frequently very poor as a result of limited sources of income, poor housing, low education, and illiteracy. Explaining prejudice and discrimination against the Roma people, O’Neill (2020) said that the Romani people have experienced so many instances of racism and prejudiced views, and the Anti-Gypsy rhetoric was now acceptable everyday racism. In short, there has been a sustained and enduring legacy of prejudice and discrimination suffered by the Roma population in Europe.

In the post-apartheid South Africa context, immigrants suffer prejudice and discrimination in different ways. For instance, children of African immigrants suffer from prejudice in various South African schools. When asked how South African students treat them, this is what one student said:

“Sometimes when the teacher takes roll call in the morning and calls out our names, we can hear some students whisper ‘makwerekwere’ and sometimes they snicker and make fun of our surnames” (Vandeyar and Vandeyar, 2017:72). Another student commented: “Before the exam we were in the hall and my friend and I were playing the piano in the hall, this South African guy comes in and he says ‘are there pianos in your country?’ I thought like, what do you think we are in our country?” (Vandeyar and Vandeyar, 2017:73). Commenting on the discrimination suffered by black African immigrants in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, Gordon (2020) stated that “During the current COVID-19 pandemic, we are seeing this pattern repeat itself with vulnerable migrants denied access to government relief programmes as well as essential health care. Rights to testing, contact tracing and medical treatment are essential for all residents of South Africa”. Indeed, there is mounting anecdotal evidence indicating that black African immigrants, in particular, were denied access to the various social security benefits offered by the government to cushion vulnerable groups against the negative socioeconomic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic (Dafuleya, 2020). Black African immigrants have also suffered discrimination when attempting to secure jobs in the host country. One black African immigrant stated: “It is difficult for us immigrants to get access to employment especially permanent jobs [because we are denied] South African identification document” (Moagi et al., 2018:3). In addition, often hiding behind the country’s employment statutes, qualifying and deserving foreign nationals are denied employment opportunities which are sometimes given to less qualifying South Africans. Incidents of foreign nationals being remunerated at a lower scale than their local compatriots have not been uncommon in many workplaces in South Africa. One foreign national worker stated: “I worked for a certain company [and] was paid less money and when I asked for an increase on my salary they tell me that foreigners do not qualify for a salary increase because they do not have proper

documents (Moagi et al., 2018: 4). This practice is likely to take a homophobic dimension with black African foreign nationals being the target. The above arguments align with some of the fundamental tenets of race and racism theoretical perspectives that argue, amongst other things, that sometimes both prejudice and discrimination become institutionalized – that is, they become embedded in a society's institutions (health services, police, schools, workplace, and so on). Institutional racism and discrimination will occur when social institutions pursue policies that favour certain groups while discriminating against other categories of people because of race, national, and ethnic origin (Giddens and Sutton, 2013). Discriminatory behavior directed at immigrants inevitably results in violent treatment of the latter group of people.

6.5.2.3. Hatred

Various stakeholders were in accord that hatred was a significant epitome of manifesting xenophobia. The following verbatims were expressed by South African participants from both interviews and focus groups:

SAN 12: “They pretend that they are our brothers from the other mother. But we detest. They only want to feed from our own plate. Very soon, we are going to make this come to an end, whether the government wants it or not”.

SAN29: We support the sentiment the sentiments attributed to our Zulu king when he said that: ‘They are like lice in a blanket, and need to be taken to the scorching sun to die’. We do not all sympathise with the Somalians when their spaza shops have been looted by members of our own community”.

FN33: South African do not see us as equal human beings. It does not matter how you want to please them. They continue to hold you at arm's length.

FN 40: Xenophobia is purely attitudinal and sits in the heart. South Africans do not see anything good coming from African brothers despite their enormous contribution to their economy”.

FGDSA4: These people came here on foot, but now they arrogantly drive around in vehicles. They should know they are enjoying our money. Time is coming for us to forcibly exit them to the borders”.

Undoubtedly, the above sentiments reflect deep-seated hatred from the hearts of South African. This presents an environment that could flare up unrelenting and inflicting episodic bouts of xenophobia. From a social, cultural and religious facet, hatred is a vice and an abhorable phenomenon (Brogaard, 2020). It evokes dreadful pain and experiences to its victims, and therefore, causes psycho-emotional deficits or doldrums (Trevithick, 2012). In many religions of the world, it is a sin to be avoided, and that it is never approved by the deities and is a sin that mankind should detest (McArthur, 2013). Hate is inhuman, and has the potential to be injurious, and cause immense psycho-social damage to the victim. Hate cultivates seeds of discord, animosity, and enhance the spirit of taking vengeance (Brogaard, 2020). Glaringly, all these factors point to hatred as a strong agent underpinning xenophobia. Inopportunately, ubiquitous contexts indicate that hatred has evidently manifested itself in multifarious bouts of xenophobia (Kang’ethe and Duma, 2013). Globally, hatred has acted as a cause, a driver, and an outcome of xenophobia. In Germany, media news outlets have reported stories of horrifying hate crimes and violent murders committed by right-wing extremist neo-Nazi group with a group called the ‘skinheads’. The ‘skinheads’ demonstrating highest forms of hatred by intermittently terrorizing and attacking immigrant groups Varga, 2019). Burger (2018) reported that German police detained six men on Monday suspected of forming a far-right militant organization which assaulted foreigners in the eastern city of Chemnitz, and performed the illegal Hitler salute afterwards. In Moscow (Russia),

a Congolese migrant who escaped an attack by the ‘skinheads’ members of this extremist group have no mercy for Black immigrants (Brooke, 2013). It is episodes like the ones illuminated above that have engulfed migrants with pain, awe-striking them and making them ever swim in an ocean of fear and despondency.

In continental Africa, The Janjaweed militiamen are believed to have been clandestinely sponsored by the Sudanese Government to conduct ethnic cleansing experiments (Gladstone, 2015). Through their vicious, murderous, and atrocious actions towards black civilians in Sudan, the Janjaweed demonstrated hatred of genocidal proportions. They maimed, raped, engaged in all form of arson, and left everyone dead (Gladstone, 2015). Apparently, in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, hatred has accompanied all forms of xenophobic turmoil with xenophobes demonstrating hatred by labelling immigrants as cannibals, impure persons and aliens who cannot be trusted because of their disposition to commit crimes and atrocities of unfathomable proportions. All these epithets are meant to dehumanize, emotionally injure, devalue, and condescend – portraying foreign nationals as people bereft of mankind and dignity (Kang’ethe and Duma 2013). Perhaps a dreadful form of hatred was demonstrated by members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) who dragged a Mozambican migrant in a police car, and the latter died in a pool of blood in police custody. This was inhuman, embraced impunity, was degrading, and dehumanizing (Crush and Ramachandran, 2014). The SAPS members were participating in a ‘ritual of dehumanization’. All this boiled down to xenophobia– it underpinned the xenophobic animus. Another dreadful demonstration of hatred towards immigrants happened in Johannesburg when a Mozambican street vendor (Mr. Emmanuel Sithole) faced a xenophobic attack resulting in being stabbed to death (Bekker, 2015). Further, bouts of xenophobic hatred are expressed at very low levels in many South African contexts. Many foreign migrants face a lot of challenges when presenting for service

in various local quarters as the service providers always drag their feet (police stations, retail shops). This process becomes very painful for foreign nationals as they are forced to use a local language. This does not only compromise the quality of service delivery, but is also prejudicial, and an expression of hatred (Landau, 2007). Cases of some South Africans being mistaken to be foreign nationals have shed some harrowing experience when they have been callously mistreated in their own country (Maguire, 2012). From the lenses of psychology and clinical social work, these South Africans have acted as objects of transference receiving xenophobic hatred and mistreatment before the South Africans realize the mistake (Maguire, 2012). This does not just connote ignorance, but it also deeply shows the way in which foreign nationals are treated and handled. The above argument aligns with theoretical lenses gleaned from the globalization discourses that argue that globalization entails a process which involves the generation and circulation of cultural and racist practices, ideas, symbols, and shared language about race and other forms of hatred associated with it (Ariely, 2017a). The process of globalization has a fragmenting influence, increases awareness of national boundaries and national uniqueness, and thus reinforcing feelings of national or local identification, hatred and xenophobic attitudes (Ariely, 2017a).

