

INVESTIGATING THE PARALLELS BETWEEN DISCIPLINARY/BIO-POWER AND
CYBER-CORPORATE EMPIRE

By

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
M.A. in Media Studies to be awarded at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University

December 2012

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I, Darren Taljaard, 9118241, hereby declare that the treatise for M.A. in Media Studies is my own work and that it has not previously been submitted for assessment or completion of any postgraduate qualification to another University or for another qualification.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply grateful to those who have assisted, encouraged and supported me in producing this treatise, without whom it would certainly not have been possible, four of whom require particular mention.

Firstly, my wife, Natasha, who spent countless hours caring for our children, ensuring the smooth running of our home and providing 'peace and quiet' in order that I may work towards completing my studies. Without her considerable help it would not have been possible to complete this project. All of the very hard work is appreciated, and will not be forgotten.

Prof. Adrian Konik, who has provided ongoing encouragement, insight, conceptual and theoretical pointers as well as linguistic enhancements of the highest order. A supervisor with a truly helpful, accessible and flexible approach is a great benefit to any student, particularly one who finds himself facing new and daunting challenges. Thank you so much for the many hours of your patient, good humoured, expert assistance, your prodding, encouraging and motivation as well as the life altering knowledge you have exposed me to. Equally, your passion for the subject at hand, deep understanding of the complexities of language and discourse, and ability to articulate theoretical positions and concepts are invaluable. You have made a tremendous impact, thank you.

Prof. Danie Jordaan, who re-ignited my passion for new forms of knowledge and persuaded me that I could contribute in some small way, you are missed, but your influence lives on.

Dr. Janina Wozniak, a compassionate and professional colleague, teacher and friend who is able to perform small miracles to prevent her students losing their way entirely. Thank you for all you do quietly in the background, it has made an enormous impact and I am grateful for your help.

ABSTRACT

Strong parallels exist between the formation of subjectivity through the disciplinary/bio-power technologies of the 18th/19th centuries – which Michel Foucault identified in his books *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, and *The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge* – and the 20th/21st century formation of subjectivity effected through Apple. Inc and Google. Inc operating systems and products. These systems and products similarly serve to canalize and ‘discipline’ the pursuit and exchange of information, in a way that is constitutive of a new cyber-variant of disciplinary/bio-power subjectivity.

Keywords: Michel Foucault, disciplinary power, bio-power, Apple. Inc, Google. Inc. operating systems, apps.

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Introduction

According to Michel Foucault, two different yet related types of power have historically acted to shape both modern societies and the individuals of which they comprise, namely disciplinary power and bio-power. That is, on the one hand, disciplinary power emerged in the late 18th century and entailed a reorganization of time and space in terms of principles of surveillance and hyper-efficiency – a reorganization which formed the individual as a docile and textually-based subject through technologies such as the dossier. On the other hand, bio-power emerged in the 19th century and – dovetailing with disciplinary power – concerned societal and individual health, through an augmented medico-scientific focus on sex, sexuality and reproduction. What will be argued in this treatise, however, is that the late 20th century saw the birth of a new form of cyber-corporate power, which has dove-tailed with disciplinary/bio-power and extended its ambit of influence into cyber space and time, informing subjectivity accordingly. That is, access to digitised information is increasingly being achieved through mobile devices using software developed by, among others, Apple Inc. and Google Inc. The development and distribution of these mobile communication devices, operating systems and related software – through direct or indirect means – is one of the greatest sources of contemporary profit (*Financial Times* 2010). Yet, on account of the link between profit and power, the generation of such (hitherto unimaginable levels of) wealth is indissociable from the approximation of hegemonic discursive influence. In this regard, the focus of this treatise will fall on the emergence of mobile communication devices, and it will be argued that through an array of mechanisms they effectively *discipline* and regiment on-line activity, while at the same time perpetuating (and indeed propagating) *bio-power* discourses – all in a way that is indissociable from the formation of a cyber-variant of disciplinary/bio-power subjectivity. In short, this treatise will examine the parallels between disciplinary/bio-power technologies and Apple Inc./Google Inc. Software, and as a corollary of these parallels, the increasing role of such software in the formation of subjectivity.

However, before outlining how this research will be pursued, it is important to elaborate on the context out of which it has emerged, in the interest of drawing into conspicuousness its significance for the contemporary era.

Michel Foucault postulated that two forms of power emerged in the modern era to reorganize society and inform subjectivity, namely disciplinary power and bio-power. Disciplinary power, as presented in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, is “a

policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour.” In effect, Foucault argues that disciplinary power “define[s] how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines” (Foucault 1991: 138). On the one hand, disciplinary power concerned the reorganization of space through a new “art of distributions” involving enclosure, partitioning and functional sites, which progressively isolated and fragmented social space – the prison, the workshop, the school, the hospital, the barracks, etc – and identified certain tasks and activities as exclusive to certain domains, all in the interest of control. Moreover, through the introduction of rank, virtual space also became subject to control and competition, insofar as the behaviour and performance of individuals were recorded and used to evaluate them in terms of schemas of categorization that pitted one against another (Foucault 1991: 141-149). On the other hand, disciplinary power also concerned the reorganization of time through a new “control of activity.” This entailed not only a novel variant of the timetable, in which the intensified division of the day into minutes and seconds occurred – along with the measurement of activity accordingly – and the temporal elaboration of acts, through which all activities were broken down into their most basic component parts to ensure their perfect, interminable repetition. In addition, it also entailed both the correlation of the body and the gesture (through which the optimal relationship between a gesture and the rest of the body was advanced and rigorously enforced), and the body-object articulation (through which the ‘best’ and only way to work with an object was stipulated). And while all of the above changes were carried out under the auspices of the principle of ‘exhaustive use,’ or the idea that one can squeeze endless, hyper-efficient productivity out of any limited amount of time (Foucault 1991: 149-155), accompanying forms of panoptical surveillance and the concomitant institution of the dossier made deviation from the related norms and imperatives increasingly problematic (Foucault 1991: 187-192, 200-205).

Yet, Foucault’s work on disciplinary power should not be regarded in isolation, because he was explicit that the text should be construed as a “background to various studies of the power of normalization and the formation of knowledge in modern society” (Foucault 1991: 308), and in this regard in the next year he followed it with the related *The History of Sexuality, The Will to Knowledge, Volume One*. In the latter work, Foucault continued along a similar research trajectory, insofar as he concentrated on the medico-scientific issue of sexuality, and the associated “explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of

bio-power” (Foucault 2008: 140). In terms of this, Foucault advanced that a “series of interventions and regulatory controls[,...]...a *bio-politics of the population*,” operated together to constitute a “great...technology” with sufficient power to influence the discourses operative within society, and hence the orientation of the subjectivity of all the individuals therein (Foucault 2008: 139). Arguably, the conceptual hub of the *scientia sexualis* that emerged around this time was orientated around the new forms of secularized/medicalized confession, which conflated sexuality and truth, and through which the ostensible knowledge of sex was pursued – in relation to the four anchorage points of the ‘deployment of sexuality,’ namely the Malthusian couple, the perverse adult, the hysterical woman and the masturbating child (Foucault 2008: 65-68, 104-106). Importantly, in *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault maintained that while disciplinary power had preceded bio-power, the latter neither negated nor opposed the former, but rather dovetailed with it, and in the process not only endorsed and extended its ambit of influence, but also opened up new avenues through which a composite of ‘disciplinary/bio-power’ could be exercised over individuals in a formative manner (Foucault 2003: 242). Yet, while in his later work, Foucault went on to explore – with reference to the Hellenistic-Roman ‘cultures of the self’ of the 1st/2nd century AD – the different ways in which people have formed their own subjectivity, through, amongst other things, exercises, dietetics, and meditative practices of self-writing (Foucault 2005: 247-266), because he died in 1984 he never had the opportunity to comment on how the advent of the internet and cyber-space were affecting or being affected by, the dynamics of the disciplinary/bio-power society he had theorized.

In this treatise, an attempt will be made, at least in some way, to address this deficit. Arguably, the various means by which many individuals and larger bodies of contemporary society communicate have evolved significantly since Foucault’s demise. In particular, in the last two decades, a fundamental shift has taken place within the media and technology industries (Castells 2009), namely the emergence and rapid ascendancy of mobile computers in the form of smartphones¹ and tablet computers.² These devices have facilitated the development of various new and (almost) entirely uninterrupted means by which to communicate across both space and time, utilising mobile communication networks. Yet,

¹ A mobile phone that is able to perform many of the functions of a computer, typically having a relatively large screen and an operating system capable of running general-purpose applications (Oxford Dictionaries Online 2012).

² A small portable computer that accepts input directly on to its screen rather than via a keyboard or mouse (Oxford Dictionaries Online 2012).

within this context, while communication networks comprise “the patterns of contact that are created by the flow of messages among communicators through time and space” (Monge and Contractor 2003: 3), arguably, these patterns are in many ways formed through the canalization of information. In this regard, Castells describes a network as a “set of interconnected nodes” and explains that “important nodes are called centers [whose] function and meaning depend on the programs of the network and on [their] interaction with other nodes” (Castells 2009: 19).

Two such centres currently dominate the fast growing mobile communications market: those of Google Inc. and Apple Inc (Gartner, Inc. 2012). As such, while these ‘centres’ have evolved into ‘global corporate empires’ through their advertising, development and provision of software and digital devices, and via the access to digital media and data that they provide, their status in this regard and correlative capacity to channel information have resulted in their effective ‘disciplining’ of their customers. Indeed, according to Castells, power is now “exercised by the construction of meaning in the human mind through the process of communication enacted in global/local multimedia networks of mass communication, including mass self-communication” (Castells 2009: 416). In 2011 alone, sales of smartphones and tablet computers exceeded those of desktop and laptop computers, and what this indicates is that an increasing number of media consumers are relying to a large extent on Google Inc. and Apple Inc. to help them ‘construct meaning’ through the process of communication. (In this regard, relevant available statistics will be tracked throughout the writing of the treatise). The implications of this are potentially very far-reaching, as far as the formation of subjectivity is concerned.

As such, the hypothesis of this treatise is that strong parallels exist between the formation of subjectivity through disciplinary/bio-power technologies in the 18th/19th centuries, and the 20th/21st century formation of subjectivity effected through Apple. Inc and Google. Inc operating systems and products. These systems and products similarly serve to canalize and ‘discipline’ the pursuit and exchange of information, in a way that is constitutive of a new cyber-variant of disciplinary/bio-power subjectivity.

In the interest of exploring the above, Chapter One will consider Michel Foucault’s article “Discourse on Language,” and his books *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* and *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume One*, with a view to elaborating upon the dynamics, features and technologies of disciplinary/bio-power, along with its formation of subjectivity during the 18th/19th century.

In turn, Chapter Two will explore the historical development of both Apple Inc. and Google Inc., with a view to sketching their respective trajectories of development from small companies to mega-corporations. After this, on the one hand, the parallels that exist between the disciplinary technologies thematized by Foucault in his *Discipline and Punish*, and the current mechanism of information canalization operative within the products and services of Apple Inc. and Google Inc., will be discussed. The parallels will include: the highly specific body-object articulation used to operate Apple and Google's mobile devices, the 'exhaustive use' of consumers' time – particularly time spent using apps³ – significant panoptical surveillance through software designed to track and record the actions of consumers, along with the concomitant institution of the dossier in the form of data collected digitally. Google Inc. will be shown to make extensive use of its many forms of technology in order to acquire in-depth knowledge of potential customers; knowledge which is then sold in exchange for advertising 'targeted' at individuals based on their web-browsing history, email content, selection of books, music tastes, digital purchases and expressed interests.

And this will be followed, on the other hand, with an elaboration on the parallels between the bio-power technologies thematized by Foucault in his *The Will to Knowledge*, and the current mechanism of information canalization operative within the products and services of Apple Inc. and Google Inc. Arguably, sexually-oriented internet material reinforces the concept of the *Scientia Sexualis*. While Apple prevents the sale of apps deemed to be in any way pornographic or offensive, a rapidly growing selection of apps which speak about sexuality are, however, available, adding to the continued growth of the deployment of sexuality. That is, no images or videos – even in the form of digital 'erotic' magazines – can be accessed through the Apple App Store or Google Play store. However, in their selection of apps, Apple and Google differ concerning what they deem to be acceptable.

Next, Chapter Three will investigate the phenomenon of Wikileaks as an anti-cyber-disciplinary exercise, along with the manner in which it was eventually undermined through cyber-bio-power reprisals.

Finally, in the Conclusion, the potential socio-cultural impact of such global mobile communication hegemony – with specific emphasis on the role of power/knowledge in the formation of a contemporary cyber variant of disciplinary/bio-power subjectivity – will be elaborated upon, and some possible first steps toward resistance will be suggested.

³ A self-contained program or piece of software designed to fulfill a particular purpose; an application, especially as downloaded by a user to a mobile device (Oxford Dictionaries Online 2012).

Chapter One: From the “Discourse on Language” to *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality*

1.1 Introduction

In 1970, Michel Foucault received tenure at the Collège de France, and in his inaugural address entitled “Discourse on Language,” he effectively summed up not only the intellectual terrain he had already traversed – in his monumental earlier work *The Order of Things* – but also looked forward to the work he would still accomplish in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, and *The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge*. As such, the “Discourse on Language” occupies a pivotal point in Foucault’s philosophical *oeuvre*, insofar as it comprises the moment of transition from an archaeological approach, in terms of which discourse is understood as determined by rules, to a genealogical approach, in terms of which power is understood as the operative variable in the formation of language, and indeed, subjectivity. With a view to exploring this shift and as a precursor to investigating in the following chapters the relationship between disciplinary/bio-power and the rise of cyber-corporate empire, in what follows, an overview of the “Discourse on Language” will be provided, in relation to some of Foucault’s other works in which analogous themes are drawn into conspicuousness. After this, the ways in which echoes and reflections of the concern over power implicit in this text became explicitly thematized in *Discipline and Punish*, and in Foucault’s subsequent work *The Will to Knowledge*, will be elaborated upon.

1.2 The “Discourse on Language”

Arguably, from the outset of the “Discourse on Language,” Foucault exhibits an awareness of how fear and power remain inextricably intertwined in the formation of language. In this regard, he poses the question to which the rest of his speech, at least to a certain extent, comprises a response, insofar as he addresses less the cause of such fear, and more its symptoms. That is, the way power is exercised with a view to constraining language, and by implication, the parameters of thought and speech. In short, Foucault asks, “What is so perilous, then, in the fact that people speak, and that their speech proliferates?” (Foucault 1972: 216), before he goes on to describe the production of discourse as being “controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures,” in order

to “avert its powers and its dangers, [and] to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality” (Foucault 1972: 216). Arguably, this differs somewhat from his earlier archaeological approach, in terms of which language/discourse was understood as the product of certain rules, the changing nature of which – as they occurred across the spectrum of society in any given era – defined the *episteme* of the epoch, or the parameters of interpretation and understanding operative for that age (Foucault 2003: 235-236). To elaborate, in “On the Archaeology of the Sciences,” Foucault advanced that, “even if it disappeared a long time ago, even if no one speaks it anymore,...a language always constitutes a system for possible statements.” As such, while, on the one hand, language comprises “a finite ensemble of rules which authorizes an infinite number of performances,” on the other hand, “discourse...is the always-finite and temporally limited ensemble of those statement” (Foucault 1968: 306-307). Understandably, the idea of free speech, from an archaeological perspective, is something of an oxymoron, or at least a misnomer in need of a great deal of qualification, because “there is no statement in general, no free, neutral, independent statement.” Rather, “a statement always belongs to a series or a whole, always plays a role among other statements, deriving support from them and distinguishing itself from them” (Foucault 2002: 111). However, later, in “Truth and Power,” Foucault admitted that “in *The Order of Things*...what was lacking...was th[e] problem of the ‘discursive regime;’” in other words, “the way power [i]s exercised – concretely and in detail – with its specificity, its techniques and tactics” (Foucault 1977: 113, 115-116). His assertions here are in concord with his earlier sentiments in the “Discourse on Language,” in which the power of discourse over the subject is illustrated, particularly when Foucault demonstrates how the formation of discourse in relation to the constraints imposed on it, shapes our world, and speaks through us, as it forms our culture and subjectivity, and shapes our minds.

1.3 External delimitation – the rules of exclusion

External influences on the formation of discourse include three interrelated rules of exclusion, the first of which addresses what is prohibited. The prohibition of speech covers “objects, ritual with its surrounding circumstances, ...[and] the privileged right to speak of a particular subject” (Foucault 1967: 195-197). In short, the formation of discourse limits what may be said, when, how and where it may be discussed, and by whom. Not every subject is considered fit for discussion, rather, the privileged right to speak is bestowed only upon those

who are seen as able to do so by virtue of their knowledge, position in society, or relevance to the subject.

While before the 18th century, the speech of a ‘madman’ was seen as either void of meaning, or as containing “a hidden rationality”, making it more rational than rational speech, after the 18th century the process of the division of reason and folly continued through the work of institutions, doctors and psychologists, who either sought to discard entirely the words of those deemed insane, or imbue them with a pathological meaning – divined by the (now) greater sagacity of medical practitioner (Foucault 1967: 195-197).

Yet, Foucault should not be understood as advancing a negative evaluation of such strategies. Rather, from a purely descriptive genealogical perspective, such strategies emerge as normal and, indeed, unavoidable, because each society has its “regime of truth...the mechanisms and instances which enable one to recognise true and false statements” (Foucault 1972: 216). This regime provides techniques and procedures for according value in the acquisition of truth and the status of those who determine what is said to be ‘true’. The ‘will to truth’ is given credence, and allowed to become increasingly important, through modern, empirical, scientific development and its concomitant impact on society. In short, truth becomes what a society decrees it to be.

1.4 Internal systems of control and delimitation

Complementary to the external rules of delimitation, three internal systems of control are described, namely: Commentary, the Author as Unifying Principle and Disciplines.

In this regard, Foucault argues that every text is a commentary on the texts that have gone before, a constant repetition of the “major narratives” of a society, which are construed as valid and valuable only when they contribute to the revelation of the ostensible “hidden secret or wealth” within the primary text (Foucault 1972: 220). As Foucault explains in “Nietzsche, Genealogy and History,” discursively-speaking these involve a broad array of “traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history,” which at the same time involve – and indeed are fuelled by – “tendencies that encourage the consoling play of recognitions” (Foucault 1971: 153). Understandably, a deep irony hangs over such practice, insofar as commentary is only able to articulate what has been spoken before, because it only gives us the opportunity to “say something other than the text itself, but on condition that it is the text itself which is uttered” (Foucault 1972: 220).

The author conceived as “as the unifying principle in a particular group of writings or statements” (Foucault 1972: 221) is the second of the internal control and delimitation systems. During the Middle Ages, a writer (as individual) lent credence to a scientific statement through their name as the author. And while contemporary society relies more on empirical evidence, in a way that has reduced the relevance of the author, the author function in literature, however, has become ever more important. In this regard we invest meaning in a text based on the body of work produced by its author, and because of this, the speech of an individual can be said to form an *oeuvre*; a body of truth speaking through that individual’s texts. Foucault argues that the value of this conception derives from the manner in which authorship limits the “hazards of discourse through the action of an identity[,] whose form is that of the individual and the I” (Foucault 1972: 222). In “What is an Author?” he explains that this is achieved through the author function, which is “the result of a complex operation that constructs a certain being of reason that we call ‘author.’” Critics then regard it as possessed of a “realistic status, by discerning, in the individual, a ‘deep’ motive, a ‘creative’ power,” and so on, in a way that lends to their words a reassuring familiarity or at least an intelligibly constrained trajectory (Foucault 1969: 213).

