

AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE POWER IN
SOUTH AFRICA'S PUBLIC POLICY, 1996 - 2014.

By

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Declaration of Originality



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Dedication

This study is dedicated to my late grandparents: Nophumele Mtiti Mvenene and Sekelwa Cecilia Jadezweni who are responsible for a laughter-filled childhood and my upbringing which has shaped and moulded my thought patterns. They are also responsible for instilling positive values in my parents. They continue to be my guardian angels beyond the grave.

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The entire family particularly my siblings: Khanya Pathisa “MaKhanyile” Jadezweni, Mveni “Mavee” Mvenene and Lindisipho “Stina” Mvenene. My aunt and uncle: Nozuko Jadezweni and Myalelo “Tigo” Jadezweni. My cousins: Thethelela “LayBee” Jadezweni, Phambili “Phara” Jadezweni and Babalwe “Nomtsiki” Jadezweni.

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Abstract

The crux of this study is an analysis of the relations between corporate power and public policy in South Africa, in the period 1996 to 2014. The study's focus is on corporate power's influence on South Africa's public policy and the various means through which power is exerted by the former to shape and control the latter, through the influence of the public policy process and outcome. The study achieves this by arguing that the GEAR and BEE policies failed to achieve their stated objectives, and instead serve as conduits for the exertion of inordinate public policy influence by corporate power. The study analyses how the placing of ANC leaders on major corporate boards has influenced South Africa's public policy. The study will also examine the ways in which private corporate donations influence public officeholders in the governing ANC. The study also seeks to explore why the ANC with its seemingly progressive stance and history is susceptible to following neoliberal policies pushed for by political forces largely but not exclusively outside the party in the industries described to be targets of redistribution, mining, energy, and finance. The study asserts that private corporate donations made to the governing ANC have a corrupting effect on public policy and corrode democratic decision-making and ultimately the public good. This study presents the argument that the ANC-aligned black political elite was co-opted into the structure of economic dominance with the GEAR and BEE policies and hence the prevalence of neoliberal economic policy in post-apartheid South Africa.

The study also addresses the intricate relationship between the corporate and political elite, business, and money in South Africa's elitist public policy landscape. This study accomplishes this by using the elite theory of public policy as a theoretical framework. This analytical lens provides that: it is the political and corporate elite that are de facto responsible for important public policy decisions. The elite theory provides that policy elites and their articulations of important issues dominate and shape South Africa's policy environment, hence powerful corporations are enabled to exert significant influence. The study proceeds to describe in detail these paradoxical power relations between the private (corporate) and public (political) and their implications thereof. This study employs the document analysis research methodology, documents analysed include newspaper articles, government publications and policy reports (documents) to analyse the aforesaid power relations. The analysis will be undertaken through a qualitative descriptive research design and theoretical thematic analysis is employed to examine the ways through which corporate power influences South Africa's public policy.

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List of Abbreviations

AA – Affirmative Action

AAC – Anglo American Corporation

ADS – African Defence Systems

AEE – Afrikaner Economic Empowerment

AG – Auditor General

ANC – African National Congress

ANCYL – African National Congress Youth League

AP – Affirmative Procurement

ARM – African Rainbow Minerals

ARM Gold – Africa Rainbow Minerals Gold

BBC – Black Business Council

B-BBEE – Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment

B-BSEE - Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment

BEE – Black Economic Empowerment

BLSA – Business Leadership South Africa

BMF – Black Management Forum

BUSA – Business Unity South Africa

BWI – Bretton Woods Institutions

CDE – Centre for Development and Enterprise

CEO – Chief Executive Officer

CODESA – Convention for a Democratic South Africa

COM – Chamber of Mines

COSATU – Congress of South African Trade Unions

CSI – Corporate Social Investment

CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility

DA – Democratic Alliance

DEP – Department of Economic Policy

DG – Director-General

DME – Department of Minerals and Energy

DMR – Department of Mineral Resources

DP – Democratic Party

DTI – Department of Trade and Industry

DPE – Department of Public Enterprises

EFF – Economic Freedom Fighters

FDI – Foreign Direct Investment

FMF – Free Market Foundation

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GEAR – Growth Employment and Redistribution strategy

GNU – Government of National Unity

HCI – Hosken Consolidated Investments

HPA – Hitachi Power Africa

HSF – Helen Suzman Foundation

IDASA – Institute for a Democratic South Africa

IDC – Industrial Development Corporation

IFI – International Financial Institutions

IFP – Inkatha Freedom Party

ILO – International Labour Organisation

IMF – International Monetary Fund

JCI – Johannesburg Consolidated Investments

JSE – Johannesburg Securities Exchange

KZN – Kwa Zulu Natal

LMIC – Low- and Middle-Income

MDB – Mineral Development Bill

MEC – Member of Executive Committee

MEC – Minerals-Energy Complex

MERG – Macro-Economic Research Group

MK – uMkhonto weSizwe

MNC – Multi-National Corporations

MPRDA – Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act No. 28 of 2002

NAFCOC – National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry

NAIL – New Africa Investments Limited

NDR – National Democratic Revolution

NEC – National Empowerment Consortium

NEC – National Executive Committee

NEDLAC – National Economic Development and Labour Council

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisations

NMU – Nelson Mandela University

NNP – New National Party

NP – National Party

NUMSA – National Union of Metal Workers South Africa

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAC – Pan Africanist Congress

PBF – Progressive Business Forum

PDI – Previously Disadvantaged Individuals

PIC – Public Investment Corporation

PMC – Palabora Mining Company

PPP – Public-Private Partnership

R2K – Right2Know

RAIL – Real Africa Investments Limited

RDP – Reconstruction and Development Programme

RSA – Republic of South Africa

SACP – South African Communist Party

SACTWU – The Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union

SAF – South Africa Foundation

SARB – South African Reserve Bank

SOE – State-Owned Enterprises

TBVC – Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (Independent Bantustans)

TEC – Transitional Executive Council

TRC – Truth and Reconciliation Commission

USA – United States of America

USSR – United Soviet Socialist Republics

WB – World Bank

WTO – World Trade Organisation

Chapter 1: The Introduction and Contextualization of the Study

Introduction

It is not idle chatter that South Africa like many fledgling democracies in the developing world is faced with the challenge of poverty, inequality, and unemployment. The country is synonymous with the rest of African countries regarding the history of colonial conquest, invasion and minority rule. Colonialism and apartheid have bestowed the country with stark levels of structural income inequality and skewed wealth and resource distributions along racial lines (Knight, 2014; Madi, 2016:3). Although political and civil rights were obtained with the demise of apartheid in April 1994 economic apartheid persists in the country. The black majority still find themselves at the tail-end of the economic ladder; in overcrowded townships which are areas of concentrated poverty and chronic joblessness. The wealth of the country remains in the hands of a few; restructuring the economy and fostering socio-economic transformation remains a politically unachievable task for the post-apartheid government, the triad of poverty, unemployment and inequality is yet to be uprooted.

From the inception of democratic rule, government interventions in the economy to redress the imbalances of the past took the form of public policy and redress legislation as strategic instruments. In a clearly defined and structured attempt, these policy instruments sought to mandate and force the foundational transformation of the socio-economic base. However, Terreblanche (2002:424-5) states that post-apartheid economic policy was crafted under the supervision and guidance of the corporate sector and International Financial Institutions (IFI). The post-apartheid economic policy trajectory of the African National Congress (ANC) was inspired by apostles of free-market fundamentalism following the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the subsequent triumphalism of neoliberalism (Prevost, 2006:166 & Capps, 2012:319). Negating the paradoxes peculiar to the South African economy and its racial demographics. Gumede (2008:8) and Maseng (2014) assert that public policy is “all formal and publicly known decisions of governments.” And further opines that these decisions are informed by and originate from the governing party’s election manifesto (Moran, Rein and Goodin, 2006). Therefore, public policy is owned by the electorate with hopes of a public policy direction that will produce equality or decreased inequality.

With the brief and concise overview provided above of the contextual circumstances surrounding the subject matter at hand, this study interrogates the relationship between corporate power and public policy in South Africa from 1996 to 2014. The previously

mentioned variables each operate in separate sectors and embody differing values, principles, and interests. However, the governing party through its policy documents such as the Growth Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy declares that cooperation, reconciliation, and nation-building require an inclusive approach to public policy (Gumede, 2008). The study's period of analysis, 1996 to 2014 is informed by the study's assumption that the 1996 GEAR policy marked the full embrace of neoliberal (market) democracy and a capitalist path of development in South Africa (Bond, 2006; 2007). Additionally, 2014 serves as an appropriate cut-off date for the analysis, to assess whether BEE's industry empowerment charters or targets for transformation have been achieved and to what extent, and to chart a way forward for the policy of market-led redistribution. Keeping in mind that most of the empowerment targets had a ten-year timeline (Shone, 2003; Acemoglu, Gelb and Robinson, 2007). The justification for the study's timeline is further explained in chapter four.

In order to undertake the aforesaid analysis, this study employs the document analysis of three documentary data sources including newspaper articles, government publications and policy reports. This study's theoretical framework is the elite theory of public policy (elitism) which provides a perspective or angle on the research question, further unpacked in chapter two. This introductory chapter seeks to contextualize and provide a framework for the key and essential components or concepts which are discussed in this study. Moreover, this chapter seeks to present the researcher's argument regarding the central focus of the study which is to establish whether corporate power exerts influence on South Africa's public policy or otherwise. The research problem, research questions, problem statement, key unit of analysis and study's focus, the purpose of the study, aims, objectives and research design, significance and limitations of the study are components that follow hereunder.

Background to the Research Problem

South Africa's unique form of uneven capitalist development arose in the last quarter of the 19th century with the discovery of diamonds and gold, the settler-colonial economy and subsequently white sub-imperial capital created the minerals-energy complex (MEC) which will be discussed in chapter three. Apartheid South Africa's racial capitalist biases and institutionalized racism accentuated uneven socio-economic and geographical development, hence the country's irrational inequality levels. Apartheid capitalism lacked broad national development priorities, for instance, the local production of luxury goods weighed more than

the production of capital goods necessary for the regime's productive industries. This culminated in an even increased reliance on capital goods imports, especially machinery in mining and energy generation which are the core productive sectors of the MEC (Bond, 2006:20).

South Africa is a country not unique in the continent of Africa, with a richly textured history of colonialism and apartheid — rule by the minority. Under the apartheid regime, the Afrikaner elite sought to achieve rapid Afrikaner upward class mobility using the state (Mbeki, 2009a:47). “Afrikaner Economic Empowerment” (AEE) aimed to create a professional, skilled and trained elite class that would fill the gaps in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This empowerment would be primarily driven by parastatal sector expansion and fiscal laxity in the agricultural, industrial and construction sectors (Ponte, Roberts and van Sittert, 2007:7-8; Padayachee and Rossouw, 2019:151-2). SOEs, publicly owned corporations or parastatals are national public entities that include enterprises, companies and corporations partially or wholly owned by the state through the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) which are accountable to the national assembly (Public Finance Management Act No. 29 of 1999). SOEs are strategic economic resources used by the government to fulfil a developmental mandate. In this study, the words SOE and parastatal will be used interchangeably. The establishment of SOEs in the second half of the 20th century reflects the Afrikaners' aim to achieve their economic objectives using state power. Padayachee and Rossouw (2019:151) term this “volkskapitalisme” or the people's (Afrikaner) capitalism. The Afrikaner political elite and English commercial interests had a common-shared agenda, which was sustained by an ample supply of cheap and disposable black labour sourced from former ethnic homelands (Southall, 2007:69; Mbeki, 2009a).

Apartheid South Africa was governed by a nexus between British economic capital and Afrikaner political nationalism, and this can be equally construed as a nexus between industry and political power. South Africa was a resource-based economy, well-endowed in mineral resources and precious metals. Hence, the most productive sectors of the economy were mining, agriculture and energy-related industrialization (Terreblanche, 2012:40-1). These previously mentioned industries were in the hands of white-controlled corporations and financial institutions. The primary products were sold to the world market, and they accounted for a huge chunk of the country's export income (Mbeki, 2009a:76). These key exporting industries relied heavily on an army of disposable black labour sourced from the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei – TBVC states (Mbeki, 2009a:47).

In 1990 when Nelson Mandela was to be released from prison, he reaffirmed that the Freedom Charter demands, that the nationalization of mines, banks and monopoly industries was an unchangeable and primary policy position of the ANC (Acemoglu et al., 2007:4). However, this study seeks to convey that quite the opposite of nationalization occurred in the post-apartheid economic policy paradigm characterized by a free-market economy and the privatization of SOEs (Bond, 2006:15-6; Klein 2007:198). The first-generation ANC political elite failed to achieve a radical democratic participatory project; they were also not able to implement policies of nationalisation contained in the Freedom Charter. Mines, banks and monopoly industries “remained firmly in the hands of the same four white-owned mega conglomerates that also control 80 percent of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Klein, 2007:206).” The ANC’s economic policy space for manoeuvre was asphyxiated by ratified agreements both formal and informal with western governments, IFI’s and the domestic mining corporate elite. Friedman (1997) posits that “the ANC has been influenced far more by international business than by its local counterpart. Most of its key policy shifts (such as President Nelson Mandela’s endorsement of privatisation) have been a response to the views of foreign business.” These agreements culminated in homegrown structural adjustments (Bond, 2006:1-2; Klein, 2007:212; Van Wyk, 2009:25).

The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations would establish an interim government that would outline a clear path toward the first democratic elections, a decisive moment in South African history. CODESA involved various organisations in talks with the apartheid government, but as the study will unravel that during the transition period mega-conglomerates (the economic oligarchy) with vested interests in negotiations dispersed financial resources to ANC political heavyweights (Butler, 2010:13). Mbeki (2009a:66) avers that the white businessmen and their families who own and control the productive economy — the MEC — constitute the economic oligarchy which were important power players in CODESA. Mbeki (2009a:74) encourages that CODESA II encompassed covert meetings and negotiations between the economic oligarchs and the black political elite. The black political elite encompass the black upper middle classes in leadership positions of the ANC which had almost a monopoly of black supporters in the country at the time. Although the black working class represented by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) did not have a seat at the negotiating table (Prevost, 2006:173; Bond, 2007:128). “Black Economic Empowerment” (BEE) came into existence as an outcome of elite pact-making in CODESA II and was later promulgated as redistributive legislation in 2003. Mbeki (2009a:74) suggests that

the formula for 'transformation' determined by the black political elite and the white economic oligarchy during negotiations equates to parliamentary democracy; globalization; and BEE.

The ANC states that the shift from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the GEAR strategy was a change compelled by the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and the subsequent triumph of neoliberalism, the rapid globalization of the world economy and global corporatism (Business Day 1997b). Keskin (2009:95) defines neoliberal globalization as "a series of interdependent states that make up the global world economy." The ANC contends that defiance of the dominant politico-economic ideology is chastised through political and economic isolation in the form of mass skilled labour emigration, the export of capital, disinvestment, currency devaluation, and expensive debt (Van Wyk, 2009:25). The relations between private wealth and the politics of the black ANC elite can be traced back to the mid-1980s and early 1990s during the period of secret meetings between the ANC political elite and the representatives of the MEC and its aligned corporations (Terreblanche, 2002:95; Mtimka, 2010:40; Wolff, 2014:61). Before proceeding further it is important to note that Terreblanche (2012:40-1) posits that capitalist corporations have long had close ties and established positions of influence on the successive political establishments in South Africa dating from 1652 to 1994. These four systemic politico-economic periods include the Dutch East India Company (VOC) 1652 – 1795, British colonialism 1795 – 1910, then the MEC 1910 – 1948 and the MEC and the National Party (NP) 1948 – 1994. However, as a result of space and time limitations, this study cannot explain these systemic periods in-depth. With this in mind, it should be noted that in this study it is inferred that relations between private wealth and politics can be traced back to the 1980s wherein representatives of the corporate sector started interacting with the black ANC leadership in exile which assumed power in 1994 (Walker, 1998; Van Wyk, 2009:13-4).

Terreblanche (2012:62-3) states that business corporations such as the Anglo-American Corporation (AAC), Gold Fields Limited (then Consolidated Gold Fields) and Shell had organized and financed these meetings between the regime's representatives, corporate lobbyists and the popular liberation elite, especially the ANC and COSATU. Business corporations did not keep at arms-length from the engagements instead they played a kingmaker role by extending gestures of benevolence such as providing financial resources to the pauperized leaders and access to facilities previously exclusive to whites (Friedman, 2010:158). According to Wolff (2014:61), the most important meetings were held in Pollsmoor prison where Nelson Mandela was detained, it was there where the then President of Apartheid

South Africa Pieter Botha made the following offer, “If Mandela were prepared to encourage the ANC to commit itself to renouncing violence against the old regime and abandon its demand for a state-run economy and the partial collectivization of monopolistic enterprises, banks and natural resources” he was to be released.

However, both international and domestic pressure signalled an imminent end of the apartheid regime, and this necessitated engagements with the leadership core of the ANC. Hence the offer was made to Mandela in Pollsmoor prison. This offer had attached to it the recognition of the apartheid regime’s foreign debt, and if Mandela were to accept this offer the ANC would be unbanned and political prisoners released. The offer was accepted and hence the release of Mandela in February 1990 by De Klerk, Pieter Botha’s successor as President of the apartheid regime. Niël Barnard former chief of intelligence of apartheid South Africa divulges that this offer was a last-ditch effort during the final death throes of the regime, the social upheavals of the 1980s signalled the imminence of a popular revolution, and this covert deal only served to avert this revolutionary process (Wolff, 2014:61-2).

As was earlier mentioned, meetings held with the ANC in exile by IFI’s, multinational and national scale corporations to salvage capitalism and internationalism in the post-1994 democratic dispensation are key in understanding the relations between corporate power and public policy in South Africa from 1996 to 2014, the time period analysed by this study. This particular study focuses on the MEC-aligned corporate sector and its interaction with the black political elite that commenced in the 1980s into the 1990s (Van Wyk, 2009:7-8; Terreblanche, 2012:60-2; Wolff, 2014:61). Mtimka (2010:40) asserts that “what is noteworthy about this relationship between the ANC and big business is that its content was based on salvaging capitalism or the apartheid culture of accumulation of wealth from potential overhaul by a new government.” These meetings were intended to persuade the future governors towards a pliant economic policy trajectory in a foreseeable democratic paradigm (Wolff, 2014:60; Mail & Guardian, 2018).

Wolff (2014:62) asserts that the “sweet deal” struck by the ANC and COSATU comrades-in-arms was a godsend for the old ruling classes and the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) – International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). However, this publicly concealed deal was a disaster for the black South African population. During the transitional period (1990-1994) the headlights of the ANC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the IMF committing to compliance with global market principles, a passive observer government, a market-determined exchange rate, and an open-door policy for

international finance capital (Terreblanche, 2002:424; Van Wyk, 2009:23; Wolff, 2014:63). In the same period, the masters of the old regime (the IMF and the WB) were now effective masters of the future South African black political elite. In addition, policy proposals for the new government came from above as a consequence of the MOU. While the Tripartite Alliance partners would tactfully buffer and neutralize mass protests by infuriated black masses, masquerading as “leaders” of these protests (Van Wyk, 2009:22; Wolff, 2014:63).

These policies included but were not limited to the market-oriented land reform policy of the RDP which supplanted the initial 30% guaranteed reallocation of large-scale holdings; in November 1993 the ANC accepted NP representatives as partners in a Transitional Executive Council (TEC) in parliament, the IMF loaned the committee \$850 million which was purported as a drought-relief fund, but was actually traditional “predatory lending”. Subsequently, in March 1994 the aforementioned committee called for market fundamentalist policies including a reduction in the size of the public sector and a cut in the public wage, a reduction in government spending and the removal of barriers to trade. Furthermore, NP parliamentarians were appointed to head the ministry of finance (Derek Keys then Christo Ferro Liebenberg) and govern the Central Bank (Dr Christian Lodewyk Stals) as part of the TEC arrangement. The ANC conceded to these contentious policies even though their first election victory was a foregone conclusion, winning by an overwhelming majority of 62.5% (Hirsch, 2005:65; Van Wyk, 2009:28; Wolff, 2014:63-4). The NP got 20.39%, the ethnic nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) got 10.54%, the conservative Freedom Front Party (Volksfront) got 2.17%, the liberal Democratic Party (DP) only 1.73%, and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) with the least votes of 1.73%. The distribution of votes among the parties reflects the racial, ethnic, and ideological divide in South Africa (Thompson, 2014:738-9).

What is more, the “benevolence” conveyed by business corporations can be construed as a method to secure future favours from the government in waiting in two ways: firstly, the penniless future holders of public office were provided with financial resources required for the standard of living expected from a governing-elite; secondly, the corporate sector took the first strides to demonstrate intent for economic liberalization by offering the future governors directorships and managerial positions in large corporations (BEE). Consequently, the line between goodwill and the use of financial resources to influence the future political and economic architecture of a democratic South Africa was blurred (Terreblanche, 2002:95; Friedman, 2010:158). The leading lights of the ANC and COSATU shop-stewards had become “filthy rich” overnight (Wolff, 2014:67). Post the first democratic election in 1994 the

governing ANC had deferred dirigisme policy aspirations of the Freedom Charter, although the RDP was initially regarded pro-worker and pro-poor by COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP) (Prevost, 2006:172; Edozie, 2008:57).

With that being said, the short-lived RDP was not socialist, it also contained neoliberal elements such as fiscal discipline, right-sizing the public sector, and privatization (Mosala, Venter and Bain, 2017:332). However, the GEAR strategy in 1996 marked the overt inception of neoliberalism. A self-imposed Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) aligned with the global neoliberal ethos of the 1990s (Bond, 2006:17). Thabo Mbeki's presidency (1999 to 2008) which has been referred to as the "1996 class project" by the Left elements in the governing-Tripartite Alliance namely, the SACP and COSATU were critical of the capitalist character of Mbeki's neoliberal redistribution. The Mbeki presidency instated the shift from the development-oriented and redistributive RDP to the neoliberal conforming GEAR – in which macroeconomic stabilization was central (Sole, 2010:198 & Capps, 2012:320). Within the same period, BEE policy had reinterpreted the aims of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) to encompass the creation of a black capitalist and middle class through state economic intervention and cooperation of the white corporate sector. The NDR was no longer construed as a road to a socialist society as the SACP and COSATU believed (Southall, 2007:69-70). The GEAR and BEE policy under Mbeki's presidency, without strong opposition, created a lot of intra-alliance scuffles. The policy direction of the country was dictated by the ANC and its alliance partners found themselves at the margins of policy formulation and implementation (Prevost, 2006:170).

The adoption of GEAR without comprehensive consultation with the governing-alliance partners was deemed a deliberate marginalization of the Left factions and a change of economic policy trajectory towards neoliberalism and its tenets: fiscal austerity and liberalization. Replacing the RDP with GEAR in June 1996 was seen as abandoning the developmental agenda which has been the former liberation movement's historical mandate (Mtimka, 2010:41). According to the GEAR and BEE policy, the creation of jobs and poverty alleviation is achievable through the seduction and/or attraction of foreign and domestic investment to attain high levels of economic growth for a trickle-down to the poor. The initial Robin Hood policies of the ANC were abandoned for neoliberal macroeconomic policy synergistic with the mainstream right-wing ethos of the 1990s which was bolstered by accelerated globalization (Business Day 1997a; Van Wyk, 2009:25). The BEE policy was exclusively accessible to and only elevated a black middle class with struggle credentials out of township poverty into the

apex of corporate hierarchies protected by the high walls of affluent suburban areas such as Sandton. As the founders of the trade union movement such as Cyril Ramaphosa ventured into the corporate sector, the wider black working-class remained exposed to high unemployment, violent crime, dubious public services, and an ever-increasing cost of living (Wolff, 2014:67-8).

Mtimka (2010:30) states that economic power in post-independence South Africa remains in the hands of a white minority and so does the country's wealth. The country's economic structure is a product of 350 years of British and Dutch settler colonialism and 45 years of apartheid. Patterns of ownership, economic participation, and resource distribution are arranged on a race basis (Madi, 2016:204). Based on data retrieved from Statistics South Africa, the World Population Review (2021) reveals that 79.4% of the population identifies as black while only 9.2% of the population are white, the residual figure is shared among Coloureds, Indians and Asians. However, as the study will portray, participation in the productive economy particularly in the mining industry is reserved for 9.2% of the population. To portray the continued racial income inequality in post-apartheid South Africa, Knight (2014:24) reveals that "white personal income is eight times higher than African personal income, African-headed households have an average consumption expenditure of R45 000, while white-headed households have a consumption expenditure of R235 000." Bond (2006) reiterates throughout his book that in analysing South Africa's peaceful transition into democracy, we must take cognisance of the negative material "continuities" which overlapped into the epoch of democratic rule. Not straying from the scope of the study, private party financing of political parties is another challenge that erodes the quality and experience of the vigorous democratic project which the governing party supposedly champions.

Before moving forward to the next section, a definition of the key concepts discussed by this study: corporate power and public policy are necessary for the ongoing analysis. Davis (2015) states that a corporation is constitutive of a series of mergers and acquisitions – a combination of multiple businesses – which transform those once fragmented businesses into national-scale behemoths. Davis (2015:395) denotes that "corporate power was vested in the executives and boards at the tops of corporate hierarchies, whose control of economic resources could often translate into political influence." The power commanded by these corporate empires emanates from hegemonic control of industry. The general prerequisites for the acceleration of capital accumulation are the concentration and centralization of capital with limited concern for the social and physical contours of expansion (Bond, 2006:8). The use of the dynastic wealth

accumulated by corporate behemoths in-charge of the commanding heights of the economy equates to corporate power and political influence. In an economy dominated by large corporate monopolies and oligopolies economic power can easily translate into political power (Doan and Weldon, 2012:6; Statva, 2012:3; Milton ([s.a.]:417-8). The economic dominance of mega-conglomerate corporations such as AAC, BHP Billiton, De Beers Group, Rembrandt Group, and Lonmin plc can easily steer a transitional period and influence the policy thinking of the governing party by using their abundant financial resources. The inordinate influence of powerful corporations can be observed in the favourable policy outcomes that promote corporate interests (Keeton and White, 2010; Terreblanche, 2012:62-3; Seoka, 2013; Bond, 2014a).

Building from the definition provided by Gumede (2008:8) earlier in this chapter, Mosala (2016:53) states that “public policy refers to government administration and is directed at the whole of society or societal groups.” Therefore, public policy governs a population within a clearly demarcated geographical area wherein a constitutionally elected government wields jurisdictional authority – a nation-state. Public policy is rooted in the needs, demands, values and expectations of the governed population within a democratic state (Gumede, 2008:13-4). Thus, a legitimate government works in fulfilment of the common good and public welfare of the people through the organs of the state. Public policy in the South African context has been employed by the governing party as a strategic instrument to reverse and undo colonial heritage and legacies of apartheid. The ANC-led government has promulgated and implemented various macroeconomic policies and redistributive legislation since it first seized power in April 1994 (Gumede, 2008:10). Policies relevant to this particular study include the macroeconomic GEAR and the redistributive BEE policy.

Tebele (2016:48) states that agenda-setting is a political process that is largely influenced by how the mainstream media paints the narrative, influencing public opinion, about the social issues which must be selected and addressed by the government’s bureaucracy. A policy issue finds its way into the policy agenda when there is a clear statement of the issue, the information has been gathered and a political process has ensued. Agenda setting is the stage in the policy cycle wherein policy is most influenced and subsequently shaped by corporate lobbyists and business leadership such as the Brenthurst Group, Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) and the Chamber of Mines (COM). Mainstream news media and independent think-tank organizations such as the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE), the Free Market Foundation (FMF) and South Africa Foundation (SAF) also play an influential role (Van Wyk,

2009:25; Tebele, 2016; Mosala, 2016:57). The public policy implementation stage in the policy cycle is also a crucial stage wherein policy may be subverted (or modified) by competing interests in an effort to advance or protect their specific policy interests (Tebele, 2016:49-50). The series of covert meetings from the 1980s into the transitional period between the leadership core of the ANC, the domestic corporate sector, and representatives of international finance capital sought to influence the socioeconomic policy thinking of the ANC and ultimately the abandonment of nationalization and radical wealth redistribution policies (Terreblanche, 2012:62). Van Wyk (2009:31) concurs that “organized business played a significant role in the transition to democracy.”

In post-apartheid South Africa, the corporatist National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) is a consultative policy platform constituted by organized labour, organized civil society, government, and business leadership (corporate sector). As a key role player in facilitating an inclusive public policy process, this corporatist coalition works synergistically with pertinent government departments such as public works, trade and industry, labour, and finance to enhance socioeconomic policy inclusivity and representativeness (Business Day, 1997c; Gumede, 2008:14; Maseng, 2014:3). However, Van Wyk (2009:31) avers that the corporate sector plays a significant role in this elite coalition and exerts inordinate influence “examples include business elite initiatives to broker meetings with exiled ANC leaders, facilitate meetings between the ANC and the NP government, assist in defining developmental goals, act as a clearinghouse for economic policy.” With the dominant and influential role of the corporate sector (economic oligarchy) in the corporatist policy-making mechanism discussed above, it can be argued that economic policy in South Africa is a rapport between the political and corporate elite. Thus, GEAR and BEE are outcomes of this corporatist-style elitism (Van Wyk, 2009; Mbeki, 2009a; Terreblanche, 2012).

Forging ahead, the GEAR and BEE policies are comprehensively discussed and critiqued in the literature review which is chapter three of this study. These policy documents are only analyzed briefly in this chapter. The review of the literature in chapter three reveals that these neoliberal policies have not significantly contributed toward ending the triad of poverty, unemployment, and inequality through capitalist class creation (Sokomani, 2010:178; Madi, 2016:202-3). Friedman (1997) describes the black patriotic capitalist bourgeoisie as a “business class which will share government’s enthusiasm for majority interests and also for building a new society.” This socially responsible capitalist class conscientized politically by the ANC, carries a moral philosophy that identifies with the interests of the black majority (Southall,

2004:314-5; Capps, 2012:320). However, this study will illustrate how this class project has created a cobweb of conflicting interests and corrupt patronage networks which are unpatriotic (Sokomani, 2010:178).

Friedman (2010:163) notes that in the South African democratic system the rules of the game are determined by a few big corporations and special interests in control of large resources. Large corporations acquire access and influence on public policy by extending resources to the political elite and financing the campaigns of political parties. The linkage between corruption scandals and private corporate funding advances the argument that covert corporate donations have an eroding effect on the quality and experience of a vigorous democracy (Friedman, 2010:164-5). Furthermore, the ANC's contentious fundraising schemes compromise the policy independence of the party and undermine public institutions effectively acting as a buffer to far-reaching redistributive public policy which will span the inequality gap, instead, it forms a corporatocracy – an unelected ruling elite (Klein, 2007:15; Sokomani, 2010:175-7; Davis, 2015:397).

Against the backdrop above, it is only necessary that the study does justice to itself by providing a definition of the concept: the corporatocracy, before proceeding further. Perkins (2014) defines a corporatocracy as a comprehensive international network of capitalism's biggest and most profitable industries and their owners. This network is composed of a nexus between large corporations, major banks (and the financial sector), and the governing elite, the network exists to serve the global empire's capitalist interests. Paramount in this unelected power alliance (power structure) between political power, economic capital, and financial assets is the preservation of the global empire and the egregious human rights violations in the developing world. Perkins (2014) further opines that the corporatocracy's mode of operation is synonymous with that of the Mafia, the influence and control of governments is derived from the practice of predatory lending. The amount and price of the debts are set such that full repayment is impossible. When repayment is impossible natural and human resources are exploited, the environment is polluted, biodiversity and plant life are destroyed by large mining corporations, and heritage sites, and ancient cultural artefacts are obliterated for commercial reasons of the global empire (Klein, 2007:11-2; Perkins, 2014).

Research Questions

The primary question that this study seeks to answer is: does corporate power influence South Africa's public policy? The secondary question is: how do private corporate donations permit

the influence of South Africa's public policy? The study answers these questions by, conducting an analysis of how the BEE policy of placing governing-party leaders on major corporate boards has influenced South Africa's public policy. The study also examines the effects of private corporate donations made to public office bearers from the governing party as a factor that permits corporate influence on South Africa's public policy. Furthermore, the study also explores why the ANC with its seemingly progressive stance and history is susceptible to following neoliberal policies pushed for by political forces largely but not exclusively outside the party in the industries described to be the target of redistribution.

Problem Statement

Post-apartheid South African society is ravaged by the triple challenge of structural unemployment 34.4% (BusinessTech, 2021) and underemployment, the widening gulf between the rich and the poor with a 0.67 Gini-Coefficient (Statistics South Africa, 2020), and dire poverty 55.5% (Omarjee, 2017). Bond (2006:19) postulates that more than 50% of the population located in former ethnic homelands live in abject poverty intensified by inadequate basic service delivery. Moreover, more than 90% of blacks are classified as poor while whites comprise less than 1% of the category. The "elite pact" meant that the transformation agenda would be advanced through the judicious use of public policy by the governing party (Mbeki, 2009a:74).

After an active engagement with the literature reviewed in chapter three, this study identified an under-researched point of entry in the academic conversation. The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, Act 46 of 2013 as amended (B-BEE), construed in this study as the creation of a black capitalist class, under the auspices of the neoliberal GEAR, accompanied by unregulated private corporate donations to the governing-party give rise to the exertion of corporate (private) interests on the governing black political elite. Moreover, the limited research on private party financing gives rise to the undertaking of this study, from its previously mentioned unique angle of analysis. Furthermore, this study tackles the research question from an interesting angle, that is: why the ANC has not confronted corporate power since the day they occupied office in 1994.

The 1996 GEAR macroeconomic policy and B-BBEE are remedies to the aforementioned social crises. However, the formula for transformation contained in these policy documents is unsuitable for the dualistic South African economic landscape inherited from colonialism and apartheid capitalism. An emphasis on high economic growth and globalization would not

facilitate fundamental structural transformation in the 1st economy. Moreover, post-apartheid economic policy was crafted by the governing elite under immense pressure (guidance) from the corporate sector and BWI (Terreblanche, 2002:424; Prevost, 2006:173; Bond, 2007:128). Davis (2015:397) argues that the intermingling between state bureaucrats, the managerial elite of the corporate sector and the governing-party political elite through “networking” and sharing tables on corporate boards form an unelected power elite. In simpler terms, a meeting of the powerful elite in society, those in politics, corporate and government and subsequent conflation of their interests mean that the democratic decision-making will be undermined.

Corporate power acquired inordinate influence on public policy through the co-option of the black political elite using the B-BBEE vehicle permitted by the government’s GEAR endorsed neoliberal agenda and the private funding of the ANC. B-BBEE integrates the political elite into the economic structure of dominance, thereby rendering them defenders of that structure. The nexus of political power and material accumulation result in a skewed concentration of wealth in a narrow black political elite while the interests of the public are deferred. Path-breaking public policy which yields social transformation is stalled by the private interests of corporate power which hold a monopoly on the economy’s most productive sectors, such as the mining industry. What is more, the need for the governing party to secure funding to win re-election, the need for corporate investment and business to finance public projects contained in the government public policy are also some of the key elements that entangle public and corporate interests’ further potholing the development of transformative public policy which is necessitated by the triple challenge.

Key Unit of Analysis and the Focus of the Study

The key unit of analysis for the purposes of this study is the GEAR macroeconomic policy, the redress legislation B-BBEE or BEE and private corporate donations made to public office bearers and the governing party. The previously mentioned policy documents are the major entities that this study analyses. The literature engaged affirms that the GEAR policy marked the full embrace of neoliberal economic policy in South Africa with an emphasis on growth to achieve redistribution, as opposed to redistribution to achieve growth, this is why GEAR is a unit analysed in this study (Terreblanche, 2002; Van Wyk, 2009:23; Terreblanche, 2012). Therefore, fundamentally restructuring the economy is a task that is outsourced to the “markets”. It should be borne in mind that, in the study “BEE” is used to refer to the policy agenda of the public sector and “B-BBEE” is used to refer to the promulgated legislation – the outcome of the political process. Therefore, in the study BEE may be used to refer to the

contents of B-BBEE and its subordinate clauses – affirmative action and affirmative procurement.

Economic disparities and entrenched inequalities continue to act as stumbling blocks to building an economy that is inclusive and accessible to all South Africans. Consequently, the economy anchored on macroeconomic stabilization to realize accelerated growth has yet to perform optimally. B-BBEE is an economic growth strategy that seeks to redress the uneven socio-economic development and the vast racial and gender inequalities which characterize the post-apartheid political-economic landscape (Department of Trade and Industry [DTI], 2003:3-4). The B-BBEE policy embodies a corporatist approach to public policy in an endeavour to attain guaranteed cooperation from the corporate sector, white and black business leadership, civil society and trade unions (NEDLAC).