6.5.2.4. Labelling

All the stakeholders owned the fact that foreign nationals are assigned epithets that took the form of stereotyping and stigmatisation. These verbatims attest to this finding:

FN2: “Usually, I have been called a ‘kwere-kwere’, and to be called by such a name affect you especially if it comes from children. This means that the children got this from their parents”.

FN8: “I am usually called a ‘kwere-kwere’. Labelling you a ‘kwere-kwere’ affects your confidence. It also makes you feel you do not belong”.

FN34: “I have been degraded by being labelled ‘gundwane’ (house rat) by some local traders...”

FGDSA1: “These people are half human beings – pseudo-people. We understand that they do not lead normal lives like ourselves. They may not have roads where they come from. They may not have houses. We understand that these people are poverty-stricken to the core. This why they scrambling here to take our resources”.

SAN: we consider these people to be impure, contaminated, and unfit to live with us”.

FGDSA: We understand that these people have bigger manhood – making our women to fall for them and leave us”.

FGDSA: These foreign nationals are criminals to the core. They can do anything for sustenance. They come here to hide from their malpractices from their countries”.

Inopportunately, South Africans manifest a characteristic of assigning labels to foreign nationals with the outcome of exposing them for possible attacks by xenophobes. Labelling is a societal construction process involving attitudes and illusions which may be positive or negative (Kang’ethe and Duma, 2013). In the context of xenophobia, the constructions are usually, negative, illusionary, dreadful, painful, and carry pangs of hatred (Kang’ethe and Duma, 2014). Majorly, those participating in this construction utilise a language that is incisive and intended to cause pain and hatred. In the process of labelling people, stereotypical thinking and ‘otherizing’ are the major outcomes. A stereotype is a distortion of reality, such that what is presented is not true and is intended to hide the reality (Trevithick, 2012). Stereotyping people is a mischievous and a sinister

innuendo as it falsifies and is illusionary. This is the terrain into which xenophobia operates (Trevithick, 2012). Xenophobia carries a lot of illusionary thinking. Once those labels are attached to a person, they stick, and he or she becomes unwanted and undesirable in society (Dick, 2011).

Another facet of labelling is stigmatization that informs victimization. Sosa (2019:197) has argued that "... labelling Mexicans and Central Americans as criminals has entered the mainstream. Latinx families continue to experience fear, discrimination, and oppressive conditions..." can result not only in victimization, but also into trauma. Labelling and stigmatization are forms of oppressing and discriminating Mexican-Americans and other immigrants from Central America. Strindberg et al., 2020: 946) add: "The one who is stigmatised is thus identified, labelled, stereotyped, isolated, denigrated, and discriminated against within a power relationship that provides the differential points of reference". The preceding viewpoints borrow heavily on Erving Goffman's thesis that stigmatized societal members had their humanity challenged by possession of a spoiled social identity (Eriksson, 2019). Further, stigma leads to victimization, incarceration, estrangement, alienation and isolation, differentiation, categorization, trauma, dehumanization, and vilification – all these underpin the xenophobic terrain (Sánchez, 2011). Labelling has a socioeconomic dimension as it drives and informs socioeconomic exclusion - being denied access to the material benefits that society offers (housing, jobs, and so on) (Winlow and Hall, 2013). This denial connotes and underpins xenophobia. For instance, foreign nationals, even those who have permanent residents in South Africa are denied these benefits (free government housing, jobs, and so on) (Masuku and Rama, 2020). Perhaps, a manifestation of labelling is when Americans used to refer to African slaves as 'nigger' – a contemptuous term for a black or dark-skinned person. This is a tag associated with devaluation, dehumanization, ignorance, and so on. These characterize the terrain of xenophobia (Sánchez, 2011). However, an unfortunate point of

departure is that African-Americans, in popular discourse and music, now use a derivative of this epithet (nigga) to refer to each other (King et al., 2018). In the European context, the ‘Roma people’ have been labelled as the “gypsies” –people who are depicted as thieves, thugs, dirty, undesirable, criminal, and so on. The implication is that these people now become targets of xenophobia as they are stigmatized as an “undesirable minority” (Giorgi and Vitale, 2017), and they need to be uprooted Simberloff (2012) because they were a threat to the very existence of native species.

In Rwanda, the Tutsis were labelled as “cockroaches” – a term that implies impurity, contamination, immunization, and therefore demanding eradication (Anderson, 2017). In the contemporary South African context, a frequently used epithet is ‘kwere-kwere’ – a term whose meaning refers to talking an alien language. The term is insinuating, and laden with prejudice. It is a term that is meant to annoy, and to disgust (Matsinhe 2017). This characterizes xenophobic terrain. Another epithet that the researcher came across in this study was referring to foreign nationals as ‘gundwane’ (house rat). A rat is a rodent that carries a disease. In epidemiological studies, a rat is associated with the bubonic plague that decimated the European population in the fourteenth century (Sayer, 2019). This dangerous label cast foreign nationals as dangerous disease-carriers who need to be exterminated. The above arguments fulfil a number of theoretical underpinnings expressed by the labelling theory of deviance that postulates, amongst other things, that labelling and stigmatization can result in discrimination and victimization (Sjöström, 2017). Labelling and stigmatization breed hatred, violence, impunity, and lawlessness.

6.5.2.5. Impunity

All stakeholders poignantly manifested impunity to the law with the result that they xenophobically attack, loot, and vandalise goods and property belonging to the foreign nationals.

The following verbatims attest to the finding above:

SAN25: “We do not care if government comes with guns. We have to do something to punish these foreigners for taking what belongs to us”.

SAN33 “Point the gun to me. Government intervention or no intervention, the journey to exterminate these foreign nationals must continue relentlessly”.

FN22: “We make sure that we are in the doors before dark to avoid the ever-burgeoning bouts of criminal attacks from South Africans. South Africans have no regard for the law”.

FN44: “South Africans manifest impunity. They loot, vandalise while the police are helplessly watching”.