The third and final instance of internal controls and delimitations is that of Disciplines, the organization of which is just as much opposed to the commentary principle as it is to that of the author.” Due to their rules, structures and theoretical underpinnings, disciplines are marked by anonymity, in direct contrast to authorship, and it is within their impersonal constraints that one is obliged to formulae “fresh propositions” (Foucault 1972: 223). In other words, to be accepted within a discipline, a proposition must be seen as belonging within the realm of ‘truth,’ insofar as it must fit a set of predetermined delimits of the area of knowledge in question. This truth can, and does change, allowing previously ‘untrue’ statements to replace those that are later deemed to be incorrect. This is neatly illustrated by Foucault, in *The Order of Things*, in relation the changes in truth orientations in the academic disciplines of biology, economics and languages, through which life, labour and language became progressively rearticulated in the 18th/19th century. Respectively, this involved a shift away from describing life in taxonomic terms towards an emphasis on its synthetic and dynamic nature, a reorientation of remuneration for labour around the issue of the finitude or mortality of the worker, and an increasing appreciation of language not in hierarchal terms – in which certain languages were privileged over others – but rather as something deep and organic (Foucault 2003: 272-316).

1.5 Conditions under which discourse is employed

Further to the systems of control and delimitation, access to participation in discourse is prohibited to anyone outside a select group, by “imposing a certain number of rules upon those individuals who employ it” (Foucault 1972: 222). This is achieved through four imbricated (and mutually reinforcing) conditions, namely: Ritual, Fellowships, Doctrine and Education.

The first condition under which discourse is employed is that of ritual, which is the “most superficial and obvious” (Foucault 1972: 225) of these restrictive systems. Ritual defines what qualifications a speaker must possess, what gestures and actions they must perform, and the context, behaviour and circumstances that must surround the act of discourse. Religious, juridical, medical, and to some extent political discourses, are all considered examples of highly ritualised discursive activities. For example, the priest recites liturgies, allegorical stories and blessings, he quietly listens to confessions, recommending penance, dressed in robes appropriate to his station, within a building designed and decorated to convey the ‘truths’ of the scriptures. Similarly, the judge wears robes and wigs, commands obedience, and reciting Latin phrases decides the fate of those brought before him – acting as the mouthpiece of ‘the law.’ The doctor, too, often dressed in a particular way, speaks solemnly, presenting his diagnoses, prescribing remedies and issuing instructions to patients and those responsible for their care within hospitals, clinics or consultation rooms. And in this he mirrors the politician who recites speeches while dressed in formal attire, in buildings and rooms (such as those of parliament) specifically structured to present adversaries with opportunities to argue, while battling for supremacy and political power. While these rituals readily spring to mind because of their ostentation, it must be remembered that even ostensible demystification and silence can contain ritual. In this regard, within the ambit of psychiatry, as Foucault indicates in *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, Freud may, on the one hand, have “demystified all the other asylum structures.” Yet on the other hand, “he exploited the structure that enveloped the medical personage” insofar as he “amplified its thaumaturgical virtues, preparing for its omnipotence a quasi-divine status.” In short, “he created the psychoanalytic situation,” wherein a “judge...punishes and rewards in a judgement that does not even condescend to language” (Foucault 1963: 222), in a highly ritualized process often viewed as too intimate and truthful to involve ritual.

Secondly, fellowships are used to contain a discourse within a select group. Statements are used to preserve or reproduce a discourse, but the discourses circulate within, and only within, specified communities. Foucault suggests that traditional ‘secret societies’ have been supplanted by more subtle fellowships, examples of which include academic fellowships, which function as the model through which contemporary medical, economic and political discourses are produced. In relation to this, doctrine constitutes a third condition, even though it opposes fellowship, in that it aims to spread its discourse to as many adherents as possible. Fundamentally, doctrine differs from fellowship in that it requires a “reciprocal allegiance” (Foucault 1972: 226); acceptance of a set of ‘truths’ and conformity to beliefs which ‘validate’ the discourse in question. Religious, political and philosophical discourses are examples of doctrinal discourse, ensuring the growth and acceptance of the tenets that reinforce the ‘truths’ they hold dear. The power of doctrine is emphasised by the fact that it “links individuals to certain types of utterance while consequently barring them from all others” (Foucault 1972: 226), in a way that recruits new adherents by separating them from competing discourses. Doctrine thereby offers a means by which a discourse can grow exponentially as it demands an absolute acceptance of the discursive regime it reflects, prohibiting the opportunities offered by change and exploration. Consequently, doctrine engenders obedience, insofar as it exercises a particularly efficient form of power over the individual, itself and the society it helps to form. There is obviously a strong resonance between the idea of such doctrine and the polemical stance detailed later by Foucault in his “Polemics, Politics and Problematization.” In terms of this, the privileged text encases the doctrinal polemicist, as it were, in principles he “will never agree to question.” It “authoriz[es] him to wage war” upon those who disagree with him. That is, “the person he confronts is not a partner in the search for the truth but an adversary...whose very existence constitutes a threat” and who must be “abolish[ed]...as interlocutor” (Foucault 1984: 112)

The most salient social appropriation of discourse occurs in the arena of education, which constitutes the fourth condition under which discourse is employed. In theory, education is “the instrument whereby every individual...can gain access to any kind of discourse” (Foucault 1972: 227). However, educational systems are also the “political means of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it” (Foucault 1972: 227). Education is therefore not separated at all from ritual, fellowship or doctrine; rather it is the most effective integration of these into a means of social appropriation of knowledge and discourse. It is for this reason that Foucault asks, “What is an educational system after all, if not the ritualisation of the word; if not a

qualification of some fixing of roles for speakers; if not the constitution of a (diffuse) doctrinal group...with all its learning and its powers?" (Foucault 1972: 227). Understandably, the effects of such appropriation are immense, because in order to advance through the educational system, students must acknowledge its stated 'facts' and 'truths.' Educational institutions demand compliance with codes of conduct, speech, dress and social structures, ensuring that impressionable young minds are bent to the will of the institution. Indeed, for more than a decade, education informs individuals' subjectivity; its very orientation being that of instilling and reinforcing discursive structures and regimes.

Discourse is therefore more than the discussion of a concept, theme or event, because it is a shaping of society, culture and the individual, the formation of entire belief systems, 'truths' and understandings of our existence. It becomes clear that discourse, by virtue of its "barely imaginable powers and dangers" (Foucault 1972: 216), is a potent force to be reckoned with.

On the one hand, it would be an error to regard Foucault as eschewing archaeology from this point on, in favour of genealogy. As Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow explain in the "Discourse on Language," Foucault "poses a complementarity between the rarity of statements (for which he had given rules in the *Archaeology*) and the effective formation of discourse by non-discursive practices," described through genealogical enquiry (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 105). However, on the other hand, in his later work "Truth and Power," written against the backdrop of both *Discipline and Punish* and *The Will to Knowledge*, it is clear that Foucault continued along the genealogical trajectory outlined in "The Discourse on Language." This is especially so when he states that, in relation to *The Order of Things* and his other archaeological works, "what was lacking...was...[the] problem of the 'discursive regime,' of the effects of power peculiar to the play of statements" (Foucault 1977: 113). In both *Discipline and Punish* and *The Will to Knowledge*, Foucault went on to demonstrate that power is a key component in defining, shaping and maintaining discursive regimes along with the subjectivities they produce.

1.6 *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*

In *Discipline and Punish*, and by means of a genealogical analysis, Foucault attempts to contextualise the emergence and transformation of modern juridical, penal and rehabilitative structures within society from the eighteenth century onwards – in short, disciplinary social structures and institutions, examples of which include prisons, schools and hospitals. He

presents the eighteenth century transition from brutal, spectacular public punishment to the ostensibly more humane incarceration of criminals as more than merely an ethical or moral evolution, insofar as he shows it to be part of the emergence of a new disciplinary society. In this regard, power is demonstrated to be a contributor in the emergence of a new discourse, shaping society in ways that are more far-reaching than many scholars have previously believed.

Accordingly, during the eighteenth century, the overthrow of the *ancien régime* created a political vacuum, which was rapidly filled by a host of new discursive dynamics, orientated around the systematic control of individuals, which was construed as both more necessary and ultimately more achievable than ever before. As such, while Foucault describes his book as a “historical background to various studies of the power of normalisation and the formation of knowledge in modern society” (Foucault 1977: 308), it must always be remembered that such power/knowledge was also highly productive. And the most important creation was “a technique for constituting individuals as correlative elements of [such] power and knowledge.” It is for this reason that Foucault maintains that “the individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an ‘ideological’ representation of society;...a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called ‘discipline’” (Foucault 1977: 194).

1.7 The body of the condemned and the spectacle of the scaffold

Prior to the adoption of incarceration within modern prisons, public torture, mutilation and execution were used as punishment to demonstrate in a visceral fashion the vengeance of the monarch against the offender. Punishment and power focused on the individual, the body of the condemned, as the intersecting point between the hateful criminal act and the authority of the King, for all to see. The audience was, of course, vital to this process, as they were *de facto* being disciplined at the same time as the criminal was being punished, insofar as they received a lesson on how the power of the King could not be contested, and that this power was absolute and extreme. The graphic retelling of the torture and execution of the regicide Damiens, which forms the opening of *Discipline and Punish*, is described as a “lurid account...pictured in excruciating detail” (Shapiro 2003: 285). “The execution used hot sulphur to burn off his right hand which had wielded the dagger. Then the executioner wielded red-hot pincers to tear away the flesh of his legs, arms and breast, and then cauterized the wounds with a mixture of boiling lead, oil, wax and sulphur. With some

difficulty he was then quartered, severing off all four limbs, and finally his torso and limbs were burned to ashes” (Craigin 2006: 13).

However, particularly in the eighteenth century, there arose increasing tension between the aristocracy and the masses,⁴ and this led to the public spectacle producing a result not desired by the monarchy; in effect, it ‘humanised’ the criminal and dehumanised the executioner, the judge and even the original victim of the crime. Horror and pity among the spectators to these violent acts mingled to varying effects and eventually the re-establishment of order, through torture and execution, became proportionately less effective as audiences displayed increasing empathy towards the accused. Moreover, when popular literature, in the form of reports and accounts of executions, focused on the words of the prisoner, rather than the monarch, the power of the public spectacle was diminished even further. Subsequent forms of execution involving gallows, guillotines and the like were then employed to end criminals’ lives rapidly, and more humanely, without protracted pain,⁵ but even these became increasingly inefficient, as “the people never felt closer to those who paid the penalty than in those rituals intended to show the horror of the crime and the invincibility of power” (Foucault 1977: 9, 59). Mobs took pity on criminals, attempting to free them, and

⁴The Enlightenment principles of equality, inalienable human rights and citizenship replaced long-held traditions of monarchy, feudalism and aristocracy and led to the formation of the Republic, the abolishment of the monarchy, and the execution of Louis XVI, among many others. A period of significant and dramatic political and social upheaval, the French Revolution of 1789 marked a turning point in the history of France, and according to Lefebvre “a bold determination to govern the economy, society, and manners grew stronger – for the welfare of the individual and the improvement of mankind. The bourgeoisie of 1789 guaranteed freedom of research to the scholar, freedom of enterprise to the producer, and at the same time undertook to rationalize the ordering of politics and society. The French Revolution denotes one step in the destiny of the Western world” (Lefebvre 1962: 17).

⁵The Guillotine, first proposed in 1789 as an instrument of “justice and mercy” (Crocker 1853: 7) – a humane, democratic mechanism for the execution of all criminals sentenced to death – became a significant feature of the revolution from June 1793 till July 1794, and was subsequently used, exclusively, to execute criminals until capital punishment was abolished in France in the late twentieth century. Intended to sever the head swiftly, and to be applied consistently to all condemned ‘criminals,’ the guillotine was a manifestation of democratic power, a clear demonstration that no man, regardless of his position or wealth, would be treated differently, and that suffering was to be replaced by a quick, relatively painless death (Opie 2006). Prior to the invention of the guillotine, executions of peasants typically involved hanging, while the more privileged classes would be decapitated by axe or sword. Both of these methods tended to be inefficient, and took several minutes to kill, resulting in extended suffering; more importantly, beheadings were seen to be a form preferential treatment, a merciful death which was not afforded to the poor.

in so doing threatened the political economy of the monarchies and the provisional government after 1789.

As such, not only was the public spectacle of torture, punishment and execution obliged to disappear, but with time, the punishment of the body, and the use of physical pain and trauma were eliminated. “One no longer touched the body, or at least as little as possible, and then only to reach something other than the body itself.” The law and those acting on its behalf distanced themselves from the body, punishment was transformed from “an art of unbearable sensations [to] an economy of suspended rights.” Importantly, in terms of this, the body was only used as an intermediary, in order to “deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded as both a right and a property.” Through this, a new form of subjectivity, possessed of great psychic depth in which lurked potential criminality, and understood as malleable and hence capable of transformation, was born. And the midwives involved in this process were a group of ‘technicians’ who replaced the executioner, including “warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists” (Foucault 1977: 11), all of whom were mandated to provide access to that most elusive of goals, engaging with the ‘soul’ of the criminal in order to transform and correct it.

1.8 Generalised punishment and the gentle way of punishment

Yet before the instantiation of incarceration as primary, there emerged a form of punishment midway between the scaffold and the prison, namely the *semio-technique* of punishment – designed to transform through education. A shift in the balance of power and punishment occurred during the period of the enlightenment, when punishment became legally ‘limited.’⁶ The reason for this limitation, this more ‘humane’ treatment of the convicted criminal, according to Foucault, concerned “not that which must be reached in order to alter him, but that which must be left intact in order to respect him.” Vengeance was no longer the objective, nor was it considered acceptable or preferable. Foucault describes the shift and impact of power as follows: “The ‘man’ that the reformers set up against the despotism of the scaffold has also become a ‘man-measure’: not of things, but of power” (Foucault 1977: 74). The irregular, inconsistent and overly forceful power exacted by the monarchy was replaced with a more complex and nuanced power, that of the man, central to so much of the reformist

⁶ Foucault maintains that “it was a time when, in Europe and in the United States, the entire economy of punishment was redistributed” (Foucault 1977: 7).

philosophy of the enlightenment period. Punishment therefore changed, from exacting the revenge of the monarchy and re-establishing order, to a means of preventing crime and ultimately of rehabilitating the offender through education.

Foucault describes the criminal within this context as a “juridically paradoxical being,” who has broken a pact with society, as “the least crime attacks the whole of society, and the whole of society – including the criminal – is present in the least punishment.” As a result, “the economy of the power to punish,” the problem of degrees and appropriateness of punishment, became paramount. A careful taxonomy of crimes and punishments was developed, which defined clear rules and systems of punishment, laying out consistent and uniform guidance in dealing with criminals within the penal system. Rather than becoming the property of the monarch, the body of the criminal became the property of society, a “rentable property: a slave at the service of all” as well as “the object of a collective and useful appropriation.” Thus, while the convicts provided useful labour – for example, the notorious chain-gangs at work on public roads – such punishments of the criminal became “obstacle-signs[;]...the true coin that is substituted in people’s minds for the false profits of crime” (Foucault 1977: 90, 108-109). On the one hand, these obstacle-signs were intended to warn and dissuade members of society, because punishments were designed to exceed, only slightly, the attraction to the crime itself. On the other hand, to maintain their impact, the presentation of the obstacle-signs was needed on a regular and frequent basis, in order that the punishments “be a school rather than a festival.” The intention was to ‘invert’ the traditional discourse of crime, to “extinguish the dubious glory of the criminal,” and to present punishment as an inevitable result of crime, a misfortune intended to dissuade the onlooker from ever attempting the same acts (Foucault 1977: 111-112). The power of punishment was in this way greatly increased, more efficiently utilised, and more effectively applied across the whole of society. The proliferation of various punishments and levels of punishment suited to a variety of crimes offered ample opportunities to exercise the semio-techniques associated with them.

Yet, such an approach remained predicated on the autonomy of the individual, who was free to learn, and capable of self-restraint in the wake of didactic example. And the idea of such autonomy, in turn, was inimical to the extension of power through the exercise of greater social control, which emerged in the wake of the *ancien régime* and whose hunger had yet to be satiated (Konik 2009: 31-32). The consequence of this was that penal discipline transitioned towards imprisonment, involving the concealment of criminals. A wide range of offenses, between light criminal punishment and the death penalty, could be dealt with by

imprisoning criminals, and so was born a “great imposed, complex and hierarchised structure that was integrated into the very body of the state apparatus” (Foucault 1977: 116). The reason for this transition will be elaborated upon in what follows.

1.9 Docile bodies

In analysing the shift from the semio-technique to the system of incarceration, Foucault points out that “a multiplicity of often minor processes, of different origin and scattered location, which overlap, repeat or imitate one another...converge and gradually produce the blueprint of a general method” (Foucault 1977: 138). This ‘general method’ is neatly illustrated within the new prisons, but by no means limited to them, insofar as it was implemented within the military, schools, hospitals, and factories – in effect, throughout modern society as a whole. While specific needs within each of the afore-mentioned institutions produced the techniques for solving disparate problems, they soon reflected those arrangements found within the penal system.

With regard to this, Foucault describes a “policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour,” and asserts that “the human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it” (Foucault 1977: 138). The use and application of what Foucault refers to as “a ‘political anatomy,’ which was also a ‘machinery of power,’” made it possible not only to persuade others to *do* as one wishes, but also “to *operate* as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines.” Foucault makes the point that this resulted in “subjected and practised bodies, ‘docile’ bodies” and that this discipline allowed for an increase in economic use (utility) and a greater level of obedience. The appropriation and adaptation of multiple techniques of discipline made possible the formation of a new era of social disciplinary mechanics, in which the ‘docile body’ could be utilised, subjected, monitored and ultimately improved upon. That is, docility allowed the body to be utilised instead of tortured, optimised instead of punished, and subjected to detailed and almost perpetual analysis and observation, in order that discipline be made more effective. The consequence of this was that the body of the individual and that of society became more integrated and ever more efficiently subjected to disciplinary power, and it was inevitable that these “meticulous, often minute, techniques” shaped the nature, structure and practise of criminology and the penal system (Foucault 1977: 139).

That is, the methods and mechanisms which will be described in the following sections should be understood as more than utilitarian solutions to specific requirements. Indeed Foucault describes them as “small acts of cunning,...apparently innocent but profoundly suspicious,” and goes on to emphasise that “we must seek not a meaning, but a precaution (Foucault 1977: 139). And if one recalls Foucault’s assertions, in *Madness and Civilization*, about the growth of fear over madness in the eighteenth century, and the correlative fear over (modern) people’s inability to restrain themselves (Foucault 1967: 172), then the underpinnings of such precaution become intelligible. Essentially, as Foucault explains in “Truth and Juridical Forms,” the “idea of *dangerousness*” emerged, and “meant that the individual must be considered by society at the level of his potentialities, and not at the level of his actions” (Foucault 1973: 57). The details and the devil therein, consist of: the Art of Distributions, the Control of Activity, the Organisation of Geneses, and finally, the Composition of Forces.

1.10 The art of distributions

The distribution and arrangement of individuals in space is the first mechanism used to incorporate the body into a larger ‘machine’ of disciplinary control, referred to as the art of distributions. Four ‘distributions’ are described, each providing a separate, but interrelated, aspect of control. The first of these is the utilisation of enclosed spaces – examples of which include schools, military barracks, hospitals and prisons. An extension of this is the partitioning of space, creating cellular divisions and structures and Foucault cites the example of monastic cells as a point of origin of this phenomenon. Beyond this, functional sites, such as factories, with dedicated spaces allocated to specific uses, are integral to the use and allocation of individuals in space, while a more sophisticated utilisation of virtual space is that of rank, involving the relative position occupied by an individual within a larger system of categorisation.