BEE is an instrument of corrective government intervention which seeks to provide blacks entry into the mainstream and productive economy through an array of policy instruments contained in the B-BBEE legislation (DTI, 2003:6). As pointed out earlier, GEAR provides the neoliberal (market) national economic policy paradigm that promises growth as a means to obtaining redistribution. B-BBEE is then the specific policy instrument that will deracialize capitalism and redistribute wealth, by creating a black capitalist and middle class. However, this study argues that neoliberal assumptions regarding redistribution and private party funding have not resulted in GEAR's policy objectives. B-BBEE and its associated legislation (outlined in chapter four) have created a politically connected business class that is susceptible to corporate influence and a bureaucracy prone to venality. These policies promise things they cannot achieve and further exacerbate the problems faced by South Africa's economy, the widening wealth gap and corporate influence on public policy (permitted by private corporate donations) that is a constraint to meeting redistributive policy objectives. The above serves as reasons for analysing these two policy documents which fall under the timeline analysed by this study.

The inordinate influence exerted by corporate power through covert party donations, personal loans to political heavyweights or bureaucrats and the empowerment of leading figures in the governing-Tripartite Alliance is analysed by this study in order to understand the means through which corporate power influences public policy. Integral to this assessment is an analysis of the effects of the ANC's questionable fundraising mechanisms which tend to culminate in news media controversy which exposes political corruption, corporate fraud and

money laundering. In a few words, an analysis of the influence of corporate money on the political system and/or process. Terreblanche (2002:55) asserts that “we can describe the South African corporate sector as a first-world oasis in an African desert.” With the hegemonic industry control of the corporate sector accounted for above and the subsequent political influence, it can thus be argued that transformative public policy is impeded by the pernicious influence of corporate party funding which supervises socioeconomic policy direction. The key focus of this study is the complex interplay between corporate power and public policy in South Africa from 1996 to 2014. GEAR, B-BBEE and the influence of private corporate donations on major political parties are the units analysed to meet the research aims.

Purpose of the Study

Against the backdrop of the problem statement and the study’s focus outlined above. With the developments in the transitional period, neoliberal triumphalism, CODESA, and the elite compromise including the TEC and the Government of National Unity (GNU), this study seeks to analyse whether corporate power (economic oligarchy) has managed to influence South Africa’s public policy in the period 1996 to 2014. This study explores how the GEAR strategy and B-BBEE policy may have been conduits for the exertion of inordinate influence by corporate power on public policy in South Africa. This study also assesses private (secret) corporate donations in South Africa’s unregulated party funding regime as a potential factor that permits the exertion of undue influence on public office bearers and ultimately public policy.

Moreover, this study explores the idea that: B-BBEE may inadvertently condone the creation of a politically connected black business class that creates a cobweb of conflicting interests between the party (ANC) and the state and established white corporations. Collaboration or networking between the governing-party leadership, public office bearers, BEE tycoons and corporate sector representatives has the potential to subvert the public interest and public policy (Davis, 2015:397). This study particularly argues that the creation of a politically connected business class through B-BBEE and unregulated private corporate donations to public office bearers and the governing party influences South Africa’s public policy (Friedman, 1997; Van Wyk, 2009:14; Terreblanche, 2012:62). The study’s position is based on the postulation that, the economic oligarchy has historically dispensed assets, resources and wealth to the political elite stemming from the transitional period and persisting into the democratic dispensation (Friedman, 2010:163). City Press (2007a) espouses that the “apartheid business elite, on the

other hand, was desperately in need of validation and saw an opportunity to ingratiate itself with the emerging elite – so it offered patronage to this group.”

As the triple challenge peculiar to South Africa persists, the study investigates whether corporate (inordinate) influence has entered into South African public policy. As Knight (2014:24) and Madi (2016:3) have indicated that the wealth chasm has not changed dramatically since 1994, access to wealth for a select clique of politically connected South Africans and private corporate donations may have convinced public office bearers and the governing party to not pursue public policies designed to fundamentally span the wealth gap. Simpler, B-BBEE as construed by this study and private corporate donations may be the chief influences which prohibit the pursuit and effective implementation of alternative public policies. An autonomous public policy would be one that advances fundamental transformation and redistributions of wealth in society in the industrial and mining industries. Independent from special interests of the corporate sector which stand to benefit from a continuation of the status quo. As stated in the problem statement, the limited research on private party funding gives rise to the undertaking of this study, in order to contribute to the existing literature. It should be noted that this study uses theory (elite theory of public policy and the policy cycle, which are discussed in chapter two) to make the argument highlighted above. Alternatively, this is a theory-informed analysis and not a causation study.

Aims and/or Goals of the Study

The aims of this study are as follows:

- i. The primary aim of this study is to establish whether corporate power influences public policy in South Africa or not.
- ii. The secondary aim is to establish in what way has corporate power used private donations to influence public policy in South Africa.

The previously mentioned research aims will be achieved by meeting the objectives which follow.

Objectives of the Study and Research Design

In this section, the aims outlined above are broken down into objectives that operationalize the overarching questions probed by this study. The objectives of this study are as follows:

- i. To investigate if corporate power influences South Africa’s public policy.

- ii. To assess the influence of private corporate donations on South Africa's public policy.

The above-mentioned objectives flow logically, in-sync with the purpose of the study, the first investigates the influence of corporate power on public policy and if so, the second assesses the extent to which influence is permitted by private corporate donations on public policy under South Africa's unregulated party funding regime. Corporate power secures its policy interests (or discredits alternative policies) through relationship building and favour trading with the political elite that occupy public office with access to state resources, and by making generous private corporate donations to public office bearers (Southall, 2004; Doan and Weldon, 2012; Beresford, 2015). The previously mentioned, focus and operationalize the study and provide the conceptual guide to answering the research questions by meeting these objectives. The aims and objectives of the study are chiefly concerned with establishing whether corporate power exerts influence on public policy in South Africa or not.

The study achieves the above-mentioned research objectives through the employ of a descriptive research design. Descriptive research vividly paints a picture of a particular phenomenon. Moreover, descriptive research commences with an accurate description of an issue or problem and the logical conclusion of the study is an answer to the research question. Therefore, the study commences with a detailed description of the research problem and the question and then proceeds to explicitly (and descriptively) answer the overarching question probed by this study. Thus, descriptive research is suitable for the analysis of policy and documentary evidence (Neuman, 2011:38). The study employs document analysis as the appropriate research methodology, the documentary data sources analysed include newspaper articles, policy reports and government publications that were purposively collected and selected to meet the study's objectives. In this section, only a cursory account is provided for the design and methodology employed by this study, as an entire chapter is dedicated to unpacking and discussing the research design and methodology.

Significance of the Study

The study undertakes an in-depth analysis of the antagonistic relationship between corporate power and public policy in South Africa in the form of descriptive research. The study seeks to examine the effect of the interplay between the two variables with a viewpoint to provide a new perspective on the understanding of this relationship within South Africa's political economy. The study seeks to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the analysis of

the variables examined by the research, existing knowledge on the subject matter is synthesized and a new perspective is provided.

The elite theory of public policy is the theory that will frame the study, Anyebe (2018:10) argues that “the essential argument of elite theory is that public policy is not determined by the demands and actions of the people or the masses but rather by a ruling elite whose preferences are carried into effect by political officials and agencies.” The application of elite theory aids understanding of public policy process and outcome. Furthermore, elite theory is useful because it provides an analytical account or logical justification of the actions and decisions taken by the policy elite which shapes and influences the final public policy outcome. Finally, the elite theory is employed to bring to the fore corporate power’s influence on public policy, which occurs either in the policy-making process or through subversion of existing policy. The theory of elitist public policy provides the researcher with the appropriate frame for undertaking an analysis that examines the complex interplay between policy actors (elites) in the South African public policy arena in the period 1996 to 2014.

Limitations of the Study

As a consequence of the wide-ranging nature of the public sector, the focus of this research through its time and resource limitations will only be an eighteen-year timeline from the year 1996 to 2014. The timeframe of the study correlates with the key focus area which is the 1996 GEAR policy, the B-BBEE legislation, private corporate donations and the influence they permit on public policy. Corporate power which the study equates to the owners of the MEC is composed of a few large powerful mega-corporations and/or conglomerates at the heart of the South African economy (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996; Mbeki, 2009a; Mbeki, 2009b). Consequently, the public policy documents analysed by this study are mainly focused on the mining and financial sector (MEC) which have been targeted for redistribution and transformation. Thompson and Wissink (2018:33) argue that the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) which replaced GEAR in 2006, the New Growth Path (NGP) launched in 2010 and the National Development Plan (NDP) vision 2030 endorsed in 2012 are all macroeconomic policy frameworks that largely mirror the pro-market or neoliberal growth trajectory of the 1996 GEAR strategy.

Capps (2012:320) asserts that GEAR was a resolute indication of the move towards pro-market neoliberal reforms as an alternative to the relatively interventionist RDP. Bond (2006:40-2) concurs that GEAR marked the beginning of the neoliberal policy dispensation in post-

apartheid South Africa. Edozie (2008:57) states that “GEAR became the cornerstone of the new democracy’s economic policy.” Tangri and Southall (2008:711) further echo that ASGISA as an economic plan sought to re-emphasize the state’s market-led development premised on high economic growth, investment attraction and the avoidance of onerous BEE prescriptions on the private sector. The different deployments of macroeconomic policy instruments to combat the triple challenge and achieve socio-economic redistribution have not dramatically deviated from GEAR’s neoliberal growth development model (Thompson and Wissink; 2018:33). Hence it is not necessary to critically discuss the successive policy frameworks post GEAR.

The above postulations underpin the rationale for the study’s scope which is limited to an analysis of the GEAR and B-BBEE policy as well as major private-party funding prevalent under liberal democracy. Of equal importance, is that the paucity of scholarly literature on private party funding with a focus on assessing corporate influence was another limitation that was countered by using newspaper articles, policy documents and government publications. Newspaper articles were not used as a standalone data source and hence this study’s design is not a media analysis, which is a subset of content analysis (Jupp, 2006), this study uses thematic analysis in order to thematically highlight conduits of corporate influence on public policy in South Africa. Limitations in the design and methodology chapter are further provided as well as in the conclusions and recommendations chapter. The analysis of power relations in this study is thus conducted through the triangulation of three data sources as already mentioned above. South African print media prior to the 1994 democratic breakthrough was largely sponsored by the MEC and the apartheid regime. These media houses produced content that was not critical of the regime. Critical print media houses not under the political and economic umbrella of the apartheid regime and the MEC saw their financial sponsoring plummet and most of these print media houses dissolved, this was especially the case in the period of transition (1990 – 1994) (Wasserman and de Beer, 2005). Wasserman and de Beer (2005:38) posit that “the result was an industry largely operating on free-market principles and according to neo-liberal functionalist logic, whilst market segmentation displayed continuities with the societal polarisations of the past.”

Moreover, the use of media analysis as a research design was avoided because of the relative accuracy of (newspapers) print media in South Africa which is tilted towards the corporate sector, elite-centric or pro-right wing (McMichael, 2020). “Much of South African media is

written from a technocratic and indeed elitist perspective, which fails to address how dismal and grim life is for ordinary people (McMichael, 2020).” Wasserman and de Beer (2005:39) point out that in the first ten years of democratisation (1994 to 2004) the media sector has been open to the workings of neoliberal economics, BEE deals, and globalisation. This opening up increased (market) competitiveness in the largely neo-liberalised media sector that led to the “tabloidization” of the print media, sensationalism, and increasingly right-wing political positions. The study analyses corporate power’s intent and action as well as the responses of the governing party. This is a consequence of South Africa’s dominant party system (Edozie, 2008:62; Maseng, 2014:3-4). It must be highlighted at this juncture that, throughout this dissertation (unless clearly stated otherwise) the discussion refers to public office bearers or public officials from the governing party. It is assumed that because the ANC has been in governmental power throughout this study’s timeline, occupying most if not all positions in the three arms of government through cadre deployment, the study refers to the ANC-led government and/or governing party in the analysis. Because most of the public office bearers are deployed or appointed by the ANC as the dominant party (through cadre deployment into government bureaucracy or SOEs) into public office. Therefore, the influence exerted on the governing-ANC largely spills-over into the roles and functions performed by the public office-bearer. This is a practicality of the dominant party system (Hirsch, 2005:65; Thompson, 2014:600; Maseng, 2014:3-4; Beresford, 2015:226).

Butler (2010:3) posits that the dominant party’s access to public financial resources and private corporate donations can make it impossible for opposition parties to compete. Beresford (2015:232) further asserts that “as a dominant party facing very weak opposition, the ANC had often succumbed to the ‘sins of incumbency’ while in office, and that ‘dishonest wealth accumulation’ had become a mainstay of party activity.” Notwithstanding arguments made by Booysen (2011:1048-9) that under the Thabo Mbeki presidency (1999 to 2008) there was a distance or separation between the state and the ANC. Power was centralised to the president (state) and the cabinet with a viewpoint to achieve policy coordination, governance, and delivery performance. However, the isolation of the top leadership of the ANC, the tripartite alliance partners, and the wings of the ANC from the presidential power centre proved to be a poisoned chalice for Mbeki and ultimately led to his ousting from state and ANC presidency in 2008 (Prevost, 2006:174). The close association of the ANC and government as the dominant party is justified because governors are sourced from the ANC and public policy is informed by the manifesto of the party in governance as stated by Moran, Rein and Goodin (2006) in

chapter two (also see Beresford, 2015:232-3 in chapter three). This point is further advanced in chapter six by Hirsch (2005:63); Beresford (2015:232-3) and McKinley (2017:5).

Brief Chapter Overview

- **Chapter 1: The introduction and contextualization of the study**

This chapter provided the introduction of the study, the background to the research problem, questions, problem statement, key unit of analysis, the purpose of the study, aims, objectives, significance and limitations of the study.

- **Chapter 2: The conceptual and theoretical framework**

This chapter will outline the critical theories and concepts that are in this study. Central to this chapter is the theoretical and conceptual perspective which guides and focuses the analysis. Furthermore, critical concepts are descriptively described and placed in the research context in order to deepen understanding and augment the theoretical weight of the study.

- **Chapter 3: The literature review**

The literature review will be given primary focus as it entails sources that were used to complete this study. This chapter provides a detailed and descriptive discussion of the arguments presented by key authors in political economy or subject matter experts of the study's focus. The researcher thus locates the significance of this study in the process and this uniqueness is presented and discussed in chapters five and six. The bone-marrow of this chapter will be centred on the influence corporate power exerted on public policy in South Africa, from 1996 to 2014.

- **Chapter 4: Research design and methodology**

This chapter will unpack the design and methodology employed in the study. The research approach appropriate for this study is the qualitative method. The research design is descriptive research. The preferred research methodology is document analysis that utilizes secondary data which includes newspaper articles, policy reports and government publications. The method of data collection, methodology, design and approach employed is synergistic and flows logically to enable the study to meet its research objectives and ultimately answer the research questions. Documentary data selected is analysed through (theoretical) thematic analysis.

- **Chapter 5: The presentation of findings and analysis: power relations between the political elite and powerful corporations**

This chapter presents the findings of the study and a brief analysis. The findings are a subsequent outcome of the data collection or selection process. These findings are constitutive of raw data, including newspaper articles, policy reports and government publications that provide the dominant policy debates and narrative in the news media. Equally important is that this chapter illustrates the symbiotic relationship between corporate power (influence) and public policy.

- **Chapter 6: The discussion of findings: the emergence of a South African corporatocracy**

This chapter will provide a detailed discussion and interpretation of the research findings thematically highlighting corporate power's influence on South Africa's public policy. The detailed discussion is anchored in the research questions and research objectives. Furthermore, the key units analysed by the study are a significant focus of why the ANC and the opposition have not pursued transformative and redistributive public policy. The consistent growth of the power and influence of the corporate sector are discussed to consolidate the narrative of a "corporatocracy" in its moderate stages.

- **Chapter 7: Final conclusions and recommendations**

This chapter will provide an analysis of the data presented in chapters five and six and will present findings to the questions entailed in chapter one. This chapter will also provide a conclusion and recommendations for further research.

Concluding Remarks

The following chapter encompasses the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study: corporate power and/or influence and the elite theory of public policy. This framework places the phenomenon under investigation in perspective and focuses the argument presented by the study.

Chapter 2: The Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Introduction

The intent of this chapter is to provide a critical analysis and discussion of the conceptual and theoretical framework. Beginning with the conceptual framework: which seeks to clearly define and measure (conceptualisation) key concepts and constructs of this study such as corporate power and public policy; in order to ascertain their relationship in connection to the research problem, context, and questions, and to broaden understanding of the phenomenon investigated. The theoretical framework: the elitist theory of public policy seeks to provide a perspective that guides, informs, and focuses the research; the theoretical framework further provides an organised and structured view of social phenomenon (corporate influence) as well as a theory-based explanation of that phenomenon (Ngulube, Mathipha and Gumbo, 2015). The theoretical framework provides an interpretation of research findings while the conceptual framework provides a conceptualised research conclusion (Ngulube et al. 2015:54-5).

The organisation of this chapter entails a conceptual discussion of corporate power, its measure and influence, and the creation of an opaque corporatocracy (corporations, banks and governments) birthed by neoliberalism and globalisation (Perkins, 2014:55-6). The section on the theoretical perspective encompasses a description of public policy, the policy cycle or process, with a specific focus on agenda-setting and public policy implementation. The study focuses particularly on these two policymaking stages because it is precisely here wherein non-state actors (corporate sector) control of financial resources is used to influence public policy (Khan, Meghani, Liverani, Roychowdhury and Parkhurst, 2018:215). This is followed by a discussion on the elitist approach to public policy in South Africa, thereby providing an account of the theory's bearing on the study. This is finalised by a conclusive argument that the powerful corporate elite (economic oligarchy) exerts their power in order to control the public policy process and shape and influence the final policy outcome through the employ of various tactics (Khan et al., 2018; Nyberg, 2021).

Conceptual Framework

Corporate Power and/or Influence

Keeping in mind the comprehensive definition of the corporation and corporate power provided by (Davis, 2015:395) in the preceding chapter, Monbiot (2014) argues that corporate power in the modern political establishment is observable through the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the public policy interests and the nullification or vilification of coherent

policy alternatives. It should be noted that this section discusses corporate power in relation to the research context and question, put differently this section provides a conceptualisation of the study. Monbiot (2014) avers that corporate power encompasses the “corrupting influence that prevents parties from connecting with the public, distorts spending and tax decisions, and limits the scope of democracy.” Corporate power’s influence is responsible for among other things the privatisation of SOEs, public sector outsourcing and its subsequent reduction including the deregulation of the labour market and flexible environmental policy (Doan and Weldon, 2012:6; Statva, 2012:3; Davis, 2015:396; Milton ([s.a.]:417-8).

Monbiot (2014) espouses that influence is acquired through covert corporate donations to major political parties by wealthy individuals or large corporations. Alternatively, influence is obtained through relationship building with political and public office bearers by building trust and reciprocating favours or aid. Hence governing-party political heavyweights and senior public officials often retire into top-tier corporate positions such as the boards of directors of corporate giants, in industries they once regulated or headed when in ministerial portfolios (Doan and Weldon, 2012:26; Davis, 2015:396). Cave and Rowell (2014) concur that “access to politicians can be bought. It is not a cash deal, rather an investment is made in the relationship.” Corporations either hire or empower (BEE) retired politicians, their family members or friends effectively establishing a relationship of favour trading that breeds negative patron-client relations. With access to public officials acquired the door is opened for corporations to exert their influence through uninterrupted ear time or airtime with prominent ANC leadership, cabinet ministers and even Director Generals (DG’s) who are obligated to the corporate donor or may be unable to refuse a request from a corporate executive or overlord (Butler, 2010:16; Cave and Rowell, 2014; Nyberg, 2021).

February and Calland (2007); Edozie (2008); Buhlungu and Tshoaedi (2013:110); Cave and Rowell (2014) and Monbiot (2014) concur that the revolving door between governing-party, public office and corporate sector is a conduit for the corrupting influence of corporate power and the distortion of democratic choice and/or political equality. Former trade union high-profile leaders such as Cyril Ramaphosa, Sakumzi Saki Macozoma, Tokyo Sexwale, James Motlatsi and Mzilikazi Mzi Khumalo became magnates through BEE cadre deployment and big empowerment deals. These individuals still wield massive political power and influence, for instance at the time of writing Cyril Ramaphosa was the President of South Africa (Bond, 2006:44; Southall, 2007:74-5). The Guardian (2014) has reported that “reforms in the areas of

party funding and lobbying, closing the revolving door between government and corporations” are requisite to discontinue the corrupting influence of corporate power.

The real power in the contemporary policy paradigm lies with the dominant position gifted to corporate monopolies by a comprador bourgeoisie (Mbeki, 2009a; Monbiot, 2012; Monbiot, 2013). Elite pacts struck before and after the democratic transition between the ANC elite, the NP and the corporate sector that encompasses the TEC, GNU, GEAR, NEDLAC, globalisation especially capital mobility, the independence of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and BEE constitute the elite compromise between the ANC and the MEC-core corporations (Van Wyk, 2009:28-9; Wolff, 2012:62). BEE saw the political elite mentioned earlier in this section provided with directorships, managerial positions, share equity ownership, debt financing and joint-venture empowerment in the largest corporations including AAC, Johnnic Holdings Limited, De Beers Group, Rosslyn Mining and Plant Hire, Gold Fields Limited, Randgold and Exploration and Harmony Gold’s merger with African Rainbow Minerals Gold (ARM gold) (Southall, 2004:324-5). Considering the above, Monbiot (2013) argues that powerful corporations do not only lobby policy but “are part of the nexus of power that creates policy. They face no significant resistance, from either government or opposition.” This is because the financial interests of major parties or their leaders are quenched by corporate giants well acquainted with courting elite party leadership and oiling party election machinery (Fine, 2000; Butler, 2010:16; Fine, 2010:157; Doan and Weldon, 2012:26). The above discussion reveals the true extent of corporate power’s influence on public policy and by extension democratic decision-making.

The measurement of corporate power’s influence on public policy is not limited to domestic political and economic factors because of globalisation in the neoliberal age (Statva, 2012:5; Milton, [s.a]:418). Fine and Saad-Fihlo (2017:688-9) argue that neoliberalism borrows extensively from the monetarist Chicago School of economics led by Milton Friedman. Neoliberalism encompasses state protection of the market freedoms of the property-owning class, the ideology is closely related to democratisation (as opposed to communism and authoritarian rule) privatisation and decentralisation. According to Klein (2007:5) for Milton Friedman and his disciples, the function of the state is limited to the roles performed by its coercive institutions, anything more than that is an encroachment of market freedoms. Consistent with the definition provided by Keskin (2009:95) in chapter one, Fine and Saad-Fihlo (2017:691) briefly define globalisation as the “global restructuring of production.” Globalisation is therefore constitutive of interlocking politico-economic events in nation-states

across the globe including corporate capitalism, the mobility of finance and capital, neoliberal democracy, technological advancements, and capital movements between and among national borders.

Against this backdrop, Monbiot (2014) argues that the globalisation of decision-making is a limitation of neoliberal democracy. He further asserts that under neoliberal globalism public consent is absent and hence the multinational corporation (MNC) and/or international finance capital make business and economic decisions outside the purview of democracy. Veldman (2015) states that globalisation and the operation of the MNC reduce the labour and fiscal policy autonomy of national governments. Fiscal austerity then limits vital government spending on public and socioeconomic infrastructure to curb the excesses of neoliberal capitalism such as significant income inequality and uneven development (Statva, 2012:3). It is corporate capitalism's principle or belief to prescribe that to generate profits the management of corporations should prioritize increasing shareholder value or returns thereby achieving economic growth and creating a trickle-down that will benefit the broader public or stakeholders. Cave and Rowell (2014) posit that "even if the corporate goal is pure, self-interested profit-making, it will be dressed to appear synonymous with the wider, national interest." The necessity for a macroeconomic policy environment favourable to seducing foreign direct investment (FDI) to achieve economic growth and employment creation are illustrative examples of the re-articulation of corporate interests through elite meetings and corporate-friendly public relations (PR) campaigns on popular media (Milton, [s.a.]:426; Klein, 2007; Terreblanche, 2012).

In the neoliberal stage of global capitalism, Milton ([s.a.]:424) defines the corporatocracy as a corporate-politico power nexus that advances the corporate agenda through a state-corporate co-governance structure which largely diminishes the quality, scope and vitality of democracy. Keeping in mind that the financial sector is integral to corporatocracy (Perkins, 2014). The dominance and influence of the corporation coincide with the global political developments post the second World War which include, the Washington Consensus, BWI and neoliberal globalisation (Milton, [s.a.]:425). The corporatocracy has "emerged by hiring intellectuals, by skilful manipulation of political power; by managing media and the press to become compliant (Milton, [s.a.]:426)." Milton ([s.a.]:425-6) further opines that corporations or MNCs in the politico-economic context of neoliberalism and globalisation falsify the facts and concoct a corporate-friendly truth to advance a specific policy agenda. The corporatocracy ratifies treaties through publicly concealed exchanges with the political elite, the endorsed policy

decision is then promoted through the skilful use of PR and popular media to reframe the narrative of the policy (Cave & Rowell, 2014). Furthermore, corporations socially engineer a collective voice, popular support or industry solidarity to advance a specific policy issue through complex lobbying or networking (Mail & Guardian, 2014; Milton, [s.a.]; Cave & Rowell, 2014).

This section has provided sufficient description and explanation of corporate power, the influence of corporations, the nature and extent of this power and influence under neoliberal globalisation and relatively less detail on the impact on democratic decision-making or rigour. The latter and specifically public policy and the theory or model which frames this study is discussed in the following section: the theoretical framework. The length of the conceptualisation is provided with the scope of this study in mind.

Theoretical Framework

Elite Theory of Public Policy

Moving with the definitions for public policy provided by Gumede (2008:8); Maseng (2014) and Mosala (2016:53) in chapter one. In a nutshell, the above authors defined public policy as all known or publicized decisions of government that affect all sections of society under the jurisdiction of that government. Maseng (2014:1) avers that “public policy can therefore be understood as political decisions of government taken through the processes of political participation involving citizens, state and non-state actors.” These decisions or policy choices are related to increasing the welfare and quality of life of the people in connection to the economic and structural legacies of apartheid’s racial capitalism. Public policy originates from the governing party’s election manifesto which reflects the people’s needs, demands and expectations from the government and its public administration or bureaucracy which implements public policy (Moran, Rein and Goodin, 2006). The B-BBEE policy is informed by the government’s agenda to undo the legacies of apartheid (Hirsch, 2005:194; Iheduru, 2008:333). Geurts (2014:6) posits that central to public policymaking is decision-making and achieving or failing to attain policy goals, failure is a result of constraints. Constraints can be attributed to influences from interest groups on the public policy stages (agenda-setting and policy implementation) (Schmitt, 2020:5). Makuru, Kiwanuka, Gilson, Shung-King and Ssengooba (2021:390) concur that the “public interest/altruism, on the other hand, entails ‘the outcomes best serving the long-term survival and well-being of a social collective construed as a public’ sometimes pursued as a moral obligation to improve welfare.”

Schmitt (2020:3-4) states that national policy in the developing world (low- and middle-income countries) is influenced by both national and transnational actors or donors. Donor-recipient power relations are often unequal and this opens the opportunity for the (external) donor to impose on the recipient (often low and middle-income countries with a huge reliance on donor funding) country “policy-based lending” or other conditionalities such as the funding of policy programmes in a vertical policy structure (Khan et al., 2018:215-6). Schmitt (2020:5) asserts that national policymakers in developing countries often design policy under the pressure of powerful external actors with enormous financial, administrative and technical (epistemic) capacity. National policymakers’ ability to withstand this pressure (on public policy) is determined by factors such as the strength and organisation of local political parties, domestic economic conditions and state or administrative capacity. Khan et al. (2018:216) stress that it is critical to understand the (asymmetrical) relationship between donors and policy actors in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) because this brings us closer to national ownership of public policy as opposed to policy priorities and their implementation which are directed by major financial resource groups. Schmitt (2020:8) avers that national policy in the developing world is influenced by a range of powerful external actors such as the World Bank, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the foreign and domestic corporate sector (non-state actors).

However, it should be noted that the influence on public policymaking is also observable in the United States of America (USA) or the developed world, Salaman and Siegfried (1977:1026); Davis (2015:396) and Nyberg (2021:2-3) surmise that in the USA the routine intermingling between corporate magnates and the governing-elite (Congressmen and women, bureaucrats and administrators) qualifies the widespread perception (proposition) that corporate lobbying for the annexation of the public by the private is indeed an actuality. Nyberg (2021:3) argues that the compendium of tactics used by the corporate sector “include providing campaign funding through political action committees (PACs) and partnering with think tanks to shape policy agendas.” Corporations further establish PR departments, employ legal and lobbying services to cement relations with politicians who occupy public office and hence secure their interests in government. In a national economy with intense capital concentrations such as the USA, with monopolies (conglomerate corporations or pyramid structure) and oligopolies in-charge of industries, then corporate political influence (political power of big business) is enlarged (Salaman and Siegfried, 1977:1027; Davis, 2015:395-6; Nyberg, 2021).

Anyebe (2018:8-9) encourages that public policy in developing countries (post-colonial societies or low- and middle-income countries) is largely influenced by the dominant ideology of that specific country. The ideology which impacts South Africa's public policy is one that is redistributive as a result of the country's politico-economic history. Terreblanche (2002:26) states that colonialism, segregation and apartheid are the true causes of the triple challenge, criminality and violence mostly suffered by black Africans. According to Thompson (2014), South Africa's history can be summarised into the colonial period from 1652 to 1909 or 1910, the segregation era from 1910 to 1948 and apartheid capitalism from 1948 to 1994. Seekings and Natrass (2005:2) state that apartheid's racial capitalism stands out in recent history for its blatant systematic brutality in entrenching structural inequality. Gumede (2008:10) argues that it is these socioeconomic ripple effects of the country's colonial and apartheid history against which the ANC fashions its public policy prescriptions to reverse income or wealth inequalities. Iheduru (2008:335) affirms that the ANC took power in 1994 with no experience in government or governance, the party, however, had a history associated with socialist policy orientation which included policies on the nationalisation of monopoly industry and the redistribution of land. Tebele (2016:28) states that affirmative action (BEE) and the policy on land reform are illustrative of redistributive public policy which is influenced by the dominant ideology in South Africa.

The public policy process is constitutive of the policy cycle (stages) without which public policy is non-existent. These stages include problem identification, agenda-setting (selection of issues), policy formulation and decision-making, implementation, and (monitoring and) evaluation (Fisher, Miller and Sidney, 2007; Tebele, 2016:2). The stages of focal concern in this particular study are the agenda-setting and public policy implementation phases. Agenda-setting as defined by Tebele (2016:48) in chapter one, is a process whereby societal issues or problems fiercely compete for a place on the policy agenda wherein various political tactics are employed by policy actors (elites). Birkland (2007:63) argues in the same line and further opines that in the agenda-setting process policy groups (elites) also compete for their preferred articulation of the problem as this means that the solutions will also be decided by this elite group and ultimately hold dominance and credibility in the policy debate, selection and interpretation of problems. It is equally important to note that policy elites also struggle to keep out specific social issues from reaching the agenda or will strive to rather articulate that specific concern in such a manner that serves their immediate interests and lessens the consequences (Maseng, 2014).

Public policy implementation according to Tebele (2016:50) “speaks to the adoption and implementation thereof a formulated/drafted policy.” This is the process situated between policy formulation and evaluation of policy success. In this particular stage of the policy cycle, public policy is seen as a course of action that must be undertaken by the government (department) bureaucracy or administration responsible. The focus on the policy implementation stage is important to keep in mind because policy elites and/or external policy pressures in South Africa have a performance history of barring fundamentally redistributive and transformative policies at both the agenda-setting and policy implementation stages. Although public policy may be deemed redistributive by the governing elite, the effective and efficient implementation of the policy may be constrained or hampered by either the private or business interests of the governing-elite; or the private (commercial) interests of corporations that donate generously to the governing-party in times of elections (Van Wyk, 2009; Butler, 2010; Terreblanche, 2012; Wolf, 2014:62).

Khan et al. (2018:215) aver that “control of financial resources was the most commonly identified route by which donors influenced priority setting and policy implementation. Greater (perceived) technical expertise played an important role in donor influence at the policy formulation stage. Central in the routes of policy influence by non-state actors is the use of financial resources, financial donors determine the agenda (or priorities) by identifying priorities for funding, and donors also determine what information is available regarding the agenda through their allocation of resources to the research or surveys of their preferred topic. The latter then determines the information available to policymakers. In this view, a public policy such as the mining charter may be purported to be redistributive by the national elite, however, implementation can be potholed by interests either than that of the general voting public. The initial leaked mining charter proposed 51% black ownership in the mining sector within a decade, however, due to the dramatic response of international finance capital and massive disinvestment on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) the mining charter was fine-tuned to the preferences of the corporate sector, reducing the 51% to 26% over a decade (Capps, 2012:326-7). Therefore, the final formulation and implementation of the mining charter was influenced (or hampered) largely by corporate interests from its initial form.

Policy Elites

Makuru et al. (2021:389) aver that policy elites are “an organized group of actors defined by [a] combination of skills, access to vital information, social status, economic resources and institutional positions.” The power of elites is a result of (or is sourced from) access or

proximity to vast knowledge resources, technical skills and professionals such as intellectuals, academics and/or policy experts who provide strategic guidance and advice (Thurlow and Jaworski, 2017:245). The corporate elite's possession of financial wealth and positional power emanating from corporate executive or managerial levels as well as the power derived from business leadership (organisations) and linked think-tank organisations (research capacity) further aggrandise the power of the corporate elite (Nyberg, 2021:3). Whereas the power of the political elite emanates from ministerial positions and support for the governing party; therefore, their power derives from political muscle (Pokharel, 2019:171). South Africa's policy consultative forum NEDLAC is composited of state actors (cabinet ministers) and various non-state actors such as business leadership BUSA, trade union federation COSATU, NGOs and organised civil society (policy elites) whom all seek to advance varying or even conflicting interests. However, in this "marketplace of ideas" not every (unorganised and poor) citizen's view is represented, therefore it is only the interests of the elites (and interest groups) who possess sufficient financial resources and social capital that are represented in national policymaking. Furthermore, it is only organised civil society, labour and business with a large membership nationally, research capacity, and an educated (formal and political) leadership with a political currency that participates in public policy forums (Maseng, 2014:3; Nyberg, 2021).

The political accommodation in the transitional period, the GNU's power-sharing arrangement and the appointment of the NP into the finance ministry and the autonomous SARB are indicative of the greater (political and militaristic) power of the old regime and the corporate sectors (MEC) massive financial and economic resource power which sanitised their ability to persuade the penniless political elite without the Soviet Union's support (Friedman, 1997; Terreblanche, 2002:424-5; Prevost, 2006:166; Bond, 2007:128). Makuru et al. (2021:389) argue that policy elites consolidate their policy interests by using their social and economic capital to advance a specific shared policy agenda within a specific industry. Zain (2014) posits that agenda-setting theory entails how mass media presents societal issues or problems that largely inform the dominant narrative, influence public opinion and ultimately determine which issues form part of the public policy agenda. Simpler, the process of agenda-setting involves, identifying the issues regarded as important by mass media, the amount of coverage they receive in accordance with their assigned weight or value, and how the narrative will be painted to the public and policymakers (Zain, 2014; Tebele, 2016:48; also see Milton, [s.a.]:425-6 earlier in this chapter).

Zain (2014) argues that the strategic use of mass media influences or changes political attitudes and behaviour through the determination of the public agenda (which emanates from public opinion on issues of importance). It can therefore be argued that mass media plays an important role in forming and shaping public opinion and ultimately the policy agenda. The employ of the elite theory of public policy is informed by South Africa's policy-making process and mechanism, corporatist NEDLAC (see Gumede, 2008:14 in chapter one; also see Maseng, 2014:3 above). The formation, structure, and workings of NEDLAC are elitist in nature, the poor and powerless masses are represented by a political elite (including mild-mannered COSATU leaders) and the brokers of the corporate elite - BUSA (Rossouw, 2009; Van Wyk, 2009:26). Notwithstanding the involvement of civil society in this corporatist policy forum, however, the political elite in the form of cabinet ministers, organised labour and the representatives of corporations wield relatively more power and thus exert greater influence due to financial and economic resources (Van Wyk, 2009:31). Maseng (2014:3-4) affirms that "large pocketbooks enable both of them [*COSATU and BUSA*] to purchase airtime for broadcasting statements able to influence public opinion. In addition, wealth can facilitate access, and in some instances purchase expensive legal services that enhance participation in government decision making."