Apparently, South Africans display the spirit of impunity – which is a recipe for unchecked and uncontrolled spates of xenophobia. Impunity emerges and sprouts when agents of social controls are weak or compromised (Misago, 2019). In an environment of impunity, people take the law into their hands – they disregard the law which is concomitant to wanton destruction of life and property, bullying, physical violence (Crush and Ramachandran, 2014). This is a recipe for xenophobia. In some European countries, racial epithets, physical violence directed at black African immigrants, and the Romani of Europe are becoming frequent and normalised. Racists and xenophobes are becoming much intrepid in expressing their racist and xenophobic venom. This trend has engendered a climate of racism and xenophobia where a culture of impunity has sprouted and become diffused, and infused into the fibre of society (Misago, 2019). In fact, many South African xenophobes have learned to be to think and act xenophobically, and this is what

drives their impugned behaviour towards immigrants. In contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, the denial of xenophobia discourses, sponsored by government representatives, have galvanized xenophobes to act with impunity (Crush and Ramachandran, 2014). Indeed, these discourses have also provided xenophobes with a powerful palliation when confronted with accusations of xenophobia. To illustrate an instance of impunity in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, this researcher cites the following comments made by a resident of Itireleng township (West of Tshwane): “‘If there are no other ways of resolving these problems even after several meetings, violence seems to be the only voice we have left’ (Misago, 2019: 65). Misago (2019) argued that if members of the community do not trust community leaders and the police, there is a likelihood that they will take the law into their own hands. Another disturbing instance of impunity relating to the treatment of foreign nationals concerns the actions of the members of the South Africa Police Services who demonstrate professional impunity (SAPS). Professional impunity was demonstrated in a 2019 xenophobic attack of Bangladeshi shops in Johannesburg by a mob estimated to be around 300-500 who looted vandalized, and callously attacked the Bangladeshi business owners. Disappointedly, police when called dragged their feet and only came after some days.

This was a typical case of SAPS members displaying professional impunity when they clearly show reluctance to stop a xenophobic advance. This is impunity of the first order. In the present study, South African ‘locals’ openly indicated that they will not fear getting involved in chasing immigrants out of the country. There is some anecdotal evidence that some SAPS members act with impunity when dealing with foreign nationals. Impunity undermines the rule of law, and is an obstacle to the development of a sustainable culture of human rights (Pinto, 2021). This culture of impunity could be explained by utilizing the theoretical insights gleaned from the social control

perspectives on deviance that hold the assumption that when mechanisms and agents of social control are weak, deviance, wanton criminality, and impunity are likely to prevail (Heitzeg, 2015).

6.5.3. Effectiveness of agents of social control

6.5.3.1. Police training

All the participant cohorts, in one accord, recommended training of agents of social control as a milestonic intervention. These are the verbatim excerpts of the participants:

SAN19: Yes. The SAPS is ill-equipped and under-trained to deal with xenophobia, and other crimes in general”.

SAN27: They try. It is difficult rising against your own people to protect a foreigner. How will they face the community members outside work”.

SAN 28: “Yes. The police never do enough in South Africa. They suffer skill deficit. I do not think there is much they can do. Maybe they should involve the military”.

KISAPS: “I wish the government can employ more police officers. It is difficult to fight crime if you have limited resources. The government should of course not allow every person just to come in”.

Deducing from the above comments, it is poignantly evident that a lack of training has disempowered the police making them vulnerable to of various criminal advances of various crimes, xenophobic criminal behaviour notwithstanding. The object of policing is the citizen. The implication of ineffectiveness of police training is that the shield protecting citizens will be removed, and the latter would now become vulnerable (Boehme et al., 2020). I opine that this ineffectiveness originates from the fact that the traditional police training has been military-oriented (Lamb, 2018), and apparently lacks a human rights orientation. Police display some gaps in dealing with human social interaction. Apparently, police are not oriented to human rights’

issues, and this makes it difficult for them to address the challenges confronting immigrants. Observably, it is not uncommon for police to allow locals to attack foreign nationals while they helplessly watch. This is a displayal of professional impunity. Amnesty International (2019) reported that Italian prison officers were investigated for aggravated torture and assault of a detainee (the detainee was a foreign migrant), and receive the unconditional support from the Minister of Interior despite their grave violations of human rights. The detainee was a foreign migrant. In Greece, there was reported incident of border control police who shot to death a Syrian migrant from neighbouring Turkey attempting to cross the border (Daily Sabah, 2020). Both incidents reflect not only bad policing practices and behaviours, but also a brazen disregard for the values that makes us human.

In contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, Goba (2021) reported that foreign street vendors were accusing the police of trying to hide a xenophobic attack on them by a group of Zulu-speaking people at the flea market in Durban. These episodes depict how ineffective and poorly-trained law enforcement agents are when it comes to dealing with xenophobia. Owing to this perceived ineffectiveness and poor training, many foreign nationals have come to view members of the SAPS as accomplices in xenophobic attacks directed at the former. The consequence of this effectiveness of police training is particularly felt more by the vulnerable groups in society such as foreign nationals who receive the blunt edge of xenophobia. This is very painful for migrants, some of who may have been violently pushed out of their countries, to come and face police animosity (Crush and Ramachandran, 2014).

Further, cases of police abetting xenophobia are rife in post-apartheid South Africa. There appears to be professional laxity and displayal of moral and ethical lapses in their day-to-day duties. This is possibly why police display incompetence when handling cases of xenophobia. Sadly, when the

layer of protection provided by law enforcement agents is weak, this leaves immigrants to the ‘wind and the cry of the jackal’. The above arguments seem to agree with the theoretical insights that emerged from the social control perspective of deviance that postulates that when formal agents of social control are weaker, this will encourage people to act deviantly and commit crime in society (Heitzeg, 2015). Realistically, formal agents of social control are a ‘vital cog’ in the process of social control, and specifically in the administration and enforcement of sanctions (Heitzeg, 2015).

6.5.3.2. Weaker community-policing practices

Study findings emerging from the empirical data collected from study participants revealed that there are weaker relations between communities and the South African Police services which negatively impact on community-policing practices. These findings found corroboration in the following sentiments:

KIPP1: “The intelligence department of the police should always detect some of these planned attacks because some of these activities are always hidden in service delivery protests or marches, and the foreign business owners become the scapegoats or victims of government failures and frustrations that our people experience on a daily basis”.

KIPP2: The policy of community policing is still in its nascent stages. This creates a weaker synergy between the communities to assist the police in fighting various criminal activity, xenophobia notwithstanding.

The above excerpts reflect weaker community-policing practices and interactions – a vital and necessary ingredient in combating the scourge of xenophobia. Weaker relations between communities and the South African Police Service will negatively impact on community-policing practices. Community policing is a partnership between the police and the community with a goal

of maintaining homeland security (Hill, 2017). Community policing is meant to strengthen ownership of security. It is meant to promote shared responsibility in maintaining security (Hill, 2017). Community policing is a vital tool in broadening the arm of the law enforcement to combat deviance and crime. In many immigrant-receiving countries, such as the United States of America, immigrants reside in immigrant communities that are located within urban human settlement spaces where locals also live. This has necessitated law enforcement agencies to engage both the foreign nationals and locals with a view to building better relations between them, and also to addressing community crimes (Police Executive Research Forum, 2017). Such police-community practices, in the United States of America, usually involve outreach programmes aimed at educating immigrants and local Americans about the role of the police in society – accentuating the role of the police not as ‘warriors’ against crime, but as a ‘guardians’ of all the members of the community – they are the agents of facilitating peace and tranquillity (Police Executive Research Forum, 2017). In addition, in order to minimize immigrants’ fears of the police, the latter should train foreign nationals on what to do if they come into contact with officers, starting with the idea that immigrants should not be afraid the police (Police Executive Research Forum, 2017.). In the contemporary post South African context, community-policing practices involving foreign nationals and locals have long been in place, but they have yet to yield some handsome dividends at all – especially in favour of foreign nationals. Perhaps why the South African Police Service (SAPS) is not successful in dealing with xenophobia is because they exhibit gaps in local intelligence – information about potential criminal activities in the community. Misago et al., 2009:14) said: “Many of the debates about working (or not working) with the police to ‘fight crime’ extend into debates on Community Policing Forums (CPFs Interestingly, the Alexandra attacks began shortly after residents threatened to take the law into their own hands at a police/CPF

meeting. At the time, police allegedly promised to deal with the ‘migrant problem’. The community clearly did not feel their commitment was sufficient ... That communities raise the perceived or real slack in state policing presents a danger because such initiatives are often unregulated and their definition of crime and its seriousness is highly subjective and impulsive ...” What is implied in the preceding commentary is the idea that if there is a lack of trust between the community and the police, and that people are inclined to take the law into their hands.