The first technique used to distribute individuals within space is that of enclosure, which is defined as “a place heterogenous to all others and closed in upon itself” (Foucault 1977: 141). Military barracks were designed to securely contain troops and allow officers increased ability to account for them. Factories were increasingly understood as requiring closed, guarded spaces, within which the equipment and manpower, as well as the raw materials and finished products of the company, could be accurately accounted for. It is emphasised however that “the principle of ‘enclosure’ is neither constant nor indispensable,

nor sufficient in disciplinary machinery” (Foucault 1977: 143), and as a result of this the principle of ‘partitioning’ is required.

“Disciplinary space tends to be divided into as many sections as there are bodies or elements to be distributed,” and the importance of partitioning lies in the ability to establish “presences and absences” when locating individuals, to “interrupt others[, and to]...supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or merits” (Foucault 1977: 143). Discipline is used to organise analytical spaces. The cellular spaces present in monastic cells are referred to as the model on which other disciplinary spaces were built.

Functional sites, designed to achieve more than supervision and the breaking of dangerous communications, function effectively in creating useful spaces. Naval hospitals exemplify the transition from a disciplinary space designed, initially, to facilitate ‘fiscal’ and ‘administrative’ roles and protections, to “medically useful space,” in which individualisation of “bodies, diseases, lives and deaths” could be achieved. Factories were designed in order to create functional spaces in which tasks could be executed according to specific requirements, while individuals could be easily observed, assessed and counted. This led not only to the division of the production process, but also concurrently to the “fragmentation of labour power” (Foucault 1977: 144-145).

In turn, rank functioned in certain ways like the components of a semiotic paradigm, whether limited to a finite set – an alphabet being a good example – or a more flexible, ever changing set – such as words in a language – insofar as in discipline the elements are interchangeable. Each element is “defined by the place it occupies in a series, and by the gap that separates it from the others.” This interchangeability is referred to as ‘rank’ and Foucault posits that “Discipline is an art of rank,” as it “individualises bodies” without giving them “fixed positions,” while it “circulates them in a network of relations” (Foucault 1977: 145-146). This is an important factor, as it allows for a multitude of roles and positions to be occupied by an individual, and allows a multitude of individuals to fulfil a given role. It also, very importantly, allows for normative virtual categorization of individuals, along a continuum ranging from healthy to pathological, efficient to unreliable, obedient to disruptive, etc.

The different arts of distribution should therefore be considered as a composite set of practices, because in organising “cells, places and ranks the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical.” In summary, the art of distributions is akin to the drawing up of ‘tables’ incorporating taxonomies, systems and

observations, with two elements being the purpose thereof: supervision and intelligibility. The table was therefore “both a technique of power and a procedure of knowledge.” Foucault points out that disciplinary tactics link the singular and the multiple, situating and defining the individual as an individual while simultaneously ordering a given multiplicity. In short, the spatiality of the art of distributions created “the base for a microphysics of what might be called a ‘cellular’ power” (Foucault 1977: 148-149), the augmentation of which occurred through new forms of controlling activity in relation to time.

1.11 The control of activity

While the art of distributions describes the utilisation of space to create docile bodies, the ‘control of activity’ refers to the arrangement and activation of bodies in time, to the same end. The control of activity encompasses five concepts; the use of the time-table, the temporal elaboration of the act, the correlation of the body and the gesture, the body-object articulation, and finally, the principle of exhaustive use.

Starting with the most basic ‘time structure’, namely the time-table, Foucault describes the notion of a ‘positive economy,’ in which the use of time is continually being optimised, with the aim of facilitating its exhaustive and highly efficient employment. The time-table, used to “establish rhythms, impose particular occupations, [and] regulate the cycles of repetition,” was evident in schools, hospitals and workshops, having originated in monastic communities (Foucault 1977: 149). The direct association between religious communities and schools as well as ‘poor-houses,’ made the adoption of time-tables a logical and acceptable practise. And a combination of religious activity (prayers, pious gestures and the like) and educational, industrious or military activity was imposed upon workers, scholars and soldiers. The monastic tradition of ‘purity’ was also applied to the time-table with “time measured and paid...without impurities,” in order to achieve the precise and ‘appropriate’ use of time (Foucault 1977: 151).

Beyond the time-table, a “general framework for an activity,” the temporal elaboration of the act involved “another degree of precision in the breakdown of gestures and movements.” By way of example, Foucault cites the highly detailed specifications used to instruct and control the marching of troops, in which even the most minute gestures, time periods and alignments of the body and its constituent parts are determined. The level of detail is remarkable, incorporating specific positions of the body, limbs, movements, directions, aptitudes, durations and order of sequence. Through this a “sort of anatomo-

chronological schema of behaviours is defined,” as through the rigidly controlled and specified act “time penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power” (Foucault 1977: 151-152).

Such undertakings were predicated on the understanding that “a disciplined body is the prerequisite of an efficient gesture.” As a result of the temporal elaboration of the act, a further development in the use of time and the body became possible, namely that of the correlation of the body and the gesture. Beyond practising the gesture in question, the entire body must be used correctly in order to make possible a “correct use of time.” Foucault refers to a set of detailed specifications to be used in teaching pupils to write at a desk, pointing out that “a well-disciplined body forms the operational context of the slightest gesture” (Foucault 1977: 152). That is, the gesture, the act itself, is only made efficient if the entire body is utilised, structured, disciplined to create the most efficient and consistent use of time and energy.

The notion of body-object articulation refers to the manner in which the body relates to the object it manipulates; in other words, once the timing of the gesture, and its relation to the body, are resolved, it is necessary to determine precisely how the body interacts with the specified object. Listing a set of instructions which describe the way in which a rifle is to be presented, Foucault demonstrates the fact that a gesture is comprised essentially of two ‘parallel series’: “the parts of the body to be used...and that of the parts of the object to be manipulated.” Accordingly, the exercise of power is essential and central to the relationship between the body and the object, and Foucault describes this as a “body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine complex.” In this regard, of particular interest is the observation that “disciplinary power appears to have the function not so much of deduction as of synthesis, not so much of exploitation of the product as of coercive link with the apparatus of production” (Foucault 1977: 153). In other words, the body and the object it manipulates are integrally linked, a ‘hybrid’ part man, part machine, in which disciplined coercion is achieved with the application of minute, absolute and precise gestures, controls and actions. Indeed, Foucault concludes this section by describing how the body cannot be seen merely as a physical, mechanical thing to be manipulated, when he describes how the organic nature of the body emerges in response to the absolute requirements of the smallest operations. In the docile body we understand that “disciplinary power has as its correlative an individuality that is not only analytical and ‘cellular,’ but also natural and ‘organic’” (Foucault 1977: 156).

Finally, if the body and the object are to be incorporated into a highly efficient disciplinary act there is one further consideration, one final time-related factor to be resolved,

namely that of exhaustive use. Previously the principle underlying the time-table was one of ‘negativity’ in that it is intended to prevent wasting of time, to encourage non-idleness. The wasting of time was seen to be “a moral offense and an economic dishonesty,” as time “was counted by God and paid for by men.” In contrast, the exhaustive use of time may be described as ‘positive’ in approach, as it is not intended to ‘defend’ against loss, but rather to facilitate an “extracting...from time...[of] ever more available moments and, from each moment, ever more useful forces.” The difference between these two approaches is significant, even though possibly one may not exist without the other, but in treating time as a resource, the objective would ultimately be to achieve “maximum speed and maximum efficiency,” by subdividing and disarticulating it, and “deploying its internal elements under a gaze that supervises them” (Foucault 1977: 154) – all of which will be discussed next.

1.12 The means of correct training

Essentially, the function of disciplinary power is to train, to link together multiple forces while creating, from a mass of bodies, individual, useable units. In stating that discipline ‘makes’ individuals, Foucault points out that “it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise.” It achieves this training through three instruments, “hierarchical observation, normalising judgement [and] the examination” (Foucault 1977: 170).

1.12.1 Hierarchical Observation

Based originally on the model of the military camp, during the classical period, observatories were constructed, allowing a significant level of control through observation. That is, as Foucault points out in “The Eye of Power,” the primary “problem of the visibility of bodies, individuals and things, under a system of centralized observation, was one of the...most constant directing principles” (Foucault 1977B: 146). These efforts were part of a “mechanism that coerces by means of observation, an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to see induce the effects of power” (Foucault 1977: 170). Comparing the growing understanding and application of the technology of the telescope, lens and light beam, Foucault describes a new “physics and cosmology” which made use of “eyes that must see without being seen” (Foucault 1977: 171). While forts and castles had traditionally utilised high walls, large gates and the like to protect those within them, the new architecture

of military barracks, hospitals and schools introduced several levels of *internal* observational, disciplinary functions. As Foucault explains in “Space, Knowledge and Power,” this constituted a crucial feature of the shift, in the eighteenth century, toward “reflection upon architecture as a function of the aims and techniques of the government of societies” (Foucault 1982: 349). In this regard, he describes “an architecture that would operate to transform individuals, to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them” (Foucault 1977: 172). With a view to facilitating such effects, the structure of hospitals, schools, military academies, and later prisons, began to include open spaces, passages along which a supervisory gaze could be directed, and divided spaces which combined both individual compartments and a ready access to all who required it for observational purposes. Hospitals were designed to better facilitate the observation of patients, the flow of air and the separation of patients in order to prevent the spreading of contagions.

Within this milieu, a particularly disturbing example of such observational architecture is the design of toilet stalls, in which divisions prevented individuals from seeing those next to them, but shortened doors allowed an observer to see the feet and heads of anyone using these facilities. Similarly, while dining rooms within schools included platforms, slightly raised, to allow inspectors to observe the tables of all others in the room, in “The Eye of Power,” one encounters the description of “the dormitories of the Military School in Paris [, where]...each pupil...was assigned a glassed-in cell where he could be observed throughout the night” (Foucault 1977B: 147). These, and many other structural techniques, comprised conscious efforts toward the formation of ‘perfect disciplinary’ apparatuses in which it would be “possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly” (Foucault 1977: 173). In order to achieve this perfection, it would need to be determined how one was to “subdivide the gaze in these observation machines [and] establish a network of communications between them” (Foucault 1977: 173).

As factories, schools and hospitals became larger they also became more complex in nature, requiring more complex, continuous and efficient mechanisms of control. In “The Punitive Society,” Foucault emphasizes that “mechanization, the organization of great factories, and the appearance of great centres for the redistribution of commodities place wealth within reach of endless attacks” – attacks which “come not from outside [but]...from within;” from “deprived or poorly assimilated individuals” (Foucault 1972: 33). In order to achieve this, a new class of worker and pupil was needed to perform tasks of surveillance. In factories these workers were not involved in the process of production, but rather worked

alongside, observing, taking into account “the activity of the men, their skill, the way they set about their tasks, their promptness, their zeal, [and] their behaviour” (Foucault 1977: 174). In schools, there were appointed a series of officers to observe, monitor, tutor etc. The observers within schools were required to keep track of the activities of other pupils, by noting when and where they acted, and what they did. Hierarchized, continuous and functional surveillance allowed “disciplinary power to become an ‘integrated’ system, linked from the inside to the economy and to the aims of the mechanism in which it was practised.” Of importance, is that it was “organised as a multiple, automatic and anonymous power,” insofar as its “functioning [wa]s that of a network of relations” (Foucault 1977: 176).

1.12.2 Normalising Judgement

The notion of a set of ‘normalising judgements’ leads Foucault to claim that normalisation “imposes homogeneity [as it] individualises by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render the differences useful by fitting them to one another” (Foucault 1977: 184). In other words, a set of judgements created to measure individuals, is able to compare and classify them at the same time as homogenising and training them. A set of norms was created, against which all individuals were measured, penalising those who did not conform, perpetually encouraging them to do so. Normalising judgement operates through five different, interrelated concepts; a micro-penalty, non-observance to rules, corrective action, gratification-punishment and, finally, distribution according to rank.

Foucault claims that “at the heart of all disciplinary systems functions a small penal mechanism,” which is structured around its own set of laws, offences, punishments, judgements and enforcements. Laws are incomplete, leaving gaps which need to be filled, spaces between what can be done at a criminal level and what must be done to achieve compliance with these laws. It is these ‘empty spaces’ which are referred to as ‘infra-penalties,’ in which small, detailed rules of behaviour and compliance are inserted. Workplaces, the army, hospitals and schools incorporated a “micro-penalty” of time, activity, behaviour, speech, the body, and even sexuality (Foucault 1977: 177-178). As Foucault indicates in “The Subject and Power,” this entailed “the objectivising of the subject [via]...‘dividing practices,’” through which “the subject is either divided inside himself or divided from others...Examples are the mad and the insane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the ‘good boys’” (Foucault 1982: 326). Any deviation from ‘correct behaviour’

becomes subject to punishment, through the punitive function of otherwise indifferent elements of the disciplinary apparatus. Everything became punishable, and everything became a means of punishment.

More than a “small-scale model of the court,” discipline brought with it the principle of ‘non-observance,’ described as “that which does not measure up to the rule, which departs from it” and it is notable that “the whole domain of the non-conforming is punishable.” For example, the soldier offends not only by failing to reach his required level, the pupil offends not only in disobeying, but of greater import, they hamper their ability to perform, to carry out tasks, to be ‘productive’. Disciplinary order involves both ‘artificial’ (laws, regulations, rules) and ‘natural and observable’ processes (time, aptitude, ability), and it is therefore referred to as a “double juridico-natural reference” (Foucault 1977: 178-179). The consequence of this, in turn, is alluded to in “Truth and Juridical Forms” by Foucault, when he advances that such disciplinary techniques “gave rise to a series of knowledges – a knowledge of the individual, of normalization, of corrective knowledge – that proliferated[,]...causing the so-called human-sciences, and man as an object of science, to appear” (Foucault 1973: 87).

By ‘reducing gaps’, disciplinary punishment asserts a corrective function, as “disciplinary systems favour punishments that are exercises,” with these exercises taking the form of intensified training, aimed at producing a ‘normalised,’ desired outcome, the achievement of the original goal of the exercise. The punishments become the solution in that they serve to correct, train and improve, while concurrently punishing the offender. By way of example, the writing out, many times over, of a sentence, phrase or passage, produces a more compliant pupil, hoping not to spend extra time in this activity again, while concomitantly teaching correct spelling, grammar and writing technique. Foucault points out that through this mechanism, “to punish is to exercise” (Foucault 1977: 179-180). However, as Foucault cautions in “What is called ‘Punishing’?,” such successful transformation is by no means guaranteed by the disciplinary system, insofar as “the results very rarely coincide with the aim...[For example,] the objective of the correctional prison...as a means of improving the individual, has not been achieved.” Rather, “the result has been the opposite on the whole, [as]...prison has tended to give a new impetus to delinquent behaviours” (Foucault 1983: 385).

Gratification-punishment is described as a “double system” in which the trainer not only punishes, but, preferably, more frequently, rewards (Foucault 1977: 180). By winning the heart of a child, through reward, the teacher obviates the need for punishment, with the

child ‘self-correcting’ their behaviour and becoming more compliant. This serves to create a definition of behaviour as good, or evil, with all activity being answered through either good or bad marks, positive or negative responses, each with its own motivation, its own means of enforcement in the mind of the person under discipline. A whole economy of points was devised in schools, with good and bad behaviour assigned points, accounted for and used to acquire privileges, opportunities and punishments, which could offset one another. Foucault indicates that the penalty that discipline “implements is integrated into the cycle of knowledge.” Notably, this ‘micro-economy’ becomes a type of perpetual penal system, an inescapable evaluation of the individual, rather than their acts, determining “their level or their value” (Foucault 1977: 181). In relation to this, in “Omnes et Singulatim,” Foucault goes so far as to characterise this situation of radical, chronically pervasive “intervention in men’s activities...as totalitarian,” on account of its “controlling ‘communication;’ that is, the common activities of individuals (work, production, exchange, accommodation)” (Foucault 1979A: 319).

Finally, distribution of individuals according to rank serves two purposes; “it marks the gaps” between qualities, skills, aptitudes, attitudes, while simultaneously punishing and rewarding (Foucault 1977: 181). By rewarding, discipline creates the opportunity to achieve promotion to higher ranks, greater status and privilege, while punishment serves to reverse this process. This system of rank, the result of systematic reward and punishment, was displayed openly, with signs and awards attached to individuals by means of uniforms, epaulettes, badges, medals and so forth. By hierarchising individuals in this way, two objectives were realised concurrently: distribution and grouping according to conduct, ability, aptitude, “according to the use that could be made of them”, as well as the exertion of “a constant pressure to conform to the same model...[s]o that they might all be like one another” (Foucault 1977: 182). Homogeneity, normalisation, differentiation and attainment of rank were achieved through various means, by the application of a well exercised system of discipline – the normalising judgement – the importance of which should not be underestimated. As Foucault emphasises in “Truth and Power,” the “mental normalization of individuals, and penal institutions...are undoubtedly essential to the general functioning of the wheels of power” (Foucault 1977: 117).

1.12.3 The Examination

In concluding the description of the means of correct training, Foucault discusses the examination, describing it as a combination of the two prior techniques, observational hierarchy and normalising judgement, and referring to it as “a normalising gaze making it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish.” The examination makes individuals more visible, more open to analysis and classification, assessment and normalisation, it facilitates “the deployment of force and the establishment of truth,” and of particular relevance to this study, it “manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected.” That is, through examination, the ‘economy of visibility’ was “transformed into the exercise of power” (Foucault 1977: 184-187). The subjected individual, object of the disciplinary gaze, was examined and classified, measured and hierarchized, disciplined through punishment and reward. Further to this, the examination situated individuals in the realm of documentation, recording their activities, behaviour, speech, movements and attitudes. The examination also transformed individuals, through documentation, into ‘cases,’ both objects for “a branch of knowledge and a hold for a branch of power” (Foucault 1977: 189-191). In “Penal Theories and Institutions,” Foucault elaborates on this, advancing that “measure, inquiry and examination...were [all] connected to...political power; they were both its effect and its instrument, serving a function of order in the case of measure, of centralization in the case of inquiry, of selection and exclusion in the case of examination” (Foucault 1971: 18).

As such, “the disciplines mark the moment when the reversal of the political axis of individualisation... takes place” (Foucault 1977: 192). In other words, through disciplinary power there occurred an inversion of the erstwhile social hierarchy of the *ancien regime*, insofar as the king, previously seen as an individual, was supplanted by ‘individuals’ of a very different kind – the child, the madman, the criminal and the ‘abnormal’ – while authority became increasingly invested in an anonymous bureaucracy. By creating a benchmark of ‘normality’ against which to measure all men, those on the fringes became increasingly construed as abnormal, and concomitantly ever more individualized. As Foucault explains in “The Risks of Security,” all those “persons or groups who, for one reason or another, cannot or do not want to accede to this way of life find themselves marginalized by the very game of the institution.” Yet, being marginalized does not entail escape from the disciplinary radar, as it were, because, insofar as abnormality is construed as a risk, security demands a heightened individualization of the threat in question – a simultaneous inclusion and exclusion (or disqualification) of the ostensibly abnormal person (Foucault 1983. 369).

In conclusion, Foucault states that, contrary to the belief that ‘mercantile society’ produced the individual, the work of ‘discipline’ contributed far more to the formation of the individual. Opposing the notion that power simply acts in a negative sense, by oppressing, Foucault points out that power, in fact, is highly creative because it “produces reality, it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth [, and]...the individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (Foucault 1977: 194).