The policy interests of the government or the ruling party's policy agenda, enshrined in its election manifesto and founding documents (the NDR and the Freedom Charter) inform and guide the behaviour and actions of government representatives regarding public policy, the common good and the collective will of the people almost always aligned to egalitarian or altruistic forms of justice (Gumede, 2008). However, Mosala (2016; 2017) argues that the pro-market reform-style GEAR and successive macroeconomic policies developed by the government contradict the ANC's stance, that their economic policy-making is inspired by the NDR. Iheduru (2008:339) points out that the ANC-government developed the BEE policy as a strategy for redistribution under the auspices of rent-seeking social groups, such as selectively mobilised foreign and domestic corporations and the new aspirant black bourgeoisie, union and party-linked companies. The policy interests (or motives) of the corporate elite differ greatly from those in the public sector, corporations have no mandate from the people or the public but are inherently dispositioned and motivated to protect and promote business interests (Mariotti, 2020:4). Makuru et al. (2021:388) state that "elites and their actions can sometimes be driven by unwritten personal interests which are contrary to written policy goals."

The Elitism Theory as an Approach to Public Policy in South Africa

The elite theory of public policy is defined by the inordinate influence of the wealthy, educated and political segments of society. Public policy is simply communicated to the illiterate and powerless majority of the people who are deemed apathetic and uninformed by policy elites. Notwithstanding NEDLAC and other mechanisms to facilitate public participation in South Africa, however as already argued above (Van Wyk, 2009:26; Maseng, 2014:3-4) the ordinary (uneducated, unemployed, unorganised, poor) public are not always able to participate in agenda-setting as this is an outlet available to wealthy individuals and organisations, corporations or major financial resource groups and the political elite (Zain, 2014; Bond, 2014b; Milton, [s.a.]). Knight (2014:24) and Madi (2016:3) outlined the unequal wealth distribution in South Africa in the previous chapter. Mariotti (2020:1) affirms that “all the forms of government are essentially oligarchies, who use different values and principles to justify the power struggle and to manipulate the consent of the ruled.” The theory of elitism is anchored on the assumption that power is distributed unequally in any society (economically) and as such those at the higher echelons of social strata hold the privilege to make policy decisions for the masses at the bottom of the barrel (Mosala; 2016:58-9; Anyebe, 2018:9; Pokharel, 2019:171). Anyebe (2018:10) argues that “the essential argument of elite theory is that public policy is not determined by the demands and actions of the people or the masses but rather by a ruling elite whose preferences are carried into effect by political officials and agencies.” In simpler terms, the political elite administers the policy preferences of the economic oligarchy (MEC) which embody and reflect the political and socioeconomic values and principles of the oligarchy – parliamentary democracy, BEE and globalisation (Mbeki, 2009a:74).

The application of elitist theory in attempts to understand the influence of public policy outcomes is appropriate and useful because it provides a detailed account or logical justification of the actions and decisions taken by the policy elite (actors) which shape and influence the final public policy outcome. Furthermore, the elite theory is employed to bring to the fore corporate powers’ influence on public policy in South Africa, from 1996 to 2014 which occurs in the policy-making process (agenda-setting and policy implementation stages). In the agenda-setting and policy implementation stage financial resources play a critical role in the exertion of influence on the policy process; in the policy formulation stage, technical expertise (epistemic power) and administrative capacity are critical to extending influence because there is often a paucity of such resources in LMICs (Khan et al., 2018:218-9). In the

agenda-setting and policy implementation stages, financial resources are crucial because policy areas and interest groups (who marshal these policy areas) identified for funding determine issues that will be placed on the agenda. Moreover, in the implementation stage financial resources (corporate investment) are crucial to the materialisation of the formulated policy (Khan et al., 2018:219). Mariotti (2020:4-5) argues that elite theory seeks to help us understand the structure of power in society, the power of course lies with those who govern and those not directly in government but are competing to secure their policy interests as well (non-state actors). The political elite is in charge of government while the corporate elite is in charge of the economy, these elites are in constant competition regarding who benefits from distributional public policy. In any society wherein elite public policy prevails there is an evident ruling elite that is less numerate and the ruled who are more numerate but possess fewer material and financial resources (see World Population Review, 2021; Knight, 2014:24; Statistics South Africa, 2020 in chapter one).

Anyebe (2018:9) argues that in spite of democratic pluralism and fair political representation “in reality public policy is by and large a mirror image of the ruling elite’s interests.” The higher-income upper classes constitutive of the business class, the educated, the bureaucrats and the national political elite hold the privilege to make public policy decisions and the implementation thereof while the ordinary public (lower-income working class) is excluded from this process. In the South African corporatist public policy landscape, NEDLAC is representative of the previous postulation (Maseng, 2014). Van Wyk (2009:9) avers that the elite pact and the GNU were responsible for corporatist-style public policymaking, including NEDLAC, GEAR, BEE, privatisation and Presidential Working Groups – state-business coalitions (Van Wyk, 2009:26). The elite (democratisation) pact, TEC and GNU are borne out of pressure or influence from BWI, international pressure groups, the domestic and global corporate sector during the period of transition (Terreblanche, 2012:63-4).

Mosala (2016:60) asserts that South Africa’s NEDLAC which is a public policy participatory mechanism is a corporatist arrangement that seeks to facilitate harmonious consensus between competing policy actors and interests. In other words, NEDLAC is a vehicle that seeks to reconcile different and conflicting interests. Key public policy decisions in South Africa such as the TEC, GNU, the independence of the SARB, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) are outcomes of corporatist elite pacts or choices between the ANC elite, the NP and its associated corporate sector – the MEC (Van Wyk, 2009:18-9; Terreblanche, 2012:64). The RDP and the GEAR policy, are also outcomes of a state-capital dialectical relationship fostered

by NEDLAC and the ANC elite's reconciliatory stance towards the corporate sector. Van Wyk (2009:22) posits that "the RDP and Mandela's statement signalled the ANC's departure from some of the key ideological positions of the Freedom Charter, resulting, according to some, in the ANC's 'capitulation' to big business." Maseng (2014:3) operationalises the previous postulation, Business Unity South Africa (BUSA) as an interest group in NEDLAC carries the interests of the corporate sector in the policy consultative forum and hence with the financial resources and economic control wielded by the business representative it has considerable potential to influence public policy process in South Africa. The foregoing postulation is exacerbated by the alliance of South African corporate monopolies in mining, energy and finance – the MEC – to secure, protect and promote their interests in NEDLAC (Van Wyk 2009).

Maseng (2014:3) further argues that "the wealthy BUSA, therefore, has considerable ability to influence public policy in South Africa." Public-Private Partnership's (PPP's) privatisation and commercialisation of SOEs and their alignment to BEE (through cadre deployment) are public policy outcomes also determined by the knowledgeable (corporate and political) elite who are distinguished by aptitude, large financial resources, positional power, cunning or ability. The privatisation policy in all its forms is a state strategy to create a class of politically connected black capitalists through BEE's preferential procurement and empowerment deals with white corporations. PPPs and the BEE policy are progressive only for black capitalists (and established corporations) commanding political clout (Bond, 2006:45; Steyn, 2007; Padayachee and Fine, 2019:166). Van Wyk (2009:28-9) affirms that affirmative action and BEE "consisted of a trade-off between maintaining macroeconomic stability and transferring economic power to black South Africans. With continued [*creation of an*] elite pact, large South African corporations either voluntarily unbundled, and/or appointed ANC elites to their boards." The public policy values imparted by the governing elite create incremental reforms, especially on socioeconomic policy issues as opposed to the masses' radical policy demands contained in the Freedom Charter and the NDR (Mosala, 2017). The policy direction is hierarchical, flowing from the top (corporate sector and national government) down to the masses (ordinary public). From the elite theory's perspective, the policy process and outcome are analogous to that of a tyranny of the powerful in society over the powerless (Anyebe, 2018:10; Pokharel, 2019:172; Mariotti, 2020:1).

Anyebe (2018:11) states that an affluent class of the owners of America's largest corporations are indirectly in control or largely influence the political system including electoral politics,

political appointments, and deployments as well as public policy decisions taken in Congress. This study argues along the same line regarding the MEC (economic oligarchy), which is the bedrock of the South African economy (Fine and Rustonjee, 1996). The MEC-core corporations have a track record of extending patronage to the political elite in the form of assets, resources, and wealth in key moments in history and in the contemporary period, especially through the covert corporate funding of the election campaigns of the governing party (Van Wyk, 2009:10; Friedman, 2010:158; Terreblanche, 2012:62-3; Wolff, 2014:60). Makuru et al. (2021:390) assert that “policy outputs arising from elite decision-making often reflect their interests because they exert power to influence decisions during the policy process. Power is operationalised as the ability to exercise influence and control over the outcomes (decisions) of the policy process.”

Essentially elite theory provides that the governing elite are influenced or pressured by (either subtly or coercively) the corporate sector in the elitist policy-making model (Anyebe, 2018:10). Makuru et al. (2021:388) assert that “pursuing the public interest requires recognising and seeking to limit the influence of other interests over policy-making.” In order to narrow the wealth gap in a highly unequal society such as South Africa identified by the triple challenge and huge differences in household expenditure demarcated by race, as illustrated by Knight (2014:24) and Bond (2006:19) in chapter one, achievement of redistributive or empowerment legislation and policy is requisite. The corporate sector’s manipulation of politics, politicians and governance style is a constraint toward meeting (B-BBEE) policy objectives and detaches the governing elite from the public. The corporate sector’s (economic oligarchy) undue manipulation of the public policy process (in the agenda-setting and policy implementation stage) thereby influencing and shaping the outcome is permitted by an unregulated political funding regime, contentious funding schemes of the ANC, the self-interests or acquisitiveness of the governing elite and the revolving door opened by BEE.

A public policy process responsive to the demands of the masses would remove the pervasive linkage between the large corporate sector and the political elite which subordinates politics to big capital; in this way, the Gini coefficient would be closer to zero (Anyebe, 2018; Makuru, et al. 2021). Therefore, it has become clear here that elite theory is a policy model which prevails in South Africa that accentuates the vulnerability of the state in the policy-making environment, that is, the financial, technical (epistemic) and administrative resources of the corporate sector enable it to exert (greater) influence in the public policy process (Maseng,

2014:3; Anyebe, 2018:10; Khan et al., 2018:218-9; Nyberg, 2021:2-3). While corporate power is the ability by large corporations to exercise influence on public policy as a result of the possession of large financial and hegemonic control of the most productive industries in a national economy. This power is observable in the influence of the public policy process (Doan and Weldon, 2012:6; Davis, 2015:395; Makuru et al., 2021:390). Thus elite theory and corporate power are not divergent views, instead, they are closely related but not the same as has been motivated above. The elite theory provides for a policy model or approach, while corporate power is the political influence of large corporations.

Pokharel (2019:173) argues that “elite groups consist of not only of prestigious and ‘established’ leaders – top politicians, important businessmen, high-level civil servants, senior military officers – but also” organised civil society and trade union leadership. Elite groups analysed by this study include the owners of the largest corporations in South Africa, the MEC with enormous financial and economic resources to exert influence on the second group – the governing elite, armed with positional power that stems out of political appointments and deployments. Keeping in mind the definition provided by Davis (2015:395) in chapter one of corporate power, the economic power wielded by mega-corporations at the commanding heights (MEC) can easily translate into political or public policy influence (Doan and Weldon, 2012:6). Elite theory of public policy enhances the researcher’s ability to investigate and explore corporate power’s influence (particularly at the two policy stages, agenda-setting and policy implementation) on public policy in South Africa, 1996-2014. Therefore, although there are numerous policy elites in the elite policymaking model, the corporate sector wields more influence as a result of its “financial resources, technical expertise and indirect financial and political incentives (Khan et al., 2018:215).” Elite theory as an analytical framework provides the researcher with an angle on the research questions. That is, South Africa’s public policy model is elitist and this is evident in the corporatist NEDLAC wherein corporate power exerts greater influence (as opposed to other policy elites) in the public policy process (Van Wyk, 2009:9; Terreblanche, 2012:64). Pokharel (2019:176) posits that the elite theory “has certain implications for understanding policy analysis.”

Concluding remarks

In this chapter, a conceptual explanation of corporate power and its influence on public policy was provided in detail. The measure and extent of corporate influence and the methods employed by the corporate elite to acquire such influence on public policy were also accounted for. This chapter further provided an account of the implications imposed by neoliberal

globalisation on the concept of corporate power. South Africa's public policy environment was unravelled along with the power relationships it establishes between policy elites in the corporatist policy-making NEDLAC. The chapter further discussed the argument advanced by this study that the elitist public policy model employed in South Africa encourages the undue influence of public policy by corporate power. Corporate influence is further exerted through the embourgeoisement of the BEE-affiliated political elite and the private party funding of the ANC's electoral machinery. Elitist public policy is the theory that provides a research frame for the study. This is because the theory suits the study undertaken, it focuses and guides the study, informs the angle of the research questions and provides a theoretical explanation of the phenomenon under investigation (Ngulube et al., 2015). Therefore, this theoretical framework provides a suitable lens to understand the phenomenon being studied.

Chapter 3: The Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide a critique of the arguments advanced in the literature concerning corporate power's influence on South Africa's public policy. The review of the literature is composed of a critical analysis of the arguments made by contemporary subject-matter experts including but not limited to: Terreblanche, 2002; 2012; Southall, 2004; 2007; Bond, 2006; 2007; Marais, 2011; McKinley, 2017; Padayachee and Fine, 2019. The discussion is organized as follows: the confluence of geopolitical and ideological circumstances and influential events which shaped the formation of the neoliberal and free-market-oriented GEAR policy. Proceeding to discuss in detail the political and economic implications of neoliberalism on the South African branch of capitalism. The chapter further provides a detailed critique of the corporate-inspired bourgeois B-BBEE legislation from varying perspectives. The oligarchic power and influence of the MEC-core capitalist corporations over public policy are discussed which then transcends into a subsequent discussion of the enormous and cumulative corporate power aggrandised by an international cabal of free-marketeers.

This chapter also entails the argument that private corporate donations made to the governing-ANC defer the public interest and common good and instead prioritize corporate elite interests and personal benefit of political elites occupying key public office. The corrosive impact of money in the form of unregulated private corporate donations and the unscrupulous interests of big business on public policy (political process) and democratic decision-making are discussed. This is followed by an analysis of the influence on public policy resulting from the contentious entanglement between the interests of the BEE empowered business class, cadres deployed into state bureaucracy, senior public officials and the governing-party leadership.

Post-Apartheid Policy Dispensation

To establish the influence of corporate power and the means by which it influences public policy in South Africa from 1996 to 2014 it is necessary to briefly describe two policy documents that are pertinent to this study's analysis: the NDR and the Freedom Charter. Mosala et al. (2017:327) argue that the NDR is the principal element that binds together the governing-Tripartite Alliance. Prevost (2006:166) and Mosala et al. (2017:329) concur that the NDR is a revolutionary, anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and socialist-oriented document that advocates for radical wealth redistribution to reverse the economic inequalities created under apartheid capitalism. Klein (2007:195) avers that the Freedom Charter adopted in the Congress of the

People in Kliptown on the 26th of June, 1955, by the liberation movement clearly outlines that emancipation would not be unilateral but multilateral. The attainment of liberation would not be limited to wielding political power but would encompass the fundamental restructuring of the country's economic base which includes the nationalization of monopoly industries, a dirigiste policy model and massive wealth redistribution (Fine and Rustumjee, 1996; Bond, 2006). Moreover, Mosala et al. (2017:337) argue that the NDR and the Freedom Charter are the lodestars for ANC policymaking. However, the ANC's adoption of neoliberal economic policy positions demonstrates that it is contradictory to the ideological interpretations of the Freedom Charter preferred by COSATU and the SACP. Suttner (2015) argues that the Freedom Charter is interpreted differently by different civil society and political movements in South Africa, these interpretations also morph over time.

Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR)

Against the backdrop above, the ANC's ideological policy position has always been one that is nationalist and socialist (before the transition period). However, Prevost (2006:172); Bond (2007:131) and Edozie (2008:50) concur that the ANC is critically acclaimed for "talking left while acting right." However, cognizant of the geopolitical context wherein the ANC acceded power is of importance to understanding the change in the economic policy tune. Prevost (2006:166-7); Klein (2007:216); Terreblanche (2012:64-5) and Mosala et al. (2017:331) argue that in the late 20th century the international political climate was not in favour of the nationalist and socialist ANC. Events such as the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the fall of Eastern European communism and the USSR indicated that the ANC's fight for liberation could no longer be advanced through its military wing, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK). Moreover, the ANC was outgunned by recurrent arguments from western governments' that neoliberalism or variations of capitalism were embraced in former socialist countries such as Russia, China, Poland, Chile and North Vietnam. The ANC was faced with the above changes in the ideological world order and given the balance of forces in world politics in the transitional period, the neoliberals had almost an absolute advantage in the South African camp (Klein, 2007; Bond, 2007).

Akyeampong (2018:84-5) posits that while African socialism failed, western economic policy was undergoing significant economic trajectory change with the rise of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School Orthodoxy of laissez-faire capitalism, Thatcherism and Reaganomics. Kumssa and Jones (2015:14-5) aver that those African countries which were once nationalist and socialist had become dependent on foreign loans from the WB and the IMF. These

countries consequently adopted SAP's which encompassed neoclassical economic theory with its fundamental emphasis on reliance on the markets to achieve growth and attain investment. The state is a bystander that would impede the process of growth when performing roles beyond that of providing law and order. SAP's and their guaranteed economic growth astoundingly raised unemployment and worsened income and social inequality. Bond (2006:49) argues that the ideological and economic policy change which was imposed on the first African states by IFI's is one in which South Africa self-imposed only two years into political independence in the form of the GEAR policy.

With that said, Capps (2012:319) argues that the ANC only managed to pressure the NP into negotiations post the occurrence of the aforementioned political events, regardless of the liberation movement's popular support inside and outside the country. In the CODESA negotiations, the ANC was eloquently persuaded into neoliberal capitalist-oriented economic ideology and policy through a well-coordinated effort by the domestic corporate sector, the ultra-rich and international financial power. The secret meetings between the corporate sector and the ANC elite in the 1980s and 1990s had automatically cancelled the aspirations of the Freedom Charter or the realization of policy advancing structural economic reform (Terreblanche, 2002:95; Klein, 2007:203; Van Wyk, 2009:21-25; Mtimka, 2010:76-77; Terreblanche 2012:62-3; Wolff, 2014:61). Klein (2007:204) observes that it "was a process of infantilization which is common to so-called transitional countries - new governments are, in effect, given the keys to the house but not the combination to the safe." Michie and Padayachee (2019:1-2) state that the ANC's abandonment of the progressive Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG) report and subsequent embrace or adoption of the Washington Consensus in the form of GEAR proved to be a formula to sustain economic inequalities.

It is useful for the ongoing review of the literature to highlight that post the meeting between AAC's Gavin Relly (chief executive at the time) and the ANC's Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki and Chris Hani in Lusaka, Zambia 1985 the ANC warmed up to a market-friendly economic policy (Walker, 1998; Van Wyk, 2009:14). Michie and Padayachee (2019:3-4) argue that the ANC elite represented by Nelson Mandela, intermingled with ease with the top executives of the largest mining corporations including Gavin Keeton and Clive Menell and was open to redistribution through the markets. Moreover, Michie and Padayachee (2019:4-5) aver that meetings between Harry Oppenheimer and Mandela accompanied by Cyril Ramaphosa, Trevor Manuel, Tito Mboweni and Tokyo Sexwale at the Brenthurst Library and the scenario planning

sessions represent a significant effort of the South African corporate sector to influence the post-apartheid economic policy of the ANC.

According to Terreblanche (2002:95) and Mbeki (2009a:74) parallel to the constitutional negotiations occurred the covert meetings between the headlights of the ANC and the corporate elite, wherein ANC leadership was placated and ingratiated by mining, industrial and banking sector magnates. The secret meetings discussed economic policy under a democratic government because the corporate elite was concerned about the ANC's leftist ideological orientation contained in the NDR and the Freedom Charter. When the meetings were concluded, the corporate agenda and accumulation strategy of the mining behemoth AAC and the MEC-core were secured. Consequently, the unchangeable and overarching goal of post-apartheid economic policy would be the achievement of continuous economic growth above all else (Terreblanche, 2002:424; Ponte, Roberts and van Sittert, 2007:6). Capps (2012:319-320) further argues that a notable limitation of the elite compromise is the protection and preservation of landed property from nationalization without compensation to permit state-led accumulation which would ameliorate deep-seated poverty, widespread unemployment and enormous development challenges.

Mosala et al. (2017:332) state that the RDP, the precursor of GEAR, was supposed to advance and bring into fruition the aspirations of the Freedom Charter but the country's economic stagflation from the 1970s into the early 1990's served as another reason for the desertion of fiscal laxity, parastatal sector expansion and nationalization. Accordingly, RDP declared a strong commitment to fiscal and monetary policy discipline and the privatization of SOEs performing below optimal capacity to fund the programme. The document further professed that economic growth would translate to job creation and outward-looking manufacturing. The RDP further supposed that redistribution (trickle-down) was guaranteed if high economic growth was achieved (Terreblanche, 2002:96). However, Prevost (2006:172); Edozie (2008:57) and Sole (2010:198) argue that although RDP was not a socialist economic development policy, it initially resonated with the Left elements of the Tripartite Alliance: as it prioritized the working class and the poor, it was development-oriented and emphasized the provision of basic essential services. Nevertheless, RDP was short-lived and there can be no tangible conclusive evaluation of the policy outcomes apart from its notable large-scale welfare programme, partly free healthcare system and public-school nutrition programme.

As was earlier mentioned by Terreblanche (2002:424) and Wolff (2014:63) in chapter one, Bond (2006:17); Bond (2007:128); Klein (2007:209-210) and Van Wyk (2009:22) further write that the GEAR policy was a greater shift in the economic policy direction of the country, a full embrace and integration into neoliberal globalism. Klein (2007:208) and Van Wyk (2009:25) argue that Nelson Mandela's right-hand man during his presidency former president Thabo Mbeki possessed the ability to finesse business leadership before and after the democratic transition. Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki met regularly with mining magnate Harry Oppenheimer and consulted him on the economic policy of the ANC before its final approval and adoption. The ANC's governing elite had been swiftly swallowed by the neoliberal and capitalist interests of the large corporate sector – the Brenthurst Group later the COM. Moreover, the GEAR policy as an economic ideological shift is an end-product of a loan received by the Transitional Executive Committee (TEC) in 1993 which indebted the political elite to IFI's and the corporate agenda (Van Wyk, 2009:28; Wolff, 2014:63-4).

However, Padayachee and Fine (2019:158) argue to the contrary, that as much as the IMF and WB were involved or interested in South African economic policy direction in the transition period, a large part of the influence on ANC economic policy is attributed to local dynamics. These dynamics include internal pressure within the ANC as some of the top brass had adopted a fondness for right-wing economic policy positions; pressure and influence from the domestic corporate sector; and the NP's aligned economic institutions and business associations. McKinley (2017:5) describes the neoliberal bloc within the ANC aligned with former President Thabo Mbeki as the "modernising, cosmopolitan and technocratic faction". Padayachee and Fine (2019:162) state that the IMF's loan to the TEC can be understood as a signal by the international community of the approval of South Africa's economic policy future. According to the Department of Finance (1996:1-2) and Mosala et al. (2017:333), the 1996 GEAR strategy which supplanted RDP emphasized even greater fiscal austerity, with generic free-market principles and a high economic growth target aimed at 6% as its most salient features. Once again, the GEAR policy prophesied that high economic growth was imperative to employment creation and reaching a more just and equitable redistribution of income and improving overall living standards. Ironically, the public policy was extolled by both domestic and international corporations.

Padayachee and Fine (2019:163-5) posit that when the ANC took office in 1994 the government refused to accept loans from the IMF due to a shared view by the leadership core that these loans would ring-fence the ANC's macroeconomic policy space. The 1993 loan

granted to the TEC had been fully paid for by the ANC government in October 1996. Although this may be the case, Basset (2006:7-8); Klein (2007:212); Motsahi (2014) and Wolff (2014:61-2) argue that the recognition of the Apartheid regimes humungous debt by the ANC government and the cost associated to servicing this debt compelled the government towards debt payment prioritization. Repayment of this inherited debt implied that expansionary fiscal policy had to be deferred, and this further provided legitimacy for the adoption of neoliberal economic restructuring in the form of GEAR. In lieu of the above, Edozie (2008:52) and McKinley (2017:38-9) argue that South Africa's political and economic development policies are in accordance with neoclassical, monetarist and laissez-faire ideologies which concentrate financial and capital resources in foreign and domestic capitalist corporations endorsed by GEAR and BEE.

Edozie (2008:53) suggests that the democratic crisis in the three cases analytically compared in his study (Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya) is always connected to a powerful multinational corporation with large financial resources which has been in existence (dominant) in the country before its democratic transition. This is important because this is the combination that has led to grand corruption in South Africa, involving both the private and public sectors to the detriment of public policy directives. Furthermore, intra-political power struggles within the ruling-ANC extending to its alliance partners always involve a party-linked or owned BEE company, a powerful multinational corporation and a cabinet minister/s rolling out a state tender. Therefore, the real factional battle is not about ideological or policy differences but individual wealth accumulation (Sokomani, 2010:175-6; Friedman, 2010:162). The above argument links (partially) with that presented by Padayachee and Fine (2019) regarding the influence of the domestic corporate sector and business leadership.

Edozie (2008) argues the sole workable route to achieving economic recovery, stability, growth and development for the Thatcherites, Chicago School disciples and the apostles of free-market fundamentalism is laissez-faire capitalism as endorsed by IFI's. To advance the previous claim, Fine and Rustomjee (1996:56) argue that according to neoclassical economic thought the accumulation of profit is only beneficial to the growth of an economy if only pursued by the markets. If profit is accumulated by the state, it is then termed rent-seeking and detrimental to growth. According to the viewpoint of neoclassical (neoliberal) economists, profit-seeking is only justified when pursued by business corporations in a market-friendly environment provided and guarded by the state. Bond (2006:42) asserts that the observable outcome of the neoliberal GEAR was an astounding reduction of the civil service and non-agricultural sectors.

Moreover, GEAR potholed any possibility for the government to create a black bureaucratic class towards a fairer redistribution of income and the enhancement of living standards.

Mosala et al. (2017:333) aver that the monetary side of GEAR entailed inflation capping, the stability of financial markets, an even more market-determined exchange rate, outward-looking manufacturing, and relaxed labour laws to lure in FDI and reinvestment from domestic corporations. Marais (2011:112) reiterates that the GEAR policy was a brainchild of IFI's and the apartheid captured ministry of finance. Many ANC rank-and-file were thrown off balance by the contents of the policy during its presentation. The adoption and implementation were deemed irreversible by the former Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel. The Left voices within the governing Tripartite Alliance maintained "party discipline" and only assumed opposing views to the policy years after its implementation. Prevost (2006:170); Mtimka (2010:41) and McKinley (2017:40-41) concur that the secretive formulation and publication of GEAR reveals the absence of consultation, debate and deliberation within the governing Tripartite Alliance and externally with the public or the national groups represented by the ANC's alliance partners. Bond (2006:51) avers that by the end of 1996 GEAR had already proven to be an embarrassing failure, the currency depreciated, economic growth plummeted, interest rates rized and an astonishing aggregate of 71 000 jobs was shed.

Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE or BEE)

According to the Republic of South Africa ([RSA]2004) and RSA (2014), B-BBEE entails the socio-economic empowerment of Africans, Coloureds and Indians – black people – by increasing the number of blacks in the mainstream and productive sectors of the economy. This also includes segments of society that have been historically excluded economically such as black women, youth, people living with disabilities and people from remote regions of the country (Padayachee and Rossouw, 2019:152). The legislative framework seeks to provide entry for blacks in the productive economy, into all categories and levels of employment and further provide an opportunity to conduct business with the government. The legislation professes to achieve these objectives through a broad range of interlocked strategies such as the imposition of transformation quotas on the executive and managerial levels of big corporations, deliberate public investment in black emerging enterprises, preferential procurement, incentives for large corporations that start joint ventures with empowerment partners, skills development and racial diversification of the workplace (Freund, 2007:667-8; Edozie, 2008:57; Iheduru, 2008:333; Makgoba, 2019:575).

McKinley (2017:42) points out that a policy of empowerment for the ANC has politico-historically meant the DE racialization of capitalism, which encompasses replacing white capitalists with black patriotic capitalists congruent with and in the facilitation of trickle-down GEAR-inspired economics. BEE as envisaged by the once nationalist ANC meant acquiring a piece of the post-apartheid pie for black capitalists and the middle-class. Mbeki (2009a:47) and McKinley (2017) believe that BEE is identical to AEE under the apartheid regime which sought to create an Afrikaner elite class and capital formation through the rapid expansion of the state parastatals. However, GEAR and B-BBEE only saw the denationalization of the once substantial SOE industry (Padayachee and Rossouw, 2019:151).

McKinley (2017:43) agrees with Terreblanche (2002:95); Mtimka (2010:40) and Wolff (2014:61) as this study also argues that the imminent co-option of the ANC and its alliance partners in the 1980s and 1990s into the economic structure dominated by the large corporate sector (MEC) played a critical role in the protection and defence of capitalism under a democratic dispensation. Sole (2010:194) and McKinley (2017) concur that the mining industry was one of the important avenues to advance and enforce BEE through the strategic use of state capital resources and government investment spending to impose black quotas on management, ownership and transformation or compliance targets. Bond (2006:44); Edozie (2008:58); Mbeki (2009a:72) and McKinley (2017:45) concur that BEE succeeded in the creation of a political black national capitalist class defined by nouveau-riche behaviour in news media scandals. This was not the “patriotic” or developmental capitalist class envisaged by the core ANC leadership. Current President of South Africa and former high-profile trade unionist Cyril Ramaphosa is one of the first leaders of the ANC to get rich overnight without lifting a finger from BEE deals. Furthermore, BEE related shenanigans such as the infamous “Arms Deal” only served to de-industrialize the economy, swell the pockets of the political elite and solidify corporate power (CDE, 2014:25-6).

According to Edozie (2008:58), BEE can be construed as what Alofun (2014:69) and Akyeampong (2018:77) have termed “Africanization” and “indigenization” of the bureaucratic and business sectors which was a common feature of African socialist development in the 20th century. Alongside politico-bureaucratic accumulation, the BEE policy sought to indigenize a significant portion of expatriate capital in the creation of an indigenous (black) capitalist elite that would drive reinvestment in the domestic economy. Capps (2012:320) concurs that the BEE envisioned by the Mbeki technocratic and pro-reform class project encompassed the creation of a patriotic black national bourgeoisie that would transform the racial structure of

the mining and other productive sectors while making productive rather than speculative investments in the domestic economy to drive development. Capps (2012:321) asserts that the “Mbeki-ite” bloc pursued transformation of the mining sector with the Minerals Development Bill (MDB) and later the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) from a “classically bourgeois reform” perspective. The BEE strategy worked well for the white mining corporations in two crucial ways, first in that the creation of a black bourgeoisie would significantly reduce further pressure and demands for extended redistribution in the ownership structure of the mining industry and subsequently the free flow of corporate capital. Secondly, the economic advancement and upward class mobility of the ANC’s political elite into the highest altitudes of the mining sector and consequently the economy would render the governing elite a “comprador bourgeoisie” which would protect the status quo.

Makgoba (2019:573) presents an analysis of the discursive responses of the African Rainbow Minerals (ARM) and Palabora Mining Company (PMC) to government constructions of BEE policy and legislation, the study is conducted through critical discourse analysis. The legal texts examined are not limited to B-BBEE legislation but include the MPRDA and the 2010 Mining Charter. The analytical examination focuses on the relationship between government and corporate constructions of BEE to understand their relations of power. This is important because it shows the importance of constructions of public policy to shape the solutions and subsequently the policy implementation. This study examines how the B-BBEE policy of placing ANC leaders on major corporate boards influences ANC policy to determine the means by which corporate power (through private corporate donations) influences public policy in South Africa, the secondary research question. Capps (2012:327) and Makgoba (2019:576) argue that the Mining Charter and the MPRDA have reframed the transformational and racial elements of BEE to sustainable development. Mining corporations have successfully shifted the goalpost from black inclusion in the white-owned and controlled mining industry to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social investment (CSI). Makgoba (2019:577) asserts that the corporatist Mining Charter and its Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment (BBSEE) have strategically and purposefully omitted the term “black” and the notion of “black empowerment” and replaced them with vague definitions which are not black-centred.

Moreover, Makgoba (2019:578) states that the MPRDA also omits “black people” and instead speaks about general inclusivity and equal access to resources and a focus on environmental

sustainability. These corporate constructions of “socioeconomic empowerment” are blind to race and deliberately exclude the political, historical and racial features of B-BBEE. Further transformation in the mining industry generally, but specifically in ARM (an empowered company) is a micro-managed process due to the supposed risk factors attached to the enforcement of BEE prescripts. This successive reconstruction portrays the unequal power relations between the mining corporate elite and the government (Mokgaba, 2019:579). Although PMC has relatively demonstrated more commitment to B-BBEE other than the non-racial, de-politicized and neoliberal Mining Charter and MPRDA. The general continued aversion of structural transformation and redistribution is disconnected from the main features of BEE (Madi, 2016:204; Makgoba, 2019:580-2).

Capps (2012:328) argues that powerful mining corporations under the COM have a track record of resisting the opening of the mining sector for black entry. The key tools of resistance employed when the initial Mining Charter leaked included the courts, capital flight and the argument that the uncritical entrenchment of blacks in the corporate sector was a transgression of the subcomponent prescripts of GEAR. Leitmotifs of GEAR include FDI attraction, market-led development and limited government (or ministerial) intervention with regards to the will of the markets and private property rights. The extent of wealth redistribution and economic inclusivity achieved by B-BBEE in the productive sectors of the economy remains a pie in the sky. Moreover, Makgoba (2019:572) argues that mining corporations are strategic in their responses to the constructions of B-BBEE by the government through legislated public policy and connected documents which serve to enforce compliance with empowerment. Mining corporations have mastered the art of selling de jure managerial compliance through advertising, marketing and PR strategies which delude the government and the public into believing that these corporations are committed to transformation.

Sole (2010:198-9) argues that BEE and the cadre deployment policy under the macroeconomic GEAR policy were purposefully established to create a black middle and aspirant capitalist class constituted by or with close ties to the political elite and the ANC. Under the Mbeki presidency, it was conceived that racism can be best fought by the existence of a black capitalist class and thus failure to create this new class of historically disadvantaged capitalists would mean the ANC had failed to achieve its historic mission (McKinley, 2017:43). Furthermore, Sole (2010:200) avers that BEE offers a simple and coherent ideological position which can be best described as an “it’s our turn to eat” ideology which is only exclusively available to the nationalist-populist clique of the governing-Tripartite Alliance. To advance the previous claim,

Buhlungu and Tshoaedi (2013:110) indicate that the trade union federation COSATU has made considerable progress since the inception of democracy in 1994, however, the upward social mobility of union leaders has posed a great threat to the working class. The continuous exit of the union leadership into organs of the state, leadership positions in the ANC, and the corporate sector has been the chief threat to retract the gains obtained by the union and the working class since 1994.

However, Bond (2006:39) argues that BEE was paraded by the governing party as redistributive legislation and transformative policy which sought to create a patriotic black bourgeoisie, its salient feature would be productive reinvestment in burgeoning black businesses. BEE beneficiaries are, however, constituted by a handful of black elites that were already prominent under apartheid incapable of patriotic or conscious class formation. Further, only a handful of already established black people benefited from BEE. Black directors and managers were only used as fronts by white economic oligarchs in a strategy to access state tenders and favour with the largely black government. In turn, black fronts were compensated in the form of company shares, placement in the directorates of corporate companies as was mandated by the BEE subsidiary: affirmative action (CDE, 2007:8; Acemoglu, et al., 2007:16; Mbeki, 2009a:68).

The Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC) and/or The Economic Oligarchy

Terreblanche (2012:40-1) argues that the four cumulative systemic periods in South Africa's politico-economic history, especially after the discovery of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886, are all defined by the enormous power and influence of capitalist corporations under the MEC over political power. Terreblanche (2012:40) further asserts that these "capitalist corporations always succeeded in manoeuvring themselves into such powerful positions that they were in the driving seat as far as political and economic decision-making was concerned." The MEC in the apartheid years was represented by the corporate dynast Harry Oppenheimer, former chairperson of the AAC and De Beers Group (before it transferred its headquarters to London) who was very proficient in lobbying the governing-elite for the special interests of the MEC core and its aligned corporate sector (corporate power). The inordinate influence of the MEC on these cumulative governments was made possible by the economic power and dominance of the mining and financial sector. From its establishment as a system of accumulation during the minerals revolution of the 1870s, the MEC core industries received tremendous English and foreign capital investment, the MEC was deeply enmeshed with the state's public

corporation accumulation strategy and relied heavily on migrant labour and a reserve of expendable black labour in ethnic homelands (Terreblanche, 2012:44).