It is good to note that xenophobic events are not happening in a vacuum. They are usually premeditated. If there was a slight link between the SAPS and community networks, such xenophobic events could be nipped in the bud. Apparently, South African ‘locals’ also appear to embrace some spirit of impunity. They lack patriotism in this regard and instead embrace the spirit of impunity in safeguarding the safety of foreign nationals. If they were interested in the well-being of foreign nationals, they would come forward and assist the police in stemming the rising tide of xenophobia. I think that a perfect community-policing practice is like a marriage. It requires the total commitment from both parties. Social control theory of deviance points to the significance of utilizing both formal and informal mechanisms to control deviant behaviour in society (Rock and McIntosh, 2018).

6.5.4. Interventions

5.5.4.1. Bolstering the socioeconomic needs of the people

Study participants revealed that the South African government could intervene, in mitigating and eventually eradication the scourge of xenophobia, by bolstering the socioeconomic needs of the people. The following comments, excerpted from the empirical evidence from informants, support this contention:

SAN9: “Apparently, foreign nationals are swimming in wealth while we are living in abject poverty”.

SAN10: “The needs of the ‘locals ought to be met first before foreign nationals from Africa can be accepted here. The deterioration of our livelihoods is a real concern for all of us”.

SAN24: “Foreign nationals are straining our national cake. Our spirit to accommodate them is increasingly running out”.

FGDSA4: “These people are scrambling for dwindling economic resources which are meant for South African only. It is time they pack and go”.

Evidently, bolstering the socioeconomic needs of South Africans could help in extinguishing the flames that usually ignite xenophobic hatred and violence (Kang’ethe and Duma, 2013). Indeed, poverty contributes to xenophobia especially when South Africans illusionary think that foreign nationals are enjoying a modest state of socioeconomics compared to themselves. Poverty and its concomitant ramifications - such as apathy, anger and hunger, bitterness and denial - form a palatable environment of xenophobia (Kang’ethe and Duma 2013). Perhaps, what makes South Africans prone to xenophobia is the bitterness resulting from unfulfilled promises at the dawn of attaining their independence. They were promised a better life for all, education for all, which for many people turned to be a mirage. Today, a larger proportion of South Africans live below the United Nations breadline (Maritz et al., 2020). This is also evidenced by the fact that presently, many South Africans are still living in squalid environment (in shacks and ghettos) (Kang’ethe 2018). The promises of freedom glaringly remain a pipe dream. This scenario makes South Africans to explode at the slightest provocation, and hence becoming amenable to become agents of xenophobia. Perhaps the government needs to intervene to change the socioeconomic history of South Africa. This is because South Africans appear to be caught in the wheels of believing in

being employed at the expense of creating employment (Naong, 2011). This has created a situation where South Africans are caught up in the pool of economic laxity. This state has led to massive disenfranchisement, apathy, and dissatisfaction that makes South Africans liable or prone to xenophobia (Kang'ethe and Duma, 2013).

Further, the government needs to facilitate research to interrogate the dependency syndrome which robs people of the morale and motivation to work. When people are occupationally pre-occupied, the propensity to xenophobia is lessened (Kang'ethe, 2018). Inopportunately, the dependency syndrome impacts negatively on the country's Gross Domestic Production (Freud, 2007; Likki and Staerklé, 2015). I challenge the government and its proxies (Non-Governmental Organizations) to come up with newer innovative models, or borrow best practices from other countries such as those of Asia, that can re-engineer the employment situation in the country. The establishment and development of small, medium and micro enterprises could be a move in the right direction (SMMEs) (Kajiita and Kang'ethe, 2020).

5.5.4.2. Restructuring of immigration laws

Various stakeholders pinned their hopes on restructuring of immigration laws as an intervention. These are the comments of study participants:

*SAN5: Make the laws tighter, and monitor the foreigners who come in.
Monitor borders, and make them less porous”.*

*SAN33: “Make it difficult for foreign nationals to immigrate here. We have
too many of them. Also expel those who are here illegally”.*

*SAN38: “There is a need for tighter laws that govern the way in which
foreign nationals come in”.*

KIPPI: “The government is failing to deal fairly and competently with immigration itself. South Africa, rightfully, has a fairly friendly immigration policy. But our borders are poorly managed and thus porous. Also, refugees are not processed efficiently, resulting in little legal distinction between those who are here legitimately, and not. This breeds further resentment”.

The above sentiments reflect the need for the South African government to restructure immigration laws as an intervention to combat rising xenophobia. Indubitably, a well-organized immigration machinery is able to sieve and screen which immigrants to accept. The role of immigration system is to assess the value immigrants bring to the host country, and whether they have valid documentation. The current immigration laws and policies are influenced by the apartheid legislation which was based on restrictionism. At the dawn of independence, immigration laws were still influenced by the previous apartheid ideology and restrictionist immigration legislation (Crush and Williams, 2010). However, in 2014, the post-apartheid South African government introduced various revised Immigration Regulations, whose intention was, amongst other things, to encourage an integrationist approach to managing immigration, while simultaneously attempting to prevent the ‘undesirable’ (the legal word used to refer to those who are not wanted in the Republic), and those trying to “play” with the immigration system (Hildago, 2019). Some of these revised immigration regulations were clearly intended to exclude some categories of migrants – clear evidence of restrictive immigration regulation bequeathed by the previous apartheid governments (Crush and Williams, 2010). Inopportunately, the South African Immigration laws were still restrictive by favouring only migrants coming from the Western world at the expense of those coming from continental Africa (Peberdy, 2001; Kaplan and Höppli, 2017). Despite the changes in immigration legislation after independence, post-apartheid South Africa was still prejudicial in that it still prevented migrants whom the government labelled as

‘undesirable nationals’, from entering the country (Pineteh, 2017). Indeed, the current immigration laws are beset with a constellation of problems: weaker border controls, corruption in issuance of national documents, poor screening and sieving of migrants, and poor monitoring of migrants (Dithebe and Makhuba, 2018)). The poor implementation of immigration laws has made immigration out of control. It is imperative that South African immigration laws are anti-xenophobic, and xenophobes should be punished harshly for their heinous deeds. In addition, there should be strengthening and utilization of information technologies to monitor immigrants. Inopportunely, failure to strengthen controls to monitor immigrants makes them vulnerable and unprotected.