1.13 Panopticism

Arguably, one of the most important productive disciplinary technologies, in the above regard, is Panopticism. By contrasting the traditional outcast leper society to that of the plague infected town, Foucault shows that both were designed to deal with a ‘contagion,’ to normalise society and deal with the abnormal fringes, the places where one could deal with infection and “separat[e] out their dangerous mixtures” (Foucault 1977: 194); however, each functioned differently. While the leper society was isolated from healthy society, in dealing with the plague – which occurred within otherwise healthy society – a new, more specific and complex system was created, namely one that utilised “multiple separations, individualising distributions, an organisation in depth of surveillance and control, an intensification and a ramification of power.” The complexity, division, observation and surveillance used to contain the plague, forms the basis of Foucault’s reading of the modern prison and, consequently, disciplinary society. Foucault presents the perceived universality of the plague, its seemingly inexorable and far-reaching spread, and its indiscriminate impact, as the silent fear underpinning modern society’s adoption of disciplinary structures and power in general, and the Panopticon in particular. In terms of this, he points out that in “disciplinary mechanisms can be read the haunting memory of ‘contagions,’...rebellions, crimes, vagabondage” (Foucault 1977: 198).

Central to Foucault’s theory of disciplinary power is Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. As Foucault explains in “Truth and Juridical Forms,” it involved a prison designed to allow constant, anonymous observation of prisoners from a central tower, surrounded by cells open to perpetual visual scrutiny (Foucault 1973: 58). As such, it comprised an architectural embodiment of disciplinary power and a conceptual mechanism for the exercise of power throughout society. The panopticon comprised the next step in the development of the disciplines, exposing the prisoner to a constant and disturbingly anonymous gaze – a gaze that brought into sharp focus the power of surveillance and discipline (Foucault 1973: 72). In

contextualising the panopticon, Foucault suggests that its design may have been based in part on the menagerie at Versailles, referring to it as “a royal menagerie” in which “the animal is replaced by man, individual distribution by specific grouping, and the king by the machinery of a furtive power” (Foucault 1977: 203). Thus it was diametrically opposed to the previous punitive technology of the dungeon, and a brief consideration of such differences allow the powerful new dynamics of the panopticon to become conspicuous.

The dungeon served three purposes; “to enclose, to deprive of light and to hide,” but the panopticon reversed all three of these functions, making visible what was hidden, removing from the prisoner the protection of darkness. In terms of this new approach, “visibility is a trap,” while the prisoner, through the arrangement of cells, was hidden from fellow prisoners he remained visible to the guard. As such, while “he is seen,...he does not see, he is the object of information, never a subject in communication” (Foucault 1977: 200). Originally, the observer was hidden within the tower by a system of venetian blinds, with the consequence that prisoners were never certain whether or not they were actually being observed, but were aware that they may be, always. In this way, the panopticon induced in the prisoner a “state of constant and permanent visibility that ensures the automatic functioning of power,” and exposes it as “a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it” (Foucault 1977: 201). In this regard, as Foucault emphasizes in “The Punitive Society,” panopticism involved “a new *optics*[;]...an organ of generalized and constant oversight...A new *mechanics*: isolation and regrouping of individuals...[and a] new *physiology*: definition of standards, [along with] exclusion and rejection of everything that does not meet them” (Foucault 1972: 35). As a result of the introduction of this ingenious mechanism, the prisoner becomes the bearer of a power exerted against himself. However, while the panopticon divided space in order to allow observation, grouping, cataloguing and analysis, it also served a second purpose, as laboratory; a place in which to experiment, “to alter behaviour, to train or correct individuals” (Foucault 1977: 203).

Arguably, this was the consequence of the fact that Bentham, as Foucault advances in “The Eye of Power,” did not “merely imagine an architectural design calculated to solve a specific problem, such as that of a prison, a school or a hospital.” Rather, he saw it as “a technology of power designed to solve the problems of surveillance [, as]...*the* great innovation needed for the easy and effective exercise of power” (Foucault 1977B: 148). And because of this Foucault argues that the panopticon is to be seen not so much as a model prison, but rather as “a generalisable model of functioning, a way of defining power relations

in terms of the everyday life of men,” and that it “may and must be detached from any specific use” (Foucault 1977: 205). In other words, the ‘panoptic schema’ can be used to deal with any number of situations involving groups of people on whom tasks must be imposed and who are required to maintain discipline. This is because, “in each of the little cells there is, depending on the purpose of the institution, a child learning to write, a worker at work, a prisoner correcting himself, a madman living his madness” (Foucault 1973: 58). As such, schools, hospitals, workplaces, and prisons, all are open to the implementation of the panoptic gaze. By introducing panopticism into a factory, the discipline required to ensure its effective and productive output is achieved through many points of contact (each worker), and this process reinforces itself constantly. And because of this, panopticism is referred to as a ‘discipline mechanism’ which makes power “lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion for a society to come” (Foucault 1977: 209).

Bentham’s model was extended into and transformed disciplinary institutions in three ways: the functional inversion of the disciplines, the swarming of disciplinary mechanisms and the state control of the mechanisms of discipline. Functional inversion of the disciplines essentially describes a shift from ‘negative’ action, neutralising or dealing with existing dangers, to a more proactive role, increasing the “possible utility of individuals” (Foucault 1977: 210). Through education a child could be altered, formed in the image of a more ‘useful’ member of society, prevented from becoming an unruly, problematic individual. In turn, the swarming of disciplinary mechanisms refers to the dual actions which arose from within disciplinary institutions, an example of which is the school which ‘normalises’ a docile pupil while also inspecting the parents, the home, and the community from which the pupil originates – disciplining and studying all of them all the while. Finally, disciplinary mechanisms extended beyond the confines of the school or hospital and into the ostensibly free and private spaces of the community. In terms of this, state control of disciplinary mechanisms is most apparent in the structure and functioning of the police, intended to ensure that society as a whole is disciplined, and that an entire nation is maintained in a state of discipline and ‘normality.’ In short, from an enclosed mechanism (the prison itself), panopticism extended itself into and throughout communities, gradually contributing to the development of carceral ‘disciplinary society’. Yet, as will be discussed next, disciplinary power underwent significant augmentation in the nineteenth century, on account of the emergence of bio-power. And as Foucault maintains in *Society Must Be Defended*, its technologies soon dovetailed with the technologies of disciplinary power, reinforcing them and extending their sphere of influence (Foucault 2003: 242).

1.14 *The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge*

In *The Will to Knowledge*, Foucault discusses the emergence of a new ‘technology of power’ – namely bio-power – describing it as “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations” (Foucault 1978: 140). Subsequently, in his lectures entitled *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault goes on to explain that bio-power is “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species” (Foucault 2007: 1).

The underpinning concept upon which Foucault builds his argument in *The History of Sexuality* is his analysis, elaboration upon, and in large part refutation of the ‘Repressive Hypothesis’ – the notion that societies in the West were responsible for suppressing sexuality from the seventeenth century onward. The repressive hypothesis has, according to Foucault, been understood by many to explain the ‘prudish’ and prohibitive nature of Western society towards sex, the “interplay of prohibitions that referred back to one another: instances of muteness which...imposed silence; in a word “censorship.” In presenting the repressive hypothesis, Foucault describes it as the idea that Western society went to great effort to subjugate sex “at the level of language, control its free circulation in speech, expunge it from the things that were said, and extinguish the words that rendered it too visibly present.” Accordingly, since the emergence of the bourgeoisie, the use of sexual energy for pleasure alone, without contributing to production, became considered anathema. And the result of this notion was the suppression of sex via the increasingly constrained discourse that emerged around sexuality. Many have held that the repressive hypothesis explained, quite adequately, the nature of Western society’s attitude towards sex; constraint, allusion, metaphor and suggestion were understood as attempts to keep at arm’s length a source of power that, unconstrained, threatened to disrupt production and destabilize society. Foucault, however, argues that closer inspection reveals such beliefs to be erroneous. He begins by stating that when looking back over the past three centuries, one sees not an attempt to silence sex, but rather “a veritable discursive explosion” surrounding the topic of sex, an explosion which *de facto* produced the idea of sexuality, and continually augmented its parameters (Foucault 1978: 17).

And it is because of this that Foucault maintains that we must...abandon the hypothesis that modern industrial societies ushered in an age of increased sexual repression.” On the contrary, “we have not only witnessed a visible explosion of unorthodox sexualities. In addition, “a deployment quite different from the law, even if it is locally dependent on procedures of prohibition, has ensured, through a network of interconnecting mechanisms, the proliferation of specific pleasures and the multiplication of disparate sexualities.” In asserting as much, Foucault contradicts, in the strongest terms, the notion that society has only become increasingly prudish, ushering in an age of sexual repression, stating categorically that “the opposite has become apparent,” and that “never have there existed more centres of power[,]. . . never more sites where the intensity of pleasures and the persistency of power catch hold” (Foucault 1978: 49). Far from being caught in a constrictive, repressive society, the West has in fact, according to Foucault, generated a prolific discursive field, a diverse and complex network of power and pleasure, referred to as ‘sexuality.’ Sexuality is therefore not something innate or natural to humanity, but is rather “the name that can be given to a historical construct[,]. . . a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, [and] the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another” (Foucault 1978: 105).

To be sure, although a new discursive phenomenon, sexuality has its roots in a very old cultural construct. In this regard, Foucault argues that societies have long attempted to produce the ‘truth’ of sex, by means of *ars erotica*, or erotic art, in which “truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as a practice and accumulated as experience...evaluated in terms of... its reverberations in the body and the soul” (Foucault 1978: 57). Within such contexts, it was considered important to hold the knowledge “in the greatest reserve,” in order to maintain its “effectiveness and its virtue,” which was achieved through the relationship between a master instructing an initiate in the erotic arts. This process resulted in the knowledge being held in secret, passed on in private, and thereby respected in its totality. According to Foucault, the objective of *ars erotica* was to achieve “an absolute mastery of the body, a singular bliss, obliviousness to time and limits, the elixir of life, the exile of death and its threats” (Foucault 1978: 58). In short, *ars erotica* entailed the acquisition of a form of knowledge, through practice and personal demonstration, erotic pleasure, for pleasure’s sake (Foucault 1977: 57).

Against the backdrop of Christian confession, and in direct contrast to such pleasure for its own sake, Foucault describes modern Western *scientia sexualis* as “procedures for

telling the truth of sex which are geared to a form of knowledge-power strictly opposed to the art of initiations and the masterful secret” (Foucault 1978: 58).

1.15 From *self-transparency*, through *self-decipherment*, to *decipherment of the subject*

Foucault’s argument in this regard is, however, predicated on a number of issues, the clarification of which lend great cogency to his assertions. These are, in order, the shift within Western culture from *self-transparency* – operative between Plato in 5th century BC Greece and the Hellenistic/Roman ‘cultures of the self’ of the 1st/2nd first/second century AD – to *self-decipherment* under the auspices of the Christian Church from the 3rd/4th century AD onward. This *self-decipherment* was inextricably intertwined with a new form of power, namely ‘pastoral power,’ which emerged in subsequent centuries and which – via the technology of ‘confession’ – precipitated the birth of a new individualizing knowledge. In turn, this individualizing knowledge, under the auspices of bio-power and its secularized/medicalized forms of confession in the 18th/19th century, gave rise to a *decipherment of the subject*. And it was within the latter context that modern Western *scientia sexualis*, in relation to the deployment of sexuality, emerged and became one of the most powerful and important forms of discursive production, informing subjectivity accordingly.

That is, in the *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, Foucault demonstrates how Plato understood “the soul as subject and not at all the soul as substance” (Foucault 2005: 57), insofar as the soul – in certain ways akin to the contemporary (non-psychoanalytic) concept of the mind – was construed as the product of habitual activity. As such, when one began to ‘take care of the self,’ through the process of *epistrophê* or conversion to the self, one began both to know oneself – in accordance with the injunction of the Delphic oracle (Foucault 2005: 52), and to train oneself (or one’s mind) through practices of purification, concentration of the soul, (meditative) withdrawal from society, and endurance (Foucault 2005: 47-48). And while Plato “refers to all these practices of endurance and resistance [, especially]...in the *Symposium*” in relation to “the image of Socrates” (Foucault 2005: 50), all the practices were necessarily predicated upon the understanding of the human being as capable of attaining significant degrees of *self transparency*. That is, their ability to know what they were doing, to recognize the vicissitudes of the mind, and to tame them through appropriate practices. Later, in the 1st/2nd century AD ‘age of empires,’ while such practices became “a general unconditional principle” extended to all who wanted to take care of the

self – rather than the small group of *polis* aristocrats within Plato’s context – and while knowledge of the self was displaced by an emphasis on *meletai* or exercises, the belief in the human capacity for *self-transparency* remained intact.

‘Care of the self’ “in no way...involve[d]...opening up the subject as a field of knowledge” (Foucault 2005: 222). As Foucault explains in “Pastoral power and political reason,” this shift toward *self-decipherment* only emerged later, in the 3rd/4th century AD. Within the context of Christian ‘pastoral power,’ the faithful were not only obliged to be obedient to the pastor, but the pastor was obliged to form “a peculiar type of knowledge between [himself]...and each of his sheep.” A knowledge which ‘individualizes,’ and which concerns “what goes on in the soul of each one,...his secret sins, his progress toward sainthood” (Foucault 1979B: 142-143). And the technique for the extraction of this knowledge was that of confession, whereby the penitent was obliged now not simply to watch the arising and passing of desires – as was the case in terms of *self-transparency* – but rather to practice *self decipherment*. That is, to decipher their hidden sins and to communicate what they discerned to the pastor in the act of confession. In turn, within the 18th/19th century, such an approach to ‘truth’ proved to be of immense importance within the formation of the new *scientia sexualis*.

That is, *scientia sexualis* differs profoundly from *ars* insofar as, like the confession of the Christian church, it is imbued with the notions of moralism and truth. Foucault thematizes the singularly confessional nature of modern Western society when he details the immense extent to which confession “plays a part in justice, medicine, education, family relationships and love relations” (Foucault 1978: 59). The solemn rites and processes cited include the confession of one’s crimes to a judge, one’s sins to a priest, one’s illnesses to a doctor, and one’s troubles to psychiatrists, parents, teachers or lovers. In this regard, confession comprises an enabling act, because “one admits to oneself, in pleasure and in pain, things it would be impossible to tell anyone else, the things people write books about” (Foucault 1977: 59). And what they write about tends to gravitate around the dynamics of sexuality. The reason for this is that, “from the early Christian penance to the present day, sex was a privileged theme of confession” and this allowed for the steady “transformation of sex into discourse...[and] the dissemination and reinforcement of heterogenous sexualities” (Foucault 1978: 61).

However, a great irony hangs over the production of discourse within the ambit of the *scientia sexualis*. On the one hand, a central and critical difference between the *ars erotica* and the *scientia sexualis* is that “by virtue of the power structure immanent in it, the

confessional discourse cannot come from above, as in the *ars erotica*, through the sovereign will of a master, but rather from below, as an obligatory act of speech” (Foucault 1978: 62). That is to say, the confessional act is one in which the speaker, not the listener, exposes ‘the truth,’ with ‘knowledge’ provided by the subject, to the authority, enacting a subversion of the dynamics of the *ars erotica*. However, on the other hand, the power arrangement is complicated by the fact that “the agency of domination does not lie in the one who speaks...but in the one who listens and says nothing.” Foucault concludes by stating that “this discourse of truth finally takes effect, not in the one who receives it, but in the one from whom it is wrested,” and also points out that we belong to a society “which has ordered sex’s difficult knowledge, not according to the transmission of secrets, but around the slow surfacing of confidential statements” (Foucault 1977: 62-63). As such, although Foucault explicitly states that “the confession was, and still remains, the general standard governing the production of the true discourse on sex” (Foucault 1977: 63), the difference is that, in terms of the sexualized/medicalized confession of the 18th/19th century, the one who spoke no longer practiced *self decipherment*. Rather, they were *subject to decipherment*, because they were no longer considered capable of the requisite insight to understand themselves.

In relation to such *decipherment of the subject*, Foucault sets out to explain how “the procedures by which that will to knowledge regarding sex...caused the rituals of confession to function within the norms of scientific regularity.” And he asks the question, “How did this immense and traditional extortion of the sexual confession come to be constituted in scientific terms?” (Foucault 1977: 65). He then provides five contributory factors, each a part of the answer. Firstly, “the clinical codification of the inducement to speak”, in which confession and clinical examination were combined, involved not only an imperative to speak outside of the salvific context of pastoral power, but also the reduction of whatever was said to “a set of decipherable signs and symptoms” (Foucault 1977: 65), obtained through interrogation, questionnaires, hypnosis, the recollection of memories and free association, among other things.

The second procedure by which the will to knowledge regarding sex became inextricably linked to confession was “the postulate of a general and diffuse causality,” which involved the belief that sex constituted the “cause of any and everything” (Foucault 1977: 65). Indeed, Foucault points out that “there was scarcely a malady or physical disturbance to which the nineteenth century did not impute at least some degree of sexual etiology” (Foucault 1977: 65).

Thirdly, “the principle of latency intrinsic to sexuality” involved the notion that while “the ways of sex were obscure” and its “causal power...clandestine,” it was also potentially dangerous, such that it required science to extract from the subject “what was hidden from himself, ultimately for his or her own good. Latency, as a principle, thereby allowed “a difficult confession” to become linked to “a scientific practice,” insofar as while the truth had to be exacted on account of the threat it otherwise posed, this required “force, since it involved something that tried to stay hidden” (Foucault 1977: 66).

The “method of interpretation” was the fourth procedure identified by Foucault, and involved the constitution of “a discourse of truth on the basis of its decipherment” (Foucault 1977: 66-67), and it was through this process that the subject was deprived not simply of the capacity to achieve *self-transparency*, but also the capacity to practice *self-decipherment*. Instead, the ensuing *decipherment of the subject* entailed a progressive infantilization of the subject, and a proportional and correlative augmentation of the sagacity of the medical person who listened, and ostensibly understood.

The fifth and final procedure by which confession and science were merged was “the medicalisation of the effects of confession,” which Foucault describes as “therapeutic operations.” Beyond the realm of error, sin and acceptability, sex began to be categorised, positioned within a matrix under the “rule of the normal and the pathological,” with sex for the first time appearing “as an extremely unstable pathological field.” Within this new context, “spoken in time, to the proper party, and by the person who was both the bearer of it and the one responsible for it, the truth healed” (Foucault 1978: 67).

The result of the five above-mentioned procedures, in conjunction with the deeply rooted ritual of confession, was, according to Foucault, “a domain susceptible to pathological processes, and hence one calling for therapeutic or normalising interventions; a field of meanings to decipher; the site of processes concealed by specific mechanisms; a focus of indefinite causal relations, and an obscure speech (*parole*) that had to be ferreted out and listened to” (Foucault 1978: 68). And all of this comprised evidence against the validity of the repressive hypothesis, insofar as it indicated that nineteenth century society constructed a means of producing “true discourses” concerning sex, compelling everyone to talk about sex, and, most notably, to “formulate the uniform truth about sex” – believing that sex harboured a “fundamental secret.” As a result of this belief, Foucault indicates that it became “essential that sex be inscribed not only in an economy of pleasure but in an ordered system of knowledge,” and that “sex became an object of great suspicion[;]...a general signification, a universal secret, an omnipresent cause, a fear that never ends” (Foucault 1978: 69).