Mbeki (2009a:76-7) avers that the MEC captures South Africa's unique form of capitalism which has historically developed because of the country's natural resource endowments. The MEC encompasses South Africa's natural resource-based economy that is characterized by the dominance of the mining industry and energy generation which is heavily enmeshed with the financial sector. The MEC involves the mining of coal, gold, diamond, platinum and the generation and distribution of electricity. These precious metals and minerals are excavated for the purposes of export to the global market and account for a huge chunk of the country's export revenue. The group producers or what Fine and Rustonjee (1996) refer to as the "six axes of capital" constitute a conglomerate system of powerful corporate behemoths which define and effectively determine market and state accumulation in the South African economy (the corporatocracy). The MEC is also responsible for a great many negative externalities such as the harmful effects of their operations on the health of surrounding communities, the rapid depletion of non-renewable resources, environmental degradation, borrowed technology and capital.

Fine and Rustonjee (1996:103-6) state that the six "axes" of capital in the South African economy, the conglomerate system of huge corporations have concentrated ownership in all sectors of the MEC, which is mining, manufacturing and the financial sector. The financial sector has historically played an important role in shaping the path of development and form of industrialization in South Africa, by prioritizing the provision of financial stimuli to the core MEC sectors. Concentration and centralization in the financial sector occurred in the second half of the 20th century identifiable by the ownership of shares in holding companies by conglomerates in financial institutions. Thus, the financial sector also assumes the form of monopolistic market control owned directly or indirectly by the organically linked six "axes" of capital namely: SA Mutual, Sanlam, AAC, Liberty/Standard, Rembrandt/Volkscas, Anglovaal (Fine and Rustonjee, 1996:107-8; Terreblanche, 2012:45).

Fine and Rustonjee (1996) further state that the MEC is deeply institutionalized with linkages, an interrelationship and interdependence between the group producers who own and control the mining sector with great influence on SOEs and the state bureaucracy which sponsors policies friendly to the vested interests of the COM – the corporatocracy. The MEC has a profound and far-reaching influence on public policy concerning the mineral sector which

accounts for a significant amount of public revenue (see Mbeki, 2009a:76-7 above). Moreover, the hegemonic and central role played by the MEC in the South African economy is analogous to that of an economic cartel with numerous smaller or related business entities (MEC non-core sector) under the ownership of the six axes of capital. Fine and Rustonjee (1996:9-10) aver that the “pattern of ownership structure and economic activity, there is close integration between the state and the private, group producers and this is entrenched institutionally.”

Corporate Power in South Africa

Mbeki (2009a:66-7) argues that the white businessmen and their families who own and control the commanding heights of the economy, which is the core of the MEC constitute the economic oligarchy. The economic oligarchy intended to protect their assets and wealth by co-opting the key leadership figures of the liberation movements through the transfer of massive assets to the private pockets of such leaders dressed up as atonement for past injustices – the neoliberal BEE. Klein (2007) states that Milton Friedman’s neoliberal orthodoxy and laissez-faire capitalism policy prescripts in the developing world have culminated in a staggering political, socio-economic and environmental crisis which have created a new power structure. Klein (2007:15) writes that “what has emerged is a powerful ruling alliance between a few very large corporations and a class of mostly wealthy politicians.”

Klein (2007) further asserts that this alliance of an unelected ruling elite birthed by Friedman’s purist form of capitalism is a nexus of ballooning corporate power and the governing elite. These millionaire and billionaire larger-than-life private player’s clubs in this covert ruling alliance are “the oligarchs” in Russia, “the princelings” in China and “the piranhas” in Chile to name a few in post-communist countries. In South Africa, the alliance is constituted by the so-called “Stellenbosch mafia” and the BEE business class in key and influential government positions. These unelected powerful ruling alliances are not concerned with market freedoms or liberty per se but with the seizure and consolidation of formerly publicly owned resources and the accrual of super-profits, wealth accumulation and an ever-shrinking government which is empire building. As Davis (2015:395) had earlier accounted (in chapter one) for a comprehensive definition of corporate power, Milton ([s.a.]:417-8) argues that the corporation under free-market conditions and a neoliberal legislative and regulatory environment is dispositioned to obtain cumulative power which supersedes that of political institutions. Such pervasive power derives from the corporation’s possession of financial and real assets which surpass those of government in the neoliberal globalized economy which continues to undermine political sovereignty.

Statva (2012) argues that public policy is in actuality the special interests of the most powerful corporations in the largest sectors of the economy and this pervasive influence by economic oligarchs is facilitated and lubricated by corporate lobbying. Statva (2012:1) maintains that powerful corporations possess the de-facto and governments the de-jure power over political, socioeconomic and cultural decisions in contemporary society. Deducing from above, corporate power in South Africa is constitutive of the six axes of capital that own and control the epicentre of the economy's largest and most productive sectors, mining and the financial industry (Fine and Rustonjee, 1996). It is important to note that "productive" in this context refers to the contribution of mining exports to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). As Mbeki (2009a) notes that the economic oligarchy holds the privilege to exercise corporate power within the country, such hegemonic dominance of the economy also encapsulates significant influence on the political establishment. Therefore, corporate power is constitutive of the decisions made and the actions taken by the MEC-core sectors which influence public policy through improper interactions with the political elite. Hence the ANC government has embodied a corporatist and elite approach to public policy processes. The means employed by corporate power to manipulate political power and influence public policy, within the confines of this study are further discussed in the next section which focuses on the influence of private corporate "donations" on the public policy position of the ruling ANC.

Private Corporate Party Financing

Butler (2010:12) espouses that post the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the ANC was compelled to look for an alternative economic lifeline. The representatives of the economic oligarchy involved in CODESA made judicious use of this opportunity to consolidate relations with the former freedom fighters, first established in the mid-1980s (Van Wyk, 2009:13-4). Friedman (2010:159) argues that the ANC from exile, the underground and the armed struggle was experiencing a "dry cash spell" with no revenue for effective electioneering to win the first democratic election. Revenue was deemed a necessity by the core ANC leadership for these reasons: to organize the party throughout the country, public funding was regarded as trivial, and so were membership fees; the disbursement of public funds was delayed. Representatives of corporatist and/or capitalist interests on behalf of the MEC seized the opportunity to exert influence on the incoming provincial and national governments. Powerful corporations proceeded to dispense assets to the political elite. The deeply entrenched nature of the relations between corporate power and the political elite had the increasing potential to promote

priorities that do not reflect the collective will of the people but the interests of the elite (Friedman, 2010).

The above discussion marked the beginning of careerism within the ANC, which is the unrelenting pursuit of political office to advance one's interests at the expense of service delivery or the public interest. Careerism found expression within the ANC as the party elite was consistently ingratiated by corporate power hence it became conventional wisdom that political and public office guaranteed material accumulation for ANC cadre. In turn, those in powerful positions within the party distribute and use their acquired resources to forge patron-clientelism in order to cement their positions of power within the party and in government (Mbeki, 2009a:71; Sole, 2010:199; Friedman, 2010:162). Dodds (2013) argues that "money in politics was a huge problem, which was 'destroying the ANC'. While the party was electorally dominant, it was 'internally shambolic, [and] enormously disorganised'." Beresford (2015:231) states that the seeds of neo-patrimonialism and self-seeking greed in the ANC stemmed in the 1980s and 1990s through intraparty inter-elite alliances and centres of clientelist relationships such as the apartheid state Advisory Boards. These predispositions morphed into a bigger scale in the democratic period wherein party leadership assumed public office or served in organs of state, overseeing vast public resources throughout the public sector. This further birthed crony capitalism wherein cadre's deployed in the private sector used their political connectedness to access the spoils (public resources) creating a constraint on ANC policy that sought to redistribute wealth and transform society, instead leadership in the party and state only meant elite enrichment and not empowerment.

Beresford (2015:232-3) argues that the (neo-patrimonial) political elite that occupies public office reproduce their power through the distribution of resources and opportunities to clients in provincial and regional fiefdoms that emanate from the misuse of public resources. For instance, employment in the public and civil service is widely viewed as an affair controlled by the heavyweights within or linked to the ANC, this includes the appointments of DG's, provincial premiers, mayors, and municipal managers. In this equation which came to form the core culture of the top brass of the ANC, the public interest and the common good were subordinate to material resource accumulation. The illicit relationship between politics, government, business corporations and money collapsed the once visionary, nationalist and socialist-oriented ANC along with radical participatory democracy and economic development (Butler, 2010:16-7; Friedman, 2010:162-3). Butler (2010) presents the argument that South Africa's unreformed party funding regime and the unregulated private funding of political

parties have a corrupting effect and erodes the vigour and experience of democracy. The arguments presented by Edozie (2008) and Butler (2010) overlap with regard to the deteriorating quality of democracy (popular sovereignty) as a consequence of international financial power infiltration, the domestic corporate sector's influence and South Africa's neoliberal policy position.

Sokomani (2010:176) and Phakathi (2014) state that the spoils from the controversial "arms deal" were used to fund the ANC's 1999 election splurge. Hartley (2004b) reports that public funding allocated in the 1999 election amounted to R66.6 million however, the total expenditure by all political parties amounted to an estimated R500 million. The residual amount is unaccounted for as a result of the unregulated party funding regime, which opens a window for the super-rich and large corporations to finance these campaigns with an expectation of reimbursement in the form of access to state tenders. Solik (2013b) reveals that "wealthy individuals and corporations will insist that the political debt be repaid by tenders, positions or favourable economic policies. It is difficult to monitor this because it is shrouded in absolute secrecy." Butler (2010:15-6) asserts that the ANC's expenditure in the 2004 elections amounted to R300 million, in the 2009 elections spending on the campaign is estimated between R400 to R500 million. Although, Du Plessis (2014) reported that public funding disbursed to political parties in the 2009 election only amounted to R94 million. Butler (2010:16) surmises that "covert funding has been linked to tender kickbacks and the buying of licences. Money-for-influence scandals have affected the ANC, the DA and the New National Party."

Solik (2013b) argues that major party funding scandals in South Africa are often linked to election years, these include the arms deal (estimated between R30 to R70 billion) and the 1999 election, "Oilgate" (worth R11 million) is linked to the 2004 election, and the ANC's Chancellor House (an empowered company) that conducts business with SOEs (valued at R38 million) linked to the 2009 election. Hunter (2014b) states that according to the ANC's treasurer-general (TG) at the time Zweli Mkhize, the party's total election expenditure in the 2014 election amounted to R429 million. This figure, however, omits expenditures on security, performers, event managers and catering, thus this figure is deemed not a true reflection of the election splurge. Pretoria News (2013) and Solik (2013b) concur that the Gupta Family's media fiasco and its relationship with leading figures in the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA) are the most recent saga surrounding the dangers of secret donations made to public office bearers and the major parties in South Africa. Financial resources dispensed to the ANC and

the DA are estimated to run in the millions. Munusamy (2013) and Beresford (2015:235) agree that these links (or connecting dots) are exacerbated by public statements made by the then ANC and state president Jacob Zuma that, wise or smart businessmen ought to invest in the ANC. Zuma further stated that businessmen who donated to the ANC were investing in the guaranteed growth of their businesses (Friedman, 2012).

Butler (2010:16); Friedman (2010:164); Sokomani (2010:176-7) and Sole (2010:187) argue that the governing party has been infiltrated by corporatist interests and relegated those of the public because of the party financing regime which informs the process of electioneering. The incessant need for material and financial resources has led the ANC to establish controversial and contentious fundraising schemes, such as the “The Network Lounge” “The Progressive Business Forum” and the provincial “Friends of the ANC”. Beresford (2015:235) asserts that “there are, for example, reports of foul play with regard to how individuals and consortiums with a history of making funding donations to the ANC have benefited directly from share deals, allegedly using the profits from these shareholdings to finance party activity.” These funding mechanisms maintain intricate interaction between the representatives of corporate power and ANC leadership serving in organs of state. In effect, segments of society with concentrated wealth (corporate elite) are afforded privileged access to the political elite. Such contentious fundraising schemes provide large corporate donors with the privilege of government decisions prior to their publicization, a consultative process with an unfair advantage based on wealth disregarding political equality. In addition, in such flamboyant banquets hosted by the ANC, the corporate elite are afforded an opportunity into the detailed information on public policy trajectory, state tenders and the criteria or mechanisms for the issuing of licences. Corporate donors pay for access, access provides influence through constant interaction between private financiers and ANC senior government officials.

Sokomani (2010:185) posits that private corporate donors, both foreign and domestic sources are concerned with buying access to influence governing-party political heavyweights and authoritative decision-makers of the public sector to secure and protect vested interests. Private corporate donors are not concerned with the creation of a balanced party finance regime nor building the strength of South Africa’s multiparty democracy. Moreover, Sokomani (2010:176-7) posits that as a result of the centrality of money in the operations of the ANC, investment and holding (pyramid) BEE companies were also used as vehicles for oiling the wheels of the former liberation movement. However, this method to swell party coffers involved a significant conflict of interests between the party, the government and the corporate elite. To illustrate

these massive conflicts of interests, the ANC elite serving in organs of the state (cabinet) rolls out tenders to party-owned or linked BEE companies and subsequently, the money flows back into party coffers through a corrupt backhander or direct corporate donation by ANC associated patriotic capitalist (Beresford, 2015:236). Sole (2010:187) states that the conduct of business between party-owned or linked companies such as Chancellor House together with joint venture partners through SOEs is what the opposition DA has described as “corruption on a grand scale”. The BEE and cadre deployment policy are pertinent instruments that are useful in the smooth progression of this stage-managed tender selection process.

The infamous Brett Kebble controversy stands out in the litter of party funding scandals wherein the controversial mining magnate attempted to evade the law and sequestration with a R3.5 million donation to the ANC. Kebble was also linked to the African National Congress Youth League’s (ANCYL) investment vehicle. “Wealthy private individuals seeking a relationship with political office-holders quickly came to see dispensing assets to political actors as the route to influence (Friedman, 2010:159-160).” Sole (2010:194) argues that since 2003 the Chancellor House group (ANC-owned BEE company) has cumulatively secured empowerment deals with the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) and has accumulated significant empowerment stakes in minerals, energy, engineering, logistics and information technology. The corporate structures of Chancellor House were occupied by the political elite who served in organs of state as well as their kinsmen, BEE executives, former cabinet ministers, state bureaucrats and ANC stalwarts. The core business of Chancellor House was to generate funds for the ANC by conducting business with the government. The Chancellor House group targeted particularly the DME, not surprisingly in-line with the government’s legislative declaration that the minerals and energy sector was the primary site for restructuring or transformation envisaged by the B-BBEE economic public policy. Beresford (2015:235-6) further opines that “the ANC’s party funding model is simply ‘business fronts benefiting from state contracts that pass profits back to the ANC’s treasury’, pointing to the party’s investment arm, Chancellor House, which has reportedly built up a portfolio of close to R2 billion (\$187 million).”

The nexus between political power and material accumulation exuded by the ANC results in a concentration of wealth in the political elite and a politically well-connected business class eschewing the prioritization of the public interest and the common good or rather negating the objectives of B-BBEE. (Sole, 2010:197) asserts that the ANC’s wilful blindness of the strong demerits of the BEE and cadre deployment policy is indifferent to its blatant disregard of the

damage inflicted by the GEAR policy advanced by the 1996 class project. Sole (2010:198) points out that “it was an effort to fundamentally reshape the character of the ANC by establishing the black middle classes and nascent black capital as the centre of gravity for the party, rather than the working-class hegemony favoured by COSATU and the SACP.”

Edozie (2008:58) states that despite the redistributive ideals of BEE, the black majority perceives the policy as a self-help vehicle for individualist upward class mobility and that the policy is corporatist and neoliberal in orientation, the broader working class without adequate human and social capital are unable to reap the rewards of BEE. Sole (2010:194) asserts that B-BBEE as an instrument to correct historical economic imbalances has identified the political elite, politically well-connected business class, cabinet ministers, state bureaucrats, and ANC stalwarts and their kinsmen as the “Previously Disadvantaged Individuals” (PDI’s). This process of redistribution in the structure of the mining, energy and financial sectors meant that ownership and control were transferred from a white capitalist class to a black capitalist class intimately tied to the political elite, and thus wealth amassed from the party-state nexus was inevitably repatriated to the coffers of the ANC. Instead of the pursuit of poor and working-class centred economic policy aimed at restructuring and the redistribution of economic power.

The Corporate State and Elitist Public Policy

Klein (2007:212) states that the grassroots activists of the ANC and ordinary black South Africans waiting to bear the fruits of liberation witnessed significant reversals within the first decade of majority rule. The ANC government had become an embodiment of neoliberal economic policy and this political posture asphyxiated the government’s ability to deliver on the promises of the Freedom Charter. The government could not intervene in the economy to curb the excesses of laissez-faire capitalism, for instance, the government could not subsidize local industries, impose tariffs on trade, or provide basic services such as housing, water and electricity at relatively lower prices because these actions would not, please the markets and would contravene ratified agreements with IFI’s. The principal constraint on government spending was not only the avoidance of a fiscal deficit but the hefty public debt inherited from the Apartheid regime.

According to Klein (2007:212), paying the old regime’s humongous debt and reconciling relations with business corporations was the top priority of the ANC government in its first decade. The ANC took this policy position in an attempt to avoid market shocks and accrue foreign investment injections to achieve economic growth and market stabilization. As was

earlier mentioned, the macroeconomic policy change by the government (GEAR) did not result in the desired outcome instead the triple challenge ballooned as well as social problems associated with it such as violent crime. As socio-economic problems swelled up within the country, the government opted to privatize national assets in an effort to further pay up the oppressor's public debt. Ironically the ANC-government had not only negated the nationalization policies but had significantly privatized SOEs through BEE aligned PPP's. However, Padayachee and Fine (2019:160-1) maintain that Tito Mboweni, head of the ANC's Department of Economic Policy (DEP), later governor of the SARB argued strongly that the IMF loan received by the TEC in 1993 had no conditionalities that bound or asphyxiated ANC post-1994 economic policy manoeuvre. Mboweni further stated that the post-apartheid government's fiscal policy discipline was intended to reduce the negative balance of payments which was a result of decreased agricultural export earnings, macroeconomic prudence was a policy position of the ANC declared in the 1992 "Ready to Govern" policy document. Suffice to say that, economic restructuring was a result of the acknowledgement of the previous regime debt and not that of the loan received in 1993.

Tebele (2016:27-8) defines redistributive public policy as a policy that re-allocates resources by taking from one category of society to give to the other, such policy includes affirmative action and social protection programmes it also seeks to address paucities in health and education. Wealthier groups are directly or indirectly taxed by the government to provide for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. The existence of such policy suggests unequal resource distribution, inequality of opportunity, class conflict and conflicting ideologies in society. The elitist BEE is an example of redistributive public policy which seeks to empower blacks economically and provide PDI's with access and participation in the productive sectors of the economy, with mining as the starting point. BEE embodies incremental reformist welfare palatable to the preferences of the corporate elite and their definition of transformation. Pokharel (2019:176) states that "changes in public policy occur as a result of redefinition by elites of their own values and choices. Because elites share a consensus in preserving the social system." Bond (2006:40) believes that the BEE proposal by the apartheid regime to the future governing-elite of a democratic South Africa was a neoliberal foray sponsored by white market propagandists. Bond (2006:44) espouses that the political elite reserved opportunities for BEE empowerment deals exclusively among themselves, the exclusive cohort (consortium) composed of former Robben Islanders, MK combatants, COSATU shop-stewards, liberation movement stalwarts and flag bearers (Mbeki, 2009a:69).

Buhlungu and Tshoaedi (2013:110) and McKinley (2017:46) affirm that the black political elite consciously resolved to be concerned with being “filthy rich” through the BEE vehicle which facilitated the corporate capture of the state, while the numerate poor and working-class (masses) South Africans are left to toil for corporate entities feeding their financial sector. Finally, Mbeki (2009a:68) further posits that the objectives of BEE and its subsidiaries were to insulate the white economy (MEC) from the ANC’s radical nationalization policies, provide economic oligarchs with inordinate access to state contracts, the protection of the domestic corporate sector from fierce international competition and importantly “provide oligarchs with prominent and influential seats at the high table of the ANC government’s economic policy formulation.”

Concluding Remarks

This chapter concludes that the BEE strategy worked well for the white mining corporations in two crucial ways, first in that the creation of a black bourgeoisie would be integrated into the system of economic dominance and curtail further pressure and demands for extended redistribution in the ownership structure of the mining, energy and financial industries. BEE was also successful in the economic advancement and upward class mobility of the ANC’s political elite into the highest altitudes of the economy. This ultimately rendered the governing elite a comprador bourgeoisie in perpetual defence of the economic status quo – governing-elite acting on behalf of a corporate elite (in an elitist public policy environment). This chapter also argued that corporatist reconstructions of BEE and the Mining Charter reflect the inequality of power between corporate power and the political elite’s public policy autonomy.

Mining corporations as illustrated, can and do undermine legislated redistributive public policy through elitist reconstructions aided by vehicles such as the corporatist NEDLAC. Coercive bargaining, the co-option of the political elite into the corporate world (revolving door) and the use of money donations to influence the policy thinking of the ANC elite are also means identified to undermine South Africa’s public policy. The chapter also argued that economic oligarchs in charge of the MEC-core sectors possess large economic resources which provide a significant influence on the political establishment and ultimately on public policy. Private corporate financing of the ANC exacerbated by BEE empowerment deals entangle party, state and business thereby compromising South Africa’s democracy and its vitality. Lastly, the deeply entrenched nature of the relations between corporate power and the political elite (public policy) has the increasing potential to promote priorities which do not reflect the collective will

of the people or meeting policy objectives. The following chapter will thoroughly unpack the research design and methodology used to complete this study.

Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology

Introduction

The intent of this chapter is to unpack and discuss the research design and methodology employed by the study to meet the research objectives which are: to investigate if corporate power influences public policy and to assess the influence of private corporate donations on South Africa's public policy. These objectives emanate from the research questions which are: does corporate power influence South Africa's public policy? And how do private corporate donations permit the influence of South Africa's public policy? The study seeks to provide answers to these questions by undertaking a research process that this study describes in detail. The research design is a strategy or framework which guides the entire research process from the planning stages to the implementation and analysis to ultimately answer the research question. In qualitative research designing the study involves the reflexivity and the cognitive involvement of the researcher from the decision on an area or topic to investigate to the data analysis and interpretation (Neuman, 2011:36). According to Bryman (2012:393), reflexivity connotes that "social researchers should be reflective about the implications of their methods, values, biases, and decisions for the knowledge of the social world they generate. Relatedly, reflexivity entails a sensitivity to the researcher's cultural, political, and social context." The critical and related decisions made regarding research design and methodology are vividly described below.

Research Approach

The qualitative and quantitative approaches to conducting systematic research are both scientific with similarities, but notable dissimilarities as well. Proponents of each approach distinguish the one from the other by crystallizing the disadvantages of the other as if these approaches were inherently diametrically opposed (Neuman, 2011:16; Erickson, 2018:87). However, these approaches are not at war, each approach has its own merits and demerits but both approaches are well suited for uniquely different studies. For instance, the qualitative approach is contextualist, constructionist (naturalistic) and employs thematic analysis; while the quantitative approach uses systematic measurement, concerned with variables, detached from the context, is bound to a laboratory and uses statistical measurement (Marczyk, DeMatteo and Festinger, 2005:17; Neuman, 2011:16-7). This particular study uses the qualitative approach in alignment with the research context, objectives and questions.

Qualitative Approach

Babbie (2016:27) argues that the central element which distinguishes the approaches to scientific research is that qualitative data is non-numerical while quantitative data is grounded in statistical measurement. The qualitative approach emphasizes “‘quality’ and not ‘quantity’, that is, social meanings rather than the collection of numerate statistical data (Miller and Brewer, 2003:238).” Qualitative research is based on naturalism which advances those social actors to create and impart meaning in the social world - this is the nature of knowledge. Qualitative data is not solely concerned with mathematical formulae and/or statistics but is also concerned with context, definitions, meanings, attitudes, experiences and influences on the social world which is the laboratory of the social researcher. The previously mentioned may well be a limitation to the quantitative approach to research because of the omission of such underlying elements existent in the social world. However, qualitative data is not an impeccable qualitative measurement as it is influenced by definitions and meanings while quantitative measurement is disinterested in those elements (Clarke and Braun, 2013; Babbie, 2016). The qualitative approach is the chosen method for this study because the overarching research question and objectives of the research are amenable to the approach. Descriptive research which uses secondary documentary materials as data instruments to provide detail in qualitative description commands the employ of the qualitative method. Hence, a qualitative approach has been applicable in this study.

The Rationale for the Qualitative Approach

Bryman (2012:380) asserts that the qualitative approach can be further distinguished from its counterpart or alternative. First, qualitative research holds an inductive outlook that theory is generated out of research, secondly, qualitative research holds an interpretivist epistemological position, and thirdly on ontology qualitative research holds a constructionist position. The qualitative approach provides the researcher with a framework or foundation for the chosen research methods or techniques. Bryman (2012:401) argues that in qualitative research, reports of the investigation undertaken tend to embody detailed descriptions of what is happening. Qualitative researchers are predisposed to provide detailed accounts of the phenomena investigated within their context because of the “why” questions which require thorough explanation (Creswell, 2007:37). This research employs the descriptive research method to vividly describe the relationship between corporate power and South Africa’s public policy,

with a focus on the economic oligarchy's (MEC) interactions with the ANC political elite that also occupy senior public office in the period 1996 to 2014.

This particular research employs documentary data instruments. Flick (2009:255) stresses that what is noteworthy is that qualitative research largely relies on the particular perspective that is represented in the documents analysed. Moreover, Bryman (2012) states that qualitative studies place emphasis on context in the social setting under investigation, the contextual understanding of phenomena investigated recorded in documentary data requires detailed descriptions and explanations. In this study, the politico-economic history of South Africa and the ideological and economic policy positions of the government of the day are critical to understanding the research problem and question. Hence this study provides a rich and detailed contextualization in chapter one laying the foundation upon which the research questions are posed, and the purpose for undertaking the study linked to the problem statement is presented. Moreover, the qualitative approach and its epistemological position enable the researcher to investigate corporate powers' influence and to determine the means by which that influence is exerted on South African public policy through descriptive analysis and interpretive analysis.

Research Design

This study uses a descriptive research design within the broader qualitative tradition. The study analyses secondary documentary data (document analysis) the data collected and selected is analysed through the thematic approach. Documentary data is relevant and useful in resolving the research problem and answering the research question. The unobtrusive nature of documents including newspaper articles, policy documents and government publications provided the researcher with ample ground to analyse, discuss and interpret the findings of this study. Proceeding with an advancement of the study's central argument and ultimately answering the research question. The authenticity and reliability of the data analysed are ensured through triangulation, an analysis of data from three different perspectives (Bryman, 2012:543-4). This study analyses newspaper articles, government publications and policy reports or documents to ensure authenticity and reliability.

The method for data analysis - thematic analysis - classifies, codes, analyses and interprets the data (Given, 2008). This study is informed and guided by interpretivist social science. Neuman (2011:101) defines interpretative social science as "social science research that emphasizes meaningful social action, socially constructed meaning, and value relativism." This epistemological position, the research approach and design enable the researcher to conduct an

in-depth investigation of corporate power's influence of; and how private corporate donations permit the influence of South Africa's public policy. The chosen research design ensured that the proof acquired empowered the researcher to explicitly respond to the questions proposed by this study (Christensen, Johnson and Turner, 2011).

Descriptive Research

The purpose of this particular study is to provide a scientific description of the situation and events which form the crux of this study. The descriptive research design is interlinked with the qualitative approach because of the epistemological assumptions underlying qualitative research such as interpretivism (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2008; Nassaji, 2015). Babbie (2016:91) states that a multitude of qualitative research intends primarily to provide an accurate, precise and detailed description of a phenomenon. "Description refers to the process of defining, classifying, or categorizing phenomena of interest" (Marczyk et al., 2005:16). Neuman (2011:38) states that descriptive research comprehensively describes the details of a situation or social relationship. Neuman (2011:39) further argues that "a descriptive research study starts with a well-defined issue or question and tries to describe it accurately." Nassaji (2015:129) argues that "the goal of descriptive research is to describe a phenomenon and its characteristics." This study is concerned with describing the relationship between corporate power and public policy in South Africa from 1996 to 2014, guided by the objectives of the study to provide a detailed account of the influence of the former on the latter. Descriptive research is not limited to a detailed explanation of social phenomenon but goes further to probe why certain patterns are prevalent and their implications thereof. This study seeks to employ the descriptive design to describe accurately and in copious detail the findings of this study anchored by the research questions.

Descriptive research is situated in the middle of the sequence of scientific inquiry. The starting point of the knowledge continuum is exploratory research then descriptive research which is succeeded by explanatory research. This is because of the nature of research problems and questions in each purpose for undertaking research (Strydom, 2013:150-1). Research questions in an exploratory study seek to inquire about phenomena lacking substantive scholarship. In descriptive research, the primary aim is to provide a detailed and accurate description of phenomena previously studied, without concern for cause-and-effect, to enrich understanding regarding the studied phenomenon. Explanatory research questions are often "why" questions that mandate an in-depth explanation of the reasons or causes for the existence of a particular phenomenon (Neuman, 2011:38-9; Strydom, 2013). Babbie (2016:91) contends that

descriptive research can be both quantitative and qualitative, in the former the emphasis is on scientific accuracy but in the latter, the focus extends to an interrogation of why certain patterns are prevalent and what they imply. In many instances qualitative descriptive and explanatory research overlap.

According to Strydom (2013:153), descriptive data is in its nature qualitative and is presented in qualitative forms such as narrative interviews, participant observation and documentary data in order to attain deeper descriptive detail and richer meanings of the settings, context or perspectives through the description. Strydom (2013) further posits that descriptive studies are also employed in quantitative research for instance in the South African National Census (large-scale survey) which broadly depicts the numeric demographics of the country including household income, the percentage of employment, and race, religion, gender and age. However, descriptive research is not only applicable to qualitative and quantitative studies but a mixed-methods approach as well. Descriptive research seeks to present an accurate and detailed description of a situation, social setting, or relationship. Moreover, descriptive studies are frequently utilized in the process of policymaking. This particular study is concerned with the analysis of the influence exerted by corporate power on the GEAR and BEE policies (Neuman, 2011:38-9; Strydom, 2013:154). Description enables the researcher to paint an accurate picture of the relationship between corporate power and public policy as well as respond to the “how” – a secondary research question proposed by this study in thorough detail.

The Rationale for the Design

The descriptive design is suitable for this particular study as it facilitates the quest to respond to the research question by providing a vivid description of the research problem and the achievement of the research objectives ultimately providing an answer to the overarching question. Research objectives are achieved through the analysis of existing knowledge on the phenomenon studied with the addition of knowledge that this study analyses to augment and insulate the argument advanced by this study. The investigation undertaken to unravel corporate powers’ influence on South Africa’s public policy is reported through a precise and detailed description of an establishment of corporate influence, how this influence prevails, what constitutes this influence, the context under which this influence is nurtured and persists and what this means for South Africa’s public policy. Moreover, how corporate power employs private corporate donations to influence public policy is also described through a vivid picture that this study paints and the argument advanced which advertently answers the research questions (Neuman, 2011:38-9; Strydom, 2013; Nassaji, 2015:129; Babbie, 2016).

Research Methodology

The methodology is constitutive of the rigorous procedural rules, methods and evaluative guidelines which govern research and legitimate scientific inquiry (Miller and Brewer, 2003:192). Given (2008:516) states that the aforementioned roadmap is employed by researchers “to render their work open for analysis, critique, replication, repetition, and/or adaptation and to choose research methods.” This study employs document analysis as the preferred methodology to conduct this inquiry, this decision was encouraged by the research context and the needs of the research questions. Documentary data used in this study entails newspaper articles, policy reports and government publications that cover the period 1996 to 2014 in congruence with the timeframe of this study. This sought to discuss the dominant discourse, news media debates, debacles and government policy at the national level of South Africa’s policy processes and how it was influenced by the large and powerful corporate sector.

Document Analysis (Documentary Data)

This study like many others in qualitative research commences with the analysis of previously collected data on the area of concern and the review of the literature in accordance with the descriptive design of the research. Document analysis is the chosen research method for this study, and it informs the collection, analysis and interpretation of data in accordance with the prescripts of research methodology. Notably, the choice of research method is informed by the research focus, questions and objectives (Johnston, 2014:620). Marczyk et al. (2005:116) argue that “the research question and the nature of the variables under investigation usually drive the choice of a measurement strategy for data collection.” Altheide, Coyle, DeVriese and Schneider (2008:127) define a document as “any symbolic representation that can be recorded and retrieved for description and analysis”. Qualitative research tends to be descriptive and explanatory with an emphasis on the context which creates social reality (Bryman, 2012:401). The phenomenon at study here is the relationship between corporate power and public policy in South Africa from 1996 to 2014. This study is conducted through a qualitative description of the two variables under study in their time dimension to present the implications of the relationship. The data analysed and interpreted is sourced from documents that are related to the research problem and question, these documents include newspaper articles, policy reports and government publications (Johnston, 2014).

This study uses secondary data documents as a stand-alone method for data collection. Although some qualitative studies are not completely reliant on secondary data, they inevitably

use primary data documents because all data in scientific research is recorded in documents (Johnston, 2014). All documents are multiple purpose carriers of information that convey messages that can also be transmuted, for instance, parliamentary bills change into acts of the legislature. Secondary data documents are of significant importance in qualitative studies as they act as preliminary or background reading before a researcher proceeds to gather primary data. Thus, documents are phenomenal in the research process whether the researcher intends to collect primary or secondary data, documentary data cannot be dispelled (Given, 2008:232).

The documents used in the study are publicly available and some fairly accessible, the documents include online newspapers, policy documents and government publications. Bryman (2012:543) states that sourcing the relevant documents is not the pinnacle of document analysis, but it is the interpretative ability of the researcher to extract the meaning contained in the documentary sources. In assessing the quality of the aforementioned documents used in the study, the arguments advanced were compared, and contrasted and points of divergence and convergence were identified. The theoretical and conceptual foundations of the varied perspectives were thoroughly interrogated and critiqued in the review of the literature and subsequent discussion chapters to rigorously exhibit the authenticity and credibility of the documents. The researcher also ensured that the documents analysed were authored by academics that are subject matter experts, that journal articles used underwent the peer-review process and that newspapers were from credible news sources related to the research problem and questions (Bryman, 2012:544; Johnston, 2014:620;).

Authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning were all regarded as key factors in selecting documentary data sources. Government publications, policy documents and newspaper articles are utilized in the study, for instance, B-BBEE and associated redistributive legislation such as the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act No. 5 of 2000. The above-mentioned data sources provide the researcher with pertinent information regarding the research assumption (see, purpose of the study in chapter one) and objectives. These documents inform the researcher about the positional power of the political elite in public policymaking avenues, the objectives of public policy and their set targets, and the influence exerted on policy actors (elites) in the competitive policy arena. Importantly the data set enables the researcher to investigate and explore the influence of corporate power on public policy by examining constraints or influence that hampers the achievement of policy goals such as wealth redistribution as stated by B-BBEE. Public policy analysis undertaken by this study is informed by the elite theory and this theoretical approach enables the study to investigate and explore

the corporate influence on public policy and provide a theory-based explanation informed by document analysis. Johnston (2014:623) further asserts that when using secondary data analysis triangulation of sources is vital for ensuring reliability (dependability) and validity (credibility) (Creswell, 2018:334).

News media sources are not only quantitatively analysed through content analysis but can also be analysed through alternative qualitative methods. This particular study employs thematic analysis which Bryman (2012:553) defines as a typical analysis that “entails searching for themes in the sources that are examined.” Thematic analysis entails the identification of common themes from the sourced documentary data regarding the subject matter under investigation (Clarke and Braun, 2017:297; Maguire and Delahunt, 2017:3352). Unlike quantitative content analysis, thematic analysis scientifically endeavours to understand social constructs of reality in analysed documents, data triangulation employed by this study further adds to the richness of insights and rigour of arguments (Bryman, 2012:545). Bryman (2012:553) affirms that the use of a meticulous analysis permits “greater sensitivity to the nature and content of specific themes.”