6.5.4. Integration

6.5.4.1. Hostile community reception

Various stakeholders established that foreign nationals face a hostile reception by South Africans. The following excerpts attest to this:

FN14: Upon my arrival, I faced a spate of humiliation, I was heckled. I was subjected to harassment despite having all the requisite documents”.

FN29: “Whoever South African I came across, the first thing that he or she wanted to know was my nationality. Which country did I come from?”.

FN33: “In many places I went to, I was viewed with suspicion, and people dragged their feet while serving me”.

SAN19: “I moved to a house next to one occupied by Somalians. I detested the way they were moving in and out house in droves. There were too many of them in that house. I had to look for alternative accommodation. I could not stand the smell emanating from that house”.

SAN31: ‘I jokingly requested one South African woman to relate with me, and she blatantly and harshly jeered to me that she could not relate to a foreign national”.

The above sentiments indicate an inhospitable environment that negates the ethos of integration. Evidently, the level of hospitality that an in-migrant is accorded in the host country determines his or her socio-psychological well-being (Trevithick, 2012). The love for that country and its citizens may also determine an immigrant's propensity to investment and commitment to that country – a critical factor for Foreign Direct Investment. A hostile reception usually strengthens the propensity to remit the money back to their countries of origin (Mayanga, 2017). A country's level of hospitality also has a bearing on its international reputation, with less hospitable countries scoring a low grade in the United Nations hospitability rankings. Further, a hostile reception of in-migrants in a country affects the quality of integration, and by extension, the heartily acceptance of immigrants (Mulvey, 2010). I contend that there is a correlation between hostile reception and levels of xenophobia. According to da Silva Rebelo et al. (2018), host societies' mistrust, hostility, and discrimination expressed in overt or subtle ways toward refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants had a harmful impact on their biopsychosocial well-being, often triggering feelings of helplessness, anger, frustration, and general mistrust. Hinnant and Barry (2018) reported rescue ships filled with migrants were prevented from docking in the Mediterranean, and had to sail for five days without safe harbour. Mazzola (2020) wrote about the cold and hostile reception of migrants in Greek Island some of whom, owing to unbearable and miserable conditions in refugee camps committed suicide. Indeed, immigrants face hostile attitudes from both immigration officials and local in many immigrant-receiving countries. In continental Africa, Hinnant and Barry (2018) reported that Algeria had expelled more than 13,000 migrants into the Sahara Desert, forcing them to walk without food or water. These incidences evidence the cold and hostile environment awaiting many migrants in many immigrant-receiving countries on the African

continent. This hostile environment of reception has a drag-on effect on the integration process – it affects and delays the integration process of migrants in host countries.

In contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw (2016) reported a chilling Whatsapp text message from some local organizations (the Patriotic Movement, Pan Local Forum, and so on) calling all black African foreign nationals to return to ‘their’ countries. Failure to heed this call would result in the deaths of all foreign nationals currently living in the country. These chilling and disturbing sentiments exemplified the hostile and threatening reception that foreign nationals face in the receiving and host country.

In addition, in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, migrants suffer hostilities (hostilities like amenities deficit, torture, sexual abuse, starvation, hostile beatings) in its only holding centre. This is what Kaziboni (2018) that in the Lindela repatriation Centre, human beings were treated like ‘animals’, beaten, and generally not cared for. This reflected how hostility and antipathy towards foreign nationals continues to run deep in post-apartheid South Africa. Even upon successful screening, immigrants enter the receiving communities attitudinally disenfranchised, and having a disdain for the country. This affects also the immigrants’ propensity to integrate with the locals.

Another indicator of low levels of hospitality concerns holding immigrants at arms’ length. Immigrants experience seldom invitations to closely interact with locals. This matches the ideals enshrined in the ‘contact hypothesis’. The ‘contact hypothesis’ conceptual framework, developed by Gordon Allport (Paluck et al., 2019), proposes that direct and positive interpersonal contact between groups can reduce prejudice and hostilities (De Coninck et al., 2020). In contemporary

post-apartheid South Africa, it appears as if foreign nationals have to be ‘xenophobically baptized’ first before being offered a ‘welcome mat’.

6.5.4.2. Language barrier

A majority of participants, supported by few South Africans, owned the fact that language barrier impacted negatively stifled integration efforts. The following comments support this finding:

FN3: “It is never easy. Many South Africans mostly reject your efforts to communicate with them”.

INF9: “It is not easy to adapt especially into a new society. People tend to distance themselves from something different”.

FN14: “I have been hated and disliked openly. So, it has become difficult. I have been laughed at for failing to speak local dialects”.

FCGDFN3: “When I arrived here, I observed that the community did not have any structure or committee to use in receiving foreign nationals”.

Evidently, the inability to understand and use the language of the local people was a critical delaying the integration effort of foreign nationals. Ubiquitously, language similarities attract acceptability, facilitates sharing, and foments trust (Ford, 2011). However, the converse is true that language barrier can foment mistrust, have a repulsion effect, hinder relationships, and obscure cordiality (Ford, 2011). These are factors which can facilitate xenophobia. In some countries of the global world, failure to understand English has facilitated xenophobia. Failure to speak English has invoked cultural racism in that those who cannot speak English have been branded as ‘culturally indigestible’ (Stolcke, 2002; Weidinger, 2017; Fortier, 2018). Metaphorically speaking, human beings break down food into consumable granules through the process of digestion. Food particles than cannot be broken down (or cannot be digested) have to be regurgitated out.

Analogically, immigrants who cannot understand English (those who are culturally indigestible) need to be thrown out of the system (society or country). Undocumented literature suggests that in Botswana, those who are unable to learn and use Setswana language find it very difficult to socialise and to work because the locals are not keen to use any language except their own. They hegemonically stick to their language (Setswana). In summary, the inability to speak a local language can delay the integration efforts of foreign migrants in the host country's social and economic life.

In contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, during the 2008 xenophobic attacks, those who could not pronounce the name of an elbow in IsiZulu were killed (Claassen, 2017). Historically, the same language barrier trick has been used for other purposes. During the internecine battles between the United Democratic Front and the Inkatha (the predecessor to the contemporary Inkatha Freedom Party), some supporters from both sides used the language barrier to identify their 'enemy'. Indubitably, language plays a crucial role in differentiation and isolation, and can therefore be used as a wedge of xenophobia.

6.6. CONCLUSION

This chapter presented, analysed, discussed, and interpreted the empirical evidence that was gathered utilising qualitative research methods. The collected empirical evidence was presented, analysed, discussed, and interpreted in terms of the following broad dimensions and themes: factors underpinning the xenophobic sentiment in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa; manifestations of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa; effectiveness of the agents of social control in dealing with xenophobia; interventions to address xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, and integration of foreign nationals into the contemporary post-apartheid South African society.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. INTRODUCTION

This discusses conclusions and recommendations, as well as directions for future research on xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa.

7.2. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON STUDY OBJECTIVES

7.2.1. Objective 1: To explore the underpinnings of xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa.

This objective has exhaustively been accomplished in that the study unveiled an inventory of attitudinal and socioeconomic factors underpinning or driving xenophobia – amongst others, perceived competition, perceived fear and illusions, national identity, and afrophobia. The study also found out that some of the factors driving the contemporaneous state of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa are illusionary and incendiary, and therefore, making xenophobia a phenomenal challenge.