1.16 The four anchorage points of the deployment of sexuality

On account of the above, sexuality constitutes “an especially dense transfer point for relations of power” and is “endowed with the greatest instrumentality: useful for the greatest number of manoeuvres” (Foucault 1978: 103). Sexuality can therefore be said to have become a highly effective mechanism for the connection of various concepts to one another, for the fusing of ideas, social structures, behavioural intentions and objectives. Having described sexuality as a highly effective point of transfer, Foucault defined four anchorage points of its deployment, or “mechanisms of knowledge and power centring on sex.” Firstly, the “hysterization of women’s bodies” refers to the concept of a woman’s body being “thoroughly saturated with sexuality,” as well as being a centre of reproduction and an object of medical knowledge (Foucault 1977: 104). Secondly, The pedagogization of children’s sex is related to the notion that “all children indulge or are prone to indulge in sexual activity,” and that this activity is at once both “natural” and “contrary to nature.” Thirdly, there occurred the socialization of procreative behaviour, which involved the “political socialisation...of couples with regard to the social body as a whole,” as well as the medical socialisation of sex through the application of birth control practises – used to increase, reduce or maintain the health of the population. Finally, the psychiatrization of perverse pleasure described how the “sexual instinct was isolated as a separate biological and physical instinct,” in relation to which a standard – normalisation – was established, by which sexual activity or urges could be measured, and ‘corrected.’ Correlatively, Foucault identified four “privileged objects of knowledge, which were also targets and anchorage points for the ventures of knowledge”, namely “the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult” (Foucault 1977: 104).

The new deployment of sexuality – which operated around and through these four categorizations and figures – can be contrasted point for point with the erstwhile deployment of alliance, which existed before the 18th/19th century, and upon which the deployment of sexuality was imposed. While the deployment of alliance was structured according to rules and laws which define the “permitted and the forbidden,” the deployment of sexuality “operates according to mobile, polymorphous and contingent techniques of power.” While the deployment of alliance was intended to “reproduce the interplay of relations and maintain the law that governs them,” the deployment of sexuality “engenders a continual extension of areas and forms and control.” While the deployment of alliance was intended to reinforce and

focus on “the link between partners and definite statuses,” the deployment of sexuality is “concerned with the sensations of the body, the quality of pleasures and the nature of impressions.” And while the deployment of alliance is linked to the economy through “the role it can play in the transmission or circulation of wealth,” the primary link between the deployment of sexuality and the economy is “the body that produces and consumes” (Foucault 1977: 106-107).

It will, perhaps, be argued, that so much time has elapsed since Foucault’s publications of the above works, and so many rapid and shattering changes have occurred, that the relevance of his research to the contemporary era is questionable. However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, powerful parallels exist between disciplinary/bio-power and the cyber technologies currently operative in our world. Indeed, so strong are these parallels that Foucault’s above theorization in many ways comprises a highly apposite hermeneutic key, through which the rise of contemporary cyber-corporate empire – and the effects of this on subjectivity – can be understood.

Chapter Two: Contemporary cyber-disciplinary/bio-power society

2.1 Introduction

Michel Foucault passed away “on June 25, 1984, at the age of fifty-seven.” At the time of his death, he “was perhaps the single most famous intellectual in the world,” insofar as, while his “books, essays, and interviews had been translated into sixteen languages,” around the world “social critics treated his work as a touchstone” (Miller 1993: 13). Arguably, both the date of his demise and the orientation of his late work around “the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject” – something he explored in relation to the Hellenistic/Roman ‘cultures of the self’ of the 1st/2nd century AD – are very important to consider. In this work, Foucault maintained that “to constitute an ethic of the self [is]...an urgent, fundamental, and politically indispensable task [, because]...there is no first or final point of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to oneself” (Foucault 2005: 252).

On the one hand, Foucault was by no means naïve in such assertions, insofar as he also acknowledged that it is for the most part “impossible today to constitute an ethic of the self” (Foucault 2005: 252), because of the way in which the last remaining “knowledge of spirituality...disappeared with the Enlightenment” (Foucault 2005: 311) and the subsequent rise of disciplinary/bio-power society. However, on the other hand, because he passed away in 1984, at first glance certain aspects of Foucault’s assertions sometimes strike us as naïve, because he did not live long enough to encounter the rise of information society – predicated on the world wide web, and augmented daily with newer, faster and ever more invasive forms of communication.

Yet this fact by no means renders Foucault’s social theorization anachronistic, because upon closer inspection, a powerful array of parallels exist between the disciplinary and bio-power technologies thematized by Foucault in his *Discipline and Punish* and *The Will to Knowledge*, respectively, and the current mechanisms of information canalization operative within the products and services of Apple Inc. and Google Inc. In what follows, these parallels will be drawn into conspicuousness with a view to thematizing how the dynamics of disciplinary/bio-power – rather than being eroded in the internet age – have become the mainstay of cyber-corporate empire, in a way that ultimately informs a cyber variant of disciplinary/bio-power subjectivity.

In this regard, after a brief overview of the context of cyber society, and the driving forces within it, cyber-disciplinary variants of the ‘art of distributions’ and the ‘control of activity,’ will be discussed, before virtual forms of the ‘means of correct training,’ ‘normalizing judgment,’ ‘examination’ and ‘panopticism,’ will be elaborated upon. After this, cyber-bio-power variants of *scientia sexualis* will be elaborated upon, in relation to the seemingly paradoxical approaches of Apple Inc. and Google Inc. to internet pornography. And just as the overlaps which occur in Foucault’s categorizations of disciplinary/bio-power technologies indicate not a deficit on his part, but rather their seamlessly interconnected nature, so too, the overlaps which occur in the following analysis of virtual technologies point to the existence of a cyber-disciplinary/bio-power matrix. A matrix within which we currently find ourselves, and which informs our subjectivity around a more pronounced form of docility than ever before.

2.2 The context of cyber society

Contemporary society has experienced a significant augmentation of the available methods of communication to include instant access to digital data and radio transmission and reception through the use of mobile devices, such as cell phones and ‘tablet’ computers. The use of such devices has increased exponentially since the emergence of mobile telephony, generating global sales of more than 427 million mobile phones in the 3rd quarter of 2012 alone (Gartner, 2012). Moreover, 169 million of these are classified as smartphones – devices capable not only of mobile telephony and email, but also of connecting with internet servers and utilising sophisticated computer processors and operating systems. Two of the most globally significant corporations providing hardware and software to consumers within this category are Apple Inc. and Google Inc.

Originally a computer hardware and software manufacturer, Apple Inc. directly employs around 73000 full time equivalent workers (Apple Inc., 2012^A) and sold 46.3 million mobile computing devices in the fourth quarter of 2012 (AppleInc., 2012^B), adding to the 400 million mobile devices sold prior to this period (Apple Inc., 2012^C). In August 2012 Apple’s market valuation reached US\$ 623 billion, making it the most valued company in history. This followed its June 2011 accrual of cash reserves of more than US\$70 billion – more than the cash reserves of the United States government (BBC News, 2011) (Forbes, 2012); it has since achieved cash reserves of US\$120 billion and Quarter 4 2012 profits of US\$ 8.2 billion (Nasdaq, 2012).

Apple mobile devices and the operating system software which drives them, referred to as iOS, are designed and produced by the company, allowing a significant level of control over the operational ambit of the devices. All iOS devices are able to make use of ‘Apps,’ or mobile software applications, and all apps are available only through Apple’s proprietary ‘App Store,’ with each app scrutinised by the company prior to being made available to users. Apple exercises censorship in determining the suitability of content made available through its app store, stating that it ensures that all apps are “free of offensive material” (Apple Inc., 2012). Apple regularly exercises the right to censor and prevent apps being made available for public use on the 440 million devices sold to date, with strict criteria applied to all apps, including a total ban on all pornographic content as well as any apps that are seen to promote hateful, defamatory or illegal behaviour. Currently more than 700 000 apps are available and in excess of 35 billion app downloads have taken place (Apple Inc., 2012). As such, the company wields considerable influence over the mobile computing industry and its many users. Further to this, Apple also sells digitised music, television programs, movies and books, as well as providing access to audio and video presentations of varying content, including university lectures and other educational material.

Google Inc. was founded in 1998 as an Internet Search Engine provider, but as of 2012 the company employs 30 000 people worldwide (Google Inc., 2012^A), offering a wide array of services including internet search, email, business software, online document hosting, social media, video hosting and streaming, digitised books, internet browser, web based apps and, more recently, mobile device operating software and hardware. Google currently generates the majority of its revenue through advertising, recording revenue of US\$ 14.1 billion in the third quarter of 2012. The mobile operating system provided by Google is named Android, and is provided, free of charge, to a range of mobile device manufacturers for use in phones and tablets. According to Gartner, Android devices accounted for 72%, or 122 million units, of mobile device sales in Quarter 3 of 2012 (Gartner, 2012). Unlike Apple, Google does not make direct profit from each Android-powered device; however, it does integrate its Google search engine, Google Maps, Gmail, Google Calendar, Youtube, Google Play Store, and other software, into all Android OS enabled mobile devices. Increasing sales of Android devices equate to increased Google searches, which generate increased advertising revenue. Google makes use of its software and services to extract data from users of these devices, allowing it to read the content of all emails and internet search queries, providing spectacular amounts of data. European and US regulators have recently demanded

that Google amend its business practises, claiming that it abuses its powers by deceptively accessing users' personal data and altering search engine results (Duhigg, 2012).

Further to the employees of these corporations, tens of thousands of content providers, software developers and artists around the world contribute to the financial success of both Apple and Google. They do this by providing music, movies, television, news, web content, mapping data, telecommunications services and software for use on Apple and Google devices and software. However, the number of employees and contributors is relatively insignificant in comparison to the many millions of consumers who purchase and make use of their various products. Consumers pay not only to purchase mobile computing, but also pay for software, apps, digital versions of music, movies, books educational tools and other content, generating spectacular profits and immensely powerful sets of data. Google produces very few physical products, generates less income and profit than Apple, and is dependent on advertising, but its access to data is immeasurable, making it potentially the most influential organisation of the 21st century. Apple, seen as cool, stylish, young and rebellious, is entrenched in the mobile device market, leading the way with devices and systems that shape an ever younger market, and all the while controlling exactly what is made available to enquiring minds through its App Store.

2.3 Docile bodies in the mobile digital age

While Foucault described the creation of docile bodies in the context of penal, military, medical, educational and industrial environments, arguably, the concept applies equally to the digital mobile realm. Indeed, Foucault's assertion that since the 18th/19th century the human body has entered "a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it" (Foucault, 1977: 138), holds true in the digital age more than ever before. In this regard, the "small acts of cunning" (Foucault, 1977: 139) utilised by Apple Inc. and Google Inc. are especially effective in strengthening the machinery of power, which these corporations inherited from the 18th/19th century.

2.4 The art of distributions

As discussed in the previous chapter, the distribution and arrangement of individuals in disciplinary space originally involved enclosure within domains such as military barracks or factories. However, with the advent of mobile digital communications devices, enclosure no

longer involves actual geographic spaces, but rather virtual cyber spaces, and these can be formed and altered instantly, by means of remote and flexible communications technology.

For instance, geo-fencing is employed to define a space, beyond the perimeters of a building or physical object, in order to communicate with users of mobile devices, or in many cases, with the devices and not the users. Gartner describes geo-fencing as “creating a virtual boundary in which a device, individual or asset can be tracked and monitored or detected if the boundary is violated.” Such technology is moreover not employed only under the auspices of penal regimes – as this description might imply – but rather everyday examples of this range, in addition, from “the tracking of pets, children and Alzheimer’s patients...[through to] trucks and high-value cargos” (Gartner, 2012^B). An example of this is Apple’s *Find my Friends* app, described as a tool with which to “set up automatic notifications — like when your husband leaves work, your kids arrive home, or your BFF is en route to the party” (Apple Inc., 2012^D).⁷ Similarly, the Google Play Store promotes *Family Tracker* – an app which “forces an automatic location update of the remote device without the person being notified.” According to the software developer, “even if the phone is rebooted, Family Tracker will automatically resume tracking and updating its position” (Fibercode LLC, 2012). As such, the tracking of criminals by means of Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) systems has evolved to become a commonplace aspect of the lives of many mobile device users and their children; what originated as a means to control and observe criminals has become a gesture of care and concern towards loved ones and friends.

While disciplinary spaces are further partitioned, creating cellular units, places in which a specific function is intended to be achieved – from large open spaces, to buildings, even specific rooms and areas within businesses, airports, hospitals and so forth – this too has a cyber counterpart. By means of GPS and other forms of tracking, businesses are able to communicate their interactions with potential and existing customers. Applications of this technology include the triggering of communications intended to instruct, inform, persuade and direct individuals upon entering a ‘geo-fenced’ area, as described by the Wall Street Journal, citing advertising messages as an example (Wall Street Journal, 2012). In terms of this, the use of apps to ‘check in’ to locations, posting information about the users’ whereabouts into online social media webpages, is increasingly common, with Facebook making the service easily available to its 1 billion members (Facebook Inc., 2012).

⁷ BFF is a commonly used cyber-abbreviation, it represents the term Best Friend Forever and is primarily associated with younger, female, technologically literate members of society.

And these digital social networks, which have become enormously popular, have not only transformed, in many respects, the ability of individuals to communicate with one another over vast distances. In addition, in an echo and reflection of disciplinary *rank* – or the categorization of individuals within a virtual hierarchic schema of classification – they have also provided a new forum in which to compare oneself against others, according to criteria such as physical appearance, fashion, social activity, number of friends and places visited, among other things. Facebook claimed in July 2012 to have more than 950 million subscribers (Lee, 2012: 14), a significant number by any measure, and a remarkable achievement for an organisation which was established only in 2004. These users have provided vast amounts of data regarding such things as relationship statuses, employment details, educational statuses, personal views, religious views, political viewpoints, home addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, names of friends, as well as a wide range of other information. By associating themselves with particular brands and goods, neighbourhoods and fashion styles, Facebook users communicate their preferences, statuses and brand loyalties, as well as their ‘status,’ as measured by consumerist standards. Facebook, and similar social media such as Google+, have been described as “the encyclopaedia of beauty, status and comparisons,” due to their enormous reach across vast swathes of humanity, and their ability to store and present text, photographs, videos and messages with great ease and efficiency (Lee 2012: 21) The covert games which Facebook users play, then, involves constantly comparing themselves to others, showing images of their social activities, homes, children and friends, and constantly playing according to rules which may be adapted to suit different types of ‘friends’ on Facebook. As such, a game is indeed underway, albeit a covert or implicit one of perpetually ranking.

In contrast, overt ranking exists as the central pillar in relation to the practice of game-playing on mobile devices. In particular, virtual partitions are created when players in gaming apps participate in competitions against one another. For example, Game Centre is an online multiplayer gaming network provided by Apple, allowing users of gaming apps to compete with one another across the bounds of physical space. Games are played, scores compared, and players ranked according to performance. A system of classification, performance and competition is thereby created, a virtual space in which small or large groups of players are able to join efforts to play with and against one another. Each player is assigned a name and rank, while their achievements are tracked, analysed and compared by fellow competitors.

The consequence of this on sociality has been, ironically, devastating. This is because, while the prisons, hospitals, schools and factories of previous centuries were able to

physically separate individuals, Google and Apple are able to cut them off from those around them with remarkably greater ease and efficiency. A user may be riding on a bus or being driven in a car, surrounded by friends or family, while concurrently engaging with a virtual community, through playing either covert or overt games, such that they are focused not on those around them in the actual, physical space, but rather on the virtual (often faceless) others from elsewhere in the world, with whom they have only (or primarily) competition in common. As such, in the digital age, separation, division and partitioning have become more integrated and effective than ever before, and concomitantly bodies have become more isolated and docile than under disciplinary technologies, insofar as the last site of resistance – the contemplative and recalcitrant mind – is now effectively being enclosed by information networks, and systematically canalized into following certain trains of thought. The parameters of this become even more worryingly apparent when the cyber ‘control of activity’ is considered.

2.5 The control of activity

Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary society described not only the division of space, but also that of time, referring to *the control of activity* as the means by which bodies are arranged and activated within time, in order to engender docility. And contemporary cyber variants of the five interdependent concepts related to the control of activity can be demonstrated to exist within the activities and methodology adopted by Google Inc. and Apple Inc.

Many contemporary careers are predicated on the notion that whilst one provides a service, an intellectual solution to a given problem, or some other form of ‘labour,’ it is imperative to allocate a value to the time spent on providing one’s labour. As such, time itself has come to be seen as a resource, a commodity to be acquired, traded and manipulated in the pursuit of profit. That is to say, time is considered to be a mechanism which is used in order to draw resources, energy and intellectual property from others. By way of example, consumers’ time spent interacting with digital devices equates to potential revenue, as a result of this potential gain, apps and media are offered to consumers with the primary aim of persuading them to pay, by means of purchases and the investment of their time, for the opportunity to interact with software and hardware.

Time is integral to the utilisation of many apps available for use on mobile devices, with multiple forms of time-related activity and interaction required, the first of these being the time table. Foucault’s assertion that the time table became deeply integrated into the

functioning of society is clearly demonstrated by the structure of the most popular category of apps, games. A number of the most successful game apps utilise the time table to generate interest and maintain ongoing engagement with the app and its virtual time scale. Within these virtual spaces, villages, cities, armies, companies and worlds are populated, grown, enhanced and evolved, as users repeat tasks such as mining, farming, breeding, trading, hunting, fighting, building and so forth. Each task is allocated a given time period, each result available only after the expiration of the allocated time. ‘Smurf Village,’⁸ (Beeline, 2012) by way of example, allows users to plant, grow and harvest various crops, with each crop allocated a fixed period of time during which it grows. Failure to adhere to the harvesting timelines leads to the automatic destruction of the crops, resulting in a loss of benefits and points, and halting of progress within the ambit of the game – thereby preventing the user from accessing higher levels, more goods, and more Smurfs.

Also, within these virtual worlds, the ability to ‘move forward’ in time in order to achieve a result more rapidly, *does* exist. In other words, the user can make a leap forward – entirely in accordance with the disciplinary principle of exhaustive use – and squeeze more productivity out of time; but this privilege is available only at a cost. That is, users are offered the ability to accelerate time in order to temporarily exceed the time table by means of ‘in-app purchases,’ which entail the acquisition of virtual assets by means of actual payments. Users are able to pay, by credit card transaction, for the tools required to accelerate their time-based activities. Smurf Village creates an absolutely precise and extremely regular timetable in which to grow and harvest food in order to achieve reward. Further to this rather unrealistic interpretation of the cycles of nature and man (which implicitly erases the vicissitudes of nature and her seasons through an imposition of disciplinary regularity), the notion that time and effort can be supplanted by the exchange of money is deeply entrenched within the game, and many others like it, such as Farmville, My Singing Monsters, Sims and Dragonvale. Primarily, games of this nature are provided free of charge, whilst generating profits through in-app purchases, often instigated by children. In this way, the timetable – in new and more complex forms – has become integrated into the play-time of children, often as young as three or four years of age, as they interact with digital devices designed to be so simple to use that even children can ‘enjoy’ them.

⁸ Smurf Village is offered as a free game on both Apple iOS and Android devices, and is listed on both the iTunes App store and the Google Play store as one of the most popular apps downloaded.

The second principle relating to the control of activity, the temporal elaboration of the act, describes the manner in which gestures and movements are precisely and minutely structured within a specific set of time constraints. This penetration of time into the body itself is demonstrated within the cyber realm as, in more than any other category of app, the game is a clear demonstration of the integration of gesture, movement, time and orientation within space. Many games require the use of gestures to control virtual vehicles, such as cars, aircraft or spacecraft, as well as directing the virtual movements of characters within games. The most profitable app in Apple's iTunes store is 'Angry Birds,' a game which requires users to aim, launch and control flying birds by using their fingers on the touch screens of Apple mobile devices. As of the end of the 2011 financial year, various iterations of the Angry Birds games had been downloaded 648 million times, and this number is expected to have increased significantly in 2012 with the release of several, highly popular, new versions of the game – as well as the release of the app to a large number of Android and Windows mobile devices (Rovio Entertainment Ltd., 2012). Typical of iOS and Android games, Angry Birds requires extremely precise triggering of actions which are reliant on users' ability to replicate specific, tiny, precise movements within fixed time periods. In order to achieve the desired results, players must activate particular functions at precisely calculated moments, with even a fraction of a second or a slight deviation from the intended placement of a finger leading to undesirable results. Further examples include the use of specific gestures to navigate the software options within mobile devices, such as swiping, tapping, sliding, pinching, pulling and stretching with one's fingers against touch enabled screens, all of which are actions that require precise movements and accurate timing to activate the functions assigned to them.