Deducing from above, qualitative document analysis is a reflexive qualitative research method in a mass-media and internet dominated epoch. The emphasis is not on quantitative numerical relationships typical of content analysis; rather the focus is on unearthing and accurately describing, with an emphasis on context, meaning, patterns and processes (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Creswell, 2018:248). Qualitative document analysis is connected to, and associated with thematic analysis as well as developments in communication patterns (interactions) and discourse. Qualitative document analysis is defined as “an integrated method, procedure, and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving, analysing documents for their relevance, significance, and meaning (Altheide et al., 2008:128).” Furthermore, qualitative document analysis as a research method is a recursive, iterative and systematic process that follows a logical sequence in conducting research wherein each step feeds into the other. Indeed, Altheide et al. (2008:128) state that qualitative document analysis follows a process between “concept development, sampling, data collection, data coding, data analysis, and interpretation.”

The Rationale for the Research Methodology

Documents should not be viewed as data that presents an objective reality relative to other “subjective” qualitative methods such as interviews. The author, the epoch, social

circumstances, the purpose for which the document was written as well as its intended readers and institutional function are of paramount importance in the analysis of documents. Documents should be construed as communicative devices which have been methodologically created to provide a particular outlook and perspective of reality. Documents are not mere containers of information they also provide contextualized information (Prior, 2008:112; Flick, 2009:259). However, document analysis like all other research methods has its own limitations, because of time and resource constraints not all available (corpus) documents were used, but only those deemed necessary, significant and relevant to the research objectives which culminate in answering the overarching question. However, some documents are not available in the university or public libraries within close geographic proximity. Neither are they freely retrievable on the internet. Moreover, some documents are not accessible in the archives because of their potential to tarnish or taint the image, prestige, or reputation of certain high-profile political figures in history (Flick, 2009:259).

Nevertheless, documents also have practical purposes for instance qualitative descriptive studies are more than not used as a framework in policymaking (Neuman, 2011:38). Braun and Clarke (2006:97) further indicate that thematic analysis employed by this study is commonly used to inform policymaking. Senior academics with substantive publications in the field of political science form part of the research and advisory team to senior government officials. Furthermore, the significance of document analysis is that the methodology enriches a certain field both in the theoretical and practical context. Document analysis provides new and unfiltered perspectives within the field investigated – South Africa's political economy. Furthermore, the use of secondary data documents is non-reactive and in the research process most if not all coding and analysis methods are applicable to document analysis (Flick, 2009:261).

The study time period of analysis, 1996 to 2014 is determined by the study's assumption that the 1996 GEAR policy is considered a marker of official neoliberal orthodoxy and self-imposed structural adjustments in South Africa (Bond, 2006; 2007). Moreover, Acemoglu, et al. (2007:2) encourage that "the appropriate response is to immediately create an institution that can properly evaluate the policy by 2014 when many targets are supposed to be met and be in the position to make a rational decision about the future of the policy." These targets include the sectoral empowerment charters such as the liquid fuels, mining and financial sector targets for transformation that are borne out of the B-BBEE and related redistributive legislation. Other justification for ending the policy analysis in 2014 includes the following considerations; 2014

is an election year wherein there are various political events and developments, such as the emergence of the Left and populism, the creation of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2013; National Union of Metal Workers South Africa's (NUMSA) expulsion from COSATU and the hope of new socialist politics; and the SACP at this time had declared that they would not be supporting the ANC in that election. For these reasons, 2014 is a good cut-off year so as to avoid overburdening the study and fashion accurate public policy analysis (Business Day, 2014; The Cape Times, 2014; Hunter, 2014a; Mosala et al., 2017:337; Poggi and Mtimka, 2021:17).

Sampling or Selection

Sampling is a technique to reduce the data corpus (all documents collected) by the systematic selection of a data set (representative documents) in accordance with the objectives of the research. Sampling is necessary for research because it is impossible to analyse all documents collected within time and resource limitations. Important scientific considerations observed in this study regarding sampling and the technique used include representativeness of purposefully selected documents in connection with the heterogeneity of the broader data corpus to ensure generalizability of findings; the research objectives of this study and what it seeks to achieve; time and resource limitations, the authenticity and reliability of selected documentary data to ensure precise and accurate findings; the pertinence of the sampling technique to the research objectives, and the utility of the sample. Sampling in this study refers to the “selection” of documentary data as units useful in answering the research question, this process is outlined below (Sharma, 2017:749).

Purposive Sampling

Cresswell and Poth (2018:224) argue that the strategy for purposeful sampling in qualitative research is employed by the researcher to acquire through an analysis “an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study.” The sample drawn from the corpus provides the researcher with a means to an end, the end is what the research seeks to accomplish – explicitly answer the research questions. The means is the sample (data set) which provides the relevant, factual, useful knowledge and insights about the research problem and the principal phenomenon under study (Given, 2008:697). Purposive sampling is a sampling technique wherein the artifacts to be analysed are selected in accordance with the purpose of the study, the representativeness of the artifacts and their use value in that regard (Babbie, 2016:187). The amount of documentary data in the broad field of South Africa's political

economy (thanks to the internet) is almost infinite and could not all be squeezed into this study. However, the sample drawn (data set) from the corpus has been assembled to reflect the diverse views and information in the broader field of political economy. The sample purposefully extracted relates to the research problem and research questions, this assists the researcher to provide an accurate description of the phenomenon – corporate powers' influence on South Africa's public policy.

The data set (documents) systematically selected consists of newspaper articles, policy documents (reports) and government publications relevant to the field of (South Africa's) political economy which communicate to the researcher information and insights connected to the questions and objectives of this study. Therefore, documents drawn from the broader texts of the field for the purposes of analysis are representative of the divergent views expressed in the news media and key public debates and debacles regarding the bone-marrow of this study (Babbie, 2016; Sharma, 2017:751; Creswell, 2018). This study seeks to investigate whether corporate power influences South Africa's public policy or otherwise, and to access how private corporate donations influence public policy (and how this influence persists); as well as the limitations to confronting corporate power. The units analysed by the study encompass the GEAR and BEE policies. Again, the secondary question probed by this study seeks to accurately and precisely describe the influence powerful corporations (economic oligarchy) gained through the covert financing of the governing party's election campaigns. Including how affirmative action and the BEE empowerment of a politically connected black business class contribute to the persistence of the exertion of corporate influence on public policy. Given (2008:697) recommends that the sampling technique should always be aligned to the research objectives and that the technique is invariably a product of the nature of the objectives and the principal phenomena studied.

Method of Data Collection

Data in qualitative studies is in the form of texts or words unlike in quantitative studies where the data is numerical. The data analysed in this study are the documentary sources already mentioned earlier in this chapter. The findings of the research are based on or are anchored by the data collected and selected secondary data (Given, 2008).

Secondary Data

According to Ajayi (2017) information is obtained from data which has been gathered and stored (archived) either from primary or secondary sources. Primary data is directly collected

by the researcher from the field or experientially from the sample drawn for analysis from the target population. Primary data collection strategies include interviews, experiments, observations, surveys and questionnaires. On the contrary, secondary data is data which has already been gathered and archived previously by either universities, individual researchers, research institutes or organizations. Examples of secondary data include books, peer-reviewed journal articles, newspapers, policy reports, government publications, websites, official data archives and internal records. In this study, there are three data sources which have been collected and selected, newspaper articles, policy reports and government publications. The data are three dimensional to ensure credibility as mandated by triangulation (Creswell, 2018:88).

Primary data is collected by the researcher to respond to the specific research problem of that particular scientific inquiry. This data is stored and archived for public access and this data can be reused by another researcher for a reconstructed or reformulated research problem and question - it then becomes secondary data (Hox and Boeije, 2005:593). Primary data collection strategies are time-consuming, costly and carry cumbersome field and administrative responsibilities. Whereas collecting secondary data is far less expensive and much quicker to complete. This is a prime advantage of using the secondary data collection strategy, it allows the researcher to make use of the relevant information in resolving the reconstructed research problem and answering the research question (Hox and Boeije, 2005:594). However, problems generally encountered with using the secondary data collection strategy include, locating, retrieving, and evaluating the quality of the data (Johnston, 2014:620). The researcher judiciously averted these practicalities by visiting the university and public library, accessing open data archives and tertiary documents such as the library catalogues. Moreover, the internet provides access to digital scholarly repositories and archives such as Google Scholar, Politikon, JSTOR and ResearchGate to name a few which were phenomenal in locating, retrieving and evaluating data because the meta-information is usually provided in these digital objects. All secondary data documents used to complete this study are cited and referenced and the original authors are acknowledged for their work. Secondary data used to complete this study is deemed relevant and useful in unravelling the research problem and answering the research questions (Hox and Boeije, 2005:593-7).

Secondary data is the information gathering strategy employed by this study. This strategy is appropriate for this study which seeks to build a new understanding, present a new perspective and ultimately contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the subject matter investigated

(Miller and Brewer, 2003:282). This study's subject matter is an analysis of the relationship between corporate power and public policy in South Africa, from 1996 to 2014. As was already mentioned, Ajayi (2017) and Hox and Boeijs (2005) concur that secondary data collection is economic and can be completed in a relatively short time. Miller and Brewer (2003) further add that secondary data is a convenient strategy for emerging researchers due to the costs related to primary data collection which often includes personnel or a research team. This can be attributed to factors such as the quality, the relevance and usefulness, the social circumstance and the context wherein the primary data was collected usually requires the expertise of a well-seasoned researcher. However, it can be argued that even with primary data collection in both quantitative and qualitative studies, the analysis is heavily reliant on the contextualization and interpretation (reflexivity) of the responses of the subjects by the researcher in the field. Secondary data analysis permits the use of larger sample sizes, for instance, Statistics SA or online news media archives such as Sabinet. The secondary analysis makes it possible for the researcher to analyse topics and time periods that would have not been available otherwise. Furthermore, secondary analysis builds upon existing data and therefore presents new and unfiltered insights and perspectives thus facilitating intellectual advancement (Miller and Brewer, 2003:283-5).

Data collected in this study is constitutive of policy reports, newspaper articles and government publications sourced from the Nelson Mandela University (NMU) library and online tertiary sources or repositories. These documents discuss the variables analysed by this study, corporate power's influence on public policy, with a focus on the timeline 1996 to 2014, the MEC or economic oligarchy (corporate power) the GEAR and BEE policy and the covert corporate financing of the governing-party's election campaigns. The use of secondary data and online archives for which access was granted by the NMU online library services enabled the researcher to retrieve policy reports and newspaper articles dating back from 1996. The study aims to unravel the research problem and answer the research questions by using this data collection method – secondary data.

Descriptive Measurement (Conceptualization)

Babbie (2016:121) argues that “to operationalize the concepts to be studied, the researcher states precisely how variables in the study will be measured.” Definitions are prerequisites and paramount when answering a descriptive question. This clarification is needed to clearly delineate the meaning of terms. Definitions of variables (concepts) in the study will invariably form and shape the conclusions reached by this descriptive research (Babbie, 2016:136).

Neuman (2011:199) surmises that measurement (definitions) is an integral part of the research process in qualitative studies and not a separate and specific step in the process because of the inductive nature of qualitative studies. In this study analysed concepts, corporate power and public policy are clearly specified and accurately defined (see chapter two) this is the conceptualization and operationalization. For instance, corporate power is constitutive of the capitalist and corporatist MEC-core which the study refers to as the economic oligarchy. The nature of the relationship between the two variables studied is accurately described as well as the extent of influence that the independent variable (corporate power) exerts on the dependent (public policy) in the period 1996 to 2014. The phenomenon at study here is the relationship between corporate power and South African public policy which will be conducted through a detailed and contextual description of the two variables to present a vivid picture of “how” corporate power influences public policy and the resulting implications.

Reliability, Validity and Triangulation

In qualitative document analysis employed in this study, there are no human subjects or engagements with the field nor need for quantitative measurement. Therefore, quantitative language such as reliability and validity are supplanted by the quality (dependability or reliability) of the documentary data used in the study and the criterion for assessing quality includes authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Flick, 2009:258; Bryman, 2012:245-6). The bulk documentary data (corpus) was relatively easy to access as many documents are in the public domain and with the arrival of the internet, it is simple to access and retrieve data. Documentary data selected provides “exactness” which presents the granular details of variables analysed in that document that provide information on the purpose and context studied (Bowen, 2009:31).

The use of all secondary data in the study is cited and clearly referenced (Hox and Boeije, 2005:597). To guarantee credibility (validity) in the research different documentary data sources such as newspaper articles, policy reports and government publications were compared and contrasted to ensure trustworthiness. Bryman (2012:392) asserts that triangulation is a process of using different data sources to ensure accuracy and correspondence in the data to ensure that research findings are reliable. Representativeness is a factor that overlaps with the chosen sampling technique earlier mentioned. The documentary data used in the study is aligned with the research objectives and is relevant and useful in answering the research question. As was observed earlier, in the analysis of the secondary data the researcher was

conscious of factors such as the purpose, methodology, intended audience and the theoretical and epistemological affiliations of those authors. The above criterion for ensuring quality and accuracy in the process of data collection, selection, analysis and interpretation corroborate the reliability and validity (conformability) of the research findings (Creswell, 2018:88; Johnston, 2014:623).

Method of Data Analysis

In the analysis of qualitative data, the process of preliminary analysis begins at the stage of collecting and selecting data. This preliminary analytical exercise is completed post the data collection completion and systematic analysis commences. Qualitative data analysis is a logical and reflexive process to “systematically organize, integrate, and examine; as we do this, we search for patterns and relationships among the specified details (Neuman, 2011:507).” This specific study uses thematic analysis to identify common themes of corporate power and public policy and their relations to the research problem and question. The research questions which form the crux of this study are: does corporate power influence South Africa’s public policy? And how do private corporate donations permit the influence of South Africa’s public policy?

Thematic Analysis

According to Bryman (2012:580), a theme is an identified category in the data that relates to the central focus or research questions of the study. The category identified builds on the codes found in the documentary data, this provides the basis for a theoretical understanding of data that can contribute to the literature relevant to the central research focus. Constructed in another way, Braun and Clarke (2006:82) assert that a theme encapsulates a certain aspect of significance in the data in reference to the research question and it also embodies a patterned meaning within the data set. Clarke and Braun (2017:297) denote that thematic analysis “is a method for identifying, analysing, and interpreting patterns of meaning (‘themes’) within qualitative data.” Thematic analysis as a qualitative data analysis approach also provides detailed and rich descriptions of an organized data set and further interprets key features of the central research focus. Themes do not one-sidedly emerge or discover themselves from the data, this would be an erroneous account of the process of analysis and would not be peculiar to thematic analysis in comparison to other approaches of qualitative data analysis. This narrow account of thematic analysis negates the proactive and cognitive involvement of the researcher in discovering themes of interest and relevance that emerge from the thinking position and

understanding of the data and its significance and relation to the central focus of the study (Braun and Clarke, 2006:80; Clarke and Braun, 2017; Maguire and Delahunt, 2017).

This qualitative thematic analysis is guided by the research problem and questions in conducting data collection and purposeful sampling of data in order to generate themes (patterned meaning) that respond to the research question. Unlike other approaches to qualitative data analysis such as discourse, conversation, narrative analysis or grounded theory, thematic analysis is not distinguished by theoretical inclinations. Thematic analysis is not enmeshed with any pre-existing theoretical framework or methodological approach to social science, it can be used within various theoretical frameworks and research methodologies for differing reasons or purposes. As it may already be evident, thematic analysis is a versatile approach that can be applied to either an essentialist or realist, constructionist or contextualist methodology (Clarke and Braun, 2017:297). The realist method is the social actors' experiences and meaning of reality, a constructionist method is distinguishable by the examination of socially constructed reality while a contextualist method describes meanings attached to experiences in their contextual "structure and agency" pertaining to meanings and reality. Therefore, "Thematic analysis can be a method that works both to reflect reality and to unpick or unravel the surface of 'reality' (Braun and Clarke, 2006:81)."

Braun and Clarke (2006) and Clarke and Braun (2017) recommend that the study presents with sufficient detail the social science methodology or philosophical approach, its assumptions and principles as they relate to the data and the implications of these underpinnings to conduct a sound thematic analysis. Interpretive social science is concerned with the analysis of documents in order to obtain an extensive understanding of the relations of social actors and the influences on those relations in their contexts. The interpretive approach is a systematic analysis of meaningful social action in a natural setting with a meaning system and how that process of meaning creation by social actors in its subjective context forms social worlds and reality (Neuman, 2011:101-2). Furthermore, constructionism is a variant of the interpretive approach and according to the constructionist orientation, social reality is an outcome of the meaningful (intended and subjective) interactions of social actors. The responsibility of the interpretive researcher is to understand and interpret this process of interest. It is of interest to the researcher because it creates meaning and reality through the construction of culture, belief and systems of right and wrong (Neuman, 2011:102-3). Interpretivism informs this descriptive research which seeks to describe the influence of corporate power on South Africa's public policy focused by the theoretical framework discussed in chapter two, the elite theory of public

policy. The context through which the power wielded by the corporate elite and the source of this power including its exertion to influence public policy in South Africa is analysed thematically in order to interpret the nature and constructions of power in the country's elite public policy environment.

In thematic analysis dominant, common, recurrent and repeated words, texts, quotations, metaphors and/or ideas comprise the codes which are drawn from the data set (Creswell, 2018:262-3). The prevalence of a theme is not measured quantitatively as the case would be for content analysis, instead, it is measured according to its significance in relation to the research question and its prevalence in the data set. However, the flexible nature of thematic analysis means that there is no rigidity in this measuring process, what is crucial is consistency in the identification of a prevalent theme (Braun and Clarke, 2006:82-3; Clarke and Braun, 2017:298). The theoretical thematic approach undertaken in this study implies the conscious acknowledgement of the researcher's theoretical or analytical interest in the research topic or area. The theoretical approach provides a thematic description of the significant aspects of the data. Therefore the "how" and "why" question pertaining to coding is to answer the research question (Braun and Clarke, 2006). In this theoretical thematic approach to data analysis coding, categorization and theme generation are guided or directed by the code or patterns' relevance in answering the research question and not necessarily its abundance in the data set because the crux of this study is explicitly responding to the research questions (Maguire and Delahunt, 2017:3354).

Thematic analysis at the latent level is not limited to the depiction of surface meanings of the data but stretches to unearth and delve deeper into the underlying and concealed ideas, concepts and ideologies (structures) that compose a theory-informed (above the surface) semantic meaning of the data (Maguire and Delahunt, 2017:3353). Accordingly, theme development under latent thematic analysis is an interpretive exercise, keeping in mind that a researcher cannot be divorced or detached from philosophical positions. Therefore, the analysis undertaken is both descriptive and theory-informed (deductive). Latent thematic analysis is born out of a constructionist framework that advances the argument that: meaning and reality are social constructs (Braun and Clarke, 2006:84; Neuman, 2011:101-2; Clarke and Braun, 2013). In the analysis of the data set the researcher goes beyond the surface level (semantic) meanings and seeks to unearth the hidden meanings (latent) through an in-depth analysis and interpretation of underlying factors which influence the shape and form of the semantic meanings on documents analysed. In simpler terms, this study seeks to provide a profound

discussion on the political and economic ideologies, the constructs of (corporate) power, power relations in the public policy environment and the (elite) influences on South Africa's public policy.

The following section provides a recapitulation of the research process: the design and methodology inclusive of the descriptive research design and document analysis; and their bearing on the process of data collection and selection.

The Design and Methodology

As was already copiously discussed in the preceding section, this study employs a qualitative descriptive research design that focuses on corporate power's influence on South Africa's public policy from 1996 to 2014. Congruent with the conceptualization of the above concepts (variables) provided in chapters one and two of this study, descriptive research is appropriate because it enables the researcher to depict the details of the elite policy environment and the power dynamics that it breeds as well as the public policy ramifications. Descriptive research has proven to be suitable for policy-oriented studies. Furthermore, the use of descriptive research provides assurance that the findings and discussion provide a rich and detailed answer to the research questions (Neuman, 2011:38-9; Strydom, 2013; Nassaji, 2015).

This study analyses documents which determine the collection, selection and analysis of data. The data sources gathered by this study include newspaper articles (see Table 1), policy documents (see chapter five) and government publications (see Table 2). As stated above, the study seeks to determine corporate power's influence on South Africa's public policy, therefore the search for newspaper articles was guided by the research questions (does corporate power influence South Africa's public policy? And how do private corporate donations permit the influence of South Africa's public policy?) and title. The title reads as follows: an analysis of the relationship between corporate power and public policy in South Africa. A search was conducted on the NMU library online services resource, the Access Global NewsBank database (<https://0-infoweb.newsbank.com.wam.seals.ac.za/apps/news/easy-search?p=AWGLNB>). The key words punched into the search box included: corporate power in South Africa, corporate powers influence in South Africa, the ANC's economic public policy, the corporate sector in South Africa, the ANC's BEE policy, private corporate donations in South Africa, the mining sector in South Africa and NEDLAC in South Africa. The search for these newspaper articles was filtered by confinement to the years 1996 to 2014.

Moreover, the selection criteria for relevant and appropriate newspaper articles in answering the research questions included: relevance to the key concepts analysed by this study, the headline or title; corporate power and South Africa's public policy; specifically, the influence of corporate power; the BEE business class, neoliberal GEAR; the private party funding regime, the mining sector elite, the ANC political elite and a key focus on 1996 to 2014. Post the search, 190 newspaper articles had been retrieved however the scope of this research project does not allow for the use of the entire corpus of data. Accordingly, the data corpus was trimmed through the evaluation of each data item, any article which did not speak about the relations between corporate power and public policy or depict any relevance in aiding the study to answer the research questions was discarded through a funnelling approach. Ultimately, there are 75 newspaper articles that were used in the analysis. The data is presented as it is in chapter five. The table below depicts the selection of newspaper articles in tabular form, this entails information on the number and period which these data items cover in their content.

Table 1 Newspaper Articles Selected for the Analysis

Newspaper Articles	The Number	Period
Business Day	37	1997 – 2014
Mail & Guardian	6	2001 – 2014
Sunday Times	11	2003 – 2012
Beeld	2	2004
Daily Dispatch	3	2005 – 2010
The Herald	1	2006
City Press	3	2007 – 2009
Cape Argus	1	2012
Sunday World	1	2012
Pretoria News	3	2013 – 2014
The Cape Times	3	2013 – 2014
Ground UP	1	2014
The Star	1	2014

Mercury	1	2014
News24	1	2015
Aggregate number of Newspaper publishers: 15	Aggregate number of newspaper articles: 75	Time period covered: 1997 to 2014

Justification for Selection of Newspaper Articles

As mentioned above, the selection of newspaper articles was determined by the scope, research problem, and question. This study uses theoretical thematic analysis; therefore, this research undertakes a theory-informed analysis to drive an argument that is presented by the study's research assumption (see, purpose of the study in chapter one). The selection of these newspaper articles is also informed by the study's intent to identify latent codes in the data synergistic with the study's interpretative epistemological philosophy. Newspaper articles selected for analysis are related to the research question and further provided useful data covering the period 1996 to 2014. Moreover, it is important to note that key policy elites include the professional or educated class, intellectuals, academics, public policy commentators, and political analysts who contribute significantly to the news media debates and public policy discourse at the national level. Therefore, the selection of these newspaper articles is intertwined to the elite theory of public policy that frames the study's policy analysis approach, the thematic analysis of the influence of corporate power on public policy in South Africa.

Table 2 Government Publications Selected for the Analysis

Government gazettes, Acts and Laws	Period	Justification for Selection
National Economic Development and Labour Council Act No. 35 of 1994	1994 to date	Legislative framework for socioeconomic policy consultation among organized labour, business, communities, and the government (policy arena).
Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy	1996 – 2006	Macroeconomic strategy to achieve redistribution through economic growth.
Skills Development Act No. 97 of 1998	1998 to date	Legislative framework for skills development of employees in every sector,

		the provision of bursaries, training and learnerships, with a focus on PDI's.
Competition Act No. 89 of 1998	1998 to date	Legislative framework for opening up highly concentrated industries.
Employment Equity Act No. 55 of 1998	1998 to date	Legislative framework for fairness in the workplace and a demographically representative workforce.
National Empowerment Fund Act No. 105 of 1998	1998 to date	Legislative framework for the redistribution of wealth to benefit PDI's through the privatization of SOEs and mechanisms for financing these transactions.
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act No. 5 of 2000.	2000 to date	Policy framework for the favouring (or preference) of BEE (PDI) bidders in the awarding of tenders and issuing of licences.
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act No. 4 of 2000	2000 – 2002	Legislative framework for the legal advancement of equality, fairness, social justice, human dignity, and freedom.
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act No. 28 of 2002	2002 to date	Overall legislative framework governing the mineral and petroleum resources industry.
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act No. 53 of 2003	2003 – 2013	A legislative framework for the empowerment of PDI's through the provision of access into the mainstream or productive economy.
Department of Trade and Industry. South Africa's Economic Transformation:	2003	A policy framework that outlines the various socioeconomic methods through-which the state and

A Strategy for Broad-Based Economic Empowerment		the corporate sector ought to achieve wealth redistribution and industry transformation.
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Amendment Act No. 46 of 2013.	2013 to date	Updated version of the B-BBEE legislation. Provides specific clearer definitions, scorecard, and targets which were previously unclear.

The above table depicts the selected and analysed government publications. These documents are relevant in answering the research question because they provide the roles, functions and powers of policy actors (elites) with access to public policy-making (councils); the influence of elites, gauged through analysis of policy context and justification sections; and policy provisions such as objectives and targets for empowerment, redistribution or transformation. Armed with this information, the researcher is able to investigate whether or not corporate power influences South Africa's public policy by assessing the policy probity of bureaucrats and high-ranking officials charged with advancing the objectives of public policy.

Data Analysis and Interpretation

As already discussed, this study employs a qualitative theoretical thematic analysis. Clarke and Braun (2017:297) aver that thematic analysis is an instrument or tool to identify shared or patterned meaning thereby interpreting the data through coding, categorization, and generation of themes. The raw data were manually analysed to identify patterns and to generate latent codes proceeding to provide descriptive themes in order to articulate a deep interpretation of the ways in which corporate power may have possibly exerted influence on South Africa's public policy from 1996 to 2014. The theoretical framework used by this study provided a useful lens in the assessment of the relationships between policy elites and power dynamics which inform the political and administrative environment of public policy in South Africa. The application of the theoretical framework aided the study in the analysis process, discussion and interpretation as well as reaching the findings. Again, the primary concern of this study is responding to the research questions, therefore the themes generated are directly linked to the research questions. A theoretical thematic analysis enabled the study to provide vivid and compelling discussions based on descriptive themes and latent codes (Clarke and Braun, 2017; Maguire and Delahunt, 2017).

Limitations to Research Design and Methodology

Limitations encountered in the collection, selection and analysis of documentary data used by this study include restricted or a complete lack of access to specific online newspaper article companies due to the subscription costs which NMU does not cover, for instance, News24. The exclusiveness of such information or content can be construed as integral to the limitations posed by the scarcity of financial resources by emerging researchers. Certain articles were not used because they did not meet the criterion for selection, and some were not established yet during the time frame (1996 to 2014) of this study. Given that this is an unobtrusive desktop study newspaper articles (publishers) that were not digitized and archived during this study's time frame were also not included. However, the researcher is also aware that all methods, designs and methodologies are not without practicalities attached to their use. For instance, unobtrusive research is only limited to the analysis of what has already been recorded (Babbie, 2016:334). Researchers with an interest in the relations between corporate power and public policy in South Africa may use interviews, focus groups or questionnaires in data collection (field research) as opposed to a desktop analysis. Practicalities related to the use of document analysis as a stand-alone are overcome by the triangulation of data sources to improve validity and reliability.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter concentrated on the research design and methodology employed by this study. The chapter described in detail the key related decisions made in the research process. The study uses the qualitative approach with the interpretivist social science methodology followed by the descriptive research design and subsequently followed by document analysis as the chosen and suitable research methodology; the study is non-reactive and hence the purposive sampling or selection technique and the collection and selection of documents for analysis. Measurement or rather definitions of key concepts (variables) adopted for this study is descriptive in nature, and reliability (dependability) and validity (credibility) were accounted for with the use of triangulation. In order to meet the aims and objectives, this study analysed three different data sources, newspaper articles, government publications and policy documents. Thematic analysis was employed for the qualitative analysis of secondary data. Moreover, before limitations were discussed, the chapter provided a recapitulation of the research process undertaken by the study in order to provide a clear explanation of how this process anchored the effort of meeting the research objectives.

Chapter 5: The Presentation of Findings and Analysis: Power Relations Between the Political Elite and Powerful Corporations.

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the presentation of findings, per research objectives which were highlighted in the first chapter of this study. The objectives are as follows: to investigate if corporate power influences South Africa's public policy, and to assess the influence of private corporate donations on South Africa's public policy. The use of this approach ensures that the research questions are effectively answered by meeting the research objectives. The research questions are: does corporate power influence South Africa's public policy? And how do private corporate donations permit the influence of South Africa's public policy? The first theme is generated from data collected and analysed for the first research objective and the second theme consists of data collected and analysed for the second objective. In the preceding chapter, it was discussed that thematic analysis is the method for the analysis of findings. The chapter follows this chronological structure: first the BEE policy document as an instrument for economic redress and the creation of a politically-savvy black business class (co-option of the political elite); and second the effect of private corporate donations on the political process and public policy decision-making. The structure of this chapter is intended to meet the research objectives in response to the overarching research questions.

In accordance with the intent of this chapter which is the thematic presentation of research findings. The themes outlined in this chapter were generated through a critical analysis of the data (newspaper articles, policy documents and government publications) collected and selected. In this process data items with shared codes were clustered together and classified into distinct categories. Codes were determined not only by the numerical frequency of specific patterned meaning, but by the significance of these codes in relation to the research question. The first category included codes related to BEE as a method of class creation and the various methods in place to achieve this goal. Codes on the creation of the black capitalist class are relevant to answering the question because they provide important data on how the movement between party-state and corporate sector by the governing-party political elite creates a cobweb of conflicting interests wherein the tender process is stage-managed. Public office bearers tend to award a state tender to an ANC-linked BEE company in a joint venture with an established MEC corporation. The black business class elevated into the corporate sector use their political-connectedness to influence the awarding of state tenders. The proceeds received by the governing-party from the BEE company ultimately find their way into the coffers of the ANC's

treasury. Examples include the arms deal and the “elephant consortium”. These conflicts of interests mean that in effect the ANC, through appointed public office bearers, bureaucrats and cabinet ministers awards a tender to an ANC-linked BEE company (Sole, 2010:187; Sokomani, 2010:176-7; Beresford, 2015:236; Madi, 2016:27).

The second category included codes that speak to the highly concentrated national economy, especially the MEC-core and aligned sectors that were targeted by B-BBEE for redistribution. This category overlaps with the first, in the channelling of corporate influence on public policy. Integral to B-BBEE is the cadre deployment policy, which saw a select clique from the governing-ANC acquire shares, directorships and joint-venture empowerment deals in the largest mining corporations in South Africa. The economic dominance of these corporations translates into political and public policy influence, largely because a politically connected business class has built relationships with the magnates of the MEC-core corporations. This relationship ensures that MEC-core corporations (economic oligarchy) maintain their position of policy influence on public office bearers from the governing-party as this chapter will unravel (Fine and Rustonjee, 1996; Southall, 2004:324-5; Bond, 2006:45; Mbeki, 2009a).

Then the third category consists of codes related to unregulated private party funding, major-party funding fiascos, the governing party’s contentious fundraising methods and the public’s perception of corporate lobbying and the intermingling of the political and corporate elite. Ultra-rich individuals and the economic oligarchy mentioned in the second category, extend private corporate donations to public office bearers and to the governing-party (that is largely in control of the national, provincial and municipal governments) in order to exert influence on public office holders and ultimately public policy (Friedman, 2010:158-9; Butler, 2010:15-6; Monbiot, 2014). Donations made to the governing-party also afford the corporate elite regular access to public office bearers and top politicians thereby establishing and building relationships that will promote special (or private) interests deferring the public interest and the common good (Cave and Rowell, 2014). Furthermore, this category uncovered information which demonstrates a link that generous corporate donations made in secret to the governing-party are reimbursed to the corporate donor in the form of state tenders and economic policy influence (Butler, 2010:16; Solik, 2013b). Chancellor House and Imvume Management (in the Oilgate scandal) demonstrate how a BEE empowered company serves as a conduit to fund the ANC, subverting the public policy process and system (Sole, 2010; Sokomani, 2010).

Generated themes relevant to answering research questions include BEE: the creation of a political black business class; and the influence of private corporate donations on ANC policy.

These themes were named as an outcome of a persistent analysis of the data and its categorization. These themes are the framework for data presentation, they will be discussed in the following chapter (Braun and Clarke, 2006:88-89; Clarke and Braun 2017:297). Data is presented in the next section, constitutive of descriptive themes and the data extracts they were drawn from.

BEE: the Creation of a Political Black Business Class

COSATU's Social Equity and Job Creation

The Congress of South African Trade Unions (1996) observes the need for increased social spending including, healthcare, housing and education as a response to the socioeconomic inequalities faced by South Africa. An economic growth and social equity nexus can be achieved through the state's investment in infrastructure, including telecommunications and transport (viable road networks) and land reform in order to span the rural-urban divide regarding economic activity and especially entrepreneurship. An integral part of this policy proposal is labour absorptive growth that will increase standards of living, increase the government's revenue collection and thereby provide for an increased budget capacity for investment in redistributive public policy.

Getting into GEAR

The Centre for Development and Enterprise (1997:2) states that GEAR was not prepared through comprehensive consultative methods, the document was prepared by a team of technocrats without time-consuming direct democracy. GEAR represents a clear shift from the ANC's egalitarian ideological (populist) and policy position, to an emphasis on investment attraction and economic growth. For GEAR to be a success further labour market flexibility is required, COSATU is a stumbling block to this objective. The people's consensus must be obtained for the policy to acquire legitimacy with the voting public.

The National Empowerment Consortium

According to News24 (2015) in 1996 Cyril Ramaphosa resigned as ANC Secretary-General to accede to Deputy Executive Chairman of New Africa Investments Limited (NAI). The same year saw AMB Capital broker an empowerment deal that gave the National Empowerment Corporation/Consortium (NEC) a controlling stake in Johnnic Holdings Limited. AMB Capital resolved on Ramaphosa acceding as Chairperson of Johnnic Holdings Limited. Capital in these multiple new BEE investments and holding companies were concentrated and centralized through a corporate structure which ensured accelerated capital accumulation at a much larger

scale. The NEC was largely constitutive of trade union leadership as capital was raised with the use of union pension funds, at the close of 1997 “broad-based deals” constituted 10% of the listed shares on the JSE (Helen Suzman Foundation [HSF], 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2007:6; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:13). Shares sold under empowerment deals went at a discount of 3 to 8% and the management and ownership structure (BEE ratings and political-connectedness) of these BEE companies saw them receive lucrative government contracts.

The Black Economic Empowerment Commission

The BEE report released in 2001 by the Black Economic Empowerment Commission (2001) (to be referred to as BEECom from this point forward) was composed of major empowerment beneficiaries endorsed including Cyril Ramaphosa and Sakumzi Saki Macozoma. The BEECom’s report sought to provide a clear, coherent and comprehensive policy framework for a coordinated national strategy and legislation for BEE that would materialize in the B-BBEE Act 53 of 2003, and Act 46 of 2013 as amended. The BEECom report encourages that BEE as a national programme must be equally articulated by black business leadership including the Black Management Forum (BMF) and the Black Business Council (BBC), black executives and managers, small and medium-size black entrepreneurs, township and rural spaza shop owners. In the 1990s the articulation of the structure and form of BEE had largely been an exercise exclusive to the white corporate sector

The Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter

The Mining Charter (2002:9) and Acemoglu et al. (2007:2) concur that a target of 26% black ownership in the minerals and mining industry was necessary to achieve transformation in the sector within 10 years.

Black Economic Empowerment and Economic Performance

Acemoglu et al. (2007:2) state that although the emphasis on BEE as a policy for economic transformation from 1994 to 2004 has been on share ownership as part of the compromise to protect private property rights, this approach has no effect on corporations’ productivity and investment and overall national economic growth. The previously mentioned approach may have out served its purpose (obsolete). A shift towards emphasizing enterprise and skills development is an alternative that would have a positive effect on the productivity and investment in and by corporations and overall economic growth.

Black Economic Empowerment and New Growth

The Centre for Development and Enterprise (2007:5) and the Department of Trade and Industry (2003) posit that post the BEECom in 2001, the corporate sector is compelled to abide by the policy prescripts (legislative environment) of B-BBEE's strategy to achieve socio-economic transformation and wealth redistribution. Clauses of B-BBEE such as the scorecard, codes of good practice and overall compliance by corporations determined whether they qualify for government licences, tenders or whether they are eligible to receive preferential treatment from the state. The Centre for Development and Enterprise (2007:8) surmises that B-BBEE is perceived by some foreign investors as a "tax" for doing business with the government and a hindrance to economic activity. As such, foreign investors demonstrated reluctance with investing in South Africa.