7.2.2. Objective 2: To expound the manifestations of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa.

Unambiguously, the study has ostensibly fulfilled this objective. The study's narratives revealed multi-faceted manifestations of xenophobia. This includes, violent behaviour, prejudice and discrimination, hatred, labelling, and impunity. This study found that South African nationals supported the use violence as a way of discouraging the presence of foreign nationals in South Africa. The analysis of empirical evidence established the phenomenon of prejudice and discrimination against foreign nationals in various life domains. The study also found that hatred has acted as a cause, a driver, and a manifestation of xenophobia. In addition, study findings

established that all the study participants owned the fact that foreign nationals are assigned epithets that took the form of stereotyping and stigmatisation. Finally, the analysed empirical evidence indicated that the culture of impunity displayed by South African ‘locals’ served to embolden xenophobes to act anomalously towards foreign nationals.

7.2.3. Objective 3: To investigate the effectiveness of agents of social control in dealing with xenophobia.

Indubitably, this objective has also been adequately met because the study has established a weakness in the effectiveness of agents of social control in dealing with the scourge of xenophobia, and its attendant violent reaction to the presence of foreign citizens. The study established that the training and capacitation of the agents of social control (such as the South African Police Service) was vital in efforts directed at combating xenophobia. The other study finding was that there are weaker community-policing practices – a vital tool that could be utilised in the fight against xenophobia in South Africa.

7.2.4. Objective 4: To suggest interventions to address xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa.

This objective has been fulfilled because study findings have established that bolstering the socioeconomic needs of the socially and economically marginalised people in South Africa could help in the mitigation, and eventual eradication of the scourge of xenophobia. The study suggested that the South African government could intervene, in mitigating and eventually eradicating the scourge of xenophobia by bolstering the socioeconomic needs of the people; restructuring the immigration regulations, particularly those relating to those migrants that are, euphemistically referred to as ‘undesirable nationals’.

7.2.5. Objective 5: To discuss, if any, integration deficits experienced by foreign nationals.

This objective has also been achieved because study findings prominently highlighted hostile community reception and language barrier as crucial impediments to integration efforts of foreign nationals into the social and economic life of the host country. Study findings revealed a hostile reception of foreign migrants in the host country as something that affected the quality of their integration, and by extension, the heartily acceptance of immigrants. Another study finding indicated that the inability to speak a local language could delay the integration efforts of foreign migrants in the host country social and economic life.

7.3. VALIDATING THE STUDY'S ASSUMPTIONS

7.3.1. Assumption 1: Xenophobia in South African context is underpinned by deviant disposition.

This assumption has been validated to be true after the study established that some aspects of deviance, including the culture of impunity, negatively affected the expression of the xenophobic sentiments in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa. Specifically, this study revealed that episodic incidents (such as necklacing, stabbing, etc.) of deviant xenophobic behaviours directed at foreign nationals are not only 'rituals of dehumanisation', but also typify the clear and present dangers of the element of violence in episodic bouts of xenophobia.

7.3.2. Assumption 2: Poor socioeconomic status and its ramifications remains a critical driver of xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa.

Through the analysis of the empirical data, this assumption has been substantiated with the finding which confirmed that real or perceived competition over socioeconomic resources was one of the underpinnings of xenophobia. This assumption was also validated by another finding that South Africans were prone to xenophobia owing to the bitterness resulting from unfulfilled promises at

the dawn of democracy. This has made South Africans bitter and jealous, and upon slight provocation, may explode and be amenable to become agents of xenophobia.

7.3.3. Assumption 3: Xenophobia is exacerbated by the ineffectiveness of the agents of social control

This assumption has been fulfilled as the current study discovered that agents of control display incompetence and effectiveness in dealing with the scourge of xenophobia.

7.4. STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on the gaps revealed by the empirical findings, review of related literature, and researcher's observations. The recommendations will help to strengthen government and civil society campaigns against violent xenophobia.

7.4.1. Training and capacitating agents of social control.

The study revealed that law enforcement agents were perceived to be ineffective in dealing with xenophobia, and violence associated with it. The study, therefore, recommends the training of agents of social control as a milestonic intervention. This recommendation includes the revival and revitalisation of community-policing practices aimed at accentuating the role of the police not as 'warriors' against crime, but as a 'guardians' of all the members of the community.

7.4.2. Conscientising society about migration policies vis-à-vis the rights of foreign nationals.

A corollary of the above recommendation is that there should be mass educational campaigns aimed at conscientising societal members about migration policies, laws, and the rights if foreign nationals. The content of such educational campaigns should encompass the building of trust between law enforcement agents and members of the community.

7.4.3. Coming out with novel strategies to job creation.

This study has found economic laxity to be one of the drivers of xenophobia. In the light of this, it is recommended that the government should aggressively pursue the small, medium and micro-enterprises model (SMMEs) of promoting economic growth and job creation. South Africa has not yet fully exploited the capabilities of this model. This model will offer many young people an opportunity to meaningfully participate in the social and economic life of the country, instead of staying idle.

7.4.4. Inculcating the spirit of Ubuntu in young children.

One disturbing observation made by the researcher in this study was how epithets used in the labelling of foreign nationals are bandied about in the presence of children. For this reason, I recommend the inculcation of the principles and ethos of ‘Ubuntu’ – the idea on a common humanity, the need to achieve a full humanity, and a common future. This will address the integration deficits experienced by foreign nationals in the host country.

7.4.5. Embracing the pan-African spirit.

This study found that xenophobia took the form of afrophobia in contemporary post-apartheid society. The study recommends that the spirit and ethos of pan-Africanism could be utilised to blunt the sharp and piercing edges of the xenophobia in the host country. One of the ideal enshrined in the pan-African ideology is that of creating tolerant and inclusive global (not only African) societies.

7.4.6. Make immigration policies more humanising.

Through the review of literature, this study established that South African immigration policy, laws, and regulations are constructed in a manner so as to marginalise immigrants from continental Africa. The implementation of these policies and laws produces a situation in which black

migrants, in particular, are treated as ‘undesirables’, deviants, ‘illegals’, ‘criminals’, ‘irregulars’. The immigration policy environment makes many immigrant people illegal. Consequently, this study recommends that the country’s immigration laws, particularly those relating to those migrants, euphemistically referred to as ‘undesirable nationals’, should be restructured.

7.4.7. Mainstreaming xenophobia in social and learning institutions’ curricula.

In order to tackle the issues of continuing prejudice and discrimination of foreign nationals in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa, this study recommends that xenophobia education be mainstreamed in all social and learning institutions in the country. The core of these curricula should be the teaching of humanities education – those disciplines that teach us how to be human.

7.4.8. Engaging in perennial research on xenophobia

This study has established that xenophobia is a multi-faceted phenomenon, and its manifestations are dynamic, and are the outcome of diverse contextual factors. In the light of the preceding, this study recommends that the phenomenon must be continuously researched with a view to understanding, and eradicating its roots.

7.5.FUTURE RESEARCH

I repeat the assertion made earlier on that the scourge of xenophobia and its attendant violent reaction to the presence of foreign citizens in immigrant receiving countries is not only a threat to global peace and security, but also an impediment to achieving our full humanity and a common future. Disturbingly, episodes of xenophobia continue to occur, like ‘veld fires’, in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa.