Foucault described, thirdly, the correlation of the body and the gesture, as well as, fourthly, the concept of body object articulation, when referring to the way in which, within the disciplinary context, the body is aligned to the gestures performed by its parts, as well as its articulation to the object of its focus. Similarly, Apple Inc. – and subsequently Google Inc. – have integrated highly effective motion sensing technology into their mobile devices and software. Examples of these sensing technologies include three-axis gyroscopes, accelerometers, proximity sensors, ambient light sensors, as well as digital compasses (Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., 2012). Mobile devices can thus be controlled through movement, allowing users to control games and operating system functions by moving their devices in particular ways. These movements are reliant upon the users' moving the devices at various speeds, altering orientation and direction as they do so. In essence, a new form of

body object articulation has emerged, one which requires coordination of the body and object within the context of mobile cyberspace. This integration of technology provides the ability to precipitate virtual movement through actual, physical movement, and thereby link the device, or object, to the body. Indeed, the imbrication of two sets of motion, digital and physical, as well as two sets of time, digital and actual, allow for a form of reinforced body object articulation and orientation, through which the physical body is habituated – through repetitive activity carried out with full attention and consummate skill – to a life of docile deference to the legitimacy and authority of virtual worlds.

Finally, the concept of exhaustive use, as described by Foucault, certainly applies to the digital mobile realm as Apple Inc. and Google Inc. both attempt to maximise the use of their devices, in order to maximise the use of the available time of their customers; the users of mobile technology. This occurs not simply in relation to gaming, as mentioned above. In addition, an increasing number of apps are available to be used on mobile devices, with Apple's iTunes store offering over 700 000 (Apple Inc., 2012), and the Google Play store making a further 500 000 available (Google Inc., 2012). App categories currently include, among others, games, books, news, weather, sport, entertainment, education, business, finance, food and drink, health, fitness, medical, music, navigation, reference, social networking and travel.

The cyber realm of the mobile device can be said to offer a broad cross section of many of the expressions of contemporary life, with corporate empires attempting to make use of their customers' time in all aspects of their lives, from personal, intimate moments of self reflection, to social, business and financial activities. Whilst Foucault described the exhaustive use of the time and bodies of prisoners, soldiers and workers, Apple Inc. and Google Inc. have penetrated almost every aspect of the lives of their users. That is, not only has an additional virtual sphere been created, but it has also become imbued with its *own* time, a time which is increasingly being advanced as *primary*, insofar as for many people such virtual time now takes precedence over their actual time. And this deference to the virtual shows no signs of abating; on the contrary, its seductiveness grows more with every day, because of the sense of mastery users experience through learning and perfecting the requisite gestures and signs, which bring the virtual world to life in their hands. The irony of this sense of mastery, however, is that the repetitive physical activity involved, and the close attention to changing details required, entail less empowerment and more subjugation to cyber-disciplinary drills. As such, these practices are indissociable from an augmentation of docility in the contemporary era.

2.6 The means of correct training

In his discussion of the means by which disciplinary power trains and links multiple forces to create individual, useable units, Foucault refers to three concepts, namely hierarchical observation, normalising judgement, and finally, the examination. Cyber variants of all three exist and are seen at work within the digital mobile realm, as Google Inc. and Apple Inc. have created individual users from a mass of bodies.

Hierarchical observation occurs as individuals are able to observe one another, to varying degrees, by means of various types of apps including, among others, ‘Social Media’ apps such as Facebook,⁹ Foursquare,¹⁰ and Google+.¹¹ Users are afforded the ability to analyse one another’s activities, dining, entertainment and shopping preferences, as well as exercise and sporting activities (using GPS enabled apps such as Map My Run).¹² The apps are designed to facilitate near perpetual communication through social channels such as Facebook, and as a result they have effectively reiterated and extended the architectural model of the school, prison, hospital and barracks, by making mobile device users more ‘visible’ than ever before.

Users can be observed by their peers, families and friends, as well as by police, government and financial institutions, and for that matter, legal representatives. In fact, potential employers frequently check the lifestyles of those who wish to work within their organisations, by observing their Facebook and other social media activities (Fairfax Media, 2012). Indeed, the regularity and frequency of such ‘snooping’ has led to a growing number of people creating fictitious Facebook and Twitter accounts, so that they may post what they truly wish to say to one another, without fear of compromising their careers, and upload photos and videos of their personal activities, while potential employers are ‘tricked’ into viewing ‘safe,’ ‘sterile’ versions of their Facebook profiles. Arguably, it is precisely such

⁹ Merriam Webster defines Social media as “forms of electronic communication through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, messages and other content (Merriam Webster, 2012).

¹⁰ Foursquare is an app which allows users to display, publicly, their location, and is used extensively as a means to promote entertainment venues, restaurants, retail outlets and so forth.

¹¹ Google+ is a social media and blogging platform developed and maintained by Google Inc., to which users link their personal profiles to those of the Gmail contacts within each user’s Gmail account.

¹² Map My Run is an app designed to track a user’s position by means of GPS data, calculating their route of travel and speed. The app is intended to be a supplementary tool to be used primarily by runners and cyclists.

actions which indicate the existence of a virtual version of the architecture, described by Foucault, “that would operate to transform individuals, to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them” (Foucault 1977: 172). Examples of this form of observation also include apps which are intended to track individuals whilst driving vehicles, using GPS data, allowing others within their companies or organisations to observe where, when, at what speed and how frequently they travel (Tom Tom, 2012). Ultimately, such apps are equally effective as deterrents to poor driving habits, as they are at providing evidence in the event of a breach of laws or rules.

2.7 Normalising judgement

The ‘normalising judgements’ to which contemporary individuals and groups are subjected are, in many respects, far more pervasive than ever before. Through the integration of social media and access to forums such as Game Centre, mobile device users participate in, and are acted upon, by the normalising judgement which is integral to the operation of disciplinary power.

The first form of normalising judgement is that of micro penalty, and as in disciplinary society, it is linked to both non-observance of rules, and correspondingly, to corrective action. In short, within cyber space, it sees users of devices subjected to a continuous stream of assessments – spelling checks when typing or dictating messages, device and operating system-specific procedures to be adhered to, and rules embedded within games designed to encourage interaction with other users. Failure to observe the rules and systems leads to non-performance, encouraging the user to adapt their behaviour and actions in order to conform, participate, and ultimately to succeed.

Gratification-punishment is also evidenced in the interaction between user and device, as games provide rewards, points, and other forms of credit for compliant activity. Beyond merely receiving rewards for participating in a game, playing according to the prescribed rules and successfully achieving milestones, users can achieve added credit for extending the game beyond the realm of player and device, by inviting their ‘friends’ and listed contacts to install and play the games on their own devices. Failure to do so, results in a form of punishment, the withholding of reward, making progress within the game all the harder to achieve, thus fulfilling the ‘double-function’ role of gratification-punishment. Users thus

become *de facto* ‘advertising mechanisms,’ providing targeted promotional messages designed to encourage others to purchase apps, install and play them.

As already discussed, the distribution of individuals according to rank is practised in game apps, in which all players are ranked, compared, rated and rewarded, according to their performances, with the widest possible access to this knowledge being made available. However, a more insidious form of ranking is also exercised by Apple Inc., and subsequently others, such as Samsung, with the inclusion of company specific digital signatures attached to all emails sent from their devices. A user of an Apple Inc. iPhone will, by default, attach the signature “sent from my iPhone” to all email messages which they send from their device. Such messages perform a dual role, the first of which is to raise the perceived status of the individual, telling others that they utilise a device considered by many to be highly prestigious, while the second function is that of encouraging, through advertising, the use of such devices.

Arguably, the ultimate result, however, of a composite of the above cyber-disciplinary variants of micro-penalty detection (in association with non-observance of rules and corrective action), gratification-punishment and distribution according to rank, is an exponentially more docile subject than the one encountered within previous disciplinary domains. Not only does this cyber-disciplinary subject receive no respite from observation and evaluation, but they, in turn, are obliged to become ever more complicit with the system of normalizing judgment, in a way that renders both themselves and those around them, ever more prostrate.

2.8 The examination

Where the actions and functions of hierarchical observation and normalising judgement combine, the normalizing gaze of the examination makes possible acts of classification and punishment. As discussed in the previous chapter, the examination “manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected,” as it transforms individuals, through documentation, into ‘cases;’ both objects for “a branch of knowledge and a hold for a branch of power” (Foucault 1977: 189-191). Similarly, within digital society, both Apple Inc. and Google Inc. collect data from their users, including, but not limited to, email addresses, names, birthdates, gender, age, geographic location, IP addresses, banking details, email information, and interests (through the installation of specific categories of apps), as well as the contact information of others with whom users

communicate (Apple Inc., 2012^E; Google Inc., 2012^B). Understandably, the collection of such data transforms users from merely being customers into becoming objects of study, targets for mercantile activity, and sources of potential advertising revenue. Further to this, the breaching of rules, such as the altering of the operating system of one's device, in order to access free content from channels other than the iTunes Store or the Google Play store, exposes one to potential legal action and civil prosecution from Apple Inc. and Google Inc.

A cyber variant of disciplinary reality has thereby emerged, based on data and the interpretation and use thereof. In terms of this, individuals are formed, defined in ways previously unheard of, and driven toward endless (economic) activity, through a type of individualizing power/knowledge *far* more incisive and encompassing than anything ever produced under the auspices of either pastoral power or the disciplinary power which supplanted it. A virtual individualizing power/knowledge possessed of a frighteningly inhuman capacity to miss nothing, and remember everything.

2.9 Panopticism

Productive disciplinary technology, in the form of panopticism, has also become increasingly evident in the activities of companies, states and individuals, as digital mobile technology has made possible new and more far-reaching surveillance opportunities. That is, Bentham's panopticon, the conceptual device around which Foucault traced the development of penal systems into disciplinary society, has been extended into the digital mobile realm where it displays an exceptional ability to adapt itself to increase cyber-disciplinary power and influence within contemporary society.

Just as Bentham designed the panopticon to be a solution to the requirements of surveillance, and not merely a prison, so too, Google Inc. has transformed search engine algorithms to form the basis of a "technology of power designed to solve the problems of surveillance" (Foucault 1977: 148). And the following paragraphs will demonstrate the extent to which Google Inc., in particular, has embraced the function of panopticism in order to build a corporate empire of spectacular proportion, with an ever-growing base of users, and a continually expanding reach into the lives and subjectivity of individuals around the world.

Google Inc., through the use of mobile devices and software, provides an exceedingly pervasive panoptic gaze, dis-incentivising illegal or punishable behaviour through exposing individuals to constant digital scrutiny. Beyond this function, it also compiles for users online, digital profiles, collections of data used to generate advertising-related data, with the

unforeseen consequence (on the part of users) of a ‘dossier’ being formed on them. These dossiers are more detailed, thorough and inclusive than any described by Foucault, as they include information pertaining to every aspect of life that users choose to ‘discuss’ or even imply via digital technology. To elaborate, Google Inc. applies algorithms to track the searches that each and every user performs on its search engine. Further to this, the company applies algorithmic surveillance to all emails sent via Gmail, in order to provide “more relevant search results and ads” (Google Inc., 2012^C). While individuals at Google Inc. do not personally read users’ emails, the digital processing of every word of correspondence is performed, with a view to providing ever more tailored advertising opportunities, intended to allow Google to charge more than ever for the right to advertise to its users. Completing a Google search potentially provides users with information, while providing Google with insight into the interests of the user. Medical, religious, sexual, relational and financial queries are logged, recorded and processed, producing an in-depth knowledge of the user, with each search adding information, and potential influence, to the dossier.

The incisiveness of this virtual panopticism is neatly illustrated by the recent case of a teenage girl who was targeted by a retailer after their analysis of her buying patterns demonstrated it to be highly likely that she was pregnant (Duhigg, 2012: 2). At first, the teenager’s father was incensed at receiving advertising aimed at her, which congratulated her on her pregnancy. After some weeks, however, the girl admitted to her parents that she was indeed pregnant, such that a retail company had successfully predicted the birth of a new consumer, before the mother had consciously divulged this information to anyone she knew. The only reason this in-depth knowledge of consumers became public is that the case was widely reported, due to the offense it generated by directly discussing the girl’s pregnancy. The retailer has since continued to use the technology to target expectant mothers, but has become more sophisticated, combining adverts and coupons for pregnancy related products with those of other, more generic products. A representative of the company stated that “as long as a pregnant woman thinks she hasn’t been spied on, she’ll use the coupons. She just assumes that everyone else on her block got the same mailer for diapers and cribs. As long as we don’t spook her, it works” (Duhigg, 2012: 3).

As such, the dossier has become an all encompassing, powerful and highly prized item, more utilised than ever before, primarily by corporate enterprise, but often by the state and its various organisations too. Google Inc. describes itself as “work[ing] hard to protect Google and [its] users from unauthorised access to or unauthorised alteration, disclosure or destruction of information” (Google Inc., 2012^D). According to the chairwoman of the French

data-protection authority, however, “the new privacy policy allows an unprecedented combination of data across different Google services [and] the data could be employed in ways that the user is not aware of” (NY Times, 2012). Of particular importance is the ability of mobile devices to locate their users, pinpointing their geographic location, and providing ubiquitous access to corporate empires such as Google Inc., and in certain cases, to governments, police and other state controlled agencies. Google is so effective at gathering information that governments frequently request user-specific information in order to investigate and prosecute individuals under investigation, with a reported 20 938 requests made by various governments between January and June 2012 (Google Inc., 2012^E). Regardless of a user’s location, the panoptic gaze can be exercised through the collection of data by means of Internet Protocol addresses,¹³ and unique identifying numbers assigned to each internet-enabled device. Consequently, anonymity has become increasingly difficult to achieve, providing exemplary evidence of the new, enhanced forms of individualization which occur as a result of virtual panopticism and cyber-disciplinary power.

The partitioning of space – virtual and actual – as well as the observation and analysis of an individual’s movements, has become more meticulous and thorough than ever before, affording ever-increasing levels of knowledge and control to corporations determined to extract maximum profit from individuals. Interchangeable units – members of society who are at once consumers and observers, as well as corporations and businesses – watch over one another constantly, forming a complex structure in which each individual forms part of a large and evolving cyber-disciplinary matrix. And as will be discussed next, cyber variants of bio-power have made this matrix even more powerful and all-encompassing.

2.10 The repressive hypothesis, the deployment of sexuality, and cyber society

As discussed in Chapter 1, in *The Will to Knowledge*, Foucault argues against the repressive hypothesis, maintaining that, instead, during the 18th and 19th centuries, sex (and sexuality) became spoken about, investigated, studied and described more than ever before. However, a distinction *can* be made between the nature of such engagement in the 18th and 19th centuries. That is, in the 18th century, it was advanced that “there is a valuable element within us that must be feared and treated with respect; we must exercise extreme care when dealing with it.”

¹³ An Internet Protocol (IP) address is defined as a “number that uniquely identifies each computer on the Internet (Merriam Webster, 2012)

However, in the 19th century it was advanced that, “whether out of scrupulousness, an overly acute sense of sin, or hypocrisy,...we have too long reduced [sex]...to silence,” such that healing can only arise through fearless disclosure of and elaboration upon it (Foucault 1998: 128-129). Arguably, the term coined by Foucault, *scientia sexualis* – associated with both 18th century caution and 19th century disclosure – is both an allusion to the Latin maxim *Scientia est lux lucis* (knowledge is enlightenment), as well as the tradition of assigning Latin nomenclature to biological terms, thereby suggesting taxonomy, order, scientificity and knowledge obtained through observation, discovery and ‘analytical’ or ‘scientific’ discourse. And the proliferation of such discourse set in motion a discursive momentum which continues through to the present.

Indeed, it would appear that 21st century society has continued, exclusively, to follow the trajectory of disclosure, insofar as it has allowed sexual discourse to proliferate, encouraged the sexualisation of contemporary media, and supported the growth of an enormous digital pornographic industry. According to Rick Poynor, “we are in the process of designing a pornotopia in which sex, or at least our dreams of sex, are allowed to permeate areas of life they would never have been permitted to enter until recently” (Poynor 2006: 9). Further to this, he goes on to explain how technology has facilitated the availability of pornography “to anyone, at any time” (Poynor, 2006: 10). These statements were made in the year prior to the release of the first iPhone, launched in the middle of 2007, and therefore prior to the subsequent growth, at a pace which astounded all predictions, of online mobile telephony and internet access, with the concomitant increase in access to sexual content, including pornographic material. The advent of the smartphone made access to the internet, and with it digital iterations of sexuality and pornography, easier, faster and cheaper to access than ever before. No longer did one need to enter an actual store to purchase sexual images, texts, films or other media, as they were readily available in virtual form on the internet, both paid and free, to anyone who desired them.

Conversely, however, a significant level of censorship emerged within the digital mobile realm, a restrictive and highly disciplined withholding of sexual imagery and discourse, reminiscent of the 18th century caution over sexuality, and representing an ‘enclosure’ and delimiting of sexual discourse. In this regard, both Google Inc. and Apple Inc. support the censorship of apps and their content, with a wide variety of apps rejected by both companies since the inception of their online stores. That is, in opposition to the proliferation of sexual material online, the two largest and most powerful corporate empires of the contemporary age – Apple Inc. and Google Inc. – both prohibit the sale or distribution

of ‘pornography’ in their app stores, with this ban extended even to images of nude bodies, regardless of the fact that such images are frequently in no way sexually explicit or pornographic; for example, when they appear within the context of artistic exhibitions. The App review guidelines document published by Apple Inc. states that “Applications must not contain any obscene, pornographic, offensive or defamatory content or materials of any kind (text, graphics, images, photographs, etc.), or other content or materials that in Apple’s reasonable judgment may be found objectionable by iPhone or iPod touch users” (Apple Inc., 2012). Similarly, Google Inc. argues that, “We don’t allow content that contains nudity, graphic sex acts, or sexually explicit material” (Google Inc., 2012).

Many apps are rejected as a result; for example, in 2009, Apple Inc. rejected an app which provided access to digitised, out of copyright books, due to the fact that one of the links, among thousands of other texts, was to “a Victorian text-only translation of the Kama Sutra of Vatsyayana” (Montgomerie 2009: 21) This demonstrated clearly that the company would rather censor, strictly, what even public libraries were unwilling to withhold, in order to avert the potential for sexuality to become entrenched in the mobile device, as provided by the iTunes app store. In relation to this, Steve Jobs, co-founder of Apple Inc., stated publicly that he wanted the iTunes app store to provide “freedom from porn” (Isaacson, 2011:522). However, the association of textual descriptions of the Kama Sutra with the digital pornographic industry appears, at best, to be tenuous, unless seen in the light of the 18th century circumspection over, and drive to ‘enclose’ or ‘encapsulate’ sex, in a way that kept society safe from its ostensibly dangerous excesses. In response to the strict criteria imposed by Apple, Mathias Müller von Blumencron, editor of German publication *Der Spiegel*, stated “we can’t adapt European magazines to the standards of Utah,” illustrating the significant rift between the sensibilities of contemporary European publishers and the conservative (rather 18th century) schema operative within Apple Inc (Pfanner 2010: 12-13). In contrast, *Der Bild*, another German publication, agreed to remove any nude photography in its fashion content, in order to be accepted into the ‘walled garden’ of the iTunes app store, with a journalist noting that “Apple’s intervention has made it clear to publishers that they find themselves in a new role in a digital world,” and “it is Apple that has final control over its platform, not the publishers” (Bunz 2010: 8).