Banning the Conglomeration of Corporations

Singh (1997a) espouses that albeit the proscription of pyramid companies (conglomerate corporations) in most parts of the world. The persistent but unfulfilled promise of the ANC to pass legislation that will outlaw pyramid companies can be attributed to arguments made by prominent black business elites such as Dr Nthatho Motlana. He states that if pyramid companies historically served to accumulate enormous wealth for and concentrate economic control in a few white families, then emergent black businesses should be permitted the equivalent albeit regulations seemed imminent. The pyramid mechanism worked well to facilitate BEE through the NAIL investment holding company (Congress of South African Trade Unions, 1996; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:13).

The Experiment of Creating a Class of Patriotic Capitalists

Helen Suzman Foundation (2000) avers that three of the government's major privatization experiments including Sun Air, Aventura and Alexkor have collapsed under the ownership of the new black business class. Brett Kebble closely associated with BEE and the magnates of the new aspirant class tends to be embroiled in improper business dealings in news media. The government's preferential procurement policy creates tokenistic (fronts) empowerment in established white corporations. The "patriotic black bourgeoisie" that is assumed to carry a developmental mandate displays the new black elite's misunderstanding of capitalism. Preferential procurement from a capitalist class sourced from a political or educated elite will only form part of the ANC's patronage network (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:13&26).

The Search for a Patriotic Bourgeoisie

Friedman (1997) conveys Thabo Mbeki's utterances that domestic business leadership in general and white business particularly need to demonstrate a willingness to operate with the largely black government. Mbeki stressed that harmonious cooperation between business and government would be essential in the creation of a black patriotic bourgeoisie. Further, the domestic white business must keep in mind that there are foreign alternatives and that they should avoid what happened to the British business class after 1948. Friedman (1997) posits that it is important to keep in mind that the ANC has been largely influenced by international business since 1990 hence Nelson Mandela's policy shift towards privatization.

The Power and Influence of Corporations in a Globalized World

City Press (2007b) President Mbeki has sat multiple meetings with the chief executives of powerful global corporations that are prospective investors in South Africa. His advisory team, the International Investment Council, is composed of executives from the biggest global corporations which record more than the GDP of many developing countries. Global corporations have a significant influence on the deregulation of the labour market.

The Imperative of a Black Business Class with Political Heritage

Singh (1997b) avers that the collaboration of white corporations in transferring wealth to a black business class (in the creation of a black elite) should not be construed as a realization of the economic exclusion of blacks under Apartheid but as politically and commercially imperative. White corporations that refuse to toe the line stand to be blacklisted from government contracts, the benefits of privatization, and influence on government policy (Acemoglu et al., 2007:17). Powerful conglomerate corporations such as AAC understand that the racial or ethnic group which wields political power must have alongside it an influential and powerful mining corporate elite.

BEE Transformation Quotas and State Economic Intervention

Business Day (1997b) and Acemoglu et al. (2007:6) state that the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NAFCOC) proposed BEE transformation quotas to corporations listed on the JSE by the year 2000. These quotas entail 30% black representation on boards of directors, 40% black equity ownership, 50% preferential procurement by established corporations, and 60% black managerial positions. Government relations with the emergent black business class are represented by cabinet ministers, who are invited to a conference to provide conference delegates (black business class) with policy perspectives that will be major drivers of black economic empowerment.

BEE, SOEs and the Principles of Corporate Governance

Gleason (2003) espouses that the IDC's financial power to drive inclusive economic growth and the objectives of broader-based economic participation in the mainstream economy is government policy, in line with the principles of corporate governance. Any deviation from the stated government policy and its objectives would not be in-line with the mandate of elected public officials or the ordinary public or electorate. The Corporate Governance and King III (2009) state that there is an emphasis on socioeconomic and environmental sustainability. Of equal importance are employees, suppliers, customers, regulators, the environment and the community. The previously mentioned are no less important to shareholder interests.

Empowering (Not Enriching) BEE Deals

According to the Sunday Times (2003) Brian Molefe (the then), CEO of Public Investment Corporation (PIC) proclaimed that under his tenure the meaning of BEE would exceed the narrow transfer of assets from a white elite to a black elite. Empowerment deals that would be considered empowering by the PIC would be ones that include operational control, influence and involvement in key and strategic decision-making positions. Not what he termed fat cat-ism of a select clique of cadres with struggle credentials who seek upward class mobility.

Party-State, BEE and Privatization: A Cobweb of Conflicting Interests

Beeld (2004b) reveals that a consortium led by Andile Ngcaba (former DG of Communications) intended to acquire a 15.1% stake in Telkom under the counsel and guidance of Lulama Smuts Ngonyama (ANC's former head of communication). Another BEE deal facilitated by the government's privatization policy. This method of black empowerment is viewed by (the then) general secretary of COSATU Zwelinzima Vavi as one which advocates and glamorizes self-enrichment accessible only to an elite class, as opposed to wider or broader empowerment.

The Interests of the ANC are Synonymous with the National Interest

Beeld (2004a) states that what is endorsed by the ANC is automatically endorsed by the state. Politically-savvy businessmen such as Schabir Shaik receive endorsements from the top brass of the ANC to participate in the arms deal as a black economic empowerment partner with the foreign corporation. The BEE envisaged by Shaik and former treasurer-general of the ANC Thomas Titus Nkobi is one that views the party and the state as complementary to black enrichment rather than empowerment.

Highly Leveraged BEE Deals

Munshi (2005) posits that BEE empowerment deals do not provide productive investment in the economy because of the debt-financing nature of these transactions. This method for financing BEE deals renders them a narrow transfer of wealth and/or assets without meaningful participation or involvement in the running or operations of these giant corporations.

The MEC and the Economic Oligarchy

City Press (2009a) and Mbeki (2009b) agree that the MEC consists of the energy-exhaustive mining industry whose export revenue accounts for a significant portion of the GDP. CODESA II was a trade-off between white mining conglomerate corporations and the black political elite, the ANC leadership. The owners of the MEC secured the continued existence of this system of capitalist accumulation while the political elite secured BEE, a transfer of wealth or financial atonement to the political elite. The MEC further secured the full embrace of globalization and economic liberalization to further perpetuate labour and resource exploitation.

Stage-Managed Tender Selection Process: A Cobweb of Conflicting Interests

Cape Argus (2012) posits that when the political elite in senior government positions, their clients, the technocratic corporate elite, and their coteries collude to stage-manage a tender process the legitimate public policy objective and ultimately society is deferred and disregarded. The common good and the people's collective will is subordinated by a regressive political culture of greed and corruption in the public sector.

The Influence of Mega-Corporations on Public Mega-Infrastructure Projects

Bond (2014a) affirms that the primary concern for the department of economic development in concert with major mining corporations is to mine resources faster and at a reduced cost for exportation alongside the profits accrued. The key ingredient in this scheme between mining capital and the political elite in senior government departments is the massive injection of billions of Rands of public money toward corporate welfare to facilitate these mega-projects.

Political Equality and Democratic Decision-Making

Bond (2014b) states that the notion of "Taking Parliament to the People" is only symbolic and not of any consequence; it is simply a facade. Dissenting views and criticisms of the government's planned mega spending decisions on public infrastructure through outsourcing and/or PPP's are strategically and swiftly suppressed by the so-called "people's parliament".

Market Consolidation and Regulation of the Media Industry

Msomi (2001) writes that the consolidation of media corporations in the same branch of production confirms the concentration and centralisation of capital through mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, oligopolies are replaced by media monopolies. Thus, the powerful corporate technocratic elite that own and control an entire industry have a monopoly on public opinion and knowledge, these powerful elite command hegemony on what is regarded as or engineering the dominant narrative on mainstream or popular media.

When Former Leftists Become Capitalists: A Cobweb of Conflicting Interests

Mercury (2014); The Star (2014) and Bell (2014) assert that the entanglement between former leftists turned media corporate executives, capitalist interests, and the government is portrayed by the influence of Ebrahim Patel, (then) minister of economic development. The patronage network flows through the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union's (SACTWU) owned and controlled Hosken Consolidated Investments (HCI) which propagates a specific political and economic narrative to the public through mainstream media, eNews. eNews coverage on the mega infrastructure projects presented one side of the story and did not paint the entire picture to the public.

Diversification of the Economy and Transformation in the MEC

Keeton and White (2010) assert that mining corporations in South Africa constitute 75% or 1,7 trillion of the country's GDP. The mining industry itself is dominated by two giants, BHP Billiton and AAC which also have substantial assets abroad and majority ownership in other domestic major subsidiary mining companies as well. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (2010:12) avers that income redistribution has worsened since the dawn of democracy in 1994, ordinary worker earnings have decreased while the salaries of top management, executives and directors (including those in SOEs) of the largest corporations have increased enormously. Congress of South African Trade Unions (2010:13) notes that the directors of the top 20 JSE listed corporations remain, white males, while black share ownership peaks at 4.6%. Moreover, the JSE is highly concentrated by MEC-core corporations (capital) involved in mining, construction and the financial sector.

Big Corporations and Lucrative State Contracts

Sparks (2014) believes that the reluctance or unwillingness by South African corporations to engage in the public debate with the government regarding public policy is because the corporate sector stands to lose more than benefit from that exercise. South African corporations avoid public engagement with the government with the hope of maintaining the status quo

which affords them influence on public procurement decisions - big government contracts and broader public policy through questionable and opaque mechanisms.

The Funding of Independent Lobby Groups or Organizations

Mail & Guardian (2014) asserts that corporate interests may at times be peddled by so-called “independent organizations” covertly funded by corporations with vested interests. This unlikely affair is in an effort to influence public policy discourse which seeks to legislatively reform and open private corporations to public scrutiny and accountability regarding fair labour practices, restructuring, and CSR.

Transition

The above section presented the research findings from documentary data analysed by this study, including newspaper articles and policy documents that are relevant to meeting the objectives and answering the research questions (does corporate power influence South Africa’s public policy? And how do private corporate donations permit the influence of South Africa’s public policy?). The following section presents the government publications (and redistributive legislation) that the study collected and analysed. These publications and/or legislations were analysed to understand the policy actors (elites), their roles and powers (positional power), influence (with the assistance of policy documents outlined above) and whether the objectives of these government publications were met. The latter was done through an analysis of whether policy actors, including cabinet ministers, elected officials, and provincial and national government representatives acted (altruistically) in the public interest or in their private interest (conflict of interest).

Government Publications – Legislative Measures Linked to BEE

Republic of South Africa (1994) NEDLAC is a socioeconomic policy consultative forum that consists of organized labour, business leadership, community representatives (civil society) and government. This deliberative forum engages on policy issues including fiscal and monetary policy, trade and industry, labour and development.

The GEAR macroeconomic strategy aims to redistribute income through the attainment of high economic growth (6%) reduction of the fiscal deficit, a tight monetary policy, privatization and unbundling of SOEs and state assets, deregulation of the labour market and trade liberalization (Department of Finance, 1996).

The Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 seeks to provide a framework for competitive trade and industry practices against South Africa's highly concentrated ownership and control of the productive economy that is an outcome of the Apartheid regime (Republic of South Africa, 1998a).

In lieu of the inequalities created by Apartheid, the Employment Equity Act No. 55 of 1998 is a redistributive framework that seeks to promote equality and workplace democracy. Ultimately the Act provides for a workforce that is reflective of South Africa's diverse demographics (Republic of South Africa, 1998b).

The National Empowerment Fund Act No. 105 of 1998 provides for the redistribution of wealth through the privation of SOEs and affirmative action to benefit PDI's. The Act also outlines the mechanisms for the provision of finance for these deals, this is in the understanding that PDI's have little or no access to large sums of financial resources (Republic of South Africa, 1998c).

Republic of South Africa (1998d) provides an institutional framework that instructs employers to provide employees with continuous skills development, training, bursaries and learnerships with a focus on PDI's, in lieu of the imbalances of the past.

According to the Department of Finance (2000), the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act No. 5 of 2000 provides for the preference (favour) of BEE compliant bidders in the contracting-out of state tenders and the issuing of operating licences.

The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act No. 4 of 2000 provides for the legal protection, promotion and advancement of constitutionally enshrined principles and values including equality, fairness, social justice, human dignity and freedom.

Republic of South Africa (2002) provides that the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act No. 28 of 2002 seeks to regulate the mineral and petroleum industry and to ensure equal access to mineral and petroleum resources, the development of mining communities, environmentally sustainable production and redistribution in the industry.

Republic of South Africa (2004) and Republic of South Africa (2014) provide that B-BBEE encompasses the meaningful and sustainable empowerment of PDI's in areas of economic activity (de racialization of the economy) including access to income-generating (productive) assets, financial and economic resources, provision of land, skills development, increased (meaningful or proactive) black ownership, management and control in the most productive

sectors, the empowerment of women and people in outlying rural areas (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2007:4).

Transition

Findings sourced from the analysis of government publications and redistributive legislation is presented above. These are legislations and policy frameworks that are closely related or enmeshed with the objectives and goals of B-BBEE including wealth redistribution and social transformation (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003:9; Ponte, Roberts and Van Sittert, 2007:11). These legislations' operationalize and anchor B-BBEE. An understanding of them is essential to critical analysis and subsequent discussion of themes that are generated by this study. The second theme that is generated from data analysis (newspaper articles and policy documents) follows hereunder.

The Influence of Private Corporate Donations on Public Policy

The Invisible Hand of Corporate Paymasters

A Call for the Regulation of Private Corporate Donations

Laufer (1997) indicates that (the then) constitutional development minister Valli Moosa announced the commencement of the debate on the regulation of private corporate donations made to political parties. This announcement follows Nelson Mandela's admittance that the ANC received a R500 000 donation from casino magnate Sol Kerzner.

A Proposal for a Multiparty Democracy Fund

Calland (1997) asserts that The Promotion of Multiparty Democracy Bill sought to establish a multiparty democracy fund that would appropriate state, private and foreign donations, making this information publicly accessible. The dangers of a lack of access to money by political parties include canvassing the wealthy groups and the subsequent representation of the wealthy class because of their better capacity to provide financial stimuli. Further, the public disquiet regarding private party funding regulation is compounded by the conduit it provides for the corrupting influence of secret private corporate donations to political parties.

The Influence of Foreign Donations on Domestic Public Policy Decisions

Hartley (1997a) posits that James Selfe of the DA raised an argument in parliament that permitting foreign governments to make donations to political parties increases the vulnerability of public and foreign policy decisions to foreign interests. Molebeledi and Hartley (2002) concur that secret and unregulated private corporate and foreign government donations

to the ruling ANC inevitably have domestic and foreign policy implications. What would be expected in return as a favour, allegiance or policy influence.

Secrecy Fuels Suspicion

Mail & Guardian (2002) espouses that the non-disclosure of private corporate and foreign government donations to the governing-ANC further exacerbates the media's, civil societies and the opposition's claims that the public interest will be or is gradually replaced by the ANC's financial interests. This extends to the governing party's decisions and actions regarding state contracts, and foreign and domestic policy.

The Saudi-backed Consortium and the Cell C License

Fine (2000) states that it was murmured in both political and corporate corridors that the awarding of the third cellular phone license to Saudi-linked Cell C was connected to an under-the-table deal that would ultimately swell ANC party coffers - alleged fraud and corruption.

The Regulation of Private Funding of Political Parties

SAPA (2001) states that individual donors, multinational corporations and foreign governments were likely to play an important part in SA politics. The fact that they contribute to political party activities may give rise to their having undue influence on policymaking. It is a fact that money plays a significant role in the electoral process.

The Dangers of Unregulated Private Funding of Political Parties

Mail & Guardian (2001) surmises that a myriad of proposed party funding regulations have been brought forth in order to assure the protection of political equity in a country with astronomical economic inequality. To also ensure that smaller parties are not annihilated by parties with greater legislative representation. Importantly, to ensure the independence of political parties (ANC and the DA) and representativeness of their policy thinking and decision-making.

The Liberal View of Multiparty Democracy and Party Funding

Xako (2001) asserts that there is a narrative that some individuals and corporations in democratic society support their preferred political party not just by a vote at the ballot box but through financial support as well and that this was simply to contribute towards policy change promised by that specific party, without any ulterior motive. However, Richard Calland, columnist of the Business Day disagrees. Calland believes that big corporations and their

shareholders do not give to political parties without expecting anything in return, altruism is not in the business world dictionary.

Secrecy Around Private Party Funding Arouses Suspicion and Erodes Legitimacy

Business Day (2001) and Acemoglu et al. (2007:16-7) point out that there is growing public suspicion of the potential influence and favours that private donations made by individuals or corporations could secure them with the government.

The Market Should Not Shape Politics in an Unequal Society

Calland and Camerer (2002) state that in a popular democracy (rule by the people) wherein political equality is constitutionally guaranteed the financial power in the hands of the corporate elite used to buy access to the government, acquire favours, protection and influence public policy decisions is repugnant to the founding constitutional principle of political equality.

Money-for-Influence

Rose (2003b) surmises that public pressure mounts on political parties to disclose corporate donors to ensure that these financial gifts are not reciprocated for favours and influence.

The Influence of Small Groups with Large Financial Resources

Calland (2003) states that the power of lucrative donations made to political parties in secret weighs far more heavily on the influence scale than the efforts to influence macroeconomic policy by civil society, pressure groups, and the ordinary public who are only armed with the power of argument and persuasion (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2005:13; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014:12-3). The poor majority who are yet to witness enormous socio-economic changes since the inception of democracy believe that corporate behemoths armed with large financial assets exerted an inordinate influence on macroeconomic policy in the transition period than the public.

Private Corporate Donations Drown the Voices of the Poor

Radebe (2003) the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (IDASA) argues that private corporate donations made to political parties or individual politicians have a corrupting effect which erodes the quality of democracy, the wealthy and powerful whether domestic or foreign wield influence on the governing-elite at the expense of the collective voice of the poor.

The Disclosure of Private Corporate Donations

Rose (2003a) avers that the illicit relationship between private corporate donors and parties with significant legislative representation is strongly represented in South African politics. This illicit relationship is illustrated by the copious political funding scandals since the inception of democracy. It has uncomfortably become commonplace in South Africa for powerful corporate donors to be provided favours and privileges by influential politicians which are not afforded to the rest of society (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014:11).

Follow the Money, Find the Power

Hartley (2004a) states that the ANC maintains that foreign or corporate donations made to the party have no relation to policy formulation or positions of the governing party. However, Richard Calland (of the Mail & Guardian) advances the argument that the initial radical redistributive Mining Charter which erupted in a furore on the JSE was later moderated and soft-lined to be palatable to the whims of mining industry corporate giants who are believed to have been consistent corporate donors to the ANC before and after the 1994 elections (Mining Charter, 2002).

South Africa Refuses to Endorse Legislation on the Disclosure of Private Donations

Rose (2004) notes that the unwillingness for private corporate donor disclosure by major political parties in South Africa encourages and advances a thriving environment for financial capacity in the hands of the economic oligarchy to inordinately influence the political process and subvert public policy outcomes.

Corruption is a Public-Private Partnership

Makhanya (2004) states that the Jacob Zuma-Schabir Shaik relationship was based on connivance between the private business interests of Shaik and the political influence of the second most powerful politician in the country (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:25). Atkinson (2005) concurs that judge Hilary Squires concluded based on evidence that the unlawful relationship between Thomson-CSF and former deputy president Jacob Zuma in the arms deal proved to be corruption in the private and public sector.

Brett Kebble: The ANC's Mystery Donor in the Western Cape

Wa Afrika (2004) states that the absence of legislation governing private corporate donations to political parties creates a situation wherein politics account to business instead of the public or their constituency.

The Connection Between Private Corporate Donors and the Awarding of a State Tender

Msomi (2004) affirms that secrecy around party funding sources creates suspicion and the perception among the public, of corruption in the awarding of state contracts to big corporations that are later revealed to donate generously to the governing party (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014:11).

Schabir Shaik's Links to the ANC Date Back to the 1980s

Manning (2005) espouses the sensational arms deal trial in which Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN) member of the executive committee (MEC) for finance Zweli Mkhize disclosed that Schabir Shaik had made substantial donations to the ANC in the 1980s and 1990s are testimony of the undue influence that powerful individuals or corporations exert on government officials (Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:25).

The Oilgate Scandal

Brown, Dlamini, Hartley and Mde (2005) posit that despite the party financing scandal Oilgate which implicates Phumzile-Mlambo Ngcuka, saw R11 million of the public purse siphoned from PetroSA into ANC coffers through an empowered company: Invume Management. Ngcuka is elevated to the office of deputy president by Thabo Mbeki.

The Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000

February (2005) argues that although this country has established legislation that provides for the prevention of corrupt activities, access to information, an open, transparent and accountable government. The unregulated private funding of political parties by the powerful corporate elite subverts the political process, erodes democracy and permits a corrupting influence on the public sector by unscrupulous special interests (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014:11).

Undue Influence Prevails in the Absence of Private Party Funding Regulation

Mde (2005a) surmises that Judith February maintains that without legislation regulating private corporate donations to political parties' inappropriate influence would prevail.

Private Corporate Donations Purchase Inordinate Political Influence

February (2006) stresses that in a laissez-faire private funding paradigm the wealthy and powerful have the potential to acquire more political influence than the majority poor which infringes on or limits the electorates' constitutionally enshrined right to political equality.

Private (Secret) Corporate Donations Carry Strings-Attached

The Herald (2006) notes that private corporate donations made to the opposition and governing-party leaders are not free gifts. Compensation in the future is a general expectation from corporations that provide these donations in secret.

Private Corporate Donations Undermine Democratic Decision-Making

Sarakinsky (2006) conveys that the argument advanced by IDASA in its court papers in a bid for public disclosure of private corporate donations was centred on the fact that special interests in the corporate sector that made large political donations exercised undue influence on government, the bureaucracy, the public sector and eroded democratic decision-making and public accountability.

Private Corporate Donations for Something in Return

Radebe (2006) states that big corporations would rather make significant contributions to political parties during national and provincial elections as these donations would affect policy. Corporate donations made during the local government elections are considerably less.

The Network Lounge

Business Day (2007c) espouses that big corporations in South Africa fork out millions to acquire a stall in ANC's luxury network lounge which is a commercialized lobbying environment between the ruling party and organized business (corporate elite).

Capital is Buying Influence

Big capital is definitely buying influence in the ruling ANC, SOEs and the government. The Schabir Shaik trial and its revelations, Oilgate and the preferential empowerment of party-linked or owned BEE companies and consortiums serve as testimony (Boyle, 2007).

The Progressive Business Forum

Wa Ka Ngobeni and Lubisi (2007); Business Day (2007a); and Devenish (2007) surmise that the ANC's controversial and desperate funding scheme the Progressive Business Forum (PBF) sells access to cabinet ministers, senior government officials and DG's to South Africa's corporate sector. The fees charged for first-hand information on the government's prospective plans and policy decisions preclude the country's majority poor while providing big corporations access and influence.

The ANC's Rent-a-Minister Programme

Boyle (2012) The ANC's PBF provides the wealthy and powerful corporations in South Africa with cabinet ministers, heads of departments, and DGs to discuss government plans, policy and state contracts and the tendering process.

The Relationship Between Established White Capital and the Black Political Elite

City Press (2007a) states that big corporations extended patronage to the impecunious black political elite on the eve of democratization in South Africa. This patronage encompassed the transfer of assets, resources and wealth to the pauperized struggle heroes from exile, the underground and imprisonment. This facilitated a cosy relationship between the corporate and political elite. Former radical African nationalists, socialists and trade unionists retired from politics to join corporate South Africa (Helen Suzman Foundation, 2000; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014).

From Zuma Incorporated to Zuma.Org.

Erasmus (2012) states that what is termed "Zuma.org" is a group of organizations linked to "Zuma Inc" these non-profit endeavours such as the Jacob Zuma Foundation have received large corporate donations. Donors include domestic mining corporate heavyweights such as Timothy Tebeila, Patrice Motsepe, De Beers, Harmony Gold and controversial foreign (American) businessman Lawal Camac. These corporate donations to these Zuma organizations are in the hundreds of thousands to the millions.

When Corporate Money (Influence) and Political Power Intersect

Former ANC treasurer-general Mathews Phosa emphasized the danger presented by powerful and wealthy individuals that seek to influence the organization, and its policy debate and interfere with the state's public procurement processes through doling out donations to the party or influential political office-bearers (Nhlabathi, 2012; Mail & Guardian, 2013).

The Perils of Private Corporate Donations

Pretoria News (2013); Solik (2013a); and Solik (2013b) posit that unregulated private funding of political parties binds politics to private wealth and special interests thereby eroding democracy.

When Money and Politics Mix

Friedman (2012) states that since the inception of democracy private corporations have held the belief that to advance their special interests, they must transfer assets to political parties, politicians, senior government officials and the civil service. This is often in the form of

donations to the governing-ANC or gifts to influential party stalwarts. This belief which has been practised by some major private corporations in South Africa advances special interests at the expense of the public interest.

The Relations Between Private Wealth and Political Power

Zibi (2013) espouses that warm relationships between wealthy and powerful individuals or corporations with political heavyweights make possible the plunder of public resources by public officials and their private or corporate counterparts in a combined effort to maliciously accumulate wealth.

The Influence of the Wealthy on the ANC's Political Elite

Munusamy (2013) avers that at the centre of the ANC's problems is its inability to insulate its political leadership from the corrupting influence of powerful and wealthy individuals or corporations.

Concluding Remarks

The main focus of this chapter was the thematic presentation of the data used to complete this descriptive study. The chapter proceeded to present the data thematically as was stated in its introduction with the data extracts forming subheadings that provide structure and logical flow. Transitions or rather a connecting voice between data extracts or groups were provided to ensure a coherent structure to the presentation of findings. Again, the themes and subthemes presented in this chapter are directly linked to the study's research context and questions. These data sources, newspaper articles, policy documents and government publications provided the researcher with insights and information about GEAR, B-BBEE and their objectives and goals, private party funding in South Africa and its effect on the political or public policy process and the debates and narratives in the public discourse contained in newspaper articles and the more rigorous policy reports or documents from think-tank organizations. The themes generated from the analysis (latent codes) of data are descriptively discussed and interpreted in the following chapter, unravelling the research problem and answering the research questions with reference to the theoretical framework and literature.

Chapter 6: The Discussion of Findings: The Emergence of a South African Corporatocracy

Introduction

The main focus of this chapter is the discussion and interpretation of the findings presented in the preceding chapter. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the findings are presented thematically. The themes generated from the findings chapter include BEE: the creation of a political black business class; and the influence of private corporate donations on ANC policy (the governing party). Subthemes of the first main theme include the ploy of the BEE by the economic oligarchy, and the collaboration between party-state, BEE business class, and corporations. The subthemes of the second include the invisible hand of the corporate paymaster, market-friendly fundraising schemes, and an elitist public policy – the corporatocracy. This chapter seeks to make sense of the findings in terms of themes that emerged from the data. Thus, this chapter will discuss and interpret the research findings in relation to the research questions, corroborate the findings with the literature and logically explain them with theoretical reasons.

Each overarching theme serves as a response to the questions probed by this study. Overarching themes are augmented by subthemes that delve deeper into providing a description and explanation of the influence of corporate power on South Africa's public policy. The discussion follows this sequence: the creation of a black business class with an ANC heritage indebted to the economic oligarchy, linked to public officials and the state bureaucracy; then the adverse effects of covert corporate donations on public policy and how the ANC's contentious entanglement with the corporate sector enables undue influence on policy and the plunder of the public resources; finally the chapter is closed by a detailed account of South Africa's corporate-led elitist form of public policy.

Theme 1: BEE: The Creation of a Political Black Business Class

A cohort of prominent trade unionists under the COSATU federation including Cyril Ramaphosa acquired large quantities of wealth through the appointment of black businessmen and women into executive and non-executive boards of the biggest JSE listed companies (Acemoglu et al., 2007:6; Centre for Development Enterprise, 2014:13; Wolff, 2014:67). The appointment of this black business elite – cadre deployment into business – with a strong ANC political linkage and influence served to elevate the BEE ratings of these companies and subsequently provided access to big government contracts. By extension, the big corporate

behemoths that entered into joint ventures with BEE empowerment companies received these contracts. The rapid embourgeoisement of the black business elite (however politically exclusive) leaves a lot to be desired regarding the almost 50% foreign ownership of the JSE (Black Economic Empowerment Commission, 2001:5-6; Freund, 2007:665; News24, 2015). The economic oligarchy had effectively in this way roped key leaders of organized labour into the dominant economic power structure (Bond, 2006:44; Edozie, 2008:58; Mbeki, 2009a:72; McKinley, 2017:45).

The black business class represented by pioneers of BEE such as Dr Nthatho Motlana former secretary of the ANCYL and the physician to Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu (Acemoglu et al., 2007:6) advocates for the preservation of the conglomerate corporation to facilitate narrow wealth transfer regardless of counterarguments. It was argued by Bond (2006:5) that the holding or pyramid company structure did not create new capital formations or productive investments but contributed to double counting and deindustrializing the economy (Congress of South African Trade Unions, 1996; Madi, 2016:200). The economic crisis of the 1990s largely stemmed from the crisis of accumulation and crisis-induced policy which magnified South Africa's racial and socioeconomic polarization instead of productive business and even development. BEE magnates maintained that if such an (unproductive) method of wealth transfer worked for old capital such as Harry Oppenheimer, Christo Wiese, and James Wellwood Basson, it should also serve the same purpose for the black business class. However, this was not wealth redistribution but a transfer through stock trading which aided white capitalists to deflect devaluation, in an isolated economy by diverting investment away from the plant, equipment, and labour-power to physical infrastructure and financial assets (Congress of South African Trade Unions, 1996; Singh, 1997a; Bond, 2006:10-11). Mbeki (2009a:61) affirms that the black political elite "have become strong allies of the economic oligarchy that is, ironically, the caretaker of South Africa's de-industrialization."

The AAC sold at a discount one of its subsidiary's Johannesburg Consolidated Investments (JCI) to an empowerment consortium composed of former trade unionists, MK combatants, Robben Islanders and the ANC's top brass. These big empowerment deals – a transfer of enormous wealth from the economic oligarchy to the politically-connected business class – constitute a trade-off between the two aforementioned groups. This elite something-for-something concessions trading entails the guarantee of neoliberal macroeconomic policy, globalization and a constitutional assurance of the protection of private property (Mbeki, 2009a:74; Capps, 2012:319-320). The empowerment deal beneficiaries became executive

directors, chairperson's and non-executive members of boards of the biggest JSE listed mining corporations without lifting a finger, not omitting the transfer of wealth, assets and/or resources to the beneficiaries of empowerment (Black Economic Empowerment Commission, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2007:6; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:13). The nature and form of this method for wealth redistribution confirmed the fears of the left-flank of the ANC: COSATU and SACP (Singh, 1997b).

The left believed that this form of empowerment would result in stern fiscal discipline, privatization, public sector rationalization, market-friendly labour legislation, and ultimately market-friendly comrades (Congress of South African Trade Unions, 2010). Mtimka (2010:69) observes this as "the triumph of the fiscal discipline ideology, of the so-called class project of 1996." These empowerment deals were not gifts, atonement, reparations, or admittance of guilt on the side of colossal mining corporations that thrived under apartheid but a form of co-optation of the political elite for the corporations to acquire state favour, contracts, and policy influence. Singh (1997b) asserts that "nothing is for free in the corporate world – everything comes at a price." Therefore BEE can be described as a transformation of capitalism which (exclusively) includes the ANC, SOEs, government, the black business class and major mining corporations (Singh, 1997b; Terreblanche, 2002:95-96; Bond, 2006:46; Mbeki, 2009a:67)

Mbeki (2009a:78-9) believes that the deal struck at CODESA II between the economic oligarchy and the burgeoning black political elite secured the preservation of the MEC and saw the creation of BEE – the elite pact. Subsequently, the political elite affirmed globalization which enabled the MEC to sustain its much-needed unskilled and disposable labour as well as the importation of cheap working-class goods from East, South-East, and South Asia. The above sweet deal struck by the country's ruling class proved regressive with regard to industrialization and the manufacturing sector which further deepened joblessness among the country's black poor (Mbeki, 2009b). Mbeki (2009a:80) observes that "BEE was the bribe offered by the economic oligarchy at CODESA II to the black middle class for it to drop its demand for nationalisation." Nyerere (1968:23-4) cautions that gifts compromise policy independence and should be avoided unless they seek to develop a great majority of the people. Moreover, governing-party leaders should not be embroiled in the corporate sector (Nyerere, 1968:36; Otunnu, 2015:24-5).

Integral to BEE is affirmative action which was first placed on the policy agenda by organized black business such as NAFSOC. The policy entails empowerment targets and transformation quota's which would be mandatory for the public and corporate sector (Republic of South

Africa, 2014: Chapter 1 (c); Acemoglu et al., 2007:7). Affirmative action as a component part of BEE was in accordance with the ANC's cadre deployment policy described by Sole (2010:190) as a mechanism to entrench party members in all strategic levers of power in government including the civil service, SOE's and organs of state; this further entailed the deployment of trusted cadre into the corporate sector. Wolff (2014:67) aptly remarks that not only was a political business class operative in the established white corporate sector but a black bureaucratic bourgeoisie with an ANC linkage was created through affirmative action (Centre for Development Enterprise, 2014:13). The political elite and the bureaucratic bourgeoisie should embody the values and principles of the national project under construction, in such a way that there is no chasm between the people and state bureaucracy (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003; Otunnu, 2015:25). It is, however, important to be cognizant of the elite form and nature of policy agenda-setting and the implementation of BEE as exclusively available to blacks with struggle credentials. Affirmative Action and cadre deployment were significant factors in the assimilation of the black aspirant elite into the economic power structure (Business Day, 1997b).

BEE is indeed a narrow transfer of wealth and not what it purports to be – transformative and redistributive policy. Public financial institutions should play a developmental role in allotting debt finance to empowerment deals that are “empowering” in the wider and broader context. The BEE deals endorsed by the state's financial institutions ought to encapsulate black operational control and involvement in strategic positions of authoritative decision-making, not the typical model of narrow wealth transfer. Meaningfully empowering deals are not limited to black influence and equity share-ownership but should also be constitutive of comprehensive transformation and redistribution consistent with the policy objectives of B-BBEE. These objectives include the involvement of blacks in the mainstream economy, creation of new capital formations, embodiment of the envisaged patriotism of the black bourgeoisie, and compliance with fair labour practices ultimately achieving significant economic consensus (Black Economic Empowerment Commission, 2001; Sunday Times, 2003; Bruce, 2004; Munshi, 2005; Madi, 2016:200). A black patriotic capitalist bourgeoisie is a class-conscious cohort largely created from state interventionism in the economy through BEE. The patriotic bourgeoisie writes Southall (2004:314-5) are the motive forces of capitalist transformation in the economy – the DE racialization of capitalism (McKinley, 2017:42).

The Ploy of BEE by the Economic Oligarchy

As observed earlier in chapter three by Klein (2007:15) and Mbeki (2009a:66-7) the economic oligarchy and the political elite constitute the ruling class or elite and they determine that desirable transformation consists of parliamentary democracy, globalization and BEE (Mbeki, 2009:74). This is what Terreblanche (2002:95-6) terms the elite compromise in 1993 between the ruling classes. As Mbeki (2009a:66-7) states that the economic oligarchy is the wealthy class that owns the MEC which forms the foundational and central site of accumulation in the South African economy (Fine and Rustonjee, 1996:81). The conception and inception of BEE signalled a co-option strategy of the former liberation movements into the structure of capitalism, disconnected from far-reaching socio-economic transformation (see Bond, 2006:40 & 44 in chapter three). The co-option of the liberation movements is evidenced by the connection between covert meetings which occurred in the 1980s and CODESA II in the 1990s between the economic oligarchy and the political elite which determined the policy for socio-economic transformation (Butler, 2010:12). These high top-drawer secret meetings resulted in the ANC's 1993 socioeconomic policy volte-face which saw the abandonment of radical redistribution policy (City Press, 2009; Mbeki, 2009b). Moreover, powerful industrial magnates (economic oligarchy) successfully lobbied the government to employ an offensive trade strategy in Southern Africa, exporting to the region yet not importing from the region. Thereby the ANC government had isolated regional allies who were strong supporters of the liberation movement prior to the democratic breakthrough (Bond, 2006:48).