7.6. CONCLUSION

Ideally, this study has comprehensively established that xenophobia is a multi-faceted phenomenon driven by an assortment of factors relating to the following: negative attitudes,

structural factors such as poverty and unemployment, issues related to racism, and aspects of nationalism such as national identification and patriotism. This study has evidently shown that owing to a diversity of factors underpinning or driving xenophobia, this phenomenon manifest itself in diverse ways – its manifestations are dynamic, and are the outcome of diverse contextual factors. This study has also consistently accentuated the fact that the deviant inclinations of some South African nationals foment and induce the proliferation of xenophobia in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa. It is, therefore, critical for law enforcement agents to be properly trained and equipped to handle the shrill voices and violent attacks of the marauding mobs of xenophobes. Moreover, the object of post-apartheid South African policing ought to be human friendly (irrespective of country of origin). The contemporary South African government needs to overhaul immigration laws and policies, and make them anti-xenophobic and immigrant-friendly.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Interview Guide for Foreign Nationals



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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY & ANTHROPOLOGY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

XENOPHOBIA IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN THE NELSON MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE..

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR FOREIGN NATIONALS

Section A: Demographic questions.

This section is going to solicit information about your demographic profile. Please note that information you give will remain confidential and would only be used to advance scientific knowledge. Please tick the most appropriate response from the choices given below.

1. Which age range do you belong to?

- a.) 18-28
- b.) 29-38
- c.) 39-48
- d.) 49-58
- e.) 59 and above

2. To which sex do you belong to?

- a.) Male
- b.) Female

c) Other

3. What is your level of education?

a.) No education

b.) Primary education

c.) Secondary education

d.) Tertiary education

4. What is your marital status?

a) Single

b) Married

c) Divorce

d) Never married.

e) Widowed.

5. What is your religious preference?

a) Catholic

b) Anglican

c) Other

6. How long have you been living in South Africa?

a) 0-5 years

b) 6-10 years

c) 11-15 years

d) More than 15 years.

Section B

The following mostly open-ended questions should be asked of each informant interviewed:

1. Decide the attitudes of the local people towards your presence in the country?
2. Have you ever felt threatened by the attitudes and behaviour of the local people?
3. What do you think drives South Africans' animosity towards foreign nationals?
4. Do you think xenophobia against you is influenced by your nationality?
5. What forms of treatment have you experience in your stay in South Africa?
6. What stereotypes have you experienced in your stay in South Africa?
7. How are your immigration rights safeguarded by Home Affairs officials?

What level of trust do you have in the South African Police Service in safeguarding your immigration rights?

What forms of social support have you experienced from the community?

How much trust do you have in South African government officials in dealing with xenophobia?

Appendix 2: Interview Guide for ‘Locals’



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XENOPHOBIA IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN THE NELSON MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE.

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ‘LOCALS’

Section A: Demographic questions.

This section is going to solicit information about your demographic profile. Please note that information you give will remain confidential and would only be used to advance scientific knowledge. Please tick the most appropriate response from the choices given below.

1. Which age range do you belong to?

- a.) 18-28
- b.) 29-38
- c.) 39-48
- d.) 49-58
- e.) 59 and above

2. To which sex do you belong to?

- a.) Male
- b.) Female

c) Other

3. What is your level of education?

a.) No education

b.) Primary education

c.) Secondary education

d.) Tertiary education

4. What is your marital status?

a) Single

b) Married

c) Divorce

d) Never married.

e) Widowed.

5. What is your religious preference?

a) Methodist

b) Catholic

c) Anglican

d) Zion

e) Other

6. What is your home language?

a) English

b) Xhosa

c) Afrikaans

d) Zulu

e) Sotho

f) Other

Section B

The following mostly open-ended questions should be asked of each informant interviewed:

1. Do you think that xenophobia is driven by the perception that foreign nationals are competing for socioeconomic benefits meant for South Africans?
2. In your own thinking, shouldn't the government of the day demarcate between the businesses operated by the 'locals' against those operated by foreign nationals?
3. In your thinking, what role do government officials play in fomenting the xenophobic sentiment in South Africa?
4. Do you think race and nationalism are crucial factors in driving xenophobia?
5. Do you support deportation of perceived 'undesirable immigrants'?
6. Do you support the political rhetorics associated with xenophobia?
7. Do you justify violence directed towards foreign nationals? Please motivate your response.
8. Some people say that the South African Police Service is not doing enough to control xenophobic violence directed at foreign nationals. Do you think this is so?
9. In what ways do 'locals' play out xenophobia against foreign nationals if, any?
10. To the best of your knowledge, what stereotypes and labels are assigned to immigrants?
11. In your own opinion is the government doing enough in addressing xenophobia?
12. Do you think the policy on deportation of 'undesirable' is being handled adequately? There is a lot of talk about South Africa about deporting immigrants deemed to be 'undesirable' back to their native country. Would you be for or against such a policy?

Appendix 3: Focus Group Discussion Questions



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FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

XENOPHOBIA IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN THE NELSON MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE..

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. In your view, what are the factors that drive or underpin xenophobia among South Africans?
2. I want us to have a discussion around what is called the ‘competition thesis’ – the idea that foreign nationals compete with locals for jobs, and other socioeconomic goods. What are your views with regard to this idea?
3. To the best of your knowledge, how does xenophobia directed at foreign nationals manifest itself in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa?
4. In your opinion, what role should government officials and law enforcement officials play in dealing with the problem of xenophobia?

Appendix 4: Interview Guide for Home Affairs Officials



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XENOPHOBIA IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN THE NELSON MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE.

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR HOME AFFAIRS OFFICIALS

Section A: Demographic questions.

This section is going to solicit information about your demographic profile. Please note that information you give will remain confidential and would only be used to advance scientific knowledge. Please tick the most appropriate response from the choices given below.

1. Which age range do you belong to?

- a.) 18-28
- b.) 29-38
- c.) 39-48
- d.) 49-58
- e.) 59 and above

2. To which sex do you belong to?

- a.) Male

b.) Female

c) Other

3. What is your level of education?

a.) No education

b.) Primary education

c.) Secondary education

d.) Tertiary education

4. What is your marital status?

a) Single

b) Married

c) Divorce

d) Never married.

e) Widowed.

5. What is your religious preference?

a) Methodist

b) Catholic

c) Anglican

d) Zion

e) Other

6. How long have you been working in the Department of Home Affairs?

a) 0-5 years

b) 6-10 years

c) 11-15 years

d) More than 15 years.

7. What is your home language?

a) English

b) Xhosa

c) Afrikaans

d) Zulu

e) Sotho

f) Other

Section B

The following mostly open-ended questions should be asked of each informant interviewed:

1. What are your general attitudes towards immigrants, especially those originating from the African continent?
2. What do you think drives the xenophobic sentiment towards immigrants in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa?
3. In your own thinking, shouldn't the government of the day demarcate between the businesses operated by the 'locals' against those operated by foreign nationals?
4. Do you think the policy on deportation of 'undesirable' is being handled adequately? There is a lot of talk about South Africa about deporting immigrants deemed to be 'undesirable' back to their native country. Would you be for or against such a policy? Please motivate your response.

Appendix 5: Interview Guide for South African Police Service



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FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

XENOPHOBIA IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN THE NELSON MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE.

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE

Section A: Demographic questions.