The extent of this control is neatly evinced in relation to the similar acquiescence of *Playboy* magazine. One of the most well known men’s magazines of the 20th century, *Playboy* agreed to censor its digital publication in order to make it available on the iPad, removing nude photos of its models, and in so doing, drawing attention to the remarkable

power and influence held by Apple Inc (Moore 2010: 19). And an even more worrying recent example of such strictly enforced silence and censorship, is the rejection of an app named ‘Geometric Porn,’ by both Apple Inc and Google Inc, despite it containing no words, photographs or sounds of sexual intercourse, or indeed of sexual activity whatsoever. The app simply makes use of moving, highly stylised geometric shapes – circles, rectangles and triangles – and these were construed as *suggesting* sexual activity (Foglia 2012: 2). Furthermore, Oscar Wilde’s *The Importance of Being Earnest*, in illustrated comic form, was initially accepted by Apple Inc., on condition that illustrations of undressed men embracing one another be ‘blacked out,’ literally, in order that readers not see such imagery (Smith 2010: 23). Similarly, another intertextual, illustrated adaptation of a respected literary text, *Ulysses Seen*, based on the Joyce novel, was only accepted for publication once illustrations of nudes were deleted from the app (Spence 2010: 11). Apple Inc. did, however, approve an app called ‘Manhattan Declaration,’ which was seen by many as being so disturbing that it was subsequently rejected from the app store, after an online petition against it was organized by the activist organisation change.org. The app posed a series of questions, to which users could answer either ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ including “Do you support same sex relationships?” and “Do you support the right of choice regarding abortion?” – with a ‘yes’ answer to either question leading the app to inform the user that they had answered “incorrectly.” The app went as far as to describe homosexuality as sexually immoral, and even suggested that “same-sex marriage would lead to the end of civilization” (Rogers 2010: 2-3).

On the one hand, the significant level of censorship displayed by both companies seems to comport with Foucault’s descriptions of the 18th century attitude towards sex, in which representations of it are treated with immense caution – indeed fear – in an attempt to safeguard society from the destabilization that would supposedly follow from unrestrained sexuality. However, on the other hand, to construe Apple Inc and Google Inc as anachronistic in their moral outlook is problematic, because of some of their other practices, which are markedly liberal in orientation, and which follow more along the lines of the 19th century attitude toward sex and sexuality.

As already mentioned, digital corporate empire can be seen to acknowledge and support this approach, adding to the means available to all who are drawn toward virtual representations of sex. And *both* Apple Inc. and Google inc. provide direct access to pornography and other forms of online sexual discourse via web browsers such as Google Chrome, Safari and Firefox. As such, *both* corporations appear to recognise the reality of the

contemporary age being deeply rooted within the discourse of *scientia sexualis*, in relation to which neither company provides any form of censorship in terms of internet access.

That is, Google Inc. proudly advocates for extremely limited, if any, censorship in the provision of its search engine services. A Google search for pornography will yield millions of ‘results,’ with direct links to the material on offer, and many of the links paid for, generating profit for Google Inc., through its advertising contracts with the providers of pornography online. Since its original inception as an online search engine, Google Inc. has declared its corporate motto to be “Do no evil” (Google Inc., 2012), arguing that it operates independently of any bias, merely providing access to information and neither endorsing nor criticising the content. The expansion of Google products to include services and hardware has, however, challenged the company’s ability to remain neutral in the lives of the billions of users who it relies upon daily for profit. Advertising revenue remains the primary source of income for Google Inc., with the consequence that, just as before, paying advertisers bring enormous influence to bear on the media through which they promote themselves (Herman & Chomsky 1994: 1-25). Similarly, Apple Inc.’s products also allow ready access to pornography, through their built in web browser, Safari.

Neither company openly promotes itself as a portal to be used in accessing sexual content, in particular, pornography, but both are indeed actively involved in facilitating engagement with virtual sexual representations in various ways. The availability of texts orientated around sex and sexuality in both the Google Play and Apple iTunes app stores attests to the fact that *scientia sexualis* is still the dominant mode of sexual discourse in the West, and increasingly, in other areas of the world too. Yet, this is less paradoxical than it at first seems, and more an echo and reflection of the hypocrisy inherent in *scientia sexualis*.

As Foucault explains, in the 19th century, modern “Western societies...began to keep an indefinite record of...people’s pleasures. They made up a herbal of them and established a system of classification.” Foucault refers to the emergence of a “confessional science” which took shape in the 19th century, describing it as “an interference between two modes of production of truth: procedures of confession, and scientific discursivity.” Interestingly, the discourse of science was by no means immune to the discourse of confession, with all its moral rules and limitations. This was evinced by the scientific community “apologising for the horrors they were about to let speak,” describing them as immoral aberrations (Foucault 1977: 64-65), before proceeding to describe them in meticulously delicious detail, but in a ‘clinical’ space which sanctioned the discussion and imbued it with medical legitimacy.

While the degree of such hypocrisy is far more muted in the contemporary era, something akin to it still informs the relationship between Apple Inc./Google Inc. and pornography. Both companies make available a wide array of texts which speak of sexuality; classifying, normalising, analysing and coding the parameters of the discourse and those who engage with it. In addition, there are a number of texts which discuss sex in terms of pleasure, gratification and the heightening of senses. Books such as *Fifty Shades of Orgasm: the official guide to pleasure* (Love, 2012: 3-30), authored by ‘Lolita Love,’ are classified within the “Body, Mind and Spirit” category of the app store, primarily a non-fiction category in which topics such as sex, pregnancy, psychology and parenting are presented – along with concepts such as spirituality, meditation and faith. The inclusion of this text, which purports to instruct the reader on how to intensify, control and manipulate orgasms, and related sensual experiences, demonstrates that while cyber corporate empire recognises the need to allow sexuality to be a component of its products, it can only accommodate this requirement by allowing related speech to occur under cover of the dominant discourse of sexuality. The proliferation of sexual discourse is therefore encouraged, under the latest auspices of *scientia sexualis*, and in order to allow the disclosure of sex and the dissemination of sexual speech, Apple Inc. and Google Inc. have similarly provided a ‘clinical’ space within which it is acceptable to discuss sex and sexuality.

If there is one thing that emerges from the above, it is that, notwithstanding all the technological marvels of the 21st century – such as the virtual realm of cyber-space and what it makes possible – in many respects, we are still beholden to the discursive momentum of regimes established in the 18th and 19th century, which continue to define (or at least powerfully inform) the axiological parameters of our world. Yet, this does intimate the possibility that, at a certain level, our epistemological frameworks have altered little since the dawn of *scientia sexualis*. That is, just like the 18th century was mesmerized by the possibility of discovering new knowledge – indeed truth – in sex, and just like this enterprise was continued with growing ardour throughout the 19th and 20th centuries (albeit through an array of different means), so too, in the 21st century, we readily conflate sex with truth, with spiritual enlightenment, and with the most profound meaning possible, etc. And like those before us, we continue to dedicate ourselves “to the endless task of forcing its secret, of exacting the truest of confessions from a shadow” (Foucault 1977: 159). The difference now, though, is that these shadows have proliferated exponentially, and now surround us as hosts of spectres within a virtual realm that is rapidly supplanting our erstwhile purchase on actual reality. But so long as we play by the rules, and immerse ourselves further in this phantom

world, all is well, and we might even for a while forget that we rest and play at the mercy of a great cyber-disciplinary/bio-power system. However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, when we try to rebel, by using the system against itself, in the interest of breaking free from its grip and returning ourselves and others to things that *actually* matter, the reprisals that ensue leave us in no doubt that we inhabit the body of a gigantic organism, which without compunction will identify us as a disease, and destroy us.

Chapter Three: Wikileaks and cyber-disciplinary/bio-power reprisal

3.1 Introduction

Events occurring in recent years in the Middle East, Latin America and to some extent, the West (Hart-Landsberg, 2009: 2; Mair, J & Keeble, R, 2011: 5; Bloom, 2012: 24) have demonstrated the effectiveness of rapid, efficient, mass communication through the use of mobile technology in the service of ‘social activism’ – such as the revolt of the Arab Spring, the formation of the Bolivarian Alliance, and the agitation of the ‘Occupy’ movement. Such social upheavals are often represented as transformative and revolutionary, with popular media and some theorists claiming that mobile communication devices have significantly contributed to the “rewiring of our brains,” potentially resulting in a “new system of global governance [which] may prevail over the power of multinational corporations, financial traders, apologists for the flattening of the world, and bureaucratic enforcers” (Castells 2009: 412-413). Of particular interest is the contention that, equipped with mobile phones to record and distribute evidence, “citizens can catch their rulers in the act of lying to them [and] organize their resistance in an instant insurgent community” (Castells 2009: 413).

But the act of ‘catching and exposing’ leaders in their lies, of subjecting them to public scrutiny, is not enough to engender true change, as evinced by the consequences of Julian Assange’s Wikileaks; the organisation he created for the purpose of exposing state secrets. Wikileaks states, in describing the principles upon which it is founded, that its task is “the defence of freedom of speech and media publishing, the improvement of our common historical record and the support of the rights of all people to create new history” (Wikileaks 2012: 2). Whilst the governments of the West have long supported freedom of speech and maintained that a free media is central to democratic rule, it is readily apparent, through their response to Wikileaks, that significant limits are both implied, and openly stated, in defining ‘freedom of speech and the press.’ The distribution of more than 250 000 classified United States diplomatic cables in 2010, proved too much for even the most liberal Western governments to accommodate, despite their ardent support of free speech as a principle in action. Assange, and Wikileaks, along with Castells and other advocates of social media ‘revolution,’ would do well to note that the ability to ‘speak out’ to the world via the platform of digital technology and social media – regardless of how liberating it may initially feel – may ultimately achieve far less in terms of resistance, revolution, and change, than first imagined. This is because the democracy to which such ‘speaking out’ refers exists largely as

the veneer covering the cyber-disciplinary/bio-power organism we inhabit, and indeed of which we are part. As such, because the momentum of the discursive regimes of this organism inform our world and our subjectivity, while ‘speaking out’ may be permissible or even valorised within the context of democracy, when it transgresses cyber-disciplinary boundaries, reprisals nevertheless occur – even to the point of vilifying the speaker as pathological in terms of cyber-bio-power. In this regard, Julian Assange has effectively been silenced, by a combination of activities including isolation from financial resources, legal action, public threats of death or violence made by prominent American politicians, intimidation, and ultimately (and most effectively), accusations of sexual abuse and rape.

That is, when the might of the world’s most powerful and well financed military, governmental, and corporate institutions proved insufficient to silence him, Assange was finally constrained through the powerful impact of the discourse of *scientia sexualis*, and incarcerated due to accusations of inappropriate sexual behaviour. Indeed, through this process, the gigantic body we inhabit, the cyber-disciplinary/bio-power organism that holds us enthralled to the ‘wonders’ of digital technology and the ‘truth’ it promises to reveal through sexuality, identified Assange as a threat – a virus or infection to be expunged. In addition, it also thereby rendered null and void his testimonies and the revelations he made possible, characterising them as manifestations of his pathology, rather than as the political acts of transgression against disciplinary parameters that they were. And through this diagnosis, it sought to ‘heal’ society, promising a return to the ‘reality’ and well-being of the world we knew before Wikileaks. In short, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that in response to Assange revealing uncomfortable truths, society has been led to believe that truth is not to be found in a man who is a sexual deviant and criminal, *regardless* of the factual nature of his material and its deep relevance to the politico-economic and socio-cultural context in which we currently find ourselves

3.2 Google Inc., Apple Inc., and Wikileaks

In 2010, Wikileaks released a veritable flood of classified and secret US government cables, exposing the United States government to scrutiny from any individual or organisation that was interested enough to read the contents of the documents. This action followed the previous disclosure of thousands of secret and incriminating US military documents, and many thousands of other explosive documents relating to countries in Africa and the Middle East. In the wake of these activities, a highly incensed and aggressive response emerged from

multiple Western governments, which was supported by both Google Inc. and Apple Inc., insofar as both claimed that providing apps designed to access Wikileaks files was in breach of the rules governing the use of their technology. Furthermore, both companies prohibited the distribution of apps designed to facilitate direct access to Wikileaks, rejecting or quickly removing any apps which offered such services. In particular, an Apple Inc. spokesperson at the time stated that “Apps must comply with all local laws and may not put an individual or targeted group in harm’s way” (Poulsen 2010). The importance of this was that Assange was being accused, by the US government and others, of acting illegally, endangering American soldiers and citizens, and even supporting terrorism. For many, it was “chilling to see Apple double down on its right to censor controversial, but lawfully published, content of indisputable news value,” especially since access to Wikileaks was still readily available through the iPhone’s web browser (Poulsen 2010). Similarly, Google Inc. subsequently banned Wikileaks apps, joining a list of companies that attempted to prevent access to and support of Wikileaks, and stop donations being made to its bank account.

What provoked senior government leaders and global corporate conglomerates to react so strongly to the acts of a self-appointed, citizen journalist? The answer lies, perhaps, in the fact that Assange largely succeeded in undermining and bypassing the cyber disciplinary structures which had hitherto protected the secrets of governments and companies, maintaining the order and stability of the dominant discourse.

That is, firstly, Assange subverted the cyber-disciplinary variant of the ‘art of distributions’ when he utilised the power of cyber communication, by means of strongly encrypted digital communications channels, to gain access to secret documents. In doing so, he was also able to create a secure, impenetrable digital fortress, a place where journalistic ‘sources’ could make full disclosure, without exposing themselves to retribution. No matter where on earth a source emerged, through the use of digital communication, Assange was able to extract information from them, undetected, due to the advantage of encrypted communication, turning technology into a tool to *undermine* secrecy. Assange stated, “we must provide the underlying tools, cryptographic tools that we control, as a sort of use of force, in that[,] if the ciphers are good[,] no matter how hard it tries a government cannot break into your communications directly” (Assange, Appelbaum, Müller-Maguhn & Zimmerman 2012: 12). By means of this approach, Wikileaks effectively separated itself from the rest of cyber space, through the use of secured, encrypted servers and communications, building a storage place for data provided by confidential sources. Wikileaks thereby turned cyber space in on itself, created a space that was at once open and

closed; open to confidential sources, open to media companies, but closed to prying eyes and those who wished to remove it and negate its potential power. As such, what Wikileaks did was bring together a virtual team of ‘subversives’ who, in some cases never actually met in person; all that was required was the provision of verifiable information, and access to hidden communications that would be used to hold governments accountable (Keller 2011: 28). Against the backdrop of the discussions of both Chapter One and Chapter Two, the extent to which the above actions of Assange and Wikileaks comprised a breaching of the parameters of the cyber-disciplinary ‘art of distributions,’ is clear. On the one hand, through the utilization of strongly encrypted digital communications channels, Assange/Wikileaks effectively penetrated the digital ‘enclosures’ established to house, and protect from view, knowledge production that was linked to the exercise of government-corporate tyranny. Yet, what this entailed was not simply gaining access to the enclosure, entering the cyber-warehouse, as it were, and achieving for the first time an overview of the great number of people and material, busily working and being produced, respectively. In addition, Assange/Wikileaks mingled undetected with the crowds of workers, and became privy to the intimate details being exchanged from ‘partition’ to ‘partition,’ and moreover, from ‘functional site’ to ‘functional site,’ such that they gained an intimate understanding of the tyrannical machinations afoot. And this understanding, in turn, transgressed the rules governing cyber-disciplinary ‘rank,’ insofar as previously it had only been the preserve of those who had habitually proved their capacity for docility, and their willingness to be complicit with the corporate-government regime. Against such secrecy and the exercise of power indissociable from it, what Assange/Wikileaks created was an ‘anti-enclosure’ – as mentioned above, a space that was at once open and closed; open to confidential sources and media companies, but closed to anyone who wished to remove the material, negate its power, or undertake reprisals against the sources. And within this ‘anti-enclosure’ there were neither functional sites nor partitions to limit and narrow perspectives, and prevent fuller understanding of current affairs from developing. Indeed, there was not even rank, only a division between those dedicated to truth, the formation of knowledge, and free discussion, and those who wished to suppress all three but who found themselves powerless to do so.

The subversion of cyber-disciplinary ‘control of activity’ also occurred, as time became a resource which Wikileaks utilised to its advantage, through the slow, persistent and measured ‘drip-feed’ of communications, which it supplied to media companies. That is, the enormous trove of information it held was slowly released, in order that the public be informed, in a measured and controlled manner, and not overwhelmed with masses of data.

Precise, planned, detailed releases of incendiary documents were used to engender a continual interest in the Wikileaks organisation, encouraging donors to sponsor its activity, and media companies to publish what it supplied (Sifry 2011: 41-57). Although Wikileaks would eventually ‘dump’ massive quantities of documents, for years it countered the docility engendered through the ‘control of activity’ by strategic means.

That is, as discussed in Chapter One, while the disciplinary technology of the timetable intensified division of the day into minutes and seconds, and the temporal elaboration of acts broke down activities into their most basic component parts to ensure their perfect, interminable repetition, both the correlation of the body and the gesture, and the body-object articulation, obliged people to adopt a related exclusively narrow mental focus; not least because all activities were carried out under the auspices of the principle of ‘exhaustive use.’ Similarly, as discussed in Chapter Two, cyber-disciplinary variants of all these technologies exist, and function to analogous effect, namely the engendering of further docility in those who operate the devices. For example, while virtual timetables add extra pressure, augmenting the pressures of actual daily timetables, in order to engage effectively and efficiently with the related virtual worlds requires cyber-variants of the temporal elaboration of acts, correlation of the body and the gesture, and the body-object articulation. And while progressive skilfulness in the accomplishment of all of these practices overtly affords the owner of the device a growing sense of mastery, s/he is covertly subordinated to a virtual realm the more they carry them out. Understandably, within this context, exhaustive use of time spans not only the working day but every waking moment, such that the individual – despite access to many time-saving devices – has less time now than ever before to think and engage critically with socio-political issues. As such, their critical faculties, forced beyond docility into a virtual coma by the clamour of a digital communication matrix, required slow but steady reviving, and this was the genius of Assange’s/Wikileaks’ ‘drip-feed’ strategy – a strategy which was construed as transgressive *precisely* because, in many cases, it proved effective in its capacity to percolate down through the matrix, and awaken in people critical understanding and growing discontent.

Finally, Assange/Wikileaks succeeded in subverting the cyber-disciplinary technologies of hierarchical observation, the examination, normalizing judgment, and panopticism. To begin with, Assange/Wikileaks effectively placed themselves higher than the corporate-government regime, and subjected the latter to observation, through accessing the secret communications of governments and organisations, while concomitantly avoiding observation themselves. This inversion led to a situation in which the Wikileaks operatives

were effectively functioning both exterior to cyber disciplinary structures, as well as within them, by virtue of the data they collected from the most central domains of power. Wikileaks could see, without being seen, reading secret texts, viewing classified video footage of soldiers waging war and breaking laws.

And just as, in terms of the examination, disciplinary/cyber-disciplinary power makes each individual a case, through the compilation of a dossier on the basis of various evaluative criteria, so too Wikileaks operatives – in an inversion of such power – through subterfuge and small acts of cunning, compiled a dossier in which they assembled a body of evidence so enormous that it would, according to the US government, “place at risk ongoing cooperation between countries – partners, allies and common stakeholders.” Although the undermining of the ability to collectively “confront common challenges, from terrorism to pandemic diseases, to nuclear proliferation, that threaten global stability,” was advanced as the threat posed by Wikileaks (Fowler 2011: 192), it remains difficult to understand why the response to such challenges demands the tyranny which was exposed *through* Wikileaks – not least because, in many cases, corporate-government tyranny precipitated the growth of such challenges in the first place.