The leadership of the ANC in exile, Zambia, met covertly with the then chairperson of the AAC, Gavin Reilly and a business delegation composed of the representatives of South Africa's biggest corporations – the economic oligarchy. Parallel to that, Mandela's lieutenant Thabo Mbeki held covert meetings in London with representatives of the mining corporate elite in a palatial mansion owned by Consolidated Gold Fields (Michie and Padayachee, 2019:2-3). These covert meetings brokered an elite pact that saw the unbanning of liberation movements, the abandonment of socialist (or strong state management) economic policy in the ANC, and a reconciliatory national propaganda programme. The policy shift in the ANC towards neoliberal economic policy included acquiescence to the Washington Consensus, an autonomous Reserve Bank and a national treasury headed by a former apartheid-regime bureaucrat and the rapid embourgeoisement of key leaders in the ANC and COSATU through BEE (Klein, 2007:203; Wolff, 2014:61-7).

At the time of Nelson Mandela's release the international investment community, western governments, IFI's collectively echoed that socialism had failed and where it seemed to not have it was at the brink of failure. This popular propaganda during the triumphalism of neoliberalism proved successful and culminated in regular meetings between the core ANC leadership, domestic and foreign corporations, IMF and WB economic technocrats. Subsequently, key leading figures in the ANC received training in foreign business schools where they were spoon-fed neoliberal economic orthodoxy, hence the GEAR policy of 1996 (Klein, 2007:216; Terreblanche, 2012:64). The autonomy of the post-apartheid government's economic policy is hog-tied by the binding elite pact between major conglomerate corporations (MEC) and the political elite prior and post 1994 (Mtimka, 2010:76-77; Terreblanche, 2002:95-6).

Klein (2007:208) points out that "Mbeki was the one who mingled most easily with business leaders, and before Mandela's release, he organized several secret meetings with corporate executives who were afraid of the prospect of black majority rule." Former president Nelson Mandela's right-hand man during his presidency former president Thabo Mbeki possessed the ability to finesse business leadership before and after the democratic transition. Mbeki had mastered this skill thanks to his Sussex University economics background. As the ANC had decided to play within the confines demarcated by the international investment community, Mbeki provided business leadership and foreign investors with confidence and assurance. Terreblanche (2012:63) states that "from 1990 Nelson Mandela and Harry Oppenheimer met regularly with a leadership core of the ANC at Little Brenthurst, Oppenheimer's estate." Post the first democratic election, Mandela and Mbeki met regularly with mining magnate Harry Oppenheimer and consulted him on the economic programme of the ANC before its final approval and adoption. Consultation with and the approval of the corporate elite on macroeconomic policy sought to avoid market volatility, backlashes and economic shocks which were ignited by the mass movements of the 1980s and the subsequent release of Mandela in 1990. In the concerted effort by the ANC-led government to create an investor-friendly environment to foster growth, Mandela distanced himself and his government from policies of nationalization, land redistribution, or socialism which formed the crux and the salient features of the Freedom Charter (Acemoglu et al., 2007:4; Klein, 2007:208).

English capital and the MEC sought to salvage capitalism in the South African branch through the financing of anti-apartheid conferences wherein the delegation consisted of critical civil society, white liberals, representatives of the corporate elite, and the top-brass of the ANC.

Harry Oppenheimer and Dr Zach de Beer of AAC and Royal Dutch Shell plc provided the finances required to wine and dine all these delegates in venues abroad, including the costs of boarding and lodging (Terreblanche, 2012:62; Michie and Padayachee, 2019:2). Mbeki (2009:66) argues that contrary to popular belief, BEE was never the creation of the government's African nationalists; instead, it was invented by economic oligarchs prior to the 1994 democratic breakthrough. BEE was the deal that the political elite could not refuse, the elite compromise provided the security of free-market economics – the wealth of the whites.

Gains obtained from the government's pro-market economic policy approach have been in decline, in spite of economic growth after 1994. Poverty, inequality and unemployment still largely remain under-addressed by redistributive or empowerment legislation or policies. Discontent with the governing party has intensified as a result of these failures to materialize policy objectives and targets (Mosala et al., 2017:337). A transformation that reflects economic emancipation, and importantly wealth redistribution which was promised by the ANC prior to its volte-face is yet to be realized. Instead, the pro-corporate bourgeois BEE was the method for redistribution or corrective justice which worked to secure for economic oligarchs shared economic interests with a politically-savvy black business class. Therefore, the policy interests of the corporate elite, the black business class, and the ruling-ANC are one and the same. The public policy manoeuvre of the government is largely influenced by the ruling classes (elite) – the economic oligarchs and the political elite – a phenomenon which Veldman (2015) refers to as a “state-endorsed corporate oligarchy” (see Mbeki, 2009a:66-7 and Terreblanche, 2002:95-6 in chapter three).

The MEC-core sectors are highly capital-intensive, dependent on FDI and imported capital goods, technology, and machinery. This conveniently puts militant black workers back in their place and compounds unemployment, there is also an increasing propensity for mechanization and automation in the core and subsectors of the MEC which also worsens job losses (Fine and Rustonjee, 1996:81; Mbeki, 2009a:53). The GEAR policy spearheaded by Trevor Manuel, then finance minister, had removed the protective walls and revenue of import tariffs on manufactured goods faster than the World Trade Organization (WTO) had imagined. The South African (ANC-led) government and its constituency, especially the working class quickly felt the harsh winds of globalization and international free trade. The labour absorptive industry of manufacturing was the hardest hit, key sectors once marked as potential export success stories were demised by excessive trade liberalization policies which effectively deindustrialized the domestic economy with self-imposed SAP's (Bond,

2006). Bond (2006:49) observes that “neoliberalism was inexorably adopted as the basis for economic policy-making, and enhanced the profitability of financiers while destroying industrial capacity.”

The socio-economic policy paradigm post-1994 is one that has failed to address the problem of abject poverty experienced by a majority of South Africans. The politico-economic system is one that serves the narrow class interests of established white economic oligarchs and that of an aspirant black bourgeoisie intimately connected to the political elite (Terreblanche, 2012:66). The elite compromise is an arrangement between foreign and local elite groups which came about in the secret negotiations, the poor majority did not form part of these high top-drawer clandestine meetings (elite policy environment) and hence redistributive policy was discarded. Central in the elite compromise are the narrow or private interests of the white corporate elite and the politically-connected aspirant black bourgeoisie. The interests of the poor majority were effectively negated in the elite compromise and the adoption of the neoliberal agenda (GEAR) constrained the ANC-governments ability to advance redistributive public policy (Terreblanche, 2012:67). Terreblanche (2012:69) indicates that the “ANC leadership core was co-opted and bribed by black economic empowerment (BEE) deals, by empowering the ANC to allocate affirmative action (AA) and affirmative procurement (AP) contracts.”

Moving forward, Bond (2014a) identified South Africa’s mega-conglomerate corporations such as BHP Billiton, AAC, Lonmin plc and Glencore plc as unpatriotic mining houses that ship profits abroad to their headquarters. As such South Africa experiences large capital outflows which could have otherwise been productively invested in the domestic economy. However, the poor residents of mining communities and the workers in these mines are subordinated to the economic and financial interests of a corporate-politico power elite. These are the seeds of a growing corporatocracy: tyrannical powerful private wealth unaccountable – an economic oligarchy – to the public, working hand-in-glove with the political black business class and large financial institutions to haemorrhage resource revenues and hide large amounts of wealth in financial havens abroad. The government’s spending decisions on infrastructure are devoid of the material inefficiencies in mining and rural communities where these migrant labourers are from. Neither are these mega-projects sensitive to infrastructural development needs of the public nor the social cost and the environmental implications. Government investment spending on public, social and economic infrastructure to create local economic viability and linkages to foster economic growth and development at the level of the people is

deferred in favour of corporate welfare to sanitize the facilitation of mega-projects linked to large amounts of money.

Moreover, Bond (2014b) reveals that the hostility with which different policy perspectives and recommendations are swiftly suppressed by the economic development parliamentary committee demonstrate and validate the claim that public consultation and deliberation on strategic public policy decisions is tokenistic. The will of the people through democratic processes is symbolic and inconsequential, it is the will of top-tier political heavyweights and powerful mining corporations which prevails not that of the public. An elite group of the owners of the country's largest mining and financial corporations – private empire – that possess hegemonic economic and financial power over the entire economy; such enormous economic power in the hands of publicly unaccountable corporate overlords affords them the exertion of inordinate influence on publicly elected representatives and by extension the political process and/or agenda of politics and public policy. Keeton and White (2010) attest that the MEC-core or the six axes of capital are indeed the central sites of accumulation in the South African economy (see chapter three, Fine and Rustonjee, 1996:103-6). Two major mining corporations AAC and BHP Billiton alone are responsible for 75% of the country's GDP. Such high levels of capital concentration and hegemonic economic power translate into political influence (see chapter one, Davis, 2015:395 and Milton [s.a.]:417-8 in chapter two).

The state has declared the need for developmentalism in redistributing wealth, reducing poverty and inequality and these mandates increased and stricter regulations improving its oversight on and supervision of the private sector. However, SOE's are a burden on the fiscus and any pseudo developmentalist policy approach that government seeks to advance must carry the complete involvement of corporate South Africa. Corporations need to cooperate with the government and its key policy objectives in a developmental agenda. This finding advances the argument that development should be corporate led, it is pregnant that corporations demonstrate the need for some level of redistribution through empowering and capacitating initiatives which include employee share ownership, worker training and development. Robust public engagement between the corporate sector and government regarding redistributive policy is essential in a developmental agenda. The consequence of illicit relations or favour trading between government and the corporate sector is co-option and collusion in corrupt activities which further postpone developmentalism (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005:13-4; Zibi, 2013; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:14; Sparks, 2014).

In order to ensure that the public debate and policy agenda is not tainted by special interests disguised as independent organizations, it is requisite that the funding of these organizations is public knowledge. It is fundamental in this case that the party funding regime and that of organizations that influence the public debate including think-tanks be in the public domain. Think tanks and academic organizations could potentially be parroting the perspective of the corporate overlord, this raises alarms regarding the ethical lobbying of public policy. In the current free-for-all paradigm regarding private party funding and that of so-called independent organizations, corporate interests may be promoted, protected, and advanced by these organizations. Transparency and complete openness are requisite although accountability for conglomerate corporations is analogous to heresy. The public interest and the will of the people are thus in grave danger, when they are unaware of who fills the pockets of organizations that largely influence the public and policy agenda (see Milton, [s.a]:426; Cave and Rowell, 2014; Mail & Guardian, 2014 in chapter two).

It is fundamental in a multiparty democracy with diverse views that ownership in the print or news media industry be regulated and that cross-ownership be disallowed. In order to strengthen the public debate, given the different points of emergence in argument, concentrated ownership be averted through competition legislation constraining big capital and industry regulation (Competition Act No. 89 of 1998). Monopoly ownership of the biggest media corporations by a large conglomerate means that public opinion is engineered to suit the economic, policy, and political interests of a small group of corporate elites. That presents the challenge and danger of a captured and biased national news media which controls the narrative in the public and by extension the issues regarded as critical and deserving to form part of the public policy agenda (Msomi, 2001). Public opinion is informed by mainstream media through its avenues and the views of revered subject matter experts. Therefore, it can be argued that those who control the media, can engineer public opinion thereby influencing the policy agenda (Zain, 2014; Tebele, 2016:48).

The extraordinary dance between former leftists, media corporate executives, capitalist interests, and the government in the following scenario raises critical concerns about the embourgeoisement of former trade unionists through investing union pension funds and BEE's model of elite empowerment (see Buhlungu and Tshoaedi; 2013:110 in chapter three). The collusion between public officials and former trade unionists turned media corporate executives distorts the facts regarding the news coverage of mega-public infrastructure projects. Marcel Golding, an executive at eTV received emails from Yunis Shaik, an HCI executive director, to

provide the Jacob Zuma R3 billion De Hoop Dam with lead coverage on the late-night news channel – eNews. The link between Jacob Zuma and Yunis Shaik is the minister of economic development Ebrahim Patel who had applied significant pressure on HCI for the substantial coverage of the mega-infrastructure programme launched by the Zuma administration. Former leftists from SACTWU resigned from parliament and are now part of the BEE millionaire and billionaire corporate elite (Mercury, 2014; The Star, 2014 & Bell, 2014).

The above entanglement portrays the improper influence of Patel, through SACTWU's owned and controlled HCI to propagate a political and economic narrative to the public through mainstream media which is not impartial in presenting government public policy. The influence exerted by Patel and Golding on the public through the media was not intended to provide a balanced report or disseminate the facts of the matter, but to paint a biased narrative that the department of economic development and the Zuma administration (ANC) were making key and strategic public infrastructure investments. In other words, an ANC marketing campaign that sought to delude or dupe the public into believing what was not for their benefit to be so. The De Hoop Dam served to provide water for the platinum mines diverting the benefits of this infrastructural project from the poor and working-class community surrounding these mines. Eskom's R120 billion and Transnet's R330 billion mega public infrastructure projects only served to further inflate the cost of electricity and public transport. Furthermore, these projects are completely inconsiderate of the environmental cost of fossil fuel dependence and industrial activity which increases high carbon emissions (Mercury, 2014; The Star, 2014).

These megaprojects were major MEC-core sector corporate welfare dressed as public infrastructure investment which would bring economic development and facilitate basic service delivery. Media manipulation to distort public opinion and influence policy deteriorates democratic decision-making and equates to deception and misinformation of the public by powerful corporations in concert with the government. This particular finding concurs with the line of argument presented in (Keeton and White, 2010; Bond, 2014a; Bond, 2014b) earlier in this chapter which speaks of the sheer size, economic power, and political influence of the MEC which subverts the policy interests of the public (also see Fine and Rustonjee, 1996 and Terreblanche, 2012:40-44 in chapter three).

Collaboration Between Party-State, BEE Tycoons and Corporations

Ploughing ahead, Thabo Mbeki's approach to the creation of a black business class is more sophisticated than the Apartheid regimes parastatal expansion, subsidization, protectionism,

favouritism, and job reservation in the creation of an Afrikaner bureaucratic and business elite. Mbeki's foreign-investor approach to black embourgeoisement is internationalized, it shows harmony with globalization, and attracts inward investment from developing countries such as Malaysia which shares similar policy goals with South Africa; which is to advance the creation of a patriotic indigenous bourgeoisie (Freund, 2007:665). Domestic white business needs to demonstrate a willingness to operate with the largely black government in the class project or they risk being discarded for the foreign alternative. The mutual mistrust which stems from Apartheid's racial capitalism can only be trashed through cooperation from state and capital. White controlled corporations and the black government must constructively engage and agree on a mutually beneficial mode of operation so that economic growth is triggered by the former and the latter can advance social policy (Friedman, 1997).

However, Sole (2010:197 & 200) in chapter two contends that the politically connected BEE tycoons are unpatriotic and that BEE's method for redistributing wealth is elitist and limited to a black business class with political clout. Lulama Smuts Ngonyama went on record stating that he "didn't struggle to be poor" or former deputy President and Minister of DME, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka who stated that blacks should not be ashamed of being "filthy rich" (Sole, 2010:197). Ngonyama improperly influenced the awarding of a stake in Telkom to the "Elephant" consortium (Boyle, 2007); Mlambo-Ngcuka was involved in the largest corruption scandals which include Oilgate (Mde, 2005a and Mde 2005b) and Travelgate (Brown, Mde, Radebe and Rose, 2006). Edozie (2008:53) in chapter three writes that the conflation of interests between the ANC, government, SOEs, BEE empowerment companies and foreign corporations or the "French connection" in the controversial arms deal displays the contradictory and impractical elements of a patriotic capitalist class in a neoliberal economic paradigm. These conflicting interests (cronyism) undermine genuine democracy, the integrity of public institutions, and trust in government policy (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005:13; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:25; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014:12).

MNC's have significantly more power over national governments and their labour policy. The power of MNC's is aggrandized by globalization and the dominance of neoliberal economic policy in the world. South Africa is confronted by the difficult trade-off between decent and protected work without investment or FDI with flexible labour legislation (Mbeki, 2009a:74). Thabo Mbeki's close interaction with colossal MNC's and the domestic corporate sector through presidential working groups (Gumede, 2008:14) to discuss pertinent public policy and

programmes reflects the MNC's position of power. Government and COSATU concur on the regressive effects of globalization on organized labour, wages and working conditions and that a concerted effort for decent and protected work would ensue. However, shortly after the then Deputy Minister of finance Jabu Moleketi with the endorsement of his superior Trevor Manuel proposed a new two-tier labour market system in an ANC National General Council (NGC) discussion paper which was received with much controversy (City Press, 2007b).

In defence of the proposal, Manuel vehemently argued that the youth component of the labour market which would be absorbed into unprotected employment by foreign MNC's was unskilled, inexperienced and unemployed. Unprotected employment without benefits would nonetheless serve the broader goal of employment creation and poverty reduction. It can be deduced from this finding that indeed MNC's possess more power and influence on the South African government and its labour policy. It is important to note the significant influence of foreign corporations on ANC policy from the 1990s which was responsible for the adoption of the policy of privatization by Nelson Mandela. Mbeki had affirmed in October 2003 in a speech to the Socialist International that the power of MNCs is not only economic but also transcends the political power of the home countries of these global corporations, particularly the USA (Bruce and Hartley, 2004; Van Wyk, 2009:25; Terreblanche, 2012:63-4). Bruce (2004) crystalizes the previous postulation, "that political weight is, in turn, used to advance the global interests of the multinational corporations."

The ANC-linked black unpatriotic bourgeoisie exerts undue influence on state bureaucrats employed in public financial institutions. A case in point is the link between a R6 million loan from Mzi Khumalo which was made to an executive of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and Khumalo's consortium subsequently receiving debt-financing from the IDC of R600 million. In connecting the dots, one may argue that the R6 million loan or rather bribe lubricated the awarding of the loan to the empowerment consortium led by Khumalo, a former spokesperson of the ANC. Such instances connote crony corruption and maladministration which blemishes people's trust in public institutions and directly impedes the objectives of public policy or broad economic empowerment for PDI's (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005:13-4; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:13-4). Moreover, such incidents indicate interference with the IDC's lending policies, non-conformity to principles of corporate governance and contravention of BEE's economic growth objectives by enabling undue influence of a small group of elite families which supersedes that of elected public officials. The Black business class hinged onto the economic structure of capitalism are

unpatriotic in exercising undue influence to advance narrow self-enrichment by rigging the internal process of public institutions and agencies. Black capitalists are defeating the goals of public policy through a corrupting or subversive influence only to advance the interests of a small BEE tycoon clique concealed by a corporate veil (Gleason, 2003; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005:26; Sokomani, 2010:176-8).

Another model example of the unpatriotic influence of the black capitalist bourgeoisie linked to foreign corporations is that which involves Andile Ngcaba ANC-aligned figure in the liberation struggle and former DG of Communications in the Mandela presidency. Ngcaba left the government in 2003 for deployment into the corporate (BEE) sector. The “elephant” consortium led by Andile Ngcaba intended to acquire and obtain a 15.1% stake in Telkom under the counsel and guidance of Lulama Smuts Ngonyama, former head of communications for the ANC. It can be argued that Ngcaba and Ngonyama improperly influenced the awarding of the 15.1% stake because Telkom falls under a (communication) industry they once regulated and headed (see Doan and Weldon, 2012:26; Davis, 2015:396 in chapter two). Another big BEE empowerment deal was facilitated by the government's privatization policy through SOEs (Acemoglu et al., 2007:7). This method of black empowerment was viewed by the then general secretary of COSATU Zwelinzima Vavi as one which advocated and glamorized self-enrichment accessible only to an elite class, as opposed to wider or broader empowerment. Through complex financial engineering involving the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) and the National Treasury, the stake was morphed into fortunes for the consortium (Beeld, 2004b; Boyle, 2007).

The empowerment model of the BEE policy involving the collusion between the ruling party, state bureaucrats, government-controlled corporations, public financial institutions, and empowerment companies is unpatriotic and purely acquisitive. This collusion or illicit collaboration facilitates rigged or stage-managed empowerment deals that narrowly benefit a select elite cabal at the public's expense and derailment of public institutions, policy and their integrity. The outward-looking neoliberalism which the SACP and COSATU had anticipated comes into fruition with the pro-market GEAR and BEE policy (Beeld, 2004b) (also see, Southall, 2007:74-5; Buhlungu and Tshoaedi, 2013:110; The Guardian, 2014 in chapter two). Hirsch (2005:63) avers that “senior officials in key government economic departments were soon drawn from the ANC policy community, though this happened much faster in some economic departments than others.” However, Prevost (2006:174) and Booysen (2011:1048-9) argue that in the Mbeki administration power has largely been concentrated in the office of

the President, the National Treasury, and economic policy technocrats and the domestic and global corporate sector. This study believes that both arguments mesh well with the aim to meet this study's objectives (see chapter one) because this study argues that corporate power exerts influence on public policy and at the same time McKinley (2017:5) states the Mbekiites were a faction within or from the ruling ANC advancing a specific ideology (Capps, 2012:320). Mosala et al. (2017:328) aver that both views inform "the ANC's ideology or the way in which the ANC government thinks about its reality (which in turn shapes government policy)."

Van Wyk (2009:38-9) further entrenches that the deployment of ANC cadre into government and the corporate sector is tantamount to elite circulation wherein the individuals from the same, narrow pool of recruitment circulate between positions of power in the political, corporate and government realms. For instance, the families (descendants) of struggle icons such as Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo have historically occupied and continue to occupy top-tier positions in the political, corporate and government spaces. These families possess the social capital and political currency to considerably influence national political and policy outcomes (Southall, 2007:73-5). Beresford (2015:231) affirms that "ANC activists could utilize positions of party authority to leverage themselves into positions of state authority, whether as parliamentarians, cabinet ministers, mayors, councillors, civil servants, or employees in the rapidly expanding state machinery." The previous postulation makes it clear that the conduit of influence available for the corporate sector in South Africa involved the appeasement of the governing-party leadership because they translated into the senior public officials, bureaucrats and administrators through the policy of cadre deployment as a subset of the BEE policy (City Press, 2007a; Sole, 2010:188-190). Anyhow, Doan and Weldon (2012); Davis (2015) and Nyberg (2021) point out that regardless of the party in government or the separation of state from the party (as argued by Booysen, 2011), this position really does not throw out the argument that, corporate power continues to exert influence on public policy.

The ANC-aligned BEE tycoon clique such as Schabir Shaik and Thomas Titus Nkobi conflate party and state or national interests to advance their Malay model of narrow wealth accumulation exclusively available to "sons of the soil". Edozie (2008:53, in chapter three) argues that BEE's empowerment approach which involves a foreign corporation is accompanied by the widespread conflict of interests which are instigated by the black business elite's undue influence on the ANC, SOEs, government, and senior public officials. This advances the argument of the corrupting influence of the political black business class on the

political and public policy processes. This is done through the subversion of the public procurement process through the employ of underhanded tactics and corrupt means such as bribery (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005:13; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:25; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014:11). Such maleficence and policy sabotage are orchestrated by a covert alliance between a foreign corporation, unpatriotic black corporate elite, the bureaucracy, SOE executives and senior public officials. Therefore to qualify as a “son of the soil” one must be closely aligned to the ANC, senior government officials and the ANC-linked black elite in order to amass wealth through BEE special deals (Beeld, 2004a).

The collusion, illicit collaboration and corruption by those in positions of power and influence in the public sector undermines the genuine principles of democracy and objectives of economic public policy. Therefore this means that the state negates legally and publicly defined legitimate processes and procedures for contracting out or outsourcing services to the corporate sector – cronyism. The nature of public-private relations in the country is one that is flawed and stands against honest and ethical governance and ultimately the public interest, the common good, and the will of the people (policy probity). In such a governance system fraught with maladministration, corruption, and nepotism at the highest levels by authoritative decision-makers or awarders of tenders, powerful corporate executives, the political elite, their clients and families benefit unduly at the expense of the public good, particularly the poor (Gleason, 2003; Beeld, 2004a and Beeld, 2004b; Sole, 2010:194; Cape Argus, 2012).

This is because when the state pays more than it would have for the deficient construction of a public school, public revenue has been wasted on a deficient social service which would have uplifted the living standards of the poor or redirected towards other social spending priorities such as healthcare or increased access to life-enhancing services. Furthermore, MNC’s are always involved in these illicit exchanges and transactions which compromise big public institutions and senior government officials (Van Vuuren, 2007). South Africa’s endemic corruption which is a private-public partnership is often induced by large corporations with market or industry dominance and economic power to exert improper influence on the government’s big-ticket expenditures involving mega-infrastructure projects (Edozie, 2008:58; Bond, 2014a; Bond, 2014b; McKinley, 2017:46). It can thus be inferred that the public interest is subordinate to the corporate agenda of private wealth accumulation and self-preservation through the pernicious influence exerted by the powerful economic oligarchy and nascent black capital.

Malusi Gigaba the former Minister of Public Enterprises, during the Zuma-administration and the state of capture saga, assumed a policy position of rapid-fire mega-infrastructure projects which epitomizes the collusion between the government, SOEs, public financial institutions, the black patriotic bourgeoisie and the economic oligarchy. Malusi Gigaba (2011) mentioned that “SA’s economy is characterised by very large mining, industrial and financial services companies that have the most to gain from an accelerated infrastructure programme.” Mtimka (2010:70) avers that the privatization and/or corporatization of strategic SOEs from the 1990s narrowed their focus to the financial interests of shareholders rather than a broad industrial development agenda. Investment decisions by these enterprises were thus enmeshed with the interests of the black business class and the corporate elite. SOEs no longer prioritized far-reaching development but advanced the narrow corporate agenda. Mtimka (2010:72) further asserts that illicit networks of patron-clientelism result in corruption and cronyism which benefit the private interest at the public’s expense (see Sokomani, 2010:176-7; Sole, 2010:187-8 in chapter three). Van Vuuren (2007) affirms that it is the “interaction between politics, bureaucracy and business, which starts off as collaboration, that too easily leads to collusion, corruption and crony capitalism.”

It has become clear here that, powerful global and domestic corporations and the local political and connected business elite collude to conquer natural and national treasures, strategic assets, and haemorrhage public resources which bequeath endemic poverty, an arrested state of underdevelopment, and bloated public debt. This Machiavellian activity by the corporate and political elite subverts public policy, destabilizes democracy, disrupts development, and undermines the integrity of public institutions (see Klein, 2007:15 in chapter three). It can therefore be deduced that public policy is an outcome of the social rapport between corporate oligarchs and the political power elite. Tebele (2016:36) posits that the elitism theory of public policy “holds that power lies in the hands of the knowledgeable elite.” The public or the electorate, NGO and civil society including trade unions are not considered in this elitist method for public policy development. If it were otherwise, as the corporatist theory advocates may suggest then the public interest, the will of the people, the common good and popular sovereignty would be evident in the public policy process and outcome in South Africa.

Theme 2: The Influence of Private Corporate Donations on Public Policy

The clarion call for private party funding regulation was made by NGOs and civil society after Nelson Mandela disclosed a donation of R500 000 received from questionable casino and hotel magnate Sol Kerzner. Kerzner allegedly paid a bribe to George Matanzima, former Prime

Minister of the Transkei, an “independent” Bantustan for the illegal acquiring of gambling rights in the former Transkei (Sokomani, 2010:174). The IFP’s acceptance of private donations from unregistered casinos just before the passing of new gambling laws also intensified the call placing it on the agenda. These party funding scandals early in the democratic experiment exposed the dangers of an unregulated party funding regime. Laufer (1997) observed that a “Russian mafia could set up a political party in SA.” Donations were made in order to gain favour or an unfair commercial advantage. The public had a compelling reason to perceive corporate donations to political parties to carry covert quid-pro quo underpinnings (Laufer, 1997).

Secrecy around private funding of political parties breeds corruption and entrenches unscrupulous interests. It is paramount that the electorate is aware of which corporation pays for which party’s overdraft and whose interests the party is likely to be advancing. The public has a right to know to what extent are public officials beholden to capital. Bearing in mind the necessity of money in the political process and extreme levels of economic inequality; vulnerable parties may fall prey to the unscrupulous; the ruling party would actually be representing the interests of the wealthy class and not of the public. Private corporate donations are of significance because they largely determine electoral success in South Africa’s geopolitical landscape divided into 9 provinces and 279 municipalities comprised of 9 metropolitan, 44 districts, and 226 local municipalities. Political party campaigns have to navigate this terrain to access the electorate and this is expensive, in the 1999 election, the ANC alone spent more than R30 million (Sapa, 2001; Msomi, 2004; RSA, 2021). Legislation regulating private, corporate, and foreign government donations is intended to ensure transparency and public accountability and to avert secrecy and corruption in the process of party fundraising which may permit concealed undue influence on the governing party. Party policy positions may be captured by particular class interests. Regulation averts the perceived compromise of party policy independence from dubious or tainted sources such as Sol Kerzner (Calland, 1997; Rose, 2003a; Rose, 2004).

The Invisible Hand of the Corporate Paymaster

Moving in the same line of argument, the donation received by the ANC from Indonesian president Mohamed Suharto leading to the 1994 elections and the succeeding bestowal of the award Order of Good Hope by Mandela to Suharto suggests that South Africa’s policy decisions have been marketized. Perceived despotic leaders such as Suharto and Muammar Gaddafi reportedly made copious donations to the ANC’s 1999 election war-chest which

garnered £112 million from tainted foreign sources (Radebe, 2003). The country's policy decisions may be determined by covert foreign government donations made to the ANC, this includes foreign policy decisions or diplomatic relations. The DA was not exempt from the court of public opinion since its Western Cape provincial leader Gerald Morkel accepted tarnished money and other favours from the German fugitive Jürgen Harsken in what was labelled Morkelgate. Harsken declared that he made a donation of more than half a million to the DA (Radebe, 2003). When a party represented at all levels of government accepts tarnished money from dubious sources only to oil election machinery there are domestic and foreign policy implications (Hartley, 1997; Molebeledi and Hartley, 2002).

The need for private funding regulation was especially emphasized by the noteworthy NGO IDASA. The acceptance of money in secret from society's undesirables such as Jürgen Harsken, Sol Kerzner, and controversial foreign governments such as Eugene Loh I-Cheng of Taiwan, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and Sani Abacha of Nigeria suggests that a link exists between South Africa's policy decisions and the financial interests of the governing-party (Molebeledi and Hartley, 2002; Radebe, 2003). A case in point is the Taiwanese government's purchase of an extension of diplomatic relations by bankrolling the ANC in 1994 with a \$10 million sweetener to seal the deal. These financial transactions conducted in the dark are not gifts in the naïve sense but a favour, advantage or policy influence is expected in return. However, as the data indicates, the links become visible only when private funding becomes public knowledge (Mail & Guardian, 2002; Hartley, 2004). Another case in point regarding the influence of powerful interests on public policy is the soft-lining of the Mining Charter from its initial radical redistribution content in the mining sector. The South African government through the DME was convinced by international financial power, mining magnates (COM) and linked financial institutions to publish a business-friendly and neoliberal version of the Charter (Southall 2004:323; Capps, 2012:326-7). The mining corporate elite and their associated organization's success in influencing the final draft of this policy was attributed to the assets, resources and wealth dispensed historically to the leadership core of the ANC by the former (Mbeki, 2009a; Van Wyk, 2009; Wolff, 2014; Terreblanche, 2012).

The unregulated private party funding regime permits the pervasive influence of powerful corporations with vested interests, such influence permeates through the ANC and cadre deployed into public office, boards of SOEs, the bureaucracy, and public financial institutions. Such influence is not limited to domestic corporations but foreign interests as well, this is a reality that arises under neoliberal globalism and the increased mobility of capital. To illustrate

this point is the awarding of the third cellular phone licence to Saudi-linked Cell C as a result of Saudi Arabia's relations with South Africa and the high level of Saudi inward investment (Fine, 2000; Business Day, 2001; Freund, 2007:668). Private corporate donations made to the governing-party raise public suspicion that the donor receives administrative and commercial advantages or favours. Such a decay of trust in the political system and public institutions compromises the public interest and discredits the principles of corporate governance. This, therefore, necessitates the establishment of an Act that would provide pressure groups, NGO's and the general public access to information related to private, corporate, and foreign government donations to political parties where it is believed that such secret gratitude was in fact reciprocal. And where there is prima facie evidence that public policy decisions, including the issuing out of big government contracts and/or casino, cellular, or mining licences were influenced by the receipt of campaign funding from a secret source. Including the endorsement or defence of certain policies by public officials to advance not the public interest but private corporate interests (Fine, 2000; Business Day, 2001; Rose, 2003b).

One cannot deny that in a country with significant and mounting income and asset-based inequality the constitutional principle of political equality and popular sovereignty must be protected and advanced to constrain the inordinate influence of the wealthy and powerful on the public policy process. The Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act 103 of 1997 enshrines that political parties should be financed by the public purse. The logic is that to protect and preserve the robustness and competitiveness of the multiparty democratic system parties vying for the public vote should be afforded funding to finance programmes and campaigns to convey their manifesto to the electorate. Money is necessary to convey the policy prescripts and ideological orientation of a distinct party in an election, hence in the protection of the democratic system money should not be a stumbling block towards a fair chance of political salesmanship. Political competition over the majority vote is a contestation of ideas, not money. It is therefore paramount that the political and democratic process be protected from the economic power and special interests of wealthy individuals and large corporations which seek to inordinately influence public policy. The aim is for government policy independence congruent with the socio-political context and economic reality of their constituency which is the poor majority in this country (Mail & Guardian, 2001; Calland and Camerer, 2002; Butler, 2010:12; Friedman, 2010:157).

The libertarian perspective regarding the private funding of political parties does not carry water. This is due to the fact that corporations are motivated by profit and do not have moral

obligations as business entities. The primary interests of shareholders are returns on investment (ROI) and an increase in dividend value thus a donation made to the governing party is an investment. Big corporations are not morally virtuous, the reason for their existence is the accumulation of profit. This is simple business logic under capitalism. Proponents of the libertarian view of democracy which perceives any kind of regulation on private party funding as limiting democratic participation, are disregarding all the facts and developments which indicate the opposite (Friedman, 2010:155). The litany of major-party funding scandals throughout the print media accounted for in this thesis qualify the previous statement. A case in point is the DA divulging that it received donations secretly from the late controversial mining magnate Brett Kebble, donations were also extended to influential leaders of the ANCYL (Freund, 2007:668). Kebble greased the palms of the ANC with R3.5 million and R875 000 to the ANCYL (Omarjee, 2007, Friedman, 2010:159-160). Kebble's Randgold & Exploration had recently entered into a big empowerment deal with a black business consortium, Phikoloso Mining constituted by ANC political heavyweights or their family members (Southall, 2004:324). The concealed nature of these corporate donations rises the possibility of ill intent in that these donations come with strings attached, backhanders that could take the form of special government favours, protection, public procurement advantages, and policy influence. When these transactions come to the light there are conflicts of interest that become evident regarding the awarding of state tenders. It is clear that the libertarian view does not carry weight (Xako, 2001; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005:13; The Herald, 2006).

The Roodefontein scandal in 2003 involving the admittance by Count Riccardo Augusta wine magnate that he paid a bribe to the New National Party's (NNP) Western Cape environment and planning minister David-Malatsi best illustrates the corrosive effect of private corporate donations on public policy. Augusta only made this confession in a plea bargain in a criminal trial proceeding. The bribe was disguised as a donation to the NNP which in actuality served to provide Augusta exemption from the due processes regarding environmental assessment in a golf estate he intended to build. Augusta divulged that the donation was worth R400 000 and Malatsi was personally loaned R100 000 (Radebe, 2003). The corrosive relationship between private corporate donations and the public policy process and outcome becomes impossible to deny. The Roodefontein scandal and the sensational arms-deal saga are graphic examples of the pervasive influence of private donations by big corporations. Schabir Shaik's involvement in the arms deal was linked to his financial contributions to the ANC and MK in the 1980s and

1990s (Calland, 2003; Manning, 2005; Sokomani, 2010:176; Wolff, 2014). NGOs and civil society concluded that important macroeconomic policy decisions in the transition period were largely influenced by conglomerate corporations and not the constituency of the governing party (Van Wyk, 2009:21-5; Terreblanche, 2012:62-3). It can thus be argued that the large resources in the hands of large corporate behemoths afford them undue influence on the governing party and subsequently public policy, while the public largely poor and disempowered are outgunned by the battalions of private concentrations. In such a case the vitality of democracy is severely undermined and discredited.