This section is going to solicit information about your demographic profile. Please note that information you give will remain confidential and would only be used to advance scientific knowledge. Please tick the most appropriate response from the choices given below.

1. Which age range do you belong to?

- a.) 18-28
- b.) 29-38
- c.) 39-48
- d.) 49-58
- e.) 59 and above

2. To which sex do you belong to?

- a.) Male
- b.) Female
- c.) Other

3. What is your level of education?

- a.) No education
- b.) Primary education
- c.) Secondary education
- d.) Tertiary education

4. What is your marital status?

- a) Single
- b) Married
- c) Divorce
- d) Never married.
- e) Widowed.

5. What is your religious preference?

- a) Methodist
- b) Catholic
- c) Anglican
- d) Zion
- e) Other

6. How long have you been working for the South African Police Services?

- a) 0-5 years
- b) 6-10 years
- c) 11-15 years
- d) More than 15 years.

7. What is your home language?

- a) English
- b) Xhosa
- c) Afrikaans
- d) Zulu
- e) Sotho
- f) Other

Section B

The following mostly open-ended questions should be asked of each informant interviewed:

1. What are your general attitudes towards immigrants, especially those originating from the African continent?
2. Have you received education and training on working with the immigrant community? Have you received any advanced specialized training in hate crimes? Please explain.
3. What role do you think the police should play in dealing with xenophobia?
4. To the best of your knowledge, are you familiar with the labels and pejorative names that are assigned to immigrants? Do you have any sympathy for immigrants being called these names?
5. Do you have any programs that focus on vulnerable xenophobia victims by making them aware of legal relief available to them?
6. Do you have any programs that focus on working with local communities and xenophobia victims that can help in law enforcement efforts directed at combating the scourge of xenophobia?

Appendix 6: Interview Guide for Political Parties



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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY & ANTHROPOLOGY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

XENOPHOBIA IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: A CASE STUDY IN THE NELSON MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY, EASTERN CAPE..

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLITICAL PARTIES

Section A: Demographic questions.

This section is going to solicit information about your demographic profile. Please note that information you give will remain confidential and would only be used to advance scientific knowledge. Please tick the most appropriate response from the choices given below.

1. Which age range do you belong to?

- a.) 18-28
- b.) 29-38
- c.) 39-48
- d.) 49-58
- e.) 59 and above

2. To which sex do you belong to?

- a.) Male
- b.) Female
- c.) Other

3. What is your level of education?

- a.) No education
- b.) Primary education
- c.) Secondary education
- d.) Tertiary education

4. What is your marital status?

- a) Single
- b) Married
- c) Divorce
- d) Never married.
- e) Widowed.

5. What is your religious preference?

- a) Methodist
- b) Catholic
- c) Anglican
- d) Zion
- e) Other

6. How long have you been a member of your political party?

- a) 0-5 years
- b) 6-10 years
- c) 11-15 years
- d) More than 15 years.

7. What is your home language?

- a) English
- b) Xhosa
- c) Afrikaans
- d) Zulu
- e) Sotho
- f) Other

Section B

The following mostly open-ended questions should be asked of each informant interviewed:

1. What are your general attitudes towards immigrants, especially those originating from the African continent?
2. What are your experiences of xenophobia in South Africa?
3. In your own thinking, shouldn't the government of the day demarcate between the businesses operated by the 'locals' against those operated by foreign nationals?
4. To the best of your knowledge, what stereotypes and labels are assigned to immigrants?
5. Some people say that the South African Police Service is not doing enough to control xenophobic violence directed at foreign nationals. Do you think this is so?
6. Do you think the policy on deportation of 'undesirable' is being handled adequately?

Appendix 7: Ethical Clearance Certificate



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ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE **REC-270710-028-RA Level 01**

Certificate Reference Number: KAN281SDUM01

Project title: **An investigation of the contexts and manifestations of the South Africa post-apartheid state of xenophobia.**

Nature of Project PhD in Sociology

Principal Researcher: Vusumzi Duma

Supervisor: Prof S Kang'ethe
Co-supervisor: Prof E.C Ejiogu

On behalf of the University of Fort Hare's Research Ethics Committee (UREC) I hereby give ethical approval in respect of the undertakings contained in the above-mentioned project and research instrument(s). Should any other instruments be used, these require separate authorization. The Researcher may therefore commence with the research as from the date of this certificate, using the reference number indicated above.

Please note that the UREC must be informed immediately of

- Any material change in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the document
- Any material breaches of ethical undertakings or events that impact upon the ethical conduct of the research

The Principal Researcher must report to the UREC in the prescribed format, where applicable, annually, and at the end of the project, in respect of ethical compliance.

The Principal Researcher must report to the UREC in the prescribed format, where applicable, annually, and at the end of the project, in respect of ethical compliance.

Special conditions: Research that includes children as per the official regulations of the act must take the following into account:

Note: The UREC is aware of the provisions of s71 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 and that matters pertaining to obtaining the Minister's consent are under discussion and remain unresolved. Nonetheless, as was decided at a meeting between the National Health Research Ethics Committee and stakeholders on 6 June 2013, university ethics committees may continue to grant ethical clearance for research involving children without the Minister's consent, provided that the prescripts of the previous rules have been met. This certificate is granted in terms of this agreement.

The UREC retains the right to

- Withdraw or amend this Ethical Clearance Certificate if
 - Any unethical principal or practices are revealed or suspected
 - Relevant information has been withheld or misrepresented
 - Regulatory changes of whatsoever nature so require
 - The conditions contained in the Certificate have not been adhered to
- Request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project.
- In addition to the need to comply with the highest level of ethical conduct principle investigators must report back annually as an evaluation and monitoring mechanism on the progress being made by the research. Such a report must be sent to the Dean of Research's office

The Ethics Committee wished you well in your research.

Yours sincerely



Professor Lindelwa Majova-Songca
Acting Dean of Research

10 November 2017

Appendix 8: Editor's Certificate

<table border="1"><tr><td>B</td><td>S</td></tr><tr><td>C</td><td>C</td></tr></table>	B	S	C	C	BE STILL COMMUNICATIONS For effective communication solutions	landamasuku@gmail.com +27835841854; +27618043021
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CERTIFICATE OF EDITING

This document certifies that a copy of the thesis whose title appears below was edited for proper English language usage, grammar, punctuation, spelling, and overall style by Dr Nhlanhla Landa whose academic qualifications and professional affiliation appear in the footer of this document. The research content and the author's intentions were not altered during the editing process.

**TITLE: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CONTEXTS AND MANIFESTATION OF
THE SOUTH AFRICAN POST-APARTHEID STATE OF XENOPHOBIA**


AUTHOR: Vusumzi Duma

Note: The edited work described here may not be identical to that submitted. The author, at their sole discretion, has the prerogative to accept, delete, or change amendments made by the editor before submission. The edited copy did not have preliminary pages.

DATE: 11 JULY 2021

EDITOR'S COMMENT

The author was advised to effect suggested corrections in regards to clarity of terms, referencing style, consistency in structure and logic, and expression.


Signature

PhD Applied Linguistics (UFH), MA Applied Linguistics (MSU), BA (Honours) English and Communication (MSU)
Professional Membership: A member of the Professional Editors Guild

Appendix 9: Originality Report

Mr. Duma Thesis

ORIGINALITY REPORT

14%	11%	8%	7%
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