In this regard, a new form of normalising judgement was implemented by Wikileaks, as the world was shown where, when and how the US military and government, among others, broke their own rules and laws in pursuit of profit and power. This level of exposure was a traumatic experience for those in positions of authority, leaving them vulnerable to the same judgement and analysis that the rest of society experiences on a daily basis. That is, on the one hand, because of the proliferation and development of the mobile communications media, according to Sifry “we literally carry in our pockets and on our laps the ability to connect and to collaborate directly with each another, without requiring permission from the people formerly known as authorities” (Sifry 2011: 42). On the other hand, this ability – in conjunction with enterprises such as Wikileaks – also allows us to subject those people in authority to scrutiny, to evaluate the ethics and efficacy of their actions, and to pass judgement on their deficits, in terms of the *same* moral benchmarks against which our own failings are reviewed.

And this process was indissociable from a dissolution of the anonymity and mystification that had previously protected those who, figuratively speaking, inhabited the central tower of the great virtual panopticon, from which they gazed out – or not – at the global population.

This was because, all of the disruptive actions of Wikileaks were entirely dependent on its ability to gaze into the darkest recesses, to shed light where none was invited, and to observe, with unnervingly steadfast electronic eyes, the previously covert actions of governments, banks, armies and corporations. Corruption, non-disclosure and selective disclosure of information, lies and treachery, all until that time hidden within the virtual walls of the central tower, were made visible to the *inverted* panoptic gaze of Wikileaks, which itself was now concealed within a new virtual tower whose centre was everywhere. How disturbing it must have been for secretive organisations to have their most confidential opinions, words and actions laid bare for all to see at any time. This is because, as Castells explains, framing a message is vital to the communication process (Castells, 2009: 192),¹⁴ but an organisation that is being observed and exposed by an unseen entity is unable to effectively frame its own messages, leaving it vulnerable to the framing of others; in this case, through the lens of Wikileaks and its stated desire to achieve and maintain transparency at any cost.

3.3 Reprisal through (cyber-)bio-power

Assange, in a recent interview, cautioned that “slowly we will end up in a global totalitarian surveillance society. By totalitarian I mean a total surveillance, and that perhaps there’ll just be the last free living people – and these last free living people are those who understand how to use this cryptography to defend against this complete, total surveillance, and some people who are completely off-grid, neo-Luddites that have gone into the caves, or traditional tribes-people. And these traditional people have none of the efficiencies of a modern economy so their ability to act is very small. Are we headed for that sort of scenario?” (Appelbaum, Müller-Maguhn, Zimmerman 2012: 53).

Yet, despite the salutary nature of his concerns, he was not only publicly condemned by governments and corporations around the world. In addition to threats and financial attempts to silence Assange, he was, at the height of the secret cables controversy, accused both of a form of sexual abuse, as well as of rape (Horton, 2010). That is, while he may have successfully transgressed the cyber-disciplinary parameters, in the manner described above,

¹⁴ Castells defines frames as “neural networks of association that can be accessed from the language through metaphorical connections. Framing means activating specific neural networks.” That is to say, framing, distinct from the literary form, but not entirely different, is a means towards creating meaning (Castells, 2009: 142-143).

and while he may have effectively continued to do so from a position immune to disciplinary reprisals, because of the dove-tailing of disciplinary and bio-power since the 18th/19th century, and because of the cyber variants of such collusion, Assange was not impervious to attack. As will be discussed in what follows, this involved Assange being misinterpreted, ‘diagnosed’ as a sexual deviant, and effectively ‘cauterized,’ to prevent the spreading of the infection he was said to represent – all in the interest of allowing the healing of society in general, and individuals in particular, defined in terms of their resumption of cyber-disciplinary induced docility.

To begin with, because governmental, military and legal fraternities were excluded from providing authority to the distribution of the documents, as Wikileaks obtained the information by unsanctioned means, they responded by vilifying Assange in the strongest terms. Ironically, the documents released by Wikileaks were published, not by Assange or his organisation, but by media companies such as the *New York Times*, *Der Spiegel*, and the *Guardian* (Sifry 2011: 171). But these companies faced no such vitriolic public attacks, as they were simply publishing what had already been made public, fulfilling their agreed upon role within society; namely that of the ‘authorised media.’ Nevertheless, while Hilary Clinton described the releases as “an attack against the international community,” Sarah Palin maintained that Assange ought to be hunted down as he was an “anti-American operative with blood on his hands” (Erlanger 2010: 13). In short, in the US, prominent public figures were fundamentally opposed to the notion that Assange’s greatest contribution to global enlightenment is that the idea of a viable stateless media... beholden to no country’s laws... has been let loose” (Sifry 2011: 173). However, despite this outcry, little could be done to contain Wikileaks, or to prosecute Assange, and it was at this point that the strategy against him shifted from what he was doing publicly, to what he had allegedly done previously in private.

Assange argued that this new focus on his sexuality was part of a tactic designed to discredit him, citing claims in a US Security Agency document which suggested that legal action against Assange and others within Wikileaks could assist in undermining its existence and ability to operate. The document stated explicitly that “criminal prosecution, legal action against current or former insiders... could potentially damage or destroy this center of gravity” (Wikileaks, 2008). It is significant that the charges which Assange faces fall within the ambit of bio-power – “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations” (Foucault 1978: 140). Had the accusations of sexual assault/rape been made and dealt with under Swedish law, in a manner

consistent with the normal handling of such charges, the question of the influence of bio-power may have appeared less relevant. However, a Swedish lawyer's observation that "everything is peculiar" and that "the case is not proceeding normally," challenges the veracity and motivation of the accusations. Moreover, a range of discrepancies and counter-accusations have been reported in the official extradition hearing regarding the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) issued against Assange (itself a seemingly disproportionate response to the accusations), which raises the specter of the subjugation of society – particularly the recalcitrant individuals therein who challenge the status quo – through sexual discourse (Riddle 2011: 2-5).

The evidence against him began to mount as a former colleague of Assange described him as a "wild child" who was "uninhibited" and different to Scandinavians, known to be tolerant of sexual freedom and choice through legal protections, and someone who "want[ed] to organise their freedom" (Fowler 2011: 177). The importance of this shift cannot be overstated, because in defining him in these terms, the *clinical codification of the inducement to speak* was brought into operation, and in terms of this, Assange's actions through Wikileaks were understood as his unwitting confession, such that his comments on why he had done so became invalid. This was because, having been designated pathological, on the evidence of his private actions, the new 'patient' could not provide further insights by commenting on his public actions, since the same pathology was understood to be reflected in *all* of his actions, and indeed to speak through his commentary on them. Instead, the confessions of those who had worked with him, and with whom he had been sexually involved, were eagerly sought out, and readily detailed with scientific accuracy.

Furthermore, in introducing sex into the power play between 'truth' and Assange vs. the government of the United States, the *postulate of a general and diffuse causality* was applied to the already complex legal and ethical problem of Wikileaks and the documents it distributed. A variety of comments and criticisms were raised, many of which centred on the personality, mental state and sexual behaviour of Assange, and at least one of his former 'lovers,' who was later to become one of the women who accused him of rape, was called upon to elaborate on related intimate details (Fowler, 2011: 168-190). The widely reported paranoia (justified or otherwise) which Assange displayed, fearing that the CIA, FBI, US government and others were hunting him, along with his frequent sexual liaisons, combined to paint a picture of a disturbed and unstable man, who was an untrustworthy source, and a pathology in the body of Western society. In short, his ostensible sexual aberrations were understood as ultimately underpinning and informing his Wikileaks enterprise, such that the

latter were less about truth and transparency, and more the symptom of a powerful, underlying sexual deviance.

And this approach to Wikileaks was thoroughly informed by the *principle of latency intrinsic to sexuality*. That is to say, Assange's sexuality was advanced as the *secret* but powerful driving force, or energy, which had motivated, shaped and directed him; a dangerous and disturbing condition of his existence, which he himself was not aware of, but which nevertheless had led to the outcome of Wikileaks. The allegations of rape, described in detail within the public media, portray Assange as a violent pervert, a threat to the safety and health of women, and society. Ironically, through this process, the descriptions of Assange's sexual encounters became more important, in many ways, than the evidence of secret, lethal, criminal and violent acts perpetrated by governments and corporations on entire countries and their vulnerable populations. However, critical protestations which point to the above irony – along with Assange's own objections to the tactics being employed against him – despite their cogency could not be taken cognizance of, because they fell outside of the correct *method of interpretation*. As before, “the truth did not reside solely in the subject who, by confessing, would reveal it wholly formed.” Rather, it “was constituted in two stages: present but incomplete, blind to itself, in the one who spoke, it could only reach completion in the one who assimilated and recorded it” and who served “a hermeneutic function” (Foucault 1977: 66-67).

It was therefore left to the popular media to decipher the content, offering their professional services in an effort to interpret the evidence against the sexual deviant. Indeed, even the process of such decipherment was used to undermine Wikileaks. By virtue of the fact that Assange did not adequately explain and interpret the information he acquired, choosing instead to release it in its *raw* form, Wikileaks did not constitute “a discourse of truth on the basis of its decipherment” (Foucault 1977: 66-67). The resulting impression, that Assange may have lied, or at least misinformed the public, was exactly what the US government suggested, denying the veracity of arbitrary individualistic interpretations of the documents not sanctioned and confirmed by government officials – whilst not blatantly stating that the documents were untrue. Surprisingly, the latter went largely uncontested, a phenomenon for which Castells provides a possible reason. He contends that “the owners of corporate communication networks provide the platform for the construction of meaning for other social actors,” by exercising power through “cultural production [and] controlling access to communication networks” (Castells 2009: 422). This analysis presents one, limited, facet of the dynamic nature of power within contemporary digital communication, and is

therefore limited in its scope, but through long habituation society has become accustomed to being ‘spoon fed’ information only once it has been filtered by the ‘experts,’ whom we have invested with the authority to analyse the ‘truth’ for us and present it to us. Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary/bio-power discourses, and indeed power/knowledge, presents a somewhat more complex, but similarly disturbing likelihood, namely that information, without context, made available outside of the framework of the dominant discursive regime/s, is almost irrelevant. And through such means, the *medicalization of the effects of confession* was brought into play, and the healing of society in general, and of all those people who had engaged with Wikileaks, commenced; a healing which – as already indicated – was defined in terms of their resumption of cyber-disciplinary/bio-power induced docility.

Castells states that “if you think differently, communication networks will operate differently, on the condition that not only you, but I and a multitude choose to build the networks of our lives” (Castells 2009: 432). The complicating factor in this argument is that the ‘multitude of others’ does not yet think differently, but is situated within a discursive regime that conditions it to obey the pre-existing ‘truths’ of the status quo. Assange appears to have thought differently, and moreover believed that by making information available to the public, one can facilitate the sea change which is required to alter the current course of our civilization. However, the ‘multitude of others’ has apparently not followed suit, negating in large part the enterprise of Wikileaks, and evincing the discursive momentum of disciplinary/bio-power and its cyber variants, along with their ability to inform our subjectivity around increasing levels of docility and socio-political myopia.

Conclusion

In the “Discourse on Language,” Foucault describes not only the ways in which knowledge and power are integral to the formation of language and subjectivity, but also the role of fear in this process. That is, while the unknown and novel tend to be treated with suspicion, both the ‘already said’ and those construed as possessing the requisite authority to ‘speak it,’ tend to be clung to for reassurance. Discourse is thereby demonstrated to be orientated around dynamics that are inimical to radical and rapid transformation, dynamics which limit an individual’s capacity to subvert the *episteme* in which they exist; not least because such dynamics are constitutive of their subjectivity, shaping and informing their culture, language and understanding of possibility.

As discussed in the preceding chapters, the formation of contemporary subjectivity occurs increasingly through cyber variants of the disciplinary/bio-power technologies of the 18th/19th centuries, via the use of the digital mobile technologies of Apple Inc. and Google Inc. In many respects, this issue can be articulated in terms of the above framework of the “Discourse on Language,” and it is useful to do so because of the focus this brings to the dynamics of power/knowledge operative in the formation of such contemporary cyber-disciplinary/bio-power subjectivity.

The first category of factors impacting on the formation of discourse, namely *external delimitation*, is composed of rules of exclusion. Such ‘prohibition of speech’ covers, in effect, what can be discussed, by whom, at what point in time, where, and in what context; in other words, “the privileged right to speak of a particular subject” (Foucault 1967: 195-196). In terms of the argument of this treatise, Google Inc. and Apple Inc. have declared certain aspects of contemporary discourse to be off limits within their app stores, with pornography and satire considered inappropriate and therefore excluded entirely. A disturbing example of this was the banning of an app developed by an editorial cartoonist, after the work was deemed to be offensive in that it ridiculed and parodied George W. Bush. The app was reinstated only after the cartoonist was awarded a Pulitzer prize for the work, with Apple Inc. apologising for originally banning it (Gauntlett 2011: 270). Yet, notwithstanding this retraction by Apple Inc., their initial rejection of the controversial app is arguably symptomatic of a tendency akin to the fearful conservatism, identified by Foucault, as residing at the heart of *external delimitation*. To be sure, the reasons for their actions in this regard are not underpinned by any irrational clinging to traditionalism, but rather by a very

rational economic *modus operandi*. Apple Inc. and Google Inc. require the largest, broadest audience possible, in order to sell increasing numbers of products and services, with the result that ‘safe,’ non-controversial topics are considered acceptable. However, the discursive effects of this, and its consequences for subjectivity, are more or less equivalent to those of censorship undertaken in support of deep-seated conservatism. This is because such measures similarly lead to a decrease in critical, challenging and controversial communication. As already mentioned, the end result of this is a self-perpetuating cycle which continues to spiral closer to a point of ideological stasis, as it were; a point at which the language of a society becomes rigidly fixed within the parameters of its discursive regime, such that it is unable to accept ‘foreign’ material, no matter how critically constructive or vital for survival and development it may be.

The *internal systems* of control described by Foucault in the “Discourse on Language” include commentary, the author as unifying principle, and the existence of disciplines. Accordingly, only commentary within the realm of ‘accepted truth’ is permitted, and only when the commentary does not advance an entirely new, contradictory perspective to the discipline it is related to, or a new perspective which challenges the idea of an author as either working consistently within a given conceptual framework, or developing along a ‘logical’ conceptual trajectory. Dissent in the above regard is construed as problematizing the cogency of the framework through and in terms of which a society understands itself, and for this reason it is silenced – despite its potential innovativeness and insight. In many respects, all three dynamics can be understood as operative in the case against Assange.

When Wikileaks exposed illicit and unethical activities by corporations and Western governments in under-developed or developing countries – in contrast to the public image of the incriminated parties – efforts commenced to silence such ‘dissent.’ In this regard, on the one hand, the commentary of Wikileaks was characterised as illegitimate, insofar as the revelations it made available were in ‘raw form,’ that is, not mediated by the relevant academic disciplines of political-economy and international relations. As such, while the facts contained in the leaked documents were not disputed, idiosyncratic interpretations of the material by the public were called into question, because those who sought to fulfil this hermeneutic function, it was suggested, lacked the requisite credentials and hence authority to pass comment on matters which, accordingly, remained beyond their comprehensive capacity. On the other hand, the author as unifying principle was employed to devastating effect against Assange, insofar as *all* of his words and deeds were imbued with a pathological consistency, which derived from his alleged sexual aberrations. And through this mechanism,

his enterprise became characterised not as a noble attempt to render visible the trans-national corruption and malpractice he had uncovered, but rather a sad symptom of a neurosis that was linked to criminal sexual deviance.

And all of this was made possible, in turn, by the conditions under which discourse is employed, namely ritual, doctrine and education; all of which are thoroughly incorporated into the cyber disciplinary/bio-power structures facilitated by companies such as Apple Inc. and Google Inc. Both corporations cited legal concerns when banning the Wikileaks app, and both have shown resistance to politically motivated apps which they see as threatening the stability of governments in the West. Yet, this should arguably not be construed simply as an exercise in political correctness, because in many ways it forms part of a broader devotion, on the part of the two corporations, to the doctrine of free-market capitalism; a doctrine which both corporations embody. Whilst Foucault described doctrine primarily in terms of religious belief systems and traditions, the very existence of the commonly used term 'brand evangelism' bears witness to the cult-like following which has developed around the brands of Apple Inc., and Google Inc.'s Android (Schneiders 2011: 20). Brands are formed and maintained in a careful, systematic and calculated manner, with the objective of attracting life-long, loyal devotees, willing to spend their money on new products as often as possible. Apple, in particular, is increasingly invested in the education sector through the widespread adoption of iPads, educational software, and Apple Macs, as a preferred tool of tuition in universities, schools and other educational organisations. Further to this, Apple offers iTunes U, a free collection of recorded lectures from prominent universities, as well as educational podcasts and educational apps. Yet, it is difficult to ignore the fact that, consequently, what one encounters now more readily than before, are discourses that have been sanctioned by the very *internal systems* described by Foucault in the "Discourse of Language."

In contrast to such 'sanitized' views, Assange has warned against the use of smartphones, particularly in light of the connection to social media apps, describing Facebook as "the most appalling spy machine ever invented," and rightly pointing out that mobile phones are superb tools for tracking the movements and locations of individuals (Beckett 2011: 179). Every time an individual performs a search using Google, they are faced with answers facilitated by Google, providing the company with data, adding to the dossier they hold on each of us, the information of which is sooner or later employed in targeted advertising and narrower sets of search results. Google Inc., and to a lesser extent Apple Inc., continue to compile spectacularly comprehensive dossiers, with ongoing refinement of the criteria by which they measure us, categorising us according to the potential interests we may

present, with a view to selling *to us*, and selling *us* to advertisers. Apple Inc. and Google Inc., in conjunction with media partners and state authorities, curate, select, frame and present information for mass consumption. Both companies have grown to be a crucial part of knowledge and information sharing, and hence have a significantly negative impact on our ability to operate outside of the *episteme* we inhabit. Indeed, Google searches provide rapid, easy, generalised answers, but in so doing, reflection, critical thinking and problem solving tend to be discouraged. Apple iOS and Android distract us, providing games and other entertainment to fill the otherwise quiet moments of our lives, preventing both introspection and external circumspection. And through alienating us from ourselves, and isolating us from one another, ironically, they join us together into a vast, increasingly uncritical, living organism, dedicated to the preservation of cyber disciplinary/bio-power in the 21st century.

Considered in this light, it would perhaps be fair to say that we are embedded in the most self-perpetuating discursive organism in history, one which is bigger and stronger than anything seen before, and which is a juggernaut spreading across the entire world, subsuming all it encounters. However, as evinced in the reprisals against Assange, in order to begin liberating ourselves from this system, we are obliged not simply to act naively under the auspices of democracy, hoping that the nobility of our gestures will appeal to the ethics of a global community, who will thereby be inspired to transform the world. Although at some point, such noble gestures will be required, the first point of resistance is to begin to understand the workings of the disciplinary/bio-power organism itself, in the *contemporary* era. That is, not simply to cling to Foucault's theorization of the disciplinary/bio-power that emerged in the 18th/19th century, but to explore how it has been appropriated within the 21st century context of virtual reality, how this has given rise to cyber-disciplinary/bio-power, and how the related dynamics of power/knowledge inform our subjectivity accordingly. To enhance understanding of this, and to begin communicating it, is the first step toward unpacking the habitual discursive echoes and reflections of cyber-disciplinary/bio-power which stand to arise in response to any challenging of the system. And it is to this end that this treatise has hopefully made a small contribution.

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