The relationship between Jacob Zuma and Schabir Shaik was a corrupt but mutually gainful arrangement. Shaik was the owner of Floryn Investments and the director of Nkobi Holdings, the sole purpose of these companies was to secure shareholding in business structures for the ANC; and to provide financial resource assistance for electioneering. Donations made to the ANC by Floryn between 1998 and 1999 of almost a million Rands were not public knowledge and were also omitted in the books of the company. Amidst these questionable dealings, the selection process for the arms deal was underway. The ANC linked companies Thomson-CSF and empowerment partner African Defence Systems (ADS), as well as Shaik's Nkobi Holdings, were part of a joint-venture with a German consortium which was awarded a slice of R1.3 billion in the arms deal contract (Sokomani, 2010:175-6). The arms deal was worth R30 billion and this provided an avenue for the ANC to raise funds through unorthodox means – particularly through the solicitation of bribes (Ensor, 2005). In parliament, Patricia De Lille proclaimed that the ANC received sweeteners totalling R500 000 from a bidding corporation in 1999, Thyssenkrupp Industrial Solutions which further made equivalent donations to organizations linked to Nelson Mandela in off-shore accounts (Hartley, 2007; Sokomani, 2010:174). Andrew Feinstein, a dismissed parliamentarian of the ANC confirms that bribes totalling R2.1 billion were paid to the ANC in the bidding process for the arms deal (Sokomani, 2010:176; Hoffman, 2013; Phakathi, 2014). Indeed, corruption is a public-private partnership that seeks to conquer the public sphere and effectively establish a for-profit government system through deeper forms of privatization policy such as outsourcing the core functions of the state (Klein, 2007, 12-3).

This loathsome reciprocal relationship between capital and state meant that Jacob Zuma secured lucrative government contracts for Shaik's business interests while Shaik bankrolled the lavish lifestyle of the Deputy President. The directors of Thomson-CSF corrupted the then deputy President through bribery while in turn, he shielded the former from law enforcement

agencies while advancing their corporate interests in the country. The money amassed through a nexus between big corporations and the ANC elite best illustrates the perilous influence of secret corporate donations to the governing party. Nyerere (1968:25) avers that “he who pays the piper calls the tune.” Private corporate donations have a corrupting effect on public policy. It has become clear here that the poisonous snake of corruption between the private and public sectors carries serious repercussions for development, macroeconomic stability, a competitive free-market economy, broader society, and the public administration which operationalizes and executes public policy. Ultimately the aspirations and desires of the people which are contained in public policy are nullified by the pervasive influence of money in politics (Makhanya, 2004; Atkinson 2005; Sokomani, 2010:175-6).

In what was dubbed the “Kebble controversy” which entailed the divulgence of a secret donation made to the Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) of the ANC in the Western Cape which totalled R500 000, Brett Kebble had managed to forge close ties with overly ambitious and acquisitive figures in the ANC including its youth wing. Lunga Ncwana and Andile Nkuhlu of the ANCYL were empowered through joint-ventures and incorporated into executive positions of Kebble’s empire (The Herald, 2006; Freund, 2007:668). The DA’s James Selfe also confessed to having received a donation exceeding R2 million from the infamous mining magnate who mingled closely with influential public officials. Post Kebble’s murder in 2005 his estate had been declared insolvent with liabilities in the hundreds of millions, he’s assets were later sequestrated (Mabuza, 2006). City Press (2007a) describes Kebble as a “serial tax evader and mega-fraudster.” The link between private corporate donations and public sector corruption is epitomized by South African party funding debacles and scandals. The unwillingness by the ANC and DA to disclose corporate donors lends credence to the suspicion that these donations buy access, influence, respectability, favours and protection from powerful political and public office-bearers. The sequestration of Kebble’s assets revealed that a link can be drawn between major donors of the ANC and which corporations receive lucrative government contracts. Therefore the tendering process is stage-managed by an intermingling of the private and public sectors to the peril of genuine democracy and public policy directives (Wa Afrika, 2004; Msomi, 2004; Business Day 2007b).

IDASA’s in-fatigable Right2Know (R2K) campaign which seeks to lay bare the link between private interests and public power revealed that colossal mining and finance corporations including AngloGold, Sanlam, Standard Bank, and the Liberty Group made sizeable donations to the ANC in the 2004 general election. These significant donations were made in secret and

they provided these corporate behemoths with access and influence to senior public officials, the bureaucracy including DG's through the governing party. As illustrated by the corrupting effect of private corporate donations, democratic decision-making is subverted, public procurement processes are perverted and public resources are plundered without accountability to the public. The previous postulation is advanced by the preference of large corporations to donate copiously in national as opposed to local government elections, this is because at the national level important public policy decisions are made and corporations seek to influence policy (Msomi, 2004; Sarakinsky, 2006; Radebe 2006). A political system without private party funding regulation is prone to unscrupulous interests and improper influence which fragments national scale movements into factions warring over access to public resources. The influence of private corporate donors can be pervasive on the governing-party economic policy trajectory rendering the party's independence to powerful economic interests. Mathews Phosa then treasurer-general of the ANC declared that the acceptance of tarnished money was the primary cause of public misuse and abuse, delegitimization of the democratic process, and the weakening of fair political representation as powerful corporations were afforded unfair influence on policy (Nhlabathi, 2012; Sunday Sun, 2012; Business Day, 2012; Mail & Guardian, 2013; Friedman, 2010:162).

Market-Friendly Fundraising Schemes

The oil gate funding scandal was another unfortunate event that exposed the corruption induced by private corporate donations to the governing party (Sokomani, 2010:179). Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka then minister of the DME exerted improper influence on SOE PetroSA to channel R11 million out of the public purse into the coffers of the ANC before the 2004 election. This complex financial engineering was conducted through Invume Management an ANC-linked empowerment company headed by Sandi Majali with close ties to Kgalema Motlanthe, the ANC's secretary-general at the time. The R11 million siphoned to the ANC by Invume was supposed to pay a supplier of oil condensate for Mossgas. PetroSA was compelled to make a double payment. The ANC's incessant thirst for party funding and its unorthodox methods of fundraising bankrupt SOEs through the use of unpatriotic black capitalists while the taxpayer bears the financial brunt (Brown, Dlamini, Hartley and Mde, 2005; Mde, 2005a; Mde 2005b; Hartley, 2005).

Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka was also implicated in Travelgate which saw R400 000 of the public's money used on a lavish business trip. Mlambo-Ngcuka was accompanied by BEE tycoon, Saki Macozoma. Travelgate is another graphic example of the use of public resources

to advance business interests of the Mbeki-aligned BEE clique (Brown, Mde, Radebe and Rose, 2006; Freund, 2007:667). Public officials at the highest levels of government connive with the black business class to annex public resources. Van Vuuren (2006) affirms that “corruption involving members of the civil service and the ever-present hand of corporate SA greasing palms where necessary.” Unrepentant corruption by those entrusted with the public purse increases political apathy and cynicism regarding the political process thereby reversing political participation and the robustness of democracy. In an unequal society such as South Africa, this permits wealthy and powerful corporations to influence public policy direction or options for the governing elite precluding the policy preferences of the majority poor while the governing elite uses public office to accumulate personal wealth at the public’s cost (February, 2005). African socialism provides that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie should not view their positions of influence and power to advance narrow self-centred interests (Nyerere, 1968:36; Boyle, 2007; Otunnu, 2015:24-5).

The 2007 R38.5 billion tender awarded by Eskom, an SOE, to Hitachi Power Africa (HPA) to build and improve the state’s capacity to provide energy is a barefaced demonstration of the conflict of interest induced by the cadre deployment and BEE policy and corruption linked to private party funding. The ANC-linked Chancellor House acquired a 25% empowerment stake in HPA in 2005. HPA pays a dividend of R5.8 billion to Chancellor House in turn Chancellor House donates generously to the ANC (Hoffman, 2013). The governing party plays dual roles in issuing out-of-state tenders; on the one hand, deployed cadres hold senior government positions and are the directors of SOEs, on the other hand, party-linked companies bid for the state tender. In simpler terms, the ANC occupies the shoes of the referee and the player simultaneously. Cadres deployed in SOEs issue out public sector contracts to advance party business interests, not the public interest (Helen Suzman Foundation, 2000; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005:13; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:25; Beresford, 2015:236). Mohammed Valli Moosa a former chairperson of Eskom had presided over the board meetings which determined the contractor for the tender while he also occupied a seat in the ANC’s fundraising committee. It is clear that contentious funding mechanisms of the ANC involving empowerment vehicles erode democratic vitality, and corrupt public procurement and policy (February, 2006; Sole, 2010:195).

As illustrated by the Nkobi conglomerate in the arms deal, Imvume Management in oil gate, and Chancellor House in the Eskom procurement deal, the BEE vehicle and private corporate donations are a conduit to eject money out of the state into the coffers of the ANC, the black

business class and foreign corporations. Such controversial fundraising schemes have transformed the once impecunious and heavily indebted ANC to one of the richest political parties in the continent with assets exceeding billions (Boyle, 2007; Sokomani, 2010; Beresford, 2015:235). The PBF, an exclusive gathering of the political and corporate elite, is another contentious scheme to swell ANC coffers. In the forum, only wealthy and powerful individuals or corporations are afforded access to cabinet ministers, DG's, political and senior public officials. Sokomani (2010:177) avers that this platform "obtain for the donor the symbolic benefit of being consulted on important policy developments, or simply afforded an opportunity to lobby politicians." The cobweb of conflicts of interest and corruption induced by BEE's cadre deployment and contentious fundraising schemes conflates the party with the public interest. Ministers and DG's are civil servants who are accountable to the public through government but the governing party misuses these public resources to oil party machinery (Wa Ka Ngobeni and Lubisi, 2007; Business Day, 2007a; Devenish, 2007; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:26; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014:12-3).

The Network Lounge is another fundraising mechanism that enmeshes big corporate interests with that of the governing party at national conferences wherein economic policy will be formulated. Attendance at this elite gathering is only afforded by wealthy corporate overlords who seek to lobby economic policy and influence the outcome of conferences. (Business Day, 2007c; February and Calland, 2007). The Network lounge and the PBF indicate the elitist form of South African politics and democracy. The intermingling of the corporate elite and political leadership has historically proven to have disastrous effects on the poor and working-class, examples cited in this chapter are ample testimony. Public and private interests are repellent hence the stark divide between the public and private sectors (Omarjee, 2007; Butler, 2010:6; Sokomani, 2010:177). Friedman (2010:157) avers that "power wielded by the action of small groups with large resources, in routine engagement with government, far outweighs that of the rest of society"

However, such intimate relations provide powerful corporations with the privilege of government decisions, a consultative process with an unfair advantage on the basis of wealth and not citizenship (Sokomani, 2010:177; Boyle, 2012). Private corporate donations to the governing party from the transition period and in the democratic period have had an influence on the contents of macroeconomic and BEE policy and its subordinate provisions. The deployment of ANC cadre into SOE's, PPP's, the establishment of empowerment companies

and partnerships with established white corporations, and affirmative action on the managerial and executive levels of corporate titans creates a politically-connected black capitalist class estranged from the views of the public on the ground (Freund, 2007:667-8; Friedman, 2010:158; Pretoria News, 2013). What arises ultimately is the erosion of the basic tenets of democratic governance, comprehensive consultation, meaningful representation or political equality, and public accountability. The majority poor become the casualties of loathsome relationships between the wealthy and political leadership. Important public policy decision-making is a reflection of the country's irrational socio-economic inequality (also see Sokomani, 2010:176-7; Sole, 2010:187 & 194 in chapter three). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2014:11) notes that "business exerts undue influence over public policy, and that the distribution of burdens and rewards in society is unfair."

An Elitist Public Policy – the Corporatocracy

Chapter 10 (195) of the Constitution of the RSA Act 108 of 1996 provides for the democratic values and principles which govern the public administration. Inter alia: an ethical and highly professional administration that is responsive to the needs of the public; provides mechanisms to make accessible and encourage public consultation in policymaking; ensures the optimal use of public resources at minimal cost; and is transparent and accountable to the governed (Tebele, 2016:1). However, the Sol Kerzner saga, Morkelgate, Roodefontein scandal, Kebble controversy, the arms deal, the elephant consortium, the Saudi-linked cellphone license, oil gate, Travelgate, Chancellor House, PBF, and network lounge indicate a contravention of values and principles outlined above. The above events that occurred in the 1996 to 2014 timeline are sufficient evidence that corporate power influences public policy in South Africa. Indeed, the evidence provided by this study qualifies that private corporate donations influence the public policy (system and process) in South Africa. Again, the public policy cycle includes problem identification; agenda-setting; policy formulation; policy implementation; and monitoring and evaluation. Public policy involves making important choices and decisions related to the government inclusive of all relevant stakeholders. These important decisions encapsulate a prioritization of the needs of the public and the estimated public resource commitment toward addressing those identified issues efficiently and effectively (Geurts, 2014; Tebele, 2016:2-3).

Public policy is inextricably linked to politics and public administration. Public policy is formulated by legislators who carry a political mandate from their respective political parties. Party policy is informed or influenced by the party's ideological position which may be either

leftist (the Freedom Charter), right-wing (GEAR), or centrist (Swedish Third Way). Public policy is implemented in government institutions by administrators or bureaucrats. Therefore, public administration operates in a political environment and thus public policy exists in both the political and administrative milieu (Tebele, 2016:4-5). Gumede (2008:16) avers that “public policymaking has been affected by the commitments of the ‘national democratic revolution’ to which the ruling political party and its alliance subscribe.” In other words, South Africa’s public policy embodies a redistributive agenda that emanates from the ideology of the governing Tripartite Alliance (Southall, 2004:314; Mosala et al., 2017:336-7). It is noteworthy for the purposes of this analysis that public policy implementation is influenced by macro-political factors and micro-political factors. The former includes national legislation, the domestic economy, and the global political and economic landscape; while the latter includes policy contents, human resource capacity, and the organizational ethos (Tebele, 2016:7).

NEDLAC was already alluded to in chapter three (Prevost, 2006:175; Bond, 2007:129). However, Gumede (2008:14) contends that the body to facilitate public policymaking is constitutive of organized business that is represented by BUSA, COSATU, government, civil society including women, youth, and organizations for people living with disabilities, the financial sector, and worker cooperatives. However, Prevost (2006:175) and Bond (2007:129) argue that the adoption of NEDLAC is synonymous with the adoption of corporatism by policy elites in South Africa. NEDLAC has amputated the bargaining power and influence and eroded the militancy of trade unions, furthering the working class and poor from public policy influence. Moreover, NEDLAC is a market-friendly mechanism in which the interests and preferences of the corporate elite prevail with the assistance of market-friendly comrades. Hence the bourgeois character of South Africa’s public policy trajectory post the inception of this corporatist talk-shop (Van Wyk, 2009:14).

Redistributive public policy is the reallocation or transfer of costs, benefits, and resources. It is driven by the national political elite; it is politically charged and controversial. It is influenced by or emanates from ideology, race, and class in society. Not surprisingly, this reallocation of resources culminates in ideological, racial and class conflict between the leftists and the liberals; blacks and whites; the extremely poor and ultra-rich. This is largely a result of the redistributive nature of such public policy which levies costs from one group to benefit the other, for instance, progressive taxation or price discrimination, resource priority is given to the basic service delivery and development of the prioritized group (Tebele, 2016:27-8).

B-BBEE, affirmative action, and land reform are examples of redistributive public policy (Tebele, 2016:27-8). According to the elite theory of public policy, the formulation of policy is an exclusive exercise of the national corporate and political elite. The masses of the people are relieved from this onerous political and intellectual exercise because of their inability to meaningfully participate which is attributed to their illiterateness and disinterestedness. Public policy development by elite groups is constitutive of the chief executives of massive corporations, the political elite, wealthy segments of society or affluent classes, and the educated middle-classes – the ruling elite (Tebele, 2016:35). Mbeki (2009a:78-9) affirms that the economic oligarchy and the political elite constitute the ruling class in South Africa which determines desirable public policy. Elite groups have different policy interests, the representatives of corporations are interested in economic, trade and industrial policy and the deregulation of the markets. While the political elite is interested in registered voters, electioneering, governance, and resource distributions in society. The interests of the above-mentioned elite groups tend to conflate, in their exertion of influence and exercise of power over policy, which results in their collaboration or in this case collusion (Friedman, 2010:157).

As the public policy cycle was already alluded to earlier in this section (Tebele, 2016:2-3). For purposes of this study, the concentration is on the agenda-setting and implementation stage and how they aid the study in understanding corporate power's influence on public policy. Tebele (2016:48) describes agenda setting as a logical process of “influencing, controlling, shaping and defining” the problems or social issues which will be placed on the policy agenda. Public policy implementation “speaks to the adoption and implementation thereof a formulated/drafted policy (Tebele, 2016:50).” The development of public policy in a democratic society has central in it the participation of the public and/or relevant stakeholders. The various influences on public policy include NGO's, community-based organizations, faith-based organizations, trade unions, the corporate sector, the opposition, and the government. Consequently, these different stakeholders contend for their group-specific interests to be placed on the policy agenda. However, power and influence in the policymaking environment are not equal, the corporate sector and the political elite exert relatively greater influence (Van Wyk, 2009:14). Mosala (2016:57) avers that “to influence policy, issues do not just happen; it requires important political tactics from policy actors.”

The series of secret meetings from 1990 to 1996 between the ANC leadership core, the economic oligarchy, the NP, IFI's, and American and British pressure groups to discuss post-apartheid economic policy involved profound concessions trading. During the six-year period

of covert negotiations, the ANC had undergone a breathtaking ideological shift evident in its socioeconomic policy positions. The once socialist and radical redistribution-oriented movement had morphed into an apostle of free-market fundamentalism. The policy interest of the MEC and IFI's materialized in the 1993 elite compromise. However, as argued by Bassett (2006:7-8) and Klein (2007:212) in chapter three, the adoption of a neoliberal macroeconomic policy arises from the pressures of repaying the inherited debt of the apartheid regime. The pressure attached to the acknowledgement of this humungous debt culminated in the 1996 GEAR strategy (Terreblanche, 2012:63). Terreblanche (2012:64) avers that "there can be little doubt that the secret negotiations between the MEC and a leadership core of the ANC were mainly responsible for the ideological 'somersault' of the ANC." Mosala (2016) advances that the key factors which influence the process of agenda-setting include: the power dynamics in society; the ultra-rich, the educated middle-classes, experts, and the numerically dominant possess the requisite capital to influence public policy. Mosala (2016:57) posits that the public policy process "is a dynamic process involving various participants and factors that influence the process." The elite theory of public policy provides that public policy reflects the interests and principal concerns of a small elite group that possesses economic, financial, social, and human capital as well as political power. The public policy approach follows a hierarchical and elitist model from the top down (Mosala, 2016:58-9).

Powerful corporations or the economic oligarchy dispensed assets, resources, and wealth to the political elite in the form of BEE which has influenced and shaped South Africa's bourgeois economic public policy (Friedman, 2010:159; Mbeki, 2009b; City Press, 2009). Southall (2004:313) avers that "Moeletsi Mbeki, the President's brother, has declared BEE a sham, dreamed up by white capital to seduce the ANC away from nationalising the economy and hence to produce a predatory black elite." Public policy is implemented by a bureaucratic bourgeoisie as a distinct class from the populous masses. According to the elitist theory of public policy, the powerful elite in society wield more influence on public policy and have considerable bargaining power and key advantages in setting the policy agenda (Mosala, 2016:59; Tebele, 2016:35-6).

The GEAR macroeconomic strategy was an outcome of discussions between the Brenthurst Group headed by Harry Oppenheimer and an ANC cohort of policymakers led by Nelson Mandela which included Tito Mboweni, Trevor Manuel and Alex Erwin, figures in the inner circle of Thabo Mbeki (Van Wyk, 2009:25; Terreblanche, 2012:63). Mboweni is the former minister of labour later turned governor of the Reserve Bank, Manuel is the longest-serving

finance minister who declared GEAR non-negotiable, and Erwin was the minister of the DTI. It has become clear here that public policy in South Africa is influenced by corporate power through an array of tactics which culminated in a corporate politico ruling alliance. The leading lights of the ANC were provided access to the opulent living-standards of their former oppressor through the BEE policy which saw the embourgeoisement of a black capitalist class through empowerment deals, affirmative action and cadre deployment, the ANC leadership was co-opted into the structure of capitalist accumulation (Klein, 2007:212; Terreblanche, 2012:68-9).

Concluding Remarks

This chapter provided a descriptive discussion of the theory-informed thematic analysis of the study's findings. This detailed discussion of the findings was linked to the research question and the study's central argument through a theoretical thematic explanation. The discussion in this chapter was linked to the literature and the theoretical framework. This chapter reached the conclusion that BEE was fashioned by the economic oligarchy as a form of co-option of the political elite into neoliberal capitalist accumulation led by the corporate sector, the chapter also found that private corporate donations made to the political elite have a corrupting effect which corrodes the quality of democracy effectively subverting public policy. The following chapter provides the study's key findings, conclusion, and recommendations.

Chapter 7: Final Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

The main focus of this chapter is the conclusion and recommendations of the study. From the outset, this research project sought to conduct a descriptive analysis of the influence of corporate power on South Africa's public policy, from 1996 to 2014. This study argued that the GEAR macroeconomic strategy and B-BBEE policy have provided corporate power with inordinate influence on South Africa's public policy (Bond, 2006:45; Steyn, 2007; Van Wyk, 2009:28-9; Padayachee and Fine, 2019:165). The study further argued that private (secret) corporate donations made to public office bearers and the governing-party permit the exertion of corporate influence on South Africa's public policy. This study also brought fourth the idea that, BEE's capitalist class creation and private corporate donations are the chief influences which prohibit the pursuit and effective implementation of alternative public policies. Moreover, the elite (corporatist) policy environment and the intermingling between corporate magnates, BEE tycoons, public office bearers and the governing-party leadership, has a great potential of advancing private and commercial (corporatist) interests thereby subverting public policy (Friedman, 2010:158; Cave and Rowell, 2014; Monbiot, 2014; Davis, 2015:397). The political elite was co-opted into the dominant capitalist economic structure through private corporate donations extended to the former by corporate monopolies throughout this study's time dimension (Friedman, 2010:157; Beresford, 2015:235-6).

The research findings presented in chapter five clearly support the above-mentioned central argument stated in chapter one (see, the purpose of the study). This study demonstrates that public policy influence largely stems from and is inextricable with the BEE policy's cadre deployment of the ANC elite into business, SOEs, and the state bureaucracy which in turn creates a cobweb of conflicting interests, fraud, and corruption (cronyism). The BEE policy has largely served as a conduit for the transfer of wealth from the white economic oligarchy to the black political elite (narrow BEE) that has, as a result, developed an elite reformative public policy (Edozie, 2008:58; McKinley, 2017:46). Chapter five presented that (see, Singh, 1997a; Singh, 1997b; Helen Suzman Foundation, 2000; Sunday Times, 2003; News24, 2015 in chapter five). BEE saw the political elite (former MK combatants, Robben Islanders and trade unionists) provided with directorships, managerial positions, share equity ownership, debt financing and joint-venture empowerment in the largest corporations including AAC, Johnnic Holdings Limited, De Beers Group, Rosslyn Mining and Plant Hire, Gold Fields Limited,

Randgold and Exploration and Harmony Gold's merger with African Rainbow Minerals Gold (ARM gold) (Southall, 2004:324-5; Van Wyk, 2009:28-9; Padayachee and Fine, 2019:165).

This peculiar nature of BEE is the silver bullet that co-opted the former liberation movement into a mild-mannered cohort of market-friendly comrades with an equally market friendly policy thinking position (Edozie, 2008:58; Sokomani, 2010:178; Buhlungu and Tshoaedi, 2011:110; McKinley, 2017:46). Chapters five and six of this study show that the highly enmeshed nature of the relations and interests between corporate power and those in charge of public policy advances the corporate agenda while the interests of the public (people) are deferred. In line with the previous postulation, it has been shown that private corporate donations have a corrupting influence on the political system and thus subverting the public policy process and outcome in South Africa. The nexus between major party funding scandals (corruption, fraud, and money laundering) and national election years discussed by this study qualifies the previous argument (Butler, 2010:15-6; Solik, 2013b; Du Plessis, 2014; Hunter, 2014b). The surreptitious co-governing arrangement of the corporate-politico power elite serves to simultaneously secure and preserve the private interests of the political elite and the commercial interests of powerful corporations in South Africa while postponing the realization of pathbreaking public policy aimed at transformation, redistribution, and development as articulated by the country's public policy documents: GEAR and B-BBEE (Mbeki, 2009a:66-8; Sole, 2010:187; Sokomani, 2010:170; Terreblanche, 2012:63-5).

The Findings of the Study

The crux of this study is unravelling the research problem and answering the main research questions. As was mentioned in chapter one, this study asks two research questions which entail: does corporate power influence South Africa's public policy? And how do private corporate donations permit the influence of South Africa's public policy? The study endeavoured to answer these questions by, conducting an analysis of how the BEE policy of placing governing-party leaders on major corporate boards has influenced South Africa's public policy. The study also examined the effects of private corporate donations made to public office bearers from the governing party as a factor that permits corporate influence on South Africa's public policy.

In response to the primary question probed by this study, the findings or analysis reveal that the influence of South Africa's post-apartheid public policy can be traced as far back as the 1980s and early 1990s. The series of secret meetings which occurred between capitalist

corporations (economic oligarchy) and the ANC elite in exile as well as those during the transition period resulted in inconceivable socioeconomic policy changes in the ANC and later the ANC-government – GEAR and BEE (Van Wyk, 2009:13-4; Terreblanche, 2012:60-1). Terreblanche (2012:40) opines that “capitalist corporations always succeeded in manoeuvring themselves into such powerful positions that they were in the driving seat as far as political and economic decision-making was concerned.” Based on the above, corporate power (economic oligarchy) grubstaked the top leadership of the ANC through a transfer of wealth, assets, and resources which led to the elite compromise, GEAR, and the BEE policy. Mbeki (2009a:80) remarks that “BEE was the bribe offered by the economic oligarchy at CODESA II to the black middle class for it to drop its demand for nationalisation.” Therefore GEAR, BEE and the creation of a patriotic black bourgeoisie are the offspring of corporate power in their quest to protect their strategic economic interests by exerting undue influence on the political elite (Mbeki, 2009b; Keeton and White, 2010). Loewenstein (2015:22) observes that “state oversight is now so weak—often, indeed, nonexistent—in both the Western world and developing countries that corporate power can be said to have won.”

As Mbeki (2009a:80) has already alluded above, BEE represents the elite compromise, a pact that entails black political power (ANC-government) and some access to wealth for selected black South Africans (BEE) in return for continued white control of the crucial sectors of the economy (MEC). This black business class was gifted with share-ownership, made managers and executives, and directors in the boards of the largest MEC corporations in South Africa. They further received lucrative government contracts in joint-venture empowerment deals (Southall, 2004:324-5). Corporate influence is further exerted through a cobweb of conflicting interests created by the unpatriotic black bourgeoisie, that has been embroiled in several major party funding scandals which often involve an ANC-linked or owned BEE company (Mbeki, 2009a:74; Friedman, 2010:159-160; Terreblanche, 2012:63-6). South Africa’s post-apartheid public policy had already taken an elitist form which was described in chapter two. Bond (2007:129) clearly articulates that GEAR has amputated the bargaining power of trade unions with the introduction of NEDLAC, which is a corporatist talk-shop composed of an elite bourgeoisie class with corporate interests. While those of the vast black lower-income working classes are negated. GEAR, BEE and the Mining Charter are borne out of this elite neoliberal malaise (Van Wyk, 2009:9). In that case, desirable socio-economic transformation driven by the state is determined through the close symbiotic relations between corporate power and the

political elite, not through the constitutionally defined mechanisms (Mbeki, 2009a; Van Wyk, 2009; Wolff, 2014).

Terreblanche (2012:66-7) states that any opportunity for the conceptualization and implementation of redistributive public policy “was squandered when a neoliberal politico-economic system was institutionalized to serve the narrow interests of the old white and the emerging black elite.” The capitalist or corporatist interests of the economic oligarchy (corporate power) remained extremely powerful in the post-1994 policy period because of the historic elite compromise between the corporate sector and the black political elite (see, Business Day, 1997a & Van Wyk, 2009:25 in chapter one). As a consequence of the neoliberal macroeconomic GEAR policy, the ANC-led government has been unable to efficiently and effectively fashion redistributive public policy to address the triple challenge. Corporate power’s influence is evident in policies such as the privatization of SOEs, PPP’s, public sector outsourcing, rationalization, and market-friendly labour market policy (Doan and Weldon, 2012:6; Statva, 2012:3; Davis, 2015:396; Milton, [s.a.]:417-8). Corporations either hire or empower BEE-affiliated retired politicians, their family members or friends effectively establishing a relationship of favour trading that breeds negative patron-client relations. Relationship building and favour trading is another channel employed by corporate power (economic oligarchy) to exert influence on political and public office bearers from the governing-party (Cave and Rowell, 2014). Hence governing-party political heavyweights and senior public officials often retire into top-tier corporate positions such as the boards of directors of corporate giants, in industries they once regulated or headed when in ministerial portfolios (Southall, 2004:324-5; Doan and Weldon, 2012:26; Davis, 2015:396). This study discussed the “elephant consortium” in chapters five and six which illustrates the previous argument (see, Beeld, 2004b & Boyle, 2007).

It can be further deduced from the findings presented by this study that, the collusion between party-state, BEE tycoons and corporations’ pervert the public procurement process and ultimately subvert public policy and the policy interests of the public (Gleason, 2003; Mde, 2005a; Mde, 2005b; Brown, Mde, Radebe and Rose, 2006; Sokomani, 2010:178; Cape Argus, 2012; Beresford, 2015:232). Crony collusive corruption and maladministration blemishes people’s trust in public institutions and directly impedes the objectives of public policy. The resultant outcome of this phenomenon closely related to BEE is inefficient or inadequate service delivery and wastage, for example poorly built schools, roads and clinics arise because the contractor was not awarded the tender based on their competitiveness in construction but

because of the power and influence, they wield on those who award these tenders (Beresford, 2015:236; Madi, 2016:27-8). The study also discovered that the financial interests of the ANC supersede the public interest and the common good. The financial resources of the economic oligarchy are used to court the political elite to gain access to public officials, acquire unfair commercial advantage, access lucrative state tenders, and exert public policy influence (Terreblanche, 2012:40-1). Madi (2016:202-3) points out that in 2015 “the wealthiest 4% of households receive 32% of all income. Over half of South Africans live below the national poverty line and more than 10% live in extreme poverty.” Therefore, this study is adamant that public policy is tainted by the special interests of powerful corporations.

Regarding the secondary question, the findings and analysis reveal that corporate power maintains its influence on public policy through the continued financing of the governing party’s operational and election campaigns. Explicitly, private corporate donations are used by corporate power (economic oligarchy) to exert influence on public policy in South Africa. These secret corporate donations carry quid pro-quo underpinnings which result in the preservation of the corporate interest at the public’s expense (Butler, 2010:15-6; Sokomani, 2010:185; Erasmus, 2012; Solik, 2013b; Phakathi, 2014). As was observed in chapter two, an affluent class of the owners of America’s largest corporations are indirectly in control or largely influence the political system including electoral politics, political appointments, and deployments as well as public policy decisions taken in the United States (US) Congress (Anyebe, 2018:11). A similar argument is made by this study regarding the economic oligarchy or corporate power, which is the bedrock of the South African economy (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996; Mbeki, 2009a; Terreblanche, 2012). Chapters five and six responded to this secondary question by providing an array of major-party funding scandals and the connection of the dots between the financier of the party and the receiver of a state tender and other unduly reciprocated favours – corruption and the subversion of public policy (Butler, 2010:15-6). The analysis provides that economic power buys political influence and this pervasive influence has a corrupting effect on the political process and ultimately public policy. In other words, political power is beholden to the special interests of corporate power (Friedman, 2010:157; Dodds, 2013; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014:11).

Incumbency renders the governing-ANC at a greater position of vulnerability because private corporate donors who seek to influence public policy-making and outcomes will judiciously resolve to donate to the incumbent party, in other words, the party in control of government in all spheres (Sokomani, 2010:173). Radebe (2006) in chapters five and six also alluded that

corporate donors donate copiously during national and provincial elections, as opposed to municipal elections, this is because the corporate donor seeks to exert influence at the national public policy level. This is why this study stated from the outset that, the focus is on the analysis of private corporate donations made to the governing-party (see, Hirsch, 2005:63; Moran, Rein and Goodin, 2006 & Beresford, 2015:232 in chapter one). The findings present that, private corporate donors are chiefly concerned with buying access to influence governing-party political heavyweights and policy decision-makers in the public sector to secure and protect corporate interests. Private corporate donors are not concerned with the creation of a balanced party finance regime, building the strength of South Africa's multiparty democracy or eradicating the triple challenge (Sokomani, 2010:185). Butler (2010:12) affirms that "private interests use financial muscle to influence public policy and public-sector procurement in their interests." Moreover, warm relationships between the wealthy and powerful economic oligarchy (corporate power) and political heavyweights make possible the plunder of public resources by elected officials and their private or corporate counterparts in a combined effort to maliciously accumulate wealth at the public's and democracy's expense (Erasmus, 2012; Zibi, 2013). This close symbiotic relationship between corporate power and public policy "relate[s] to the use of political donations to gain unfair access to policy-makers and to unduly influence public policy (Sokomani, 2010:170)."

Sokomani (2010:176); Hoffman (2013) and Phakathi (2014) pointed out the solicitation of bribes by the ANC during the arms deal's bidding process in order to bankroll the 1999 national election. This is not an isolated incident in the period analysed by this study, the Sol Kerzner saga, Morkelgate, Roodefontein scandal, Kebble controversy, the elephant consortium, the Saudi-linked cellphone license, oil gate, Travelgate, Chancellor House, PBF, and the network lounge are other examples discussed by this study in chapter five and six which highlight the corrupting influence of private corporate donations and the ANC's contentious fundraising schemes. It can thus be argued that the large resources in the hands of big corporate behemoths afford them undue influence on the governing party and subsequently public policy, while the public largely poor and disempowered are outgunned by the battalions of private concentrations. In such a case the vitality of democracy is severely undermined and discredited. With the corrupting effect of private corporate donations, democratic decision-making is subverted, public procurement processes are perverted and public resources are plundered without accountability to the public. Redistributive public policy which seeks to reverse and undo the socioeconomic legacies bestowed by apartheid's racial capitalism have been stymied

by a nexus of unethical lobbying, the revolving door, cadre deployment, and the influence of secret corporate donations which subvert public policy and pervert public procurement (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005:13; Edozie, 2008:53; Sole, 2010:197; Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2014:14&25; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2014:12). Butler (2010:2) opines that “money given in return for implicit or stated favours not only has a corrupting effect on a political system, but it also undermines the trust and legitimacy upon which a flourishing democracy depends.” It can be concluded that the dissertation provides sufficient data responding to the questions posed by this study.

Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Further Research

Without reiterating what has already been alluded to in chapters one and four regarding the limitations of this study, this section chiefly focuses on the limitations encountered in arriving at the conclusions of this study. The paucity of academic literature on private party funding in South Africa is a limitation which presented difficulties in expanding on corporate influence permitted by private corporate donations on public policy in South Africa (1996-2014). Although the study made judicious use of newspaper articles, policy reports and government publications, the secrecy surrounding party funding in the study’s time dimension presents difficulties in uncovering an overt or obvious correlation between corporate donations and public policy. The study was compelled to be investigative in the process of data collection and the approach to data analysis, in an endeavour to connect the dots (between a corporate donor and favourable public policy outcome) and explicitly demonstrate the way in which corporate power uses private donations to influence public policy in South Africa. Moreover, because of the technicalities of South Africa’s dominant party system (and proportional representation) the analysis has largely focused on private corporate donations made to the governing party which occupies most if not all levels of government (public sector). The rationale for this decision is that “incumbency may render ruling parties more vulnerable to the undue influence of money in politics, for to ‘maximise access, money must be directed toward the strongest candidates – the incumbents’ (Sokomani, 2010:173).”

Academics and researchers with a research interest similar to that of this study may conduct further research on aspects, variables or elements which fall outside the immediate scope of this particular study. For instance, future research may focus on or assess the influence of the BEE tycoon clique or the patriotic black bourgeoisie, exclusive of established white corporations, on South Africa’s public policy. Alternatively, one may analyze the changing

nature of ownership in the corporate sector or the changing nature of capital particularly the entrance of the black patriotic bourgeoisie, and the implications for public policy. Another closely related area of potential future inquiry is an analysis that focuses on a time dimension earlier than 1996 to examine the influence of foreign government donations on South Africa's foreign policy, especially controversial sources such as Muammar Gaddafi, King Fahd, Sani Abacha, and Mohamed Suharto.

Concluding Remarks

This study sought to analyze the relationship between corporate power and public policy in South Africa, from 1996 to 2014. This study found that public policy in South Africa has historically been influenced by corporate power through the dispensation of wealth, resources, and assets to the political elite. And that public policy probity in South Africa is subverted by the corrupting influence of private corporate donations to the governing ANC.

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
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